[i]

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS STUDIES
IN THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES

VOL IV. NO. 2 JUNE 1915

BOARD OF EDITORS

ERNEST L. BOGART JOHN A. FAIRLIE

LAURENCE M. LARSON

Published by the University of Illinois
Under the Auspices of the Graduate School
Urbana, Illinois

[ii]

Copyright, 1915
By the University of Illinois

[iii]

The Defeat of Varus and the German
Frontier Policy of Augustus

WILLIAM A. OLDFATHER, Ph. D.
Associate Professor of Classics, University of Illinois

AND

HOWARD VERNON CANTER, Ph. D.
Assistant Professor of Classics, University of Illinois

[iv]

The present monograph is the outcome of a certain dissatisfaction felt with the traditional view as expressed in some of the literature which appeared six years ago on the occasion of the nineteen-hundredth anniversary of the battle of the Teutoburg forest. The principal theses as here presented were jotted down at the time, and although a variety of circumstances prevented their immediate elaboration, they were not forgotten, collections of literature were made from time to time, as occasion offered, and the general course of argument outlined. In 1912 Mr. Cyrus S. Gentry, then a graduate student in this university, working under the supervision of Mr. Oldfather, prepared and submitted, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Classics, a thesis entitled: “The Effect of the Defeat of Varus upon the Imperial Policy of Rome regarding the Northern Frontier.” We desire to express our thanks to Mr. Gentry for kind permission to use some of his collections of material. The present work is, however, a wholly independent production, being much more extensive and detailed, and differing substantially in plan and scope. Active work upon the present study was begun by us in cooperation in the spring of 1914, and continued, with intermissions, to the present time.

In the first part, which deals with the traditional view, we have gone into some detail in the presentation and criticism of current explanations, with the hope that, as a review of present and past opinion, it may not be without value, even if our new interpretation fail to receive general acceptance. A certain amount of repetition in the two parts of the monograph has thus been rendered unavoidable, but though this may at times prove tiresome, it contributes to the clearness of the argument, which is, after all, the chief consideration.

To some it may perhaps seem unfortunate that a discussion of such a subject as this should appear at a time when the German nation is involved in a momentous conflict. We do not [vi] so feel. Disinterested scholarship should not be affected by transitory or even permanent emotions. We are confident that our work has not been so affected. That we have been compelled in scientific candor to destroy a certain glamor which has been attributed to an early period of German history, has not the slightest bearing upon our attitude toward German character and achievement, for which we entertain the most sincere respect. Our investigation deals not with the quality of the deed of Arminius, but only with its historical consequences, two utterly unrelated aspects. It is surely no discredit that an act of heroism should not be also big with destiny. Over consequences no man has control. The modern German nation needs, perhaps less than any other, the lustre of a long buried past to shed renown upon the present.

We take pleasure in acknowledging our indebtedness to Professor A. S. Pease of the Department of Classics, who has kindly read all the manuscript in proof.

W. A. O.
H. V. C.

The University of Illinois

May 24, 1915

[viii]

Historians and other writers in discussing the defeat of Varus, and its bearing upon the subsequent history of Rome and Germany, are almost united in the belief that Augustus, until the events of the year 9 A. D., had in view the complete subjugation of Germany as far as the river Elbe. Gardthausen [1] unhesitatingly predicates the emperor’s intention in the following words: “er wollte das Land östlich vom Rhein und nördlich von der Donau mit seinem Reiche vereinigen, um ihm eine bessere Grenze zu geben.” Mommsen everywhere expresses the traditional view. In discussing Drusus’ command of the year 13 B. C. against the Germans he says: [2] “Drusus ... übernahm bei Augustus Rückkehr nach Italien (741) die Verwaltung von Gallien und den Oberbefehl gegen die Germanen, deren Unterwerfung jetzt ernstlich in das Auge gefasst ward.” Further on [3] Drusus’ successor, Tiberius, is represented as having succeeded [10] in making this subjugation: “weit und breit zwischen Rhein und Elbe zeigten sich die römischen Truppen, und als Tiberius die Forderung stellte, dass sämmtliche Gaue die römische Herrschaft förmlich anzuerkennen hätten ... fügten sie sich ohne Ausnahme.” Again, Mommsen [4] calls Arminius the leader in the conflict of despair over the lost national independence, and speaks [5] of the campaign of the year 16 A. D. as the last which the Romans waged in order to subdue Germany and to transfer the boundary from the Rhine to the Elbe. Delbrück’s position on the question is unequivocal [6] . So is that of Schiller. [7] Hübner [8] voices the surprising belief that Augustus in his effort to subdue Germany was merely following in the steps of Julius Caesar! Koepp [9] hazards the same view, and says that not only was the shortening of the Rhine boundary planned by Caesar, but that this plan was to have been carried into execution after the overthrow of the Getae; that nothing but more pressing duties prevented Caesar’s heir, for thirty years after Gaul’s subjugation, from pushing the boundary beyond the Rhine; that the settling of the Ubii on the left bank of the Rhine by Agrippa (19 B. C.) was not a backward step from that taken in crossing the Rhine in 37 B. C., but a mere confession that only in this way could Rome protect the Ubii from the attack of their neighbors.

Seeck [10] and many others assert that not only was Germany [11] subdued by Rome, but that Roman administration was actually set up in the new province. [11] This is stated by Knoke as follows: [12] “Das germanische Gebiet konnte bis zur Elbe als unterworfen gelten ... Römische Verwaltung und Gerichtsbarkeit waren eingeführt, die Deutschen zu Heeresfolge und Tribut gezwungen ... nach menschlichem Ermessen musste für das deutsche Volk die Zeit gekommen sein, wo es auf immer der Herrschaft Roms verfallen war.” However, there is no general agreement as to when Augustus conceived the plan of conquering Germany. Hertzberg [13] believes it doubtful whether he had any such intention at the time of Lollius’ defeat (16 B. C.): “Ob er wirklich schon jetzt die Eroberung Deutschlands bestimmt ins Auge gefasst hat, ist uns—wir wiederholen es—freilich zweifelhaft.” Abraham’s conclusion is that as late even as 10 B. C. Augustus had no further purpose than to secure the Rhine boundary, but that later he had larger ambitions which were fully realized: “Später indessen hat Augustus wirklich Deutschland bis zur Elbe ... zur Provinz machen wollen, und vor der Niederlage des Varus sah er die Unterwerfung Norddeutschlands für vollendet an.” [14] Many believe that an effort was made on Augustus’ part to shorten the Rhine-Danube boundary, and they regard this as tantamount [12] to an attempt to subjugate Germany. [15] The campaigns of Drusus and Tiberius in particular are usually cited as proofs of Rome’s purpose with respect to Germany. So by Pelham [16] : “Nor can we doubt that the object of the campaigns carried on beyond the Rhine by Augustus’ two stepsons, Drusus and Tiberius (13 B.C.-6 A.D.), had for their object the extension of Roman rule up to that [the Elbe] river.” Occasionally, however, more caution is shown in discussing Rome’s policy. So Abbott [17] : “To the north the frontier policy of Augustus was, at the outset, less clearly determined. For a time the Romans seem to have intended making the Elbe the line between them and the Germans.” Ferrero, although he devotes a chapter of his well-known work [18] to the “Conquest of Germania,” concedes, nevertheless, that Augustus was opposed to expansion by conquest, and that the first fifteen years of his rule unmistakably contradict such a policy [19] : “he had persistently avoided hazardous adventures beyond the frontiers of the empire and had found a thousand pretexts to deceive the impatience and ambition of the people.” We may observe also that Eduard Meyer’s view [20] is not wholly in harmony with the commonly accepted one. He objects to the assertion frequently made that the victory of Arminius preserved the individuality of the German nation: “Wenn wir ... die Frage aufwerfen, wie es gekommen ist, dass den romanischen Völkern germanische zur Seite stehen, dass ich hier deutsch zu Ihnen rede und nicht in einer romanischen Sprache, so wird einer vorurteilslose Erwägung [13] nicht die Schlacht im Teutoburger Wald nennen dürfen.” And although he insists on the necessity resting upon Augustus to war against the Germans in order to preserve Gaul, to maintain peace, and to secure a shorter and more distant frontier at the Elbe, he makes it clear that the war was in no sense prompted by the desire for imperial expansion [21] : “aber auch dieser Krieg ist durchaus nur als Grenzkrieg geführt worden, nicht als ein Reichskrieg an der Art wie Cäsar seinen Geten- und Partherkrieg geplant hatte.”

Nevertheless, from a careful consideration of the foregoing opinions, which have been selected merely as representative of a very large number of similar expressions, we may discover a strikingly universal belief that before the battle of the Teutoburg forest Augustus was attempting the conquest of Germany; that the disaster which overtook the legions of Varus in this battle caused him to give up his plans, and to renounce all hope of making Germany a province [22] . Most historians claim in addition that Arminius was the preserver of the German nationality, and that his victory over Varus was a turning point in the world’s history. So Seeck [23] : “Der Sieg des Armin hat es für alle Zeiten verhindert, dass auch die Germanen Bürger des Reiches wurden und so den Keim gerettet, aus dem künftig die Völkerwanderung und mit ihr eine neue Welt erwachsen sollte.” Gardthausen [24] states the same belief in still stronger terms: “Wenn wir daher jetzt, also beinahe nach 2000 Jahren, noch von einer deutschen Nation reden, wenn es noch heute eine deutsche Sprache gibt, so ist das ohne Frage, zum grossen Theile, das Verdienst [14] des Arminius ... kurz, die Entwickelung der deutschen Geschichte und in beschränkterem Masse auch der Weltgeschichte wäre eine andere geworden, wenn Arminius nicht zur rechten Zeit den Kampf mit dem Varus aufgenommen und wenn er nicht später—was noch schwerer war—den Siegespreis der Freiheit gegen Germanicus vertheidigt hätte.” The debt of the German nation, and the world at large, to Arminius, is proclaimed again and again in monographs, remarkable as exhibitions of patriotic fervor, but at times wanting in scientific spirit and in the objective temper that should characterize estimates of historical significance. [25] Mommsen and Koepp may be cited as the most distinguished representatives of the view that the battle of the Teutoburg forest is a turning point in national destinies, an ebbing in the tide of Rome’s sway over the world, a shifting of the bounds of Roman rule from the Elbe to the Rhine and the Danube. [26] Koepp is the more guarded. He says [27] , “Seit dieser Niederlage scheint Roms Macht, auf dieser Seite wenigstens, zurückzuebben, und wie ein Wendepunkt der Weltgeschichte erscheint diese Schlacht im Teutoburger Walde.” But this view has currency elsewhere than in the writings of [15] German authors. Thomas Arnold voices it [28] with all the extravagance that characterizes rash generalizations: “The victory of Arminius deserves to be reckoned among those signal deliverances which have affected for centuries the happiness of mankind; and we may regard the destruction of Quintilius Varus, and his three legions, on the bank of the Lippe, as second only in the benefits derived from it to the victory of Charles Martel at Tours over the invading host of the Mohammedans.” We find it, as one might expect, in a text of such unscientific character as that of Creasy [29] , the motto for whose discussion is an epigrammatic sentence taken from the epitomator Florus, “Hac clade factum, ut imperium quod in littore oceani non steterat, in ripa Rheni fluminis staret.” And we need feel no surprise that this view is perpetuated in such a compilation as that of P. V. N. Meyers. [30] Here and there, however, are to be found writers who warn against such a sweeping generalization. So Eduard Meyer, who has been quoted above. [31] Ferrero too shows a saner historical view when he says [32] : “Historians have long been accustomed to regard the defeat of Varus as one of the ‘decisive’ battles of the world, and as an event which may be said to have changed the course of history. It is said, that if Varus had not been overthrown, Rome would have preserved her [16] grip upon the territory from the Rhine to the Elbe and would have romanised it as she did Gaul: the prospects of a Germanic nationality and civilization would have been as impossible as those of a Celtic nationality and civilization after the defeat of Vercingetorix. Thus the defeat of Teutoburg is said to have saved Germanism even as that of Alesia was the ruin of the old Celtic nationalism. This straightforward line of argument, however, touches the sinuous course of reality only at a few points, and those far distant from one another. It is always a dangerous task, in dealing with history, to say what might have happened, in view of the considerable difficulty involved in the attempt to explain what did happen.” [33] It should be observed also that such a generalization involves the assumption that the German nation developed as it did because of its liberation from Roman influence, whereas it may properly be argued that the so-called liberation was instrumental in separating Germany for centuries from civilizing contact with Rome. For it is a fact that the early Germans made no progress whatever, left no literature, no monument, no memory of themselves until they again came into relations with that great transmitter of civilization, Rome, in the person of Rome’s new representative, Charlemagne. [34]

[17]

Now it is of course obvious that the estimate of Arminius’ achievement will depend upon the significance which impartial criticism will assign to the battle in which Varus was defeated—Arminius’ one great deed. Regarding that we propose in the present monograph to show that the ancient accounts of the battle of the Teutoburg forest are of inferior authority; that while some of them are broadly detailed, they are on the whole meager, inconsistent, and full of errors, exaggerations, and absurdities; that a striving after rhetorical effect is their peculiar characteristic; [35] that frequently what these sources say in express words is not objectively trustworthy, and still less so are the deductions made immediately from the descriptions found there, or from the delineations which the authors of the sources doubtless never intended to serve as objective pictures of reality; [36] that only the less cautious writers assert that [18] Augustus in a spirit of imperialism sought to conquer Germany; [37] that historians who have the best standing as authorities abandon this ground and give as a reason the necessity resting on Augustus of protecting Gaul and Italy from the Germans. An effort will be made to show that Germany was never made a Roman province; that Augustus never had the intention, and never made the attempt, to conquer Germany and organize it as a province; that his operations in Germany consisted merely in making a series of demonstrations in force, in order to impress the barbarians and to facilitate the defense of the frontier by pacifying and bringing into friendly relations with Rome a wide strip of the enemy’s territory.

It is but natural, when such exaggerated estimates are current regarding the significance of the battle of the Teutoburg forest, that the leading figure on the German side, Arminius, should be elevated to a position of quite fictitious glory, and that he should have been exalted to the rank of one of the world’s greatest heroes. [38] As Koepp pertinently observes, many well-meant accounts of the Teutoburg battle have been written [19] under mere impulse of national feeling. [39] However, that the glorification of heroes at the expense of truth finds no place in sober historical investigation is the warning given by the best trained German scholars themselves, and by none more effectively than by Koepp [40] , who said to an assembly of scholars at an Arminius Jubilee celebration held at Detmold, October 22, 1908: “eher dürften wir heute unseren Helden aus der bengalischen Beleuchtung romantischer Schwärmerei in das Tageslicht geschichtlicher Betrachtung rücken, ohne uns gegen die Jubiläumsstimmung zu versündigen. Es ist ja auch Vorrecht und Pflicht der Wissenschaft, auch an festlichen Tagen der Wahrheit die Ehre zu geben.” So Fustel de Coulanges complains that in Arminius’ case historians have taken liberty with historical [20] facts under motives of idealization [41] : “Nous désapprouvons les historiens allemands, qui ont altéré l’histoire pour créer, un Arminius legendaire et une Germanie idéale.” Finally, we may note that the same authority warns also in more general terms of historians who allow patriotic motives to exaggerate the few facts at their disposal. [42]

The only ancient accounts that have come down to us which throw light on the battle of the Teutoburg forest are: Cassius Dio, 56, 18-23; Velleius, II, 117-120; Florus, II, 30, 21-39; Tacitus, Annales , I, 60-62. These we must now compare with each other, with the purpose of determining their weight and credibility in the light of what we know of the authors, of the time and circumstances under which they wrote, and of the purpose had in view. [1]

Cassius Dio ( ca. 150- ca. 235 A. D.) is the only one of these ancient writers who has given us anything like a connected account of the catastrophe. [2] Although he wrote in Greek, Dio [22] must be regarded as a Roman, being the son of a Roman senator, and himself filling the office of praetor and consul. His industry—he spent ten years (200-210 A. D.) in accumulating material for his history—and his various activities, as a practical soldier and politician, made his work much more than a mere compilation. While not remarkable for historical insight it represents what Dio sincerely believed to be the truth. Nevertheless, Dio was a product of the rhetorical schools and under the spell of their influence he wrote. His battle scenes are rhetorical exercises. [3] Noticeable also is his inclination toward a lively narration of events of a military character, a tendency which causes him to depart from the bare truth of his sources, and to ornament them with sensational descriptions after the rhetorical manner. [4] Delbrück notes that our sources for the wars of the Romans with the Germans are almost all from second, third, or fourth hand, and that Dio’s account was written at the very time when the rhetorical spirit most completely dominated literature. Dio, as well as our other sources for these years, is to be used with caution, since these writers regarded historical composition as preeminently an opus oratorium , and sought first of all to hold the reader’s attention by brilliant characterizations and striking descriptions.

To Velleius ( ca. 19 B. C.- ca. 30 A. D.), the only contemporary author who tells of the Varus disaster, we are indebted for a brief account. [5] A loyal officer with a military record behind him, a dilettante with undeniable studium , Velleius, in the reign of Tiberius, turned to the writing of history. As prefect of horse he accompanied Tiberius to Germany, where he served “per annos continuos novem praefectus aut legatus.” [6] His fervid loyalty and extravagance cause him to magnify everything that concerns Tiberius to such a degree that he is scarcely [23] more than a partisan memoir writer. In his hasty sketches of military campaigns in Germany and Pannonia, full of blunders and inconsistencies, it is clear that he is but little concerned with the exact establishment of facts. With no appreciation of the internal connection of things, and no ability to sift evidence, he centers his interest almost entirely upon individuals for purpose of praise or blame, and excels as a rhetorical anecdotist, and as a delineator of individual actors. His inflated style, his straining after effect by hyperbole, antithesis, epigram, and piquancies of all kinds, mark the degenerate taste of the Silver Age, of which he is the earliest representative. [7] His reflections and observations generally outweigh the information given. Velleius’ training, the occasion of his composition, the attempt to satisfy the taste of his age, all make him a source, which, because of distortions and overemphasis, cannot be accepted at full value.

L. Annaeus Florus, usually identified with the rhetorician and poet of Hadrian’s time, wrote (probably in 137 A. D.) an abridgement in two short books of Rome’s wars from the foundation of the city to the era of Augustus. As to Florus’ purpose in writing, and his rating as a rhetorician, scholars are agreed. [8] He composed solely from rhetorical motives [9] , hence historical truth is frequently misrepresented, both intentionally and unintentionally, in a work full of errors, confusions, and [24] contradictions. [10] Florus’ work is declamatory in tone, shows no traces of independent investigation, and little of the calm, even temper demanded of the historian. In his search for the surprising, the unusual, and the spirited, he is frequently led into exaggerations. He is given to the use of superlatives and enhancing epithets, as ingens , immensus , incredibilis , perpetuus , etc., and that he was himself conscious of exaggerations is clear from his free use of such words as quippe , seventy-five times, and quasi , more than a hundred times. In Florus each event is presented as a marvellous fact, and no better commentary on the poverty and unsatisfactoriness of our sources for the Varus disaster could be found than the fact that to Florus many writers have given the honor of being our chief authority. [11]

It is apparent to the most superficial reader that the accounts given by our sources—especially those by Cassius Dio and Florus—are contradictory [12] , notwithstanding the efforts that have been made to show that there is no conflict between them. [13] According to Dio, supported by Tacitus, the attack was made on Varus while he was on the march, whereas Florus says that Varus was seated in his camp quietly dispensing justice, when he was surprised by the German host. [14] Further, a [25] detailed examination of the several accounts, sundry particulars of which we have no other means of testing, reveals so many inconsistencies and improbabilities that we are scarcely justified in accepting more than the bare defeat of Varus, the popular tradition of which was later incorporated into the studiously dramatic sketches of the rhetorical historians who serve as our sources. For example, Dio tells us [15] that the Germans craftily enticed Varus away from the Rhine and by conducting themselves in a peaceful and friendly manner lulled him into a feeling of security. This enticement is not mentioned by the other writers, and is in itself improbable [16] , as Roman generals had frequently down to this time marched much further into the interior without any enticement whatsoever. It becomes doubly suspicious when we note the excellent rhetorical effect it produces by bringing into greater relief the setting of the disaster, and Varus’ sudden reversal of fortune. Again, Dio makes the statement that Varus and all his highest officers committed suicide. [17] If this remarkable event took place, it is almost wholly inconceivable that it should have found no mention in Velleius and Florus, the former of whom stood much nearer in time to the event. On the other hand, both of these writers relate that Varus’ body was treated with indignity by the savage foe, and according to Velleius, one prefect died honorably in battle, and one preferred to surrender, while Varus’ legate, Numonius Vala, treacherously deserted. Dio’s description of the battle, moreover, is in sharp contradiction to that revealed by Tacitus’ account of conditions in Varus’ camp, as discovered by Germanicus in the year 15 A. D. The first camp that he came upon was one which, by its wide circuit and the measurement of its headquarters, showed the work of three legions, i. e. of an undiminished army; then came a second camp, with half-fallen rampart and shallow trench, where the diminished remnant were understood to have sunken down, i. e. the camp was laid out after a day’s loss with heavy fighting. Finally, Germanicus found in the plain the whitening bones, scattered or accumulated, just as Varus’ [26] men had fled or made their stand in the final catastrophe. [18] Tacitus’ description of a regular camp, the “wide circuit and headquarters” on a scale suitable for the whole force, is utterly inconsistent with the statement of Dio that the first camp was pitched “after securing a suitable place so far as that was possible on a wooded mountain.” And so is there contradiction in Tacitus’ statement that the legions suffered loss only after moving on from the first encampment. For according to Dio their greatest suffering and losses were on the first day’s march before their first encampment; on the second the loss, he tells us, was less because they had burned or abandoned the greater number of their wagons, and hence advanced in better order.

According to Florus it was while Varus was in his summer camp holding court that suddenly the Germans broke in upon him. Mommsen is undoubtedly correct in saying that this ridiculous representation does not reflect real tradition, but a picture of sheer fancy manufactured out of it. Doubtless it is nothing but a rhetorical exaggeration of the silly security into which Varus is represented as having been inveigled, and by which the disaster is dramatically brought about. It is past credibility that the Germans in such numbers could have broken into the Roman camp without arousing suspicion, or without having come into contact with the Roman sentries. And the more so if Varus had already been warned by Segestes of the enemy’s plans. Further, the storming of a single camp is out of harmony with the two camps mentioned by Tacitus, and clearly implied in Dio’s narrative. And it is difficult to believe that Varus would choose such a place for his summer camp—one shut in by forests, swamps, and untrodden ways. The entire description of the place where the battle was fought is far more in keeping with a camp pitched by an army on the march, than with a summer camp, in which Varus exercised the functions of a judicial office. Moreover, Florus’ account is contradicted by Velleius [19] , who says that Ceionius, one of the prefects of Varus’ camp, wished to surrender to the enemy just at the time when a large part of the Roman army had fallen in battle. Now if this refers to the first camp, in which the Romans must have left a detachment [27] (for which there is no direct evidence), then the main part of the army must have come out in orderly wise, and no unexpected surprise at the hands of the Germans could have occurred. Or, if it refers to the second camp, it was clearly not the summer camp, as Florus relates.

Florus’ account is by no means a bare narration of events, nor does he bring forward events in their sequence. His choice both of materials and the grouping of facts is with reference to the leading thought. The very words introducing the story of the Germanic wars show that they serve as the theme for the part that follows: “Germaniam quoque utinam vincere tanti non putasset! magis turpiter amissa est quam gloriose adquisita.” The same is true of the words by which he passes on to the events under Varus’ rule: “sed difficilius est provinciam obtinere quam facere.” [20] Having assumed that Augustus conquered Germany, Florus seeks to maintain the thesis that the government of a province is a difficult undertaking; that Varus took the task all too lightly, and as a result Germany was ignominiously lost. It is significant that Florus is the only author who asserts that Augustus wished to conquer Germany. And the reason assigned for this conquest is as follows: “set quatenus sciebat patrem suum C. Caesarem bis transvectum ponte Rhenum quaesisse bellum, in illius honorem concupierat facere provinciam.” [21] It is absurd to believe that Augustus ever intended to make a province of Germany for so puerile a reason as merely to honor Julius Caesar, for the latter “had not charged the heirs of his dictatorial power with the extension of Roman territory on the north slope of the Alps and on the right banks of the Rhine so directly as with the conquest of [28] Britain.” [22] If Augustus had desired to make a province in honor of his father, he would doubtless have conquered Britain instead, in accordance with Caesar’s supposed wish. Julius Caesar’s expeditions against the Germans were, as stated by Mommsen himself [23] , merely forward movements of defense. And it seems reasonable to assume that Augustus did not, as Florus tells us, wish to conquer Germany, but was merely continuing in a more extensive manner the policy of his father.

How untrustworthy Florus is as an authority may be seen from the following: “quippe Germani victi magis quam domiti erant moresque nostros magis quam arma sub imperatore Druso suspiciebant; postquam ille defunctus est, Vari Quintilli libidinem ac superbiam haut secus quam saevitiam odisse coeperunt.” [24] That is, according to Florus, Varus follows Drusus directly as commander in Germany, in spite of the fact that there intervene between them three commanders, and a long series of important events. [25] The reason for this statement is Florus’ indifference to mere facts, and his desire to harp on the theme “ difficilius est provinciam obtinere quam facere ,” and hence to bring into sharp contrast the man who won that territory and the man who was directly responsible for its loss. [26] Florus’ method is observable elsewhere. According to Velleius the Germans purposely introduced a series of fictitious lawsuits and legal contests to throw Varus off his guard. It suits Florus’ [29] purpose, however, to represent them as having recourse to arms at once, as soon as they saw the toga, and felt that laws were more cruel than arms. He thus illustrates in a rhetorical way the sudden and unexpected perils which beset one who attempts the difficult task of maintaining authority over a province. Further evidence of Florus’ inaccuracy is found in his statement that “to this day the barbarians are in possession of the two eagles.” They had as a matter of fact been recovered long before the time at which he wrote, two in the time of Tiberius [27] , and the third during the reign of Claudius. [28] With this fact established, Florus’ story to the effect that one of the standards was saved at the time of the disaster is seen to be without any basis of truth. Finally, attention may be called to Florus’ concluding statement: “hac clade factum est ut imperium, quod in litore Oceani non steterat, in ripa Rheni fluminis staret.” This has no value save that of a glittering rhetorical antithesis, but like other statements in the account, has exercised far more than due influence upon writers who discuss the effect of Varus’ defeat upon Rome’s imperial policy.

Velleius’ undisguised flattery of Tiberius warns us that even a contemporary source must be used with caution. His account shows that his one great purpose is to praise Tiberius, and place him in a favorable light. To shed the greater luster on his hero he reveals a marked animus against Varus, whose command in Germany immediately preceded Tiberius’ second term of service there. Note the depreciatory tone in which Varus is spoken of, a man who in his stupidity imagined that the inhabitants of Germany were not human beings save in voice and body, and that men who could not be subdued by the sword might be civilized by law; likewise the persistent malice which runs through his account of the loss of Varus’ legions, a dreadful calamity brought about by the incompetence and indolence of the leader; an army unrivalled in bravery, the flower of Roman troops in discipline, vigor, and experience, some of whom were severely punished by their general for using Roman arms with Roman spirit, chastised by a general who showed some courage in dying though none in fighting. Immediately following this is a sketch of the mighty deeds in Germany done by Tiberius, the constant patron of the Roman [30] empire, who undertook its cause as usual. And the next chapter relates that the same courage and good fortune which had animated Tiberius at the beginning of his command still continued with him.

Certain disagreements between Tacitus’ account of the Varus disaster and that of our other sources have already been cited. [29] But of even more importance for our discussion is Tacitus’ warm personal eulogy of Arminius at the notice of his death. [30] There can be no doubt that this tribute has done much to perpetuate the traditional view as to the effect of Varus’ defeat. The observation has often been made that Tacitus’ sympathies were strongly inclined toward the aristocratic Republic; [31] that notwithstanding his conviction that the Republic had become impossible and the monarchy necessary [32] , the terrors and indignities of Domitian’s reign embittered his whole thought; [33] that although he felt that the beneficent rule of Nerva and Trajan offered to the Roman state the best possible combination of liberty and authority [34] , “those happy and glorious times when men were able to think what they would and say what they thought” [35] , the dark colors, the severe and uncompromising judgment found in Tacitus’ representation of the whole imperial [31] period covered by the Annals owe not a little of their gloom to the sense that the acts of the early emperors were in anticipation of, even a direct preparation for, the wretchedness and bitter degradation which Tacitus himself felt at the hands of Domitian. [36] Having at best little or no sympathy with the early emperors, and living in a time of great imperial expansion, Tacitus has only contempt for the prudent foreign policy of Augustus. [37] He regards it as a weakness of all the emperors [38] that down to the days of Nerva and Trajan they took no pains to extend the empire. But for the two generals in whom he discovered some inclination to renew the traditions of conquest he has warm admiration. Observe the complacency with which he dwells upon the campaigns of Germanicus and Corbulo, and upon these alone, in his history of the early empire. These two characters he treats with sympathy and admiration bordering on affection. [39] And just as Tacitus is hearty in his praise of those features of German social life which reflect obliquely on the life of the Roman aristocracy [40] , so he regards as a hero the energetic and martial Arminius, who destroyed three legions of the conservative Augustus, led by the supine and incompetent [32] Varus.

It is worth while to notice the basis for Tacitus’ generalization, “liberator haud dubie Germaniae.” Does Tacitus here summarize correctly the facts as given by him of Rome’s conflict with Germany under the leadership of Varus and his successors? [41] Did Arminius become a liberator by virtue of the defeat of Varus? Or by the defeat of Varus’ successors? Is it correct to infer that Arminius was oftentimes victorious, when only one instance is cited of a clear defeat for the Romans? An examination of Tacitus’ narrative forces a negative to each of these inquiries. His first mention of Arminius is as a leader of one of the German parties—Segestes was leader of the rival faction—against whom Germanicus was operating in the campaign of 15 A. D. [42] In this year Germanicus fell suddenly upon the Chatti, many of whom were captured or killed, while others abandoned their villages and fled to the woods. Their capital, Mattium, was burned, and their country ravaged before Germanicus marched back to the Rhine. [43] Then acting on an appeal from Segestes for relief against the violence of Arminius, Germanicus marched back and fought off the besiegers of Segestes, who was rescued, together with his followers and relatives, among them his daughter, the wife of Arminius. [44] Next, after Arminius had aroused the Cherusci and bordering tribes, Germanicus, having dispatched a part of his army under lieutenants, who utterly defeated the Bructeri [45] , himself pursued Arminius until he retired into pathless wastes. [46] The Germans, after engaging and harassing the Romans in the swamps, were finally overpowered and the slaughter continued as long as daylight [33] lasted. [47] Tacitus adds that although the Romans were distressed by want of provisions and wounds, yet in their great victory they found everything, vigor, health, and abundance.

With the year 16 A. D. Germanicus, supported by the ardent enthusiasm of his soldiers, sought further engagements with the Germans, remembering that they were always worsted in a regular battle and on ground adapted to fighting. [48] The Chatti, who at this time were besieging a Roman stronghold on the river Lippe, stole away and disappeared at the report of the Roman approach. Finally, however, the Germans dared to meet the Romans in the plain of Idistaviso, near the river Weser, Tacitus, after giving a detailed account of the dreadful slaughter which here befell the Germans [49] , says that it was a great victory for the Romans and without loss on their part. Not less disastrous to the Germans was a succeeding Roman victory on grounds chosen by the Germans. [50] But after the losses by storm that overtook the Roman legions on their return by fleet to winter quarters [51] , the Germans were encouraged to renew their attacks. Again Germanicus marched against the Chatti and the Marsi, who either did not dare to engage, or wherever they did engage were instantly defeated, exclaiming that the Romans were invincible and superior to any misfortune. [52] Tacitus tells us that at the conclusion of the conflict the Roman army was led back into winter quarters full of joy that this expedition had compensated for their misfortune at sea. Significant are his concluding words: “nor was it doubted that the enemy were tottering to their fall and concerting means for obtaining peace, and that if another summer were added the war could be brought to completion.” [53] Immediately following this we read of Germanicus’ recall by Tiberius to celebrate his triumph, and to enter on a second consulship, no further operations being conducted against the Germans. Tacitus hints that this step was taken by Tiberius through envy of Germanicus. But whether for this reason or for the far more probable one, [34] assigned by Tiberius himself [54] , it is evident to any one following the story as told by Tacitus that Arminius was not a liberator of Germany, either by his defeat of Varus or through the conflict that he waged against Varus’ successors. Tacitus’ account shows on the one hand that the Romans were not concerned about securing permanent possessions in Germany, and on the other that with but one exception the Romans were victorious throughout the conflict. But in tracing the biography of Arminius further Tacitus recounts that on the departure of the Romans the German tribes, the Suebi led by Maroboduus, who had assumed the title of king, and the Cherusci, led by Arminius, the champion of the people, turned their swords against each other; [55] that, however, after the defeat of Maroboduus, Arminius aiming at royalty became antagonistic to the liberty of his countrymen, and fell by the treachery of his own kinsmen. [56] The opportunity here for a rhetorical antithesis between Arminius the foe of his country’s liberty and Arminius its erstwhile champion, Tacitus could not resist. Hence, “liberator haud dubie Germaniae,” notwithstanding the fact that this bold assertion has no basis in what has gone before. A Roman historian under the spell of rhetoric did not as a rule hesitate to adjust his conclusions in the interest of dramatic portrayal of character.

Examination has already been given to the sources on which historians base their accounts of the Varus disaster. The influences under which these sources were written—ancient accounts repeated for the most part without question by later writers—and their availability for sound historical conclusions have also been discussed. We now advance to a general consideration of facts which are in contradiction to the accepted view as to the effect of Varus’ defeat.

The great importance usually attributed to this defeat is surprising to the student of history, in the light of several significant facts revealed by a study of the battle. Varus at that time had three legions, which, if complete, comprised not more, or scarcely more, than 20,000 troops. [1] The battle was not a regular contest, but one in which the Romans were hemmed in, we are told [2] , by woods, lakes, and bodies of the enemy in ambush. Our authorities are agreed that swamps, forests, a running contest, and the elements were factors that contributed to the Roman defeat. [3] Further, in the encounter the Romans were directed by a leader very generally represented [4] as indolent, [36] rash, and self-confident, and they were pitted against far superior numbers. [5]

This contest, therefore, waged under such circumstances, could not have been in any sense a real test of the military strength of the contending forces. Remembering too that it was a fundamental policy of Rome to take no backward step in the face of defeat, and considering also the known strength of Rome at this period, it is inconceivable that the loss of three legions could in itself have reversed the policy of that great world-power, particularly when it is remembered that only a few years before (6 A. D.) Tiberius had assembled twelve legions against Maroboduus [6] , while in that same year, against the Dalmatian-Pannonian insurrection, the Roman legions were increased to twenty-six, a body of troops such as had never since the close of the civil wars been united under the same command. [7] This difficulty [37] has not escaped notice. Schiller recognizes it [8] , and while denying that the explanation is to be found in the exhaustion of the empire, he urges the advanced age of Augustus and the financial situation, which, without the creation of new revenues, could not have provided sufficient means. Similarly Mommsen observes [9] : “We have difficulty in conceiving that the destruction of an army of 20,000 men without further direct military consequences should have given a decisive turn to the policy at large of a judiciously governed universal empire.” Immediately following this Mommsen offers as explanation: “there is no other reason to be found for it than that they [Augustus and Tiberius] recognized the plans pursued by them for twenty years for the changing of the boundary to the north as incapable of execution, and the subjugation and mastery of the region between the Rhine and the Elbe appeared to them to transcend the resources of the empire.” [38] Seeck, commenting on the difference in Rome’s policy in the time of the Punic wars and after the disaster to Varus [10] , believes that Augustus turned back to his “weaker wisdom” of an earlier day (the year 20 B. C., when he said the empire was large enough), because the Germans threatened only the provinces, not Rome itself, as did the Pannonians, whom Rome was at all hazard and at any cost compelled to subdue. Eduard Meyer thinks that although Arminius’ revolt and the battle as a military event had no greater significance than the revolts and victories of the Celts and the Pannonians, the battle nevertheless was decisive because it was not possible for Rome to raise troops sufficient to win back the advantage lost, the two legions that were levied being raised by proscription, and from the non-citizen class. Further, whereas the insurrection in Pannonia left no choice but to increase the army, the war with Germany would have imposed not only too great a financial burden, but would have revoked in the most drastic way the old rule which permitted service in the army only to citizens. [11] To have subdued Germany at such a cost as this, argues Meyer (p. 487) would have been as inexpedient as to subdue the Parthians.

These suggestions by Mommsen and Meyer as to Rome’s lack of resources necessitate, before any conclusion is reached as to the permanent effect of this one defeat, a consideration of the relative resources of Rome and Germany at this period.

When we compare the general resources of the Roman empire with those of Germany the balance is found to be overwhelmingly in favor of the former, had its whole strength, or even any considerable fraction thereof, been employed. The [39] population of the empire under Augustus was not far from 55,000,000 [12] , and, as service was voluntary and men of any nationality were admitted, at least into the auxilia , practically the whole free male population of the empire was available for service. There was, of course, the traditional custom according to which the legions were restricted to Roman citizens, and the auxilia , consisting of foreigners, were kept at about the same number as the legionaries [13] , but Pompey and then Caesar had enrolled legions of provincials (the so-called legiones vernaculae ), and in the armies of Brutus and Cassius and the triumvirs this was done on so extensive a scale that Vergil, Ecl. I, 70 f. calls the veterans who were settled in Italy out and out “miles ... barbarus.” [14] Now Augustus appears to have made some consistent [40] efforts to restore the old conditions, but even then the eastern legions seem to have been recruited, in large part at least, from the Orient, while those of the west were drawn from Italy and the Latin Occident [15] , and under the succeeding emperors the provinces were more and more heavily drawn upon, until Roman citizens almost wholly disappeared from the ranks of the imperial army. [16] Seeck indeed, after a renewed examination of the material collected by Mommsen, comes to the conclusion that Augustus did exercise much greater caution in drawing the bulk at least of his forces from the citizens of Italy and the Roman citizens of the provinces. [17] But granting this position for the sake of argument, and admitting that Augustus would recruit his legionaries only from Roman citizens (for we prefer to give minimal estimates in order to avoid any charge of overstating our case), the citizen population of the empire [41] (about 4,700,000 in 9 A. D.) [18] was sufficient to raise an army of 400,000 men under the inspiration of some great national cause, which, with an equal number of auxilia , would yield a total potential military force of 800,000, not counting the fleet which was frequently employed in the operations in Germany, and must have been heavily drawn upon if any permanent conquest of the land was to be undertaken. [19] That such a figure as this is not beyond reason is clear from the fact that after Actium Augustus found himself in possession of 50 legions, a total army of between five and six hundred thousand men [20] , while after Mutina, 66 legions, at least 660,000 men, were in the field at once, and after the defeat of Sextus Pompey in 36, Octavian and Antony had together no fewer than 74 or 75 legions under arms, which, counting everything, and including naval contingents, must have amounted to at least 800,000 men. [21]

However, even if the numerical superiority of the Roman empire may not appear so overwhelming in the number of troops which might be raised, we must remember that the resources of the whole population were available to the full for maintaining in the field, at the highest efficiency, and for an indefinite period, an army of several hundred thousand men; for all the inhabitants of the empire without exception contributed [42] abundantly in money and materials, so that in this respect the great numbers and vast economic resources of the empire gave it a position of immeasurable superiority over the barbarians. Furthermore for a war such as the organized conquest of Germany would have entailed, a huge levy of men suddenly rushed to the spot, would have proved useless—or rather positively injurious; without adequate means of communication in that rough country it would have been almost impossible to make effective use of them at one spot, or even along one line, while the difficulty of provisioning them would have been quite insuperable. What was needed was a force of moderate size, capable of meeting any concerted effort on the part of the enemy, which could press steadily forward, constructing roads, establishing depots of supplies, firmly seizing and organizing the territory that was reached and passed, and leave no possibility of revolt in their rear. For this an army of ten to twelve legions operating from two established bases, the Rhine and the Danube, would have sufficed. Before such methods Germany must inevitably have succumbed after two or three campaigns.

For the actual size of the standing army under Augustus was ample to have carried on precisely such operations. The number of his legions varied somewhat from time to time. After Actium Augustus had about 50 legions; this number was reduced to 18, then raised again to 26 at the outbreak of the Pannonian revolt. [22] Three were lost in 9 A. D., and in their place but two were added, so that the number left at his death was 25. [23] Taking this latter as that of the average number about [43] the time of the defeat of Varus, calculating the theoretical strength of the legion at 6000 men [24] , and adding in an equal number of auxilia , the city troops, the praetorian cohorts, the fleet, and various detached contingents [25] , we get about 325,000. The effective force would be somewhat less than this, of course, but would not probably fall much if any under 300,000 men. [26] Now the majority of these could have been launched upon Germany with little or no difficulty. Fifteen legions, or nearly three-fifths of the total force of the empire had been concentrated in Pannonia for three years (Suetonius, Tiberius , 16), and there is no conceivable reason why these same legions might not at once have turned upon the Germanic tribes, their task in Pannonia now accomplished, especially as twelve legions, that is to say, two-thirds of the whole army as it stood at that time, were actually operating in Germany at the time of the outbreak of the Pannonian revolt. Fifteen legions and the whole of the [44] otherwise unoccupied fleet would constitute an effective strength of at least 175,000 men, a force several times as large as that with which Caesar had accomplished the conquest of Gaul.

On the other hand the population of Germany between the Rhine, the Elbe, and the Danube was extremely small. The Germans had no regular cities (Tacitus, Germania , 16), some tribes had as yet scarcely passed the nomadic state, there were immense forests, and undrained swamps, while there were here and there wide stretches of waste and uninhabited land on the marches between hostile tribes. [27] Agriculture was primitive, and industries did not exist at all. Under such conditions the density of population must have been low indeed. And yet the traditional view represents the Germans as being very numerous, several millions in fact (Gutsche und Schultze, Deutsche Geschichte , I (1894), p. 236, for example, estimate the total number of Germans at no fewer than 15,000,000, more in fact, rather than less!), and the persistence of such utterly uncritical opinions explains in part the strange tenacity with which even those who know better are obsessed with the idea that the conquest of Germany, because of its teeming millions, would have been a very difficult undertaking. [28] Fustel de Coulanges long since and H. Delbrück more recently had insisted upon the [45] numerical weakness of the tribes which actually overthrew the empire in the fifth century [29] , and Ch. Dubois, in an elaborate study of Ammianus, has shown that the actual numbers of the Franks, Alamanni, etc., who wrought such devastation in Gaul in the fourth century, were astonishingly small. [30]

H. Delbrück was the first to use severely critical methods for the calculation of the population of Germany. [31] On the basis of Beloch’s calculations for Gaul he estimated an average density of population of 4-5 per square kilometer, which makes for the region between the Rhine, Elbe, and the Main-Saale line, with which alone he is concerned, a population of roughly 515,000 to 645,000, or as he prefers to count it at 250 per (German) square mile, about 575,000 (calculating the area of this district at ca. 2300 (German) square miles). For the whole region between the Rhine and the Elbe he estimates not more than about 1,000,000 inhabitants. That makes for all Germany about 2,000,000, taking the first group of tribes as constituting not quite one third of the whole nation. [32] This calculation he supports on the basis of a totally different one, which is derived from the number of warriors who could take part in an assembly and be addressed by a single speaker. Setting this at a maximum of six to eight thousand, and taking the average as five thousand, [46] at the ratio of 5 to 1 he gets 25,000 as the size of the average German tribe, and as there were about twenty-three of these between the Rhine, Elbe, and Main-Saale line, he reaches exactly the same figure of 575,000 for the population of this district.

A different line of attack was pursued by G. Schmoller shortly after Delbrück’s critique. [33] Taking the results of extensive studies in the population of nations at different stages of economic development, he estimates the average density of population per square kilometer for “the north Indogermanic farming and cattle-raising communities about the beginning of the Christian era” to have varied between the limits 5 and 12, setting that of Germany as 5 to 6. This would give for the area between the Rhine, Elbe, and Main-Saale line a population of roughly about 640,000 to 770,000, or for the whole of Germany, taking this portion as not quite one-third, a total population only slightly in excess of two millions. The substantial agreement in the results reached by these three different methods employed independently, the historical-statistical, the institutional, and the economic, makes an exceedingly strong case. It can be further strengthened, perhaps, by one or two other considerations which have as yet not been employed. They are the following.

Maroboduus at the head of the Marcomannic confederation, which included a large number of tribes (even the distant Semnones and the Longobardi) seems, at the height of his power, to have commanded a total force of 74,000 men. [34] This number, as Ludwig Schmidt has pointed out [35] , bears every evidence of being reliable, because of the immense force, twelve legions, one hundred thousand men at the lowest estimate, which Tiberius felt he must employ in order to crush him. [36] Now this is probably the total number of males who in the last extremity might bear arms, i. e., following the customary Roman calculations [37] , [47] one-fourth of the whole population. The Marcomannic confederation at its greatest development would have had, therefore, a population of 296,000, or let us say, in round numbers, 300,000. Now some years later the Cheruscan confederacy under Arminius waged war with Maroboduus on fairly even terms; hence it is not unreasonable to suppose that the strength of the two confederations was about equal. [38] Of course a large number of the tribes which lay even between the Rhine and the Elbe must have held aloof from the struggle, certainly those along the sea coast like the Cannanefates, the Frisii and the like, who were under Roman control, but doubtless many others also in the remoter parts of the district concerned. The neutrals may very well have been as numerous as either confederacy, but hardly more numerous than both combined, for the struggle is represented as a great national movement. In one case we would get a total population of 900,000, in the other 1,200,000, figures which agree very closely with those already reached by Delbrück and Schmoller.

Again Posidonius in his description of Gaul (in Diod., V, 25) has calculated that the smaller tribes of Gaul counted 50,000 members, the largest a scant 200,000. The average would be 125,000, but, as E. Levasseur, who has used this datum for his calculations of the population of Gaul, observes [39] , the number [48] of large tribes was probably very small, so that a lower average (he accepts 100,000) must be taken. On what seems to be a fair assumption, therefore, i. e., that the 60 tribes of Gaul which were represented on the great altar at Lyons [40] , existed in Posidonius’ day, one would get a total population of about 6,000,000, which is astonishingly close to Beloch’s own revised calculations, who concedes the possibility of 6,750,000, but prefers 5,700,000. [41] Now the Germans being without cities, developed agriculture or elaborate commerce, must have had a very much scantier population, certainly not more than an average of 50,000 per tribe, and probably much less. Hence taking 50,000 as a maximum figure, we should get for the whole of Germany with about 60 tribes [42] , a maximum of 3,000,000, and for the Rhine, Elbe, Main-Saale district with 20 to 23 tribes [43] , a maximum of 1,000,000 to 1,150,000, and a probable size of about three quarters of a million—or even less. These numbers, while somewhat larger than those already reached by other methods, are yet reasonably close to them to serve as a sort of confirmation, and in any event come very far below the figures customarily given for the population of Germany.

Finally, one might note Lamprecht’s ingenious estimate of the population in a district of the Moselle country by a comparison of the relative number of place names recorded for different epochs. [44] He finds that a district which in 1800 A. D. [49] had a population of about 450,000, had in 800 A. D. only about 20,000. This would give the German settlements of the year 800 A. D. as a whole, about 4.5% of the population one thousand years later. As the population of Germany in 1800 was about 23,000,000 (Levasseur), that of a correspondingly large area would have been slightly in excess of one million. In attempting to apply this result to conditions in Germany at the beginning of our era [45] , we must bear in mind that the method employed is one which is likely to secure minimal figures, and that in the Moselle land we do not have the ancient seat of the Germanic tribes, but only a colonised territory, which for some accident or other may not have been as thickly settled as other localities. On the other hand, we must note that the land in question had been German probably for four centuries, and the conditions were favorable to its bearing as heavy a population as that of any interior district of Germany in the first century of our era. While, therefore, we should regard this estimate as being certainly too low, yet it supports in a way the calculations of Delbrück and Schmoller, and is utterly inconsistent with figures like twelve or fifteen millions.

We shall regard then the population of Germany between the Rhine, Elbe, and Danube, as about 1,000,000, or taking the Main-Saale line instead of the Danube, for all the campaigning was done in the region northwest of these two streams, the population could not have been in excess of three quarters of a million. Taking Caesar’s calculation of one man for every twelve inhabitants as the largest army which a semibarbarous people could collect from a considerable extent of territory [46] , we should get something over 60,000 men as the maximum force which the Germans could put into the field for a single stroke. Without any adequate organization, transport, or central authority, this number could not be fed and maintained any length of time, and it is extremely doubtful whether Arminius ever had a force as large as this. Besides, a number of the tribes along the coast as far as the Weser, and along the lower Rhine, [50] remained friendly and loyal, so that their contingents would have to be subtracted from the total. That something less than 60,000, say roughly 50,000, is approximately correct may be inferred from the size of the armies which campaigned in Germany. We have already seen that when Tiberius set out to crush Maroboduus with his 74,000 men, he assembled twelve legions, a force of 100,000 to 120,000 legionaries and auxilia . Yet Germanicus invaded Germany in 14 A. D. with only four legions [47] , and fought the campaigns of the next two years with no more than eight [48] , and that too when he had reason to expect that practically all of the tribes of northwestern Germany would be united against him. We cannot imagine that the extremely cautious Tiberius would have entrusted his nephew, his legions, and his own imperial position to eight legions alone, if he had had reason to think that the enemy exceeded 50,000 in number, when he had ventured against Maroboduus only with a numerical superiority of 50%. In other words the same proportional strength used against Maroboduus, 12 legions against 74,000 men, would allow us to infer that Tiberius expected to find no more than 50,000 capable of meeting his eight legions. [49]

We have already referred to the hopeless inferiority of the Germans in tactics, strategy, and equipment, and their inability to cope with the great resources of the empire, if systematically employed in steady and long drawn out operations. The only branch of service in which the Germans were on an equality with the Romans, if not actually surpassing them, was the cavalry, but that was of comparatively little consequence, partly because the Romans used the Batavians for cavalry service, and they were easily the equals of the Germans, while the nature of the country, consisting largely of swamps and forests, made cavalry an unimportant arm of the service. Indeed the cavalry played no very important rôle in the great battles, and in the [51] one serious defeat of the Romans, that of Varus, they are not so much as mentioned. [50] Two other advantages the Germans had on their side, one a difficult terrain, the other inadequate supplies for a large force of invaders. The first was a real difficulty, but nothing insuperable; indeed it may be questioned whether the terrain of Germany was much more difficult than that of Gaul in Caesar’s time, and certainly not nearly so difficult as that of the Alps and of Illyricum, the inhabitants of which were subdued with no especial difficulty. As for provisions, it was a simple thing for the Romans to collect immense stores along the frontier and to deposit them at various stations inland as the armies advanced; besides, the numerous navigable rivers would enable them to bring supplies in any desired quantity far into the interior, and it is well known how often the fleet was used in the campaigns, on one occasion actually sailing far up the Elbe to meet Tiberius and the land army. [51]

This suggests the final point of advantage which the Romans had, that of the superior military position. Germany could be attacked from three sides, the Rhine, the Danube, and the Ocean. The Romans could select their own time and place of attack, and support a forward thrust in any direction by a powerful flank movement. Any position the Germans took up might have been turned by forces coming from one side or the other, or, if they held their ground, they would be in imminent danger of being caught and crushed between two armies. The rivers of Germany are numerous, and most of them, three at least in the west, navigable for Roman fleets, which could not merely move considerable armies at slight risk far inland, but also furnish inexhaustible supplies. That the Romans know how to use this superior strategical position is clear from the plan of campaign against Maroboduus, and the numerous occasions when the fleet cooperated with the Rhine armies.

To sum up, the Romans had such overwhelming superiority [52] in total population, size of army, general resources, equipment, [52] tactics, strategy and military location, that any serious and persistent effort at conquest could not conceivably have failed. If the Romans, therefore, did not complete a conquest it was unquestionably because they did not desire to do so, not because they could not. As we shall see later on, the course of their operations nowhere shows a consistent effort at subjugation; the reason they did not incorporate Germany into the empire is simply that they were engaged in doing something quite different. We must not forget that what the Middle Ages could not bring about in the Alps, or the Turks in the Balkans, i. e., the utter pacification of these districts, the Romans accomplished with ease and celerity, while Charlemagne, with forces and opportunities incomparably inferior to those of Rome, achieved the most thorough subjugation of the Germanic tribes. To deny that Rome could have done the same is an utterly untenable position.

It is clear from the preceding discussion, and of the utmost significance for our question, that this battle was not a fair test of the comparative strength, actual or potential, of the Roman and Germanic forces. Not less noteworthy is a consideration of the incidents following the defeat. One would have expected that the events succeeding such a momentous engagement would have been equally as important as the battle itself, if not more so. Such, however, is not the case, and this fact is recognized by Mommsen in the words quoted above [53] , “without further direct military consequences.” If there was an advantage on either side it was with the Romans [54] , for immediately the army was [53] increased to eight legions, and Tiberius, an experienced general, was placed at its head. [55] It is to be noted too that not another victory was gained by the Germans, while the Romans under Tiberius (who had no opportunity for victories), and particularly under Germanicus, marched and countermarched over practically all of Germany (certainly over the territory of the tribes who had taken part in this war), with little or no opposition. Tiberius’ activity following the overthrow of Varus is told by Velleius (II, 120), and making due allowance for the latter’s partiality and proneness to exaggeration, we cannot disregard entirely his general statements, since he was an eye witness (II, 104). There is no doubt that Tiberius proceeded cautiously [56] in the years 10 and 11, but in the latter year he crossed the Rhine and starting from Vetera marched up the Lippe river, utterly devastating the territory of the Bructeri [57] , resentment for which doubtless caused a member of this tribe to attempt Tiberius’ assassination. [58] Later on (16 A. D.) Germanicus, just before his recall, was so successful against the Germans that he requested only one more year for the completion of his work. [59] This means that Germany at this time was as near to being a province as in any of the preceding years, but no nearer, since the land had never been reduced to tranquillity. And with respect to possession, the Romans were in control of [54] as much territory as they formerly held, and had the advantage of having an army larger than it had ever been before. Moreover, while it doubtless was more difficult to raise troops at this time than in the days of Julius Caesar, the presence in Germany of this larger armed force shows beyond doubt that Rome’s resources were as yet by no means exhausted. As already noted above, excellent authorities admit that had Rome made any whole-hearted attempt she could have conquered Germany just as she had other countries. Likewise Mommsen, after observing that it was no easy task for Rome to overthrow the Germanic patriot-party, as well as the Suebian king in Bohemia, says [60] : “Nevertheless they had already once stood on the verge of succeeding and with a right conduct of the war these results could not fail to be reached.” Gardthausen [61] too agrees that Rome could easily have erased this blot upon her military honor had she tried.

As has been suggested above, the Romans never at any time brought into the field against the Germans their full quota of available troops. If it had been necessary, Augustus could have sent into Germany the larger part of the great army of Tiberius, after the revolt in Pannonia had been put down. [62] It is evident, therefore, that Augustus had sufficient troops at his disposal for Germany’s subjugation, if he had wished to use them for that purpose. And, if we grant the contention put forward by many, that he changed his mind after he had once resolved to subdue that country, some purely psychological reason must be found for this change. A brief review of his leading traits of character ought to bring to light such a reason, if there be one. Does it accord with what we know of Augustus to conclude that he gave up such an ambitious undertaking because of the intervention of a single, incidental defeat? Cold, calculating, shrewd, determined, is the character that Augustus reveals preeminently in his public and private life. [63] Nor is [55] there any contradiction in recognizing in Augustus’ nature a desire for supreme power united with great gentleness, and at the same time with great positiveness. One can conceive that Julius Caesar might attempt the impossible, Augustus never, since he began nothing without careful preparation, and tests which brought a decision favorable to the undertaking. [64] Meyer, after contrasting Augustus’ calm and deliberate procedure with that of Julius Caesar, says [65] : “In all seinem Tun dominiert der Verstand.... Alles sorgfältig wieder und wieder zu erwägen, alle Chancen in Rechnung zu ersetzen, immer den sichersten Weg zu gehen, das war Octavians Art.” No basis whatever exists for the reproach sometimes brought, that Augustus was wanting in courage, even if he did lack the bold warrior-spirit of Caesar. [66] Considering then [56] that Augustus began nothing without careful and thorough preparation, that he was positive and resourceful, and not wanting in bravery, there is no reason for the belief that he would suddenly have given up a policy so important and so far-reaching. Further, it must be remembered that it involves a contradiction of Rome’s entire previous history to conclude that she would abandon, because of a trivial reverse, a great national plan of conquest, once it had been begun. But even should we admit such an abandonment, it is almost impossible to believe that Augustus would have undertaken a war as extensive as that necessitated by the subjugation of Germany, after his army had been so greatly diminished. [67] That too in the face of the fact that he was primarily a man of peace, as is shown by the following words from one of the documents deposited by Augustus with his will: “nulli genti bello per iniuriam lato.” [68] That he was a man of peace is shown also by the statement of Suetonius; [69] and of Dio (56, 33) to the effect that whereas Augustus might have made great acquisitions of barbarian territory, he was unwilling to do so; also of Dio (54, 9), a striking bit of evidence, which has not been accorded its due significance, to the effect that in the year 20 B. C. Augustus [57] laid down as his policy that “he did not think it desirable that there should be any addition to the former [subject territory] or that any new regions should be acquired, but deemed it best for the people to be satisfied with what they already possessed; and he communicated this opinion to the senate.” Similar too, we note, is the view of Gibbon: [70] “It was reserved for Augustus to relinquish the ambitious design of subduing the whole earth and to introduce a spirit of moderation into the public councils. Inclined to peace by his temper and situation, it was easy for him to discover that Rome, in her present exalted station, had much less to hope than to fear from the chance of arms.” Finally, Augustus found no joy in war for war’s sake, as did Julius Caesar. [71]

Since Augustus was practically an absolute ruler, his wishes and character would determine the policy of the empire. And, as seen above, it was contrary to Augustus’ character and wishes to carry on extensive wars of conquest. Further, that peace was Rome’s object at this period is universally admitted. [72] The reason for this desire for peace Meyer sums up as follows [73] : “weil die Kämpfe des letzten Jahrzehnts einen so furchtbaren Charakter getragen hatten, weil ... aus dem entsetzlichen Elend der Zeit nur ein Gefühl übermächtig sich erhoben hatte, die Sehnsucht nach Frieden, nach Ordnung und Sicherheit um jeden Preis.” While it is true that this feeling and condition refer more particularly to the early part of Augustus’ reign, the same policy of peace manifested itself all [58] through his rule, and was continued by his successors. [74] The fact that the doors of the temple of Janus, which had stood open for more than two centuries, and had been previously closed but twice since Rome’s beginning in recorded history, were closed three times in the first few years of Augustus’ reign [75] proves that he was eager for a cessation of war.

The previous discussion shows that the effect of Varus’ defeat has long been exaggerated; that this reversal was a mere incident, “a wound to the pride rather than to the prosperity of the empire.” [76] While it was without doubt of greater consequence than the loss of Lollius’ legion [77] , which occurred at the beginning of the Germanic incursions across the northern border (16 B. C.), the overthrow of Lollius, coming at an earlier date, should naturally have influenced Rome’s policy more than Varus’ misfortune, which came long after her plans of conquest, as many suppose, had been definitely formed. If a defeat did not cause Rome to take a backward step, when she was merely on the defensive, it seems highly improbable that “a wound to her pride” could have done so, when she had once definitely assumed the offensive. If there is any truth in the theory that Augustus intended to subdue and organize Germany into a province, no satisfactory explanation has been offered as to why he allowed a defeat, which was of such little military or political consequence, to interfere with a national policy of so great moment.

We must now examine in more detail three questions which have a very important bearing on the subject under discussion. First, why did Augustus begin his wars against Germany? Second, was Germany ever subdued by Rome and organized into a province? Third, if not, and if the attempt was made, why [59] was the effort not carried to completion? In the absence of documentary evidence historians must have recourse to conjecture to explain why Augustus, contrary to his well-known personal inclination, contrary to his peace policy of years, attempted the conquest of Germany. The view has been advanced that he had a burning ambition for world-empire, and, through mere desire for military renown, he wished to see himself at the head of such an empire; that as a part of his plans to that end, the attempt at conquest was begun. This view merits little consideration, as it has been rejected by practically every competent historian who has investigated the subject [78] , despite the fact that it enlists the support of von Ranke, whose authority, to be sure, in the field of ancient history is relatively slight. He sees in Augustus’ plans with respect to Germany “das ideale Ziel der Welteroberung [79] , welches aus einem ungeheuren geographischen Irrthum entsprang. Man meinte, nach Osten weiter schiffend in das caspische Meer gelangen [60] zu können, das einen Busen des indischen Weltmeeres bilde, welches die Erde umkreise.” Further, he speaks of Augustus’ ambition as directed toward the unattainable. But there is no evidence to show that the sober-minded Augustus ever indulged the vision of world-empire that haunted Alexander. Moreover, it is too much to assume that he shared the colossal geographic error of Strabo. [80] And even if he had, that is no reason for assuming a desire to conquer the whole world. Besides, universal dominion must have included the South as well as the North, and there was never any attempt by the Romans to push their conquests far into Africa, either directly from Egypt into the Sudan or along either eastern or western coast. Furthermore, the conquest of Britain must have been an important milestone in such an undertaking, yet there was no move in the long reign of Augustus toward that end. Finally, Augustus must have had much clearer conceptions of the immense stretch of Asia, as he was the first of European monarchs to receive ambassadors from China, a region which these same ambassadors must have made clear to him lay far beyond the utmost confines of Parthia, or the remotest conquests of Alexander. On the other hand, if he had wished to send his legions to the ends of the earth, it is unthinkable that he would have waited until fifteen years after he had become master of the Roman world as a result of the battle of Actium. And for a beginning, to engage in slight and irregular campaigns with small armies, no consistent plan of action, and with the requirement that each fall the legions were to recross the Rhine and winter behind the frontier! If this be the indication of a policy of universal dominion its futility is nothing less than colossal. The madcap fancies of the “Emperor of the Sahara” would look like the combined sagacity of Bismarck and von Moltke in comparison. It is to be remembered too that plans for universal empire would have brought Augustus into conflict with the Parthians, with whom he was very careful to avoid war, preferring the less hazardous weapons of diplomacy. Further, it is to be borne in mind that by character and from principle Augustus was committed to a policy of peace. The brilliant successes of his earlier rule, instead of firing him with a desire for world-empire, brought to him the conviction that his empire was large enough. Neither the wish nor the need of enhancing his military renown can [61] be used as a valid reason for his having altered his belief in this respect. [81]

Kornemann [82] indeed maintains that Augustus suddenly became warlike about the year 4 B. C. The events leading up to, and the evidence for, such a singular reversal of policy he gives as follows. In 5 B. C. the Roman senate agreed that Gaius Caesar, grandson of Augustus and heir presumptive, should be consul, as soon as he had attained the age of twenty. Augustus, with a successor thus assured, invited the people to share his own joy and that of the prince’s family in the celebration of public festivals, in the construction of buildings, in the distribution of largesses, donations, etc. to the public. At this time Augustus added to the Monumentum Ancyranum (which Kornemann believes was a political document written in five distinct parts and at as many different periods [83] ), the second part, chapters 15-24, in which he enumerates with satisfaction all that he has done for the people, for the city of Rome, and for the army. Then in 2 B. C. Lucius Caesar obtains the same favor as his brother Gaius, and shortly thereafter aids in the establishment of the Roman protectorate over Armenia. Thereupon Augustus, forgetting that he had already represented himself as the champion of peace, and yielding to the love of military glory and conquest, added, about 1 B. C., a third part, chapters 25-33 with chapters 14 and 35, in which he sets forth what he has done to strengthen the Roman power in the provinces and to extend it beyond, dwelling all the while on the part that his grandsons and future successors have played in this achievement. However, Kornemann’s theory and the deduction therefrom as to Augustus’ attitude toward imperial conquest [62] find contradiction in an article by Wilcken [84] , who argues that while Augustus worked long over the document nothing was added after the year 6 A. D. Further, the three parts, honores , impensae , res gestae , form a whole, and were written at one and the same time. Augustus filled in the original outline with details which may be easily detected. For example in chapter 26 the provinces of western Europe are thus enumerated: Gaul, Spain, Germany. Now Germany, according to its geographical position, ought to stand at the head of the list, but its position of third in order is proof that it was inserted after the other two. [85] For Germany could not have been called a province until after the campaign of Drusus to the Elbe in 9 B. C. Hence the first outline of the res gestae antedates not only the year 1 B. C. (proposed by Kornemann), but even 9 B. C. Therefore Augustus’ warlike tendency developed, if at all, prior to 4 B. C., the date claimed by Kornemann.

This conclusion Kornemann combats [86] with the assumption that while the passage referring to the western provinces shows clear traces of interpolation, the name of Germany was not inserted until the year 6 A. D., at which time there was entered also the mention of Tiberius’ naval expedition to the coasts of that country in 5 A. D. The insertion of each item attests the desire which Augustus felt at that time to bring into relief the services rendered to Rome by his adoptive son and sole heir. But the chapter as a whole, he avers, is older than this, and the reasons for attributing it to the earlier date remain unshaken. Bésnier [87] , on the other hand is undoubtedly right in saying that it is impossible to follow Kornemann in assigning precise dates [63] to each fragment of the Monumentum Ancyranum and in tracing point by point, from 23 B. C. to 14 A. D., the successive accretions to the text. The most that can be said is that the three parts, honores , impensae , res gestae were written at three different times and that they correspond to the different and successive preoccupations of Augustus. We may feel certain, however, that Augustus did not revise his work just before his death, and that he ceased to add to it in the year 6 A. D. [88] Kornemann’s theories are super-subtle and break down under a cumulation of interdependent suppositions, besides being psychologically almost inconceivable. Their rejection by such scholars as Wilcken, Gardthausen, Koepp, Marcks, Vulić, and Bésnier completely invalidates his view as to Augustus’ attitude toward the expansion of the empire by conquests. Kornemann feels keenly, as do others, the psychological difficulties in the way of explaining Augustus’ Germanic campaigns as due to thirst for conquest. He therefore attempts to suggest a plausible motive, i. e., to give the young princes their “baptism of fire”, and a chance to win the military prestige, which down to that time every great Roman had had. But his effort fails for reasons which may now be summarized as follows: (1) If Augustus really was engaged in the conquest of Germany he had been at the task ever since 10 B. C., and not merely since 4 B. C. (2) The explanation offered creates far greater difficulties than it avoids. (3) There is no need of any explanation whatever, if one takes the simple straightforward view of events.

More important, and very widely accepted, is the view that Augustus, in order to protect Gaul and Italy from the barbarians, was under the military and political necessity of conquering Germany. The year 16 B. C. is cited as the time which [64] brought a significant change in Rome’s foreign policy [89] , and committed Augustus to the subjugation of Germany. The reasons are stated broadly by Hertzberg [90] as follows: “es waren die Verhältnisse an der gesammten europäischen Nordgrenze des römischen Reichs, die schliesslich den grossen Staatsmann bestimmt haben, abermals und in sehr umfassender Weise, eine Arena auswärtiger Kriege zu eröffnen.” The events of this year were the barbarian invasions from all the boundaries of the north. From the Danube wild robber bands made their way into Macedonia. Germanic stocks, the Sugambri with the remnants and descendents of the Usipites and Tencteri, under the leadership of Melo [91] , attacked and killed the Roman traders sojourning in their midst, crossed the Rhine, plundered Gaul far and wide [92] , cut off and defeated the fifth legion under Marcus Lollius, and captured its standard. [93] To meet this danger Augustus himself was called to the Rhine, and although he found to his surprise that the enemy had retreated and the land was enjoying peace, he decided upon “einen Gegenstoss nach Germanien hinein und ... ein Vorschieben der Marken bis zur Elbe.” [94] It is also Gardthausen’s belief that by reason of Lollius’ defeat Augustus felt the necessity of protecting Gaul either by an offensive or a defensive policy; that he had to choose between either strengthening the army for holding the Rhine or the subjugation of Germany; and that he finally [65] decided on the latter. [95] Eduard Meyer finds not only the protection of Gaul but the winning of a shorter and more distant boundary from Italy as reasons for Augustus’ wars against Germany [96] : “nur gegen die Germanen hat er sich nach der Vollendung der Organisation Galliens zum Kriege entschlossen: der selbe schien notwendig um Gallien zu sichern und womöglich in der Elblinie eine kürzere und zugleich weiter von Italien abliegende Grenze zu gewinnen.” So Schiller urges the same reasons. [97] Likewise it is Mommsen’s view [98] that Augustus’ change in policy was necessary to Rome’s security; that it is easy to understand how Roman statesmen, who, like the emperor himself, were opposed to a policy of subjugation, could no longer assume that it was expedient for the empire to halt at the Rhine and on the north slopes of the Alps; that “Great Germany” (so called by the Romans), which forced itself in like a wedge between the Rhine and Danube boundaries, and the Germans on the right of the Rhine, with inevitable boundary strife, were far more dangerous to Roman rule than the blazing torch in Gaul and the zeal of Gallic patriots. Hertzberg [99] thinks that Augustus was greatly influenced by the eager desire for war and adventure on the part of the three military leaders of his household, his spirited stepsons, Tiberius and Drusus, and his old friend and son-in-law Agrippa. [100] Gardthausen also believes [101] [66] that, while preliminary conditions urgently demanding a strong offensive policy were at hand, the desire and vigorous support of such a policy by Tiberius and Drusus was a matter of considerable weight. As for Agrippa, he was either not an open advocate of imperial conquest or did not wish to hazard his well-deserved military reputation by new ventures; moreover advancing age and illness made him cautious. As long as he lived his voice was potent in the emperor’s counsels, and no attempt was made to break away from Augustus’ policy of peace. But with his death the situation changed; youth took the place of age, and while both Tiberius and Drusus were alike supporters of the now altered policy, Drusus must be regarded as the really aggressive factor. Ferrero at the very beginning of his chapter on the “Conquest of Germania” [102] discusses the reasons therefor. He rejects “the theory of ancient and modern historians” that Augustus’ unexpected decision for expansion by conquest can be “traced to no other cause than an inexplicable change of personal will.” [103] The urgency of the undertaking depended on the fact that it was the only possible means of preserving Gaul, the value of which had been revealed to Augustus by Licinus. Beside the economic advantages of this rich province great political advantages also were apparent. The western provinces were inferior to the eastern in population, and though national feeling affected to despise the orientals, eastern, particularly Egyptian influence, was spreading a more refined and intellectual civilization throughout Italy and the empire. “It is therefore not improbable” adds Ferrero, “that Augustus under the advice of Licinus [67] may have regarded the rich and populous province of Gaul ... as a counterpoise to the excessive wealth and the teeming populations of the eastern provinces.” Finally we may note the view expressed by Seeck [104] , viz., that Rome discovered from the events of the year 16 B. C. that only continued conquest would permit Roman territory bordering the empire’s boundaries to come to quiet and fruitful development; that the peaceful provinces had imperative need of the partially subdued ones at their side as a protection; that if these half-subdued territories became peaceful, and developed under Roman culture into a condition that attracted plundering bands, then the partially subdued must in turn be wholly subdued until some natural protecting border of sea or desert was reached. He concludes: “so wurde denn die Eroberung der freien Barbarenländer in noch grösserem Umfang ins Auge gefasst, als sie zwanzig Jahre früher beabsichtigt war.”

Gardthausen voices the belief [105] that political reasons also forced Augustus into a policy of imperial conquest. He himself from principle and character was a man of peace, but the man of peace had to reckon with both citizens and soldiers. Not only had he to convince the former ever anew of the absolute necessity of the form of government he had wrought out, but he was obliged to gratify the soldier’s desire for his natural element, by allowing him to break the eternal monotony of long service in peace by the glory and spoils of war. Unimportant wars, which, even when unsuccessful, were not sufficient to destroy the equilibrium of the state, seemed to be the best means to meet the wishes of the citizen and soldier classes. After the civil wars a time of rest was necessary to recruit the strength of the Roman state. This transition period was now past and the gaps which many battles had made in the ranks were now filled. Peace was no longer praised as the greatest blessing. Freedom for the Romans was forever gone, but as a recompense the empire could offer its subjects fame in war, and by foreign victories could also strengthen itself internally. Indeed even the opponents of Augustus’ government were easily reconciled to imperial expansion when they saw Rome’s position abroad bettered through the operations of the army, and the burdens of the individual diminished by [68] the empire’s enlargement. But of special moment to the emperor was the temper of the army. The soldier loves war as such; the avarice of the commanders, the hope of the soldiers for booty, and the desire for adventure are all factors with which even a peace-loving prince must reckon. So Ferrero, wholly apart from conditions in Gaul, finds [106] a necessity for some military conquest by Augustus, and says further, that this necessity was recognized by Augustus by virtue of his acute appreciation of public opinion; that some important enterprise at this time had to be found, which would occupy the attention of the people as a whole, and would serve as a concession to the ideas of a new generation, which could not sympathize with the peaceful ideals of the early empire, and which was restive under Augustus’ social reforms. Further, Augustus saw clearly the decadence in Roman society; that the Roman aristocracy was now willing to die by a kind of slow suicide in physical and intellectual indolence and voluptuousness, tendencies which were personified by Ovid and which were beginning to act upon the new generation, as peace dispelled the recollections of the civil wars, and as Egyptian influence grew stronger.

By way of summary we may note at this point that of the long series of opinions and explanations given above:

We must now consider the matter of a German province in the time of Augustus. Many assert that the subjugation [71] was complete or practically complete; [107] that the provincial organization was just about to be put into operation when disaster overtook Varus, and made such an organization forever impossible. [108] Gardthausen thinks [109] that Drusus’ death came opportunely for German freedom; that although his three campaigns did not reduce Germany to the actual condition of a province, Drusus had nevertheless laid sure foundations for the subjugation of that country. And while he can point to no certain evidence Gardthausen believes the Romans established garrisons in the very heart of the land [110] : Koepp sees no reason to conclude that Germany was ever a Roman province [111] ; he is quite [72] sure that the part on the right of the Rhine was never such, either before or after the battle with Varus. [112] Zumpt [113] was probably the first to deny the existence of a province in Germany. Later, however, Mommsen’s view became the accepted one. [114] He mentions for the year 16 B. C. a “governor of Germany”, and gives for the years 9-6 B. C., during which the land between the Rhine and the Elbe is described as “a province, though still by no means reduced to tranquillity”, a discussion on the “Organization of the province of Germany”, as evidence for which he adduces the administration of Roman law, and the establishment of an altar to Augustus among the Ubii. Next, for the years 6-9 A. D., he speaks of the “province of Germany”, as an undoubted fact, and says that the battle of the Teutoburg forest was the reason for “giving up the new German province” (p. 52). Quite positively he says (p. 107): “The original province of Germany, which embraced the country from the Rhine to the Elbe, subsisted only twenty years”, i. e., 12 B. C. to 9 A. D. Further on (p. 108) we are told that “the governorship and the command were not, in a strict sense done away with by that catastrophe, although they were, so to speak, placed in suspense”, and that out of the parts on the left of the Rhine, and the remnants of the district upon the right, there were formed the two Roman provinces of Upper and Lower Germany [115] ; that these were “in the territory which properly belonged to the Belgic”, but that the latter, since “a separation of the military and civil administration was, according to the Roman arrangements, excluded, was placed for administrative purposes also under the commandants of the two armies, so long as the troops were stationed there” [east of the Rhine].

[73]

The relation of this so-called province of Germany to the great Gallic-Germanic command is discussed by Hirschfeld [116] , who believes that the separation of the command over the Rhine legions from the Gallic governorship was complete in Augustus’ time. In like manner Marquardt [117] thinks that as a consequence of subjugation on the east side of the Rhine there arose the two provinces of Upper and Lower Germany, whose organization was interrupted by reason of the unexpected events of the year 9 A. D. Schiller also speaks of a division into two provinces, but regards the establishment of the provinces as planned rather than actually carried out. While he includes the Germans on the left bank of the Rhine in the Belgic, one of the three Gallic provinces set up by Augustus 16-13 B. C., he adds: “Wahrscheinlich nahmen später auch die beiden Germanien an den gallischen Provinziallandtagen [in Lugdunum] theil.” [118] On the other hand, he describes Mainz in the year 9 B. C. as lying in “der von ihm [Drusus] gewonnenen künftigen Provinz Germaniae.” [119] Further on [120] we are told that after Quintilius Varus succeeded Tiberius, and at the same time obtained command over both the provinces of Germany, the disaster to Varus took place, and a change in the German policy of the emperor ensued, “und die Benennung Ober- und Untergermanien, einst als Benennung für das Land zur Elbe geplant, bezeichnete jetzt etwas prahlerisch den schmalen Streifen längs dem Rheine am linken Ufer.” [121] Riese, [74] who has carefully examined all the available sources, shows conclusively that no such separation was made, and that Germany was considered by the Romans as merely a part of Gaul, which they regarded as extending to the Elbe. [122] The east boundary of Roman Gaul, to be sure, was originally the Rhine, and, as land divisions in the geographical treatise of Agrippa (who died 12 B. C.), Gaul appears on the one side, while Germany with Raetia and Noricum stands on the other. The governor of Gaul (the so-called Gallia Comata) was Agrippa in 21, M. Lollius in 17, and Tiberius in 16. Then, probably during the presence of the emperor in Gaul (16-13 B. C.), the land was divided into three separate provinces—Belgica, Lugdunensis, and Aquitania. [123] The legate of Belgica naturally, as before, commanded the army of all Gaul [124] , which was on duty among the Germanic stocks on the left bank of the Rhine, and intended to serve as a defense against the Germans on the right bank of that river. Therefore such commanders could very properly be called commanders in Germany, as by Velleius (II, 97, 1): “accepta in Germania clades sub legato M. Lollio”, although, as is well known, the actual defeat of the legion was west of the Rhine, in Roman Germany, i. e., in Gaul proper. During Drusus’ command, in the year 12 B. C., the three Gauls were again united. Later Tiberius, and after him Ahenobarbus, commanded, probably under like conditions, as more certainly [75] Tiberius did, when a second time (4-6 A. D.) he held both the supreme civil and military commands in Gaul and the Danube lands. The only difficulty in the acceptance of such a view is that Sentinus is called by Velleius “legatus Augusti in Germania”, and by Dio “τῆς Γερμανίας ἄρχων”. But this does not mean that at that time there was a German province along with the Gallic one. The combined testimony of Pliny, Ptolemy, Strabo, and of Augustus himself, tells us nothing of a German province, but indicates that the Gallica extended to the Elbe. Significant too are the words employed by Velleius. Although ever ready to praise Tiberius, and to expatiate on his military achievements, in his narrative of peoples subdued by Tiberius (“in formam provinciae redacti”), he says nothing about his conquering the Germans, but “sic perdomuit Germaniam, ut in formam paene stipendiariae redigeret provinciae” (II, 97, 4). Florus is the only ancient author who supports the view that Germany was conquered and organized as a province (II, 30). And he is not only unreliable, but uses the term provincia in different senses. [125] Once (II, 30, 23) it may mean nothing more than “land”, since surely there was no province before Drusus, while in another place (II, 30, 25) it may very well refer to the province of Gaul. In answer to Mommsen’s view that the establishment of a separate province in Germany is evident from the organization of courts there, and in the erection of an altar to Augustus, Riese convincingly argues that the administration of justice, which could be exercised also by a Gallic governor, proves nothing; further that the establishment of an altar to Augustus at Köln would be of significance for our question only in case it had been customary in every province for the emperor’s worship to be observed in a single place. But that this was by no means true is seen from the instances of this cult in different places of one and the same province [126] , e. g., in Asia, Macedonia, and Lycia. Riese concludes that Varus also, as his predecessors, was at the head of the entire Gallic-Germanic province. This is nowhere expressly stated in the ancient sources, but seems probable from all the facts. First of all Varus, as the husband of Claudia Pulchra, was related by marriage to Augustus, and so an available man for the position, since it was the emperor’s policy from the [76] beginning of the reorganization in Gaul to entrust this position of plenary power only to those who were closely connected with the emperor’s house. [127] And not only are we nowhere told the contrary, but it is highly improbable that the emperor, just at the time when the Gallico-Germanic provincial arrangement was succeeding so well, would have instituted any change in it. Further, since we find that under Varus’ successor, no less than under his predecessors, the entire power of Gaul and Germany was combined, it would seem most probable that the status was not different during Varus’ incumbency.

From the foregoing it is evident that scholars are far from unanimously accepting the old view that Germany was organized into a province, or that any attempt was made to that end. On the other hand Riese’s presentation of facts has definitely proved, beyond the chance for further argument, that no such province was organized. But so strong is the force of the preconceived and traditional view that Riese, despite his successful attack on a part of it, expresses the belief that a conquest of Germany was intended. However, we are by no means restricted to Riese’s contention that Rome’s relations with the Germans, as a part of the Gallic province, looked to their subjugation. If so, they would have been treated as other peoples, including the Gauls, whom we know Rome wished to make subjects, and would not have been left in a state of uncertainty, neither a province nor yet wholly independent, as they were left for fifteen years after Tiberius’ departure for Rhodes. This very matter of indecision with reference to Germany has been suggested as directly responsible for the catastrophe which [77] befell Varus. So Ferrero says [128] : “In Germany ... the people, apparently subdued, were not bound to pay any tribute, and were left to govern themselves solely and entirely by their own laws,—a strange anomaly in the history of Roman conquests.” Nor in theirs alone, one may well add. It seems strange that such an anomalous “conquest” should not long since have been recognized as no conquest at all, and as nothing more or less than a desultory series of punitive expeditions or of demonstrations.

Once more we press the question why, if Germany was not subdued by Rome and never organized into a province, did Rome give up the attempt to do so? Many, as shown above [129] , argue that Rome was unable to accomplish her purpose, and that the defeat of Varus was the great turning point in her policy, and the direct cause for abandoning the attempt. [130] Gardthausen in addition to the direct cause (the defeat) finds also a more remote one. [131] He thinks that the unfortunate family estrangement which in 6 B. C. drove Tiberius into voluntary retirement forced Augustus to suspend or give up a [78] plan that was well considered and already successfully begun; that this advantage nevertheless was forever lost, since Augustus could find no competent successor to Tiberius [132] , and was unwilling to entrust to one person the large forces which were necessary to bring about the subjugation of the land. Although the war with Germany was costly and fraught with danger, Delbrück is of the opinion that Rome could reasonably count upon final success, since the war party which is not strong enough to risk an engagement must sooner or later succumb. Energetic prosecution of the war with Rome’s available forces would without doubt have brought ultimate victory. [133] . But the explanation why Rome did not continue the war which Germanicus was apparently bringing to successful issue Delbrück discovers not in the war itself, but in the inner conditions of the Roman principate. Tiberius had become emperor only by adoption; Germanicus, however, stood in the same relationship to the deceased Augustus in which the latter once stood to Julius Caesar. Tiberius was by nature jealous, and concluded that for his own safety he could not allow the same condition to establish itself between Germanicus and the legions in Germany as had once existed between Caesar and the legions in Gaul. To bring the war to a close required not only a commander of the highest ability, and with great means at his disposal, but one who had a free hand in the prosecution of the war. Tiberius did not have a general who could meet the requirements, and even if he had had such a one, would not have dared to send him. Hence after watching the course of affairs for a year or two he recalled Germanicus, and the Germans remained free. [134] Koepp [135] sees the [79] reason for Germanicus’ recall not, as Tacitus hints, in the jealousy of Tiberius, but in the fact that Germanicus’ campaigns and losses were proving too expensive. [136] Riese is closely in agreement with Delbrück’s view given above. There was, he says, no change of policy on the part of Augustus, but the change was due to Tiberius. Notwithstanding Germanicus’ loyalty in putting down a rebellion in the legions, Tiberius was suspicious and recalled him. The Roman troops were brought to the right bank of the Rhine, and Germanicus, as commander of Gaul, never had a successor. Never again was Tiberius willing to expose his power to the danger of great leaders in command of the Rhine army. As a result of this decision the frontier forces were divided into the armies of lower and upper Germany, and, after the year 17 A. D., these were under the command of consular legates, because Tiberius was too suspicious to allow the command of these armies to be united with that of Gaul. [137]

The great diversity of views cited above shows that as yet no satisfactory conclusion has been reached which will explain Rome’s alleged change of policy toward German territory. As we have seen, many have sought other reasons for this change beside the defeat of Varus, a clear indication that it in itself [80] is insufficient. If one must assume such a series of personal and accidental causes, adding supposed conditions of jealousy, weakness of the empire, inadequate finances, etc., it is evident that the defeat of Varus ceases, even under the most favorable interpretation, to be a great climacteric cause. It was only one of a series of contributing causes, i. e., of relatively small concern, and significant only because of chance association with other reasons. The whole position of the theorists as to Varus’ defeat is full of inconsistencies, assumptions, and inferences, at variance with the evidence, and ending in the admission that after all several other causes were equally operative. With this we may take leave of the traditional view as to the significance of the defeat of Varus, in the conviction that no one has reasonable ground to continue to espouse it, when once a simple and satisfactory solution is offered that not only recognizes but explains all the ascertainable facts. And at this point we may summarize the objections which have been adduced against the belief that Augustus had in mind the conquest of Germany:

The cumulative effect of these objections is overwhelming, and causes the student of history not only to feel sceptical about the significance of Varus’ defeat, but strongly convinced that it played no such part in the determination of Augustus’ Germanic policy as is generally supposed. And since the current theory as to this defeat can be maintained only after disregarding these several and serious objections, some interpretation of Augustus’ purpose must be offered which will obviate these difficulties, and still be consistent with his known policies and acknowledged acts. In the following chapter it will be made clear that Augustus had no other purpose in his operations in Germany than to make repeated demonstrations of Rome’s power, in order to impress the barbarians [138] , and to make the frontier defense effective by pacifying and bringing into friendly relations with Rome large parts of the bordering territory; that it was not at any time his intention to conquer Germany, and organize it as a subject province.

Every empire of the ancient world was bordered on one or more sides, if not actually surrounded by barbarian tribes which envied its prosperity and were ever on the alert to organize a razzia into its prosperous domains. It was therefore a prime policy of every empire builder, not merely to mark out distinctly the limits of national authority and responsibility, and to round off the lines of dominion by the inclusion of the whole of some tribe or nation, or the complete extent of a certain well defined district possessed of a unified economic character, but beyond all else to secure an easily defensible frontier line against the aggression of his civilized rivals, and the chronic brigandage of barbarian neighbors. Certainly no civilized country of ancient times enjoyed such immunity from annoyance on the part of its neighbors as did ancient Egypt, when once the upper and the lower kingdoms had been united, for it is wholly surrounded by seas and deserts; yet even here the barbarian was an intermittent danger, the Nubian and Ethiopian in the south, against whom many a Pharaoh waged punitive campaigns; the Libyan in the west; the Bedouins at the northeast; and even the sea could not protect the Delta from the ravages of freebooters from the isles, the far spread front of the latest wave of the Hellenic invaders of Greece. And two of the barbarian nations actually invaded the country in such numbers as to set up dynasties of more than an ephemeral character, the Hyksos and the Ethiopians. Less favorably situated was the civilization in the Mesopotamian valley; Elamites, Kassites, Mitanni, Khita, Aramaeans, and the brigands of the mountains, the last and most powerful, the Medo-Persians, were ready to devastate their peaceful preserves. Persia had to contend with Massagetae and Scythians; [1] Philistia had the Hebrews, and they in turn the [83] Amalekites and other dwellers in the wastes; Carthage, the Numidians, Libyans, and Moors; the Macedonians had the Thracians and Paeonians; the Greeks in Asia Minor had the Lydians, in Italy, the Sabellians, Bruttians, Lucanians, Iapygians,—in short the Greek colonies had upon every coast of the three continents a fringe of warlike and rapacious enemies with whom permanent peace was an impossibility.

Rome was, of course, no exception to the rule, and once her power had spread beyond the confines of Italy it was inevitable that her extraordinary national vitality and genius for organization must keep extending her confines until strong and satisfactory frontiers were secured. By the beginning of our era the great permanent boundaries of the empire had in the main been reached. To the west lay the Atlantic ocean; the south and southeast was covered by the deserts of Sahara, Arabia, and Syria; the north had the Black Sea [2] and the Danube; only two quarters were inadequately provided for, the northeast, Armenia, and the northwest, Germany. In the former case the uplands of the Taurus constitute a welter of confused peaks and ranges, whose trend is, however, in the main east and west, so that neither the crest of a long line of mountains nor the course of some large river supplies any satisfactory north and south line. [3] In the latter, a relatively small river, that showed a marked tendency to flow in parallel channels, with a rather sluggish current except in a few places, and with a considerable number of islands, so that it could be crossed almost at will even by barbarian tribes, furnished inadequate protection to the rich provinces of Gaul. [4] Had the population [84] on the right band of the Rhine been extremely thin, or sluggish, as for a long period it seems to have been on the north bank of the Danube, no great danger need have been anticipated here, but the Germans were, for barbarians, relatively numerous, [5] brave, and adventurous to a fault, and passionately addicted to warfare and marauding. Under these circumstances it seems clear that an ordinary frontier line would have been thoroughly insecure. No matter how many forts and trenches might be established along the Rhine it would have been impossible to hold a single line intact even with the full standing army of the Empire. If the hostile territory extended right up to the ramparts of the legionaries, the Germans, secure in the protection of their hills, forests, and swamps, could gather an overwhelming force, cross the river and break through the fortifications at any point they pleased along a line of several hundred miles in length, before an adequate force, with the slow methods of communication then available, could be gathered to resist them. And once past the defenses, either the invaders must be allowed to harry and plunder at will, while the breach [85] was repaired to stop the influx of others, or else, if they were pursued and hunted down, the forts must be weakened to the imminent danger of a repetition of the same event at some other point.

There were but two ways to remedy this situation. One was to give up the Rhine as a frontier and to push on; but this would merely have transferred the scene of difficulty, not removed it, for bad as the Rhine may have been it was the best available frontier in this direction until one came to the Arctic Ocean and the Ural Mountains; [6] or if only the Germans were so dangerous as neighbors, the limits of the empire must have been pushed to the almost equally impossible line of the Vistula, or beyond, in order to include them all within its confines; and finally, a very material increase must have been made in the size of the standing army, because the legions on the Rhine served not only the purpose of warding off the Germans but also of keeping in restraint the restless Gauls, while, if the frontier were fixed at the Elbe or the Oder, quite as many troops would be needed to defend it there, and many additional legions for garrison service in Belgica, Gaul, and Noricum. [7] The other way was to buttress the frontier by securing on the right bank of the Rhine a series of friendly states or tribes, whose leading men or factions were to be kept well disposed to the empire by all the expedients of force and diplomacy. In this way the danger from the barbarian would be minimized, no sudden attacks from the proximate tribes need be apprehended, and even against a great tribal movement in the remote hinterland, like that of the Basternae, the Galatians, the Cimbri and Teutones, the Helvetians, and many another even before the Völkerwanderung , the Romans would be amply prepared in advance. The shock could be absorbed by the launching of friendly tribes, more or less strongly supported by Roman troops, against the newcomers, and, if worst came to worst, and the foe pushed his way relentlessly onward, the issue could be decided on foreign territory beyond the frontiers, and with the assistance of tribes which otherwise would have been forced to [86] join the invaders against Rome, or at the best, have remained neutral. [8] Once established, such friendly relations might easily [87] be maintained by the countless devices of a resourceful diplomacy, the honors and recognitions, the flattery and gifts which are so dear to the barbaric heart, and for which incalculable values have ofttimes been rashly bartered away; or, when a chief proved recalcitrant, it was easy among so ambitious and independent a nobility as was that of Germany to raise up a rival who could either compel obedience or else take his place. [9] We can readily believe that the subtle and resourceful Tiberius accomplished during his German campaigns more by diplomacy than with the sword [10] , and characteristic not merely of the man but of the general situation which had been produced was his effort to console the impetuous Germanicus with the observation that the Germans could well be left to themselves now, i. e. to cutting one another’s throats at the artful suggestion of Roman diplomacy. [11] But diplomacy alone could never have initiated such a condition in Germany; nothing less was needed than the vivid fear of the legionaries, and that too not as a static body of troops however powerful, but dreaded through bitter experience of what it meant to have the cohorts carry fire and sword to the innermost recesses of the country. Barbarian [88] peoples are easily impressed by a portentous occurrence, but with them the effect wears rapidly away, unless by frequent repetition it be seared into their consciousness. This process of terrorization had to be kept up until the fear of Rome was so great that the mere thought of invasion would be recognized as madness. The readiness with which the tribes of Gaul and even of Germany [12] expressed their submission to Caesar, after some heavy stroke, is familiar to all readers of the Gallic Wars , but no less characteristic is the readiness with which they would take up arms at the least rumor of a reverse, or even without any change in the situation whatsoever, merely after the first effects of the news of disaster had worn away. [13] For years therefore after the Rhine had been definitely determined upon as a frontier it was necessary for Roman generals to march at frequent intervals into Germany, making powerful demonstrations in force not simply among the proximate tribes, but penetrating far into the interior, so that even the remotest might trust no more to their forests and their swamps; bringing ships of war up the larger rivers not merely to support the land troops, but also to demonstrate the mastery over water as well as land, and to show how far beyond the actual frontier of the empire its outstretched arm could strike; rewarding friends and establishing them more firmly in places of authority, punishing foes individually and in small groups, beating down any armed opposition that dared to raise its head (and that was relatively seldom in the numerous campaigns that were waged), and ruthlessly devasting the territory of the intransigent, frequently in the more completely pacified districts adjusting disputes between Roman merchants and the natives, or acting as arbitrators in difficulties which had arisen between individuals and factions among the Germans themselves. Such is the picture of these German campaigns as we should draw it, filling in the meager outlines of events as given by the ancient historians. Of a similar nature are the punitive or monitory expeditions carried on by the French, the British, and the Russians, in their dealing with similar barbarous or semicivilized [89] tribes upon the borders of their African or Asiatic empires. Real warfare was rare, a pitched battle seldom took place [14] , but the repetition of the demonstrations gradually had its effect even upon the fierce and rapacious Germans.

Let us examine from this point of view the actual conduct of the Germanic campaigns, bearing in mind the utter dissimilarity with the methods employed by Caesar for the conquest of Gaul under similar conditions. In the first place no army posts, forts, or powerful garrisons were established and maintained in Germany. Aliso was nothing more than a station for munitions of war and no doubt traders’ stocks of goods [15] , [90] and it was established so short a distance from the Rhine, only a trifle more than 30 miles from Vetera, as to have little more effect in overawing the tribes in its vicinity than did the powerful fortresses along the Rhine itself. [16] The fort built by Drusus in Mt. Taunus can hardly have been much out of sight of the Rhine, and doubtless served merely to secure an easy entrance into the upland country for the garrisons farther south along the river. [17] These two posts certainly could have had no direct influence upon the maintenance of authority in the remote interior. Flevum on the coast was a feeble trading post for merchants, sufficient only to hold their supplies, give a safe anchorage for their vessels, harbor an occasional Roman war vessel which would be needed to guard against the danger of piracy, and protect a few ships engaged in coast traffic towards the north and the northeast. On rare occasions it might serve as a naval base for a large fleet sent out to make a demonstration along the coast and rivers of Germany. [18] None of these [91] can properly be denominated a “Zwingburg”, yet how could the Romans have expected to maintain and make permanent a conquest over such fierce barbarians without overawing them in some wise with great fortresses located at strategical points in their very midst?

It is noteworthy also that no Roman army ventured to spend the winter on German soil except on one occasion, and that was in 4-5 A. D., when for some unknown cause (doubtless one of considerable importance judging from the way in which Velleius speaks of it), Tiberius was so long delayed in the north that his active campaign was not over until December, and winter must have been upon him before he could reach the Rhine. [19] In this case he remained “ad caput Iuliae”, as near the permanent camps doubtless as he could get. [20] The next summer an extensive campaign was undertaken to the north and east, and with the cooperation of the fleet even the Elbe was reached, but that this encampment in the confines of Germany the preceding winter had meant nothing singular, and established no new policy, is clear from the fact that after this summer’s campaign, when, if ever, it would have been necessary to retain a powerful army in the “conquered” territory whose [92] limits are supposed to have been greatly extended, Tiberius calmly led his troops back to the Rhine as usual (“in hiberna legiones reduxit”, Velleius, II, 107, 3). [21]

Furthermore, there was no building of a network of great military roads to facilitate the march of the legions far into the interior, yet if such roads were anywhere needed it was surely in Germany, where the trifling commercial trade routes could not possibly have sufficed for the sure and speedy movements of the legions and their large baggage trains. There are some vague statements regarding engineering works by Drusus [22] , and [93] we hear likewise of certain structures of Domitius, the pontes longi in the northwestern swamps [23] , and certain limites and [94] aggeres with which Germanicus connected Aliso and the Rhine [24] , nothing at all commensurate with the ambitious schemes which the Romans are supposed to have entertained for the conquest of the country. [25]

Finally there was no civil administration established for any part of the country, even that which might have some appearance of being under Roman sway; no colonies were founded, either military or commercial; there was no effort to push forward, to settle, and to absorb the newly acquired “province”. [26] Nor can shortness of time be put forward as an [95] excuse for failure to perform these characteristic features of a regular Roman conquest. Two generations had passed between Caesar’s first passage of the Rhine and the defeat of Varus, forty-seven years since Agrippa had crossed the same river, or, if we consent to take the date generally set for the conquest of Germany, the last campaign of Drusus, 9 B. C., eighteen years of Roman domination had elapsed before the battle of the Teutoburg forest, yet nothing of any real importance had been done to organize the “new province”. For the earlier part of this period since Caesar, one might indeed argue that Rome had been engaged in more absorbing enterprises, to wit, the civil wars, but since the battle of Actium, or at all events since the establishment of the dyarchy, Augustus had a perfectly free hand to complete any project whatsoever that he may have had in mind with regard to Germany. Drusus, Tiberius, Domitius, Vinicius, and Tiberius again had campaigned often enough beyond the Rhine, but nothing was actually done toward finishing any formal conquest. Nor will it do to ascribe to Augustus, as is generally done, the policy of turning over to Quintilius Varus the last formal act of organizing the province. What less opportune moment could possibly have been selected than just the period of the Pannonian revolt, when the Rhine armies were reduced below their normal strength, and a man placed in charge, who, whatever his other virtues may have been, was certainly not an experienced general? For it would certainly be expected that the formal establishment of complete imperial administration in Germany would have aroused what little spirit of independence yet remained (according to this theory) in German bosoms, and to have entrusted such a mission to such a man, at such a time, with such small forces, and without any of the necessary preliminary work of roadbuilding, fortress erection, stationing of garrisons and the like, would have been an act of colossal and criminal folly on the part of one of the shrewdest and most patient and calculating statesmen of the ancient world. [27]

[96]

We must here examine the arguments of the authorities who are cited for the statement that Varus was engaged in organizing a full civil administration for the “province” when disaster overtook him. The rhetorical nature of these documents and their general untrustworthiness have already been emphasized; when we look for perfectly definite acts we find either the vaguest language, or else utterly improbable statements. Much has been said of the presence of “causarum patroni” in Varus’ army, but just how much is properly to be inferred therefrom is doubtful. In the first place the evidence for their presence is the worst possible, Florus alone mentioning them (II, 30, 36 f.), and that with the most patent rhetorical purpose, and the highly colored story of how, when the tongue of one was cut out and the lips sewed together he was taunted with the remark, “Viper, you have finally ceased to hiss”. But granted that some “causarum patroni” attended Varus, how much does that signify? When was the organization of a province entrusted to these men, or what official rôle would they play in such a process? Their presence is easily enough explained as an aid to the general in his semilegal activities. We have already observed that he must often have been called upon to settle disputes between the numerous rival nobles of Germany. Who indeed was better suited to act as arbitrator than a powerful and disinterested official of the great neighboring empire? [28] Doubtless many an appeal regarding the business [97] dealings of Roman traders with the Germans was referred likewise to him. The only regular course of procedure would have been to act in accordance with the recognized Roman legal traditions—one surely would not expect a Roman general to dispense German law or to act merely on his passing whims—, and it would be perfectly natural to have on his general staff a few legal advisers. That Varus took their advice frequently, and that some persons felt that they had been injured when such advice was followed, and bore a special grudge against those men, may very well be, but that the final steps of turning a barbarian country into a province were being then and there taken surely cannot be established by the presence of a few legal advisers on Varus’ staff.

More serious is the statement that tribute was being assessed and collected. [29] That this was literally true on any [98] comprehensive scale is clearly impossible. We hear nowhere of publicani [30] , or any of the paraphernalia for collecting the tribute of a conquered province. [31] That certain things were given Varus and his army by allied and friendly chiefs and tribes there can be no doubt, and these may have been objects of high specific value, as choice pieces of amber and the like, or mere supplies of grain, meat, hides, and similar material. It was not to be expected that Roman armies should march through Germany without being amply assisted by their socii and amici . An example of what such assistance may have been is the well-known case of the Frisians, who were expected to [99] furnish a few oxhides annually for military uses, and who started to fight when an exacting officer modified the terms of the original understanding. That the Frisians however were really a free, though allied people, at this time, there can be no question, for there is not a hint of actual Roman administration of their affairs. [32] Similar must have been the case with the Cheruscans and other tribes farther inland. A certain amount of assistance was doubtless quite properly expected, and in fact the genuineness of the friendship might well have been doubted if there were no willingness manifested to be helpful. [33] That Varus or some of his officers may occasionally have regarded a voluntary service of friendship or policy in the light of an obligation, and may have requested and even insisted upon more than friendship or policy would lead the Germans to regard as a fair offering, is quite possible, although with a weak force and while the Pannonian revolt was still unsubdued, it would indeed have been preternatural folly. But we are not justified in admitting any more, and this is all that our sources, stripped of a little rhetorical embellishment, really assert. [34]

[100]

Finally, Dio speaks of a division of Varus’ forces, whereby a large portion of his army was serving on garrison duty at one point or another in the country, and adds that after the defeat of the main body of his troops all these separate detachments were hunted down and destroyed. [35] This would be important if it could be used as evidence for the establishment of Roman garrisons throughout the land, but it cannot. There is no hint in any other author that a large number of forts and strongholds were captured in consequence of this defeat, yet as intensifying the importance of the reverse, that must surely have been referred to by some one. Every other authority knows merely of the annihilation of Varus and his army, not of the capture of a whole series of strongholds all over the land. [36] Besides, one asks in vain what these places were and when occupied. There is nothing in the accounts of earlier or of later operations which furnishes any answer to such questions, or a parallel to such a military policy on the part of Varus. And finally, what could have been more foolish than to divide a force, unusually small in itself, at a critical period, when the great revolt in Pannonia was not yet put down? That Varus might not have had every man of his three legions with him on the fatal occasion, [101] is quite conceivable. Some detachments might have been with convoys of provisions, others out to look for supplies, yet others engaged in hunting down some band of outlaws, or in putting into execution some decision favorable to a conspicuous supporter of Rome, and that these small bands may have fallen victims after the great disaster is perfectly possible. That is all that we are justified in inferring from Dio after the veneer of rhetoric has been removed.

For we must bear in mind the marked tendencies of our sources for the administration of Varus. Florus was concocting a melodrama; Dio arranging an explanation, which should save the credit of Rome and the Roman soldier by putting all the blame on the dead who tell no tales; Velleius distorting everything in maiorem gloriam of Tiberius, for whom Varus must serve as a foil at every turn. There is therefore nothing so stupid, arrogant, or wilful that it is not cheerfully ascribed to him, while perfectly proper and natural things, like the presence of lawyers on his staff, the making of arrangements regarding the quantity and character of the assistance to be rendered by the socii , the dispersion of little detachments of troops upon one or another small but necessary service, are exaggerated into acts of wanton folly and oppression, and interpreted as the inauguration of a totally new policy. Yet every one of these things must inevitably have taken place on all the numerous similar demonstrations that had been made in Germany; the only reason that they are not mentioned elsewhere is that we have no accounts regarding other operations in Germany in which such details would have been in place. They were the ordinary routine of campaigning and of no interest to the average ancient historiographer, save as they served to point a lurid description of a disaster, or to supply a basis, however flimsy, for a misrepresentation.

Varus was, we may feel assured, doing no more, in all probability much less, than his predecessors had done on numerous occasions. Two years of heavy fighting had not broken the Pannonian revolt. The forces along the Rhine, if not actually weakened in order to enlarge those in Pannonia, would doubtless be so represented by hot-headed Germans of the nationalist persuasion, particularly after two years of utter inaction. It was doubtless in response to suggestions that Roman prestige needed some refurbishing in the interior, and very likely at the [102] express command of Augustus, that Varus undertook his fatal demonstration. The very fact that he left so large a force at the Rhine under Asprenas would indicate that he felt it safer to keep two armies in readiness for action at different points, rather than to concentrate his forces and so risk the breaking out of trouble in some quarter from which pressure had been removed. Without any open show of violence, rather with every expression of courtesy, confidence, and good will, he was engaged in the ordinary routine of a commanding officer upon such a demonstration in force, when suddenly attacked and destroyed. Graciousness and friendliness had been taken for weakness, as too often with the barbarian, and he and his men had to pay for a conciliatory attitude with their lives. All this is but the thing which we should reasonably expect under the circumstances; it is all that the sources, critically examined, will justify us in asserting. We do not possess, to be sure, the actual documents of alliance between Rome and various tribes or chieftains of Germany; we have in fact scarcely the name of any German preserved from Ariovistus to Arminius, but we can be perfectly certain that negotiations of friendship and alliance were frequently and solemnly entered upon. If Rome had made an alliance with Ariovistus in 59 B. C. (see above n. 8 ), while as yet he was a relatively unknown force, hundreds of miles from the frontier, how much more must she have been busy in organizing friendly relations with the German tribes that were immediately contiguous to the Rhine and through whose territories her armies so often marched in peace?

Finally, we would emphasize the general defensive character of the campaigns. In the great majority of cases some disturbance in Germany is definitely given as the cause of the operations, and if our sources for the Germanic wars were not so hopelessly fragmentary we should doubtless find that in every instance the Germans were the aggressors. [37] Even the proposed [103] campaign against Maroboduus we have no right to regard as an act of wanton aggression, for Maroboduus had retired sulkily into the forests of Bohemia, and there developed a formidable army, and though his overt acts were conciliatory, his very presence, considering the inflammable character of the nation to which he belonged, and in which he might incite greater disturbances than had ever yet broken out, was a cause of justifiable apprehension. [38] Indeed any other German than Maroboduus [104] and the fact that he did not seems to have been regarded by his fellow Germans as disloyalty to the national cause. Likewise the campaigns of Germanicus in 14 A. D., while apparently at the very moment unprovoked, were in reality a bit of deferred revenge for the treacherous attack upon the legions of Varus. Is it in fact not truly singular that among so many scattered references to the Germanic wars, there is nowhere, save in Florus, who has been dealt with elsewhere, any direct assertion that the purpose was conquest, reduction to a state of subjection, or the like? (Cf. pp. 27 and note; 75). All writers represent the Romans as being compelled to send troops from time to time into Germany to preserve the peace, and to make powerful demonstrations; there are none of the characteristic marks or processes of conquest. Were it not for the all but universal preconception that conquest was intended the sources speaking for themselves would tell a very different tale. That is briefly the following: for a generation from the time of Caesar to that of Drusus, Rome had been content with merely repelling attacks and punishing the immediate offenders, together with a local demonstration of her forces. That procedure finally appeared to be ineffective, and so a vigorous policy of terrorizing the Germans from further disturbances of the peace was tried. Some canals were dug to facilitate the movements of the fleet which was greatly needed for the purpose of transporting supplies upon the marches into the remote interior; close to the Rhine some swamp road construction was undertaken, subsidiary apparently to the naval operations; a few castella near to the Rhine and along the highways leading into the interior were erected as munition depots, and nothing further. [39] Preparations were made to facilitate incursions into Germany, and these were repeatedly undertaken, but every year Drusus came back to his starting point upon the Rhine, after the most approved manœuvers of the noble Duke of York, or of the perplexed Persian poet who tried to become a philosopher,

The campaigns of Domitius and of Tiberius are of exactly the same character, a rally, a raid, and a relapse. Regarded as attempts at conquest these operations represented from the [105] political point of view sheer folly, from the military point of view a sequence of grandiose fiascos; considered as a prolonged series of demonstrations intended to establish a line of buffer states in the form of friendly, allied tribes as a further protection of a naturally weak frontier against the barbaric hordes of the remote swamps and forests, they were sagaciously conceived and to the highest degree successful.

Our argument has thus far followed the process of exclusion. The Roman operations in Germany were either those of permanent conquest or of demonstration; there is no tertium quid . If not conquest, and we have endeavored to refute that view at every point, it must have been demonstration. The nature of our sources does not permit a positive and detailed proof of our new interpretation; that, properly interpreted, however, they are in harmony with it, we have been at pains to show. By way of conclusion we shall undertake to strengthen our position by pointing out analogies and parallels, not merely in the general course of ancient history, but in the foreign policy of Augustus himself.

Punitive and monitory raids were frequently undertaken in antiquity without any attempt whatsoever at making permanent conquest. Such were the oft repeated razzias into Nubia made by the Pharaohs, the countless raids of Assyrian monarchs into the mountains to the east and north, especially the great campaign of Darius among the Scythians in 512 B. C. [40] Of the same sort were the frequent campaigns of the Macedonian kings against the Paeonians and Thracians, thou [106] gh no serious attempt was made to extend their dominion greatly in this direction. A typical example of such chronic punitive campaigning was the service of Clearchus in the Chersonese, who used that peninsula as his base of operations while raiding the Thracians above the Hellespont. [41] The whole history of the more powerful Greek colonies is filled with the record of such punitive expeditions intended to keep the restless barbarians at peace. Of this identical nature were Caesar’s demonstrations across the Rhine in Germany, and beyond the channel in Britain. He had surely no thought of making a permanent conquest, at least at that time, but desired merely to make a display of Roman power to the barbarians who were, or might be, interfering with the security of his conquests in Gaul. [42] It is true that the Romans were not generally in the habit of keeping a foe off at arm’s length in this fashion, but preferred to close with and destroy him once for all, but the time was bound to come soon or late when even the amazing vitality of the Romans would reach its limit, and when they must content themselves with defense instead of new conquest. And this limit was first reached along the Rhine, where an effort at further advance would have involved endless difficulties.

But we are not without examples of quite the same thing from the very reign of Augustus, and that too at a period considerably prior to the disaster of Varus. Of precisely this nature was the raid into Arabia in 25-24 B. C. There is no evidence that a permanent seizure of the land was intended; but occasion was taken to demonstrate the power of Rome, and then the expedition returned. That there may have been some intention of seizing or securing fabled wealth we cannot perhaps wholly deny, although men so well informed as the Roman merchants and administrators of Egypt could hardly have been guilty of such folly, but its main purpose seems to have bee [107] n merely a demonstration of the vigor of the new Egyptian administration. [43] For it is significant that in the very next year began the Ethiopian wars, which lasted until 20 B. C., wherein likewise no effort was made at extending the limits of the new province, but the Ethiopians or Nubians were given a taste of Roman steel, and made to realize how serious a thing it would be to harass the new lords of Egypt. [44] Of quite the same nature was the invasion of Dacia, 12-9 B. C., and the later raids during the Pannonian revolt, 6-9 A. D. Augustus had certainly no intention of adding Dacia to the Empire; he merely wished to punish the tribes north of the Danube for interfering in the affairs of the province and to give a sharp warning against a repetition of the offense. [45] That the invasions of Germany were made more frequently and probably upon a larger scale than elsewhere, there can be no denial, but that is due to the fact that the Germans were more warlike and martial than the other contiguous barbarians. We have already observed that practically every campaign in Germany was preceded by grave provocation on the part of the barbarians, while frequently the difficulties raised were settled by diplomacy without recourse to armed intervention. But the lesson that an invasion of the Empire was likely to cost far more than it was worth, while it took a long time to teach, was in the end thoroughly learned. For two hundred years after the death of Tiberius almost unbroken peace reigned along this quarter of the frontier, which had been for half a century the storm center of the empire [46] , and when the northern defenses finally began to crumble, it was towards the north and northeast, not the northwest, that they first succumbed. The policy of the first two principes was therefore abundantly justified by it [108] s lasting success.

As regards the secondary policy, i. e., that of the upbuilding and support of friendly or buffer states immediately contiguous to the actual frontier, there is no lack of parallels from antiquity. [47] Tiglath Pileser IV in 732 B. C., after annexing certain parts of Palestine, set up such a buffer between his empire and Egypt along the marches of Philistia, in the shape of a vassal principality under a Bedouin chief called “ kipi , (or resident) of Musri” (i. e. Egypt). [48] Similar was doubtless the purpose of Nebuchadrezzar in leaving Jehoiakim of Judah upon the throne of a subject kingdom after his conquest of Palestine in 704 B. C. Only after two revolts, both instigated apparently by Egypt, did he apparently feel compelled to give up a policy which, though it made it unnecessary to invade Egypt directly, nevertheless allowed the temptation to renew hostilities without a desperate risk. [49] Something similar, though under very different conditions was the policy of Sparta in building a ring of Perioeci about her own Helot population on every side save that of Messenia, where by the destruction of cities and the closing of harbors the Helots were likewise cut off from contact with the outside world. The Perioeci thus formed a double barrier, warding off the enemy on the outside, and helping to keep in a disaffected servile population. [50] Again, this was clearly the policy of Alexander in the East, who set the Indus as his actual frontier, but secured that by establishing two powerful protected states, the kingdoms of Porus and of Taxiles, on the eastern bank. [51] A parallel not too [109] remote, perhaps, can be pointed out in the case of the first contact of Rome and Carthage in Spain. Here the Romans seem to have set up Saguntum as an allied state to act as a buffer or check to the advances of Hannibal to the Ebro, and towards what they chose to regard as their proper sphere of influence (or, if one prefer, that of their ancient ally Massilia). That the policy in this case failed to prevent war is of course no proper criticism of its intent. There were also the numerous but ephemeral protectorates of the eastern marches, which served for the most part the purpose of preparing the formal advance of the empire rather than actually covering a difficult frontier, and so lasted only a short time. But in Armenia we have a truly classical example of a buffer state, whose fortunes no less an authority than Lord Curzon compares directly with those of Afghanistan, similarly situated between the two great rival powers of Russia and Great Britain. [52] One Roman general or emperor after another might have made Armenia a province, as Trajan actually did, although his successor immediately restored it to its former state of uncertainty, but for more than four centuries it was preserved as a buffer state against Parthia. [53] Less notorious but equally clear is the case of Mauretania. In [110] 25 B. C. Augustus transferred King Juba from Numidia, which he thereupon transformed into a province, to Mauretania, which, after having been eight years a province, was once more made a kingdom. The purpose of this singular interchange of political status, must have been to protect the actual confines of the empire from direct contact with the barbarians of the south and west, who were not yet accustomed to the presence of the Romans. [54] It was not until sixty-five years afterwards, 40 A. D., when danger from this quarter might have been expected to have diminished or disappeared after two generations of a strong and peaceful government, that Mauretania was once more made into a province. [55]

[111]

With this brief list of parallels and precedents to the German frontier policy which we have ascribed to Augustus, we hope to have shown that there was no striking innovation involved therein, nothing really beyond the range of the expedients and experiences of an ancient statesman. In thus attributing to Augustus in Germany a policy bearing so modern a designation as that of the “buffer state”, we feel convinced that we are not modernizing the ancients, but only recognizing how very ancient some of our supposedly modern expedients of statesmanship in reality are.

[112]

CHAPTER IV, NOTE 16

Of course this assumes that Aliso was at Haltern, which is far from being well established (see below). Even Oberaden is not so very much farther away from the Rhine, but it seems not to have been occupied any great number of years, as Aliso certainly was. Koepp’s remark ( Die Römer in Deutschland , p. 102) that the extent of the fortifications at Aliso sets a minimum figure for the number of the troops that occupied it permanently, seems to be the reverse of probability. The camp was more likely laid out on a large scale so as to be able to hold the largest army that might be expected to operate in that region on its way forward and back, as well as great quantities of war supplies, but the actual number of troops which held the fort year in and year out was probably very small, since our literary sources are unanimous in representing the left bank of the Rhine as the permanent headquarters of the army. As for the camp at Oberaden, it has yet to be proved that it was occupied in force throughout the winter, as Koepp ( loc. cit. ) believes, and so accuses Velleius of an outright falsehood in a plain statement of fact, where he must have known better. Certainly its size does not prove this, as it might not have been occupied at full capacity all the time; nor does the ornamentation of certain wall posts upon which Koepp lays such stress. That beams were artistically shaped shows merely that the builders had plenty of time in which to do their work, or else loved a bit of ornamentation, not that whole armies wintered in these quarters. The probability is that if occupied at all during the winter, it was held by only a small body of troops. Finally, if it could be shown that it was occupied during the winter, is it impossible that this may have been one of the camps of Tiberius, who wintered once in Germany? Can the archaeologist really date a structure like a camp within a limit of 15 years (only 13 years separated Drusus’ death from Tiberius’ winter in Germany), in the case of a simple construction, whose general plan never varied greatly, and without the evidence of superposition and modification of structure? That a thing is “Augustan” may well be asserted; to claim that a fortification belongs to Drusus, and not to Tiberius, is perhaps going too far, particularly when one must reject utterly the literary evidence in order to do so. Koepp is at pains to insist upon this matter of permanent occupation, because, as he rightly observes, “ein grosses Land schwerlich erobert werden kann, wenn der Eroberer alljährlich bis zu seinem Ausgangspunkt zurückgeht, und nicht vielmehr einen von Jahr zu J [114] ahr wachsenden Gebietsteil besetzt hält.” But even if one granted that Oberaden is Drusus’ first fort and Haltern a later or contemporary establishment (as Kropatschek, and Koepp, p. 20, believe), nothing is gained regarding an ever advancing limit of possession, for Haltern is nearer the Rhine than Oberaden. In order to prove that the Romans were actually moving forward in this systematic fashion, as indeed they must have done, if conquest was their purpose, one would have to be able to show not two neighboring camps of the same period, but a whole series of advancing forts, the later situated ever farther inland than the earlier. This has not been done, and one is inclined to doubt greatly if it ever can be.——Delbrück’s arguments against Haltern or Oberaden as Aliso ( Gesch. d. Kriegskunst , 2nd ed., II, pp. 131-150) seem very convincing, but there are also grave difficulties in the way of setting Aliso near Paderborn. However, no matter in which place Aliso be located, the upper or the lower Lippe, our argument is not affected, for though the location near Paderborn is far inland, and, if held in great force, must have overawed the surrounding tribes, it is perfectly clear from Delbrück’s arguments (pp. 48-50, 130 ff.) that Aliso was never a “Zwingburg”, but only a center for munitions and supplies, probably as small as it could possibly have been made for easy defense. He has well emphasized the fallacy of parcelling out an army in fortresses so long as there remains a hostile force in the field. The point we wish to make, however, is that, if the whole country was subdued, or even any substantial portion thereof, it must have been necessary to move forward the legions into great permanent fortresses either in its midst, or on its farther borders, and that this was never done in Germany; the few castella of which we hear were certainly not far extended points held in full force by an army of permanent occupation.——We have hitherto paid no attention to the statement of Florus that “Drusus castella ubique disposuit per Mosam flumen, per Albin, per Visurgin” (II, 30, 26). Of course no one accepts this as being in any sense literally true of the Elbe and the Weser (cf. Abraham, Zur Gesch. d. germ, u. pannon. Kriege , etc., p. 4) and there is grave doubt even of the correctness of the statement regarding the “quinquaginta amplius castella”, that Drusus is supposed to have built along the Rhine (cf. Hübner, Römische Herrschaft , p. 110). So much however is clear, that the Romans did make a serious effort to pacify and control the coast, and castella may very well have been located at or near the mouth of the Weser and the Elbe (cf. Delbrück, op. cit. , p. 51). The strategical value of such naval bases has already been pointed out (above, p. 51); their commercial significance is quite as great. Ancient commerce was, whenever possible, water-borne. With Germany, in the absence of even tolerable roads, it must have been almost wholly so. A close parallel is furnished by the conditions which prevailed in the American Middle West during the period of French occupation and even later. For the Roman trade with Germany see K. T. von Inama-Sternegg, Deutsche [115] Wirtschaftsgeschichte , 2nd ed., Leipzig, 1909, I, p. 229 ff., a good though somewhat cursory summary, with references to the literature. The very carefully worded official statement of Augustus regarding the results of his activities in Germany, mentions this feature, and it alone, as a solid achievement: “Gallias et Hispanias provincias et Germaniam qua includit oceanus a Gadibus ad ostium Albis fluminis pacavi” (c. 26). “Pacavi” seems to be chosen in order to indicate that peaceful commercial enterprises had been made possible.

CHAPTER IV, NOTE 49

[For the following important note upon Palestine, and especially Judah, as a “buffer state”, I am indebted to my friend Professor F. C. Eiselen, who writes me the following under date of May 5, 1915. W. A. O.]: “The two great world powers in antiquity were Babylonia-Assyria on the one hand and Egypt on the other; only for a short time did the Hittites and the people of Urartu play a very important rôle in the ancient history of Western Asia. Between them lay Syria-Palestine; hence if we look for buffer states in antiquity we might expect to find them in that region. Now the strategical position of Syria-Palestine in relation to these two great powers has long been recognized, but historians do not seem to have considered it from the standpoint of buffer states, but more from the standpoint of a bone of contention, or the mixed character of its population and civilization, or the opportunity of exerting an influence in all directions” (E. Meyer, Geschichte des Altertums , zweite Auflage, I, 2, pp. 602 ff.). It is rather strange that the other question has received so little attention, but such is the case: while there are more or less indirect suggestions of such a situation, the idea of buffer states receives very little consideration. No doubt Klamroth is right in saying that the establishment of buffer states was not foreign to Assyrian policy. At any rate the line in the inscription of Tiglath-Pileser IV, to which he refers (II Rawlinson, 67) may well be interpreted as implying such a policy on the part of this ruler. It is translated by E. Schrader ( Keilinschriftliche Bibliothek , II, p. 21) as follows: “Den (Stamm) Idibi-il machte ich zur Grenzwacht gegen Egypten”; similarly by A. S. Strong ( Records of the Past, New Series , V, p. 125): “Idibi-ili as a watch over (against) Egypt I appointed.” (Cf. also the establishment of a Phoenician province by Tiglath-Pileser under the rule of his own son, to hold together the states along the Mediterranean, Hugo Winckler, Altorientalische Forschungen , II, p. 4; cf. p. 67). The interpretation by Rogers of the significance of Gaza and other Philistine cities [i. e. as possible buffer states for Egypt against the Assyrian] is undoubtedly quite correct. The relation of Israel and Judah and Assyria as reflected especially in 2 Kings 15-25, suggests that the Egyptians also considered Syria-Palestine in the nat [116] ure of a buffer state. In describing the policy of Egypt during the eighth century J. H. Breasted uses these words—applicable also in other centuries: “Unable to oppose the formidable armies of Assyria, the petty kinglets of Egypt constantly fomented discontent and revolt among the Syro-Palestinian states in order, if possible, to create a fringe of buffer states between them and the Assyrian” ( A History of Egypt , p. 549). The Egyptians succeeded in stirring up Hezekiah of Judah (Isa. 28-30), whereupon Sennacherib came, severely punishing the rebel (2 Kings 18, 19; Isa. 26, 37). May it not be that the transfer of some of Hezekiah’s territory to Ashdod, Ekron, and Gaza was for the purpose of maintaining or intensifying the good will of these buffer states? ( Taylor Cylinder III, lines 1-26; Lehmann-Haupt, Israel , p. 122). The later history of Judah may be interpreted on the same principle. The rapid advance of Necoh against Assyria through the territory of Judah (2 Kings 22:28, 29) resembles the rapid advance of the Germans against the French, through the territory of Belgium; Nebuchadnezzar cannot afford to lose such a valuable buffer state (2 Kings 24:1); and after the revolt and destruction of Judah, he still attempts to maintain a state under Gedaliah (2 Kings 25:22). The restored community, after the exile, served as a buffer state between Persia and Egypt. Six years ago I wrote regarding the attitude of Cyrus toward the Jews: “A clash with Egypt was inevitable; hence it was to the interest of Cyrus to have on the Egyptian border a state that was bound to him by the strongest ties of gratitude, and upon the fidelity of which he could rely” ( Prophecy and the Prophets , pp. 246, 247). Regarding the general policy of Cyrus see E. Schrader, Keilinschriften und das alte Testament , dritte Auflage, p. 115; L. W. Batten, Ezra and Nehemiah , p. 35. A similar situation continued to exist in later ages.”

Addendum (p. 87)

Perhaps the best ancient statement regarding the workings of Roman diplomacy with both friendly and hostile tribes beyond the Rhine is in Flavius Vopiscus, Probus , ch. 14 and 15, especially the succinct report of Probus himself to the senate (15, 2): “Omnes iam barbari vobis arant, vobis iam serunt et contra interiores gentes militant”. Though the period is late this is the same policy as that inaugurated by Augustus, perfected by Tiberius, and maintained doubtless by all the abler emperors.

• Agrippa, 65 f. , 74 .
• Alexander, 108 f.
• Aliso, 89 , Appendix, Chapter IV, n. 16.
• Arabia, 106 .
• Ariovistus, Chapter IV, n. 8 .
• Armenia, 83 , 109 f.
• Arminius, 10 , 13 , 17 , 47 ;
• in literature, Chapter I, n. 38 ;
• eulogized by Tacitus, 30 ff.
• Augustus: attempt of to subdue Germany, 9 f. , 27 ;
• refutation of this view—summary, 80 ;
• worship of, Chapter I, n. 11 ; p. 75 ;
• opposed to expansion by conquest, 12 f. , 57 ;
• purpose of operations in Germany, 18 , 57 ;
• protection of Gaul and Italy by him a military and political necessity, 18 , 63 f. , 66 ;
• character of, 54 f. ;
• policy one of peace, 60 ff. ;
• influenced by military leaders, 65 f. ;
• influenced by political considerations, 67 ff.
• Auxilia , 39 , 41 .
• Borma, Chapter IV, notes 8 and 22 .
• Buffer states: general policy of, 85 , 105 ff. ;
• historic examples of, 105 ff.
• Caesar, 10 , 27 f. , 55 ;
• in Britain and Germany, 106 .
• Causarum patroni , 96 ff. , Chapter IV, n. 34 .
• Commerce in Germany, 92 , Chapter IV, n. 15 , Appendix, Chapter IV, n. 16 .
• Dacia, 107 .
• Dio, 21 f. , 56 , Chapter IV, n. 29 ;
• p. 99 ff. ;
• his description of battle contradicted by Tacitus, 25 f.
• Drusus and Tiberius: campaigns of, 12 , Chapter IV, n. 23 ;
• influence of on Augustus, 65 f.
• Elbe, the, as frontier, 9 f. , 11 ff. , 65 , 75 .
• Empires, ancient world, relations of to barbarians, 82 ff.
• Engineering works, 92 ff.
• Ethiopia, 107 .
• Fleet, 41 , 51 , Appendix, Chapter IV, n. 16.
• Flevum, 90 .
• Florus, 23 ff. , 27 f. , 75 , 96 , 100 , Chapter IV, n. 29 .
• Forts, Chapter IV, n. 26 ; p. 110 , 104 , Appendix, Chapter IV, n. 16.
• Frontiers: Armenia, 83 ;
• Rhine, 83 ;
• rivers, Chapter IV, n. 4 ;
• western, Chapter IV, n. 8 .
• [118] Germanicus, campaigns of, 30 f. , 50 , 53 , 104 .
• Germans, attacks and provocations of against Rome, 63 f. , 102 f.
• Germany, attempted subjugation of, 9 ff. , 27 f. ;
• anomaly of “conquest”, 77 , 89 ff. , 94 f. ;
• not made a Roman province, Chapter I, n. 11 ; p. 70 ff. ; 76 ff. ;
• physical conditions of, 41 , 51 ;
• military forces of, 46 , 49 f. ;
• military operations in, 87 ff.
• German campaigns, strategy of, 42 , 51 , 88 f. ;
• defensive character of, 102 ff.
• Legions: number of, 36 f. , 41 ;
• composition of, 38 ff. , Chapter III, n. 11 ;
• size of standing army, 41 ff. ;
• percentage of population in army, 41 ;
• size of Rhine army, Chapter IV, n. 54 .
• See also Auxilia .
• Maroboduus, 46 , 47 , 50 , 103 f.
• Mauretania, 110 .
• Military roads, 92 f.
• Monumentum Ancyranum , Chapter III, n. 67 ; p. 61 ff. , Chapter III, n. 108 .
• Mount Taunus, fort, 90 , Chapter IV, notes 17 and 36 .
• Palestine, 108 ff. , Appendix, Chapter IV, n. 49.
• Population: of Roman empire, 39 , 41 ;
• of Germany, 44 f. ;
• of Gaul, 47 f.
• Posidonius: on population of Gaul, 47 f.
• Rhine, as frontier, 9 ff. , 83 ff.
• Rome: general forces of, 49 f. , 50 ff. , 54 ;
• alleged desire for war on part of soldiers and citizens, 67 ff. ;
• alleged change of policy toward Germany, 79 f. ;
• general frontiers of, 83 ff. ;
• diplomacy of in Germany, 85 ff.
• See also Population .
• Saguntum, 109 .
• Sources: rhetorical character of, 17 , Chapter I, n. 11 ; p. 22 , 24 , 34 , 96 , 101 ;
• general account of, 21 ff. ;
• contradictions between, 24 ff. , Chapter IV, n. 29 .
• Sparta, 108 .
• Tacitus, 21 , 24 , Chapter III, n. 68 ;
• contradicted by Dio, 25 f. ;
• his eulogy of Arminius, 30 ;
• criticism of eulogy, 34 .
• Teutoburger forest: battle of and consequences, 12 ff. , 36 f. , 52 , 77 , 81 ;
• numbers in battle of, 35 ff.
• See also Varus .
• Tiberius: at Rhodes, Chapter I, n. 11 ;
• his recall of Germanicus, 33 f. , Chapter I, n. 43 ;
• operations of in Germany, 53 , 74 f. , 87 , 91 ;
• estrangement from Augustus, 77 ;
• Character of, 78 f.
• Tribute, 97 ff.
• Varus: defeat of, 9 ff. , 58 ;
• circumstances of defeat, 24 ff. , 35 f. ;
• relation to Augustus, 75 f. ;
• character of, 95 , Chapter IV, n. 29 ;
• conduct and policy of, 96 ff. , 102 .
• See also Teutoburger forest .
• Velleius, 21 f. , 25 , 29 , 53 , 74 , 101 , Chapter IV, n. 29 .