Transcriber’s Note:

Footnotes have been collected at the end of each chapter, and are linked for ease of reference.

Minor errors, attributable to the printer, have been corrected. Corrections appear with a underline highlight. The original text can be viewed by placing the cursor atop the correction . Please see the transcriber’s note at the end of this text for details regarding the handling of any textual issues encountered during its preparation.

Minor errors, attributable to the printer, have been corrected. The corrected text appears as a hyperlink to an entry in the endnote table of corrections.

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Vol. I., p. 88, line 16, for southward, close to the castle, read northward, close to the castle.

Vol. II., p. 41, line 3, for 22nd November, read 11th December.

”      p. 199, line 4, for Opposed, read Approved.

Gale on the Egyptian and Syrian Coasts—The Author’s return to Marmorice Bay—Letters from the Admiral, the General and the Ambassador regarding the Convention—The Author’s Replies—Letter of the Admiral to Mehemet Ali—Commotion occasioned by the Convention—Admiral’s Letter to the Admiralty—Instruction of the 14th November—Captain Fanshawe dispatched to Alexandria—Instruction to the Admiral.

Among the reasons that induced me to enter into negotiation with the Pacha of Egypt, it will be recollected that I have mentioned the uncertain state of the weather, which rendered it possible that the British squadron might at any minute be blown off the coast; and I found that I had concluded my arrangements only just in time. For I had hardly got the Prometheus away, on the 28th of November, 1840, when it began to blow, which freshened to a gale in the night; the morning brought more moderate weather, but towards dusk it came on with great violence, and lasted thirty-six hours. The Powerful 2 was struck by a heavy sea, which started her fore-channels and endangered the fore-mast; the new rigging of the Rodney and Cambridge had given out so much, that their masts became insecure, and seeing no further necessity for keeping the squadron at sea, I proceeded to Marmorice Bay, where I anchored on the 8th of December, and was much gratified to be received by the squadron with three cheers, and the rigging manned, with the same enthusiasm I had before experienced on joining the squadron off Alexandria.

Captain Henderson, of the Gorgon, first communicated to me that my Convention had been rejected by the Admiral, which I have reason to believe he approved of in the first instance, but was overruled by the authorities in Syria. Next morning the Princess Charlotte and Bellerophon arrived from Beyrout. They had experienced the same gale we did off Alexandria, and rode it out in St. George’s Bay; the Bellerophon, driven from the anchorage at Beyrout, was obliged to cut her cable and make sail, and after scraping the land as far down the coast as Latakia, was saved by a miraculous shift of wind; great credit is due to Captain Austin, and the officers and crew of the 3 Bellerophon, for saving the ship. The Pique was obliged to cut away her masts to prevent her going on shore at Caiffa; and the Zebra parted and was thrown on the beach, with the loss of two men only. The Austrian squadron quitted the coast of Syria with the English, and the French vessels of war remained.

On the Admiral’s arrival at Marmorice, letters from himself, Sir Charles Smith, and Lord Ponsonby, were put into my hand. I insert them here, together with the replies.

I also insert the Admiral’s letter to Mehemet Ali, acquainting him that he had disapproved the Convention, couched in no very measured terms. An admiral may disapprove of the acts of a junior officer, even with severity if he pleases, but I believe it is not usual in addressing a foreign prince, to convey to him the opinion he has formed of his second in command.

The Ambassador wrote also to the Admiral and to the different authorities in Syria and Egypt, calling upon them to repudiate my Convention, and in fact no means were neglected by him to prevent the settlement of the Eastern Question, and do as much mischief to Mehemet Ali as possible.

The reader will allow this was tremendous odds against me: the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces, the General commanding in Syria, Lord Ponsonby, and the four Ambassadors, the Sultan and all the Divan, against an Old Commodore. The whole corps diplomatique, (for on this point even the French minister agreed,) were up in arms—they thought their trade was gone—nevertheless I was not dismayed. I felt satisfied at Alexandria I was right, and I felt still more satisfied at Marmorice, when I found our squadron, with the exception of the steamers, had abandoned the coast, and left Ibrahim 13 to himself. Why he did not take advantage of it is not my affair—he ought to have done it. In the fleet we had conventionalists and non-conventionalists: the Captains who were off Alexandria were satisfied I was right; those who were not, with few exceptions, were satisfied I was wrong. For my part I had only to wait patiently the first arrival from England, to announce either that I was a blockhead, or that I had taken a more correct view of the affairs of the East, than either Admirals, Generals, Ambassadors, Sultans, or Divans.

The letter of Sir Robert Stopford to the Admiralty, acquainting their Lordships that he had rejected my Convention, clearly shows that he was not aware of Ibrahim’s movements. The Admiral writes under date of the 1st of December, from Beyrout.

Now, it is well known that Ibrahim did not finally leave Damascus till the 29th of December; so that it appears by the Admiral’s letter, that nothing was known at Beyrout of Ibrahim’s movements; and, after the squadron left the coast, there was nothing to hinder him falling upon Beyrout; I know that there were strong fears there that he would do so, and General Michell, as will hereafter appear, requested the Admiral would send some ships of war back.

Before the Admiral arrived at Marmorice, he fell in with the Megæra, bringing the Instruction of the 14th of November, which was given to satisfy Austrian etiquette, Prince Metternich not entirely approving of the instruction of the 15th of October, his reasons for which he afterwards explained.

Upon the receipt of this document, and a special instruction of the same date, the Admiral immediately dispatched Captain Fanshawe, with the following letter, to communicate with the Pacha. His orders were, to proceed to Alexandria and demand an interview with Mehemet Ali, in the presence of Boghos Bey, and communicate the instructions of Her Majesty’s Government. He was not to refuse Mehemet Ali’s answer even if he expressed a desire to obtain the hereditary government of Egypt.

The further conduct of the Admiral was to be guided by the following instruction, of November 14, from Lord Palmerston to the Admiralty.

The reader must bear in mind that, at the date of these instructions, the capture of Acre was not known at the Foreign Office, nor was my Convention signed.

Captain Fanshawe’s proceedings at Alexandria—Letter from Mehemet Ali to the Admiral—Official Report of Captain Fanshawe—Letter of Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier—English Ships again ordered to the Coast of Syria—Part of the Convention carried into effect by the Admiral.

The mode in which this new negotiation of points which he naturally considered as already settled, was received by the Pacha, will best appear from his own letter, and Captain Fanshawe’s report.

On the 13th of December Captain Fanshawe returned from Alexandria, and after delivering the Pacha’s reply to the Admiral, proceeded to Constantinople with his answer to the Vizier, which, like a clever diplomatist, he had taken care to base on the Convention, and it does appear to me quite astonishing that so determined a man as the Pacha certainly is, and as he had shown himself, should have listened at all to the Instruction of the 14th of November, which had the material difference from that of the 15th of October, of not containing the hereditary title; the very fact of our appearing to have changed our mind in so short a period, ought to have awakened his suspicion, because he could not know that that change originated with Austria, who however, as will presently be seen, got alarmed at the rejection of the Convention, and distinctly stated that Mehemet Ali should be confirmed, and that she would have nothing to do with any attack that might be meditated on Alexandria.

The Admiral in the mean time, in consequence of an application from General Michell, who now commanded the English force in Syria, (Sir Charles Smith having returned to England,) sent Captain 32 Stewart, in the Benbow, and several small ships, to Beyrout, with instructions to suspend hostilities until the result of Mehemet Ali’s submission was known; and also authorized the Pacha to send steamers to Caiffa to bring away the sick and wounded; thus putting into execution a part of the rejected Convention.

Captain Fanshawe’s Arrival at Constantinople—Interview with the Grand Vizier—Conference of Ambassadors and Rechid Pacha—Conduct of Lord Ponsonby; his Letter to Lord Palmerston—The Porte accepts the submission of Mehemet Ali—Letter of Rechid Pacha to the Ambassador and of the Vizier to Mehemet Ali—Captain Fanshawe returns to Marmorice.

It has already been shown, that notwithstanding the rejection of the Convention communicated to Mehemet Ali by Captain Fanshawe, he, on the 11th of December, in a letter to the Grand Vizier, sent his unconditional submission; that letter reached Constantinople on the 16th of the same month. Captain Fanshawe, on his arrival, gave in a report of his proceedings to the Ambassador, couched in much the same terms as that to the Admiral already given, and on the 18th he had an audience of the Grand Vizier. ^[1] The Captain was accompanied by Mr. Pisani, and by Captain Codrington and Captain Williams, and he informed the Vizier that he had been ordered by the Admiral to convey to Alexandria a summons to Mehemet Ali to make 34 his submission; this submission he now conveyed to him in an open letter, which he begged to deliver. The Grand Vizier, after having read Mehemet Ali’s letter, said, “The Porte is already aware of these conditions, as is known; but I can tell you nothing upon this great question which the Sublime Porte is treating with the Allied Courts, and which consequently has become a question of foreign policy, belonging entirely to the department of Foreign Affairs, which is acquainted with all the circumstances relating to it better than I am. The Porte will take this question into consideration with the representatives of the Allied Courts, and his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs will make known the intentions of the Porte to the Allies; I beg you, M. le Capitaine, in the mean time, not to consider my acceptance of this letter from you as an acceptance of its contents.” Captain Fanshawe replied that he also was in nowise authorized to enter into the details of this affair, and that he would learn the result from Lord Ponsonby. The Captain said that Mehemet Ali had given him his word that he would deliver over the Turkish fleet to whatever officer the Porte shall direct to conduct it hither. The Vizier replied, “The fleet is ours; Alexandria is 35 our country; we are perfectly sure of having the fleet sooner or later.” The Captain took the opportunity of speaking of peace between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali. The Grand Vizier replied, “Peace is made between two governments, and not between a sovereign and one of his rebel subjects.”

The letters given clearly show that Mehemet Ali could do no more. He promised to deliver up the fleet, Candia, Syria, and the Holy Cities. The Grand Vizier replied, as has been shown: “The fleet is ours; Alexandria is ours;” and when Captain Fanshawe talks to him about peace, he said, “Peace is made between two Governments; and not between a sovereign and one of his rebel subjects.” This indeed was talking big; the Grand Vizier forgot that Mehemet Ali had twice nearly knocked at the gates of Constantinople, and had he not been interfered with, would have dethroned his Master.

What does the Ambassador do? Though he was quite aware that every hour the Eastern Question remained unsettled, a European war was imminent—though he knew that France had intimated that we were not to touch Egypt—though he knew the British fleet had left the coast of Syria 36 and Egypt in consequence of bad weather—yet the Ambassador, acting on his own responsibility, to gratify his dislike of Mehemet Ali, did all he could to keep the question open, though he must have known the Allies were anxious to bring it to a close; and if he had had the power, I know, would have risked the whole British fleet to ensure the Pacha’s destruction. Annexed is his letter to Lord Palmerston, furnishing an account of the Conference which the arrival of Mehemet Ali’s letter gave rise to.

The reader will observe, without my pointing it out, from his own letter, and still more from the Protocol, with what diplomatic art the British Ambassador, in opposition to the opinion of the other Ministers, endeavours to gain time. Had he been instructed so to do, he would have shown himself a good diplomatist; but the contrary was the case. Rechid Pasha writes from Constantinople, under date of the 26th of November, to Chekib Effendi at Paris, “That Lord Palmerston was favourable 39 to the reinstatement of Mehemet Ali, and that instructions had been sent to the Ambassador at Constantinople on the subject.” Besides that, he knew of the instructions that Captain Fanshawe had communicated to Mehemet Ali, and which he accepted.

And no Minister of Foreign Affairs could have shown his want of confidence in his Ambassador more distinctly than Lord Palmerston did, by sending his instruction of the 14th of November direct to Sir Robert Stopford, thus completely throwing the Ambassador overboard. And well he did; for he decidedly would have found some means of putting it aside, as he did my Convention. In fact, his Lordship was the cleverest of Ambassadors for evading orders, and, indeed, managed to transfer Downing-street to Constantinople.

The Sultan, however, appeared to be satisfied with Mehemet Ali’s submission; and the Minister of Foreign Affairs wrote to Lord Ponsonby, thus:

The Vizier, too, at the same time, wrote as follows to Mehemet Ali:

On the 30th of December Captain Fanshawe wrote as follows to the Admiral from on board the Stromboli, off Tenedos, and soon after joined him at Marmorice.

The despatch referred to inclosed a copy of the official note from the Porte ^[3] , announcing the appointment of the Commissioners, and requesting the assistance of the British ships to bring home the Ottoman fleet from Alexandria.

Disinclination of the Porte to confer the Hereditary Pachalic on Mehemet Ali—Departure of the Turkish Commissioners—Their orders—Opposition of the Austrian, Prussian, and Russian Ministers to the views of Lord Ponsonby—Lord Palmerston’s opinion of his conduct—Rewards conferred on the Officers of the Squadron at Acre—News from England—Approval of the Convention—Instruction of the 15th of December—Lord Palmerston’s Letter to Lord Ponsonby—Prince Metternich and Count Nesselrode, in approval of the Convention.

Though the Porte accepted the submission of Mehemet Ali, it was in no hurry to act, and when it did get in motion, it was far from doing what, I presume, three out of the four Representatives wished and expected.

The Commissioners did not leave Constantinople till the 6th of January, and they had no power to confer the hereditary pachalic on Mehemet Ali; and instead of carrying orders to General Jochmus to suspend hostilities, they brought orders to demand the arms and guns of Ibrahim’s army; which demand was supported by Mr. Wood, the emissary of the Ambassador, and also by General Jochmus ^[4] .

The Austrian Internuncio saw through this 45 intrigue; and on the 7th of January, in an interview with Rechid Pacha, announced to him that the four Powers had decided on applying for the hereditary succession for Mehemet Ali. This produced a correspondence—far too long for me to give here, but which may be seen in the Government volume of Levant Papers .

From this correspondence it appears that the Austrian, Russian, and Prussian Ministers decided to act without Lord Ponsonby, in consequence of directions from the Ministers in London, based upon the Convention they had previously rejected. The English Ambassador does not appear to have received his instructions till the 10th of January, though they were dated the 17th of December. I should like to see the reply Lord Palmerston made to the Ambassador on learning that he had rejected the Convention; why it is suppressed, is easily accounted for. It ought to be explained how, on the 7th of January, the Internuncio received his dispatches which must have passed through the hands of Prince Metternich at Vienna, whilst the English Ambassador only received his on the 10th. The delay might have caused great embarrassment, and indeed at such a critical moment it was not desirable that a 46 disagreement even for three days should have existed between Lord Ponsonby and the other Ministers.

The Governments of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, as well as their Ambassadors at Constantinople, saw how things were going on in the East. They wrote peremptorily to those personages to settle the question; and Prince Metternich requested Lord Beauvale to state to Lord Palmerston that, in case the Porte should hesitate to accede to the recommendation of the Allied Powers to confer the hereditary government on Mehemet Ali, his court could not be compromised by such hesitation ^[5] .

Lord Beauvale also wrote to Lord Palmerston on the 17th of January ^[6] , that the Turkish Commissioners going to Alexandria were not empowered to grant the hereditary pachalic, and in consequence, Austria would withdraw her support from the Sultan, and would disavow any attack on Ibrahim Pacha.

Lord Palmerston, in a letter to the Ambassador, of the 26th of January ^[7] , does not exactly find 47 fault with his Excellency for not taking Mehemet Ali’s offer as a complete submission, but he tells him the advice in his Lordship’s instructions of the 15th of October ^[8] might have been given. This appears a pretty broad hint, and I suppose diplomatic etiquette did not admit of any thing stronger.

On the 17th of December despatches were received in Marmorice Bay from England. The Commander-in-Chief was appointed Governor of Greenwich Hospital; I was directed to hoist a red broad pennant, and was made a Commander of the Bath; the Captains commanding ships at Acre were made Companions; and a large promotion went through all classes of officers who were fortunately present at the bombardment. On the 27th a new Pacha arrived from Constantinople on his way to Syria, with orders to send to Adrianople Izzet Pacha, who had created so much discontent throughout the country, and to report on the state and condition of Ibrahim’s army. This Pacha was the bearer of letters of thanks to the Admiral and others employed in Syria, with the exception of myself, who have never received any 48 acknowledgment from the Turkish Government up to the present day. The Admiral strongly recommended this new Pacha to suspend hostilities, and I also advised him to control General Jochmus, who was a young man ambitious of military glory, and more likely to make war than peace.

On the 5th of January, 1841, the Megæra arrived from England. I was aware she must either bring my sentence of acquittal or condemnation, and having been already denounced by the wise men of the East, I felt it was not impossible that their opinion might have influenced the judgment of the Ministers of the West, if unfortunately their protests had arrived in London before my despatches from Alexandria. I had, however, taken precautions to prevent this, which fortunately succeeded, and they were left to their own calm judgment, which decided in my favour.

I had a party dining with me that day, when numerous letters, public and private, were put into my hand by the officer of the watch. I laid them on the table, determined not to run the risk of spoiling my dinner by bad news, and not requiring good to give me an appetite. After the inward man had been well fortified, I ventured to open a letter 49 from Lord Minto, which, to my great satisfaction, announced to me that the Government were satisfied with what I had done, with the exception of the Guarantee. I received also letters from various members of the Government, and an official one from the Admiral, inclosing an instruction from Lord Palmerston to the Admiralty, bearing date Dec. 15, 1840, some extracts from which I subjoin ^[9] :

“I have to request your Lordships to convey to Commodore Napier the approval of Her Majesty’s Government of the steps taken by him on this occasion, though without any instructions to that effect, and upon his own responsibility, to carry into execution the arrangements contemplated by the Treaty of the 15th of July, and to put an end to the contest in the Levant.

“But the instruction given by your Lordships to Sir Robert Stopford in pursuance of my letter of the 14th of November ^[10] , will have reached Sir Robert Stopford a few days after he received from Commodore Napier a report of the result of his negociation at Alexandria; and it is uncertain whether Sir Robert Stopford will have considered the instruction 50 of the 14th of November as superseding Commodore Napier’s arrangement, or whether he will have looked upon Commodore Napier’s arrangement as superseding that instruction.

“In this state of things, Her Majesty’s Government must postpone a final communication with respect to the arrangement made by Commodore Napier, till they learn, as they probably will in a few days’ time, what course Sir Robert Stopford took upon the receipt of the instruction of the 14th of November. But there is one part of the Articles signed by Commodore Napier and Boghos Bey, upon which it is necessary that an instruction should immediately be sent to Sir Robert Stopford.

“In the first Article, Boghos Bey, on the part of Mehemet Ali, takes two engagements: the one is to order the Egyptian troops to evacuate Syria; the other is to restore the Turkish fleet. The first engagement was to be fulfilled immediately, and was to be conditional only upon the promise of Commodore Napier that he would, in his capacity of commander of the British fleet before Alexandria, suspend hostilities against Alexandria, and every other part of the Egyptian territory. The other engagement was eventual, and was to be fulfilled as 51 soon as Mehemet Ali should have received an official notification that the Porte grants him the hereditary government of Egypt, and that this concession is, and shall continue to be, under the guarantee of the Four Powers. Now it is necessary that Sir Robert Stopford should lose no time in making known to Mehemet Ali that this last demand of his, that the Four Powers should guarantee to him the grant of the hereditary government of Egypt, if that grant should be made to him by the Sultan, cannot be complied with.

“That which the Four Powers will do, is to recommend to the Porte to make the concessions specified in the communication which Sir Robert Stopford has been instructed to convey to Mehemet Ali.”

A despatch of the same tendency was addressed (Dec. 17) by Viscount Palmerston to the Ambassador ^[11] , in which he remarks,—

“A doubt may have been felt by your Excellency and your colleagues what steps you should take in pursuance of the instructions contained in my despatch of the 15th of October, and in the corresponding instructions sent from Vienna, Petersburgh, 52 and Berlin; because those instructions, modified by the subsequent letter to the Admiralty of November 14, contemplated the unconditional submission of Mehemet Ali to the Sultan, as a preliminary to the advice to be given to the Porte to reinstate Mehemet Ali in the Government of Egypt; and, on the contrary, Mehemet Ali, in the demands which he sets forth in the first Article of the Agreement, signed on the 27th of November, engages to restore the fleet only on two conditions,—the one being, that the Sultan should grant him hereditary tenure in the Government of Egypt,—and the other being, that such grant on the part of the Sultan should be placed under the guarantee of the Four Powers.

“It appears to Her Majesty’s Government that the fact that Mehemet Ali attached the first of these conditions to his restoration of the fleet, need not prevent the Porte from making to him that concession. For, in fact, those Articles of Agreement were substantially a complete surrender on the part of Mehemet Ali; and he was led to suppose, that in asking for hereditary tenure, he was only asking that which the Porte was willing to give. But the second condition, namely, the guarantee of the Four 53 Powers, is one which cannot be complied with; and your Excellency should, on this point, give to the Porte the same explanations which Sir Robert Stopford has been instructed, in pursuance of my letter to the Admiralty of the 15th instant, to give to Mehemet Ali.

“It has been reported, but upon what authority is not known, that the Porte was, towards the end of November, but before it had heard of the submission of Mehemet Ali, disinclined to revoke the decree which had deprived him of the Government of Egypt. It is not unnatural that such a feeling should have existed at that time in the mind of the Turkish Government, but Her Majesty’s Government hope that subsequent events, and the unanimous advice of the Four Powers, will have removed these objections on the part of the Porte, and will have led the Porte to accept the settlement effected by Commodore Napier’s arrangement, or by the subsequent more ample submission of Mehemet Ali.”

Lord Palmerston’s letter to Lord Ponsonby, acknowledging the receipt of the Ambassador’s letter announcing the rejection of the Convention, as I have before said, has never been published; it would be a curious document, and I dare say 54 will come to light some day or other; but Lord Palmerston’s despatch to Lord Ponsonby after receiving my despatches, is clear enough; he tells the Ambassador plainly, that it does not signify whether Sir Robert Stopford adopted my Convention or his subsequent instruction of the 14th of November; that the articles of agreement were substantially a complete surrender on the part of Mehemet Ali; and he was led to suppose, on asking for the hereditary tenure, he was only asking that which the Porte was willing to give; but that the guarantee could not be complied with.

Prince Metternich also agreed with Lord Palmerston, and directed the Internuncio to co-operate with Lord Ponsonby in carrying out the instructions of the 17th; and moreover tells Lord Beauvale very plainly that in case the Porte hesitates to confer the hereditary Pachalic on Mehemet Ali, his Court will not admit that the Allies could be compromised by such hesitation. Count Nesselrode also states to Lord Clanricarde, that it is unfortunate that the Sultan had not been disposed, or advised, to concede the hereditary government to Mehemet Ali.

Shortly before this (December 22,) Count Nesselrode wrote to Baron Brunnow at London, in 55 terms that show his full approval of the Convention, except the guarantee ^[12] .

“I hasten to reply to the despatch which your Excellency has done me the honour to address to me under date of the 27th November (9th Dec.), and the arrival of which was almost immediately preceded by that of the reports which you entrusted to the Marquis of Clanricarde. Before entering further into detail upon the principal subject of that despatch, my first desire, M. le Baron, is to communicate to you the lively satisfaction with which the Emperor received the happy intelligence of the submission of Mehemet Ali. The Treaty of London has at last been executed in spite of all opposition. It has been so to its fullest extent, and that without having cost the Powers who were parties to it any compromise, or any concession to be regretted. There is nothing, even including the armed demonstration with which the British squadron accompanied its summons at Alexandria, which has not stamped its result with a character still more favourable to the consideration of the alliance. Have the goodness, M. le Baron, to offer our sincere congratulations 56 to Lord Palmerston upon this result, which we consider as a common triumph of his and of our policy.

“The Eastern Question thus settled, it now remains to record and confirm the solution thereof by a final transaction in which France should concur. You have already, in anticipation of this event, been put in possession of the views and intentions which our august Master entertains upon this subject. Much more will the Emperor be disposed to accede to the plan which Lord Palmerston has proposed to you, because it simplifies still further the transaction which is to be concluded. His Majesty, then, could not but approve the motive which leads Lord Palmerston to desire that the details of the special arrangement, by virtue of which the Sultan shall grant to Mehemet Ali the investiture of Egypt, should not be embodied in the text of the agreement. Accordingly, M. le Baron, if the bases of the proposed agreement should be such as have been stated to you by the Principal Secretary of State, and if the French Government should decide upon accepting it, the Emperor would authorize you to concur in it.”

57 The Count also wrote as follows, under date of 4th January, 1841, to M. Titow, at Constantinople ^[13] :—

“I lost no time in laying before the Emperor your despatch of the 28th of November, in which you reported to us the late events which have taken place at Alexandria, as well as the determination of the Porte to refuse its sanction to the arrangement concluded by Commodore Napier.

“It certainly belongs to his Highness alone to determine finally the extent of the sacrifices which it is expedient for him to make, in order to secure the pacification of his empire, and that Sovereign ought not to doubt that the Emperor desires sincerely that that pacification may be effected upon conditions as little unfavourable as possible to the Porte.

“But, the more our august Master has at heart the defence of the interests of the Sultan, the more would His Imperial Majesty consider himself as failing in the friendship which he bears to his Highness, if he did not seriously recommend him, at this decisive moment, to consider with calmness and moderation the present posture of affairs, and to be 58 on his guard against illusions and hopes which in the end may never be realized.

“But a few months since, even at the period of the signature of the Convention of July 15, the Porte could not have hoped in so short a time to have reduced Mehemet Ali to the powerless state to which he is now reduced; and it is hardly to be doubted, that it would a little while ago have granted to him the hereditary succession, if it had been possible for it by that means to hasten a definitive arrangement, in the interests of general peace.

“The military operations of the Allies in Syria have, since, been crowned with the most decided success. Nevertheless, when the Porte in a moment of irritation, determined to pronounce the deprivation of Mehemet Ali, the Powers did not hesitate to declare their opinion upon the subject, and to make known the conditions upon which it appeared to them that the Sultan should not hesitate to reinstate the Pacha in the hereditary administration of Egypt.

“It is certainly true that the Porte has never hitherto received an official communication of the advice which the Allied Powers thought it their duty to tender to it, but the Porte is perfectly aware 59 of the nature and tendency of the instructions of the 15th of October, which have acquired European publicity; it is equally acquainted with the measures determined upon on the 14th of November in London, and with the step which Sir Robert Stopford was instructed to take, and the only object of which was to secure the execution of the preceding instructions.

“It would now be impossible for the Four Allied Powers to retract their former declarations. Already the British Cabinet has not hesitated an instant to declare itself in favour of the advantages which result from the cessation of hostilities between the Porte and Mehemet Ali; but while it fully appreciates the object which Commodore Napier had in view, in undertaking upon his own responsibility to hasten the submission of the Pacha; while it fully approves of all the conditions which that officer has imposed upon him; the Cabinet of London has not thought fit to take upon itself a formal guarantee with respect to the right of hereditary succession which the Sultan might confer upon Mehemet Ali.

“We are firmly convinced that the other Powers will readily adhere to this opinion of England; not one of them will, in fact, take upon itself a guarantee, 60 which would become as burdensome for those Powers, as it would be incompatible with His Highness’s rights of Sovereignty.

“The Cabinet of London appears to be more than ever impressed with the necessity of furthering, by all possible means, the pacification of the East, and of putting an end to the doubts which the Divan appears to entertain with respect to the real intentions of the Allies. Have the goodness then, Sir, to unite with Lord Ponsonby, in holding to the Ministers of the Porte the language which Lord Palmerston has lately prescribed to the English Ambassador, and which, we have no doubt, will be equally supported by the Representatives of Austria and Prussia.”

Nothing could be more gratifying to me than that my first essay at diplomacy should have received the sanction of the great powers of Europe, and I presume such a sanction was not very palatable to the gentlemen who took a different view of Eastern affairs.

The Author ordered to Alexandria to carry the Convention into effect—Interviews with the Pacha and Boghos Bey—Letter from Boghos Bey explaining the Pacha’s Intentions—Lieut. Loring dispatched to see the Evacuation of Syria carried into effect; his Instructions—Letters to the Chief Officers in Syria—Arrival of the Turkish Commissioners at Alexandria—Surrender of the Turkish Fleet—Bad Faith of the Turks—Correspondence between the Author and Boghos Bey respecting the Cotton Crop—The Commercial Treaty.

The day after the arrival of the Megæra, I waited on the Commander-in-Chief, who directed me to proceed to Alexandria, and see the Convention carried out. I arrived there in the Stromboli on the 8th January, when the Pacha sent one of his officers to compliment me, and invite me to the Palace.

Between seven and eight in the evening I waited on Boghos Bey, and delivered the Admiral’s and Rechid Pacha’s letters ^[14] , and an extract of Lord Palmerston’s instruction, dated the 15th of December, beginning with the words, “Now it is necessary that Sir Robert Stopford ^[15] .” Boghos Bey did not seem much disappointed at the refusal of the Allies 62 to give a guarantee, but expressed his dissatisfaction at the word “hereditary” not appearing in the letter of Rechid Pacha to the British Ambassador, and expressed his fears that there would be some difficulty with the Pacha, who fully expected on his submission, the hereditary Pachalic of Egypt would be conferred on him.

I was now introduced to the Pacha, who was far from being in good humour, and evidently disappointed at the communication Boghos Bey had previously made to him; he nevertheless invited me to sit on the divan beside him, and gave me a pipe.

I acquainted his Highness that I was authorized to allow vessels to proceed to Caiffa, to embark the sick, wounded, women, children, and any part of the Egyptian army, and that I should send a British officer with the person to whom he entrusted his instructions to Ibrahim to evacuate Syria. I also told him that I should give every assistance to fit out the Turkish fleet, which I was sorry to observe was in the same state I had left them.

He replied it was not his fault; that after the agreement I had made with him the officer had been sent back from Syria, and the agreement disallowed.

I remarked that that difficulty was now obviated, 63 that the Convention had been approved of in London, with the exception of the guarantee.

To this he observed that he did not care so much about the guarantee, but that the word “hereditary” had been left out, whereas in Lord Palmerston’s dispatch to Lord Ponsonby, dated the 15th of October, and which had been made public, it was distinctly stated that the Porte would be strongly recommended to confer on him the hereditary Pachalic, and that in M. Guizot’s speech to the French Chambers he had declared that the Allies would recommend it; and finally, that the agreement signed by Boghos Bey and myself stipulated that the fleet should be delivered up on receiving the official account that the Sublime Porte would confer on him the hereditary government of Egypt; that notwithstanding this, in Lord Palmerston’s instructions of the 14th of November, communicated to him by Captain Fanshawe, the word “hereditary” had been left out; but nevertheless he had entirely submitted himself to the will of the Sultan, and asked for no terms, being convinced he would be confirmed in the fullest sense.

There was so much truth in these observations that I did not endeavour to controvert them, and 64 soon after took my leave, promising to call on Boghos Bey next morning, when the papers were translated.

In my next interview with Boghos Bey he again spoke of the disappointment and dissatisfaction of the Pacha. He said he had done everything to gain the good will of England; that the interests of Great Britain and Egypt were identified; that at one time England had encouraged him, and even permitted Egyptians to enter her dockyards and ships to gain instruction, and that now she wanted to put him down altogether. All this he very naturally attributed to Lord Ponsonby, and Mehemet Ali often said, he was not at war with either Turkey or England, but with the English Ambassador.

I told him I was not without hopes that the British Government would still use their influence with the Porte to obtain that point, and that I should do everything in my power to forward the Pacha’s wishes, and I had reason to believe they would be complied with.

He requested me to read the part of Lord Palmerston’s letter, approving of the Convention ^[16] , which I consented to do, but he must consider it a 65 private communication; he listened to this with much satisfaction, and said, if I would communicate it to the Pacha, it would go a great way to tranquillize his mind.

In the morning I waited on the old man, and read to him the other part of Lord Palmerston’s instructions, which had some effect in putting him in good humour; he talked a good deal about the difficulty of quitting Syria till the spring without a great loss of life and stores, and was anxious that the women, children, and sick should be allowed to embark at Beyrout, Sidon, or the most convenient place, should the army be still at Damascus.

There is no doubt whatever that he had sent orders to Ibrahim to withdraw, but was probably afraid that he would not obey them when he heard of his fathers submission without being certain of the hereditary pachalic being conferred, and he was anxious, in the event of his staying at Damascus, to free him of his incumbrances.

I observed that the weather was now better than when the Convention was signed, and was improving every day; that I had no authority to allow any embarkation either at Beyrout or Sidon, but that I should write to the officer in command to give every 66 facility in his power, and that I felt satisfied the best way to insure the British Government pressing the point of the hereditary pachalic was, by throwing no difficulties in the way; that, whether or no, his son must succeed him, and as to a guarantee, he had shown it was more necessary to guarantee the Porte against him, than him against the Porte. The old man was tickled at this observation, and consented to all I asked, and next morning Boghos gave it me in writing, as follows:

The Egyptian steamer Generoso started on the second day after my arrival, with one of the Pacha’s officers and Lieutenant Loring, to whom I gave the following instructions:—

69 I wrote also to the senior Naval and Military officers in Syria.

The Turkish Commissioners, Yaver Pacha (Admiral Walker,) and Mazloum Bey, arrived at Alexandria on the 10th January, and were graciously received by Mehemet Ali, who gave directions that the fleet should be immediately given up, and Admiral Walker hoisted his flag on the 11th at noon, under a salute from the batteries at Alexandria, and the Egyptian men-of-war and steamers were put at their disposal, and they were ordered to be entertained at the Pacha’s expense. My friend, Admiral Walker, took up his residence with me, and in the morning of the 13th I visited him on board the Mahomedie, and afterwards waited on all the Turkish and Egyptian Admirals, when as much powder was burnt as would have fought a good action.

I dispatched the Stromboli with the important intelligence of the delivery of the Turkish fleet, to Sir Robert Stopford, at Marmorice Bay, on the 11th of January, supposing that the Eastern Question 72 was brought to a close, but the sequel will show that it was not yet over.

I shall here make a comparison between the conduct of Sir Robert Stopford and Lord Ponsonby. Both rejected my Convention, and I believe it was the first time they ever agreed. When Captain Fanshawe returned from Alexandria, the Admiral, I think, saw his error, because he wrote to Syria to order a suspension of hostilities, and permitted the embarkation of the sick and wounded. Lord Ponsonby, on the other hand, did every thing he possibly could to gain time, and more than that, the British Ambassador wrote to General Jochmus, a Turkish officer, and desired him not to suspend hostilities, as is positively stated in General Michell’s letter to Lord Palmerston, dated December 31, 1840, and as we shall shortly see, he gave the same directions to his emissary, Mr. Wood; and the very steamer that brought the Commissioners to Alexandria, as I shall show hereafter, was the bearer of orders to, if possible, destroy Ibrahim’s army: so much for the good faith of the Turks ^[17] . Admiral Walker was quite ignorant of this as well as myself, and thinking 73 every thing was settled with Turkey, I very naturally turned my attention to English interests at Alexandria.

Boghos Bey had announced his intention of selling the crop of cotton on the 20th of February, and continuing the sale the first of every succeeding month. The British merchants complained of the difficulty they had in becoming purchasers under this arrangement; they alleged that if they imported cash to purchase the cotton, it might be put up at such a price that they would either be obliged to take it at a loss, or re-export their specie, and they requested I would use my influence with Boghos Bey to get him to put it up at public sale. I thought their request so reasonable, that I immediately went to Boghos Bey, and suggested to him, that the cotton in question should be put up at public sale, when it is sure to fetch its real value, and the merchants would then have a fair chance of becoming purchasers; that this system was invariably followed by the East India Company, and they found it to answer their purpose and satisfy the public.

I also took the opportunity of asking Boghos Bey whether the Pacha intended to execute the Commercial Treaty of the 16th of August, 1839, 74 which, I assured him, the British Government would insist upon; and that I felt certain, if the Pacha would allow it to take its course, he would not only gain many friends in England, but it would engage Lord Palmerston more strongly to push the point of the hereditary government. I told him that as I had signed the Convention of the 27th of November, which had been approved of, I felt bound in honour to do all in my power to carry it out, and that no argument I could make use of would weigh more than being able to write to Lord Palmerston that the Commercial Convention was in full operation.

I also expressed to his Excellency my satisfaction at the loyal manner in which His Highness had acted throughout the whole affair of the evacuation of Syria, and the delivery of the fleet, and I trusted it would have its due weight at Constantinople. The substance of this I put in writing, and requested Boghos Bey to give me a reply, which he did next morning.

The Author visits Cairo—The Mahmoudieh Canal—Fire on board the Steamer—Voyage up the Nile—Appearance of the Country—Condition of the People—Arrival at Cairo—Visit to Abbas Pacha—Palace of Schoubrah—Establishments of the Pacha—Industry of the Arabs—Visit to the Pyramids—Quit Cairo.

Things appeared to go on so smoothly at Alexandria, and anticipating no further difficulty in Syria, I took this opportunity of proceeding to Cairo, to gain as much information as I could relative to the interior of the country. The Pacha put his own steam-boat at my disposal, and sent one of his officers as interpreter; and who, I afterwards found, was likewise charged with paying the expenses of my journey. A palace in the neighbourhood of Cairo was also put at my disposition, both of which civilities I declined.

We embarked in a very tolerable boat on the 24th of January, and proceeded by the Mahmoudieh Canal to Atfeh, where it joins the Nile. The boat was dragged by horses at a good pace, and the distance, forty-eight miles, was accomplished in about 77 seven hours. At Atfeh there is a tolerable inn, where we stopped.

According to a statement in Russell’s Egypt , this canal was begun by Mehemet Ali in October, 1819, and finished early in December of the same year. It is forty-eight miles long, eighteen feet deep, and ninety feet broad. It is said that 250,000 persons were employed in cutting it, and that 30,000 men, women, and children perished in the undertaking; but I believe this number to be much exaggerated. Before the construction of this canal, the produce of Upper Egypt was brought down the Nile in boats to Damietta, and there transhipped into sailing vessels; and, in fine weather, even open boats frequently undertook the voyage to Alexandria. This occasioned much loss of time; and as they were frequently wrecked, much destruction of life and property; for which reasons Mehemet Ali decided on undertaking the construction of this Grand Canal. Unfortunately for the inhabitants, the Pacha was anxious to see his work completed in a short space of time, and the poor Fellahs were driven in from the country like a flock of sheep, and set to work,—the greater part unprovided with tools, and all ill-fed, and unpaid; exposed on a scanty allowance 78 of water to the heat of a broiling sun by day, and with little or no shelter from the noxious dews at night.

Under these circumstances, it cannot be wondered that the destruction of human life was immense; but the Pacha troubled himself little about their sufferings. He saw his work rapidly progressing; and the first boat started just two months after its commencement. The Mahmoudieh Canal, though certainly a grand undertaking, is, nevertheless, incomplete; there are no locks at either end to communicate with the Nile and the harbour of Alexandria; the goods are landed at the latter place, and carried by railroad to the canal close by; and when they arrive at Atfeh, are again disembarked, and transported to the Nile, which is shut out by a badly constructed barage. The Nile, in the lowest season, is below the canal; and the canal is several feet above the sea in the harbour of Alexandria. It makes a considerable circuit round the eastern end of the lake Mareotis; and, I believe, had a skilful engineer been employed, it might have been greatly shortened.

At daylight on the morning of the 25th we embarked in one of the Pacha’s steamers. I was accompanied by Mr. Larking, the English 79 Consul, and his lady,—the former in very bad health,—by Captain Martin, Mr. Waghorn,—the active agent for the transport of goods and passengers (and indeed the first projector of the enterprise) up the Nile and across the Isthmus,—and several officers of the Carysfort. Mr. Larking has the management of a farm belonging to a relation of his, on the banks of the canal, which he conducts as nearly after the English method as the difference of the country will allow. There was a very good house on the estate, besides other extensive buildings.

Mrs. Larking was a capital caterer; and we owe to that amiable lady the good cheer we met with in our passage up the Nile. The steamer was none of the best as to speed; but her accommodations were good.

We had not proceeded many miles when she was discovered to be on fire in the coal-bunkers. We ran her alongside the bank; and Mr. Larking, who was ill, and could hardly walk, was with difficulty got on shore, together with Mrs. Larking and his child. The decks were ript up; and, notwithstanding the noise and confusion amongst the Arab crew, with the assistance of the officers, we managed to get the fire under, without materially injuring the boat. 80 On examination, we found the beams of the vessel were too close to the chimney; and after being completely charred, they took fire, and ignited the coals. This was not a good beginning; but was attended with no other consequence than the delay of a few hours. The current was running down between two and three miles an hour; and, although the wind was generally in our favour, we made little progress, and were easily passed by the light country boats, notwithstanding their miserable equipments. The Nile in most parts is about a quarter of a mile wide; and the water not being low, was easily navigated. Boats of all sizes crowd the river, conveying to Alexandria, corn, chopped straw, cotton, and various other products of the upper country. Most of these boats were the property of the Pacha, for he monopolized the greater part of the trade, as well as most of the produce of the country; and if I may judge by their appearance, Mehemet Ali was as bad a ship’s husband, as he was an agriculturist; but he has a mania of doing every thing himself. He was rapidly making himself owner of all the land in Egypt, as well as of all the trade. It is a common custom with him, when 81 his crops are ready, to force the Fellahs to leave their own villages to work on his property. At the same time, he seizes all the boats on the river to bring down his produce, caring very little what becomes of the property of others. This becomes peculiarly oppressive when the Nile is rapidly rising, as it often happens that the whole of their produce is swept away during the time they are employed to save the Pacha’s.

When the wind blows down the river, the passage of the boats is very slow. There is no towing path; no horses or mules; the crew land, and they manage to tug their boats along from ten to twenty miles a day, varying according to the size of the boat. The descent down, owing to the current, unless the wind is very strong, may be about fifty or sixty miles in the twenty-four hours; and considerably more when the wind is fair.

Egypt in the Delta is about 160 miles wide; but when you ascend the river, and are clear of the Delta, it narrows to from 11 to 20 miles, and is shut in by sand-hills and mountains on each side. The country is richly cultivated, and well irrigated, but in a very primitive manner. The villages are raised considerably above the plain; but, nevertheless, are 82 sometimes much inconvenienced by a high Nile, and are of the most miserable description. The people are poorly dressed in coarse blue cotton shirts and petticoats; but their wants seemed few; and I saw no appearance of discontent or unhappiness amongst them.

At sunset on the second day, in passing round a point where there was a considerable bend in the river, the Pyramids opened to our view, apparently only a few miles off; their gigantic size gave them this appearance, though their distance could not have been less than thirty miles. We continued our route during the night, and at daylight we stopped considerably below Boulac, the Wapping, it may be called, of Cairo. From thence we decided to prosecute our journey on foot. As the vapour that hung over the river became dissipated by a brilliant sun rising over the Mokhattan hills, on one hand appeared the spires, mosques, and minarets of the City of Victory, whilst on the other its beams gilded that part of the seven wonders of the world, the gigantic relics of antiquity, the Pyramids. About an hour’s pleasant walk, under the shade of a fine avenue of sycamore trees, brought us to the comfortable hotel of Mr. Waghorn, 83 to whose perseverance and activity we owe the comparatively easy traject across the isthmus to Suez. By the time we had dressed and breakfasted, our guide returned from the Citadel, where I had sent him to announce our arrival to Abbas Pacha, the grandson of Mehemet Ali, and the Governor of Cairo. Eleven was the hour appointed to wait upon his Excellency, who sent a brilliant cavalcade to conduct us to his palace, consisting of splendid Arab horses, proudly champing their golden bits, under a profusion of crimson velvet trappings, each led by a sais, or groom, and a tolerable coach dragged by four cream-coloured horses; the coach we consigned to the junior of the party, Captain Martin; Captain Williams and myself preferred the horses. In this manner we entered the Citadel, the scene of so many brilliant achievements, and of so many bloody deeds. Memory failed not to recall one of the most appalling of the latter that tyranny ever planned or perfidy carried into effect. The foul murder of the Mamelukes will for ever be a deep stain on the character of Mehemet Ali. It is true they were troublesome gentlemen, and had they lived would, in all probability, have destroyed the Pacha; but nothing can excuse the treacherous manner in which he accomplished his object.

84 Such were our feelings as we passed the gates so securely closed on that fearful occasion, and as we cast a glance on these, on the appalling height of these once blood-stained battlements, we could not help admiring the bold spirit which ventured on such a leap, and wondering how he survived to tell the tale. The place known as the Mameluke’s Leap is near the gateway, the fall between thirty and forty feet. The horse was crushed on the spot, but, strange to say, the bold rider escaped unhurt, and lived for many years afterwards at Constantinople.

Abbas Pacha, the grandson of Mehemet Ali, has long been known for his hatred to anything having the resemblance of a Frank, and this is little to be wondered at, considering the education he has received. His character is none of the best; he is devoid of talent, and much more feared than either loved or respected. However, all things considered, he received us with tolerable politeness. Pipes and coffee were produced, and we were invited to take seats on the Divan. His appearance is not much in his favour, being a dull heavy man, much more resembling a butcher than a Pacha. After a short conversation on indifferent subjects we took our leave, and were conducted through the different apartments 85 of the Palace, which were both elegant and comfortable. From the Citadel we proceeded to the country palace and gardens of Schoubrah, which we approached under the shadow of a noble avenue of Egyptian sycamore, whose thick foliage rendered it quite impervious to the rays of the sun. The palace of Schoubrah, built a few years back by the Pacha, cost an immense sum of money, and as we strolled through the delightful gardens, and inspected the fountains and kiosks, constructed at immense expense, we could not repress a feeling of sorrow that the ruler who had raised such a structure for his own ease and convenience, had not turned more of his attention to the comforts of the poor Arabs, who are lodged in the most miserable mud huts at the very gates of the palace.

During the short period of our stay at Cairo, time did not hang heavily on our hands. The crowded and covered bazaars, the mosques, the tombs of the Caliphs and Mamelukes, together with the numerous manufactories and institutions established by the Pacha, successively occupied much of our time, and fully engaged our attention.

Had the Pacha shown a little more judgment and a little more nature in the establishment of 86 these institutions he would have deserved more credit, but he has a mania of going ahead, and thinks that Egypt should have manufactories of her own of all sorts, and be independent of other nations; and really when we look at his founderies for cannon, his manufactory for arms, and the industry with which the Arabs work, it is quite surprising. Most of his establishments are directed by English or French men; in the musket manufactory there is an Englishman, and he assured me that the industrious manner in which the Arabs were working on the day we inspected the establishment was their usual habit; if so, I certainly never saw so much activity in any manufactory in my life. The Pacha has begun to find out that the cotton and cloth manufactories, &c., are far from profitable, and many of these establishments were shut up, and the workmen discharged.

Amongst the scientific institutions, which are nearly all under the management of Frenchmen, may be reckoned the hospital, with the schools of surgery and medicine attached to them, under the superintendence of Clot Bey; the academy of drawing, and that of mathematics; the students being all taken from the class of common Fellahs, and, like 87 the rest of the Pacha’s subjects, compelled to work at whatever he thought fit, and toil they do from morning to night, in hopes of being one day employed as civil engineers, or draughtsmen.

The second day following our arrival we devoted to a pilgrimage, which we could not but fulfil: a visit to the Pyramids.

After traversing the fine olive grounds and gardens planted by Ibrahim, on what were formerly unsightly and huge heaps of rubbish, we crossed the Nile at the Island of Rhoda, where he has likewise carried cultivation to great perfection, and landed on the western bank, at Gezeh, famed for the action that took place between the French and the Mamelukes; the conquerors thought perhaps it would be more grand if dignified as La Bataille des Pyramids, of which it is certainly in view. Each of our party being duly accommodated with that most useful of all animals in Egypt, a little jackass, after traversing fields waving with the richest luxuriance of cultivation, we in due time reached the foot of the first of those stupendous monuments the “Pyramids,” that of Cheops; then, and not till then, were we aware of the huge mass at the foot of which we stood. But descriptions without end have been written of these 88 stupendous works, and they rise as a memento of the folly of those who consumed so much labour and time in raising such useless fabrics. As numberless conjectures as to their purposes have been ventured by various writers, I shall not increase the list, but refer the reader to Belzoni, Wilkinson, Vyse, or fifty others.

On my return to Cairo I learned by telegraph that intelligence of importance had arrived at Alexandria, which required my immediate presence; this put an end to all the projects we had formed of further exploring this interesting country, and next morning we bad adieu to Cairo and its wonders, and soon found ourselves steaming down the broad Nile, with the current in our favour, but a strong northerly wind right in our teeth.

Letter from Captain Stewart—Apprehended Treachery of the Turkish Authorities—Question of the Syrian Troops—Double dealing of Mehemet Ali—The Author’s Letters to the chief British and Turkish Officers—Letter to the Admiral.

Halfway down the river I met Colonel Napier, with the following letter from Captain Stewart, who had come to Gaza to prevent, if possible, a collision between the Turks and the Egyptians.

The Turks, not aware of the strength of the Egyptians, seemed to await a good excuse to attack them, and this I feared would be afforded them, by the fact that many of the Syrians had accompanied the Egyptian army; the Turks had orders to demand them, and it was stoutly refused by the Egyptians, who had no orders on the subject.

I had before spoken to Mehemet Ali about these people, and he objected, under the plea that it would disorganize Ibrahim’s army even more than the retreat, and if they were allowed to join the Turks they might be turned against him. This was much more than probable, and I in consequence consented that they should be delivered up at Gaza. Mehemet Ali in this case did not keep his word.

92 Colonel Napier, accompanied by Capt. Ward, had seen Boghos Bey and also the Pacha, on the subject of these despatches. Mehemet Ali declared to them that he had settled with Masloum Bey that they were to come into Egypt, and be sent back from thence. This was not true. I do not believe any such arrangement was entered into with Masloum: on the contrary, he demanded them, and on the Pacha appealing to me I consented to their coming as far as Gaza. The Turks had shown so little good faith since the commencement of the retreat that I am not at all surprised that Ibrahim should put no confidence in them.

On my return to Alexandria I brought the subject of the Syrian troops before the Pacha, who expressed a great unwillingness to leave them behind; and as there was no way of obliging Ibrahim to do this but by violence, and as it is more than probable the Turks would have had the worst of it, I thought it much better, under all circumstances, not to proceed to this extremity, and I wrote as follows to Captain Stewart, and General Jochmus, inclosing a copy of the Convention, in order that the Turks might have no pretext whatever to use force; which I have 93 no doubt they would have done when Ibrahim’s army was weakened by the detachments that were embarked, and sent across the Desert, had it not been for the presence of the British officers, who, however, though with difficulty enough, managed to keep them quiet till the evacuation was completed.

I wrote a short letter to the same purport to Colonel Bridgeman, and also communicated the state of affairs to the Admiral, then at Malta:—

Affairs in Syria—Letters of Sir Charles Smith to Lord Palmerston—Course that ought to have been pursued after the Battle of Boharsof—Ignorance as to Ibrahim’s Movements and Intentions—General Michell to Lord Palmerston—M. Steindl’s Report respecting the Advance upon Gaza—Capt. Stewart to the Admiral—General Michell’s and Captain Stewart’s Opinion as to Lord Ponsonby’s Orders—Correspondence between Captain Stewart and General Jochmus.

It will now be necessary to go back to Syria, and give an account of what took place there after the rejection of the Convention.

It appears, by Sir Charles Smith’s letter to Lord Palmerston, dated November 24th, 1840 ^[18] , that 98 Ibrahim retired from Zachle and Malaka on the 21st of that month.

Without at all putting my experience in comparison with Sir Charles Smith’s, I must differ in opinion from him about the propriety of attacking Ibrahim Pacha. When Sir Charles Smith took command of the troops, Ibrahim had lost Sidon, been beat on the heights of Ornagacuan and Boharsof, and been forced to evacuate Beyrout, Tripoli, and the passes of the Taurus, and retire on Zachle. My opinion at the time was for a 99 forward movement. Ibrahim ought not to have been allowed to concentrate at Zachle and Malaka. He ought not to have been allowed breathing-time, and most probably the greater part of his army would have deserted or been captured. I cannot say the Turkish troops were well organized, but, nevertheless, they had done very well; their wants were few, and after getting possession of Beyrout, the means of transport was not wanting, and they were capital marchers. I do not say that we ought to have followed them across the plain of the Bekaa without cavalry, but we ought to have followed him up to Zachle and Malaka, and afterwards been guided by circumstances. It appears that he was enabled to collect 50,000 men at Damascus, of which 30,000 were effective. Such a force being collected, there was a very good reason for accepting a Convention, but a very bad one for rejecting it.

Sir Charles Smith further writes, under date of the 29th of November ^[19] , that the troops from Aleppo had commenced their retreat from Damascus on El Mezereib on the 26th instant, and that Ibrahim Pacha had ordered his secretaries to be ready to 100 depart with him by the same route, and the whole of the force under his command had moved, or was in order of march. On comparing dates, it is impossible that Ibrahim’s army could have moved from Damascus on the 26th, as he only left Zachle on the 21st, the distance from thence to Damascus being three days’ march, and it surely would have required more than two days to put in motion an army of 50,000. I am disposed to think the intelligence was incorrect. It is not impossible that a division might have gone to El Mezereib, but I do not believe that Ibrahim began his final retreat till the 29th of December.

Sir Charles further writes from Beyrout, under date of the 6th of December ^[20] , that a courier from Alexandria had stopped the progress of the Egyptian army in retreat, and that Ibrahim Pacha, by intelligence of the 2nd from Damascus, “had returned to the city, with the intention of quartering his whole force within the walls, wisely preferring, to the hazard of a retreat through the Desert, the guarantee of the Convention for embarking all he possesses, (plunder as well as military stores,) at the points we hold on the coast; such stipulation having been 101 made clear to his understanding, as being binding on the Allies. The contrary, however, being the fact, he will now find himself, (accidentally as it were,) master of a stronghold in the heart of Syria, of which he had been virtually, if not totally, bereaved.”

How a courier could stop the progress of the Egyptian army I cannot comprehend. The Convention was signed on the 27th of November; on the 28th Mehemet Ali sent an officer to Beyrout by a British steamer, with orders to Ibrahim to commence his retreat; the Egyptian was to be accompanied by a British officer to see it carried into execution. What object, then, could Mehemet Ali have in sending a courier, even if it was possible, which he declared it was not, in consequence of the distracted state of the country, to order them to return? It will be seen, by my correspondence with Boghos Bey, that Mehemet Ali always objected to embarking his troops. I proposed that he should do so, thinking it much better for the peace and happiness of the country, that they should proceed by sea to Alexandria in preference to marching through a country where the inhabitants would be exposed to all the devastations of a retiring army. I never 102 contemplated that his army should be destroyed after signing a Convention; quite the contrary. The moment the Convention was signed, Mehemet Ali could only be considered the Sultan’s servant, and the Egyptian troops the Sultan’s army, and not a hair of their heads ought to have been touched; and as to embarking plunder, no part of the Convention sanctioned that, and if it had been permitted, the blame would have rested with our own officers.

I cannot either understand how Ibrahim Pacha could have known of the Convention which only left Alexandria on the 28th in the afternoon, so as to have allowed him time, had he quitted Damascus on the 27th, to return on the 2nd of December; nor can I understand how he could suppose the Convention should be binding on the Allies, when it was immediately rejected by the authorities in Syria, and his officer sent back without, I believe, landing at Beyrout; nor do I see how he had either been virtually or totally bereaved of his stronghold in Syria, seeing that if he had ever quitted Damascus and returned, it was his own act and deed.

Sir Robert Stopford received the intelligence of Ibrahim’s retreat at Marmorice Bay on the 13th of January, which he communicated to the 103 Admiralty, adding, “my orders to Commodore Sir Charles Napier may by this time have been the means of facilitating his retreat ^[21] .”

Captain Stewart writes to the Admiral from Jaffa, January the 10th ^[22] : “General Jochmus reached this from Jerusalem yesterday morning early; and we find that he has given such orders as will complete a line of twenty-eight battalions betwixt this place and Jerusalem, and that all will be in position by sunset this evening. The chief object of this advance seems to be to induce Ibrahim Pacha to retire by the Desert, and not by the coast. We have been somewhat in doubt and suspense as to which road he would retire by; but news reached the Seraskier last night, which is believed to be authentic, stating, that Ibrahim’s vanguard was already thirteen hours’ march to the south-east of El-Mezereib, and that, consequently, there was no longer any doubt of his taking the Desert route. It is very difficult to get information, and still more so to know how much to believe; but my own opinion, and (what is of much more importance,) General Michell’s opinion is, that Ibrahim is positively evacuating Syria. General Michell and I are both 104 determined to confine ourselves strictly to precautionary and defensive measures; and we shall use every endeavour to prevail on our allies to do the same, and not to obstruct, but rather to facilitate, Ibrahim’s retreat.” By this it appears that Captain Stewart and General Michell had also orders to facilitate Ibrahim’s retreat; and with the exception of the irregulars and mountaineers harassing, and occasioning some losses, unavoidable in a retreating army, but very much exaggerated by the officers sent by General Jochmus, who reports them to have lost 10,000 or 15,000 men, on the 5th of January nothing had been done by the Turkish army who occupied Acre, Jerusalem, defiles of D’Jenin, Jaffa, and Ramla.

General Michell writes to Lord Palmerston, dated Acre, December 31, 1840 ^[23] :—

“On the departure of Sir Charles Smith, the Sultan’s commission was delivered to General Jochmus, and a few days afterwards he left Beyrout for Sidon, and proceeded thence with some light cavalry to Hasbeyah in the hill country on the Upper Jordan, for the purpose of giving encouragement and direction to the mountaineers, and of 105 obtaining accurate intelligence concerning the Egyptian army.

“The most vague and conflicting accounts were arriving daily as to the intentions of Ibrahim Pacha. He had concentrated his forces about Damascus, and the general belief was that he would immediately commence his retreat to Egypt.

“General Jochmus, notwithstanding his nearer approach to Damascus, has been still kept in doubt as to what is going on there; but he seems to be fully of opinion that Ibrahim Pacha is about to move, and that he will, if possible, retreat on Gaza. His proposal, therefore, is to cause the Egyptian Army to be harassed on its flanks and rear by the mountain levies, and having assembled the regular Turkish troops at points along the coast, to operate with them as occasions may offer, in the defiles between the Jordan and the coast. In the mean time General Jochmus has been very desirous of attacking Gaza, and of capturing or destroying the provisions which are said to be in store there for the Egyptian army, and he has repeatedly urged my co-operation for this purpose with men-of-war or steamers on the coast. There have been, however, and are still, many difficulties opposed to such 106 an undertaking. The whole of the fleet had taken shelter at Marmorice, leaving only one steamer to watch the wreck of the Zebra in the Bay of Acre, besides the Hecate, which brought me to Beyrout; yet three French vessels, a corvette, and two brigs of war, remained upon the coast and were generally at anchor near Beyrout. I took the earliest opportunity of making this known to the Admiral, Sir Robert Stopford, and he most kindly and promptly sent Captain Houston Stewart with the Benbow, seventy-two, and the Hazard sloop. They arrived on the 24th of December, but the heavy surf prevented their communication with the shore, and it was not until the 27th that I could get the detachments of artillery and sappers, which came from England in the Hecate, disembarked at Acre. In the mean time, however, Lieutenant-Colonel Colquhoun of the Artillery, and Lieutenant-Colonel Alderson of the Engineers, had made a visit to that fortress, and likewise to Tyre and Sidon.

“The Admiral, while he sent me this naval aid, expressed a great unwillingness to have it employed against Gaza or in any offensive operations; first, on account of the storms prevailing at this season; secondly, because the negotiations opened by Captain 107 Fanshawe were still pending, and he had consented to a request, made by the Pacha of Egypt, Mehemet Ali, that Egyptian steamers might go off Gaza to embark the sick, the women, and the children, of Ibrahim Pacha’s army, for Alexandria.

“Captain Houston Stewart had instructions from the Admiral based upon these reasons; and they of course weighed also with me as to any operations against Gaza; besides I had received information of the Egyptian force there, and at El-Arish, having been largely reinforced.

“Nothing has been seen of the Egyptian steamers from Alexandria, to receive the sick of Ibrahim Pacha’s army. When that permission was given by Captain Fanshawe, it was supposed the army was already on its march to Gaza, and not likely to linger at Damascus. Probably Ibrahim Pacha delays his movement from that city, now, in consequence of the Convention commenced with his father by Captain Fanshawe. Our situation will be very embarrassing until the negotiations are terminated, since any act of hostility on our part may be construed into a breach of faith, and may disturb arrangements half concluded. I am, therefore, 108 anxiously expecting orders from Lord Ponsonby upon the subject. In the meantime his Excellency’s latest instructions to General Jochmus, and upon which he is prepared and resolved to act with energy, dictate a continuance of offensive operations.”

As I have before stated, we now see the Commander-in-Chief of the allied force by sea and land giving directions to his officers to facilitate the retreat of Ibrahim Pacha, and the Austrian Ambassador declaring he would disavow any attack upon him, thereby maintaining good faith with Mehemet Ali; and the Ambassador at Constantinople giving orders to his general to continue offensive operations, thereby compromising not only the honour of England but of the Allied Powers.

M. Steindl, in a letter to Baron Stürmer, dated the 10th of January, writes from Jaffa ^[24] ,—

“General Jochmus, escorted by 100 Turkish cavalry, continued in the mean time to traverse the mountains of the Naplouse and the districts situated between the Jordan and the Haouran, in order to assemble as many mountaineers as possible. He formed several corps of them, the command of 109 which he entrusted to M. Dumont and Count Szechenyi, his aides-de-camp, for the purpose of harassing Ibrahim Pacha during his retreat, whilst he ordered Omar Pacha, who was stationed at Ramla, with 2500 men, to form a junction with a portion of the garrisons of Jaffa and of Jerusalem, and to attempt a sudden attack upon Gaza, in order there to burn the considerable magazines of provisions which Mehemet Ali had caused to be transported thither to facilitate the retreat of his son’s army by that road.

“The English loudly disavowed this attack, less, as it appears, because they despaired of success, than because Admiral Stopford had indicated to Mehemet Ali that town as the place where the Egyptians should concentrate themselves to be embarked for Alexandria, in case an arrangement could be brought about between the Sultan and his vassal. For this purpose, Rechid Mehemed Pacha, appointed Chief of the Staff at head-quarters, was sent on the 5th instant from St. Jean d’Acre to Tiberias to General Jochmus, with orders to invite him to proceed to Jaffa to be present at a great council of war, whilst the same order was sent by Tatar to Omar Pacha, with a prohibition against attacking 110 Gaza. General Jochmus arrived here in the course of yesterday, still leaving his aides-de-camp at the head of the armed peasantry.”

On the 17th of January Captain Stewart again writes to the Commander-in-Chief from Jaffa ^[25] :—

“My letter of the 10th instant ^[26] , forwarded by Gorgon, would inform you of General Michell’s and my own determination to confine ourselves strictly to precautionary and defensive measures. It will be therefore necessary to explain the circumstances attending a late advance of the Turkish troops upon Gaza, and for this purpose I transmit herewith copies of a letter I addressed to General Jochmus, immediately after our last conference on the 12th instant, also of a note which I received from General Michell, after he had reached Ramla, and my reply to that note, sent by a staff officer to General Michell, at Ashdod.

“General Michell expressed, in the most decided and unequivocal terms, his disapprobation of the expedition. We both appealed to the Seraskier, who refused to put his written veto on the advance, without which General Jochmus declared he would persevere, and accordingly he left Jaffa for Ramla 111 within an hour. General Michell then felt that he was in a peculiarly awkward position, but with the true spirit of an English soldier determined to accompany and render every assistance to the Turkish generals.

“I also felt myself bound, notwithstanding my protest, to go down with the Vesuvius and Hecate, and make a demonstration on the coast, especially as I thought I might render material assistance, by either threatening a descent on the Egyptians’ rear to the southward of Gaza, by which their retreat on El-Arish would be endangered, or in case of the Turks retreating, protecting with the great guns that hazardous operation.

“At 4 A.M. of Friday the 15th, we weighed in the Vesuvius and Hecate, and proceeded as far as Ascalon, when the weather became so thick, and blew so hard, with a heavy increasing sea, that after showing ourselves again off Jaffa, I requested Captain Henderson to run out fifteen or twenty miles for an offing, bank up the fires, and put the vessels under canvass. At 2 A.M. on the 16th, it being then more moderate, we bore up, and at daylight we put the steam on and steered towards Ascalon, but on getting sight of the beach, the surf was so excessive 112 as to preclude all hope of being able to communicate with the shore for many hours to come. We therefore unwillingly returned off Jaffa, where we were not able to effect a landing until sunset, when I found General Michell just returned, having preceded the returning Turkish troops. The Seraskier had reached Jaffa about two hours previous to General Michell.

“I ought to have stated, that by General Michell’s desire, twenty-five marines were embarked on board the Vesuvius under command of Lieutenant Anderson, and a like number on board the Hecate; these have all since been disembarked here.”

General Michell writes to Capt. Stewart ^[27] , “Mr. Wood is prepared to give us in writing very powerful arguments in favour of a continuation of active offensive operations; his letter from Lord Ponsonby, after Captain Fanshawe’s arrival at Constantinople, is strong upon the subject.” To which Stewart replies ^[28] , “We know Lord Palmerston’s and the British Government’s wishes and orders. Lord Ponsonby’s orders must with us be subordinate to 113 Lord Palmerston’s; we have promised the Admiral that we will act strictly on precautionary and defensive principles.”

Captain Stewart’s letter to General Jochmus, above referred to, and the reply, were as follow:

Examination of the Conduct of General Jochmus regarding Ibrahim Pacha’s Retreat—Sir Robert Stopford styled by him Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces—The General’s Reports to Sir Robert Stopford—Unwillingness of the Admiral to prolong the War—Reported Destruction of the Egyptian Army—Advance upon Gaza—Colonel Alderson’s Narrative of the Skirmish of Medjdel.

Whether Sir Robert Stopford, as commanding the allies by sea and land, wrote also to General Jochmus, as well as to General Michell and Captain Stewart, I am not aware. In the official correspondence laid before Parliament Sir Robert Stopford’s orders to these officers do not appear, and we only learn the fact from General Michell and Captain Stewart’s letters, but it is evident though General Jochmus commanded the army of operation he still considered himself under Sir Robert Stopford’s orders, for he writes to him officially from Jaffa, on the 13th of January, 1841 ^[29] , sending him the details of his operations, in which he styles him Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces. It appears by his letter that he took charge of the army of operation 120 on the 16th of December, 1840; at that period he could not have known of the submission of Mehemet Ali, and therefore he was quite right to make his arrangements for driving Ibrahim from Damascus, particularly after the rejection of the Convention, but he must have been quite aware of his submission by the 22nd, the day he shifted his head-quarters to Hasbeya. In one paragraph of the General’s letter he says Ibrahim had resolved to maintain himself as long as he could in Damascus; in another he states, that should circumstances force him to retire he had determined to march by El Mezereib, the bridge of Moïadjumah on the Jordan, D’Jenin, Ramla, and Gaza, to El-Arish, and this was corroborated by the Admiral having authorized the embarkation of the sick, wounded, and women at Gaza, and the Carysfort frigate being then in the harbour of Alexandria. What does this prove? Why that General Jochmus must have known of the Pacha’s submission, and of the unwillingness of the Admiral to prolong the war.

In the next paragraph he writes (remember this is to his Commander-in-Chief, who disapproved of carrying on hostilities), “Under such circumstances I considered it a most positive duty on my 121 part to defeat the intention of the Egyptian commander, and oblige him to quit Damascus, and follow the route of the Desert; for if a Convention had actually been signed while Ibrahim Pacha remained at Damascus, the military question remained undecided, and the complete conquest of Syria by the allied arms could be denied on the ground of our inability of driving a much superior force from its capital; while, if the Egyptian army made forcibly its way through Palestine to El Arish, its losses and sufferings would be small, the country being rich in every resource, and large government stores existing still at Safed, Tiberias, Ramla, and Gaza.” Now what does this mean? that neither General Jochmus nor Lord Ponsonby, under whose orders it appears, by General Michell’s letter, he was acting ^[31] , cared one straw about conventions or submission, but were 122 determined, if they could, to destroy as many human beings as possible to give éclat to themselves, and please the Sultan or his ministers. After describing what his plans were, the General writes, “It was at this time, and it remains still, my firm conviction ^[30] , that victory would have crowned the Sultan’s arms in a few hours, and that the whole of Ibrahim’s army would have been annihilated, or obliged to surrender; the only force of his still in some state of organization being his cavalry, and they would have been of no use in the rocky grounds of D’Jenin.”

Here the General reckoned without his host, for there was no necessity for Ibrahim passing by D’Jenin at all. He might have kept through the extensive plains of Esdraelon, until he arrived at the defiles of Kakoun between Mount Carmel and the Naplouse range, which he must have traversed to gain the sea shore; at this point he might have been attacked advantageously. But it appears that Ibrahim had no intention of taking that route; his apparent hesitation at El Mezereib for three days was probably, as General Jochmus says, to reconnoitre the Jordan, but he had another object in view, and 123 which it will be seen he executed with great skill. By General Jochmus’s account he appears to have arrived at Remtha on the 7th or 8th of January, 1841; and on the 9th a foraging party was repulsed near Es-Salt.

“The Egyptian army,” says the General, “fairly launched into the Desert ^[32] , has not since been authentically heard of. When last seen, between El Mezereib and Kalat Mefrek, its infantry was reduced to 15,000 disorderly men; its artillery, though still numerous, was utterly disorganized, principally by desertion.”... We shall shortly see where this wandering, disorganized army next makes its appearance.

Ibrahim, the reader already knows, quitted Damascus on the 29th of December, 1840; General Jochmus says he left in consequence of his military dispositions, and being blocked up within the walls of Damascus; but surely irregular troops only, without either pay or commissariat, were not capable of blocking up an army of upwards of 50,000 men, including about 8000 cavalry, known to be in splendid order, 150 pieces of artillery, together with 4000 or 5000 irregulars, for he does 124 not acquaint the Commander-in-Chief that there were any regular Turkish troops near Damascus. The fact is, Ibrahim had received orders from Mehemet Ali to return to Egypt, he knew of the enemy’s army advancing by land, and it would have been imprudent, even if he had not received orders, any longer to have delayed his retreat. Captain De l’Or reports that in three days he lost 10,000 men and 20 guns. “The hail and intense cold,” writes the General, “caused numerous deaths amongst the nearly naked soldiery, in summer clothing, and the sword of the fierce and revengeful Haouranees, the victims of Ibrahim’s abominable oppression, was unmerciful to small detachments of straggling deserters.” All this reputed loss of life took place after Mehemet Ali’s submission, and after that submission was known, and the unfortunate wretches destroyed, if they were destroyed , were the Sultan’s own subjects.

General Jochmus also tells the Commander-in-Chief the valour of the Imperial and Allied troops had done much in the conquest of a vast country like Syria, in a short period of glory and success. How he makes this out I am at a loss to know, for up to this time the Allied and Imperial troops had 125 not fired a shot since the capture of Acre, so if the reports sent to General Jochmus were correct the whole mischief was done by the mountaineers and irregular cavalry.

“The God of battle,” says the General, “may lead Ibrahim and his shattered forces through the desert, and bring some troops back to the banks of the Nile.” (We shall shortly see how many he brought to the banks of the Nile.) “I have taken, as in duty bound, such means as may as much as possible delay his march or diminish his chance of escape.” And again, “It is to me an agreeable duty to state to your Excellency the perfect unanimity which has actuated all the men of the Turkish and allied forces during these late and extensive operations ^[33] , which by mere strategic combinations and movements, and with very little loss of life, have produced great and important results; the clear proof of Ibrahim’s having lost Syria by force of arms, and without negotiations, the salvation of Palestine from pillage and destruction, and finally, the enormous loss of the Egyptian General, only as far as El-Mezereib, 126 since he left Damascus, without calculating those reserved for him by the sufferings of the Desert.”

By this dispatch one would suppose that the gallant General had been destroying the Russians, the natural foes of the Porte, and not the Egyptians, who had submitted to Turkish sway, and who ought to have been preserved instead of destroyed. What could have been the use of all this boasted destruction of human life? Syria would have been evacuated, the country would have suffered less, and humanity would not have been outraged, had not a single Turkish soldier quitted his cantonments, or at least, had they confined themselves to precautionary and defensive measures, so strongly recommended by General Michell and Captain Stewart.

We now come to General Jochmus’ report of the affair of Gaza ^[34] , against which it has already been 127 shown that both General Michell and Captain Stewart protested so strongly. It appears the division intended for the attack arrived at El-Medjdel on the 15th of January, where it halted. Here the General changed his mind, and decided on returning to Jaffa, and against this movement General Michell protested as strongly as he had before done against the advance: the first he thought quite unnecessary, and the last he thought quite improper.

Before the General retired, a party of the enemy’s irregular horse reconnoitred his position, and were fired upon by several field-pieces planted in an open 128 grove, in advance of Medjdel. At this moment Colonel Rose, who had been in search of some stray baggage with a small party of irregular horse, accidentally coming up, charged them in the most gallant style, and beat them; this being observed by Captains Harvey and Wilbraham from the Turkish camp, they sallied out with a few horse, joined Rose, and pursued the enemy for a considerable time, until the Colonel was severely wounded, when the pursuit ended. Whether it is to this that the General alludes I do not know, but it 129 appears strange that no mention is made of the British officers in the dispatch to Sir Robert Stopford.

The account of this affair, by Colonel Alderson, of the Royal Engineers, one of the British officers engaged, is so graphic that it cannot fail to be highly interesting to the reader. I give it at length:

General Jochmus’s further Reports to Sir Robert Stopford—Destruction of the Magazines at Maan—Ignorance as to Ibrahim’s movements—Ibrahim crosses the Jordan to Jericho, and menaces Jerusalem, while supposed to be wandering in the Desert—General Jochmus’s Account of the Movements of Ibrahim—Reported Destruction of his Infantry—Ibrahim did not intend to enter Palestine—his Statement to Colonel Napier.

To proceed with General Jochmus, I may remark that a letter of his to the Admiral, of the 20th of January ^[36] , clearly shows what little reliance could be placed in the reports that were made to him, of the state of Ibrahim’s army from all quarters. After giving an account of the destruction of 230 camel-loads of grain by the Baron Dumont, at Maan, after Souliman Pacha had provisioned himself, and marched on Suez, with the greatest part of the artillery, women, and children, he states, “The army itself, of which the second column was to sleep at Maan on the 11th, seeing its provisions burnt, had been obliged to countermarch, and is now wandering in the Desert harassed on all 135 sides by Bedouin tribes. Its state seems to be dreadful, and all over the country through which the Baron Dumont came back to Kerek, he saw the bodies of small detachments which had been cut off by the Bedouins.”

We look in vain for a confirmation of this in Baron Dumont’s report ^[37] . The Baron talks of the quantity of grain he destroyed, of the forty-four camels he captured, and forty he found dead, which are included in the eighty-four taken in one night, but not one word of dead bodies destroyed by the Bedouins, or of Ibrahim’s army wandering in the Desert; and so far were they from wandering in the Desert pursued by the Arabs, that on the very day that the magazines at Maan were said to be destroyed, Ibrahim, hearing of the movement on Gaza, crossed the Jordan at Jericho, menaced Jerusalem, and forced Hussein Pacha to return to Abugosh. Having succeeded in this point, he recrossed the Jordan, passed to the south of the Dead Sea, and arrived at Gaza without any person knowing what had in the meantime become of him, as will shortly be seen by Lieut. Loring’s report.

In another report to the Admiral, dated from 136 Jerusalem, January 28 ^[38] , the General, in giving an account of the passage of the Jordan by the Egyptians, says: “On the 14th a corps was reported to have crossed the Jordan, and bivouacked (near Jericho) at Reyha. Hassan Pacha, encamped at Abugosh, three hours south-west of Jerusalem, marched, towards the evening, on the 15th instant; but the Egyptian division, hearing of his approach, immediately recrossed the Jordan, with a heavy loss in drowned and killed, the waters of that river having risen more than a foot during the incessant rains of the 14th and 15th of January; and the Arabs falling upon the troops during the passage, and in the nearly impracticable passes of the Dead Sea.

“The enemy’s column above-mentioned proved to be the shattered remains of the corps, called by Mehemet Ali ‘The Guards,’ amounting to from 4000 to 5000 men, and two cavalry regiments, with a battery of artillery, forming the rear-guard of the army, under the personal command of Ibrahim Pacha. The artillery, and one of the regiments, had remained at some distance on the left bank of the river, and the movement was evidently a 137 desperate attempt to march by any way on Gaza or El Arish.

“The forlorn situation of this corps,” adds the General, “will be seen from the two inclosed reports of Mehemed Rechid Pacha, Chief of the Staff, and of Riza Pacha, commanding the cavalry ^[39] . I do not estimate the loss of this army so great as the latter; but certainly, after comparing all the reports, it amounts to 1,000 or more men, and eight pieces of artillery, which latter, although with the column at Es-Salt, were unquestionably not at Kerek on the 19th instant, whither Ibrahim had retired after continual skirmishes with the Arabs. The Governor of Jerusalem had sent his son, Hadgi Hafiz, to ascertain whether the artillery had been buried in the desert mountain or not.

“Such was the isolated position of this last corps of the Egyptian army, that its Commander-in-Chief had lost all means of communication with his remaining forces, and that, although Hamid Bey and the Commissioners from Egypt were from the 19th to the 23rd at El-Chalil, trying by all means to 138 establish a communication with Ibrahim either by the north or south of the Dead Sea, it proved a vain attempt, notwithstanding that, during the same days, the above column under the Pacha was at Kerek, surrounded by the Arabs of the country, who had been reinforced by the tribes of Beni Sackr and Beni Hennedy, arrived from the depths of the Desert in consequence of the orders sent them from Jerusalem on the 8th of January, through Baron Dumont.

“The distance from El-Mezereib to Kerek is, at the utmost, five days’ march. Ibrahim Pasha left the former place on the 6th or 7th of January, and after fifteen days was still at Kerek, having continually marched and counter-marched in the desert mountains in search of food, or from having been stopped in the mountain defiles. According to the statement of the son of the Chieftain of Abugosh, a Captain in the Guards, who deserted on the 21st instant from Kerek, and had been with the column ever since it quitted Damascus and El-Mezerib, Ibrahim marched from the latter place to Bilka, thence back north to Es-Salt, again south to Kerek and back to Jericho; obliged to recross the Jordan, he for a second time returned to Kerek, having lost 139 his guns, ammunition, and stores, during the continued and very harassing attacks, day and night, of the Arab bands intent on plunder.

“My last reports from El-Chalil of the 28th of January (twenty-two days after Ibrahim’s leaving El-Mezereib, and thirty-one after his retreat from Damascus) state that Hamid Bey, despairing of communicating with Ibrahim Pacha, had resolved to return to Gaza, and thence to Egypt.”

Here it appears that General Jochmus himself began to doubt the reports that were made him. We have before seen ^[40] that Captain De l’Or reported Ibrahim to have lost 10,000 men on his march to El-Mezereib, though he had 10,000 cavalry to cover his retreat, and was only followed by 3000 or 4000 irregulars, who must have been ill provisioned.

It never could have been Ibrahim’s intention to have taken the Jaffa road to Gaza, unless he intended to fight a battle, which he hardly would have risked, with his rear guard only, and after having detached Souliman to Suez; moreover he must have known of the submission of Mehemet Ali, and would certainly not have provoked the hostility of the European Powers by a breach of faith, and it is 140 well for the Turks he did not, for by all accounts his army was not in the state they supposed it was, and his cavalry was in excellent order.

Colonel Napier was with the corps of Hassan Pacha, who, although he had an opportunity of attacking Ibrahim, was too wise to attempt it. The Colonel saw Ibrahim Pacha afterwards at Alexandria, and he declared to him that the passage of the Jordan was a mere feint, which completely succeeded; and, moreover, that had he been attacked by the Turkish army, they would have been cut to pieces by his cavalry.

Fruitless Journey of the Envoys sent in quest of Ibrahim Pacha—Arrival of part of the Egyptian Army at Gaza—Promised Neutrality of the Turks—The Egyptians informed of the Cessation of Hostilities by the English Officers—Terms recommended by Mr. Wood to be imposed upon Ibrahim Pacha—Colonel Napier’s Narrative of the Retreat of Ibrahim Pacha.

On the 30th January, General Jochmus writes from Jaffa to the Admiral: “Hamid Bey, Major Wilbraham, and Selim Bey (the Turkish Commissioner,) after fruitless attempts to communicate with the Pacha (Ibrahim), have returned to Gaza ^[41] .”

This is not to be wondered at: no assistance was given them, as will be seen hereafter by Lieutenant Loring’s report, and they were reluctantly obliged to return to Gaza on the 22nd of January. Ahmed Menikli Pacha had arrived there the day before with the main body of the cavalry, and Ibrahim himself came in on the 31st, with the rest of the army, the greater part of whom must have been resurrection men, as we have seen they had been destroyed in the retreat.

142 It has been seen that General Jochmus’s report of the 17th of January, to the Admiral, of the affair of Gaza ^[42] , affirms that he intended to resume his operations when the ground became practicable, but on his arrival at Jaffa he was officially informed of the complete submission of Mehemet Ali, and the consequent cessation of the state of rebellion of his army; “our troops,” he adds, “have been ordered to cease offensive hostilities. His Excellency, the Seraskier Ahmed Zacharias Pacha, commanded in person since we left Ramla.” I presume General Jochmus means that Lieutenant Loring arrived with my despatches to the authorities in Syria.

These despatches were certainly sufficient authority for the Allies to suspend all hostilities against Ibrahim Pacha, but we shall see that notwithstanding the opinion of the British officers, difficulties were endeavoured to be thrown in the way, both by General Jochmus and Mr. Wood. It has before been shown that both General Michell and Captain Stewart, in consequence of the submission of Mehemet Ali, and the instructions from Sir Robert Stopford, had decided on taking only precautionary measures, and the Turkish authorities, 143 acting under the Admirals orders, were bound to follow the same course, notwithstanding any directions to the contrary they might have received from the Ambassador at Constantinople, whose orders, Captain Stewart justly remarks, must be subordinate to those of Lord Palmerston.

Two days after my despatches arrived at Jaffa the Seraskier received his instructions from Constantinople; the nature of them will appear in Mr. Wood’s Protest, at which I shall presently arrive: nevertheless the Seraskier, after holding a council, gave General Michell and Captain Stewart a positive assurance that no further act of hostility should take place, and that he had no wish to deprive Ibrahim Pacha of either his arms, baggage, or guns ^[43] . The Seraskier was a wise man, he knew very well he had not the power to deprive him of either the one or the other. Captain Stewart and General Michell most properly wrote to Ibrahim Pacha and the Egyptian officer in command at Gaza, to inform them of the cessation of hostilities ^[44] , and of their intention to give every possible facility for the evacuation of Syria, and the 144 embarkation of the women, children, and sick at Caiffa, or any other more convenient port; and Captain Arbuthnot and Colonel Colquhoun were despatched with the letters to Ibrahim Pacha and the Egyptian officer commanding at Gaza, and they were instructed to protest against any act of hostility the Turks might commit ^[45] .

So ignorant were the Turkish authorities of the movements of Ibrahim, who they fancied was wandering in the Desert, without an army, that on the very day on which Captain Stewart signed the instructions to Captain Arbuthnot and Colonel Colquhoun, to insist on Ibrahim retiring by Gaza in successive columns of 3000 men each, Ahmed Menikli Pacha arrived at Gaza with the main body of Ibrahim’s cavalry in excellent order, and the infantry in three columns. Ibrahim himself bringing up the rear was shortly expected: and on that day also General Jochmus and Mr. Wood, the emissary of Lord Ponsonby, wrote to the Seraskier ^[46] to inform him that the Baron Dumont having destroyed the magazine at Maan, Ibrahim’s army being cut in two, and gone back in thorough disorder, and his 150 145 guns being already in their power, according to the official orders read at the council of the preceding day Ibrahim would only be allowed the choice of two conditions,—viz.

“1. To march upon El-Arish by the south of the Dead Sea, also upon Suez, with the men, arms, and conveyance which he now possesses.

“2. To come in detachments of 3000 men by Gaza upon El-Arish, leaving his cannon in our hands, in consideration of the power which is granted to him of being permitted to follow this road, provided that he leaves all the Syrians in their country.”

The march of Ibrahim on Gaza, by the south of the Dead Sea, shows very clearly that he never had the intention of entering Palestine, and that his crossing the Jordan was a manœuvre to mislead the Turks, in which he completely succeeded, and arrived safe at Gaza, without having encountered a single outpost of the Turkish army.

Colonel Napier was attached to the Turkish division that Ibrahim forced to return to Jerusalem: the following is the Colonel’s account of their movements, as well as of what he knew of Ibrahim’s retreat.

Conduct of Mr. Wood—His Letter to the Seraskier examined—His Advice disregarded by the British Officers—Mission of Colonel Alderson to Gaza—Colonel Rose’s Account of the State of Ibrahim’s Army—Colonel Alderson’s Character of Ibrahim Pacha—Death of General Michell.

I do not think blame can be attached to General Jochmus for having done all he could to cripple Ibrahim, if he was acting under proper authority; but whether his orders were from the English Ambassador or the Sultan is not clear: both General Michell and Captain Stewart speak of the Ambassador’s orders ^[53] . If so, I do not think he was justified in obeying them; on the other hand, if his orders were from the Sultan’s minister, or from the the Seraskier, he was quite right. I think, however, he put too much reliance in the reports that were made to him of numerous loss inflicted on the Egyptian army, which he speaks of with much complacency, and which I hope and believe was very much exaggerated.

As to Mr. Wood, he was quite in a different capacity, and what right he had, as a British subject, 158 to put the interpretation he did on Sir Robert Stopford’s orders, I do not know.

In the first paragraph of his letter ^[54] , he says the women and sick were to be embarked, and that Ibrahim Pacha must provide other means of withdrawing his army; now the despatches say, women, sick, and others of the Egyptian army, which meant any portion that Ibrahim thought proper; but even if the term was not clear, as Syria was to be evacuated without delay, why was Mr. Wood to take upon himself to point out the way in which it ought to be done?

In the second paragraph he says that it is “understood that Ibrahim must re-enter Egypt by the Desert, or by El Arish, which is the direct road, and the easiest; and by leaving the road free, we act in conformity with the desire of Mazloum Bey and of the Commodore, to offer every facility for his retreat without compromising our military position.”

Mazloum Bey, in his letter to the Seraskier, read before the council, according to Mr. Wood, says the impression at Constantinople was that the Egyptian army was disorganized; but that Commodore 159 Napier undeceived him, and pretended that it was in a situation to resist the Imperial army, and that he did not venture to insist on Mehemet Ali giving up the Syrian conscripts, and his arms, guns, and military stores, agreeably to the orders of the Porte; but as they were on the spot, they must be the best judges whether or no they ought to insist on these two conditions. I do Mazloum Bey the justice of saying that he was much wiser than the Divan, for had he proposed those terms, Mehemet Ali would not have given up one ship.

Mr. Wood then goes on to advise, that in consequence of the complete disorganization of the Egyptian army, the want of provisions, and the small number of men capable of resistance, the destruction of Maan, the passage over the Desert of Souliman, and the retrograde movement of Ibrahim Pacha with a handful of men without artillery, and as there was now nothing to fear from their antagonist, he should be obliged to ask permission to come to Gaza, which should only be granted on condition of giving up the Syrian troops, his guns, stores, and arms.

According to Mr. Wood’s reasoning, this would be, affording him “the facilities required by Mazloum 160 Bey and Commodore Napier;” and “if he persisted in coming to Gaza without those conditions, he would be the aggressor, and must trust to the consequences.”

He finishes by saying, this is his humble opinion, founded on mature reflection; and he cannot conceal from himself the danger of Ibrahim coming to Gaza, where he might recruit his army, and allow his father to negotiate more advantageously. “Even now,” he adds, “his General at Gaza has instructions not to attack us, but to deliver up Gaza only with his life. From such facts, your Excellency may judge of the bad faith of the vassal who refuses to surrender his arms on the demand of his Sovereign, which renders his submission incomplete, and even doubtful.” Really, Mr. Wood is a true disciple of the Ambassador’s school; he does not perceive that not the Egyptians, but the Turks, were guilty of bad faith from beginning to end; and that, if the officer at Gaza had delivered it up, Ibrahim’s army would have been compromised.

Fortunately for the honour of the Porte there were wiser men on the spot who decided to follow neither the advice of the General nor that of the Diplomatist, and I should like to have seen the 161 faces of these latter when they heard of the arrival of Ibrahim’s cavalry, and the near approach of the infantry.

Next day the accounts came in of the arrival of the Egyptians, and Captain Stewart most wisely sent Colonel Alderson, at the desire of General Michell, with instructions ^[56] , very properly saying nothing 162 about the advance by columns of 3000 men. The mode in which Colonel Alderson acquitted himself of his delicate mission may be best told in his own words ^[55] :—

Colonel Rose, soon after this, went to Constantinople, and upon his arrival at Therapia, made a report to Lord Ponsonby on the state of Ibrahim’s army, which differs a good deal from that of the other officers. I give a short extract from the document ^[59] .

Colonel Alderson had necessarily some intercourse with Ibrahim Pacha, and his character of that renowned personage is well worth quoting.

The second day after the departure of Colonel Alderson, that good and gallant officer General Michell fell a sacrifice to the climate and the fatigue he suffered on the Gaza expedition, and Colonel Bridgeman succeeded to the command.

Colonel Alderson remarks, “The cold caught by General Michell, that wretched night of incessant rain, that followed the affair of Medjdel, under single canvass, acting on a delicate frame, arising from repeated wounds received in an hundred fights, 171 together with, I firmly believe, the mortification he felt at the result of the movement on Gaza, brought on a fever, under which poor Michell sank in a few days. He died at Jaffa on the 24th of January, at noon.

“It falls to the lot of few soldiers to earn so high a reputation in the profession as Brigadier-General Michell had done; fewer still, who to these high military acquirements have united a mind so highly cultivated. He was too well known in the military world to enable me to add anything to his well-earned reputation. I may, however, be permitted, as a friend, to say that, having been his constant companion since we left Spain together, I deeply felt and deplored his loss; and that a life so valuable to his country should have been thus so prematurely cut off.

“His remains were deposited in a vault hastily constructed by the British sappers, in what is called the English, or South-Eastern Bastion, at Jaffa, for which a marble slab is now preparing at Malta, as a slight memorial of the great respect and esteem in which he was held by his brother officers.”

Detail of the Retreat of the Egyptians—Treacherous Intentions of the Turkish Authorities—Decided Conduct of the British Officers—Guarantees exchanged—Fright of Rechid Pacha—Letter from Ibrahim to the Seraskier—The Author’s Letters to Lords Minto and Palmerston.

On the 22nd of January General Jochmus wrote to the Seraskier from Jerusalem ^[61] that as Ibrahim had passed to the south of the Dead Sea, with his disorganized army, there was no necessity for negociation, 173 and that Baron Dumont corroborated the complete defeat of the Egyptians. (I suppose he means the taking of Maan, defended by twenty men, for we have had no account of any action, therefore there could not be a defeat.) The Baron appears to have been within gun-shot of Ibrahim’s columns and did not see the artillery; it was therefore concluded that the guns were buried in the Desert, but I believe it will be found that they all arrived safe at Cairo; at all events we have not heard of their having been dug up.

174 “The cavalry,” observes the General, “are reduced to 2500 horses and 700 dismounted horsemen, in a miserable condition, and if it had not been for the Convention”—(oh! that Convention!)—“two battalions, in the almost impracticable passes of Wadi-el-Ghor, would have been sufficient to stop the columns.” To catch a bird you must put salt on his tail,—to stop the columns they must have come through the Ghor, which, according to Col. Napier, they never did, having only crossed it to the south of the Dead Sea, on their way to Gaza.

175 Hassan Pacha, who commanded the division to which Colonel Napier was attached, reported that he had sent a safe conduct to Achmet Menikli Pacha, commander of the Egyptian cavalry, and that his officer conducted him to Gaza. Colonel Napier knows nothing of this, nor does Lieutenant Loring, who, after communicating with this division, set out in search of Ibrahim, of whom he could get no tidings, and returned to Gaza; therefore the safe conduct must have existed only in Hassan Pacha’s imagination, or if he did send it, it certainly never arrived; but if it was sent, more shame to the Turkish authorities, who not only meditated attacking Ibrahim, fancying his army was destroyed, but had actually given orders to that effect. This Captain Stewart ascertained from Rechid Pacha, who admitted that orders had been sent to General Jochmus to act upon Ibrahim’s line of march, and impede it as much as possible, abstaining at the same time from any direct attack. But as Ibrahim’s troops began to arrive in a very different state from that which this gentleman expected, he changed his mind and set out for Jaffa, post haste, overtook the courier with the letter, and put it into Colonel Bridgeman’s hands, who immediately protested in the council 176 against such proceedings ^[62] , which would compromise the honour both of Great Britain and Turkey, after the guarantees that had been exchanged between Captain Stewart, Colonels Rose and Alderson, and the Egyptian Generals ^[63] . This decided conduct of Colonel 177 Bridgeman had the desired effect; promises were given that no hostile movement should be made, but every possible assistance should be afforded. These assurances were kept, but more owing to the strength of Ibrahim than to the good faith of the Turkish 178 authorities; and as for Rechid, the officer who recommended the movement against Ibrahim, I am informed by an eye-witness, that he went into Ibrahim’s presence with fear and trembling, using the words, “ Il m’assassinera ,” and absolutely stooped down and kissed the hem of his garment.

On the arrival of Ibrahim Pacha he approved of the conduct of his Generals, and made the following reply to the Seraskier:—

179 Being duly informed of the arrival of Ibrahim, and how affairs were going on in Syria, I wrote as follows to Lord Minto and Viscount Palmerston:—

Contradictory Statements as to the Numbers of the Egyptian Army—Reason for abiding by the Reports of the British Officers—Colonel Alderson’s Detail of the Retreat—General Jochmus’s Statement—Lieutenant Loring’s Mission.

It appears rather difficult to get at the exact amount of Ibrahim’s army, either when it left Damascus, or when its two divisions arrived at Gaza and Akaba. In the Levant Papers are several statements upon the subject; but they are rather contradictory ^[64] . This is not to be wondered at, as the framers of some of them must have been sorely puzzled to account for the numbers, who, in spite of famine, cold, and “the sword of the fierce and revengeful Haouranees ^[65] ,” unquestionably made their appearance ^[66] at the places I have named. I shall, therefore, prefer to abide by the statements of the British officers at Gaza, who had no former 183 reports to bolster up, and who undoubtedly have described things precisely as they fell under their observation.

By Colonel Bridgeman’s report ^[67] , Ibrahim brought to Gaza 15,000 infantry and 6000 or 7000 cavalry. Lieutenant Loring, who was charged by me with superintending the evacuation, gave the infantry at 23,550 men, and the cavalry 6440, independent of Souliman’s division of 5000 men, and 175 pieces of artillery ^[68] who marched from El-Mezereib to Akaba and Suez, by the way of Maan, at which latter place he provisioned himself for his march, arrived safely at Cairo, and by all the information I received at Alexandria, and what Souliman Pacha communicated to Colonel Napier at the former place, he did not lose a gun, and the Colonel was himself an eye-witness to the excellent state of his cavalry. This enumeration of Lieutenant Loring’s does not include the noncombatants.

Colonel Alderson, who was with the naval officer, carried up the amount of Ibrahim’s army to 33,000 men ^[69] , besides Souliman’s force. He remarks, 184 in a private document with which I have keen favoured:

“It appears Ibrahim commenced his retreat from Damascus on the 29th of December to El-Mezereib: at the latter place he divided his forces into five columns ^[70] : 1st, the artillery and guns ^[71] , women, &c., via the Desert and Suez, under Souliman Pacha; 2nd, the cavalry, consisting of ten regiments, under Achmet Menekli Pacha; two of them (the cavalry of the Guards) were recalled to join Ibrahim, after he recrossed the Jordan, near Jericho; the 3rd and 4th, each consisting of five regiments of infantry; 185 and lastly Ibrahim himself, with three regiments of foot guards, the two cavalry regiments of the guard as before stated, and from 300 to 400 Arnauts, Henadi, and 300 rifles. Each of these last four divisions had orders to make the best of their way to Gaza.

“When they left Damascus they had only sixteen days’ provisions, in addition to which they obtained a small supply of flour at El-Mezereib. The cavalry were sixteen days on the march, the infantry twenty-seven and twenty-eight, and Ibrahim’s corps thirty-four. Small supplies were occasionally received from the villages, but they avoided the great towns, and made for the Dead Sea, which they kept sight of, and approached as near as the nature of the country would allow.”

Colonel Alderson, who was an eye-witness an eye-witness of their arrival at Gaza, and collected all the information he could, states that Ibrahim left Damascus with 62,499 souls, including women and children; there arrived at Gaza, independent of women and children, 27,000 regular troops, of which 4250 were cavalry, and 3200 irregulars; the garrison of Gaza consisted of 2800 men. Thus, then, 33,000 men either embarked from Gaza or marched from thence 186 between the 23rd of January and the 19th of February, besides 9215 under Souliman Pacha, who marched to Suez.

Colonel Alderson’s account stands thus:

Be it remembered this loss of human life took place after the submission of Mehemet Ali on the 11th of December, and the greater part after his submission had been accepted by the Porte. The poor sufferers had taken no interest in the contest, but had been dragged from their homes to gratify the ambition of Mehemet Ali; why, then, after his submission were they not allowed to retire in safety? Where was the merit of forcing Ibrahim through the Desert, when he might have taken the shortest road to Gaza, where he had depôts of provisions? These men lost their lives, not in open war with the 187 Turkish army, which they never saw, but were plundered and butchered by the Arabs; therefore there was no great credit due to those who were the authors of such measures, barbarous in themselves, and, as I have already shown, contrary to the opinion of Austria, (who would most probably be supported by the Allied Powers,) who had declared they would disavow any attack on Ibrahim Pacha ^[72] .

General Jochmus, in his letter to Sir Robert Stopford, dated the 15th of February ^[73] , states the remains of Ibrahim’s army to be 19,000 men; and from the reports of the Turkish and European staff-officers sent to ascertain the numbers, the estimate, he says, is quite correct. General Jochmus makes his calculation from the reports of his officers, which must be received with caution. Captain de L’Or gave Ibrahim’s losses in five days at 10,000 men; this was considered by the English officers very much exaggerated, nor do I see how Ibrahim and Souliman, who were both good generals, could have met with such a loss, unpursued as they were by a regular army, and having nearly 10,000 cavalry to 188 cover their retreat and protect them from the few irregulars that followed them, and who, if they did not behave better than those Colonel Napier had under his command ^[74] , would never have come within sight of them, and it is more than probable, picked up the stragglers only.

Lieutenant Loring, in his report ^[75] ; states that he did not reach Caiffa till the 15th of January; the weather had been very boisterous and the steamers were hardly seaworthy. Having procured horses at Acre, he proceeded along the coast, through Tortura and Cesarea, and arrived on the 17th at Jaffa, where were stationed the greater part of the Turkish forces, having returned from their demonstration on Gaza the day before.

On the same evening, by the advice of General Michell, he proceeded to Jerusalem in company with Major Wilbraham and Selim Bey, who was the bearer of a letter from the Seraskier to Ibrahim; he was also provided with a firman to the Governor and Scheiks to assist them on the road. On arriving at Jerusalem they found Hassan Pacha had marched 189 on Halil (Hebron) with 8000 men and six pieces of artillery.

Thither they proceeded and arrived the same evening. On acquainting Hassan Pacha with their mission, he was easily persuaded to return to Jerusalem; they then pushed forward, but instead of getting information from the authorities, Abder Rahman, the scheik of the El-Halil district, plainly told them that he would neither give them information nor assistance, and there is no doubt whatever he was acting under orders from the Turkish authorities. Abder Rahman must have known where Ibrahim’s army was, because he had just returned from Maan, to which place he had accompanied the Baron Dumont on his excursion to destroy the magazines; in which, however, the Baron failed, as Souliman’s division had passed through the day before and pretty nearly cleared the stores. Finding it impossible to advance with any prospect of meeting Ibrahim, they returned to Gaza, where they found Achmet Menekli Pacha had arrived with the greater part of the cavalry. He made bitter complaints of the conduct of the Arabs, and Lieutenant Loring immediately proceeded to Jaffa to remonstrate with the Turkish authorities on the 190 conduct of their officers. From Jaffa he returned to Gaza with Captain Stewart and Colonel Rose, accompanied by Rechid Pacha, and everything appeared settled in an amicable manner with Achmet Pacha to facilitate as much as possible the evacuation of Syria.

Mr. Loring was present some hours after, when Rechid Pacha, to the utter astonishment of the British officers, declared his intention of immediately returning to Jaffa, confessing at the same time that he had sent orders for the advance of the Turkish troops to endeavour to cut off the communication between the division at Gaza and those hourly expected from the Desert. As has been already shown ^[76] , the spirited remonstrance of Captain Stewart and Colonel Bridgeman put a stop to this infamous proceeding.

Embarkation of the Egyptians—Mode in which it was conducted—Departure of Ibrahim Pacha—Retreat of Souliman’s Division—Complete Evacuation of Syria—Letter of Lord Ponsonby—Delivery of the Turkish Fleet—Anxiety of Mehemet Ali for the safety of his Army—Letter from Boghos Bey to the Author on the subject.

The season of the year was very unpropitious for embarking troops on the coast of Syria, nevertheless Mehemet Ali, who had no idea of difficulties or the risk he ran of losing his ships at Gaza, which is at the very bottom of the Mediterranean, and from whence there is no escape should the wind blow on the land, sent three transports, two steamers, two corvettes, and a brig of war, from Alexandria, with directions to carry the troops to Damietta. The surf is generally so high on the coast that six days out of seven embarking troops is attended with great danger. The Egyptian admiral and generals were indefatigable in their exertions; they seldom left the beach night or day, and Ibrahim himself, when he recovered, was frequent in his attendance. The poor Arabs, whether sick or well, were obliged to strip, take their clothes on their heads, and wade up 192 to their armpits, and were then bundled into the boats like so much lumber; the women and children were treated in the same manner. Human life is little thought of amongst either Turks or Egyptians.

Ibrahim Pacha remained to the last, and embarked on the 18th of February on board the Hadji Baba, and landed at Damietta; the same day a regiment of cavalry or of cuirassiers, and two corps of irregular horse, marched for El-Arish, and the town was shortly after taken possession of by a Turkish regiment of cavalry.

As to the retreat of Souliman Pacha’s column I am not able to speak very particularly. Some documents that would have given the whole detail, had they arrived, have not reached me. I believe, however, that after parting from the main body at El-Mezereib on the 4th of January, the column reached Maan on the 13th, supplied themselves with provisions, and then pursued their route to Akaba, where the guns and stores were embarked and carried to Suez, to which port the troops repaired overland, and arrived there in tolerable condition and with very little loss, reaching Cairo about the middle of February.

193 Thus terminated the evacuation of Syria, and after comparing the different reports, the loss of the Egyptians could not have been less than 10,000 men, (besides women and children,) the greater part of whom most probably deserted, and were destroyed by the Arabs. The Turkish army never came in contact with them, except in the affair at Medjdel; they were, however, followed and harassed by irregulars, and also suffered from want of provisions; but under all circumstances the retreat seems to have been well conducted. Ibrahim’s crossing the Jordan was a masterly manœuvre; it alarmed the Turks, saved Gaza, and greatly facilitated his arrival there. The Turkish army appear to have followed a very prudent course by taking up a position to cover Jerusalem, Acre, and Jaffa, thereby securing those places against a breach of faith on the part of Ibrahim, had he entertained any notion of the sort; and it is just as well they never came in contact: Ibrahim was well provided with cavalry, and that is an arm of which the Turkish soldiers are very apprehensive, and I have no idea they could have maintained themselves steady enough in square to resist an attack of cavalry.

Had the Convention been adopted by Sir Robert 194 Stopford in the first instance the loss of life incurred in this retreat might have been saved, and the country would have suffered much less than it did. Nothing has been gained by its rejection; it stipulated for the delivery of the Turkish fleet, the evacuation of Syria, and the confirmation of Mehemet Ali in the hereditary government of Egypt, all of which have now been obtained, with the loss, it is true, of some thousands of human beings, who were not at all interested in the war. General Jochmus thinks that the military question has been decided, and that the Turks drove Ibrahim out of Syria; it is very certain that Ibrahim marched out of Syria, harassed by the different tribes, but the Turkish army might just as well have been at Constantinople; in fact, they were just where they ought to have been, and the only fault committed by the Turkish authorities was giving directions to the different tribes to harass Ibrahim’s retreat, which was quite improper after the unconditional submission Mehemet Ali sent to the Porte by Captain Fanshawe. This submission, too, was well known in Syria at the time they were thus acting, for we learn from Captain Stewart that on the 9th of January the Gorgon arrived at Jaffa, bringing the 195 news that the Pacha’s submission had been accepted by the Porte ^[77] .

The British Ambassador, I find, has not hesitated to take upon himself the responsibility of the attempts made by General Jochmus to destroy Ibrahim’s whole army. The following is his letter to Lord Palmerston, for he shall speak for himself:—

I have already mentioned the arrival of the Turkish Commissioners at Alexandria, and the formal delivery of the fleet ^[79] on the 11th of January, which sailed on the 20th of that month from Alexandria; and the greatest credit is due to 197 Admiral Walker for his exertions in fitting out that fleet, many of which were obliged to be lightened even to their ballast, and take in their guns and stores outside; this they did without anchoring, and got clear of the land before sunset. Mehemet Ali having parted in good faith with this valuable deposit, became alarmed about the fate of his son and his army, and though he complained little to me in person, desired Boghos Bey to write to me on the subject.

In consequence of this application, I wrote the letters to the British and Turkish authorities in Syria already given ^[80] , and did everything I could to tranquillize the Pacha’s mind, and assured him that I felt perfectly satisfied Captain Stewart would do all in his power to oblige the Turks to keep faith.

Examination of the Conduct of the Allied Ministers at Constantinople—Lord Ponsonby’s Propositions regarding the Hereditary Government of Egypt— Approved Approved by the other Allied Ministers, but on consideration rejected by them—Lord Palmerston’s Conversation with the Turkish Minister—Note of the Four Powers in favour of the Hereditary Tenure.

It is now proper to examine a little into the conduct of the Allied Ministers at Constantinople, who, of course, had some influence over the Porte, and exercised it, in framing the Hatti Sheriff reinstating Mehemet Ali in the government of Egypt; and I shall take the Levant Correspondence to guide me in my criticism; for although a great deal of that is no doubt suppressed, there still remains enough to form an opinion on the wisdom of the Allied Ministers.

I shall take the British Ambassador in hand first, as he had more influence, and took a more prominent part than the Ambassadors and Ministers of the other powers.

After the news of the surrender of the Turkish fleet arrived at Constantinople, Lord Ponsonby 200 wrote to the Internuncio and to M. Titow ^[81] , recommending conditions which should be attached to the grant of the hereditary pachalic of Egypt to Mehemet Ali, which they approved of in the first instance, but on reconsideration, they, like wise men, rejected.

Lord Ponsonby, in his letter to Lord Palmerston ^[82] , states, that he will follow his Lordship’s instructions of the 17th of December, and do all he can to secure the Sultan against the evil designs of Mehemet Ali, and preserve the people of Egypt in future from the oppression which they have hitherto endured. “I am convinced there is no way of doing both, so certain, as that which your Lordship says you wish would be taken, viz.: taking the collection of the revenue out of the hands of the Pacha.” I see nothing of the sort in Lord Palmerston’s letter; he gives an opinion that the Porte will be able to make certain regulations for the government of Egypt, but not one word is said about the collection of the revenue; and surely it was not statesmanlike of Lord Ponsonby advising the Porte to impose conditions on 201 Mehemet Ali which they had no power of enforcing, for Lord Ponsonby knew full well that neither England, or the other Powers, could touch Egypt, without provoking a war with France. He says, “The Austrians desire to put a sudden end (as they suppose they can do) to the question here, by yielding every thing to the Pacha. Your Lordship desires to establish future security both for the Sultan and his Egyptian subjects. My duty is to follow your orders; but could I be shaken in that duty by the exertions of the Austrians, I should be still deterred from acting with them for such a purpose, by my own knowledge that all this question is to be most rigidly scrutinized in Parliament, and that severe censure would fall upon me if I deviated from your instructions ^[83] .”

I do indeed hope that Parliament will scrutinize his conduct, and ascertain whether or not it is true that the Ambassador instructed General Jochmus to follow up hostilities after the submission of Mehemet Ali ^[84] , and thereby cause the death of some 202 thousands of human beings, which was just as bad, if not worse than the chase of the negroes in Nubia, of which Lord Ponsonby speaks with such horror ^[85] . The only difference between the two is, that the chase of the negroes was the custom of the country, whereas the chase of the Egyptians from Syria was not according to the custom of civilized nations, as it was carried on after the submission of Mehemet Ali, and when there was not the least necessity for it.

The British Ambassador, in writing to Baron Stürmer and M. Titow, quotes the 3rd, 5th, and 6th Articles of the Treaty of the 15th of July ^[86] , and makes a budget for the Pacha, showing the resources of Egypt in the year 1833 ^[87] to be 62,778,750 piastres, while the expenditure was only 49,951,500, which may have been correct or not; but it appears to me that the tribute Mehemet was to pay to the Porte on his being reinstated in the government of Egypt, ought to have been fixed by the state of the revenue and expenditure in 1841, when the war ceased.

203 The proposition his Excellency makes is, that the Sultan should issue a firman, giving the hereditary government of Egypt to Mehemet Ali; but he is to bear in mind that Egypt was just to be considered like any other pachalic of the Turkish empire, and at a future time he should be made acquainted with the nature and extent of his administrative powers ^[88] .

All this would have been very well had the power of the Porte alone put down Mehemet Ali, and then had the means of enforcing the firman; but the Ambassador must have known full well, that had Mehemet Ali been left to himself, he could have dictated terms to the Sultan, and that, even after all the losses he met with in Syria, occasioned by the Allied Powers, and the losses he met with in his retreat by the bad faith of the Turks, he was still in a position to resist the whole power of the Turkish empire.

M. Titow, as well as Baron Stürmer and Count Königsmark, as I have before stated, at first agreed with Lord Ponsonby ^[89] , but asked his opinion about the restrictive clause relating to the nomination of 204 the successor of Mehemet Ali. Their approval of the British Ambassador’s proposal seems to have thrown his Excellency off his guard, and he wrote to M. Titow:

“I reply at once to your question, and I say that I think it will be more prudent to keep everything like specific arrangement for the settlement that will flow from the assertion and establishment of the Sultan’s sovereign authority and right. You will observe that I used the expression, ‘hereditary in the family of Mehemet Ali,’ which cannot tie up the Sultan’s right to specify the mode in which the succession shall take place; and if it should be argued hereafter that the succession should be in the direct line, (and, as it is called, by representation,) the answer would be easy, that nothing of the sort is known to Turkish law, nor is usual in the East, succession being commonly regulated by very different principles.

“I do not see any inconvenience in leaving this matter untouched, but I do fear that any thing that might give Mehemet Ali ground for discussion and dispute at this moment might be inconvenient, and would be seized upon by him. He cannot deny the Sultan’s sovereignty, which he has already admitted; 205 it will be impossible for him to refuse the hereditary right, as it is expressed, without denying, at the same time, the sovereignty of the Sultan already acknowledged.”

The alteration of the opinion of the Allied Ministers only appears in Lord Ponsonby’s letter to Baron Stürmer two days after, in which he withdraws his proposal ^[90] . He, however, alludes to a letter from Baron Stürmer, communicating this change of opinion, in which the Baron asks, “Have we any right to act according to our fancies, when the route we have to pursue is clearly traced to us?”

To which Lord Ponsonby replies, “Certainly not; and in conformity with your just notions, I will continue to act, without the smallest deviation, upon the instructions of December 17, which have already been made known to you, but which, to avoid error, I transcribe literatim from the document.

“‘It will indeed be necessary, that in reinstating Mehemet Ali in the Pachalic of Egypt, care should be taken to make such arrangements as would protect the people of Egypt from a continuance of 206 the tyrannical oppression by which they have of late years been crushed, and should secure the Sultan against a renewal of those hostilities which have compelled him to have recourse to the aid of his Allies. But the means of effecting all these purposes may be found in the stipulations of the Treaty of the 15th of July, without removing Mehemet Ali from his Pachalic. The Treaty says, that all the laws of the Turkish Empire, and all the Treaties of the Porte, shall apply to Egypt, just as much as to any other province of the Sultan’s dominions; and the land and sea forces which may be maintained by the Pacha of Egypt, shall be part of the forces of the empire, and be kept up for the service of the State.

“‘Under these stipulations, the Sultan will of course be able, by an exercise of his legislative authority, to establish unity of flag, and of military and naval uniform, throughout all his provinces; to limit the number of troops which each province shall, according to its population, maintain; to regulate the mode of enforcing the conscription, so as to protect the people from undue burthens and oppressive levies; to fix the number and class of ships of war which shall belong to the several naval ports of his dominions; to fix the manner in which 207 commissions in the army and navy shall be granted in his name, and by his authority; to determine that a single monetary system shall prevail throughout all his dominions, and that there shall be but one Mint. The Treaty specifies, that none but the legal imposts should be levied in Egypt, which will secure the people from undue exactions; and the execution of the Convention of 1838, by which all monopolies are to be abolished, will at once free the industry of the people of Egypt from those oppressive restrictions which have hitherto kept the great mass of the population in the most abject poverty, and which have gradually thrown out of cultivation extensive tracts of land that were formerly tilled and productive.

“‘By such means it seems to Her Majesty’s Government, that future security might be afforded, both to the Sultan and to his Egyptian subjects, against the disposition of Mehemet Ali to rebel against his Sovereign, and to oppress the people of the province he would have to govern.’

“The above constitute the sole rule I can follow, and they are the only words I am at liberty to use in the counsel I shall consent to give to the Sublime Porte.”

208 The reader will observe these instructions were merely general, and ought to have been followed only so far as the Porte had the power of enforcing them; besides, at the time they were given, Lord Palmerston was not aware what force Mehemet Ali had in Egypt; and there is not a word in these instructions to lead Lord Ponsonby to suppose that Lord Palmerston would have recommended the Porte to set aside Ibrahim Pacha, which was evidently Lord Ponsonby’s aim.

His Lordship finishes his letter to the Baron by observing, that as Mehemet Ali had rejected the Treaty of the 15th of July, the Allies are free to act as they think proper. However free they might have been, they always declared they should abide by the basis of the Treaty of the 15th of July, which was acknowledged by my Convention, and also by the instructions of the 15th of October, which Lord Palmerston quotes in his despatch of the 17th of December,—that despatch which the British Ambassador takes for the guide of conduct, viz.: “Your Excellency and your colleagues will, of course, have given to the Porte the advice specified in my despatch of the 15th of October to your Excellency:” and again, “In fact these articles of 209 agreement were substantially a complete surrender on the part of Mehemet Ali, and he was led to suppose, that in asking for hereditary tenure, he was only asking that which the Porte was willing to give ^[91] .”

Lord Palmerston writes still more strongly to the Ambassador, under date of the 29th January ^[92] , in which, relating a conversation he had had with the Turkish Minister in London, he says, in reply to the unwillingness of the Porte to grant the hereditary pachalic communicated to him by Chekib Effendi, “I said, that in all affairs, one must be content with what is practicable, and not endanger what has been obtained by striving after that which is unattainable. I said, that it is clear that Mehemet Ali has made his submission in the expectation that he should obtain hereditary tenure in Egypt: now if, after all, this tenure were to be refused to him, what would probably be the consequence?—renewed revolt, or an attitude, at least, of passive resistance. What would then be the remedy? Such a state of things could not be allowed to continue, because if it lasted, it would 210 amount to the separation of Egypt from the Turkish Empire. But the Sultan, has not, at present, naval or military means sufficient to enforce his authority, in such a case, over Mehemet Ali in Egypt. The Sultan, would, therefore, be obliged to have recourse for aid to his Allies. But the measures hitherto agreed upon by the Four Powers in virtue of the Treaty of July, are confined to the expulsion of the Egyptians from Syria, Arabia, and Candia, and to the driving of Mehemet Ali’s forces and authorities back within the limits of Egypt. If, then, the Sultan were to apply to the Four Powers for assistance to attack Mehemet Ali in Egypt itself, a new deliberation of the Conference would become necessary.

“Now, I said to Chekib, I could tell him beforehand what would be the result of that deliberation, if the assistance asked for by the Sultan were required in consequence of the Sultan’s refusal to comply with the advice given him by the Four Powers, to confer upon Mehemet Ali hereditary tenure of his Egyptian pachalic. I said I knew perfectly well that the Four Powers would decline giving the Sultan such assistance; and what then would happen? Why, the Sultan would, in consequence, 211 find himself, for want of sufficient means of his own, obliged to grant to Mehemet Ali, with a bad grace, and after an ineffectual attempt to avoid doing so, that which he might now make a merit of conferring willingly; and thus, instead of performing, as he now may do, an act of sovereign power, at the suggestion of his Allies, he would appear to all the world as making an extorted concession to a subject.

“I said that I would not attempt to represent as being of no value or importance a sacrifice which is unquestionably a great one, because such a representation could not convince the Sultan. But I begged Chekib Effendi to request his Government to consider the immense importance of the moral and physical strength which the Sultan has gained by the events of the few last months, and to remember that all which the Sultan has gained, Mehemet Ali has lost. That thus their relative positions have been so entirely changed, that the Pacha can never again become really dangerous or seriously troublesome to the Sultan, if the Sultan avails himself properly of the stipulations of the Treaty of July; and if he shall well organize his army, navy, and finances, and shall place those 212 branches of his public service upon an efficient footing. I desired Chekib Effendi to bear in mind that the Sultan has recovered, for his direct authority, the whole of Syria, Arabia, and Candia; points which, with reference to military, naval, financial, and religious considerations, are of the utmost importance, and for the recovery of which the Sultan would, at this time last year, have gladly made very considerable sacrifices. I further reminded him, that a faithful execution of that stipulation of the Treaty of July, which says, that all the laws and treaties of the empire are to apply to Egypt as to any other province, will afford a most essential security for the sovereign authority of the Sultan. I therefore requested Chekib Effendi to urge his Government to conclude this matter without further delay, because it is of great importance for all parties concerned, that it should be brought to a final settlement as soon as possible.

“Chekib Effendi promised me to write to Rechid Pacha to this effect, and he said that he had no doubt that the Sultan will comply with the advice of his Allies.”

The day after this conversation, and in conformity with Lord Palmerston’s views, the Allied 213 Ministers sent a note to Chekib Effendi, expressing their opinion that the Sultan should confer on the descendants of Mehemet Ali in the direct line, the Pachalic of Egypt ^[93] .

Determination of the Allied Courts to secure the Hereditary Pachalic for Mehemet Ali—Correspondence between Baron Sturmer and Lord Ponsonby—Decisive Instructions from Lord Palmerston to Lord Ponsonby—Conference of the Allied Ministers with Rechid Pacha—Project for settling the Egyptian Question—Lord Ponsonby’s Observations at the Conference—The Firmans decided on—Refusal of Lord Ponsonby to allow the English Consul-General to return to Egypt—Lord Ponsonby’s Letter to Rechid Pacha.

Before the last communication could reach the British Ambassador, indeed before it was written, Baron Stürmer in a letter of the 7th of January ^[94] , had told him that Prince Metternich had written in the most peremptory terms, that the Four Courts had pronounced that the hereditary succession in the functions of the Government of Egypt should be granted to the family of Mehemet Ali , and he finishes by condoling with Lord Ponsonby, that the Allies have destroyed the hope they both had of seeing the power of Mehemet Ali crumble to pieces. He adds, “My part is played, and it only remains for me to await in silence the orders which 215 my Government may be pleased to transmit to me, and execute them scrupulously.”

The English Ambassador, in no way daunted, replies ^[95] , “It is wholly indifferent what may be the private opinion of any of us as to this question, which is the affair of our Governments, and for which none of us are responsible; but it is another thing to act ‘without orders,’ and I will not incur ‘that’ responsibility, and therefore I must decline acting in concert with you until I am authorized to take the steps you propose, by instructions to that effect. It is necessary I should acquaint our colleagues and the Ottoman Ministers with my position, and I shall do so without loss of time. I have been told by the best authority, including yourself, if I mistake not, that your Government had not decided to grant the hereditary right to Mehemet Ali; and at the Conference it did appear that you had no authority to mention that point. This matter, however, is not of a very recent date, and it is not at all impossible that more than one alteration may have taken place in the language or opinion of that Government, and that which is erroneous now, may have been right before, or possibly may be so 216 again, for in this affair there has been a perpetual fluctuation of circumstances. If my Government has not sent me orders, it cannot be for want of time, as they would have reached me through Vienna as soon as the instruction you have received.”

The Ambassador wrote in the same sense to M. Titow and Count Königsmark ^[96] , complaining of the breathless haste they were proceeding in, in recommending the hereditary succession, and urging every argument to prevent it in the first instance; all of which happily failed, and at last he got decided instructions from home, which produced a couple of short notes to the other Ministers and M. Pisani.

Lord Palmerston, in a short letter of February 10 ^[97] , approves of the Ambassador’s conduct, without stating whether it was the long correspondence to endeavour to induce the Allied Ministers not to recommend the grant of the hereditary tenure, or the short correspondence recommending the grant to be confirmed.

Notwithstanding that Lord Ponsonby had been foiled in his first attempt to prevent the Porte from conferring the hereditary pachalic on Mehemet Ali, he was not discouraged, and returned to the charge with fresh vigour, on the question of attaching such conditions to the hereditary title, as would render it worse than useless; and I have shown that on reflection, the Allied Ministers altered their 218 opinion, and Lord Ponsonby in consequence withdrew his proposal.

On the 4th of February the Allied Ministers were invited to a conference with Rechid Pacha, who laid before them his project of definitively settling the Egyptian question, which was as follows:—

Lord Ponsonby, being first called upon for his opinion, stated, he had no objection to offer, but 220 after his colleagues had spoken he should make some observations on the Tribute. The other Ministers gave their assent to the propositions of Rechid Pacha; the arguments they used Lord Ponsonby does not report to Lord Palmerston, as they would appear in the Protocol, but which Protocol is not, I suppose for some wise purpose, inserted in the Levant Papers . We must, then, content ourselves with the British Ambassador’s own observations. He begins by stating, that Mehemet Ali having been deposed, and the Porte appealed to, to reinstate him, sufficiently proves that the Treaty of the 15th of July does not bind the Allies. His Lordship, I believe, was singular in this opinion, for it has been distinctly and repeatedly stated by the Allied Ministers both in London, Vienna, and Constantinople, that the Treaty of the 15th of July should be the basis of the settlement of the Egyptian question; and in no part of the correspondence does it appear that the Allies approved of the deposition of Mehemet Ali, and it may therefore be fairly inferred that they entirely disapproved of it.

His Lordship takes for granted the Treaty is not an absolute rule, and thus observes:

221 “If the Treaty be not the absolute rule, why are we to counsel the Sublime Porte to take a measure that was adopted in that Treaty, at a time when affairs were in a state totally different from their actual state? The Treaty was a compromise with Mehemet Ali, and all its stipulations were conditional, and with a view to engage him to accept it. Mehemet Ali decided to refuse the Treaty, and to try the chance of arms. He has been vanquished, and he has made unconditional submission to his Sovereign. How then can the Treaty be obligatory upon the Allies, (of whom the Sultan is one,) to take the measures framed for another position of affairs which has ceased to exist?

“If then the Treaty be not obligatory upon the Allies, the counsel to be given by us to the Ottoman Porte is to be based upon the instructions we have received from our Courts; and we are not to advise the Porte to adopt measures that are impossible to be reconciled one with another, and contradictory, so as that one measure, if adopted, shall defeat almost every other measure which we are ordered to recommend.”

The document is much too long, but may be seen in the Levant Papers . The burden of it is, that 222 Mehemet Ali should be crippled in his finances to prevent him doing further mischief; and the Ambassador finishes by saying, “I have reason to believe my colleagues entertain an opinion different from mine. They have had before them for their consideration consideration the instructions from Lord Palmerston so often referred to. They are possibly better able to interpret them than I may be, but I understand them in the sense I have described; and it is for others, not for me, to decide, and to take such part as they may esteem the best. Those whom I have now addressed can judge, as well as I can do, what is the opinion of the British Government. My opinion is of little importance, excepting to myself, but I must stand before my country and justify my acts ^[99] .”

All this would have been right enough if the Porte had the power to enforce it, but not having the power, they only exposed their own weakness to Mehemet Ali, and gave him an opportunity of treating their overtures with the contempt they deserved.

On the 15th of February Rechid Pacha officially delivered to M. Pisani, Lord Ponsonby’s dragoman, 223 copies of the firman granting the hereditary succession, the firman for governing the provinces bordering on Egypt, as likewise an official note to the four Ministers, and a letter from the Vizier to Mehemet Ali ^[100] , communicating to them at the same time, that the Consuls might proceed to Alexandria in the steam-boat, which would leave in the afternoon without fail. This information had been privately communicated by the dragoman to Lord Ponsonby on the 13th.

Nothing was, however, further from his Lordship’s intention than allowing the British Consul-General to return. He appears to have been dissatisfied because he was not consulted before the measure was decided on, and he informed the Turkish Minister that he should not require the Consul-General to return, because it might not suit the British Government to establish the Consul-General on the same footing as before; that Mehemet Ali might refuse; and lastly, that Colonel Hodges could not leave Constantinople so suddenly ^[101] . Of these three arguments the only valid 224 one seems to be, the probability of Mehemet Ali’s refusing the conditions; but even granting that, it would have been more politic to have sent the Consuls with the Turkish Commissioner who bore the firmans, with orders to persuade Mehemet Ali, if possible, to accept them, and to signify to him at the same time that the flags would not be hoisted till that point was arranged. They being on the spot, and in an official capacity, furnished with instructions from the Ambassador at Constantinople, would have seen how far it was possible for Mehemet Mehemet Ali to accept the firman without risking the tranquillity of Egypt, and would necessarily have more influence on the Pacha than I could have, being totally unprovided with instructions, and not having received a single line from the Ambassador to guide my conduct.

On the 15th of February Lord Ponsonby wrote officially to Rechid Pacha ^[102] , disowning having had any thing to do with the firman, and stating that he never had been consulted at all, or knew any thing about it, till every thing was decided, and ordered to be sent to Alexandria. The fact is, the Porte saw that Lord Ponsonby was determined to keep the question open, and therefore arranged the firman 225 without asking his advice. What that advice might have been is hard to say; but we must infer that had he been consulted, the firman would have been much more stringent than it was, and which, as it turned out, was not palatable to the Pacha, who absolutely constrained the Porte to alter it, and give him more favourable terms; in this, as we shall see, he was supported by the majority of the Ambassadors.

Delay in forwarding the Firmans to Mehemet Ali—Instructions to the Commissioner—The Author’s Visit to the Egyptian Flag-ship—Substance of the Firmans—Objections of the Pacha—The Author’s Advice—Letter to Lord Palmerston—The Author’s last Interview with Mehemet Ali—Return to Malta—Correspondence with Sir Robert Stopford—Return to England.

Although it had been distinctly stated to Mehemet Ali in the Vizier’s letter of the 12th of January, (in consequence of the remonstrance of the Allies) ^[103] , 227 that he should be confirmed in the hereditary government of Egypt after the delivery of the fleet and his complete submission, still the confirmation was delayed for a considerable time, and the firman did not arrive at Alexandria until the 20th of February, and was brought by Said Muhib Effendi, who was instructed to read the firman ^[104] in full divan, and if rejected by the Pacha, he was to exhort him to receive it. He was also the bearer of the fez and the nisham of the Vizier, which Mehemet Ali was to wear on the day the firman was 228 read. He was to inform him, that in consequence of his advanced age, the Sultan did not require him to go to Constantinople to receive his investiture, but that one of his sons was expected to thank the Sultan in person for the signal favour conferred on his father. He was further instructed, in the event of Mehemet Ali’s remonstrating against any part of the firman, to send back the steamboat for further orders; but in the event of the Pacha’s rejecting the firman, he was to demand that the rejection should be in writing.

The day after the arrival of the firman, Mehemet 229 Ali visited the Liverpool steamer, and from thence invited me on board the Egyptian Admiral’s ship. The old man appeared in low spirits, but nevertheless, he seemed proud of pointing out the cleanliness and order that reigned in every part of his ship. On entering the cabin, the whole of the guns were fired at once, and the rest of the squadron followed the example of the flag-ship. He conducted me through every part of this magnificent vessel, and it was quite impossible to conceive any ship better fitted in every respect. After the inspection the drums beat to quarters, and in less than three minutes she was ready for action. The men were well trained, and the guns exercised with great alacrity, though not quite in the style of the Excellent. The magazine was opened, the powder-boxes handed up, the rigging stoppered, fire-engines and buckets at hand, and large tubs full of water were placed along both the lower and main deck in great abundance. After the gun exercise, a party were paraded with their cutlasses and muskets, and it was altogether surprising to see how well the poor Arabs went through their exercises. The yards were then manned; but in this part of their manœuvres they were not quite so expert.

230 After the exercises were over, we retired into the cabin, and I ventured to ask if he was satisfied with the news from Constantinople, at which he shook his head, and expressed a desire to see me in his palace. On arriving there he begged me to sit beside him on the divan, pipes and coffee were called for as usual, and through the medium of his interpreter, he communicated the substance of the firman ^[105] , which he also gave me in writing; it is as follows:—

Another firman conferred upon the Pacha the government (not hereditary) of the provinces of Nubia, Darfour, Kordofan, and Sennaar. This firman forbids the incursion of the troops into these provinces, who had been permitted to seize the inhabitants, male and female, and retain them as slaves in lieu of pay. He was also prohibited from reducing the slaves to the state of eunuchs, a common practice in Egypt.

The Pacha pointed out to me how impossible it was to comply with the firman relative to the hereditary title. That in the first place, with respect to the Porte choosing his successor from 234 any of his family, that it was a blow directed against Ibrahim Pacha, which was both unjust and impolitic. That he was his eldest son, and well worthy of succeeding him; besides which, even if he consented to such a condition, it was by no means clear that Ibrahim would, and even if he did, it would sow the seeds of dissension in his family. That as to the appointment of his officers, it had always been the practice to allow the Pacha of Egypt to appoint them up to the rank of General, and that the proposed restrictions would dissatisfy the army, and probably cause a mutiny. The 3rd Article, stipulating that he was to pay a fourth of the revenue of Egypt to the Porte, appeared to him oppressive to Egypt. He asked my advice how to act in his present position. This was a delicate question; I had no instructions from home, nor from the Admiral, who was at Malta, and no communication of any description from Lord Ponsonby, and simply a letter from Colonel Hodges, stating the fact of the firmans having been sent, and his opinion that the conditions would not be accepted by the Pacha.

The reasons the Pacha gave for rejecting parts of the firman were so just and so strong, that I did not 235 hesitate to express my opinion that they ought not to be accepted, and I advised him to write to the Porte, and respectfully point out the impossibility of his accepting such terms.

I knew in doing this I was taking a good deal of responsibility on myself, as it was probable these terms had been suggested to the Porte by some of the Ambassadors, if not by all; but, being on the spot, and seeing that should Ibrahim, who was at the head of a large army, resist, and be supported in his resistance by the officers of the army, which was pretty certain, the whole country would be thrown into confusion, I knew I should incur censure for not taking upon myself the responsibility of advising the Pacha to adopt what I thought was the safest course. Had the British and the other Consuls been at Alexandria, I should have left it entirely to them.

The following is my letter to Lord Palmerston, relating the whole occurrence:—

My last interview with the Pacha was not of a very pleasant nature; for the first time, he neither offered me a pipe, nor took one himself, and was in very ill humour. I pressed him hard about the Syrians, which he evaded; and I told him I should speak to him no more on the subject, but should address an official letter to Boghos Bey; this I did, and he answered, promising their immediate release.

Next morning the Pacha set out for Cairo to see Ibrahim, who, for some reason or other, had declined coming to Alexandria. Seeing that I could be of no further use here, I made up my mind to proceed to join the Powerful in Marmorice Bay, and accordingly paid a parting visit to Boghos Bey. The old man was very civil, and informed me he had orders to present me with a snuff-box set in brilliants. 240 Boghos Bey had before pressed me to receive a large present as a souvenir from the Pacha, which I declined, as being contrary to our rules and regulations; but in this instance he pressed the box, saying it was an Eastern custom, and the grand souvenir should be given at a later period. I replied that I should have had no objection to have taken a small keepsake of little value from the Pacha; but that in my last interview, I did not think he had behaved well, and evaded giving me any answer about the Syrian troops, in which I thought he had not kept his word. I added that he might rely upon it the British Government would insist on the performance of his promise.

I then took leave of Boghos Bey, left Alexandria on the 1st of March, and arrived at Marmorice Bay on the 3rd. I there found orders to proceed to Malta, where I arrived on the 22nd, and was placed in quarantine. The day after my arrival I received a letter from the Commander-in-Chief, which left me in doubt whether the Government had repented their approval of my Convention or not. The letter and answer I insert, together with the Admiral’s further reply:—

On the 31st of the same month, having obtained a month’s leave of absence, I hauled down my broad pennant, and proceeded to England in the Oriental steamer, and arrived at Liverpool in the middle of April.

Meeting of the Foreign Ministers in London—Protocol of the 5th March—Note of Chekib Effendi—Note of the 13th of March—Lord Palmerston’s explanation of the Views of the Allies regarding the Hereditary Tenure—Conference of the 16th March—Protocol—Endeavour to include France in a Convention for closing the Straits of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus—False Position of the Porte—Views of Lord Ponsonby and of the other Ambassadors—Instructions of the Austrian and British Governments—Opinions of M. Guizot—Turkish Plan of Settlement—Note of the 10th May.

When Lord Palmerston heard from Sir Robert Stopford that the Turkish fleet had arrived at Marmorice Bay, and that Ibrahim Pacha had reached Gaza, he immediately assembled the Foreign Ministers, and, on the 5th of March, they agreed to a Protocol to the following effect ^[106] :—

1. That Mehemet Ali had submitted, and asked for pardon.

2. That he had delivered the Ottoman fleet to the Commissioners.

3, 4. That he had evacuated Syria; and that the Turkish authority was established there and in Candia.

245 5. That the Sultan had accepted the submission, and pardoned Mehemet Ali, his children, and adherents.

6. That the Sultan had announced his intention of reinstating Mehemet Ali with hereditary succession.

The conditions settled on the 15th of October and 14th November ^[107] , being thus fulfilled, the assembled Ministers determined that the Consuls of the Four Powers should now return to Alexandria.

On the 11th of March, Chekib Effendi, the Ottoman Minister, communicated to Lord Palmerston ^[108] that the Porte had restored Mehemet Ali, and forwarded him the firmans I have already mentioned, and requested his Lordship to communicate them to the other Ambassadors in London, and he desired an answer to the official communication; whereupon Lord Palmerston again assembled the Foreign Ministers on the 13th of March ^[109] , and they drew up a Collective Note, expressing their lively satisfaction at the event, and communicating to the Ottoman Minister that they had heard from Alexandria, under date of the 24th of February, that Mehemet Ali had admitted, without reserve, that the treaties and 246 laws of the empire should apply to Egypt in the same way as to the other provinces of the empire. That he had acceded to the regulation of the monetary system, the service and uniform of the troops, and the building of the ships. That he had replaced under the orders of the Sultan, the land and sea forces, and, in fact, that at the present moment he had put himself in the situation of a subject, and that it appertains to the Sultan alone to settle the internal administration, and take into consideration the wishes which Mehemet Ali has submitted to the Sultan. The Ministers finish the Note by stating, “The Undersigned are fully assured that these explanations, conceived in a sincere spirit of conciliation, would be received by the Sultan in the same manner in which he has constantly received the advice already given by his Allies,—advice disinterested and sincere, which His Highness has justly appreciated, when he accomplished, by an act of clemency, a work of pacification which his Allies had frankly aided him in effecting.”

Lord Palmerston wrote at the same time to Lord Ponsonby ^[110] , transmitting the Note of the Plenipotentiaries, and remarking that doubts might 247 arise out of the wording of the first Article of the Hatti-Sheriff, which specifies the conditions to be imposed upon Mehemet Ali. “The wording of that Article might lead to the supposition, that the Sultan intended to reserve to himself to choose upon each vacancy in the pachalic of Egypt, any one of the descendants of Mehemet Ali, without regard to any fixed rule whatever; and that thus the principle of hereditary tenure would be rendered illusory.

“Her Majesty’s Government conceive, that this was by no means the intention of the Porte, and that what was meant to be established by the condition above-mentioned is, that while, on the one hand, the Sultan grants to the descendants of Mehemet Ali in the direct male line hereditary succession in the pachalic of Egypt, the Sultan reserves his own sovereign rights intact, by declaring, that those descendants shall not succeed as a matter of course and of inherent right, as would be the case with the rulers of an independent state, but shall each in turn receive his appointment from the Sultan, and by a separate act of the Sultan’s sovereign power.

“If this is a correct view of the meaning of the 248 Article in question, there can be no difficulty on the part of the Porte in giving such an explanation thereof as will remove all misunderstandings; and the Porte might say, that is the intention of the Sultan that this right of selection shall in all cases he exercised in favour of the next male heir to the deceased Pacha, unless, by infancy or by physical incapacity, such male heir should be incapable of taking charge of the administration of the province, in which case the person next in relationship to the deceased Pacha would be appointed in his stead. The Sultan might, at the same time, make it to be clearly understood, that it is his intention that Ibrahim shall succeed to Mehemet.”

Lord Palmerston was also of opinion that it would not be difficult to settle the affair of the tribute, and that the Allies had purposely abstained from entering into the question; and that relative to the appointment of the officers, could be easily arranged.

On the 16th of March the Allied Ministers in another conference ^[111] conceiving the Eastern Question settled, engaged the French Government to rejoin the European family, and they initialed a 249 Convention recognising the right of the Porte to shut the passage of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus against ships of war of all nations. The Protocol was as follows:—

On the 6th of March Mehemet Ali’s and Said Muhib Effendi’s letters to the Vizier arrived at Constantinople ^[112] . Mehemet Ali’s, in respectful terms, and with great clearness, pointed out the 251 impossibility of his consenting to the first, third, and part of the sixth articles of the Firman; the other articles he cheerfully acceded to. The Commissioner makes a long report of the arguments he used to induce Mehemet Ali to consent, and the very clever way he evaded them; and it must be admitted the old Pacha had the best of the argument.

The Porte, as might have been expected, was now in a false position; France had so far joined the Allies as to initial the Treaty for shutting the Dardanelles, but it was not likely she would now attempt to coerce Mehemet Ali or even advise him to yield; and under this embarrassment Rechid Pacha, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, wrote to the Ministers for advice. Lord Ponsonby did not hesitate to entirely agree with Rechid Pacha that the application of Mehemet Ali to change some of the articles of the Firman was no proof of submission ^[113] . The Firman, says the Ambassador, is an order, and no subject can refuse to obey an order and be considered submissive; he does not admit that he petitioned for a change, but he asserts that he disobeys. I cannot read Mehemet Ali’s letter in that sense. After giving his reasons 252 why the hereditary succession should go by right of primogeniture, which appear to me convincing, he states, “It is evident, moreover, that his Highness, moved by sentiments of clemency, desires the maintenance of repose and tranquillity, and it is for that reason that I request that the question of the hereditary succession may be settled as has been stated above.” Surely this may be considered petitioning, and in a moderate way too, when we recollect that Mehemet Ali knew full well that the Porte had no means of enforcing these orders.

What the Ambassador says of the preparations Mehemet Ali was making for resistance is incorrect. I was at Alexandria at the time, and I saw no new preparations; there were a few men completing his unfinished works, which were so ill constructed that if not attended to they would have crumbled to pieces. He was certainly reorganizing his army, after the retreat, which was absolutely necessary; but even had he been preparing for resistance could he be blamed? The Firman that was sent to him was so perfectly absurd that no man in his senses, with an army of 50,000 or 60,000 man, and upwards of 10,000 cavalry, would have accepted such terms from a weak master; and no 253 set of men, possessed of common understanding, and knowing the relative position of the Porte and Mehemet Ali, would have counselled such a Firman. The Ambassador finishes by recommending the Porte to do nothing till they have heard from Great Britain.

Baron Stürmer was a wiser man, and he recommended the Porte to seek some means of acceding to the entreaties of Mehemet Ali without compromising the dignity of the Sultan ^[114] . Baron Königsmark and M. Titow declined giving an opinion till they received further instructions ^[115] .

On the 29th of March Rechid Pacha and Ahmed Fethi Pachi were displaced, and succeeded by Rifat Bey, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Tahir Pacha, as Capudan Pacha.

On the 31st March Prince Metternich, seeing no end to this question, instructed Baron Stürmer to inform the Divan, that if they did not adopt the modifications to the Firman recommended by the Conference of London, the Emperor of Austria would withdraw altogether from the alliance. Prince Metternich writes most strongly; he observes, “The contents 254 of your despatch of the 17th of March attract our most serious attention, because they prove the existence of a position without precedent in the annals of diplomacy. What, for example, has been the result of the very precise instructions of the 30th of January? What attention have the Divan, and the agents of the Four Courts, paid to the opinion expressed in that document? On the one hand we see the Porte undecided as to the course which it will have to take on the subject of the representations of Mehemet Ali against certain articles of the Firman; and on the other, the Representatives of the Four Powers ignorant how to counsel from the very clear words of the Collective Note above mentioned; in truth, M. le Baron, it is impossible to make it out.” This is pretty strong language, which he follows up by saying, “The instructions I sent you on the 26th of March have replied, by anticipation, to your scruples, and I flatter myself you will have considered those instructions as anticipating the orders which each of you have applied for, and not have hesitated to offer the advice they contain.

“Nevertheless, as in the course of this affair we have already been exposed to see ourselves deceived 255 in our expectations, I now direct you to invite your colleagues to a conference, and acquaint them that the Emperor enjoins you to insist on the Divan admitting the modifications which the other Courts desire, for the interest even of the Porte, to see introduced into certain articles of the Firman. And should your colleagues decline doing so, you are to take the step prescribed, either alone or with those who will join you; and should the Porte refuse to listen, the Emperor will consider himself as restored to entire liberty of position and action ^[116] .”

Lord Palmerston writes under date of the 10th of April ^[117] ; that he conceives his former despatches and the Collective Notes are sufficient to guide Lord Ponsonby in the advice he shall give, and that it is important the dispute between the Porte and Mehemet Ali should be settled as soon as possible, and that the Government do not think the objection stated by the Ambassador, “that it would not be proper for the Sultan to negotiate with Mehemet Ali,” ought to weigh against the extreme urgency of coming to a final settlement, and that no settlement can be made without a direct communication. 256 “On some points,” his Lordship adds, “Mehemet Ali has reason on his side, in others he is clearly and decidedly wrong.” The Sultan ought, therefore, without delay, to modify the Firman in the objectionable parts, and explain that other parts cannot be altered without a departure from the terms of the Treaty of the 15th of July.

Lord Palmerston wrote to Lord Ponsonby more peremptorily on the 21st of April, inclosing a copy of Prince Metternich’s letter to Baron Stürmer, and acquainting his Lordship that Her Majesty’s Government concur in the view taken of the matter by the Austrian Government, and are prepared to take the same course ^[118] .

M. Guizot in a conversation with Mr. Bulwer at Paris, took the same view of the 1st, 3rd, and 6th articles of the Firman I had done, and admitted he disapproved of some of Mehemet Ali’s pretensions, and had taken care to tell him so; and that the only way to settle the dispute was by the Allies pressing the Porte on one side, and France pressing Mehemet Ali on the other ^[119] .

On the 27th of April, Chekib Effendi, the 257 Ottoman Minister in London, submitted to Lord Palmerston a new plan ^[121] , which was little better than the first: the Porte offered to confer the Government of Egypt, after the death of Mehemet Ali, either on Ibrahim Pacha or any other son that Mehemet Ali might select, on condition that afterwards, the right of selection should devolve on the Porte; if that was not approved of, it was proposed that one of his descendants should be chosen by the members of his family and by the chief people of the country, and proposed to the Sublime Porte, which choice should be confirmed, and the person nominated by the Sultan; the other articles remained the same. Who could have put this wild scheme into the heads of the Divan, it is not easy to conceive; this plan would certainly have settled the succession on Ibrahim Pacha, but on failure it would have given rise to intrigues without measure, and also have put the dignity of the Porte in a worse position than at once fixing the hereditary succession in the family of Mehemet Ali as he wished. The Plenipotentiaries met in London on the 10th of May, and very adroitly passed over the new proposition of Chekib, and repeated their opinion that the 258 succession should go in the right line, from father to son. As to the tribute, they recommended that it should be fixed at a stated sum, subject to revision at certain periods, and they conceived that the difficulty which had arisen relative to promotion, could only be considered as of secondary importance. They finish by saying that they persist in their views communicated to the Porte in the Collective Notes of the 30th of January, 13th of March, and by the Protocol of the 5th of March ^[120] , and that they look upon the submission formally made by Mehemet Ali as absolute, and in consequence the Turco-Egyptian question terminated ^[122] .

Colonel Napier’s Account of his Missions to Egypt—Seizure of the Maronite and Druse Emirs and Sheikhs—Their Condition in Egypt—Their Return to Syria—False Assertions of the French—Mission for the Liberation of the Syrian Soldiers—Difficulty of ascertaining their Number—Bad Faith of the Pacha—Infamous Proposal of a Turkish Officer—Sudden termination of the Negotiation—Suspicious conduct of the Egyptians—Liberation of the Syrians.

I have already mentioned that on my way down the river from Cairo, in February, 1841, I met Colonel Napier. He had been dispatched from Syria by Colonel Bridgeman, with orders to bring back the Scheiks and Emirs for whose restoration to liberty I had stipulated in my correspondence with Boghos Bey ^[123] . The Colonel’s own account of this mission, and of a subsequent one in which he was employed by the Foreign Office to procure the release of the Syrian troops carried into Egypt, is as follows:—

Prince Metternich’s Orders to the Internuncio—Lord Ponsonby’s Correspondence with Baron Stürmer—Hesitation of the Porte—Message from Lord Ponsonby to Rifat Pacha—The new Firman granted—Accepted by Mehemet Ali—Termination of the Eastern Question.

The peremptory orders of Prince Metternich to Baron Stürmer, to settle the Egyptian question, arrived on the 12th of April at Constantinople, whereupon the Baron wrote to Lord Ponsonby to inform him that his colleagues of Russia and Prussia had agreed to hold to the Porte an uniform language, and requesting to know if he could count on his Lordship’s concurrence in this instance ^[128] .

I give his Lordship’s answer in full, that the reader may judge for himself: it is an exquisite piece of diplomacy, and judging from it, it would be extremely difficult to decide whether the Ambassador had followed his instructions or not.

270 His Lordship, under the same date, writes to Lord Palmerston that the Porte had given way to the wish of the Allies, and come to the resolution that the government of Egypt should be inherited by the eldest son; that Mehemet Ali should have the right to appoint officers to the army below the rank of General of Brigade, and that the tribute should be fixed at a stated sum.

The Porte, still in doubt, or wishing for delay, asked Lord Ponsonby what were his precise notions relative to the execution in Egypt of the laws of the Sublime Porte as laid down in the Separate Act of the Treaty of Alliance, as it could not know what the Allied Powers would say should Mehemet Ali not fulfil that part of the Treaty. To which Lord Ponsonby replies, that he is quite ignorant what will be the opinion of the Allies on this point, and he therefore cannot give advice.

Baron Stürmer, though an old diplomatist, seems to have been puzzled with Lord Ponsonby’s letter to him, and did not reply. This called forth another letter, which with the reply I give.

The Porte, though they expressed their satisfaction with the plan proposed by the Representatives of the Four Powers, were extremely slow in following it out, and the British Ambassador, who seemed now to be disciplined into obedience by Prince Metternich and Lord Palmerston’s peremptory 273 instructions, on the 12th of May directed his dragoman to tell Rifat Pacha that if any further delay took place, he should feel it necessary to call upon his colleagues to support him in inquiring of the Sublime Porte the cause of the delay ^[129] . This letter quickened the motions of the Divan; and on the 22nd of May the new Firman was laid before the Allied Ministers, and approved of by them ^[130] . This Firman complied with Mehemet Ali’s demands; it left Constantinople on the 2nd of June, arrived at Alexandria on the 7th, was accepted by Mehemet Ali, and was publicly read on the 10th ^[131] .

Thus terminated this long protracted question, which might have been as easily settled after the signing of my Convention on the 28th November, 1840, as it was on the 10th June, 1841, and without at all compromising the honour or dignity of the Porte, who the reader has seen was, through the rejection of my arrangement, obliged to make concession to a conquered vassal. Who was the principal adviser of the Sultan the reader will be able to judge by what I have stated; and if that is not sufficiently satisfactory, he may turn over the 274 Levant Correspondence , where he will find that the British Ambassador, even at the eleventh hour, lent a willing ear to every report which designing people were too happy to make to him, prejudicial to Mehemet Ali.

Review of the Turco-Egyptian Question—Mehemet Ali not the Aggressor—Hostile Preparations of the Porte—Representations of the Allied Powers—What Interests affected by the Independence of Mehemet Ali—Views of France—Designs of Russia.

The Syrian and Egyptian question being now brought to a close, by the total evacuation of the former country, and Mehemet Ali’s establishment in the hereditary pachalic of Egypt almost on his own terms, it is time to inquire what has been gained by measures that had well nigh plunged Europe into a war, the end of which no man could have foreseen.

I think every impartial man who has read the correspondence must allow that Mehemet Ali was not the aggressor. It is quite true he was anxious to be independent, and no wonder that a man who had acquired such extensive possessions by the sword should be desirous of emancipating himself from a weak master. I am not going to justify Mehemet Ali’s first invasion of Syria: that would have been the time for the Allies to have discouraged him, and a naval force sent off Acre would have been quite 276 sufficient to have put an end to his ambitious designs; but nothing of the sort was done. Mehemet Ali was allowed to follow up one victory after another, till his road to Constantinople was open, and the Turks, having been refused assistance by their friends, called in the Russians to protect them; and the Treaty of Kutayah settled for that time the Eastern question.

The Allied Powers, on learning that preparations were making for war at Constantinople, instructed their Ambassadors to urge the Porte to preserve peace. At the same time Russia took the initiative, and instructed her Consul to desire Mehemet Ali to recall Ibrahim, and to withdraw the Egyptian army to Damascus. What right had Russia, after consenting to the Treaty of Kutayah, to make such a proposal? Would it not have been safer and wiser, had the Allied Powers preserved the status quo , or even persuaded the Porte to acknowledge Mehemet Ali at once, and confer on him the government of the countries he had conquered, stipulating at the same time that he should establish a milder government in his extensive possessions? It had been proved that Turkey, weak as she was, was entirely incapable of governing her distant provinces; and would it not 277 have been better to have given her a powerful ally who would have been interested in protecting her against her natural enemy, Russia, than curtailing his power, by restoring provinces which she had not been able to govern, and at best giving her a discontented vassal? It may be argued that such a proceeding would have been dismembering the Turkish empire: I answer, that was already done by the Treaty of Kutayah, and it would have been much safer to have let things alone.

Candia, which was entirely separate both from Egypt and Syria, might have been restored to the Porte; this would have given her more real strength than she is ever likely to receive from her very imperfect possession of Syria.

Let us now examine whose interests would have been affected by giving Mehemet Ali independence. No power in Europe is so much interested in keeping well with Mehemet Ali as Great Britain, and no power is more aware of that than France; for in the very first conversation Count Molé had with Lord Granville ^[132] he alluded to the subject, and the French Government have never let slip an opportunity of doing acts of kindness to Mehemet Ali, 278 so as to keep him as much out of our hands as possible, and I fear they have too well succeeded. France had opened a considerable trade with Egypt, and she entertained great fears that English enterprise would supplant her; no wonder, then, that she should have befriended the Pacha in every possible way. France is as well aware as we are, that steam navigation having got to such perfection, Egypt has become almost necessary to England as the half-way house to India, and indeed ought to be an English colony. Now if we wished to weaken Mehemet Ali, with a view, in the event of the breakup of the Turkish empire, which is not far distant, to have seized Egypt as our share of the spoil, we were perfectly right in our policy; or even, had we not looked so far ahead, it might, perhaps, have been politic to have confined Mehemet Ali to Egypt, so that in the event of his stopping the road to India by Suez, we might have the road of the Euphrates open, one remaining in the possession of the Ottoman empire, and the other in that of the Pacha of Egypt. It is not, however, usual for a Government to quarrel with their own interests, and it is so decidedly the advantage of the Pacha of Egypt to facilitate, by every possible means, the passage across the 279 Isthmus of Suez, that on the whole I believe the soundest policy of Great Britain would have been to have supported Mehemet Ali, and I have not the smallest doubt that when France saw we were committed against him, she seized that opportunity of quitting the alliance in order to make the Pacha her firm friend.

France, however, though she had all the desire to protect the Pacha, even at the risk of war, with match lighted ready to put to the gun, hesitated, and, fortunately for Europe at large, Louis Philippe had either not nerve to begin the strife, or being desirous of preserving peace, refused to adopt M. Thiers’ plan of sending the French fleet to Alexandria. The Ministers resigned, and Europe was saved from a general conflagration.

What aid France actually promised to the Pacha, or whether she ever decidedly promised him any, we do not know, but it is not to be supposed he would have resisted the wishes of the Allied Powers without some hope of assistance at the last moment. The fall of Acre opened the Pacha’s eyes; he turned his back on France, and listened to English counsels, which guided him for a while. But the hostile conduct of our Ambassador 280 at Constantinople so disgusted him, that he again turned to France, who received him with open arms, and thus completely destroyed the English influence in Egypt.

I think I have shown that England had no immediate reason to clip the Pacha’s wings, and that France supported him because England was against him. To Prussia it must have been quite indifferent whether Mehemet Ali kept possession of Syria or not; nor do I see what interest Austria could possibly have in displacing him—quite the contrary. Russia cannot be a pleasant neighbour to Austria; and the Porte is a feeble ally. By raising Mehemet Ali the Porte would have been strengthened; and indeed, the Pacha, in possession of Syria and Egypt, would have been as much interested in controlling the power of Russia as the Sultan himself. Who then was to gain by reducing the power of Mehemet Ali? Russia! and Russia alone.

The Emperor of that great and powerful state saw clearly that the duration of the Ottoman empire was drawing to a close; and that, sooner or later, Russia would be the greatest gainer by its dissolution. It is not then to be wondered at that she should be content to wait her time, and accept the 281 legacy that would fall in to her at its demise; and all she had to do was to prevent a skilful practitioner coming to her assistance. That practitioner was Mehemet Ali; and had he been supported by France, England, Austria, and Prussia, his independence, granted by the Porte and guaranteed by those Powers, would have been a far greater blow on Russia than she has received for many years; and which blow, I have no doubt, she would have used every effort to avert. We, however, fell into her views; the Treaty of the 15th of July was signed; Mehemet Ali has been sent back to Egypt; the Syrian provinces restored to the Porte, and she has become weaker than ever.

Various reasons have been given for Mehemet Ali’s obstinate refusal to listen to the advice of the Allies. At one time it was supposed he was backed by Russia, who wished for an excuse to come to Constantinople for the second time; and, indeed, after the battle of Nizib, and the defection of the Turkish fleet, that was my opinion. To check Russia, I always thought that the combined fleets should have proceeded at once to Constantinople, which was the thing, of all others, the Emperor wished to avoid; and Count Nesselrode distinctly stated to 282 Count Medem, that if a French fleet appeared in the sea of Marmora, he would withdraw the Ambassador, and then take such measures as he saw necessary to re-establish the independence of the Porte ^[133] .

When France began to take a different view of the question from the other Powers, and support Mehemet Ali, Russia at once came forward, and despatched Baron Brunnow to England with a letter from the Emperor to the Queen. Part of the proposal of Russia was that the French and English should appear off Alexandria, while the Russian fleet should anchor in the Bosphorus. This France most properly and most decidedly objected to. Lord Palmerston took the same view; and though he expressed himself perfectly satisfied with the good intentions of Russia, he was of opinion that if it was necessary for a Russian force to appear in the Bosphorus, a British force should be there also. To this, as might be expected, Baron Brunnow objected, and lamented that the British Government had not more reliance on the good faith of Russia. After various discussions, unnecessary to enter upon here, Russia gave up the point of being the sole protector of Constantinople, and consented to a small English 283 force being sent there in the event of the Russian fleet appearing in the Bosphorus ^[134] . France in consequence withdrew from the alliance, and the Four Powers decided so far to fall into the views of Russia as to put down Mehemet Ali, who was the best supporter the Ottoman empire could have had, and give back Syria to the Porte, and thereby accelerate her fall.

The defection of France brought the other Powers closer together; and the insurrection breaking out in Lebanon hastened the signing of the Treaty of the 15th of July. We have seen that the movement was put down by the energy of the Pacha; and that he refused the conditions that were offered to him, and determined to defend himself; and, under all circumstances, I think he was right. He had good intelligence from Constantinople; he knew the Turkish Government could only spare a very small force; he knew we had only 1500 marines in the fleet; he was quite certain that Prussia would send no troops to Syria; and he did not think that Austria would; and he was sensible that Great Britain, Austria, and Prussia, would be very unwilling to call in the military assistance of Russia, which would 284 also be disagreeable to the Porte. Besides this, he had a very large army in Syria, which had always been victorious, and was well commanded, and the season of the year was far advanced, and not a safe harbour or anchorage (with the exception of Scanderoun, which was too far distant) on the coast where our ships could take shelter in the winter. In addition to all this, he was backed by France, and was determined to put every thing to the hazard of a die; and had his views been properly followed up, he must have succeeded.

Errors of the Pacha—His proper course of Action—Mismanagement of Ibrahim Pacha in Syria—Gain or Loss of Turkey by the Acquisition of Syria—Conduct of the Turks in Lebanon—Quarrels of the Mountaineers—Ill treatment of the Prince—Consequent hatred of Turkish rule—Conclusion.

The first error Mehemet Ali committed was not immediately ordering Ibrahim to march on Scutari after the battle of Nizib. At that time the Allies had not come to a final arrangement, and the British and French fleets were not collected in Besika Bay. Had he done that at once, Russia would certainly have come down to Constantinople with a fleet and army; France would have got alarmed, and probably ordered her fleet up the Dardanelles; Great Britain would have done the same. Russia would have urged the Porte to prevent it, which she would have been obliged to have complied with, and the probability is that Europe would have been set by the ears, and in the struggle Mehemet Ali would most likely have retained the government of Syria; indeed, both France and England would have been obliged to have made use of Mehemet Ali against 286 Russia, and the Porte, who must have joined with Russia in preventing the fleets from forcing the Dardanelles. His second error was, in not concentrating his army the moment he resolved on resisting the decision of the Allies.

At the time we landed in D’Jounie Bay, the Egyptian army in Syria could not have consisted of less than 80,000 men of all arms. They were distributed, it is true, in various parts of the country. Ibrahim Pacha ought to have divined our plan of operations the moment we landed; he ought also to have ascertained from his spies, (which we could not prevent,) the number of our troops, and the works we were throwing up, which of themselves showed our weakness. He must have also known how slow the mountaineers were in coming in in the first instance for arms. Seeing all this, had he acted with vigour, and set his troops in motion from Tripoli, he would first have saved D’Jebail, then occupied Gazir, and prevented the Emir Abdallah from joining our standard. Had Osman Pacha advanced at the same time from Balbeck, and occupied Antura and the strong ground in front of our advanced posts, while Souliman Pacha, strengthening himself at Beyrout with a couple of thousand men 287 from Sidon, might have marched with his army from Beyrout, and occupied the convents and high grounds above the Nahr-el-Kelb, and threatened an advance at the same time at the mouth of the river, he would, in the first place, have prevented a single mountaineer from joining our standard, and the overwhelming force which he would have mustered almost within shot of us, would have been quite sufficient, without firing a gun, to have made us pack up our traps and carry the Turkish troops to Cyprus. By some strange fatality he remained inactive; we gained confidence; were successful in all our enterprises; desertion began in Ibrahim’s army, which was just as likely to have begun in our’s; and when at last Ibrahim made an effort, and advanced to Beckfaya and Boharsof, instead of collecting the whole of his forces, and driving us from Ornagacuan, he did not bring half his troops, and allowed himself to be attacked on both flanks, front and rear, and was defeated. Still the game was not up with him; withdrawing his troops from Tripoli, Aleppo, Adana, and concentrating the whole at Zachle, Malaka, and Damascus, and seeing we hesitated in following up our successes, he ought to have taken advantage of the absence of the squadron 288 at Acre, and the weakening of the garrison at Beyrout, and pushed on the latter place, which he would have taken with ease, and found abundance of provisions. He should then have marched on Sidon, which probably would have shared the same fate.

These movements being communicated to the Governor of Acre, would have encouraged him to hold out; and if he was forced to withdraw, he could have joined Ibrahim, and again marched on Acre, where they would have found a practicable breach; and most certainly, at that season of the year, the British squadron would not have remained in so open an anchorage.

Such vigorous measures would have had a great effect on France, and there is no knowing what might have happened. This was not done; and Ibrahim, without making one effort to draw our attention from Acre, or to profit by our absence, remained inactive, and to his astonishment, heard of the surrender of that renowned fortress, which he had not in the least calculated upon. Still his cause was not lost; our troops were divided in Beyrout, Sidon, Tyre, and Acre, and, I believe, we had also some at Tripoli.

289 The gale of the 29th of November alarmed the Admiral for the safety of the squadron. The coast was abandoned, except by a steamer or two, and there was nothing whatever to have prevented Ibrahim from again advancing, and recovering all his losses, and which he would have been perfectly justified in doing when the Convention was rejected. Why he did not, to every military man acquainted with the country, and with our weakness, must be a matter of surprise.

Had any of these operations I have described been put in force, Mehemet Ali would have been now in Syria, and a war among the European Powers in all probability would have been raging.

We will now examine what Turkey has gained by the recovery of the Syrian provinces. She has got back her fleet, which will never be of the least use to her, and is an expensive floating ornament to the Seraglio. Situated as the Turkish empire is, with a rapid stream cutting her in two, it is evident her only proper defence is a fleet of steamboats; with these, and the Bosphorus and Hellespont properly fortified, she may defy attacks either from the north or the south, and have a rapid means of communicating with her islands and possessions 290 on the Syrian coasts, and of suddenly transporting troops to any part of her extensive empire. The Turks are not sailors, and never will be, and are therefore much better adapted to serve in vessels moved by steam than in line-of-battle ships, where seamanship cannot be dispensed with.

The Porte has regained Syria, and with it a most extensive kingdom and discontented population, and instead of keeping her army at home to defend her against Russia, her natural enemy, she is obliged to maintain a large force in Syria to keep down her justly irritated subjects, whom she has neither the talent nor inclination to govern either with prudence or decency. Syria is divided, as before, into pachalics, and influential Turks are appointed, as usual, to govern them. There is neither law nor justice. The Turk sits all day smoking his pipe, and the people are plundered by their underlings as usual; and they now feel they were better off under the government of Mehemet Ali than they are now under their former masters. They pay the taxes they formerly did under the Porte; they pay Mehemet Ali’s taxes in addition, and are plundered into the bargain by their old rulers. Property of every description is less protected than it was, 291 trade destroyed, and the roads insecure throughout the country. As for Mount Lebanon, whose population was the first to come forward and join our bands, and whose position the Allies and the Turks themselves promised to alleviate—how have they been treated? As yet they have received little or no remuneration for the burning of their villages and destruction of their property by Ibrahim Pacha, in revenge for their having joined the standard of the Sultan. They have been badly paid for the losses we ourselves caused them at D’Jounie, at Beyrout, Acre, and Sidon. The old feuds between the Maronites and Druses, which had nearly subsided, have been fomented by their rulers, and I fear Mehemet Ali himself, as might have been foreseen, has not been altogether blameless in assisting to set them by the ears.

In the course of my work it has been shown that the Maronites were the first to take up arms in the cause of the Sultan. The Druses being more under the influence of the old Emir Bechir, came forward at a later period, and when the war was nearly finished, they became jealous of the Maronites; and the Turks, instead of by prudent management discouraging these feelings, rather 292 fomented them, with the view of weakening both. The mountaineers had been armed during the insurrection, and they are looked upon more as enemies, than friends who had assisted in bringing them back to power.

In the beginning of November, 1841, about the period when the taxes for the support of the local government were to be raised, the chiefs of the Druses requested the Grand Prince to attend at Deir-el-Kamar, the seat of government, to consider how the taxes were to be distributed; this being acceded to, they sent orders to the different tribes to come armed to the meeting, which was certainly not a very peaceable way of settling who was to bear the burden of taxation. These tribes concealed themselves in the houses of the Scheiks of the family of Abu Bekr, in Deir-el-Kamar, and, without provocation, sallied out of their houses, set fire to the town in several places, and plundered and murdered several of the peaceable inhabitants. The Maronites, taken entirely by surprise, suffered very considerably at first, but being rallied by their leaders took up arms, and a regular battle ensued, which lasted with occasional intermission for several days. The Prince defended himself in his palace, 293 but seeing the Druses were the strongest, repeatedly sent to Selim Pacha, who commanded the Ottoman troops at Beyrout, for assistance; none, however, arrived. This was exactly what the Turks wanted—the more men killed on each side, and the more exasperated they became against each other, the better they were satisfied. “Divide and Govern,” was their motto.

When the news of this unfortunate rencontre came to the knowledge of our gallant Consul-General, Colonel Rose, he immediately set out for the mountains, and at imminent hazard to himself, succeeded in putting an end, for a time, to the broil. Unfortunately, however, the Maronite Christians hearing of the danger of their countrymen at Deir-el-Kamar, sent a strong force to relieve them; this, as might be expected, again brought the Druses into the field, and again the Grand Prince sent to Selim Pacha, but his appeal to him was in vain, and the Druses being the strongest, he was besieged in his palace for twenty-four days.

Instead of Turkish troops being sent to put down the insurrection and relieve the Prince, he received orders to repair to Beyrout; and his provision and ammunition being expended, he was 294 obliged to capitulate with the Druse Scheiks, who guaranteed his safety and that of his retinue and their property; and though the negotiations were carried on through the medium of the messenger sent by Selim Pacha, no sooner had the Prince quitted his residence, than the Druses rushed upon them, seized their arms, horses, and clothes, and even stripped them to their shirts. The Prince himself did not escape this indignity. On his arrival at Beyrout he made strong and repeated representations to Selim Pacha, and entreated him to assist in putting down the civil war, but in vain. The fact is, Selim Pacha was acting under the orders of the Porte, who only wanted a good excuse to put an end to the government of the ruling Prince.

Shortly after this the Porte threw off the mask; the Grand Prince was arrested and sent to Constantinople, and Omar Pacha, a German who had entered into the Turkish service, and served under my orders in Syria, was appointed by the Porte Governor of Lebanon. He may be a good man enough; but certainly, a Christian having changed his religion was not a fit man to govern the Christians of Lebanon. The poor Prince has lost the whole of his 295 property, and his family is brought to ruin. This is the gratitude of the Porte; this is the reward he has obtained for his eminent services; and this is the way the Ottoman Government have treated their allies.

We are informed by Sir Robert Peel that our Ambassador at Constantinople has protested against these acts, and also against the Porte sending Albanian troops (who are little better than barbarians) into Syria, and that they have promised to remove Omar Pacha, and restrict the services of the Albanians to garrison duty only. How far the Porte will keep their promise we shall see; but, I confess, with such a man as Izzet Pacha at the head of the Turkish Government, and who is only putting into execution what he planned when in Syria, and for which he was recalled, I confess I have no reliance upon him, or indeed upon any Turkish Pacha. They are all alike, and quite incapable of preventing the fate of the Ottoman empire, which is tottering to its base, and the sooner it goes the better; it is unworthy of preserving.

Had my advice been followed, and the seaports of Lebanon, the Bekaa, and Anti-Lebanon, been put under the jurisdiction of the Grand Prince, assisted 296 by a council of the powerful Emirs, and the Turkish troops removed entirely from his territory, causing him to pay a reasonable tribute to the Porte, the whole Mountain would have been bound by gratitude to the Sultan, and would have assisted him to keep the rest of Syria in order. As it is now, there is nothing but the most inveterate hatred existing against the Turkish Government; and I most sincerely hope the different sects will unite, and make a noble effort to drive their miserable and tyrannical rulers out of their fine country. Cultivation and commerce would then revive; a field would be opened to British enterprise, and we might recover the influence we had in the mountains, and which has been lost, in consequence of the inhabitants believing that we have not made use of our power to obtain from the Porte all that was so liberally promised them when we were in want of their assistance.

297 I cannot close this work without returning my best thanks to all the officers and men who served in the squadron that Sir Robert Stopford did me the honour of putting under my command. The very laborious services they performed in D’Jounie Bay is above all praise; this was no question of sending a Lieutenant and a working party on shore; the whole of the ships’ companies were constantly employed, headed by their Captains. Captain Reynolds was my second in the landing at D’Jounie, and continued his unremitted exertions till he was sent off Alexandria. Captain Berkeley was my second on the attack at Sidon, and both of us regretted that I could not employ him in the assault on shore; but it was absolutely necessary that he should remain on board the Thunderer to regulate the firing as we advanced, and to cover our retreat if necessary. Nor am I less obliged to Captain Maunsell, of the Rodney, who was my ambassador to Mehemet Ali, and who with great decision landed at once at the Palace and opened the negotiations. Indeed, all the officers, both of the Navy and Marines, as well as Selim 298 Pacha, General Jochmus, Omar Bey, and the whole of the Turkish officers, did their duty to my entire satisfaction, and I should be but too proud to command such a force on another occasion. The merits of Admiral Walker are too well known to make it necessary for me to say one word in his praise.

I must also take this opportunity of thanking the Commander-in-Chief for having placed the Allied force under my direction when the ill health of Sir Charles Smith obliged him to proceed to Constantinople.

No. I.

Instructions given by the Sultan to Hafiz Pacha , found at the Turkish Head-Quarters after the battle of Nizib ^[135] .

Seeing that the Egyptian Government will never submit to its Sovereign, it is very probable that in the approaching summer it may declare and obtain its independence. As all my efforts and all my calculations have been useless, there is nothing but war which will render me master of that province, and which will unite it to the empire of the Osmanlis, and for its execution and success good dispositions must be taken.

Art. I. —For the success of this enterprise, rigorous laws must be established; in the public orders the grade of Seraskier shall be promised to all the Ferik Pachas, if they do not betray their trust or intrigue; but if they fail in their duties, 300 they shall be immediately turned out of the service.

Art. II. —According to this plan, the army ought to consist of from 60,000 to 70,000 men, with 120 pieces of cannon, as follows: 40,000 infantry, 15,000 cavalry, 5,000 artillery and engineers, and the remaining 10,000 irregular troops.

Art. III. —Wherever the enemy shall be met, he should be attacked by the artillery; it is necessary that the Commander-in-Chief should exercise the artillery daily in line of battle.

Art. IV. —To prevent the Egyptians from making a sudden attack upon Marash, it is necessary that this town be fortified and guarded by a strong body of troops. After having taken these measures, the Commander-in-Chief will march upon Aleppo, and from thence to Damascus, and then to Acre, to take possession of that fortress, and not to lose time in obtaining possession of all the said towns. After the capture of Acre, he must leave a strong body of troops in that place, and march direct upon Egypt. The taking of Acre shall be considered the first conquest of this war; this enterprise may, perhaps, be accomplished within four or five months; and if the Egyptian Government does not return under the dominion of the empire, let the Commander-in-Chief know that the war will be indefinite, and he must take measures in consequence; for the conquest of Egypt being the second achievement, four or five months will be necessary 301 for the success of this second enterprise. According to this calculation, the important possession of Syria and Egypt will require eleven months or a year to accomplish.

Art. V. —According to the information we have, Solyman Pacha is not content with his position. A man of so much importance should be got rid of. An officer should be sent to him to endeavour by all means to gain him over to our side. Solyman Pacha being a European, one of our French officers must be sent to him to endeavour to gain him over to us.

Art. VI. —Mehemet Ali, up to the present time, has given no higher grade to Arabs than that of Captain, whilst to Christians he gives the rank of Colonel, General, and Pacha; in our camp, there are Arabs who have the rank of Pacha. Such being the case, he who deserts to us with thirty soldiers, shall receive the rank of Lieutenant; and he who deserts with from thirty to one hundred soldiers, the rank of Captain; and if a Commandant deserts with his battalion, the rank of Colonel; and those who intrigue in the Egyptian army to make the soldiers revolt, whether he be an officer or Colonel, shall obtain high grades with us. In order to put this project into execution, it is necessary to write proclamations and to scatter them in the Egyptian camp by means of spies.

Art. VII. —The Druses, the Mutualis, who are in the Egyptian army, the chiefs of tribes, and the people who are under the dominion of Mehemet Ali, 302 should be encouraged by promises to embrace our party. Accordingly their intentions should be seconded, and they should be granted all they desire; and the better to succeed in this enterprise, it is necessary that Hafiz Pacha should have with him 7000 or 8000 purses, to distribute money where he judges it convenient and useful.

Art. VIII. —In the army of Mehemet Ali Pacha, there are a great many European employés , by means of whom all his plans and projects may be known. It is necessary, in order to be well informed, to send spies among them, in order that the success of the war, which is about to open in the approaching summer, may be ensured.

Art. IX. —In order to disembark 10,000 or 12,000 men at Tripoli, the squadron must be put in movement, and as soon as the corps d’armée shall march from Marash, it is necessary to enter into communication with the Druses, the Mutualis, and other Cabaïles. For the success of this enterprise, thirty or forty pieces of field artillery, from 10,000 to 15,000 muskets, with ammunition and materiél , must be prepared to be sent by sea on the first demand. The persons charged with this enterprise should employ all their diligence in order that these affairs may terminate as soon as possible.

Translation of a Petition (in Copy) from the Nations and Inhabitants of Mount Lebanon and Syria , to Sultan Abdul Medjid of Constantinople.

We humbly supplicate, at the threshold of the Divan of the Mighty Sovereign, the Benevolent and Just, the Venerated Authority and Daring Lion, the Lord of the Sword and of the Pen—(viz. of Death and Mercy)—the Shadow of God over the Earth, our Honoured Sultan, Abdul Medjid Khan, may God perpetuate the days of his flourishing reign for ever and ever, Amen.

That the frightful tyranny and the horrible oppression and cruelty under which Mehemet Ali Pacha has belaboured us—(he who pretends to be as one of your Majesty’s slaves, but who, in fact, has dared to be treacherous to your most illustrious and venerated defunct Father, of blessed memory, and whose abode now may be Paradise)—have compelled us to throw ourselves at the feet of your Imperial Throne, which is adorned with the rays of justice and mercy,—spreading our supplicating arms towards your Majesty’s paternal and sublime clemency, that you may be pleased may be pleased to turn your eye towards our protection and safety,—knowing as we do how vast and extensive the equity of your Majesty’s Government, which is so renowned throughout the world.—and how immense and unlimited your Majesty’s 304 mercy and clemency; wherefore our hearts burn with the fire of the desire of attaining that happiness also, which is enjoyed by all those fortunate beings who are your subjects. What crime have we committed to cause your Majesty’s resplendent face to be turned away from us, and thereby we should be left to be thrashed under the edges of an unbearable tyranny and of an insupportable iniquity and oppression, while our fathers and forefathers, ever since a period of four hundred years, have continually enjoyed the happiness and comfort of the protection of your Majesty’s Imperial Standard? We are their sons, and prepared to follow their steps, that we may inherit the same happiness which they enjoyed for so many centuries, to the great glory of your Majesty’s Imperial Dynasty.

We therefore pray and supplicate your paternal benignity and clemency not to abandon us, and to let it be said that a vast and numerous population has been left to be immolated as a sacrifice to the selfish ambition and sordid avarice of a single man, a tyrant, totally void of feeling and humanity, who not only proved himself ungrateful to, and forgetful of, your Majesty’s great bounty to him, but dared, most perfidiously, to turn his sword towards your sacred person. Seeing ourselves thus placed in this most wretched and miserable condition, bordering on the last degree of our total ruin and annihilation, we have got up and raised your Majesty’s mighty Standard in defence of the legitimate and lawful 305 rights of your Imperial Sovereignty over us, for which we shall continue to fight to the last breath of our existence; and therefore we trust to the Divine aid of the Almighty, and in your Majesty’s assistance, to overpower that common enemy of yours and ours, and to drive him away from your dominions.

Hence, we again supplicate and implore the Throne of your Majesty’s universal mercy and clemency, to turn your royal face towards us with your mighty aid and assistance,—especially, our said enemy having stopped all the roads against us by land and also by sea, and thereby prevents us receiving any supply of the necessary warlike stores we are in need of; and as we have no fleet to oppose his, we most earnestly entreat your Majesty to afford us the needful recourse for the opening of the roads, &c.; otherwise, we shall be, God forbid, unavoidably placed in a most distressing state, and in imminent ruin. But no, never will your Majesty’s imperial and paternal mercy and benevolence allow such a disastrous calamity to befall us! And we pray the Almighty God to preserve your sacred person, and to perpetuate the days of your glorious reign with happiness and victory.

Signed and Sealed by your Majesty’s Slaves.

306 Letter addressed by the Inhabitants of Mount Lebanon to his Excellency the British Ambassador .

The humanity which so eminently distinguishes all the acts of the British Government,—the readiness with which it steps forward to the assistance of the oppressed,—the anxiety that it displays to make the people of the East share in the benefits enjoyed by that portion of their fellow-creatures that are blessed with happier Governments,—embolden the Syrians to appeal to England for her mediation to rescue them from the destruction with which Mehemet Ali threatens them now.

Since the invasion of Syria by Mehemet Ali, he has trampled us under foot by an oppression which knows no bounds, and by a tyranny the most atrocious and cruel.

For the last eight years, we have acceded to all his demands, and because he has left us nothing more to give him, he menaces us with extermination; nor will his unbounded rapacity be satisfied until he drinks the very blood of our children, and satiates the licentiousness of his soldiers with the honour of our families. Driven to despair, we have taken up arms for the defence of our lives, and to guard our dwellings from fire and ourselves from the sword with which he threatens to erase us from among nations.

Abandoned by the world, we implore the protection of Great Britain. In the humanity of her 307 Government, and in the generosity of one of the greatest and most powerful nations, rest all our hopes in this cruel crisis. All that we demand is, to be allowed to return to our legitimate Sovereign Abdul Medjid,—a natural desire coming from loyal subjects. Why should two millions and a-half of His Highness’ subjects be sacrificed to the personal ambition of one man, who himself, forgetful of the benefits conferred upon him, has turned his sword against the bosom of his own Sovereign?

We have but one prayer,—we seek but to be allowed to enjoy, in common with the rest of His Highness’ subjects, the rights and privileges secured to them by the Hatti-Sheriff; and it is in this hope that we submit our petition to your Excellency, praying that you will be pleased to lay it before the “Divan” of Great Britain, the Ally of our august Master Abdul Medjid, with a request that we may be honoured with a speedy glad tidings, before we are utterly destroyed by the Governor of Egypt.

May the Almighty prolong the days of your Excellency with happiness to the end of time.

308 Letter addressed by the Inhabitants of Mount Lebanon to his Excellency the French Ambassador .

After the usual Compliments,

The painful news that have reached us by the newspapers, have struck a terrible blow to Syria,—they have torn the hearts of men, women, and children, now menaced to be exterminated by Mehemet Ali, to whom France has deigned to grant her powerful protection. Can she be possibly ignorant of the evils this man has made us suffer since fortune has made him master of Syria? They are innumerable. Suffice it to say, that the most distressing vexations, and the most cruel oppression, have driven us to despair, and have renewed in us the ardent desire of returning to the paternal government of our august Sovereign, Abdul Medjid. Is not this a legitimate desire from a loyal people? France, a nation so great, so magnanimous, that has extended liberty everywhere, that has for ages spilt so much blood to establish it in her own Government, refuses us to-day her powerful influence to obtain the enjoyment of the same good!

The French press says, “that France will not admit of any arrangement that has for basis the restitution of Syria to its legitimate Sovereign.” Can it be so? the Syrians cannot believe it! The French nation, so generous, so civilized, cannot desire to see us crushed by a systematic oppression which 309 alone distinguishes the Egyptian Government from others.

We wish but to be allowed to return to the protection of our legitimate Sovereign, whom we have not ceased to obey for the last four hundred years. We demand but to participate in the privileges and rights of the Hatti-Sheriff which our gracious Sovereign has granted to all his faithful subjects, without exception, without distinction. We appeal to the French Government—we supplicate the French nation at large, to assist us to obtain our demand. The most atrocious tyranny has compelled us to take up arms for the defence of our lives and the honour of our families, from the brutality of the Egyptian soldiery, or to bury ourselves in the ruins of our country. Our cause is a just one; and as such, we sincerely trust that the French Government will not abandon us in a moment so dangerous.

It is with this hope we submit to your Excellency this, our prayer, begging that you will be pleased to lay it at the feet of the throne of your august Master, the Ally of our gracious Sovereign, Abdul Medjid.

I received your letter and postscript of the 10th and 13th of July, and I think you are as cautious a diplomatist as if you had been at it for the last twenty years; you do not make a single remark upon what my opinions were relative to this expedition of Mehemet Ali. I do not feel that there is any responsibility on me whatever; I am positively forbid to meddle with anything that Mehemet Ali may do, as long as he lets alone British persons and property; and however I disapprove of this, I can only obey.

The Pacha’s troops marched out yesterday morning, and although they met with no resistance, they set the whole country in a blaze, convents and all. I wrote a very strong letter to the Egyptian Admiral, which I begged him to communicate to Abbas Pacha, a copy of which accompanies this. Mr. Wood was sent here by Lord Ponsonby, and he came off a few days ago, bringing petitions from the poor Mountaineers to the Sultan and the French and English Ambassadors; he landed again early this morning, and brings off news that the insurgents are divided amongst themselves, have been abandoned by many of their chiefs, are badly armed, and, by all I can collect, unless they are succoured with 311 arms and ammunition, the insurrection will be put down very shortly, and thus will finish all hope of Syria being released from the power of Mehemet Ali, by the efforts of the inhabitants themselves, and the question will become more complicated than ever; all of which might have been avoided, had the Admiral had instructions how to act, or had he taken upon himself, which I feel assured would have been approved of by our Government at home. I am surprised the mission of Mr. Wood has not been notified to you, as he certainly was sent here by Lord Ponsonby, and I have the Admiral’s order to facilitate him, and even to send the Cyclops back when he has any particular communication to make.

Should Mehemet Ali come this way, the shortest way of putting an end to all doubts would be to seize him. I do not say I am prepared for so bold a step, but if I see much cruelty and devastation going on, I don’t know whether I should not be very much disposed to do it, unless he came accompanied by such a force as would render the success doubtful; but I have no idea that he will come, because I believe all will be settled without him, and you will find that the strength of the insurgents has been very much magnified. You seem to think that Mehemet Ali is on his last legs, but I think this will strengthen him very much; he is evidently backed up by the French, that is clear by the language held by all the French officers, and 312 we have Thiers’ speech, which is plain enough. You say, if we act with vigour and determination, we shall carry through Lord Palmerston’s policy without the aid of any foreign power; but, my good friend, the opportunity is lost, his troops are landed and his squadron by this time is in Alexandria, and I do not see now where our vigour and determination can be applied.

July 20. —It was only yesterday I could get anything positive about the Egyptians. Our Consul knows nothing, and he will believe nothing against the Syrians, but a Frenchman has read me a letter from Souliman Pacha, saying the insurrection was put down; and another from his secretary, detailing the whole of their operations. It appears they marched as far as Hammana, about eight hours from here, and met less than a couple of hundred of the insurgents, whom the Albanians disposed of, and the Emir Bechir sent to desire them to submit, and give up their arms, which many of them have done. I was not satisfied with this, and last night I went down in the Cyclops, and sent on shore at Zouk and Jebel, when they informed me that the son of Emir Bechir had been there and told them. It is a pity you had not a vessel to have sent earlier information, but even that would have made no difference, as nothing would have been done; it serves them right for their behaviour to me, and I hope you will tell Lord Palmerston so. I shall keep this open till the last moment.

313 July 21. —The Indian mail is just arrived; I have no more news. I wish you could come this way, for I fear there is no chance of my going to Alexandria; I shall, however write to the Admiral by the Austrian steamer, which I expect hourly.

No. IV. See Vol. I., page 52 .

Extract of Letter from Commodore Napier to Admiral the Honourable Sir Robert Stopford , G.C.B.

In execution of your order of the 9th instant, I removed the whole of the Turkish troops from the transports and the marines of the squadron into the steamers. The Dido and Wasp took up an anchorage well up to Beyrout Point, in order to draw Souliman Pacha’s attention from the position I intended to disembark at. Soon after daylight, the squadron and steamers you had put under my orders weighed; the Turkish squadron, under Admiral Walker, weighed also; and the whole, with the exception of Zebra, who flanked the Egyptian camp, worked up to Beyrout Point, where a considerable force of the enemy was in position.

314 When the breeze freshened, the whole bore up for D’Journie. Castor and Hydra anchored close to Dog River, landed the Turkish troops, and completely blocked up the pass leading to D’Journie.

The Powerful and Pique, Gorgon, Cyclops and Phœnix, followed by the Turkish squadron, ran into the bay of D’Journie, and landed the troops in an incredibly short time, owing to the excellent arrangement of Captain Reynolds, who took charge of the landing. Admiral Walker put his troops on shore at the same moment with great celerity and order; a position was then taken up, and the artillery landed, the few Albanians stationed here retiring without firing a shot. The Carysfort and Dido went off D’Jebel, about three leagues to the northward, to act against a strong tower, garrisoned by Albanian troops.

D’Journie is a good-sized bay, with a promontory projecting considerably into the sea. A road from Beyrout lies along the shore, and is practicable for infantry, artillery, and cavalry: this road the Revenge covered. The road from Tripoli leads also along shore, and the Wasp and Phœnix covered a gorge, over which it would be necessary to pass. Two roads lead from Baalbec by Antura, where an excellent position was taken up by two battalions of Turks, supported by five companies of marines. The left of this is protected by an impassable gorge, the right rests on the sea, Dog River separating it from high ground in front.

315 The first day the inhabitants who had been driven into the mountains, came in slowly for arms, but these few took them with great avidity, and hastened to the mountains to drive away the Emir Bechir’s troops, and open the mountain passes,—this done, the mountaineers have flocked in in great numbers, with the Sheiks, who have crowded to the standard of the Sultan.

I beg to inclose Captain Martin’s reports of the occupation of D’Jebel and Batroun, in which he speaks highly of Captain Austen, of the Cyclops, and of the officers employed ^[136] .

I regret the loss he met with; it was not to be avoided. The inhabitants of this city are most warlike and determined, and many Albanians have suffered by their severity.

Ibrahim Pacha reconnoitred our positions the day before yesterday.

I have sent a battalion of Turks in advance of Gazir to open the country, and give due notice, should he endeavour to turn our left by that road, which he will have some difficulty in doing, as the country is covered by the broadsides of the ships.

I have much reason to be satisfied with the zeal of the whole of the officers and seamen employed: their exertions in completing our lines, under Mr. Aldrich, of the Engineers, is beyond all praise.

Permit me, sir, to congratulate you on the first success of the army of Lebanon. You, yesterday, 316 were witness of the arrival of his Highness the Emir Abdallah, the Governor of the district of Kesrouan, and of the enthusiasm of the mountaineers; and if this continues, I have every reason to think that the Egyptian army will be obliged to retire from the sea-coast, and the mountains of Lebanon.

No. V. See Vol. II., page 17 .

Instructions for Captain Fanshawe , on his Mission to Alexandria .

By the Honourable Sir Robert Stopford , &c.

Having received instructions from the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to send a competent officer to Alexandria, in order to make a communication to Mehemet Ali, the substance of which is stated in a letter from Viscount Palmerston to their Lordships of the 14th of November, of which you will receive a copy,—it is my direction you proceed forthwith in H.M. steam vessel Megæra to Alexandria, taking with you the Dragoman named in the margin ^[137] , and on your arrival, after communicating with the senior officer, who will give you every support, you will demand to have an interview 317 with Mehemet Ali, in the presence of Boghos Bey, in order to make to Mehemet Ali a communication from Her Majesty’s Government. When admitted you will be guided in all respects by the directions contained in the said letter; and further, should the written document which Mehemet Ali may deliver to you, for the purpose of being transmitted to Constantinople, contain an expression of a desire, on the part of Mehemet Ali, to obtain hereditary tenure of the Pachalic of Egypt, you will not decline to receive and convey the document on that account, provided it shall also contain the engagements mentioned in the aforesaid letter. You will also state that if Mehemet Ali, as a proof of his desire for conciliation, expresses his readiness to restore the fleet immediately, you will offer in my name every assistance in conducting it to Marmorice, where it will be placed at the Sultan’s disposal; and making the senior officer acquainted with the result, you will return in the Megæra, and join me at Marmorice.

Should the senior officer be at any distance from the port, you will not go out of your way, but communicate with him on your return from Alexandria.

Given on board the Princess Charlotte, off Cyprus, 6th Dec. 1840.

(Signed) Robert Stopford , Admiral .

By command of the Commander-in-Chief,

(Signed) John Loudon , Secretary .

Protocol of the Conference held at the house of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sublime Porte, the 20th of December, 1840, between the Minister for Foreign Affairs, on one part, and the Representatives of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, on the other.

Minister for Foreign Affairs. You are aware, gentlemen, that a letter was addressed by Mehemet Ali to the Sublime Porte, and you are acquainted with its contents. The Sublime Porte yesterday received likewise the Memorandum of the Conference of London of the 14th of November. The Sublime Porte directs me to ask you, gentlemen, if Mehemet Ali by this letter has complied with the spirit of the Memorandum, and if his submission ought to be considered as real?

Ambassador of England. I think that it belongs to the Sultan alone to decide this point.

Minister for Foreign Affairs. Up to this time there have only been words on the part of Mehemet Ali; if he executes the promises made in the letter, then his submission may be considered as real.

Ambassador of England. I leave to my Colleagues to decide upon that point. As for me, I see nothing before me at present which can authorize me in explaining myself, or in giving an opinion.

Internuncio of Austria. With the view of relieving myself from all responsibility, and of making 319 the views of my Government in so important a matter clearly manifest, I have deemed it fitting to give my vote in writing. I will now read it to the Conference:—

“I have read over and over again with the most scrupulous attention the letter which Mehemet Ali has just addressed to the Grand Vizier, and on which I am called upon to pronounce my opinion. I have found nothing in it which is not correct. The tone which pervades it has appeared to me to be altogether proper. It might have been desirable that no allusion had been made to the Convention of Commodore Napier; but we are all agreed that it would have been much more so that the Convention in question had never been concluded; and Mehemet Ali, by referring to it, has only made use of an advantage which has been gratuitously offered to him. Besides, it was Captain Fanshawe alone who should have represented to him that an act which the Allied commanders had declared null and of no effect, ought not to be mentioned in the letter to the Grand Vizier. But I will not dwell on this point, which, after all, is now only of secondary interest. I return to Mehemet Ali’s letter. In this letter the Pacha declares himself ready to do all that is required of him, and in this respect his submission appears to me entire.

“I should then be of opinion that this submission should be accepted; that an officer of his Highness should be sent to Alexandria; that Mehemet 320 Ali should be enjoined to deliver up to him the Ottoman fleet; that, according to the terms of the Separate Act of the Convention of the 15th of July, the Allied commanders should be invited to assist at such delivery; that the Pacha should be summoned to evacuate the provinces or cities of the Ottoman empire still occupied by the Egyptian troops, and situated beyond the limits of Egypt; finally, that the Grand Vizier, in replying to his letter, should announce to him that when once these conditions should be entirely fulfilled, his Highness, from deference to his Allies, would be pleased to reinstate him in his functions as Pacha of Egypt. This advice is what the Conference of London wished that we should give to the Sublime Porte, in case Mehemet Ali should yield to the summons about to be made to him. As for the tribute, the land and sea forces, and the laws which must govern Egypt, those points have been settled beforehand by the Convention of the 15th of July, and it will be sufficient to execute in this respect the stipulations contained in the IIIrd, Vth, and VIth Articles of the Separate Act annexed to the Convention.

“I should consider as in every respect to be regretted any hesitation on the part of the Porte to comply with the advice of its Allies. The most brilliant successes have crowned their efforts in Syria; those successes have surpassed our calculations, our anticipations, our expectations. Syria has returned to the rule of his Highness, and thus 321 the principal object of the alliance is accomplished. To proceed further does not enter into the views of the Allied Powers; the Conference of London has pronounced with sufficient distinctness in this respect. The Sublime Porte may doubtless have good reasons to desire the destruction of Mehemet Ali; but as it has not the means of effecting it itself, the task of doing so would devolve upon its Allies. Now would it desire, in return for the services which they have rendered to it, to involve them in an undertaking which would endanger the general peace, so ardently desired by all people, and so happily maintained up to the present time?

“It is especially towards France that the attention of our Governments is at present directed; that Power is entitled to their respect and their consideration; and if the menacing and warlike attitude of the Thiers Ministry could not stay them in their course towards the end which they proposed to themselves, and which they have attained, they appear henceforth to be desirous to dedicate all their care to keep well with the Ministry which succeeds it, and whose language announces a prudent, moderate, and conciliatory policy. They must consequently enter into its position, make allowances for the difficulties by which it is surrounded, and not expose it to be hurried along against its will in a false course. In the present state of sentiments in France an unlooked-for event might subvert everything; and is it not for the interest of all and for 322 that of justice, that they should frankly unite themselves with those who govern France, to prevent a like calamity?”

The Internuncio thereupon reads the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth paragraphs of the Separate Act of the 15th of July.

Envoy of Prussia. I partake of the opinion of the Internuncio. Mehemet Ali’s proceeding appears to me in fact to be in conformity with the spirit of the Memorandum. I think besides, that Mehemet Ali having solicited his pardon of the Sultan, the Sublime Porte ought not to act with too great severity against him; that, on the contrary, it ought to lend itself to explanations, and to evince consideration and moderation, not only for the interest of the Porte itself, but also for the general interest of Europe.

Chargé d’Affaires of Russia. In all that relates to the general question the views of my Government cannot differ from those of the three other Courts, its Allies; my instructions are founded on that principle. In the special question which forms the object of this Conference, the existing documents ought to point out to us the course and the rules to be observed; now this course and these rules appear to me to be already laid down by the Memorandum of the Conference of London on the 14th of November, and by Lord Palmerston’s despatch of the 15th of October. The Memorandum had not yet reached me from my Government; it is the 323 Internuncio who has had the goodness to communicate it to me; I have only received Lord Palmerston’s despatch, which is mentioned, and I conceive that I shall conform to the meaning of these documents, by joining, under existing circumstances, in the vote pronounced by the Internuncio.

Ambassador of England. The question, I repeat, appears to me to depend upon the fact of the submission of Mehemet Ali, and the Sultan appears to me to be the sole judge in such a question: he alone has the right to decide. If the Sublime Porte informs us that the Sultan has accepted Mehemet Ali’s submission, that he is satisfied with it, the orders of my Government enjoin me, in such a case, to advise the Porte to grant to Mehemet Ali the hereditary government of Egypt. Until that time, until the Porte communicates to us the decision of the Sultan, I must abstain from giving any advice, any opinion.

Minister for Foreign Affairs. There are different kinds of submission. Mehemet Ali might, for example, have come himself, according to our usages, or have sent some one to implore his pardon; but that is not what we mean. The Memorandum requires that Mehemet Ali should restore the fleet, that he should evacuate certain countries. He writes that he will do all this; if he accomplishes these promises, the Sublime Porte will be able to credit his submission, but the letter cannot of itself alone be considered as a real submission.

324 Internuncio of Austria. The letter is a commencement of submission. If the Sublime Porte demands the delivery of the fleet, if Mehemet Ali restores it, and if he evacuates the countries specified in the Memorandum, his submission will certainly be then complete.

Chargé d’Affaires of Russia. It is certain that we shall not be able to consider the submission of Mehemet Ali as completed until he shall have restored the fleet, and evacuated the Holy Cities, as well as the other places specified in the Memorandum; but for the present we should abide by the text of the Memorandum and of the instruction addressed by the Admiralty to Admiral Stopford, wherein mention is made of a letter to be delivered by Mehemet Ali to the officer commissioned to notify to him the decision of the Conference of London.

Internuncio. What more could Mehemet Ali do? He must begin by saying that he submitted, and he could not, at the same instant, carry into effect all the conditions of his submission.

Minister for Foreign Affairs , alluding to what the Ambassador for England had said, observes, that up to the present time there had been no question of hereditary succession.

Internuncio. I am not at this moment called upon to discuss that point, on which I have no precise instruction; but, the case occurring, I shall conform myself altogether on that matter to what the Ambassador of England shall do.

325 Ambassador of England. For my part, I have precise orders to advise the Porte to grant hereditary succession to Mehemet Ali, so soon as it shall apprize us that the Sultan is satisfied with the submission of Mehemet Ali; but such advice can only be conditional; I have not the right to judge of the reality of the submission, and I must wait, before giving it, for the Sultan to pronounce himself on the fact of the submission.

Internuncio. As for me, I must repeat it, I look upon the letter of Mehemet Ali, as a first step towards his submission.

Ambassador of England. It will not be in my power to act in the sense of the instructions of my Government, until the Sublime Porte shall have declared that it considers the submission of Mehemet Ali as complete. But I cannot demand of the Sultan any declaration whatever on that matter, for I should think that I trenched upon his rights. It is for his Majesty to decide.

Envoy of Prussia. I think, as I have already said, that the Sublime Porte ought not, in the present case, to act with too great severity, and I must always exhort it to act with moderation.

Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Porte has never wished to act with severity; facts have already proved it. It does not wish to do so even now. It wishes, on the contrary, to act in concert with its Allies; and although it is doubtless for the Sultan to decide on the submission of Mehemet Ali, nevertheless, 326 as his Allies have declared their intentions in the Memorandum, I have thought it right to consult their Representatives to know whether Mehemet Ali’s proceeding is in conformity with the spirit of the Memorandum: but, since their opinions are at variance, they might refer to the decision of the Conference of London.

Internuncio. But there is no variance between us; we all think that Mehemet Ali’s submission, in order that it should be complete, must be followed by the execution of the conditions which are imposed upon him. I think, moreover, that to refer the question to the decision of the Conference of London would be to appeal from the Conference to the Conference, and lose time in useless adjournments.

Minister for Foreign Affairs. I think that Mehemet Ali must first execute the conditions imposed upon him; as for the hereditary succession, that is another question upon which I am not prepared to explain myself.

Internuncio once more declares, that when the time arrives, he will concur in the steps of the Ambassador of England on that point, and the Envoy of Prussia makes the same declaration.

Minister for Foreign Affairs. You are aware, gentlemen, that on his accession to the throne the Sultan had granted to Mehemet Ali the hereditary administration of Egypt; he rejected that favour. Still later, with the view of sparing the shedding of blood, the Treaty of July 15 granted it to him; 327 Mehemet Ali equally rejected it. It was necessary to have recourse to measures of coercion, and the Sultan withdrew this favour from him. At present it appears to me that there can no longer be a question of a right in favour of Mehemet Ali, and the Sultan is free to take his decision on this point.

Representatives unanimously admitted that the Sultan possesses his entire freedom of action in this respect, and that Mehemet Ali could not appeal to any right.

Envoy of Prussia added, that any concession in favour of Mehemet Ali could only be considered as an effect of the Sultan’s generosity; for the independence of his Highness is the object of the Convention of July 15; but the more advantageous the Sultan’s position is at the present time, the more will it perhaps allow him to be generous.

Minister for Foreign Affairs. Since Mehemet Ali has rejected the Treaty of July 15, that Treaty no longer exists for him, and other conditions might be imposed on Mehemet Ali.

Internuncio. But the Treaty continues to exist for us.

Ambassador of England. I declare that, in my opinion, Mehemet Ali has now no right; that the Sultan is master to take the course which he shall consider fitting, and that we can only afford him our advice.

Minister for Foreign Affairs , addressing himself to the Internuncio, says to him: Your Excellency 328 began by saying, that if the Sultan is satisfied with the letter of Mehemet Ali, his submission ought to be accepted. But Mehemet Ali has already written a thousand letters of the same kind. Can any faith be placed in his letters? It is evident besides that there is some trick even in this last letter. For example, he speaks of Commodore Napier’s Convention, which is a void act, in order to come to the subject of hereditary succession.

Internuncio. That is true; but this letter, given in consequence of a summons made to him by the English Admiral in the name of the Four Powers, cannot be compared to all those which he has addressed of his own accord to the Sublime Porte, and specifically to Hosrew Pacha.

Minister for Foreign Affairs. You understand, gentlemen, that in any case it is necessary that the Porte should have time to reflect upon this matter.

Internuncio. Assuredly, an affair of this kind cannot be concluded in a day; it is, doubtless, necessary that your Excellency should be able to concert with your colleagues, and take the orders of the Sultan.

Minister for Foreign Affairs observes, that having to submit to the Council and to the Sultan his report on the Conference of this day, he is desirous of knowing, definitely, what is the conclusion which he should communicate to them.

Representatives reply that their opinion being recorded in the present Protocol, they refer themselves to it.

329 Ambassador of England. I repeat that I must wait for the decision of the Sultan to give the advice which is enjoined to me by the orders of my Government.

Internuncio observes once again how much it would be to be regretted if the Porte should not conform with promptitude to the wish expressed by the Allied Courts in the Memorandum of the 14th of November.

No. VII.

Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Napier to Sir Charles Napier .

I have just returned from a visit to Souliman Pacha, who is a fine hearty old soldier, and begs to be remembered to you, saying it will be some time ere he forgets the cannonnade you gave him. I told him how much you were annoyed at his house having been plundered at Beyrout, assuring him that the English had nothing to do with it; to which he replied that he was aware that he was under an obligation on that account to the Austrians; but he said that some things of his which you had ordered to be sent to him, had been seized by the douane at Beyrout, and amongst others some arms from Persia, which he valued much as curiosities. 330 When his house was plundered all his papers was destroyed; amongst others some military works of his in manuscript, which had cost him the labour of years.

Ibrahim Pacha was present at Beckfaya, and mentioned your having taken off your hat. He was also in person at the crossing of the Jordan, when we returned in such a hurry to Jerusalem. He says it was merely a demonstration, which answered the purpose for which it was intended, and which caused him to gain three marches on us. We had altogether a most interesting conversation, which lasted upwards of an hour, and during which he was civil in the extreme, shaking me repeatedly by the hand, and ended by desiring to be most particularly remembered to you.

Feb. 17. —Souliman Pacha has just called on me; he is a fine old fellow. I gave him a bottle of porter; he drank your health, and told me to let you know he had done so heartily.

He brought back with him 8000 troops of artillery, who were much harassed by the Arabs from Akaba. He says he put to death every one of them whom he caught. I did not like to ask him if he had many Syrians amongst his troops; but I am sorry to inform you that there are a great many here, who have arrived with the troops from Gaza.

About eight regiments of infantry are now encamped near this, the last of which arrived yesterday 331 from Gaza, which they left on the 4th instant; and from what I can learn from the men, they were forced to accompany the Egyptians. Besides the infantry, a couple of regiments of lancers have come, some irregular Mogrebins (from the Deserts of Libya), and some irregular Turkish cavalry from Anatolia ; I believe about 200. The horses, particularly those of the lancers, are in good condition, and it is lucky for me that I could not get my mountain horsemen to approach them ^[138] , as they would have eaten us without salt. I dine with Souliman the day after to-morrow, and manage to spend my time pleasantly enough; but I am anxious to hear from our head-quarters, and have as yet been able to learn nothing positive about the Emirs, but have sent to Thebes to obtain information.

The disturbances have already begun in the Hedjaz since the Egyptian troops have been withdrawn; and a Prophet, calling himself King of the Land and Sea, has already set up the standard of a religious warfare. * * * *

I hasten to acknowledge the receipt of the letter, dated May 27, with which you have honoured me. me. Having placed it before His Highness the Viceroy, I am desired to express his grateful acknowledgements for the friendly expressions it contains.

On the two points, “of the return of some Syrian soldiers who are still here, and of the regulation of the monopoly,” which form the principal object of your letter, I believe that I cannot do better than transcribe, Commodore, the words which His Highness proffered in reply, as I have obtained authority to transmit them to you.

“I cannot see the motive why my friend Napier should be in any difficulty; he who has talked with me, who has seen all, and doubtless, with his penetration, understood all. No one is ignorant that since the signing of the Convention with him the difficulty of the question could not have been made smoother; the affair having been submitted to different conditions, has been prolonged by negotiations with the Envoy of the Sublime Porte; and whilst the conditions were under consideration, they could not be executed, neither could they consider my conduct strange, still less suppose that I was thereby breaking my word. Thank God, it is now 333 arranged to the satisfaction of the parties; the Firman has arrived, and has been solemnly read in public with the usual ceremonies. I am now only under the necessity of submitting to the clemency of my Sovereign as to the quota of the tribute. I have already conferred on this subject with his Envoy here, who is on the point of setting out, and the matter is almost arranged. Now that the moment has arrived to put successively into execution the conditions contained in the above-mentioned Firman, my friend Napier will very soon learn that what I talked to him about, that what I said to him concerning the monopoly, will be effected in a manner to promote the interests of the country; and I hope that his friendship for me will be more than ever strengthened.”

In sending you, Commodore, on the part of His Highness, the preceding communication, I am desired also to present his friendly salutations, and I avail myself of this opportunity in my own person to reiterate the assurances of the high consideration with which I have the honour to be,

“The personal character of the Author is not only impressed upon almost every page, but the book contains a narrative of one, and to all appearance the most important of the leaves out of a hero’s life, written by himself. It is Cæsar’s Commentaries in the first person, wanting the classical eloquence of the Roman, but equally devoid of his concealed vanity, and his suspected partiality. Grander battles have been fought, more gallant never. It is rare to have a description of such a fight from its hero, even in a gazette; but it is still rarer to have an account of his feelings.”— Spectator.

“The gallant Commodore’s description of the battle off Cape St. Vincent is one of the most stirring nautical sketches that has fallen under our observation.”— United Service Gazette.

“An excellent and spirit-stirring book—plain, honest, and straight forward—the very stuff of which the web of history alone should be composed. This is, indeed, an honest, fair and impartial history.”— Morning Chronicle.

“In spirit and in keeping, from beginning to end, Admiral Napier’s War in Portugal is the happiest picture we could conceive of the hero of the battle off Cape St. Vincent, its especial excellence consisting in a regardless bluntness of manner and language, that is quite admirable and delightful.”— Monthly Review.

“If Commodore Napier be not distinguished by the commonplace facilities of authorship, he possesses the higher qualities of truth, discretion, end clear-sightedness, in no small degree.”— Atlas.

“In speaking of himself and his deeds, he has hit the just and difficult medium—showing his real feelings, yet steering clear of affected modesty on the one hand, and over-weening egotism on the other hand.”— Tait’s Magazine.

“This is a very graphic account of the affairs in which the gallant author figured so nobly, and added fresh lustre to the name of Napier.”— News.

In charge of the Expedition sent by the Royal Geographical Society, and the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, to the Christian Tribes in Chaldea.

I. A COMPENDIOUS GRAMMAR, with a copious Appendix; including a Dictionary of Prefixes and Affixes. Fourth Edition, revised. 5 s.

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