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Title: History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 3 Author: William Francis Patrick Napier Release date: May 27, 2022 [eBook #68187] Language: English Original publication: United Kingdom: Thomas & William Boone Credits: Brian Coe, John Campbell and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.) *** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE PENINSULA AND IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR 1814, VOL. 3 *** TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE Italic text is denoted by _underscores_. A superscript is denoted by ^x or ^{xx}, for example Nov^r or 5^{th}. Omitted text is indicated by four asterisks, * * * *. All changes noted in the ERRATA have been applied to the etext. Footnote anchors are denoted by [number], and the footnotes have been placed at the end of the book. Several Sidenotes have the abbreviation S. As in other volumes, this stands for Soult. With a few exceptions noted at the end of the book, variant spellings of names have not been changed. The tables in this book are best viewed using a monospace font. Minor changes to the text are noted at the end of the book. Volume 1 of this series can be found at https://sendtokindle.compellingsciencefiction.com/ebooks/67318 Volume 2 of this series can be found at https://sendtokindle.compellingsciencefiction.com/ebooks/67554 HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE PENINSULA AND IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE, FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR 1814. BY W. F. P. NAPIER, C.B. COLONEL H. P. FORTY-THIRD REGIMENT, AND MEMBER OF THE ROYAL SWEDISH ACADEMY OF MILITARY SCIENCES. VOL. III. LONDON: THOMAS & WILLIAM BOONE, NEW BOND-STREET. MDCCCXXXI. TABLE OF CONTENTS. BOOK IX. CHAPTER I. Inactivity of the Asturians and Gallicians--Guerilla system in Navarre and Aragon--The Partidas surround the third corps--Blake abandons Aragon--Suchet’s operations against the Partidas--Combat of Tremendal--The advantages of Suchet’s position--Troubles at Pampeluna--Suchet ordered by Napoleon to repair there--Observations on the Guerilla system _Page_ 1 CHAPTER II. Continuation of the operations in Catalonia--St. Cyr sends Lecchi to the Ampurdan; he returns with the intelligence of the Austrian war--Of Verdier’s arrival in the Ampurdan, and of Augereau’s appointment to the command of the seventh corps--Augereau’s inflated proclamation--It is torn down by the Catalonians--He remains sick at Perpignan--St. Cyr continues to command--Refuses to obey Joseph’s orders to remove into Aragon--Presses Verdier to commence the siege of Gerona--Reinforces Verdier--Remains himself at Vich--Constancy of the Spaniards--St. Cyr marches from Vich, defeats three Spanish battalions, and captures a convoy--Storms St. Felieu de Quixols--Takes a position to cover Verdier’s operations--Siege of Gerona--State of the contending parties--Assault of Monjouic fails--General Fontanes storms Palamos--Wimphen and the Milans make a vain attempt to throw succours into Gerona--Monjouic abandoned 17 CHAPTER III. Claros and Rovira attack Bascara and spread dismay along the French frontier--Two Spanish officers pass the Ter and enter Gerona with succours--Alvarez remonstrates with the junta of Catalonia--Bad conduct of the latter--Blake advances to the aid of the city--Pestilence there affects the French army--St. Cyr’s firmness--Blake’s timid operations--O’Donnel fights Souham, but without success--St. Cyr takes a position of battle--Garcia Conde forces the French lines and introduces a convoy into Gerona--Blake retires--Siege resumed--Garcia Conde comes out of the city--Ridiculous error of the French--Conde forces the French lines and escapes--Assault on Gerona fails--Blake advances a second time--Sends another convoy under the command of O’Donnel to the city--O’Donnel with the head of the convoy succeeds, the remainder is cut off--Blake’s incapacity--He retires--St. Cyr goes to Perpignan--Augereau takes the command of the siege--O’Donnel breaks through the French lines--Blake advances a third time--Is beaten by Souham--Pino takes Hostalrich--Admiral Martin intercepts a French squadron--Captain Hallowell destroys a convoy in Rosas-bay--Distress in Gerona--Alvarez is seized with delirium, and the city surrenders--Observations 31 CHAPTER IV. Plot at Seville against the Supreme Junta defeated by lord Wellesley--Junta propose a new form of government--Opposed by Romana--Junta announce the convocation of the national Cortez, but endeavour to deceive the people--A Spanish army assembled in the Morena under Eguia--Bassecour sends cavalry to reinforce Del Parque, who concentrates the Spanish army of the left at Ciudad Rodrigo--He is joined by the Gallician divisions--Santocildes occupies Astorga--French endeavour to surprise him, but are repulsed--Ballasteros quits the Asturias and marching by Astorga attempts to storm Zamora--Enters Portugal--Del Parque demands the aid of the Portuguese army--Sir A. Wellesley refuses, giving his reason in detail--Del Parque’s operations--Battle of Tamames--Del Parque occupies Salamanca, but hearing that French troops were assembling at Valladolid retires to Bejar 55 CHAPTER V. Areizaga takes the command of Equia’s army and is ordered to advance against Madrid--Folly of the Supreme Junta--Operations in La Mancha--Combat of Dos Barrios--Cavalry combat of Ocaña--Battle of Ocaña--Destruction of the Spanish army 67 CHAPTER VI. King Joseph’s return to Madrid--Del Parque’s operations--Battle of Alba de Tormes--Dispersion of the Spanish troops--Their great sufferings and patience--The Supreme Junta treat sir A. Wellesley’s counsels with contempt--He breaks up from the Guadiana and moves to the Mondego--Vindication of his conduct for having remained so long on the Guadiana--French remain torpid about Madrid--Observations 86 BOOK X. CHAPTER I. Joseph prepares to invade Andalusia--Distracted state of affairs in that province--Military position and resources described--Invasion of Andalusia--Passes of the Morena forced by the French--Foolish deceit of the Supreme Junta--Tumult in Seville--Supreme Junta dissolved--Junta of Seville re-assembles, but disperses immediately after--The French take Jaen--Sebastiani enters Grenada--King Joseph enters Cordoba and afterwards marches against Seville--Albuquerque’s march to Cadiz--Seville surrenders--Insurrection at Malaga put down by Sebastiani--Victor invests Cadiz--Faction in that city--Mortier marches against Badajos--The visconde de Gand flies to Ayamonte--Inhospitable conduct of the bishop of Algarve 101 CHAPTER II. Operations in Navarre, Aragon, and Valencia--Pursuit of the student Mina--Suchet’s preparations--His incursion against Valencia--Returns to Aragon--Difficulty of the war in Catalonia--Operations of the seventh corps--French detachments surprised at Mollet and San Perpetua--Augereau enters Barcelona--Sends Duhesme to France--Returns to Gerona--O’Donnel rallies the Spanish army near Centellas--Combat of Vich--Spaniards make vain efforts to raise the blockade of Hostalrich--Augereau again advances to Barcelona--Sends two divisions to Reus--Occupies Manreza and Villa Franca--French troops defeated at Villa Franca and Esparaguera--Swartz abandons Manreza--Is defeated at Savadel--Colonel Villatte communicates with the third corps by Falcet--Severolli retreats from Reus to Villa Franca--Is harassed on the march--Augereau’s unskilful conduct--Hostalrich falls--Gallant exploit of the governor, Julian Estrada--Cruelty of Augereau 124 CHAPTER III. Suchet marches against Lerida--Description of that fortress--Suchet marches to Tarega--O’Donnel advances from Taragona--Suchet returns to Balaguer--Combat of Margalef--Siege of Lerida--The city stormed--Suchet drives the inhabitants into the citadel and thus forces it to surrender 144 CHAPTER IV. Reflections on that act--Lazan enters Alcanitz, but is driven out by the French--Colonel Petit taken with a convoy by Villa Campa, and assassinated after the action--Siege of Mequinenza--Fall of that place--Morella taken--Suchet prepares to enter Catalonia--Strength and resources of that province 158 CHAPTER V. Operations in Andalusia--Blockade of Cadiz--Dissentions in that city--Regency formed--Albuquerque sent to England--Dies there--Regency consent to admit British troops--General Colin Campbell obtains leave to put a garrison in Ceuta, and to destroy the Spanish lines at San Roque--General William Stewart arrives at Cadiz--Seizes Matagorda--Tempest destroys many vessels--Mr. Henry Wellesley and general Graham arrive at Cadiz--Apathy of the Spaniards--Gallant defence of Matagorda--Heroic conduct of a sergeant’s wife--General Campbell sends a detachment to occupy Tarifa--French prisoners cut the cables of the prison-hulks, and drift during a tempest--General Lacey’s expedition to the Ronda--His bad conduct--Returns to Cadiz--Reflections on the state of affairs 169 CHAPTER VI. Continuation of the operations in Andalusia--Description of the Spanish and Portuguese lines of position south of the Tagus--Situation of the armies in Estremadura--Complex operations in that province--Soult’s policy 188 CHAPTER VII. Situation of the armies north of the Tagus--Operations in Old Castile and the Asturias--Ney menaces Ciudad Rodrigo--Loison repulsed from Astorga--Kellerman chases Carrera from the Gata mountains--Obscurity of the French projects--Siege of Astorga--Mahi driven into Gallicia--Spaniards defeated at Mombouey--Ney concentrates the sixth corps at Salamanca--The ninth corps and the imperial guards enter Spain--Massena assumes the command of the army of Portugal and of the northern provinces--Ney commences the first siege of Ciudad Rodrigo--Julian Sanchez breaks out of the town--Massena arrives and alters the plan of attack--Daring action of three French soldiers--Place surrenders--Andreas Herrasti--His fine conduct--Reflections upon the Spanish character 201 BOOK XI. CHAPTER I. Lord Wellington’s policy--Change of administration in England--Duel between lord Castlereagh and Mr. Canning--Lord Wellesley joins the new ministry--Debates in Parliament--Factious violence on both sides--Lord Wellington’s sagacity and firmness vindicated--His views for the defence of Portugal--Ministers accede to his demands--Grandeur of Napoleon’s designs against the Peninsula--Lord Wellington enters into fresh explanation with the English ministers--Discusses the state of the war--Similarity of his views with those of sir John Moore--His reasons for not advancing into Spain explained and vindicated 215 CHAPTER II. Greatness of lord Wellington’s plans--Situation of the belligerents described--State of the French--Character of Joseph--Of his Ministers--Disputes with the Marshals--Napoleon’s policy--Military governments--Almenara sent to Paris--Curious deception executed by the marquis of Romana, Mr. Stuart, and the historian Cabanes--Prodigious force of the French army--State of Spain--Inertness of Gallicia--Secret plan of the Regency for encouraging the Guerillas--Operations of those bands--Injustice and absurdity of the Regency, with respect to South America--England--State of parties--Factious injustice on both sides--Difficulty of raising money--Bullion committee--Wm. Cobbett--Lord King--Mr. Vansittart--Extravagance of the Ministers--State of Portugal--Parties in that country--Intrigues of the Patriarch and the Souza’s--Mr. Stuart is appointed Plenipotentiary--His firmness--Princess Carlotta claims the regency of the whole Peninsula, and the succession to the throne of Spain 234 CHAPTER III. Lord Wellington’s scheme for the defence of Portugal--Vastness of his designs--Number of his troops--Description of the country--Plan of defence analysed--Difficulty of supplying the army--Resources of the belligerents compared--Character of the British soldier 254 CHAPTER IV. Character of Miguel Alava--Portuguese government demand more English troops--Lord Wellington refuses, and reproaches the Regency--The factious conduct of the latter--Character of the light division--General Crawfurd passed the Coa--His activity and skilful arrangements--Is joined by Carrera--Skirmish at Barba del Puerco--Carrera invites Ney to desert--Romana arrives at head-quarters--Lord Wellington refuses to succour Ciudad Rodrigo--His decision vindicated--Crawfurd’s ability and obstinacy--He maintains his position--Skirmish at Alameda--Captain Kraükenberg’s gallantry--Skirmish at Villa de Puerco--Colonel Talbot killed--Gallantry of the French captain Guache--Combat of the Coa--Comparison between general Picton and general Crawfurd 273 CHAPTER V. Slight operations in Gallicia, Castile, the Asturias, Estremadura, and Andalusia--Reynier passes the Tagus--Hill makes a parallel movement--Romana spreads his troops over Estremadura--Lord Wellington assembles a reserve at Thomar--Critical situation of Silveira--Captures a Swiss battalion at Puebla de Senabria--Romana’s troops defeated at Benvenida--Lascy and captain Cockburne land troops at Moguer but are forced to reimbark--Lord Wellington’s plan--How thwarted--Siege of Almeida--Allies advance to Frexadas--The magazine of Almeida explodes--Treachery of Bareiros--Town surrenders--The allies withdraw behind the Mondego--Fort of Albuquerque ruined by an explosion--Reynier marches on Sabugal, but returns to Zarza Mayor--Napoleon directs Massena to advance--Description of the country--Erroneous notions of lord Wellington’s views entertained by both armies 296 CHAPTER VI. Third Invasion of Portugal--Napoleon’s prudence in military affairs vindicated--Massena concentrated his corps--Occupies Guarda--Passes the Mondego--Marches on Viseu--Lord Wellington falls back--Secures Coimbra, passes to the right bank of the Mondego, and is joined by the reserve from Thomar--General Hill anticipates his orders, and by a forced march reaches the Alva--The allied army is thus interposed between the French and Coimbra--Daring action of colonel Trant--Contemporaneous events in Estremadura, and the Condado de Niebla--Romana defeated--Gallantry of the Portuguese cavalry under general Madden--Dangerous crisis of affairs--Violence of the Souza faction--An indiscreet letter from an English officer, creates great confusion at Oporto--Lord Wellington rebukes the Portuguese Regency--He is forced to alter his plans, and resolves to offer battle--Chooses the position of Busaco 312 CHAPTER VII. General Pack destroys the bridges on the Criz and Dao--Remarkable panic in the light division--The second and sixth corps arrive in front of Busaco--Ney and Regnier desire to attack, but Massena delays--The eighth corps and the cavalry arrive--Battle of Busaco--Massena turns the right of the allies--Lord Wellington falls back, and orders the northern militia to close on the French rear--Cavalry skirmish on the Mondego--Coimbra evacuated, dreadful scene there--Disorders in the army--Lord Wellington’s firmness contrasted with Massena’s indolence--Observations 325 CHAPTER VIII. Massena resumes his march--The militia close upon his rear--Cavalry skirmish near Leiria--Allies retreat upon the lines--Colonel Trant surprises Coimbra--The French army continues its march--Cavalry skirmish at Rio Mayor--General Crawfurd is surprised at Alemquer and retreats by the wrong road--Dangerous results of this error--Description of the lines of Torres Vedras--Massena arrives in front of them--Romana reinforces Lord Wellington with two Spanish divisions--Remarkable works executed by the light division at Aruda--The French skirmish at Sobral--General Harvey wounded--General St. Croix killed--Massena takes a permanent position in front of the Lines--He is harassed on the rear and flanks by the British cavalry and the Portuguese militia 340 CHAPTER IX. State of Lisbon--Embargo on the vessels in the river--Factious conduct of the Patriarch--The desponding letters from the army--Alarm--Lord Liverpool--Lord Wellington displays the greatest firmness, vigour, and dignity, of mind--He rebukes the Portuguese Regency, and exposes the duplicity and presumption of the Patriarch’s faction--Violence of this faction--Curious revelation made by Baron Eben and the editor of the Brazilienza--Lord Wellesley awes the Court of Rio Janeiro--Strengthens the authority of Lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart--The French seize the Islands in the river--Foolish conduct of the governor of Setuval--General Fane sent to the left bank of the Tagus--Lord Wellington’s embarrassments become more serious--The heights of Almada fortified--Violent altercation of the Regency upon this subject--The Patriarch insults Mr. Stuart and nearly ruins the common cause 364 CHAPTER X. Massena’s pertinacity--He collects boats on the Tagus, and establishes a depôt at Santarem--Sends general Foy to Paris--Casts a bridge over the Zezere--Abandons his position in front of the Lines--Is followed by lord Wellington--Exploit of serjeant Baxter--Massena assumes the position of Santarem--Lord Wellington sends general Hill across the Tagus--Prepares to attack the French--Abandons this design and assumes a permanent position--Policy of the hostile generals exposed--General Gardanne arrives at Cardigos with a convoy, but retreats again--The French marauders spread to the Mondego--Lord Wellington demands reinforcements--Beresford takes the command on the left of the Tagus--Operations of the militia in Beira--General Drouet enters Portugal with the ninth corps--Joins Massena at Espinhal--Occupies Leiria--Claparede defeats Silveira and takes Lamego--Returns to the Mondego--Seizes Guarda and Covilhao--Foy returns from France--The duke of Abrantes wounded in a skirmish at Rio Mayor--General Pamplona organizes a secret communication with Lisbon--Observations 377 BOOK XII. CHAPTER I. General sketch of the state of the war--Lord Wellington objects to maritime operations--Expedition to Fuengirola--Minor operations in Andalusia--National Cortez assemble in the Isla de Leon--Its proceedings--New regency chosen--Factions described--Violence of all parties--Unjust treatment of the colonies 402 CHAPTER II. Soult assumes the direction of the blockade of Cadiz--His flotilla--Enters the Troccadero canal--Villantroys, or cannon-mortars, employed by the French--Inactivity of the Spaniards--Napoleon directs Soult to aid Massena--Has some notion of evacuating Andalusia--Soult’s first expedition to Estremadura--Carries the bridge of Merida--Besieges Olivenza--Ballasteros defeated at Castellejos--Flies into Portugal--Romana’s divisions march from Cartaxo to the succour of Olivenza--That place surrenders--Romana dies--His character--Lord Wellington’s counsels neglected by the Spanish generals--First siege of Badajos--Mendizabel arrives--Files the Spanish army into Badajos--Makes a grand sally--Is driven back with loss--Pitches his camp round San Christoval--Battle of the Gebora--Continuation of the blockade of Cadiz--Expedition of the allies under general Lapeña--Battle of Barosa--Factions in Cadiz 421 CHAPTER III. Siege of Badajos continued--Imas surrenders--His cowardice and treachery--Albuquerque and Valencia de Alcantara taken by the French--Soult returns to Andalusia--Relative state of the armies at Santarem--Retreat of the French--Massena’s able movement--Skirmish at Pombal--Combat of Redinha--Massena halts at Condeixa--Montbrun endeavours to seize Coimbra--Baffled by colonel Trant--Condeixa burnt by the French--Combat of Casal Nova--General Cole turns the French at Panella--Combat of Foz d’Aronce--Massena retires behind the Alva 450 CHAPTER IV. Allies halt for provisions--State of the campaign--Passage of the Ceira--Passage of the Alva--Massena retires to Celerico--Resolves to march upon Coria--Is prevented by Ney, who is deprived of his command and sent to France--Massena abandons Celerico and takes post at Guarda--The allies oblige the French to quit that position, and Massena takes a new one behind the Coa--Combat of Sabugal--Trant crosses the Coa and cuts the communication between Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo--His danger--He is released by the British cavalry and artillery--Massena abandons Portugal 473 CHAPTER V. Estimate of the French loss--Anecdote of Colonel Waters--Lord Wellington’s great conceptions explained--How impeded--Affairs in the south of Spain--Formation of the fourth and fifth Spanish armies--Siege of Campo Mayor--Place falls--Excellent conduct of major Tallaia--Beresford surprises Montbrun--Combat of cavalry--Campo Mayor recovered--Beresford takes cantonments round Elvas--His difficulties--Reflections upon his proceedings--He throws a bridge near Jerumenha and passes the Guadiana--Outposts of cavalry cut off by the French--Castaños arrives at Elvas--Arrangements relative to the chief command--Beresford advances against Latour Maubourg, who returns to Llerena--General Cole takes Olivenza--Cavalry skirmish near Usagre--Lord Wellington arrives at Elvas, examines Badajos--Skirmish there--Arranges the operations--Political difficulties--Lord Wellington returns to the Agueda--Operations in the north--Skirmishes on the Agueda--Massena advances to Ciudad Rodrigo--Lord Wellington reaches the army--Retires behind the Dos Casas--Combat of Fuentes Onoro--Battle of Fuentes Onoro--Evacuation of Almeida 489 CHAPTER VI. Lord Wellington quits the army of Beira--Marshal Beresford’s operations--Colonel Colborne’s beats up the French quarters in Estremadura, and intercepts their convoys--First English siege of Badajos--Captain Squires breaks ground before San Cristoval--His works overwhelmed by the French fire--Soult advances to relieve the place--Beresford raises the siege--Holds a conference with the Spanish generals, and resolves to fight--Colonel Colborne rejoins the army, which takes a position at Albuera--Allied cavalry driven in by the French--General Blake joins Beresford--General Cole arrives on the frontier--Battle of Albuera 523 CHAPTER VII. Continuation of the battle of Albuera--Dreadful state of both armies--Soult retreats to Solano--General Hamilton resumes the investment of Badajos--Lord Wellington reaches the field of battle--Third and seventh divisions arrive--Beresford follows Soult--The latter abandons the castle of Villalba and retreats to Llerena--Cavalry action at Usagre--Beresford quits the army--General Hill reassumes the command of the second division, and lord Wellington renews the siege of Badajos.--Observations 542 _Papers relating to the former volumes._ I. Letter from major-general F. Ponsonby 559 II. Note upon the situation of Spain in 1808, dictated by Napoleon 560 APPENDIX. No. I. Returns of the French army in the Peninsula, extracted from the French muster-rolls 567 No. II. Extracts of letters from lord Wellington to lord Liverpool, and one from sir John Moore to major-general M’Kenzie, commanding in Portugal 573 No. III. Extracts from the correspondence of a field-officer of engineers, employed at Cadiz, and extracts from the official abstract of military reports from the British commanders at Cadiz 580 No. IV. Extracts from king Joseph’s correspondence 583 No. V. Extracts of letters from lord Wellington 586 No. VI. Extracts from a report made by the duke of Dalmatia to the prince of Wagram and Neufchatel 603 Intercepted letter from marshal Mortier to the emperor 607 No. VII. Miscellaneous correspondence of the French marshals and others, and extracts from general Pelet’s journal 607 No. VIII. The French officers, prisoners of war at Oporto, to general Trant 623 No. IX. A letter from lieutenant-general Graham to the right hon. H. Wellesley, and state of the troops at Tarifa, under his command 624 Extract of a letter from general Frederick Ponsonby, and various other documents 629 No. X. Extracts from the correspondence of captain Squires, of the engineers 638 No. XI. Extract of a letter from general Campbell to lord Melville 639 ERRATA. Page 10, line 6, _for_ “Caspe secured the communication between the wings of the third corps and Fraga, and its wooden bridge, &c.” _read_ “Caspe secured the communication between the wings of the third corps, while Fraga and its wooden bridge, &c.” .. 14, .. last, _for_ “absolutely” _read_ “absolute.” .. 71, .. 16, _for_ “Bulluno” _read_ “Belluno.” .. 91, .. 20, _for_ “thousend” _read_ “thousand.” .. 139, margin, _for_ “Istoria militaire degl’Italiano” _read_ “Istoria militáre degl’Italiani.” .. 143, .. 10, _for_ “Augereau’s” _read_ “Augereau.” .. 194, .. 3 from bottom, _for_ “marched” _read_ “march.” .. 216, .. 15, _for_ “fitting, out &c.” _read_ “fitting out, &c.” .. 219, .. 6 from bottom, _for_ “even that in case” _read_ “even in that case.” .. 249, .. 3, _for_ “denied” _read_ “desired.” .. 278, .. 14 from bottom, _for_ “him” _read_ “he.” .. 304, .. 10 from bottom, _for_ “amounted” _read_ “mounted.” .. 306, .. 11 from bottom, _for_ “only” _read_ “principal.” .. 319, .. 23, _for_ “severally” _read_ “several.” .. 382, .. 6, _for_ “where” _read_ “there.” .. 392, .. 5, _for_ “right bank” _read_ “left bank.” .. 417, .. 4, _for_ “latter” _read_ “Cortes.” .. 431, .. 17, _for_ “besieged” _read_ “besiegers.” .. 443, .. 2 from bottom, _for_ “Dikies” _read_ “Dilke.” .. 465, margin, _for_ “Campagne de Français” _read_ “Campagne des Français.” .. 470, .. 9, _for_ “Fons” _read_ “Foz.” .. 470, .. 17, _for_ “Fons” _read_ “Foz.” .. 512, .. 2, _for_ “eight” _read_ “eighth.” LIST OF PLATES. No. 1. Suchet’s Operations, 1809-10 _to face page_ 10 2. Siege of Gerona _to face page_ 48 3. Areizaga’s Operations, 1809 _to face page_ 84 4. Invasion of Andalusia, 1810 _to face page_ 108 5. Defence of Portugal, 1810 _to face page_ 266 6. Crawfurd’s Operations, 1810 _to face page_ 292 7. Operations on the Mondego, 1810 _to face page_ 334 8. Lines of Torres Vedras, 1810 _to face page_ 358 9. Battle of Barosa, March 5th, 1811 _to face page_ 446 10. Massena’s Retreat, Combat of Sabugal, 1811 _to face page_ 486 11. Battle of Fuentes Onoro _to face page_ 516 12. Battle of Albuera _to face page_ 540 NOTICE. The manuscript authorities consulted for this volume consist of original papers and correspondence of the duke of Wellington, marshal Soult, king Joseph, Mr. Stuart,[1] general Graham,[2] general Pelet,[3] general Campbell,[4] captain Codrington,[5] and colonel Cox,[6] together with many private journals and letters of officers employed during the war. Before the Appendix two papers are inserted, the one a letter from major-general Frederick Ponsonby relative to a passage in the description of the battle of Talavera; the other is an original note by the emperor Napoleon, which I had not seen when I published my first volume. The reader is referred to it as confirmatory of the arguments used by me when objecting to Joseph’s retreat from Madrid. The reader is informed that, in the second volume, Book VI. & VII. should be Book VI., and Book IX. should be Book VIII. HISTORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. BOOK IX. CHAPTER I. [Sidenote: 1809.] When Gallicia was delivered by the campaign of Talavera, the Asturias became the head of a new line of operation threatening the enemy’s principal communication with France. But this advantage was feebly used. Kellerman’s division at Valladolid, and Bonet’s at San Andero, sufficed to hold both Asturians and Gallicians in check; and the sanguinary operations in the valley of the Tagus, were colaterally, as well as directly, unprofitable to the allies. In other parts the war was steadily progressive in favour of the French; yet their career was one of pains and difficulties. Hitherto Biscay had been tranquil, and Navarre so submissive, that the artillery employed against Zaragoza, was conveyed by the country people, without an escort, from Pampeluna to Tudela. But when the battle of Belchite terminated the regular warfare in Aragon, the Guerilla system commenced in those parts; and as the chiefs acquired reputation at the moment when Blake was losing credit by defeats, the dispersed soldiers flocked to their standards; hoping thus to cover past disgrace, and to live with a greater license, because the regular armies suffered under the restraints without enjoying the benefits of discipline, while the irregulars purveyed for themselves. Zaragoza is surrounded by rugged mountains, and every range became the mother of a Guerilla brood; nor were the regular Partizan corps less numerous than the Partidas. On the left of the Ebro, the Catalonian colonels, Baget, Perena, Pedroza, and the chief Theobaldo, brought their Migueletes to the Sierra de Guara, overhanging Huesca and Barbastro. In this position, commanding the sources of the Cinca and operating on both sides of that river, they harassed the communication between Zaragoza and the French outposts; and maintained an intercourse with the governor of Lerida, who directed the movements and supplied the wants of all the bands in Aragon. On the right of the Ebro, troops raised in the district of Molina, were united to the corps of Gayan, and that officer, taking possession of the mountains of Montalvan, the valley of the Xiloca, and the town of Daroca, pushed his advanced guards even to the plain of Zaragoza, and occupied Nuestra Senora del Aguilar. This convent, situated on the top of a high rock, near Cariñena, he made a depôt of provisions and ammunition, and surrounded the building with an entrenched camp for three thousand men. On Gayan’s left, general Villa Campa, a man of talent and energy, established himself at Calatayud, with the regular regiments of Soria and La Princessa, and making fresh levies, rapidly formed a large force, with which he cut the direct line of communication between Zaragoza and Madrid. Beyond Villa Campa’s positions the circle of war was continued by other bands; which, descending from the Moncayo mountains, infested the districts of Taranzona and Borja, and intercepted the communications between Tudela and Zaragoza. The younger Mina, called the student, vexed all the country between Tudela and Pampeluna; and the inhabitants of the high Pyrennean valleys of Roncal, Salazar, Anso, and Echo, were also in arms, and commanded by Renovalles. This general officer, taken at Zaragoza, was, by the French, said to have broken his parole; but he, pleading a previous breach of the capitulation, fled to Lerida, and from thence passing with some regular officers into the valleys, took the command of the insurrection, and succeeded in surprising several French detachments. His principal post was at the convent of San Juan de la Pena, which is built on a rock, remarkable in Spanish history as a place of refuge maintained with success against the Moorish conquerors. The bodies of twenty-two kings of Aragon rested in the church, and the whole rock was held in veneration by the Aragonese, and supposed to be invulnerable. From this post Saraza, acting under Renovalles, continually menaced Jaca, and communicating with Baget, Pedroza, and Father Theobaldo, completed, as it were, the investment of the third corps. All these bands, amounting to, at least, twenty thousand armed men, commenced their operations at once, cutting off isolated men, intercepting convoys and couriers, and attacking the weakest parts of the French army. Meanwhile Blake having rallied his fugitives at Tortoza, abandoned Aragon to its fate, and proceeding to Taragona, endeavoured to keep the war alive in Catalonia. Suchet, in following up his victory at Belchite, had sent detachments as far as Morella, on the borders of Valencia, and pushed his scouting parties close up to Tortoza; but finding the dispersion of Blake’s troops complete, he posted Meusnier’s division on the line of the Guadalupe, with orders to repair the castle of Alcanitz, so as to form a head of cantonments on the right bank of the Ebro. Then crossing that river at Caspe with the rest of the army, he made demonstrations against Mequinenza, and even menaced Lerida, obliging the governor to draw in his detachments, and close the gates. Suchet, however, continued his march by Fraga, recrossed the Cinca, and leaving Habert’s division to guard that line, returned himself in the latter end of June to Zaragoza by the road of Monzon. Having thus dispersed the regular Spanish forces and given full effect to his victory; the French General sought to fix himself firmly in the positions he had gained. Sensible that arms may win battles, but cannot render conquest permanent, he projected a system of civil administration which enabled him to support his troops, and yet to offer some security of property to those inhabitants who remained tranquil. But, as it was impossible for the people to trust to any system, or to avoid danger, while the mountains swarmed with the Partidas, Suchet resolved to pursue the latter without relaxation, and to put down all resistance in Aragon before he attempted to enlarge the circle of his conquests. Foreseeing that while he thus laid a solid base for further operations, he should also form an army capable of executing any enterprize. He commenced on the side of Jaca, and having dislodged the Spaniards from their positions near that castle, in June, supplied it with ten months’ provisions. After this operation, Almunia and Cariñena, on the right of the Ebro, were occupied by his detachments; and having suddenly drawn together four battalions and a hundred cuirassiers at the latter point, he surrounded Nuestra Senora del Aguilar, during the night of the 19th, destroyed the entrenched camp, and sent a detachment in pursuit of Gayan. On the same day, Pedrosa was repulsed on the other side of the Ebro, near Barbastro, and general Habert defeated Perena. The troops sent in pursuit of Gayan dispersed his corps at Uzed, and Daroca was occupied by the French. The vicinity of Calatayud and the mountains of Moncayo were then scoured by detachments from Zaragoza, one of which took possession of the district of Cinco Villas. Meanwhile Jaca was continually menaced by the Spaniards at St. Juan de la Pena, and Saraza, descending from thence by the valley of the Gallego, on the 23d of August, surprised and slew a detachment of seventy men close to Zaragoza. On the 26th, however, five French battalions stormed the sacred rock, and penetrated up the valleys of Anso and Echo in pursuit of Renovalles. Nevertheless, that chief, retiring to Roncal, obtained a capitulation for the valley without surrendering himself. These operations having, in a certain degree, cleared Aragon of the bands on the side of Navarre and Castile, the French general proceeded against those on the side of Catalonia. Baget, Perena, and Pedrosa, chased from the Sierra de Guarra, rallied between the Cinca and the Noguerra, and were joined by Renovalles, who assumed the chief command; but on the 23d of September, the whole being routed by general Habert, the men dispersed, and the chiefs took refuge in Lerida and Mequinenza. Suchet, then occupied Fraga, Candasnos, and Monzon, established a flying bridge on the Cinca, near the latter town, raised some field-works to protect it, and that done, resolved to penetrate the districts of Venasques and Benevarres, the subjection of which would have secured his left flank, and opened a new line of communication with France. The inhabitants, having notice of his project, assembled in arms, and being joined by the dispersed soldiers of the defeated Partizans, menaced a French regiment posted at Graus. Colonel La Peyrolerie, the commandant, marched the 17th of October, by Roda, to meet them; and having reached a certain distance up the valley, was surrounded, yet he broke through in the night, and regained his post. During his absence the peasantry of the vicinity came down to kill his sick men, but the townsmen of Graus would not suffer this barbarity; and marshal Suchet affirms that such humane conduct was not rare in Aragonese towns. While this was passing in the valley of Venasque, the governor of Lerida caused Caspe, Fraga, and Candasnos to be attacked, and some sharp fighting took place. The French maintained their posts, but the whole circle of their cantonments being still infested by the smaller bands, petty actions were fought at Belchite, and on the side of Molino, at Arnedo, and at Soria. Mina also still intercepted the communications with Pampeluna; and Villa Campa, quitting Calatayud, rallied Gayan’s troops, and gathered others on the rocky mountain of Tremendal, where a large convent and church once more furnished as a citadel for an entrenched camp. Against this place colonel Henriod marched in November, from Daroca, with from fifteen hundred to two thousand men and three pieces of artillery, and driving back some advanced posts from Ojos Negros to Origuela; came in front of the main position at eleven o’clock in the morning of the 25th. COMBAT OF TREMENDAL. The Spaniards were on a mountain, from the centre of which a tongue of land shooting out, overhung Origuela, and on the upper part of this tongue stood the fortified convent of Tremendal. To the right and left the rocks were nearly perpendicular, and Henriod, seeing that Villa Campa was too strongly posted to be beaten by an open attack, imposed upon his adversary by skirmishing and making as if he would turn the right of the position by the road of Albaracin. Villa Campa was thus induced to mass his forces on that side. In the night, the fire of the bivouacs enabled the Spaniards to see that the main body of the French troops and the baggage were retiring, and, at the same time, Henriod, with six chosen companies and two pieces of artillery, coming against the centre, suddenly drove the Spanish outposts into the fortified convent, and opened a fire with his guns, as if to cover the retreat. The skirmish soon ceased, and Villa Campa, satisfied that the French had retired, was thrown completely off his guard, when Henriod’s six companies, secretly scaling the rocks of the position, rushed amongst the sleeping Spaniards, killed and wounded five hundred, and put the whole army to flight. Meanwhile, on the other side of the Ebro, a second attempt was made against the valley of Venasque, which being successful, that district was disarmed. Petty combats still continued to be fought in other parts of Aragon, but the obstinacy of the Spaniards gradually gave way. In the month of December, Suchet (assisted by general Milhaud, with a moveable column from Madrid,) took the towns of Albaracin and Teruel, the insurgent junta fled to Valencia, and the subjection of Aragon was, in a manner effected. The interior was disarmed and quieted, and the Partidas, which still hung upon the frontiers, were recruited, as well as supplied, from other provinces, and acted chiefly on the defensive. The Aragonese also were so vexed by the smaller bands, now dwindling into mere banditti, that a smuggler of Barbastro raised a Spanish corps, with which he chased and suppressed many of them. Reinforcements were now pouring into Spain, and enabled the French general to prepare for extended operations. The original Spanish army of Aragon was reduced to about eight thousand men; of which, a part were wandering with Villa Campa, a part were in Tortoza, and the rest about Lerida and Mequinenza. Those fortresses were, indeed, the only obstacles to a junction of the third with the seventh corps; and in them the Spanish troops who still kept the field took refuge, when closely pressed by the invaders. The policy of the Supreme Junta was however, always to form fresh corps upon the remnants of their beaten armies. Hence Villa Campa, keeping in the mountains of Albaracin, recruited his ranks, and still infested the western frontier of Aragon: Garcia Novarro, making Tortoza his base of operations lined the banks of the Algas, and menaced Alcanitz: and Perena, trusting to the neighbourhood of Lerida for support, posted himself between the Noguera and the Segre. But the activity of the French gave little time to effect any considerable organization. Suchet’s positions formed a circle round Zaragoza; and Tudela, Jaca, and the castle of Aljaferia were garrisoned; but his principal forces were on the Guadalupe and the Cinca, occupying Alcanitz, Caspe, Fraga, Monzon, Barbastro, Benevarres, and Venasque; of which the first, third, and fourth were places of strength: and certainly, whether his situation be regarded in a political, or a military light, it was become most important. One year had sufficed, not only to reduce the towns and break the armies, but in part to conciliate the feelings of the Aragonese--confessedly the most energetic portion of the nation--and to place the third corps, with reference to the general operations of the war, in a most formidable position. 1º. The fortified castle of Alcanitz formed a head of cantonments on the right bank of the Ebro; and being situated at the entrance of the passes leading into Valencia, it also furnished a base, from which Suchet could invade that rich province; and by which also, he could place the Catalonian army between two fires, whenever the seventh corps should again advance beyond the Llobregat. 2º. Caspe secured the communication between the wings of the third corps, while Fraga and its wooden bridge over the Cinca, offered the means of passing that uncertain river at all seasons. 3º. Monzon, a regular fortification, in some measure balanced Lerida; and its flying bridge over the Cinca enabled the French to forage all the country between Lerida and Venasques; moreover a co-operation of the garrison of Monzon, the troops at Barbastro, and those at Benevarres, could always curb Perena. 4º. The possession of Venasques permitted Suchet to communicate with the moveable columns, (appointed to guard the French frontier,) while the castle of Jaca rendered the third corps in a manner independent of Pampeluna and St. Sebastian. In fine, the position on the Cinca and the Guadalupe, menacing alike Catalonia and Valencia, connected the operations of the third with the seventh corps; and henceforward we shall find these two armies gradually approximating until they form but one force, acting upon a distinct system of invasion against the south. [Illustration: _Vol. 3, Plate 1._ SUCHET’S OPERATIONS 1809-10. _Published by T. & W. Boone 1830._] Suchet’s projects were, however, retarded by insurrections in Navarre, which, at this period, assumed a serious aspect. The student Mina, far from being quelled by the troops sent at different periods in chase of him, daily increased his forces, and, by hardy and sudden enterprizes, kept the Navarrese in commotion. The duke of Mahon, one of Joseph’s Spanish adherents, appointed viceroy of Navarre, was at variance with the military authorities; and all the disorders attendant on a divided administration, and a rapacious system, ensued. General D’Agoult, the governor of Pampeluna, was accused of being in Mina’s pay. His suicide during an investigation seems to confirm the suspicion, but it is also abundantly evident, that the whole administration of Navarre was oppressive, venal, and weak. To avert the serious danger of an insurrection so close to France, the emperor directed Suchet to repair there with a part of the third corps. That general soon restored order in Pampeluna, and eventually captured Mina himself; but he was unable to suppress the system of the Partidas. “_Espoz y Mina_” took his nephew’s place; and from that time to the end of the war, the communications of the French were troubled, and considerable losses inflicted upon their armies by this celebrated man--undoubtedly the most conspicuous person among the Partida chiefs. And here it may be observed how weak and inefficient this guerilla system was to deliver the country, and that, even as an auxiliary, its advantages were nearly balanced by the evils. It was in the provinces lying between France and the Ebro that it commenced. It was in those provinces that it could effect the greatest injury to the French cause; and it was precisely in those provinces that it was conducted with the greatest energy, although less assisted by the English than any other part of Spain: a fact leading to the conclusion, that ready and copious succours may be hurtful to a people situated as the Spaniards were. When so assisted, men are apt to rely more upon their allies than upon their own exertions. But however this may be, it is certain that the Partidas of Biscay, Navarre, Aragon, and Catalonia, although they amounted at one time to above thirty thousand men, accustomed to arms, and often commanded by men of undoubted enterprize and courage, never occupied half their own number of French at one time; never absolutely defeated a single division; never prevented any considerable enterprize; never, with the exception of the surprise of Figueras, to be hereafter spoken of, performed any exploit seriously affecting the operations of a single “corps d’armée.” It is true, that if a whole nation will but persevere in such a system, it must in time destroy the most numerous armies. But no people will thus persevere, the aged, the sick, the timid, the helpless, are all hinderers of the bold and robust. There will, also, be a difficulty to procure arms, for it is not on every occasion that so rich and powerful a people as the English, will be found in alliance with insurrection; and when the invaders follow up their victories by a prudent conduct, as was the case with Suchet and some others of the French generals, the result is certain. The desire of ease natural to mankind, prevails against the suggestions of honour; and although the opportunity of covering personal ambition with the garb of patriotism may cause many attempts to throw off the yoke, the bulk of the invaded people will gradually become submissive and tranquil. It is a fact that, notwithstanding the violent measures resorted to by the Partida chiefs to fill their ranks, deserters from the French and even from the British formed one-third of their bands. To raise a whole people against an invader may be easy, but to direct the energy thus aroused, is a gigantic task, and, if misdirected, the result will be more injurious than advantageous. That it was misdirected in Spain was the opinion of many able men of all sides, and to represent it otherwise, is to make history give false lessons to posterity. Portugal was thrown completely into the hands of lord Wellington; but that great man, instead of following the example of the Supreme Junta, and encouraging independent bands, enforced a military organization upon totally different principles. The people were, indeed, called upon and obliged to resist the enemy, but it was under a regular system, by which all classes were kept in just bounds, and the whole physical and moral power of the nation rendered subservient to the plan of the general-in-chief. To act differently is to confess weakness: it is to say that the government being unequal to the direction of affairs permits anarchy. The Partida system in Spain, was the offspring of disorder, and disorder in war is weakness accompanied by ills the least of which is sufficient to produce ruin. It is in such a warfare, that habits of unbridled license, of unprincipled violence, and disrespect for the rights of property are quickly contracted, and render men unfit for the duties of citizens; and yet it has with singular inconsistency been cited, as the best and surest mode of resisting an enemy, by politicians, who hold regular armies in abhorrence, although a high sense of honour, devotion to the cause of the country, temperance, regularity, and decent manners are of the very essence of the latter’s discipline. [Sidenote: Extract from the Life of Mina.] Regular armies have seldom failed to produce great men, and one great man is sufficient to save a nation: but when every person is permitted to make war in the manner most agreeable to himself;--for one that comes forward with patriotic intentions, there will be two to act from personal interest; in short, there will be more robbers than generals. One of the first exploits of Espoz y Mina was to slay the commander of a neighbouring band, because, under the mask of patriotism, he was plundering his own countrymen: nay, this the most fortunate of all the chiefs, would never suffer any other Partida than his own to be in his district; he also, as I have before related, made a species of commercial treaty with the French, and strove earnestly and successfully to raise his band to the dignity of a regular force. Nor was this manner of considering the guerilla system confined to the one side. The following observations of St. Cyr, a man of acknowledged talents, show that, after considerable experience of this mode of warfare, he also felt that the evil was greater than the benefit. “Far from casting general blame on the efforts made by the Catalans, I admired them; but, as they often exceeded the bounds of reason, their heroism was detrimental to their cause. Many times it caused the destruction of whole populations without necessity and without advantage.” “When a country is invaded by an army stronger than that which defends it, it is beyond question that the population should come to the assistance of the troops, and lend them every support; but, without an absolute necessity, the former should not be brought on to the field of battle.”--“It is inhuman to place their inexperience in opposition to hardened veterans.” “Instead of _exasperating_ the people of Catalonia, the leaders should have endeavoured to _calm_ them, and have directed their ardour so as to second the army on great occasions. But they excited them without cessation, led them day after day into fire, fatigued them, harassed them, forced them to abandon their habitations, to embark if they were on the coast, if inland to take to the mountains and perish of misery within sight of their own homes, thus abandoned to the mercy of a hungry and exasperated soldiery. The people’s ardour was exhausted daily in partial operations, and hence, on great occasions, when they could have been eminently useful, they were not to be had.” “Their good will had been so often abused by the folly of their leaders, that many times their assistance was called for in vain. The peasantry, of whom so much had been demanded, began to demand in their turn. They insisted that the soldiers should fight always to the last gasp, were angry when the latter retreated, and robbed and ill-used them when broken by defeat.” “They had been so excited, so exasperated against the French, that they became habitually ferocious, and their ferocity was often as dangerous to their own party, as to the enemy. The atrocities committed against their own chiefs disgusted the most patriotic, abated their zeal, caused the middle classes to desire peace as the only remedy of a system so replete with disorder. Numbers of distinguished men, even those who had vehemently opposed Joseph at first, began to abandon Ferdinand; and it is certain that, but for the expedition to Russia, that branch of the Bourbons which reigns in Spain, would never have remounted the throne.” “The cruelties exercised upon the French military were as little conformable to the interest of the Spaniards. Those men were but the slaves of their duty, and of the state; certain of death a little sooner or a little later, they, like the Spaniards, were victims of the same ambition. The soldier naturally becomes cruel in protracted warfare; but the treatment experienced from the Catalans brought out this disposition prematurely; and that unhappy people were themselves the victims of a cruelty, which either of their own will or excited by others, they had exercised upon those troops that fell into their power; and this without any advantage to their cause, while a contrary system would, in a little time, have broken up the seventh corps,--seeing that the latter was composed of foreigners, naturally inclined to desert. But the murders of all wounded, and sick, and helpless men, created such horror, that the desertion, which at first menaced total destruction, ceased entirely.” Such were St. Cyr’s opinions; and, assuredly, the struggle in Catalonia, of which it is now the time to resume the relation, was not the least successful in Spain. CHAPTER II. OPERATIONS IN CATALONIA. [Sidenote: See Vol II. p. 102.] The narrative of the Catalonian affairs was broken off at the moment, when St. Cyr having established his quarters at Vich, received intelligence of the Austrian war, and that Barcelona had been relieved by the squadron of admiral Comaso. His whole attention was then directed towards Gerona; and with a view to hastening general Reille’s preparation for the siege of that place, a second detachment, under Lecchi, proceeded to the Ampurdan. During this time Conpigny continued at Taragona, and Blake made his fatal march into Aragon; but those troops which, under Milans and Wimphen, had composed Reding’s left wing, were continually skirmishing with the French posts in the valley of Vich, and the Partizans, especially Claros and the doctor Rovira, molested the communications in a more systematic manner than before. Lecchi returned about the 18th of May, with intelligence that Napoleon had quitted Paris for Germany, that general Verdier had replaced Reille in the Ampurdan, and that marshal Augereau had reached Perpignan in his way to supersede St. Cyr himself in the command of the seventh corps. The latter part of this information gave St. Cyr infinite discontent. In his “Journal of Operations,” he asserts that his successor earnestly sought for the appointment, and his own observations on the occasion are sarcastic and contemptuous of his rival. Augereau, who having served in Catalonia during the war of the revolution, imagined, that he had then acquired an influence which might be revived on the present occasion, framed a proclamation that vied with the most inflated of Spanish manifestoes. But the latter, although turgid, were in unison with the feelings of the people, whereas, Augereau’s address, being at utter variance with those feelings, was a pure folly. This proclamation he sent into Catalonia, escorted by a battalion; but even on the frontier, the Miguelette colonel, Porta, defeated the escort, and tore down the few copies that had been posted. The French marshal, afflicted with the gout, remained at Perpignan, and St. Cyr continued to command; but reluctantly, because (as he affirms) the officers and soldiers were neglected, and himself exposed to various indignities, the effects of Napoleon’s ill-will. The most serious of these affronts was permitting Verdier to correspond directly with the minister of war in France, and the publishing of his reports in preference to St. Cyr’s. For these reasons, the latter contented himself with a simple discharge of his duty. Yet, after the conspiracy in the second corps, Napoleon cannot be justly blamed for coldness towards an officer, who, however free himself from encouraging the malcontents in the French army, was certainly designed for their leader. It is rather to be admired that the emperor discovered so little jealousy; when a man has once raised himself to the highest power, he must inevitably give offence to his former comrades, for, as all honours and rewards, flowing from him, are taken as personal favours, so all checks and slights, or even the cessation of benefits, are regarded as personal injuries. Where the sanction of time is wanting, to identify the sovereign with the country, the discontented easily convince themselves that revenge is patriotism. [Sidenote: See Vol. II p. 363.] While St. Cyr was preparing for the siege of Gerona, Joseph, as we have seen, directed him to march into Aragon, to repel Blake’s movement against Suchet. This order he refused to obey, and with reason; for it would have been a great error to permit Blake’s false movement to occupy two “Corps d’Armée,” and so retard the siege of Gerona, to the infinite detriment of the French affairs in Catalonia. Barcelona was never safe while Hostalrich and Gerona were in the Spaniard’s possession. St. Cyr was well aware of this, but the evils of a divided command are soon felt. He who had been successful in all his operations, was urgent, for many reasons, to commence the siege without delay, but Verdier, who had failed at Zaragoza, was cautious in attacking a town which had twice baffled Duhesme, and when pressed to begin, complained that he could not, after placing garrisons in Rosas and Figueras, bring ten thousand men before Gerona; which, seeing the great extent of the works, were insufficient. St. Cyr, disregarding the works, observed that the garrison did not exceed three thousand men, that it could not well be increased, and that expedition was of more consequence than numbers. Nevertheless, considering that a depôt of provisions, established for the service of the siege at Figueras, and which it was unlikely Napoleon would replenish, must, by delay, be exhausted, as well as the supplies which he had himself collected at Vich: he sent all his own cannoniers, sappers, and artillery horses, two squadrons of cavalry, and six battalions of infantry to the Ampurdan, and having thus increased the number of troops there to eighteen thousand men, again urged Verdier to be expedite. These reinforcements marched the 22d of May, and the covering army diminished to about twelve thousand men under arms, continued to hold the valley of Vich until the middle of June. During this time, the Miguelettes often skirmished with the advanced posts, but without skill or profit; and the inhabitants of the town, always remained in the high mountains unsheltered and starving, yet still firm of resolution not to dwell with the invaders. This may be attributed partly to fear, but more to that susceptibility to grand sentiments, which distinguishes the Spanish peasants. Although little remarkable for hardihood in the field, their Moorish blood is attested by their fortitude; and, men and women alike, they endure calamity with a singular and unostentatious courage. In this they are truly admirable. But their virtues are passive, their faults active, and, continually instigated by a peculiar arrogance, they are perpetually projecting enterprises which they have not sufficient vigour to execute, although at all times they are confident and boasting more than becomes either wise or brave men. Early in June, St. Cyr, having consumed nearly all his corn, resolved to approach Gerona, and secure the harvest which was almost ripe in that district; but, previous to quitting Vich, he sent his sick and wounded men, under a strong escort, to Barcelona, and disposed his reserves in such a manner that the operation was effected without loss. The army, loaded with as much grain as the men could carry, then commenced crossing the mountains which separate Vich from the districts of Gerona and Hostalrich. This march, conducted by the way of Folgarolas, San Saturnino, Santa Hillario, and Santa Coloma de Farnes, lasted two days; and, the 21st of June, the head-quarters being fixed at Caldas de Malavella, the Fort of St. Felieu de Quixols was stormed, and the Spanish privateers driven to seek another harbour. The French army was then distributed in a half circle, extending from St. Felieu to the Oña river. Intermediate posts were established at St. Grace, Vidreras, Mallorquinas, Rieu de Arenas, Santa Coloma de Farnes, Castaña, and Bruñola; thus cutting off the communications between Gerona and the districts occupied by Conpigny, Wimphen, the Milans, and Claros. During the march from Vich, the French defeated three Spanish battalions, and captured a convoy, coming from the side of Martorel, and destined for Gerona. St. Cyr calls them the forerunners of Blake’s army; a curious error, for Blake was, on that very day, being defeated at Belchite, two hundred miles from Santa Coloma. Strictly speaking, there was, at this period, no Catalonian army, the few troops that kept the field were acting independently, and Conpigny, the nominal commander-in-chief, remained at Taragona. He and the other authorities, more occupied with personal quarrels and political intrigues than with military affairs, were complaining and thwarting each other. Thus the Spanish and French operations were alike weakened by internal divisions. Verdier was slow, cautious, and more attentive to the facilities afforded for resistance than to the number of regular soldiers within the works; he, or rather Reille, had appeared before Gerona on the 6th of May, but it was not till the 4th of June that, reinforced with Lecchi’s division, he completed the investment of the place on both sides of the Ter. On the 8th, however, ground was broken; and thus, at the very moment when Blake, with the main body of his army, was advancing against Zaragoza, in other words, seeking to wrest Aragon from the French, Catalonia was slipping from his own hands. THIRD SIEGE OF GERONA. When this memorable siege commenced, the relative situations of the contending parties were as follows:--Eighteen thousand French held the Ampurdan, and invested the place. Of this number about four thousand were in Figueras, Rosas, and the smaller posts of communication; and it is remarkable that Verdier asserted that the first-named place, notwithstanding its great importance, was _destitute of a garrison_, when he arrived there from France. A fact consistent with Lord Collingwood’s description of the Catalan warfare, but irreconcilable with the enterprise and vigour attributed to them by others. [Sidenote: Imperial Muster Roll. MSS.] St. Cyr, the distribution of whose forces has been already noticed, covered the siege with twelve thousand men; and Duhesme, having about ten thousand, including sick, continued to hold Barcelona. Forty thousand French were, therefore, disposed between that city and Figueras; while, on the Spanish side, there was no preparation. Blake was still in Aragon; Conpigny, with six thousand of the worst troops, was at Taragona; the Milans watched Duhesme; Wimphen, with a few thousand, held the country about the Upper Llobregat. Juan Claros and Rovira kept the mountains on the side of Olot and Ripol; and, in the higher Catalonia, small bands of Miguelettes were dispersed under different chiefs. The Somatenes, however, continuing their own system of warfare, not only disregarded the generals, as in the time of Reding, but fell upon and robbed the regular troops, whenever a favourable opportunity occurred. The Spanish privateers, dislodged from St. Filieu, now resorted to Palamos-bay, and the English fleet, under Lord Collingwood, watched incessantly to prevent any French squadron, or even single vessels, from carrying provisions by the coast. But from Gerona, the governor did not fail to call loudly on the generals, and even on the _Supreme Central Junta_, for succours; yet his cry was disregarded; and when the siege commenced, his garrison did not exceed three thousand regular troops: his magazines and hospitals were but scantily provided, and he had no money. Alvarez Mariano was however, of a lofty spirit, great fortitude, and in no manner daunted. [Sidenote: See Vol. I. p. 78.] The works of Gerona, already described, were little changed since the first siege; but there, as in Zaragoza, by a mixture of superstition, patriotism, and military regulations, the moral as well as physical force of the city had been called forth. There, likewise, a sickness, common at a particular season of the year, was looked for to thin the ranks of the besiegers, and there also women were enrolled, under the title of the Company of Sta. Barbara, to carry off the wounded, and to wait upon the hospitals, and at every breath of air, says St. Cyr, their ribbons were seen to float amidst the bayonets of the soldiers! To evince his own resolution, the governor forbad the mention of a capitulation under pain of death; but severe punishments were only denounced, not inflicted upon faint-hearted men. Alvarez, master of his actions, and capable of commanding without phrenzy, had recourse to no barbarous methods of enforcing authority; obstinate his defence was, and full of suffering to the besieged, yet free from the stain of cruelty, and rich in honour. On the 4th of June the siege was begun, and, on the 12th, a mortar-battery, from the heights of Casen Rocca, on the left of the Ter, and two breaching-batteries, established against the outworks of Fort Monjouic, being ready to play, the town was summoned in form. The answer was an intimation that henceforth all flags of truce would be fired upon; the only proceeding indicative of the barbarian in the conduct of Alvarez. The 13th the small suburb of Pedreto was taken possession of by the French, and early on the morning of the 14th, the batteries opened against Monjouic, while the town was bombarded from the Casen Rocca. The 17th the besieged drove the enemy from Pedreto, but were finally repulsed with the loss of above a hundred men. The 19th the stone towers of St. Narcis and St. Louis, forming the outworks of Monjouic, being assaulted, the besieged, panic-stricken, abandoned them and the tower of St. Daniel also. The French immediately erected breaching-batteries, four hundred yards from the northern bastion of Monjouic. Tempestuous weather retarded their works, but they made a practicable opening by the 4th of July, and with a strange temerity resolved to give the assault, although the flank fire of the works was not silenced, nor the glacis crowned, nor the covered way or counterscarp injured, and that a half moon, in a perfect state, covered the approaches to the breach. The latter was proved by the engineers, in a false attack, on the night of the 4th, and the resolution to assault was then adopted; yet the storming-force drawn from the several quarters of investment was only assembled in the trenches on the night of the 7th; and during these four days, the batteries ceasing to play, the Spaniards retrenched, and barricadoed the opening. At four o’clock in the morning of the 8th, the French column, jumping out of the trenches, rapidly cleared the space between them and the fort, descended the ditch, and mounted to the assault with great resolution; but the Spaniards had so strengthened the defences that no impression could be made, and the assailants taken in flank and rear by the fire from the half moon, the covered way, and the eastern bastion, were driven back. Twice they renewed the attempt, but the obstacles were insurmountable, and the assault failed, with a loss of a thousand men killed and wounded. The success of the besieged was however mitigated by an accidental explosion, which destroyed the garrison of the small fort of St. Juan, situated between Monjouic and the city. About the period of this assault which was given without St. Cyr’s knowledge, the latter finding that Claros and Rovira interrupted the convoys coming from Figueras to Gerona, withdrew a brigade of Souham’s division from Santa Coloma de Farnés, and posted it on the left of the Ter, at Bañolas. The troops on the side of Hostalrich were thus reduced to about eight thousand men under arms, although an effort to raise the siege was to be expected. For letters from Alvarez, urgently demanding succours of Blake, had been intercepted, and the latter, after his defeat in Aragon, was, as I have said, collecting men at Taragona. Meanwhile, to secure the coast-line from Rosas to Quixols before Blake could reach the scene of action, St. Cyr resolved to take Palamos. To effect this, general Fontanes marched from St. Filieu, on the 5th of July, with an Italian brigade, six guns, and some squadrons of dragoons. Twice he summoned the place, and the bearer being each time treated with scorn, the troops moved on to the attack; but in passing a flat part of the coast near Torre Valenti, they were cannonaded by six gun-boats so sharply, that they could not keep the road until the artillery had obliged the boats to sheer off. STORMING OF PALAMOS. This town having a good roadstead, and being only one march from Gerona, was necessarily a place of importance; and the works, although partly ruined, were so far repaired by the Catalans as to be capable of some defence. Twenty guns were mounted; and the town, built on a narrow rocky peninsula had but one front, the approach to which was over an open plain, completely commanded from the left by some very rugged hills, where a considerable number of Somatenes were assembled, with their line touching upon the walls of the town. Fontanes drove the Somatenes from this position, and a third time, summoned the place to surrender. The bearer was killed, and the Italians immediately stormed the works. When the Spaniards flying towards the shore endeavoured to get on board their vessels, the latter put off to sea, and some of Fontanes’ troops having turned the town during the action, intercepted the fugitives, and put all to the sword. Scarcely had Palamos fallen when Wimphen and the Milans, arriving near Hostalrich, began to harass Souham’s outposts at Santa Coloma, hoping to draw St. Cyr’s attention to that side, while a reinforcement for the garrison of Gerona should pass through the left of his line into the city. The French general was not deceived; but the Spaniards nevertheless sent fifteen hundred chosen men, under the command of one Marshal, an Englishman, to penetrate secretly through the enemy’s posts at Llagostera. They were accompanied by an aide-de-camp of Alvarez, called Rich, apparently an Englishmen also, and they succeeded on the 9th in passing general Pino’s posts unobserved. A straggler, however, was taken, and St. Cyr being thus informed of the march, and judging that the attempt to break the line of investment would be made in the night and by the road of Casa de Selva, immediately placed one body of men in ambush near that point, and sent another in pursuit of the succouring column. As the French general had foreseen, the Spaniards continued their march through the hills at dusk, but being suddenly fired upon by the ambuscade, hastily retired, and the next day fell in with the other troops, when a thousand men were made prisoners: the rest dispersing, escaped the enemy, yet were ill used and robbed of their arms by the Somatenes. St. Cyr says that Mr. Marshal, having offered to capitulate, fled during the negotiation, and thus abandoned his men; but the Spanish general Conpigny affirmed that the men abandoned Marshal, and refused to fight, that Rich ran away before he had seen the enemy, and that both he and the troops merited severe punishment. It is also certain that Marshal’s flight was to Gerona, where he afterwards fell fighting gallantly. This disappointment was sensibly felt by Alvarez. Sickness and battle had already reduced his garrison to fifteen hundred men, and he was thus debarred of the best of all defences, namely, frequent sallies as the enemy neared the walls. His resolution was unshaken, but he did not fail to remonstrate warmly with Conpigny, and even denounced his inactivity to the Supreme Junta. That general excused himself on the ground of Blake’s absence, the want of provisions, and the danger of carrying the contagious sickness of Taragona into Gerona; and finally adduced colonel Marshal’s unfortunate attempt, as proof that due exertion had been made. Yet he could not deny that Gerona had been invested two months, had sustained forty days of open trenches, a bombardment and an assault without any succour, and that during that time, he himself remained at Taragona, instead of being at Hostalrich with all the troops he could collect. From the prisoners taken the French ascertained that neither Conpigny nor Blake had any intention of coming to the relief of Gerona, until sickness and famine, which pressed as heavily on the besiegers as on the besieged, should have weakened the ranks of the former; and this plan receives unqualified praise from St. Cyr, who seems to have forgotten, that with an open breach, a town, requiring six thousand men to man the works, and having but fifteen hundred, might fall at any moment. After the failure of the assault at Monjouic, Verdier recommenced his approaches in due form, opened galleries for a mine, and interrupted the communication with the city by posting men in the ruins of the little fort of St. Juan. But his operations were retarded by Claros and Rovira, who captured a convoy of powder close to the French frontier. To prevent a recurrence of such events, the brigade of Souham’s division was pushed from Bañolas to St. Lorenzo de la Muja; and, on the 2d of August, the fortified convent of St. Daniel, situated in the valley of the Galligan, between the Constable fort and Monjouic, was taken by the French, who thus entirely intercepted the communication between the latter place and the city. On the 4th of August, the glacis of Monjouic being crowned, the counterscarp blown in, and the flank defences ruined, the ditch was passed, and the half moon in front of the curtain carried by storm, but no lodgement was effected. During the day, Alvarez made an unsuccessful effort to retake the ruins of St. Juan; and at the same time, two hundred Spaniards who had come from the sea-coast with provisions, and penetrated to the convent of St. Daniel, thinking that their countrymen still held it, were made prisoners. On the 5th the engineers having ascertained that the northern bastion being hollow, the troops would, after storming it, be obliged to descend a scarp of twelve or fourteen feet, changed the line of attack, and commenced new approaches against the eastern bastion. A second practical breach was soon opened, and preparations made for storming on the 12th, but in the night of the 11th, the garrison blew up the magazines, spiked the guns, and, without loss, regained Gerona. Thus the fort fell, after thirty-seven days of open trenches and one assault. CHAPTER III. Verdier, elated by the capture of Monjouic, boasted, in his despatches, of the difficulties that he had overcome, and they were unquestionably great, for the rocky nature of the soil had obliged him to raise his trenches instead of sinking them, and his approaches had been chiefly carried on by the flying sap. But he likewise expressed his scorn of the garrison, held their future resistance cheap, and asserted that fifteen days would suffice to take the town; in which he was justified neither by past nor succeeding facts; for the Spaniards indignant at his undeserved contempt, redoubled their exertions and falsified all his predictions; and while these events were passing close to Gerona, Claros and Rovira, at the head of two thousand five hundred Miguelettes, attacked Bascara a post between Figuera and Gerona at the moment when a convoy, escorted by a battalion had arrived there from Belgarde. The commandant of Figueras indeed, uniting some “_gens d’armes_” and convalescents to a detachment of his garrison, succoured the post on the 6th; but, meanwhile, the escort of the convoy had fallen back on France and spread such terror, that Augereau applied to St. Cyr for three thousand men to protect the frontier. That general refused this ill-timed demand, and, in his Memoirs, takes occasion to censure the system of moveable columns, as more likely to create than to suppress insurrections, as being harassing to the troops, weakening to the main force, and yet ineffectual, seeing that the peasantry must always be more moveable than the columns, and better informed of their marches and strength. There is great force in these observations, and if an army is in such bad moral discipline that the officers commanding the columns cannot be trusted, it is unanswerable. It must also be conceded that this system, at all times requiring a nice judgement, great talents, and excellent arrangement, was totally inapplicable to the situation and composition of the seventh corps. Yet, with good officers and well combined plans, it is difficult to conceive any more simple or efficient mode of protecting the flanks and rear of an invading army, than that of moveable columns supported by small fortified posts; and it is sufficient that Napoleon was the creator of this system, to make a military man doubtful of the soundness of St. Cyr’s objections. The emperor’s views, opinions, and actions, will in defiance of all attempts to lessen them, go down, with a wonderful authority to posterity. A few days after the affair of Bascara, eight hundred volunteers, commanded by two officers, named Foxa and Cantera, quitted Olot, and making a secret march through the mountains, arrived in the evening of the 10th, upon the Ter, in front of Angeles; but being baffled in an attempt to pass the river there, descended the left bank in the night, pierced the line of investment, and, crossing at a ford near St. Pons, entered Gerona at day-break. This hardy exploit gave fresh courage to the garrison; yet the enemy’s approaches hourly advanced, pestilence wasted the besieged, and the Spanish generals outside the town still remained inactive. In this conjuncture, Alvarez and his council were not wanting to themselves; while defending the half ruined walls of Gerona with inflexible constancy, they failed not to remonstrate against the cold-blooded neglect of those who should have succoured them; and the Supreme Junta of Catalonia, forwarded their complaints to the Central Junta at Seville, with a remarkable warmth and manliness of expression. “The generals of our army,” they said, “have formed no efficient plan for the relief of Gerona; not one of the three lieutenant-generals here has been charged to conduct an expedition to its help; they say that they act in conformity to a plan approved by your Majesty. Can it be true that your Majesty approves of abandoning Gerona to her own feeble resources! If so, her destruction is inevitable; and should this calamity befall, will the other places of Catalonia and the Peninsula have the courage to imitate her fidelity, when they see her temples and houses ruined, her heroic defenders dead, or in slavery? And if such calamities should threaten towns in other provinces, ought they to reckon upon Catalonian assistance when this most interesting place can obtain no help from them?”--“Do you not see the consequences of this melancholy reflection, which is sufficient to freeze the ardour, to desolate the hearts of the most zealous defenders of our just cause? Let this bulwark of our frontier be taken, and the province is laid open, our harvests, treasures, children, ourselves, all fall to the enemy, and the country has no longer any real existence.” In answer to this address, money was promised, a decree was passed to lend Catalonia every succour, and Blake received orders to make an immediate effort to raise the siege. How little did the language of the Spaniards agree with their actions! Blake, indeed, as we shall find, made a feeble effort to save the heroic and suffering city; but the Supreme Central Junta were only intent upon thwarting and insulting the English general, after the battle of Talavera, and this was the moment that the Junta of Catalonia, so eloquent, so patriotic with the pen, were selling, to foreign merchants, the arms supplied by England for the defence of their country! Towards the end of August, when the French fire had opened three breaches in Gerona, and the bombardment had reduced a great part of the city to ashes, Blake commenced his march from Taragona with a force of eight or ten thousand regulars. Proceeding by Martorel, El Valles, and Granollers, he reached Vich, and from thence crossed the mountains to St. Hillario, where he was joined by Wimphen and the Milans; and as he had free communication with Rovira and Claros, he could direct a body of not less than twenty thousand men against the circle of investment. His arrival created considerable alarm among the French. The pestilence which wasted the besieged, was also among the besiegers, and the hospitals of Figueras and Perpignan contained many thousand patients. The battalions in the field could scarcely muster a third of their nominal strength. Even the generals were obliged to rise from sick-beds to take the command of the brigades; and the covering army, inferior in number to the Spanish force, was extended along more than thirty miles of mountainous wooded country, intersected by rivers, and every way favourable for Blake’s operations. Verdier was filled with apprehension, lest a disastrous action should oblige him to raise the long-protracted siege, notwithstanding his fore-boasts to the contrary. But it was on such occasions that St. Cyr’s best qualities were developed. A most learned and practised soldier, and of a clear methodical head, he was firm in execution, decided and prompt in council; and, although, apparently wanting in those original and daring views, which mark the man of superior genius, seems to have been perfectly fitted for struggling against difficulties. So far from fearing an immediate battle, he observed, “that it was to be desired, because his men were now of confirmed courage. Blake’s inaction was the thing to be dreaded, for, notwithstanding every effort, not more than two days provisions could be procured, to supply the troops when together, and it would be necessary after that period to scatter them again in such a manner, that scarcely two thousand would be disposable at any given point. The Spaniards had already commenced skirmishing in force on the side of Bruñola, and as Blake expected no reinforcements, he would probably act immediately. Hence it was necessary to concentrate as many men as possible, in the course of the night and next day, and deliver battle, and there were still ten thousand good troops under arms, without reckoning those that might be spared from the investing corps.” On the other hand, Blake, with an army, numerous indeed but by no means spirited, was from frequent defeat, become cautious without being more skilful. He resolved to confine his efforts to the throwing supplies of men and provisions into the town; forgetting that the business of a relieving army is not to protract, but to raise a siege, and that to save Gerona was to save Catalonia. He had collected and loaded with flour, about two thousand beasts of burthen, and placed them in the mountains, on the side of Olot, under an escort of four thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry. Garcia Conde, an ambitious and fiery young man of considerable promise, undertook to conduct them to Gerona, by the flat ground between the Ter and the Oña, precisely opposite to that of the French attack. To facilitate this attempt, Blake caused colonel Henry O’Donnel to fall upon Souham’s posts, near Bruñola, on the evening of the 31st of August, supporting this attack with another detachment under general Logoyri. At the same time he directed colonel Landen to collect the Miguelettes and Somatenes on the side of Palamos, and take possession of “_N. S. de los Angelos_,” a convent, situated on a high mountain behind Monjouic. Claros and Rovira also received directions to attack the French on the side of Casen Rocca. Thus the enemy were to be assailed in every quarter, except that on which the convoy was to pass. O’Donnel, commencing the operations, attacked and carried a part of the position occupied by one of Souham’s battalions at Bruñola, but the latter, with an impetuous charge, again recovered the ground. The Spanish general, being joined by Loygori, renewed the skirmish, but could make no further impression on the enemy. Meanwhile, St. Cyr, having transferred his head-quarters to Fornels, was earnestly advised to concentrate his troops on the left of the Ter, partly, that it was thought Blake would attempt to penetrate on that side; partly that, being so close to the Spanish army, the French divisions might, if ordered to assemble on their actual centre, be cut off in detail during their march. But he argued that his opponent must be exceedingly timid, or he would have attacked Souham with all his forces, and broken the covering line at once; and, seeing that such an opportunity was neglected, he did not fear to concentrate his own troops, on the Oña, by a flank march close under the beard of his unskilful adversary. Souham’s division, falling back in the night, took post the 1st of September, on the heights of San Dalmaz, reaching to Hostalnou, and at eight o’clock, the head of Pino’s division entered this line, prolonging it, by the left, in rear of the village of Rieudellot. At twelve o’clock, these two divisions were established in position, and at the distance of four miles in their rear, Verdier with a strong detachment of the besieging corps, was placed in reserve on the main road to Gerona. Lecchi was sick, and his troops, commanded by Millosewitz, took post at Salt, guarding the bridge and the flat ground about St. Eugenio; having also instructions to cross the Ter and march against Rovira and Claros, if they should press the Westphalian division which remained at San Pons. The trenches under Monjouic were guarded. The mortar battery of Casa Rocca was disarmed, and the Westphalians had orders, if attacked, to retire to Sarria, and look to the security of the parc and the trenches. A thick fog and heavy rain interrupted the view, and both armies remained apparently quiet until the middle of the day, when the weather clearing, St. Cyr rode to examine the Spanish positions; for the heads of Blake’s columns were disposed as if he would have penetrated at once, by Bruñola, Coloma de Farnés, Vidreras, and Mallorquinas. Scarcely had the French general quitted Fornels, when Garcia Conde, who, under cover of the mist had been moving down the mountains, crossed the Ter at Amer, and decended the heights of Bañolas with his convoy. He was now on the flat ground, where there was no other guard than the two thousand men under Millosewitz, placed, as I have said, at Salt to watch the garrison and the movements of Rovira and Claros; and consequently, with their rear to the advancing convoy. Verdier’s reserve, the nearest support, was six miles distant, and separated from Millosewitz by considerable heights, and the Spanish columns, coming into the plain without meeting a single French post, advanced unperceived close to the main body, and, with one charge, put the whole to flight. The fugitives, in their panic, at first took the direction of the town; but being fired upon, turned towards the heights of Palau, made for Fornels; and would have gone straight into Blake’s camp, if they had not met St. Cyr on his return from viewing that general’s positions. Rallying and reinforcing them with a battalion from Pino’s division, he instantly directed them back again upon Salt, and at the same time sent Verdier orders to follow Garcia Conde with the reserve; but the latter had already conducted his convoy safely into the town. Alvarez, also, sallying forth, had destroyed the French works near St. Ugenio, and thinking the siege raised, had immediately sent five hundred sick men out of the town, into the convent of St. Daniel, which place had been abandoned by the French two days before. Verdier after causing some trifling loss to Conde, passed the bridge of Salt, and marched down the left of the Ter to Sarria, to save his parcs, which were threatened by Rovira and Claros; for when those two Partizans skirmished with the Westphalian troops, the latter retired across the Ter, abandoning their camp and two dismounted mortars. Thus the place was succoured for a moment; but, as Blake made no further movement, Alvarez was little benefitted by the success. The provisions received, did not amount to more than seven or eight days’ consumption; and the reinforcement, more than enough to devour the food, was yet insufficient to raise the siege by sallies. While Millosewitz’s troops were flying on the one side of the Ter, the reports of Claros and Rovira, exaggerating their success on the other side of that river, had caused Alvarez to believe that Blake’s army was victorious, and the French in flight. Hence, he refrained from destroying the bridge of Salt, and Verdier, as we have seen, crossed it to recover his camp at Sarria. But for this error, the garrison, reinforced by Conde’s men, might have filled the trenches, razed the batteries, and even retaken Monjouic before Verdier could have come to their support. St. Cyr having but one day’s provisions left, now resolved to seek Blake, and deliver battle; but the Spanish general retired up the mountains, when he saw the French advancing, and his retreat enabled St. Cyr again to disseminate the French troops. Thus ended the first effort to relieve Gerona. It was creditable to Garcia Conde, but so contemptible, with reference to the means at Blake’s disposal, that Alvarez believed himself betrayed; and, trusting thenceforth only to his own heroism, permitted Conde’s troops to go back, or to remain as they pleased; exacting, however, from those who stopped, an oath not to surrender. Renewing the edict against speaking of a capitulation, he reduced the rations of the garrison first to one half, and afterwards to a fourth of the full allowance, a measure which caused some desertions to the enemy; but the great body of the soldiers and citizens were as firm as their chief, and the townsmen freely sharing their own scanty food with the garrison, made common cause in every thing. Garcia Conde’s success must be attributed partly to the negligence of St. Cyr’s subordinates; but the extended cantonments, occupied in the evening of the 31st, gave Blake, as the French general himself acknowledges, an opportunity of raising the siege without much danger or difficulty: nor were St. Cyr’s dispositions for the next day perfectly combined. It is evident that giving Blake credit for sound views, he was himself so expectant of a great battle that he forgot to guard against minor operations. The flat country between the left of the Oña and the Ter was the natural line for a convoy to penetrate to the town; hence it was a fault to leave two thousand men in that place, with their front to the garrison, and their rear to the relieving army, when the latter could steal through the mountains until close upon them. Cavalry posts at least should have been established at the different inlets to the hills, and beacons raised on convenient eminences. The main body of the army appears also to have been at too great a distance from the town; the firing that took place in the plain of Salt was disregarded by Verdier’s reserve; and the first information of the attack was brought to Fornels by the fugitives themselves. [Sidenote: St. Cyr’s Journal of Operations.] St. Cyr says that his generals of division were negligent, and so weakened by sickness as to be unable to look to their outposts; that he had recommended to Verdier the raising of field-works at the bridge of Salt and in the passes of the hills, and, when his advice was disregarded, forbore, from the peculiar situation in which he himself was placed by the French government, to enforce his undoubted authority. But St. Cyr avows that his soldiers answered honestly to every call he made; and he was bound, while he retained the command, to enforce every measure necessary for maintaining their honour. In other respects, his prudence and vigilance were such as beseemed his great reputation. It was not so with Blake. The whole of his operations proved that he had lost confidence, and was incapable of any great enterprize. He should have come up with a resolution to raise the siege or to perish. He contented himself with a few slight skirmishes, and the introduction of a small convoy of provisions; and then notwithstanding the deep suffering of this noble city, turned away, with a cold look, and a donation that mocked its wants. When the siege was resumed, St. Cyr withdrew the French posts from Palau and Monte Livio, leaving the way apparently open on that side, for the return of Garcia Conde, who, deceived by this wile came out at daybreak on the 3d of September, with fifteen hundred men and the beasts of burthen. Halting, for a little time, just beyond the gate, he examined the country in front with his glass; every thing appeared favourable and his troops were beginning to move forward, when the noise of drums beating to arms gave notice that an ambuscade was placed behind Palau. St. Cyr had, indeed, posted a brigade there in the hope of surprising the Spaniards, but the French forgetting the ambush, were performing the regular service of the camp at day-light, and a cry of astonishment burst from the Spanish column as it hastily retreated again into the town. Baffled by this ridiculous mistake, and concluding that the next attempt would be by Castellar and La Bispal, St. Cyr placed Mazzuchelli’s brigade (the same that had been behind Palau) in the valley of the Oña in such a manner that it could fall upon Conde’s rear when the latter should again come forth. He also put a battalion on the hills in a position to head the Spanish column, and drive it back either upon Mazzuchelli’s brigade or upon La Bispal, where he also posted three battalions and a squadron of Pino’s division. The 4th of September one thousand infantry, five hundred cavalry, and eleven hundred mules again came out of Gerona, and ascending the heights in which the fort of the Capuchin was situated, pushed in single files along a by-path, leading to Castellar da Selva. Mazzuchelli saw them plainly, but did not attack, waiting for the fire of the battalion ahead, and that battalion did not fire because Mazzuchelli did not attack, and it was supposed the Spaniards were part of his brigade. Garcia Conde quickly perceived their double error, and with great readiness filing off to his left, turned the right of the battalion in his front, and gained Castellar without hurt, although the French in Monjouic observing all that passed, played their guns upon the rear of his column. Being informed by the peasants at Castellar, that troops were also waiting for him at La Bispal, he made for Caza de Selva, and General Pino having notice of his approach, directed two battalions to seize the summit of a ridge which crossed the Spanish line of march, but the battalions took a wrong direction; the Spaniards moved steadily on, and although their rear was attacked by Pino’s personal escort, and that fifty men and some mules were captured, the main body escaped with honour. There were now four open breaches in Gerona; Mazzuchelli’s brigade and the troops at La Bispal were added to the investing corps, and the immediate fall of the city seemed inevitable, when the French store of powder failed, and ten days elapsed before a fresh supply could be obtained. Alvarez profitted of this cessation, to retrench and barricade the breaches in the most formidable manner. Verdier had retaken the convent of St. Daniel in the valley of Galligan, and obliged the five hundred sick men to return to the town on the 4th; but Landen, the officer sent by Blake, on the 31st of August, to seize the convent of _Madona de los Angeles_, had fortified that building, and introduced small supplies of provisions; thus reviving, in the mind of Alvarez, a plan for taking possession of the heights beyond those on which the Capuchin and Constable forts were situated, by which, in conjunction with the post at Madona de los Angeles, and with the assistance of Blake’s army, he hoped to maintain an open communication with the country. A bold and skilful conception, but he was unable to effect it; for making a sally from the Capuchins on the 6th with eighteen hundred men, he was beaten by a single French regiment; and the same day Mazzuchelli’s Italians stormed Madona de los Angeles, and put the garrison to the sword. During these events, Verdier marched against Claros and Rovira who were posted at St. Gregorio, near Amer. He was repulsed with loss, and the French general Joba was killed. Meanwhile the batteries having recommenced their fire on the 13th, Alvarez made a general sally, by the gates of San Pedro, beat the guards from the trenches, and spiked the guns in one of the breaching batteries. The 18th, however, Verdier thinking the breaches practicable, proposed to give the assault, and required assistance from St. Cyr, but disputes between the generals of the covering and the investing forces were rife. The engineers of the latter declared the breaches practicable, those of the former asserted that they were not, and that while the fort of Calvary, outside the walls, although in ruins was in possession of the Spaniards, no assault should be attempted. Either from negligence, or the disputes between St. Cyr and Augereau, above five thousand convalescents capable of duty were retained in a body at Perpignan, and Verdier could not produce so many under arms for the assault, nor even for this number were there officers to lead, so wasting was the sickness. The covering army was scarcely better off, and Blake had again taken the position of St. Hilario. Howbeit, St. Cyr, seeing no better remedy, consented to try the storm provided Calvary were first taken. [Sidenote: St. Cyr’s Journal of Operations] Souham’s division was appointed to watch Blake, Pino was directed to make a false attack on the opposite quarter to where the breaches were established, and, on the 19th, Verdier’s troops, in three columns, advanced rapidly down the valley of Galligan to the assault. But the fort of Calvary had not been taken, and its fire swept the columns of attack along the whole line of march. Two hundred men fell before they reached the walls, and just as the summit of the largest breach was gained, the French batteries, which continued to play on the Spanish retrenchments, brought down a large mass of wall upon the head of the attacking column. The besieged resisted manfully, and the besiegers were completely repulsed from all the breaches with a loss of six hundred men. Verdier accused his soldiers of cowardice, and blamed St. Cyr for refusing to bring the covering troops to the assault; but that general, asserting that the men behaved perfectly well, called a council of war, and proposed to continue the operations with as much vigour as the nature of the case would permit. His persevering spirit was not partaken by the council, and the siege was turned into a blockade. Blake now advanced with his army, and from the 20th to the 25th, made as if he would raise the blockade; but his object was merely to introduce another convoy. St. Cyr, divining his intention and judging that he would make the attempt on the 26th, resolved to let him penetrate the covering line, and then fall on him before he could reach the town. In this view, Souham’s division was placed behind Palau and Pino’s division at Casa de Selva, and Lecchi’s division of the investing troops, was directed to meet the Spaniards in front, while the two former came down upon their rear. Blake assembled his troops on the side of Hostalrich, then made a circuitous route to La Bispal, and, taking post on the heights of St. Sadurni, detached ten thousand men, under Wimphen, to protect the passage of the convoy, of which Henry O’Donnel led the advanced guard. At day-break, on the 26th, O’Donnel fell upon the rear of the French troops at Castellar, broke through them, and reached the fort of the Constable with the head of the convoy; but the two French battalions which he had driven before him, rallying on the heights of San Miguel to the right of the Spanish column, returned to the combat, and at the same time St. Cyr in person, with a part of Souham’s division came upon the left flank of the convoy, and, pressing it strongly, obliged the greater part to retrograde. When Pino’s division, running up from Casa de Selva, attacked the rear-guard under Wimphen, the route was complete, and Blake made no effort to save the distressed troops. O’Donnel with a thousand men and about two hundred mules got safely into the town, but the remainder of the convoy was taken. The Italians gave no quarter and three thousand of the Spaniards were slain. After this action, some troops being sent towards Vidreras, to menace Blake’s communications with Hostalrich, he retired by the side of St. Filieu de Quixols, and Gerona was again abandoned to her sufferings which were become almost insupportable. Without money, without medicines, without food; pestilence within the walls, the breaches open. “If,” said Alvarez, “the captain-general be unable to make a vigorous effort, the whole of Catalonia must rise to our aid, or Gerona will soon be but a heap of carcases and ruins, the memory of which will afflict posterity!” St. Cyr now repaired to Perpignan to make arrangements for future supply, but finding Augereau in a good state of health, obliged that marshal to assume the command. Then, he says, every thing needful was bestowed with a free hand upon the seventh corps, because he himself was no longer in the way; but a better reason is to be found in the state of Napoleon’s affairs. Peace had been concluded with Austria, the English expeditions to the Scheldt and against Naples had failed, and all the resources of the French government becoming disposable, not only the seventh, but every “corps d’armée” in Spain was reinforced. Augereau, escorted by the five thousand convalescents from Perpignan, reached the camp before Gerona, the 12th of October. In the course of the following night, O’Donnel, issuing from the town, on the side of the plain, broke through the guards, fell upon Souham’s quarters, obliged that general to fly in his shirt, and finally effected a junction with Milans, at Santa Coloma; having successfully executed as daring an enterprise as any performed during this memorable siege. Augereau, however, pressed the blockade, and thinking the spirit of the Spaniards reduced, offered an armistice for a month, with the free entry of provisions, if Alvarez would promise to surrender unless relieved before the expiration of that period. Such, however, was the steady virtue of this man and his followers, that, notwithstanding the grievous famine, the offer was refused. Blake, on the 29th of October took possession once more of the heights of Bruñola. Souham, with an inferior force put him to flight, and this enabled Augereau to detach Pino against the town of Hostalrich, which was fortified with an old wall and towers, defended by two thousand men, and supported by the fire of the castle. It was carried by storm, and the provisions and stores laid up there captured, although Blake, with his army, was only a few miles off. This disaster was however, more than balanced by an action off the coast. Rear-admiral Baudin, with a French squadron, consisting of three ships of the line, two frigates, and sixteen large store-ships, having sailed from Toulon for Barcelona, about the 20th of October, was intercepted by admiral Martin on the 23d. During the chase several of the smaller vessels were burnt by the enemy, the rest were driven on shore at different places, and two of the line of battle ships were set on fire by their own crews. The store-ships and some of the armed vessels, taking refuge at Rosas, put up boarding nettings, and protecting their flanks by Rosas and the Trinity-fort, presented a formidable front, having above twenty guns on board disposed for defence, besides the shore batteries. On the 31st of November however, captain Hallowell appeared in the bay with a squadron; and the same evening, sending his boats in, destroyed the whole fleet, in despite of a very vigorous resistance which cost the British seventy men killed and wounded. [Illustration: _Vol. 3, Plate 2._ SIEGE of GERONA 1810. _Published by T. & W. Boone 1830._] Meanwhile the distress of Gerona increased, desertions became frequent, and ten officers having failed in a plot to oblige the governor to capitulate, went over in a body to the enemy. During November, famine and sickness increased within the city, and the French stores of powder were again exhausted; but on the 6th of December, ammunition having arrived, the suburb of Marina, that of Girondella, the fort of Calvary, and all the other towers beyond the walls, were carried by the besiegers; and the besieged, confined to the circuit of the walls, were cut off from the Capuchin and Constable forts. Alvarez, who had been ill for some days, roused himself for a last effort; and, making a general sally, on the 7th, retook the suburb of Girondella and the redoubts; and opening a way to the outworks of the Constable, carried off the garrison. The next day, overcome by suffering, he became delirious. A council of war assembled, and after six months of open trenches, Gerona yielded on the 10th. The garrison marched out with the honours of war, the troops were to be exchanged in due course, the inhabitants were to be respected, and none but soldiers were to be considered prisoners. Such was the termination of a defence which eclipsed the glory of Zaragoza. French and Spanish writers alike, affirm that Augereau treated Alvarez with a rigour and contumely that excited every person’s indignation; and that, in violation of the capitulation, the monks were, by an especial order of Napoleon, sent to France. This last accusation admits, however, of dispute; the monks had during the siege, formed themselves into a regular corps, named the Crusaders; they were disciplined and clothed in a sort of uniform; and being to all intents soldiers, it can hardly be said, that to constitute them prisoners, was a violation, although it was undoubtedly a harsh interpretation of the terms. Alvarez died at Figueras in his way to France; but so long as virtue and courage are esteemed in the world, his name will be held in veneration; and if Augereau forgot what was due to this gallant Spaniard’s merit, posterity will not forget to do justice to both. OBSERVATIONS. 1º. In this siege, the constancy with which the Geronans bore the most terrible sufferings accounts for the protracted resistance; but constancy alone could not have enabled them to defy the regular progress of the engineer; as I have before observed, the combinations of science are not to be defied with impunity. But the French combinations were not scientific; and this, saving the right of Gerona to the glory she earned so hardly, was the secret of the defence. 2º. General St. Cyr, after observing that the attack on Montjouic was ill judged and worse executed, says, “The principal approaches should have been conducted against the Marcadel, because the soil there, was easy to work in, full of natural hollows and clifts, and the defences open in flank and rear to batteries on the Monte Livio and the Casen Rocca. Whereas on the side of Montjouic, the approaches, from the rocky nature of the soil, could only be carried forward by the flying sap, with great loss and difficulty.” If however, the Marcadel had fallen, the greatest part of the city would still have been covered by the Oña, and Montjouic, and the forts of the Constable and Capuchin, (regular places complete in themselves,) would have remained to be taken, unless it can be supposed, that a governor who defended the feeble walls of the town after those outworks fell, would have surrendered all, because a lodgement was made in an isolated quarter. These things are, however, ordinarily doubtful; and certainly, it must always be a great matter with a general, to raise the moral confidence of his own army, or to sink that of his adversary, even though it should be by a momentary and illusive success. 3º. The faulty execution of the attack on Montjouic is less doubtful than the choice of direction. The cessation of the breaching fire for four days previous to the assault, and the disregard of the rules of art already noticed, amply account for failure; and it is to be observed, that this failure caused the delay of a whole month in the progress of the siege; that during that month disease invaded the army, and the soldiers, as they will be found to do in all protracted operations, became careless and disinclined to the labours of the trenches. 4º. The assault on the body of the place was not better conducted than that against Montjouic; and considering these facts, together with the jealousy and disputes between the generals, the mixture of Germans, Italians, and French in the army, and the mal-administration of the hospitals, by which so many men were lost, and so many more kept from their duty, it is rather surprising that Gerona was taken at all. 5º. The foregoing conclusions in no wise affect the merits of the besieged, because the difficulties and errors of their adversaries only prolonged their misery. They fought bravely; they endured unheard of sufferings with constancy; and their refusal to accept the armistice offered by Augereau, is as noble and affecting an instance of virtue as any that history has recorded. Yet how mixed are good and evil principles in man; how dependent upon accidental circumstances is the development of his noble or base qualities! Alvarez, so magnanimous, so firm, so brave, so patriotic at Gerona, was the same Alvarez who, one year before, surrendered the Barcelona Montjouic, on the insolent summons of Duhesme! At that period, the influence of a base court, degraded public feeling, and what was weak in his character came to the surface; but in times more congenial to virtuous sentiments, all the nobility of the man’s nature broke forth. 6º. When the siege of Gerona is contrasted with that of Zaragoza, it may shake the opinion of those who regard the wild hostility of the multitude as superior to the regulated warfare of soldiers. The number of enemies that came against the latter was rather less than those who came against the former city. The regular garrison of Zaragoza was above thirty thousand; that of Gerona about three thousand. The armed multitude, in the one, amounted to at least twenty-five thousand; in the other, they were less than six thousand. Cruelty and murder marked every step in the defence of Zaragoza; the most horrible crimes were necessary to prolong the resistance, above forty thousand persons perished miserably, and the town was taken within three months. In Gerona there was nothing to blush for; the fighting was more successful; the actual loss inflicted upon the enemy greater; the suffering within the walls neither wantonly produced nor useless; the period of its resistance doubled that of Zaragoza; and every proceeding tended to raise instead of sinking the dignity of human nature. There was less of brutal rule, more of reason, and consequently more real heroism, more success at the moment, and a better example given to excite the emulation of generous men. 7º. With reference to the general posture of affairs, the fall of Gerona was a reproach to the Spanish and English cabinets. The latter having agents in Catalonia, and such a man as lord Collingwood in the Mediterranean, to refer to, were yet so ignorant, or so careless of what was essential to the success of the war, as to let Gerona struggle for six months, when half the troops employed by sir John Stuart to alarm Naples, if carried to the coast of Catalonia, and landed at Palamos, would have raised the siege. It was not necessary that this army should have been equipped for a campaign, a single march would have effected the object. An engineer and a few thousand pounds would have rendered Palamos a formidable post; and that place being occupied by English troops, and supported by a fleet, greater means than the French could have collected in 1809, would not have reduced Gerona. The Catalans, indeed, were not more tractable nor more disposed than others to act cordially with their allies; but the natural sterility of the country, the condensed manufacturing population, the number of strong posts and large fortified towns in their possession, and, above all, the long and difficult lines of communication which the French must have guarded for the passage of their convoys, would have rendered the invaders’ task most difficult. 8º. From the commencement of the Spanish insurrection, the policy of the Valencians had been characterised by a singular indifference to the calamities that overwhelmed the other parts of Spain. The local Junta in that province, not content with asserting their own exclusive authority, imagined that it was possible to maintain Valencia independent, even though the rest of the Peninsula should be conquered. Hence the siege of Zaragoza passed unheeded, and the suffering of Gerona made no impression on them. With a regular army of above ten thousand men, more than thirty thousand armed irregulars, and a large fleet at Carthagena, the governors of this rich province, so admirably situated for offensive operations, never even placed the fortified towns of their own frontier in a state of defence, and carelessly beheld the seventh and third corps gradually establishing, at the distance of a few days’ march from Valencia itself, two solid bases for further invasion! But it is now time to revert to the operations of the “_Central Supreme Junta_,” that it may be fully understood how the patriotism, the constancy, the lives, and the fortunes of the Spanish people were sported with by those who had so unhappily acquired a momentary power in the Peninsula. CHAP. IV. When sir Arthur Wellesley retired to the frontier of Portugal, the calumnies propagated in Andalusia, relative to the cause of that movement, were so far successful that no open revolt took place; but the public hatred being little diminished, a design was formed to establish a better government, as a preliminary to which, measures were secretly taken to seize the members of the Junta, and transport them to Manilla. The old Junta of Seville being the chief movers of this sedition, no good could be expected from the change, otherwise, such an explosion, although sure to be attended with slaughter and temporary confusion, was not unlikely to prove advantageous to the nation at large, it being quite obvious that some violent remedy was wanting to purge off the complicated disorders of the state. “_Spain_,” said lord Wellesley, “_has proved untrue to our alliance, because she is untrue to herself._”--“_Until some great change shall be effected in the conduct of the military resources of Spain, and in the state of her armies, no British army can attempt safely to co-operate with Spanish troops in the territories of Spain.”--“No alliance can protect her from the results of internal disorders and national infirmity._” This evident discontent of the British ambassador led the conspirators to impart their designs to him, in the hopes of assistance; but he being accredited to the existing government, apprised it of the danger, concealing, however, with due regard to humanity, the names of those engaged in the plot. The Junta, in great alarm, immediately sought to mitigate the general hatred; but still averse to sacrificing any power, projected a counter scheme. They had, for the public good according to some, for private emolument according to others, hitherto permitted trading, under licenses, with the towns occupied by the enemy. This regulation and some peculiarly-heavy exactions they now rescinded, and, as a final measure of conciliation, appointed, with many protestations of patriotism, commissioners to prepare a scheme of government which should serve until the fit period for convoking the Cortes arrived. But the commissioners, principally chosen from amongst the members of the Junta, soon made manifest the real designs of that body. They proposed that five persons should form a supreme executive council, every member of the existing Junta, in rotation, to have a place; the colonies to be represented as an integral part of the empire; and the council so composed, to rule until the Cortes should meet, and then to preside in that assembly. Thus under the pretence of resigning their power, by a simple change of form, the present and the future authority of the Junta were to be confirmed, and even the proposal, in favour of the colonies, was, following the opinion of lord Wellesley, a mere expedient to obtain a momentary popularity, and entirely unconnected with enlarged or liberal views of policy and government. [Sidenote: Vol. II. p. 348.] This project was foiled by Romana, who, being of the commission, dissented from his colleagues; and it was on this occasion that he drew up that accusatory paper, quoted in another part of this history, and the bad acts therein specified, although sufficiently heinous, were not the only charges made at this period. It was objected to some amongst the Junta, that having as merchants, contracted for supplying the army, they in their public capacity, raised the price to be paid by the treasury for the articles; and that the members generally were venal in their patronage, difficult of access, and insolent of demeanour. Romana proposed a council of regency, to be composed of five persons, not members of the Junta. This council to be assisted by a fresh chosen Junta, also composed of five members and a procurator-general, and to be stiled “_The Permanent Deputation of the Realm_.” One of this body to be a South American, and the whole to represent the Cortes, until the meeting of that assembly, which, he thought, could not be too soon. His plan, introduced by misplaced declarations in favour of arbitrary power, and terminated by others equally strong in favour of civil liberty, was not well considered. The “_Permanent Deputation_,” being to represent the Cortes, it was obvious that it must possess the right of controlling the Regency; but the numbers and dignity of both being equal, and their interests opposed, it was as obvious that a struggle would commence, in which the latter, having the sole distribution of honours and emoluments, could not fail to conquer, and no Cortes would be assembled. Some time before this, when the terror caused by sir Arthur Wellesley’s retreat from Spain, was fresh, Don Martin de Garay had applied to lord Wellesley for advice, as to the best form of government, and that nobleman also recommended a “_Council of Regency_,” and, like Romana, proposed a second council; but with this essential difference, that the latter were only to arrange the details for electing the members of Cortes, a proclamation for the convocation of which was to be immediately published, together with a list of grievances, “_a Bill of Rights_” founded on an enlarged conciliatory policy and having equal regard for the interests of the colonies as for those of the mother country. Garay approved of this advice while danger menaced the Junta; but when the arrangement for the command of the armies had been completed, and the first excitement had subsided, his solicitude for the improvement of the government ceased. It must, however, be acknowledged, that lord Wellesley, condemned the existing system, as much for its democratic form as for its inefficiency; because the English cabinet never forgot, that they were the champions of privilege, nor, that the war was essentially, less for the defence of Spain, than the upholding of the aristocratic system of Europe. To evade Romana’s proposition, the Junta, on the 28th of October, announced that the National Cortes should be convoked on the 1st of January, 1810, and assembled for business on the 1st of March following. Having thus, in some measure, met the public wishes, they joined to this announcement a virulent attack on the project of a Regency, affirming, and not without some foundation as regarded Romana’s plan, that such a government would disgust the colonies, trample on the king’s rights, and would never assemble the Cortes; moreover that it would soon be corrupted by the French. Then enlarging on their own merits in a turgid declamatory style, they defended their past conduct by a tissue of misrepresentations, which deceived nobody; for, to use the words of lord Wellesley, “_no plan had been adopted for any effectual redress of grievances, correction of abuses or relief from exactions, and the administration of justice, the regulation of revenue, finance, commerce, the security of persons and property, and every other great branch of government, were as defective as the military establishments_.” However, the promise of assembling the Cortes sufficed to lull the public wrath; and the Junta resolved to recommence offensive military operations, which they fondly imagined would, at once, crush the enemy, and firmly establish their own popularity and power. They were encouraged by a false, but general impression throughout Andalusia, that Austria had broken off negotiations with France; and in September and October, fresh levies, raised in Estremadura and Andalusia, were incorporated with the remains of Cuesta’s old army; the whole forming a body of more than sixty thousand soldiers, of which nearly ten thousand were cavalry. Nor was the assembling and equipment of this force a matter of great difficulty; for owing to the feeble resistance made against the invaders, the war had hitherto drawn so little on the population, that the poorer sort never evaded a call for personal service; and the enormous accumulation of English stores and money at Cadiz and Seville, were sufficient for every exigency. In October Eguia advanced with this army a short way into La Mancha; but when the French, unwilling to lose the resources of that fertile province made a movement towards him, he regained the Sierra Morena on the 16th, taking post, first at St. Elena, and finally at La Carolina. The first and fourth corps then occupied the whole of La Mancha, with advanced posts at the foot of the mountains; the second and fifth corps were established in the valley of the Tagus and at Toledo; and the reserve at Madrid. During these movements, Bassecour, who commanded in Estremadura, detached eight hundred horsemen to reinforce the duke Del Parque, and quartered the rest of his forces behind the Guadiana. Thus in the latter end of October, there were sixty thousand men, under Eguia, covering Seville by the line of La Mancha; ten thousand under Bassecour on the line of Estremadura, and about six thousand employed as guards to the Junta and in the service of the depôts behind the Morena. [Sidenote: See Vol. II. p. 427.] In the north, the Spanish army of the left was concentrated near Ciudad Rodrigo. For when Beresford marched down the Portuguese frontier to the Tagus, the duke Del Parque, reinforced with the eight hundred cavalry from Estremadura, and with the Gallician divisions of Mendizabel and Carrera, (amounting to thirteen thousand men, completely equipped from English stores, brought out to Coruña in July,) made a movement into the rugged country, about the Sierra de Francia, and sent his scouting parties as far as Baños. At the same time general Santocildes, marching from Lugo with two thousand men, took possession of Astorga, and menaced the rear of the sixth corps, which after forcing the pass of Baños, had been quartered between the Tormes and the Esla. In this situation, a French detachment attempted to surprise one of the gates of Astorga, on the 9th of October, and, being repulsed, returned to their cantonments. Soon afterwards Ballasteros, having again collected about eight thousand men in the Asturias, armed and equipped them from English stores, and, coming down to Astorga, crossed the Esla, and attempted to storm Zamora. Failing in this, he entered Portugal by the road of Miranda, and from thence proceeded to join the duke Del Parque. Thus the old armies of Gallicia and the Asturias being broken up, those provinces were ordered to raise fresh forces; but there was in Gallicia a general disposition to resist the authority of the Central Junta. Del Parque, eager to act against the sixth corps, demanded, through Perez Castro the Spanish envoy at Lisbon, that the Portuguese army should join him; but this being referred to sir Arthur Wellesley, he gave it a decided negative, grounding his refusal upon reasons which I shall insert at large, as giving a clear and interesting view of the military state of affairs at this period. [Sidenote: Letter from Sir A. Wellesley, Sept. 23, 1809. MS.] “The enemy, he said, were superior to the allies, including those which Beresford might bring into the field, not only in numbers, but (adverting to the composition of the Spanish armies, the want of cavalry in some, of artillery in others, of clothing, ammunition, and arms, and the deficiency of discipline in all) superior in efficiency even to a greater degree than in numbers. These circumstances, and the absolute deficiency in means, were the causes why, after a great victory at Talavera, the armies had been obliged to recur to the defensive, and nothing had altered for the better since. “But, besides these considerations, the enemy enjoyed peculiar advantages from his central position, which enabled him to frustrate the duke Del Parque’s intended operations. He could march a part, or the whole of his forces to any quarter, whereas the operation of the different corps of the allies must necessarily be isolated, and each for a time exposed to defeat. Thus there was nothing to prevent the enemy from throwing himself upon the duke Del Parque and Beresford, with the whole corps of Ney, which was at Salamanca, of Soult, which was at Plasencia, and with the force under Kellerman, which was near Valladolid, in which case, even if he, sir Arthur, had the inclination, he had not the means of marching in time to save them from destruction. “In the same manner the British army, if it took an advanced position, would be liable to a fatal disaster; so likewise would the Spanish army of La Mancha. It followed, then, that if any one of these armies made a forward movement, the whole must co-operate, or the single force in activity would be ruined; but the relative efficiency and strength of the hostile forces, as laid down in the commencement of the argument, forbad a general co-operation with any hopes of solid success; and the only consequence that could follow would be, that, after a battle or two, some brilliant actions performed by a part, and some defeats sustained by others, and after the loss of many valuable officers and soldiers, the allies would be forced again to resume those defensive positions, which they ought never to have quitted. “Satisfied that this was the only just view of affairs, he, although prepared to make an effort to prevent Ciudad Rodrigo from falling into the enemy’s hands, was resolved not to give the duke Del Parque any assistance to maintain his former position, and he advised the Portuguese government, not to risk Bereford’s army in a situation which could only lead to mischief. The proposed operation of the duke Del Parque was not the mode to save Ciudad Rodrigo. The only effectual one was to post himself in such a situation as that the enemy could not attack and defeat him without a long previous preparation, which would give time for aid to arrive, and a march, in which the enemy himself might be exposed to defeat. To expose those troops to defeat which were ultimately to co-operate in defence of Ciudad Rodrigo, was not the way of preventing the success of an attempt of that fortress. The best way was to place the Spanish force in such a post that it could not be attacked without risk to the enemy, and from whence it could easily co-operate with the other corps, which must be put in motion, if Ciudad was to be saved; and although he would not take upon himself to point out the exact position which the duke Del Parque ought to occupy, he was certain that, in his present forward one, although joined by Beresford, he could not avoid defeat. Ciudad Rodrigo would be lost, and other misfortunes would follow, none of which could occur under any other probable, or even possible concurrence of circumstances. In fine, that he had long been of opinion that the war must necessarily be defensive on the part of the allies, and that Portugal at least, if not Spain, ought to avail herself of the short period, which the enemy seemed disposed to leave her in tranquillity, to organize, and equip, and discipline her armies. Those objects could not be accomplished, unless the troops were kept quiet, and yet they were much more important to all parties, than any desultory successful operations against the French troops about Salamanca; but any success was doubtful, and certain to be temporary, because the enemy would immediately collect in numbers sufficient to crush the allies, who must then return, having failed in their object, lost a number of men, and, what was worse, time, which would have been more usefully employed in preparing for a great and well combined effort.” [Sidenote: Sir A. Wellesley’s Correspondence with Don M. Forjas, October 19, 1809. MSS.] This reasoning, solid, clear, convincing, made no impression upon the Spanish Junta or their general. Castro replied to it, by demanding a positive and definitive answer, as to when the Portuguese army would be in a condition to co-operate with the Spaniards in the Spanish territories. “_When there is a Spanish army with which the Portuguese can co-operate on some defined plan, which all parties will have the means, and will engage to carry into execution, as far as any person can engage to carry into execution a military operation._” “_When means shall be pointed out, and fixed, for the subsistence of the Portuguese troops while they remain in Spain, so that they may not starve, and be obliged to retire for want of food, as was the case when lately in that country._” “_When decided answers shall be given upon those points, I shall be enabled to tell the governors of Portugal that their excellencies have an army in a state to be sent into Spain._” This was sir Arthur’s reply, which ended the negotiation, and the duke Del Parque commenced operations by himself. To favour the junction of Ballasteros, his first movement was towards Ledesma. General Marchand immediately drew together, at Salamanca, eleven thousand men and fourteen guns, and marched to meet him. Thereupon, the duke, without having effected his junction, fell back to Tamames; taking post half-way up a mountain of remarkable strength, where he awaited the enemy, with a thousand cavalry and twenty thousand infantry, of which the Gallicians only could be accounted experienced soldiers. BATTLE OF TAMAMES. General Losada commanded the Spanish right, count Belvidere the reserve, Martin Carrera the left, which being on the most accessible part of the mountain was covered and flanked by the cavalry. Marchand, desirous of fighting before Ballasteros could arrive, moved rapidly, reached the foot of the mountain early on the 18th of October, and immediately fell upon Del Parque’s left. The Spanish cavalry fled rather hastily; the French horsemen followed closely, the infantry surprised in the midst of an evolution, were thrown into disorder, and the artillery was taken. Carrera, Mendizabel, and the duke, rallied the troops on the higher ground, reinforced them from the reserve, and coming down with a fresh impetus, recovered the guns, and discomfitted the French with the loss of an eagle, one cannon, and several hundred men. During this brilliant combat on the left, the right and centre were felt by the French skirmishers; but the ground was too strong to make any impression. Marchand, seeing his men repulsed in all quarters with loss, and fearing to be enclosed by Ballasteros in that disordered state, retreated to Salamanca. Del Parque did not venture to follow up his victory until the 21st, when, being joined by Ballasteros, he pushed with nearly thirty thousand men for Ledesma; crossed the Tormes there on the 23d, turned Salamanca by a night march, and early in the morning of the 24th crowned the heights of San Cristoval in rear of that city, hoping to cut off Marchand’s retreat. But that general had timely information, and was already at Toro, behind the Douro. Meanwhile, the news of the defeat at Tamames reached Madrid, Dessolle’s division was detached through the Puerto Pico to reinforce the sixth corps; and Kellerman was directed to advance from Valladolid, and take the command of the whole. When the duke Del Parque heard of this reinforcement, he fell back, not to Ciudad Rodrigo, but by the way of Alba de Tormes to Bejar, which latter place he reached on the 8th of November. And while these events were taking place in Castile, the Central Junta having finally concocted their schemes, were commencing an enterprise of unparalleled rashness on the side of La Mancha. CHAPTER V. In the arrangement of warlike affairs, difficulties being always overlooked by the Spaniards, they are carried on from one phantasy to another so swiftly, that the first conception of an enterprise is immediately followed by a confident anticipation of complete success, which continues until the hour of battle; and then when it might be of use, generally abandons them. Now the Central Junta having, to deceive the people, affirmed that sir Arthur Wellesley retreated to the frontiers of Portugal at the very moment when the French might have been driven to the Pyrenees, came very soon to believe this their own absurd calumny, and resolved to send the army at Carolina headlong against Madrid: nay, such was their pitch of confidence, that forenaming the civil and military authorities, they arranged a provisionary system for the future administration of the capital, with a care, that they denied to the army which was to put them in possession. Eguia was considered unfit to conduct this enterprise, and Albuquerque was distasteful to the Junta; wherefore, casting their eyes upon general Areizaga, they chose him, whose only recommendation was, that, at the petty battle of Alcanitz, Blake had noticed his courage. He was then at Lerida, but reached La Carolina in the latter end of October; and being of a quick lively turn, and as confident as the Junta could desire, readily undertook to drive the French from Madrid. This movement was to commence early in November, and at first, only Villa Campa, with the bands from Aragon, were to assist. But when Areizaga, after meeting the enemy, began to lose confidence, the duke of Albuquerque, successor to Bassecour in Estremadura, received instructions to cause a diversion, by marching on Arzobispo and Talavera de la Reyna. The duke Del Parque, coming by the pass of Baños, was to join him there; and thus nearly ninety thousand men were to be put in motion against Madrid, but precisely on that plan which sir Arthur Wellesley had just denounced as certain to prove disastrous. Indeed, every chance was so much in favour of the French, that taking into consideration the solid reasons for remaining on the defensive, Areizaga’s irruption may be regarded as an extreme example of military rashness; and the project of uniting Del Parque’s forces with Albuquerque’s, at Talavera, was also certain to fail; because, the enemy’s masses were already in possession of the point of junction, and the sixth corps could fall on Del Parque’s rear. [Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 1.] Partly to deceive the enemy, partly because they would never admit of any opposition to a favourite scheme, the Junta spread a report that the British army was to co-operate; and permitted Areizaga to march, under the impression that it was so. Yet nothing could be more untrue. Sir Arthur Wellesley being at this period at Seville, held repeated conversations with the Spanish ministers and the members of the Junta, and reiterating all his former objections to offensive operations, warned his auditors that the project in question was peculiarly ill-judged, and would end in the destruction of their army. The Spanish ministers, far from attending to his advice, did not even _officially inform him of Areizaga’s march until the 18th of November_, the very day before the fatal termination of the campaign. Yet, on _the 16th they had repeated their demand for assistance_, and with a vehemence, deaf to reason, required that the British should instantly co-operate with Albuquerque and Del Parque’s forces. Sir Arthur, firm to his first views, never gave the slightest hopes that his army would so act; and he assured the Junta, that the diversion proposed would have no effect whatever. OPERATIONS IN LA MANCHA. Areizaga, after publishing an address to the troops on the 3d of November, commenced his march from La Carolina, with sixty pieces of artillery, and from fifty to sixty thousand men, of which about eight thousand were cavalry. Several British officers and private gentlemen, and the baron Crossard, an Austrian military agent, attended the head-quarters which was a scene of gaiety and boasting; for Areizaga, never dreaming of misfortune, gave a free scope to his social vivacity. The army marched by the roads of Manzanares and Damiel, with scarcely any commissariat preparation, and without any military equipment save arms; but the men were young, robust, full of life and confidence; and being without impediments of any kind, made nearly thirty miles each day. They moved however in a straggling manner, quartering and feeding as they could in the villages on their route, and with so little propriety, that the peasantry of La Mancha universally abandoned their dwellings, and carried off their effects. [Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations. MSS.] Although the French could not at first give credit to the rumours of this strange incursion, they were aware that some great movement was in agitation, and only uncertain from what point and for what specific object the effort would be made. Jourdan had returned to France; Soult was major-general of the French armies, and under his advice, the king, who was inclined to abandon Madrid, prepared to meet the coming blow. But the army was principally posted towards Talavera; for the false reports had, in some measure, succeeded in deceiving the French as to the approach of the English; and it was impossible at once to conceive the full insanity of the Junta. The second corps, commanded by general Heudelet, being withdrawn from Placentia, was, on the 5th of November, posted at Oropesa and Arzobispo, with an advanced guard at Calzada, and scouting parties watching Naval Moral, and the course of the Tietar. The fifth corps, under Mortier, was concentrated at Talavera. Of the fourth corps, half a division garrisoned Madrid in the absence of Dessolle’s troops; and the other half, under general Liger Belair, was behind the Tajuna, guarding the eastern approaches to the capital. The remaining divisions, commanded by Sebastiani, were, the one at Toledo, the other with Milhaud’s cavalry at Ocaña. [Sidenote: Imperial Muster Roll. MSS.] The first corps, about twenty-one thousand strong, and commanded by marshal Victor, was at Mora and Yebenes, a day’s march in advance of Toledo, but the cavalry of this corps under the command of Latour Maubourg occupied Consuegra and Madrilejos, on the road to the Sierra Morena. The whole army including the French and Spanish guards, was above eighty thousand fighting men, without reckoning Dessolle’s division, which was on the other side of the Guadarama mountains. [Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations. MSS.] In the night of the 6th, information reached the king, that six thousand Spanish horsemen, supported by two thousand foot, had come down upon Consuegra from the side of Herencia, and that a second column likewise composed of cavalry and infantry, had passed the Puerto de Piche, and fallen upon the outposts at Madrilejos. All the prisoners taken in the skirmishes agreed that the Spanish army was above fifty thousand strong, and the duke of Belluno immediately concentrated the first corps at Yebenes, but kept his cavalry at Mora, by which he covered the roads leading from Consuegra and Madrilejos upon Toledo. On the 8th, there were no Spaniards in front of the first corps, yet officers sent towards Ocaña, were chased back by cavalry; and Soult judged what was indeed the truth, that Areizaga continuing his reckless march, had pushed by Tembleque towards Aranjuez, leaving the first corps on his left flank. The division of the fourth corps was immediately moved from Toledo by the right bank of the Tagus to Aranjuez, from whence Sebastiani carried it to Ocaña, thus concentrating about eight thousand infantry, and fifteen hundred cavalry at that point on the 9th; and the same day Victor retired with the first corps to Ajofrin. On the 10th, Gazan’s division of the fifth corps was ordered to march from Talavera to Toledo; and the first corps which had reached the latter town, was directed to move up the right bank of the Tagus to Aranjuez to support Sebastiani, who holding fast at Ocaña, sent six squadrons to feel for the enemy towards Guardia. The Spaniards continuing their movement, met those squadrons and pursued them towards Ocaña. COMBAT OF DOS BARRIOS. Areizaga, ignorant of what was passing around him, and seeing only Sebastiani’s cavalry on the table-land between the town of Dos Barrios and Ocaña, concluded that they were unsupported, and directed the Spanish horse to charge them without delay. The French thus pressed, drew back behind their infantry which was close at hand and unexpectedly opened a brisk fire on the Spanish squadrons which were thrown into confusion, and being charged in that state by the whole mass of the enemy’s cavalry, were beaten, with the loss of two hundred prisoners and two pieces of cannon. Areizaga’s main body was, however, coming up, and Sebastiani fell back upon Ocaña. The next morning he took up a position on some heights lining the left bank of the Tagus and covering Aranjuez, the Spaniards entered Dos Barrios, and their impetuous movement ceased. They had come down from the Morena like a stream of lava; and burst into La Mancha with a rapidity that scarcely gave time for rumour to precede them. But this swiftness of execution, generally so valuable in war, was here but an outbreak of folly. Without any knowledge of the French numbers or position, without any plan of action, Areizaga rushed like a maniac into the midst of his foes, and then suddenly stood still, trembling and bewildered. [Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 1.] From the 10th to the 13th he halted at Dos Barrios, and informed his government of Sebastiani’s stubborn resistance, and of the doubts which now for the first time assailed his own mind. It was then the Junta changing their plans, eagerly demanded the assistance of the British army, and commanded the dukes of Albuquerque and Del Parque to unite at Talavera. Albuquerque commenced his movement immediately, and the Junta did not hesitate to assure both their generals and the public, that sir Arthur was also coming on. Thus encouraged, and having had time to recover from his first incertitude, Areizaga on the 14th, made a flank march by his right to Santa Cruz la Zarza, intending to cross the Tagus at Villa Maurique, turn the French left, and penetrate to the capital by the eastern side; but during his delay at Dos Barrios the French forces had been concentrated from every quarter. [Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations. MSS.] South of Ocaña, the ground is open and undulating, but on the north, the ramifications of the Cuença mountains, leading down the left bank of the Tagus, presented, at Santa Cruz, ridges which stretching strong and rough towards Aranjuez, afforded good positions for Sebastiani to cover that place. Soult was awake to his adversary’s projects, yet could not believe that he would dare such a movement unless certain of support from the British army; and therefore kept the different corps quiet on the eleventh, waiting for Heudelet’s report from Oropesa. In the night it arrived, stating that rumours of a combined Spanish and English army being on the march, were rife, but that the scouts could not discover that the allied force was actually within several marches. Soult, now judging that although the rumours should be true, his central position would enable him to defeat Areizaga and return by the way of Toledo in time to meet the allies in the valley of the Tagus, put all his masses again into activity. The first corps was directed to hasten its march to Aranjuez; the fifth corps to concentrate at Toledo; the second corps to abandon Oropesa, Calzada and Arzobispo, and replacing the fifth corps at Talavera, to be in readiness to close upon the main body of the army. Finally, information being received of the duke Del Parque’s retreat from Salamanca to Bejar and of the re-occupation of Salamanca by the sixth corps, Dessolle’s division was recalled to Madrid. During the 12th, while the first, second, and fifth corps were in march, general Liger Belair’s brigade continued to watch the banks of the Tajuna, and the fourth corps preserved its offensive positions on the height in the front of Aranjuez, having fifteen hundred men in reserve at the bridge of Bayona. The 14th the general movement was completed. Two corps were concentrated at Aranjuez to assail the Spaniards in front; one at Toledo to cross the Tagus and fall upon their left flank, and the king’s guards at Madrid, formed a reserve for the fourth and first corps. The second corps was at Talavera, and Dessolle’s division was in the Guadarama on its return to the capital. In fine, all was prepared for the attack of Dos Barrios, when Areizaga’s flank march to Santa Cruz la Zarza occasioned new combinations. In the evening of the 15th, it was known that the Spaniards had made a bridge at Villa Maurique, and passed two divisions and some cavalry over the Tagus. The duke of Belluno was immediately ordered to carry the first and fourth corps (with the exception of a brigade left in Aranjuez) up the left bank of the Tagus, operating, to fix Areizaga, and force him to deliver battle; and, with a view of tempting the Spaniard, by an appearance of timidity, the bridges of La Reyna and Aranjuez were broken down. While these dispositions were making on the French side, the Spanish general commenced a second bridge over the Tagus; and part of his cavalry, spreading in small detachments, scoured the country, and skirmished on a line extending from Arganda to Aranjuez. The Partidas also, being aided by detachments from the army, obliged the French garrison to retire from Guardalaxara upon Arganda, and occupied the former town on the 12th. But, in the night of the 13th, eight French companies and some troops of light cavalry, by a sudden march, surprised them, killed and wounded two or three hundred men, and took eighty horses and a piece of artillery. The 16th the infantry of the first and fourth corps was at Morata and Bayona, the cavalry at Perales and Chinchon, and, during this time, the fifth corps, leaving a brigade of foot and one of horse at Toledo, marched by Illescas towards Madrid, to act as a reserve to the duke of Belluno. The 17th Areizaga continued his demonstrations on the side of the Tajuna, and hastened the construction of his second bridge; but on the approach of the duke of Belluno with the first corps, he stayed the work, withdrew his divisions from the right bank of the Tagus, and on the 18th, (the cavalry of the first corps having reached Villarejo de Salvanes,) he destroyed his bridges, called in his parties, and drew up for battle on the heights of Santa Cruz de la Zarza. Hitherto the continual movements of the Spanish army, and the unsettled plans of the Spanish general, rendered it difficult for the French to fix a field of battle; but now Areizaga’s march to St. Cruz had laid his line of operations bare. The French masses were close together, the duke of Belluno could press on the Spanish front with the first corps, and the king, calling the fourth corps from Bayona, could throw twenty-five or thirty thousand men on Areizaga’s rear, by the road of Aranjuez and Ocaña. It was calculated that no danger could arise from this double line of operations, because a single march would bring both the king and Victor upon Areizaga; and if the latter should suddenly assail either, each would be strong enough to sustain the shock. Hence, when Soult knew that the Spaniards were certainly encamped at Santa Cruz, he caused the fifth corps, then in march for Madrid, to move during the night of the 17th upon Aranjuez. The fourth corps received a like order. The king, himself, quitting Madrid, arrived there on the evening of the 18th, with the Royal French Guards, two Spanish battalions of the line, and a brigade of Dessolle’s division which had just arrived; in all about ten thousand men. The same day, the duke of Belluno concentrated the first corps at Villarejo de Salvanés, intending to cross the Tagus at Villa Maurique, and attack the Spanish position on the 19th. A pontoon train, previously prepared at Madrid, enabled the French to repair the broken bridges, near Aranjuez, in two hours; and about one o’clock on the 18th, a division of cavalry, two divisions of infantry of the fourth corps, and the advanced guard of the fifth corps, passed the Tagus, part at the bridge of La Reyna, and part at a ford. General Milhaud with the leading squadrons, immediately pursued a small body of Spanish horsemen; and was thus led to the table-land, between Antiguela and Ocaña, where he suddenly came upon a front of fifteen hundred cavalry supported by three thousand more in reserve. Having only twelve hundred dragoons, he prepared to retire; but at that moment general Paris arrived with another brigade, and was immediately followed by the light cavalry of the fifth corps; the whole making a reinforcement of about two thousand men. With these troops Sebastiani came in person, and took the command at the instant when the Spaniards, seeing the inferiority of the French, were advancing to the charge. CAVALRY COMBAT AT OCAÑA. The Spaniards came on at a trot, but Sebastiani directed Paris, with a regiment of light cavalry and the Polish lancers, to turn and fall upon the right flank of the approaching squadrons, which being executed with great vigour, especially by the Poles, caused considerable confusion in the Spanish ranks, and their general endeavoured to remedy it by closing to the assailed flank. But to effect this he formed his left and centre in one vast column. Sebastiani charged headlong into the midst of it with his reserves, and the enormous mass yielding to the shock, got into confusion, and finally gave way. Many were slain, several hundred wounded, and eighty troopers and above five hundred horses were taken. The loss of the French bore no proportion in men, but general Paris was killed, and several superior officers were wounded. This unexpected encounter with such a force of cavalry, led Soult to believe that the Spanish general, aware of his error, was endeavouring to recover his line of operations. The examination of the prisoners confirmed this opinion; and in the night, information from the duke of Belluno, and the reports of officers sent towards Villa Maurique arrived, all agreeing that only a rear-guard was to be seen at Santa Cruz de la Zarza. It then became clear that the Spaniards were on the march, and that a battle could be fought the next day. In fact Areizaga had retraced his steps by a flank movement through Villa Rubia and Noblejas, with the intention of falling upon the king’s forces as they opened out from Aranjuez. He arrived on the morning of the 19th at Ocaña; but judging from the cavalry fight, that the enemy could attack first, drew up his whole army on the same plain, in two lines, a quarter of a mile asunder. Ocaña is covered on the north by a ravine, which commencing gently half a mile eastward of the town, runs deepening and with a curve, to the west, and finally connects itself with gullies and hollows, whose waters run off to the Tagus. Behind the deepest part of this ravine was the Spanish left, crossing the main road from Aranjuez to Dos Barrios. One flank rested on the gullies, the other on Ocaña. The centre was in front of the town, which was occupied by some infantry as a post of reserve, but the right wing stretched in the direction of Noblejas along the edge of a gentle ridge _in front_ of the shallow part of the ravine. The cavalry was on the flank and rear of the right wing. Behind the army there was an immense plain, but closed in and fringed towards Noblejas with rich olive woods, which were occupied by infantry to protect the passage of the Spanish baggage, still filing by the road from Zarza. Such were Areizaga’s dispositions. Joseph passed the night of the 18th in reorganizing his forces. The whole of the cavalry, consisting of nine regiments, was given to Sebastiani. Four divisions of infantry, with the exception of one regiment, left at Aranjuez to guard the bridge, were placed under the command of marshal Mortier, who was also empowered, if necessary, to direct the movements of the cavalry. The artillery was commanded by general Senarmont. The Royal Guards remained with the King, and marshal Soult directed the whole of the movements. Before day-break, on the 19th, the monarch marched with the intention of falling upon the Spaniards wherever he could meet with them. At Antiguela his troops quitting the high road, turned to their left, gained the table-land of Ocaña somewhat beyond the centre of the Spanish position, and discovered Areizaga’s army in order of battle. The French cavalry instantly forming to the front, covered the advance of the infantry, which drew up in successive lines as the divisions arrived on the plain. The Spanish outposts fell back, and were followed by the French skirmishers, who spread along the hostile front and opened a sharp fire. About forty-five thousand Spanish infantry, seven thousand cavalry, and sixty pieces of artillery were in line. The French force was only twenty-four thousand infantry, five thousand sabres and lances, and fifty guns, including the battery of the Royal Guard. But Areizaga’s position was miserably defective. The whole of his left wing, fifteen thousand strong, was paralized by the ravine; it could neither attack nor be attacked: the centre was scarcely better situated, and the extremity of his right wing was uncovered, save by the horse, who were, although superior in number, quite dispirited by the action of the preceding evening. These circumstances dictated the order of the attack. BATTLE OF OCAÑA. At ten o’clock, Sebastiani’s cavalry gaining ground to his left, turned the Spanish right. General Leval, with two divisions of infantry in columns of regiments, each having a battalion displayed in front, followed the cavalry, and drove general Zayas from the olive-woods. General Girard, with his division arranged in the same manner, followed Leval in second line; and at the same moment, general Dessolles menaced the centre with one portion of his troops, while another portion lined the edge of the ravine to support the skirmishers and awe the Spanish left wing. The king remained in reserve with his guards. Thus the French order of battle was in two columns: the principal one, flanked by the cavalry, directed against and turning the Spanish right, the second keeping the Spanish centre in check; and each being supported by reserves. These dispositions were completed at eleven o’clock; at which hour, Senarmont, massing thirty pieces of artillery, opened a shattering fire on Areizaga’s centre. Six guns, detached to the right, played at the same time across the ravine against the left; and six others swept down the deep hollow, to clear it of the light troops. The Spaniards were undisciplined and badly commanded, but discovered no appearance of fear; their cries were loud and strong, their skirmishing fire brisk; and, from the centre of their line, sixteen guns opened with a murderous effect upon Leval’s and Girard’s columns, as the latter were pressing on towards the right. To mitigate the fire of this battery, a French battalion, rushing out at full speed, seized a small eminence close to the Spanish guns, and a counter battery was immediately planted there. Then the Spaniards gave back: their skirmishers were swept out of the ravine by a flanking fire of grape; and Senarmont immediately drawing the artillery from the French right, took Ocaña as his pivot, and, prolonging his fire to the left, raked Areizaga’s right wing in its whole length. During this cannonade, Leval, constantly pressing forward, obliged the Spaniards to change their front, by withdrawing the right wing _behind_ the shallow part of the ravine, which, as I have before said, was in its rear when the action commenced. By this change, the whole army, still drawn up in two lines, at the distance of a quarter of a mile asunder, was pressed into somewhat of a convex form with the town of Ocaña in the centre, and hence Senarmont’s artillery tore their ranks with a greater destruction than before. Nevertheless, encouraged by observing the comparatively feeble body of infantry approaching them, the Spaniards suddenly retook the offensive, their fire, redoubling, dismounted two French guns; Mortier himself was wounded slightly, Leval severely; the line advanced, and the leading French divisions wavered and gave back. The moment was critical, and the duke of Treviso lost no time in exhortations to Leval’s troops, but, like a great commander, instantly brought up Girard’s division through the intervals of the first line, and displayed a front of fresh troops, keeping one regiment in square on the left flank: for he expected that Areizaga’s powerful cavalry, which still remained in the plain, would charge for the victory. Girard’s fire soon threw the Spanish first line into disorder; and meanwhile, Dessolles, who had gained ground by an oblique movement, left in front, seeing the enemy’s right thus shaken, seized Ocaña itself, and issued forth on the other side. The light cavalry of the king’s guard, followed by the infantry, then poured through the town; and, on the extreme left, Sebastiani, with a rapid charge, cut off six thousand infantry, and obliged them to surrender. The Spanish cavalry, which had only suffered a little from the cannonade, and had never made an effort to turn the tide of battle, now drew off entirely: the second line of infantry gave ground as the front fell back upon it in confusion; and Areizaga, confounded and bewildered, ordered the left wing, which had scarcely fired a shot, to retreat, and then quitted the field himself. For half an hour after this, the superior officers who remained, endeavoured to keep the troops together in the plain, and strove to reach the main road leading to Dos Barrios; but Girard and Dessolle’s divisions being connected after passing Ocaña, pressed on with steady rapidity, while the Polish lancers and a regiment of chasseurs, outflanking the Spanish right, continually increased the confusion: finally, Sebastiani, after securing his prisoners, came up again like a whirlwind, and charged full in the front with five regiments of cavalry. Then the whole mass broke, and fled each man for himself across the plain; but, on the right of the routed multitude, a deep ravine leading from Yepes to Dos Barrios, in an oblique direction, continually contracted the space; and the pursuing cavalry arriving first at Barrios, headed nearly ten thousand bewildered men, and forced them to surrender. The remainder turned their faces to all quarters; and such was the rout, that the French were also obliged to disperse to take prisoners, for, to their credit, no rigorous execution was inflicted; and hundreds, merely deprived of their arms, were desired, in raillery, “to return to their homes, and abandon war as a trade they were unfit for.” This fatal battle commenced at eleven o’clock; thirty pieces of artillery, a hundred and twenty carriages, twenty-five stand of colours, three generals, six hundred inferior officers, and eighteen thousand privates were taken before two o’clock, and the pursuit was still hot. Seven or eight thousand of the Spaniards, however, contrived to make away towards the mountain of Tarancon; others followed the various routes through La Mancha to the Sierra Morena; and many saved themselves in Valencia and Murcia. [Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MSS.] [Sidenote: Letter from Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Nov. 30, 1809. MSS.] Meanwhile, the first corps, passing the Tagus by a ford, had re-established the bridge at Villa Maurique before ten o’clock in the morning, and finding Santa Cruz de la Zarza abandoned, followed Areizaga’s traces; at Villatobas, the light cavalry captured twelve hundred carriages, and a little farther on, took a thousand prisoners, from the column which was making for Tarancon. Thus informed of the result of the battle, the duke of Belluno halted at Villatobas, but sent his cavalry forward. At La Guardia they joined Sebastiani’s horsemen; and the whole continuing the pursuit to Lillo, made five hundred more prisoners, together with three hundred horses. This finished the operations of the day: only eighteen hundred cannon-shot had been fired, and an army of more than fifty thousand men had been ruined. The French lost seventeen hundred men, killed and wounded; the Spaniards five thousand: and, before nightfall, all the baggage and military carriages, three thousand animals, forty-five pieces of artillery, thirty thousand muskets, and twenty-six thousand captives were in the hands of the conquerors! [Illustration: _Vol. 3, Plate 3._ AREIZAGA’S Operations, 1809. _Published by T. & W. Boone 1830._] [Sidenote: Letter from Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Nov. 30, 1809. MSS.] Areizaga reached Tembleque during the night, and La Carolina the third day after. On the road, he met general Benaz with a thousand dragoons that had been detached to the rear before the battle commenced; this body he directed on Madrilegos to cover the retreat of the fugitives; but so strongly did the panic spread that when Sebastiani approached that post on the 20th, Benaz’s men fled, without seeing an enemy, as fearfully as any who came from the fight. Even so late as the 24th, only four hundred cavalry, belonging to all regiments, could be assembled at Manzanares; and still fewer at La Carolina. CHAPTER VI. Joseph halted at Dos Barrios, the night of the battle, and the next day directed Sebastiani, with all the light cavalry and a division of infantry, upon Madrilegos and Consuegra; the first corps, by St. Juan de Vilharta, upon the Sierra Morena, and the fifth corps, by Tembleque and Mora, upon Toledo. One division of the fourth corps guarded the spoil and the prisoners at Ocaña. A second division, reinforced with a brigade of cavalry, was posted, by detachments, from Aranjuez to Consuegra. The monarch himself, with his guards and Dessolle’s first brigade, returned, on the 20th, to Madrid. Three days had sufficed to dissipate the storm on the side of La Mancha, but the duke Del Parque still menaced the sixth corps in Castile, and the reports from Talavera again spoke of Albuquerque and the English being in motion. The second brigade of Dessolle’s division had returned from Old Castile on the 19th, and the uncertainty with respect to the British movements, obliged the king to keep all his troops in hand. Nevertheless, fearing that, if Del Parque gained upon the sixth corps, he might raise an insurrection in Leon, Gazan’s division of the fifth corps was sent, from Toledo, through the Puerto Pico, to Marchand’s assistance, and Kellerman was again directed to take the command of the whole. During these events, the British army remained tranquil about Badajos; but Albuquerque, following his orders, had reached Peralada de Garbin, and seized the bridge of Arzobispo, in expectation of being joined by the duke Del Parque. That general, however, who had above thirty thousand men, thought, when Dessolle’s division was recalled to Madrid, that he could crush the sixth corps, and, therefore, advanced from Bejar towards Alba de Tormes on the 17th, two days before the battle of Ocaña. Thus, when Albuquerque expected him on the Tagus, he was engaged in serious operations beyond the Tormes, and, having reached Alba, the 21st, sent a division to take possession of Salamanca, which Marchand had again abandoned. The 22d he marched towards Valladolid, and his advanced guard and cavalry entered Fresno and Carpio. Meanwhile Kellerman, collecting all the troops of his government, and being joined by Marchand, moved upon Medina del Campo, and the 23d, fell with a body of horse upon the Spaniards at Fresno. The Spanish cavalry fled at once; but the infantry stood firm, and repulsed the assailants. [Sidenote: Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool. MSS.] The 24th the duke carried his whole army to Fresno, intending to give battle; but on the 26th imperative orders to join Albuquerque having reached him, he commenced a retrograde movement. Kellerman, without waiting for the arrival of Gazan’s division, instantly pursued, and his advanced guard of cavalry overtook and charged the Spanish army at the moment when a part of their infantry and all their horse had passed the bridge of Alba de Tormes; being repulsed, it retired upon the supports, and the duke, seeing that an action was inevitable, brought the remainder of his troops, with the exception of one division, back to the right bank. BATTLE OF ALBA DE TORMES. Scarcely was the line formed, when Kellerman came up with two divisions of dragoons and some artillery, and, without hesitating, sent one division to outflank the Spanish right, and, with the other, charged fiercely in upon the front. The Spanish horsemen, flying without a blow, rode straight over the bridge, and the infantry of the right being thus exposed, were broken and sabred; but those on the left stood fast and repulsed the enemy. The duke rallied his cavalry on the other side of the river, and brought them back to the fight, but the French were also reinforced, and once more the Spanish horse fled without a blow. By this time it was dark, and the infantry of the left wing, under Mendizabel and Carrera, being unbroken, made good their retreat across the river, yet not without difficulty, and under the fire of some French infantry, which arrived just in the dusk. During the night the duke retreated upon Tamames unmolested, but at day-break a French patrol coming up with this rear, his whole army threw away their arms and fled outright. Kellerman having, meanwhile entered Salamanca, did not pursue, yet the dispersion was complete. After this defeat, Del Parque rallied his army in the mountains behind Tamames, and, in ten or twelve days, again collected about twenty thousand men; they were however without artillery, scarcely any had preserved their arms, and such was their distress for provisions, that two months afterwards, when the British arrived on the northern frontier, the peasantry still spoke with horror of the sufferings of these famished soldiers. Many actually died of want, and every village was filled with sick. Yet the mass neither dispersed nor murmured! For Spaniards, though hasty in revenge and feeble in battle, are patient, to the last degree, in suffering. [Sidenote: Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Dec. 7, 1809. MSS.] This result of the duke Del Parque’s operation amply justified sir Arthur Wellesley’s advice to the Portuguese regency. In like manner the battle of Ocaña, and the little effect produced by the duke of Albuquerque’s advance to Arzobispo, justified that which he gave to the Central Junta. It might be imagined that the latter would have received his after-counsels with deference; but the course of that body was never affected by either reason or experience. Just before the rout of Alba de Tormes, sir Arthur Wellesley proposed that ten thousand men, to be taken from the duke Del Parque, should _reinforce Albuquerque, that the latter might maintain the strong position of Meza d’Ibor, and cover Estremadura for the winter_. Meanwhile Del Parque’s force, thus reduced one-third, could be more easily fed, and might keep aloof from the enemy until the British army should arrive on the northern frontier of Portugal, a movement long projected, and, as he informed them, only delayed _to protect Estremadura until the duke of Albuquerque had received the reinforcement_. The only reply of the Junta was an order, directing Albuquerque _immediately to quit the line of the Tagus, and take post at Llerena, behind the Guadiana_. Thus abandoning Estremadura to the enemy, and exposing his own front in a bad position to an army coming from Almaraz, and his right flank and rear to an army coming from La Mancha. This foolish and contemptuous proceeding, being followed by Del Parque’s defeat, which endangered Ciudad Rodrigo, sir Arthur at once commenced his march for the north. He knew that twenty thousand Spanish infantry and six thousand mounted cavalry were again collected in La Carolina; that the troops (eight thousand), who escaped from Ocaña, on the side of Tarancon, were at Cuença, under general Echevarria; and as the numbers re-assembled in the Morena were (the inactivity of the French after the battle of Ocaña considered) sufficient to defend the passes and cover Seville for the moment, there was no reason why the British army should remain in unhealthy positions to aid people who would not aid themselves. Albuquerque’s retrograde movement was probably a device of the Junta to oblige sir Arthur to undertake the defence of Estremadura; but it only hastened his departure. It did not comport with his plans to engage in serious operations on that side; yet to have retired when that province was actually attacked, would have been disreputable for his arms, wherefore, seizing this unhappily favourable moment to quit Badajos, he crossed the Tagus, and marched into the valley of the Mondego, leaving general Hill, with a mixed force of ten thousand men, at Abrantes. The Guadiana pestilence had been so fatal that many officers blamed him for stopping so long; but it was his last hold on Spain, and the safety of the southern provinces was involved in his proceedings. It was not his battle of Talavera, but the position maintained by him on the frontier of Estremadura, which, in the latter part of 1809, saved Andalusia from subjection; and this is easy of demonstration, for, Joseph having rejected Soult’s project against Portugal, dared not invade Andalusia, by Estremadura, with the English army on his right flank; neither could he hope to invade it by the way of La Mancha, without drawing sir Arthur into the contest. But Andalusia was, at this period, the last place where the intrusive king desired to meet a British army. He had many partisans in that province, who would necessarily be overawed if the course of the war carried sir Arthur beyond the Morena; nor could the Junta, in that case, have refused Cadiz, as a place of arms, to their ally. Then the whole force of Andalusia and Murcia would have rallied round the English forces behind the Morena; and, as Areizaga had sixty thousand men, and Albuquerque ten thousand, it is no exaggeration to assume that a hundred thousand could have been organized for defence, and the whole of the troops, in the south of Portugal, would have been available to aid in the protection of Estremadura. Thus, including thirty thousand English, there would have been a mass of at least one hundred thousand soldiers, disposable for active operations, assembled in the Morena. From La Carolina to Madrid is only ten marches, and while posted at the former, the army could protect Lisbon as well as Seville, because a forward movement would oblige the French to concentrate round the Spanish capital. Andalusia would thus have become the principal object of the invaders; but the allied armies, holding the passes of the Morena, their left flank protected by Estremadura and Portugal, their right by Murcia and Valencia, and having rich provinces and large cities behind them, and a free communication with the sea, and abundance of ports, could have fought a fair field for Spain. [Sidenote: Sir J. Moore’s Correspondence.] [Sidenote: Lord Wellesley’s Correspondence, Parl. Papers, 1810.] It was a perception of these advantages that caused sir John Moore to regret the ministers had not chosen the southern instead of the northern line for his operations. Lord Wellesley, also, impressed with the importance of Andalusia, urged his brother to adopt some plan of this nature, and the latter, sensible of its advantages, would have done so, but for the impossibility of dealing with the Central Junta. Military possession of Cadiz and the uncontrolled command of a Spanish force were the only conditions upon which he would undertake the defence of Andalusia; conditions they would not accede to, but, without which, he could not be secured against the caprices of men whose proceedings were one continued struggle against reason. This may seem inconsistent with a former assertion, that Portugal was the true base of operations for the English; but political as well as physical resources and moral considerations weighed in that argument. For the protection, then, of Andalusia and Estremadura, during a dangerous crisis of affairs, sir Arthur persisted, at such an enormous sacrifice of men, to hold his position on the Guadiana. Yet it was reluctantly, and more in deference to his brother’s wishes than his own judgement, that he remained after Areizaga’s army was assembled. Having proved the Junta by experience, he was more clear sighted, as to their perverseness, than lord Wellesley; who, being in daily intercourse with the members, obliged to listen to their ready eloquence in excuse for past errors, and more ready promises of future exertion, clung longer to the notion, that Spain could be put in the right path, and that England might war largely in conjunction with the united nations of the Peninsula, instead of restricting herself to the comparatively obscure operation of defending Lisbon. He was finally undeceived, and the march from Badajos for ever released the British general from a vexatious dependence on the Spanish government. Meanwhile the French, in doubt of his intentions, appeared torpid. Kellerman remained at Salamanca, watching the movements of the duke Del Parque; and Gazan returned to Madrid. Milhaud, with a division of the fourth corps, and some cavalry, was detached against Echavaria; but, on his arrival at Cuença, finding that the latter had retreated, by Toboado, to Hellin, in Murcia, combined his operations with general Suchet, and, as I have before related, assisted to reduce the towns of Albaracin and Teruel. Other movements there were none, and, as the Spanish regiments of the guard fought freely against their countrymen, and many of the prisoners, taken at Ocaña, offered to join the invaders’ colours, the king conceived hopes of raising a national army. French writers assert that the captives at Ocaña made a marked distinction between Napoleon and Joseph. They were willing to serve the French emperor, but not the intrusive king of Spain. Spanish authors, indeed, assume that none entered the enemy’s ranks save by coercion and to escape; and that many did so with that view, and were successful, must be supposed, or the numbers said to have reassembled in the Morena, and at Cuença, cannot be reconciled with the loss sustained in the action. The battles of Ocaña and Alba de Tormes terminated the series of offensive operations, which the Austrian war, and the reappearance of a British army in the Peninsula had enabled the allies to adopt, in 1809. Those operations had been unsuccessful; the enemy again took the lead, and the fourth epoch of the war commenced. OBSERVATIONS. 1º. Although certain that the British army would not co-operate in this short campaign, the Junta openly asserted, that it would join Albuquerque in the valley of the Tagus. The improbability of Areizaga’s acting, without such assistance, gave currency to the fiction, and an accredited fiction is, in war, often more useful than the truth; in this, therefore, they are to be commended; but, when deceiving their own general, they permitted Areizaga to act under the impression that he would be so assisted, they committed not an error but an enormous crime. Nor was the general much less criminal for acting upon the mere assertion that other movements were combined with his, when no communication, no concerting of the marches, no understanding with the allied commander, as to their mutual resources, and intentions, had taken place. 2º. A rushing wind, a blast from the mountains, tempestuous, momentary, such was Areizaga’s movement on Dos Barrios, and assuredly it would be difficult to find its parallel. There is no post so strong, no town so guarded, that, by a fortunate stroke, may not be carried; but who, even on the smallest scale, acts on this principle, unless aided by some accidental circumstance applicable to the moment? Areizaga obeyed the orders of his government; but no general is bound to obey orders (at least without remonstrance) which involve the safety of his army; to that he should sacrifice everything but victory: and many great commanders have sacrificed even victory, rather than appear to undervalue this vital principle. 3º. At Dos Barrios the Spanish general, having first met with opposition, halted for three days, evidently without a plan, and ignorant both of the situation of the first corps on his left flank, and of the real force in his front: yet this was the only moment in which he could hope for the slightest success. If, instead of a feeble skirmish of cavalry, he had borne forward, with his whole army, on the 11th, Sebastiani must have been overpowered and driven across the Tagus, and Areizaga, with fifty thousand infantry and a powerful cavalry, would, on the 12th, have been in the midst of the separated French corps, for their movement of concentration was not completely effected until the night of the 14th. But such a stroke was not for an undisciplined army, and this was another reason against moving from the Morena at all, seeing that the calculated chances were all against Areizaga, and his troops not such as could improve accidental advantages. 4º. The flank march, from Dos Barrios to Santa Cruz, although intended to turn the French left, and gain Madrid, was a circuitous route of at least a hundred miles, and, as there were three rivers to cross, namely, the Tagus, the Tajuna, and Henares, only great rapidity could give a chance of success; but Areizaga was slow. So late as the 15th, he had passed the Tagus with only two divisions of infantry. Meanwhile the French moving on the inner circle, got between him and Madrid, and the moment one corps out of the three opposed to him approached, he recrossed the Tagus and concentrated again on the strong ground of Santa Cruz de la Zarza. The king by the way of Aranjuez had, however, already cut his line of retreat, and then Areizaga who, on the 10th, had shrunk from an action with Sebastiani, when the latter had only eight thousand men, now sought a battle, on the same ground with the king, who was at the head of thirty thousand; the first corps being also in full march upon the Spanish traces and distant only a few miles. Here it may be remarked that Victor, who was now to the eastward of the Spaniards, had been on the 9th to the westward at Yebenes and Mora, having moved in ten days, on a circle of a hundred and fifty miles, completely round this Spanish general, who pretended, to treat his adversaries, as if they were blind men. 5º. Baron Crossand, it is said, urged Areizaga to entrench himself in the mountains, to raise the peasantry, and to wait the effect of Albuquerque’s and Del Parque’s operations. If so, his military ideas do not seem of a higher order than Areizaga’s, and the proposal was but a repetition of Mr. Frere’s former plan for Albuquerque; a plan founded on the supposition, that the rich plains of La Mancha were rugged mountains. In taking a permanent position at Santa Cruz or Tarancon, Areizaga must have resigned all direct communication with Andalusia, and opened a fresh line of communication with Valencia, which would have been exposed to the third corps from Aragon. Yet without examining whether either the Spanish general or army were capable of such a difficult operation, as adopting an accidental line of operations, the advice, if given at all, was only given on the 18th, and on the 19th, the first corps, the fourth, the greatest part of the fifth, the reserve and the royal guards, forming a mass of more than fifty thousand fighting men, would have taught Areizaga that men and not mountains decide the fate of a battle. But in fact, there were no mountains to hold; between Zarza and the borders of Valencia, the whole country is one vast plain; and on the 18th, there was only the alternative of fighting the weakest of the two French armies, or of retreating by forced marches through La Mancha. The former was chosen, Areizaga’s army was destroyed, and in the battle he discovered no redeeming quality. His position was ill chosen, he made no use of his cavalry, his left wing never fired a shot, and when the men undismayed by the defeat of the right, demanded to be led into action, he commanded a retreat, and quitted the field himself at the moment when his presence was most wanted. 6º. The combinations of the French were methodical, well arranged, effectual, and it may seem misplaced, to do ought but commend movements so eminently successful. Yet the chances of war are manifold enough to justify the drawing attention to some points of this short campaign. Areizaga’s burst from the mountains was so unexpected and rapid, that it might well make his adversaries hesitate; and hence perhaps the reason why the first corps circled round the Spanish army, and was singly to have attacked the latter in front at Zarza, on the 19th; whereas, reinforced with the division of the fourth corps from Toledo, it might have fallen on the rear and flank from Mora a week before. That is, during the three days Areizaga remained at Dos Barrios, from whence Mora is only four hours march. 7º. The 11th, the king knew the English army had not approached the valley of the Tagus; Areizaga only quitted Dos Barrios the 13th, and he remained at Zarza until the 18th. During eight days therefore, the Spanish general was permitted to lead, and had he been a man of real enterprise he would have crushed the troops between Dos Barrios and Aranjuez on the 10th or 11th. Indeed, the boldness with which Sebastiani maintained his offensive position beyond Aranjuez, from the 9th to the 14th, was a master-piece. It must, however, be acknowledged that Soult could not at once fix a general, who marched fifty thousand men about like a patrole of cavalry, without the slightest regard to his adversary’s positions or his own line of operations. 8º. In the battle, nothing could be more scientific than the mode in which the French closed upon and defeated the right and centre, while they paralized the left of the Spaniards. The disparity of numbers engaged, and the enormous amount of prisoners, artillery, and other trophies of victory prove it to have been a fine display of talent. But Andalusia was laid prostrate by this sudden destruction of her troops; why then was the fruit of victory neglected? Did the king, unable to perceive his advantages, control the higher military genius of his advising general, or was he distracted by disputes amongst the different commanders? or, did the British army at Badajos alarm him? An accurate knowledge of these points is essential in estimating the real share Spain had in her own deliverance. [Sidenote: Letter to Lord Liverpool. MS.] 9º. Sir Arthur Wellesley absolutely refused to co-operate in this short and violent campaign. He remained a quiet spectator of events at the most critical period of the war; and yet on paper the Spanish projects promised well. Areizaga’s army exceeded fifty thousand men, Albuquerque’s ten thousand, and thirty thousand were under Del Parque, who, at Tamames had just overthrown the best corps in the French army. Villa Campa also, and the Partida bands on the side of Cuença were estimated at ten thousand; in fine, there were a hundred thousand Spanish soldiers ready. The British army at this period, although much reduced by sickness, had still twenty thousand men fit to bear arms, and the Portuguese under Beresford were near thirty thousand, making a total of a hundred and fifty thousand allies. Thirty thousand to guard the passes of the Sierra de Gredos and watch the sixth corps, a hundred and twenty thousand to attack the seventy thousand French covering Madrid! Why then, was sir Arthur Wellesley, who only four months before so eagerly undertook a like enterprise with fewer forces, now absolutely deaf to the proposals of the Junta? “_Because moral force is to physical force, as three to one in war._” He had proved the military qualities of Spaniards and French, had foresaw, to use his own expressions, “_after one or two battles, and one or two brilliant actions by some, and defeats sustained by others, that all would have to retreat again_:” yet this man, so cautious, so sensible of the enemy’s superiority, was laying the foundation of measures that finally carried him triumphant through the Peninsula. False then are the opinions of those, who, asserting Napoleon might have been driven over the Ebro in 1808-9, blame sir John Moore’s conduct. Such reasoners would as certainly have charged the ruin of Spain on sir Arthur Wellesley, if at this period the chances of war had sent him to his grave. But in all times the wise and brave man’s toil has been the sport of fools! [Sidenote: 1810.] Alba de Tormes ended the great military transactions of 1809. In the beginning, Napoleon broke to atoms and dispersed the feeble structure of the Spanish insurrection, but after his departure the invasion stagnated amidst the bickerings of his lieutenants. Sir Arthur Wellesley turned the war back upon the invaders for a moment, but the jealousy and folly of his ally soon obliged him to retire to Portugal. The Spaniards then tried their single strength, and were trampled under foot at Ocaña, and notwithstanding the assistance of England, the offensive passed entirely from their hands. In the next book we shall find them every where acting on the defensive, and every where weak. BOOK X. CHAPTER I. Napoleon, victorious in Germany, and ready to turn his undivided strength once more against the Peninsula, complained of the past inactivity of the king, and Joseph prepared to commence the campaign of 1810 with vigour. His first operations, however, indicated great infirmity of purpose. When Del Parque’s defeat on one side and Echevaria’s on the other had freed his flanks, and while the British army was still at Badajos, he sent the fourth corps towards Valencia, but immediately afterwards recalled it, and also the first corps, which, since the battle of Ocaña, had been at Santa Cruz de Mudela. The march of this last corps through La Mancha had been marked by this peculiarity, that, for the first time since the commencement of the war, the peasantry, indignant at the flight of the soldiers, guided the pursuers to the retreats of the fugitives. [Sidenote: Appendix No. IV. Sec. 1.] Joseph’s vacillation was partly occasioned by the insurrection in Navarre, under Renovalles and Mina. But lord Wellington, previous to quitting the Guadiana, had informed the Junta of Badajos, as a matter of courtesy, that he was about to evacuate their district; and his confidential letter being published in the town Gazette, and ostentatiously copied into the Seville papers, Joseph naturally suspected it to be a cloak to some offensive project. However, the false movements of the first and fourth corps distracted the Spaniards, and emboldened the French partizans, who were very numerous both in Valencia and Andalusia. The troubles in Navarre were soon quieted by Suchet; the distribution of the British army in the valley of the Mondego became known, and Joseph seriously prepared for the conquest of Andalusia. This enterprise, less difficult than an invasion of Portugal, promised immediate pecuniary advantages, which was no slight consideration to a sovereign whose ministers were reduced to want from the non-payment of their salaries, and whose troops were thirteen months in arrears of pay. Napoleon, a rigid stickler for the Roman maxim, that “War should support war,” paid only the corps near the frontiers of France, and rarely recruited the military chest. Both the military and political affairs of Andalusia were now at the lowest ebb. The calm produced by the promise to convoke the National Cortes had been short lived. The disaster of Ocaña revived all the passions of the people, and afforded the old Junta of Seville, the council of Castile, and other enemies of the Central Junta, an opportunity to pull down a government universally obnoxious; and the general discontent was increased by the measures adopted to meet the approaching crisis. The marquis of Astorga had been succeeded by the archbishop of Laodicea, under whose presidency the Junta published a manifesto, assuring the people that there was no danger,--that Areizaga could defend the Morena against the whole power of France,--that Albuquerque would, from the side of Estremadura, fall upon the enemy’s rear,--and that a second Baylen might be expected. But, while thus attempting to delude the public, they openly sent property to Cadiz, and announced that they would transfer their sittings to that town on the 1st of February. Meanwhile, not to seem inactive, a decree was issued for a levy of a hundred thousand men, and for a forced loan of half the jewels, plate, and money belonging to individuals; sums left for pious purposes were also appropriated to the service of the state. To weaken their adversaries, the Junta offered Romana the command of the army in the Morena,--sent Padre Gil on a mission to Sicily, and imprisoned the Conde de Montijo and Francisco Palafox. The marquis of Lazan, accused of being in league with his brother, was also confined in Pensicola, and the Conde de Tilly, detected in a conspiracy to seize the public treasure and make for America, was thrown into a dungeon, where his infamous existence terminated. Romana refused to serve, and Blake, recalled from Catalonia, was appointed to command the troops re-assembled at La Carolina; but most of the other generals kept aloof, and in Gallicia the Conde de Noronha, resigning his command, issued a manifesto against the Junta. Hence the public hatred increased, and the partizans of Palafox and Montijo, certain that the people would be against the government under any circumstances, only waited for a favourable moment to commence violence. Andalusia generally, and Seville in particular, were but one remove from anarchy, when the intrusive monarch reached the foot of the Morena with a great and well organized army. The military preparation of the Junta was in harmony with their political conduct. The decree for levying a hundred thousand men, issued when the enemy was but a few marches from the seat of government, was followed by an order to distribute a hundred thousand poniards, as if assassination were the mode in which a great nation could or ought to defend itself, especially when the regular forces at the disposal of the Junta, were still numerous enough, if well directed, to have made a stout resistance. Areizaga had twenty-five thousand men in the Morena; Echevaria, with eight thousand, was close by, at Hellin; five or six thousand were spread over Andalusia, and Albuquerque had fifteen thousand behind the Guadiana. The troops at Carolina were, however, dispirited and disorganized. Blake had not arrived, and Albuquerque, distracted with contradictory orders transmitted almost daily by the Junta, could contrive no reasonable plan of action, until the movements of the enemy enabled him to disregard all instructions. Thus, amidst a whirlpool of passions, intrigues, and absurdities, Andalusia, although a mighty vessel, and containing all the means of safety, was destined to sink. This great province, composed of four kingdoms, namely, Jaen and Cordoba in the north, Grenada and Seville in the south, was protected on the right by Murcia and on the left by Portugal. The northern frontier only was accessible to the French, who could attack it either by La Mancha or Estremadura; but, between those provinces, the Toledo and Guadalupe mountains forbad all military communication until near the Morena, when, abating somewhat of their surly grandeur, they left a space through which troops could move from one province to the other in a direction parallel to the frontier of Andalusia. Towards La Mancha, the Morena was so savage that only the royal road to Seville was practicable for artillery. Entering the hills, a little in advance of Santa Cruz de Mudela, at a pass of wonderful strength, called the Despenas Perros, it led by La Carolina and Baylen to Andujar. On the right, indeed, another route passed through the Puerto del Rey, but fell into the first at Navas Toloza, a little beyond the Despenas Perros; and there were other passes also, but all falling again into the main road, before reaching La Carolina. Santa Cruz de Mudela was therefore a position menacing the principal passes of the Morena from La Mancha. To the eastward of Santa Cruz the town of Villa Nueva de los Infantes presented a second point of concentration for the invaders. From thence roads, practicable for cavalry and infantry, penetrated the hills by La Venta Quemada and the Puerto de San Esteban, conducting to Baeza, Ubeda, and Jaen. In like manner, on the westward of Santa Cruz, roads, or, rather, paths, penetrated into the kingdom of Cordoba. One, entering the mountains, by Fuen Caliente, led upon Montoro; a second, called the La Plata, passed by La Conquista to Adamuz, and it is just beyond these roads that the ridges, separating La Mancha from Estremadura, begin to soften down, permitting military ingress to the latter, by the passes of Mochuello, Almaden de Azogues, and Agudo. But the barrier of the Morena still shut in Andalusia from Estremadura, the military communication between those provinces being confined to three great roads, namely, one from Medellin, by Llerena, to Guadalcanal; another from Badajos to Seville, by the defiles of Monasterio and Ronquillo; and a third by Xeres de los Caballeros, Fregenal, and Araceña. From Almaden, there was also a way, through Belalcazar, to Guadalcanal; and all these routes, except that of Araceña, whether from La Mancha or Estremadura, after crossing the mountains, led into the valley of the Guadalquivir, a river whose waters, drawn from a multitude of sources, at first roll westward, washing the foot of the Morena as far as the city of Cordoba, but then, bending gradually towards the south, flow by Seville, and are finally lost in the Atlantic. To defend the passage of the Morena, Areizaga posted his right in the defiles of San Esteban and Montizon, covering the city of Jaen, the old walls of which were armed. His left occupied the passes of Fuen Caliente and Mochuello, covering Cordoba. His centre was established at La Carolina and in the defiles of the Despenas Perros and Puerto del Rey, which were entrenched, but with so little skill and labour as to excite the ridicule rather than the circumspection of the enemy. And here it may be well to notice an error relative to the strength of mountain-defiles, common enough even amongst men who, with some experience, have taken a contracted view of their profession. From such persons it is usual to hear of narrow passes, in which the greatest multitudes may be resisted. But, without stopping to prove that local strength is nothing, if the flanks can be turned by other roads, we may be certain that there are few positions so difficult as to render superior numbers of no avail. Where one man can climb another can, and a good and numerous infantry, crowning the acclivities on the right and left of a disputed pass, will soon oblige the defenders to retreat, or to fight upon equal terms. If this takes place at any point of an extended front of defiles, such as those of the Sierra Morena, the dangerous consequences to the whole of the beaten army are obvious. Hence such passes should only be considered as fixed points, around which an army should operate freely in defence of more exposed positions, for defiles are doors, the keys of which are on the summits of the hills around them. A bridge is a defile, yet troops are posted, not in the middle, but behind a bridge, to defend the passage. By extending this principle, we shall draw the greatest advantages from the strength of mountain-passes. The practice of some great generals may, indeed, be quoted against this opinion; nevertheless, it seems more consonant to the true principles of war to place detachments in defiles, and keep the main body in some central point behind, ready to fall on the heads of the enemy’s columns as they issue from the gorges of the hills. Pierced by many roads, and defended by feeble dispirited troops, the Morena presented no great obstacle to the French; but, as they came up against it by the way of La Mancha only, there were means to render their passage difficult. If Albuquerque, placing his army either at Almaden de Azogues, or Agudo, had operated against their right flank, he must have been beaten, or masked by a strong detachment, before Areizaga could have been attacked. Nor was Andalusia itself deficient of interior local resources for an obstinate defence. Parallel to the Morena, and at the distance of about a hundred miles, the Sierra Nevada, the Apulxaras, and the Sierra Ronda, extend from the borders of Murcia to Gibraltar, cutting off a narrow tract of country along the coast of the Mediterranean: and the intermediate space between these sierras and the Morena is broken by less extensive ridges, forming valleys which, gradually descending and widening, are finally lost in the open country about Seville. Andalusia may therefore be considered as presenting three grand divisions of country:--1º. The upper, or rugged, between the Sierra Morena and the Sierra Nevada. 2º. The lower, or open country, about Seville. 3º. The coast-tract between the Nevada and Ronda, and the Mediterranean. This last is studded, in its whole length, with sea-port towns and castles, such as Malaga, Velez-Malaga, Motril, Ardra, Marbella, Estipona, and an infinity of smaller places. [Illustration: _Vol. 3, Plate 4._ INVASION of ANDALUSIA 1810. _Published by T. & W. Boone, 1830._] No important line of defence is offered by the Guadalquivir. An army, after passing the Morena, would follow the course of its waters to gain the lower parts of Andalusia, and, thus descending, the advantage of position would be with the invaders. But, to reach the Mediterranean coast, not only the ridges of the Nevada or Ronda must be crossed, but most of the minor parallel ridges enclosing the valleys, whose waters run towards the Atlantic. Now all those valleys contain great towns, such as Jaen and Cordoba, Ubeda, Grenada, and Alcala Real, most of which, formerly fortified, and still retaining their ancient walls, were capable of defence; wherefore the enemy could not have approached the Mediterranean, nor Grenada, nor the lower country about Seville, without first taking Jaen, or Cordoba, or both. The difficulty of besieging those places, while a Spanish army was stationed at Alcala Real, or Ecija, while the mountains, on both flanks and in the rear, were filled with insurgents, and while Albuquerque hung upon the rear at Almada, is apparent. Pompey’s sons, acting upon this system, nearly baffled Cæsar, although that mighty man had friends in the province, and, with his accustomed celerity, fell upon his youthful adversaries before their arrangements were matured. But in this, the third year of the war, the Junta were unprovided with any plan of defence beyond the mere occupation of the passes in the Morena. Those, once forced, Seville was open, and, from that great city, the French could penetrate into all parts, and their communication with Madrid became of secondary importance, because Andalusia abounded in the materials of war, and Seville, the capital of the province, and, from its political position, the most important town in Spain, was furnished with arsenals, cannon-founderies, and all establishments necessary to a great military power. INVASION OF ANDALUSIA. The number of fighting-men destined for this enterprise was about sixty-five thousand. Marshal Soult directed the movements; but the king was disposed to take a more prominent part, in the military arrangements than a due regard for his own interest would justify. To cover Madrid, and to watch the British army, the second corps was posted between Talavera and Toledo, with strong detachments pushed into the valley of the Tagus. Two thousand men, drawn from the reserve, garrisoned the capital; as many were in Toledo, and two battalions occupied minor posts, such as Arganda and Guadalaxara. Gazan’s division was recalled from Castile, Milhaud’s from Aragon; and the first, fourth, and fifth corps, the king’s guards, and the reserve, increased by some reinforcements from France, were directed upon Andalusia. During the early part of January, 1810, the troops, by easy marches, gained the foot of the Morena, and there Milhaud’s division, coming by the way of Benillo, rejoined the fourth corps. A variety of menacing demonstrations, made along the front of the Spanish line of defence, between the 14th and 17th, caused Areizaga to abandon his advanced positions and confine himself to the passes of the Morena; but, on the 18th, the king arrived in person at Santa Cruz de Mudela, and the whole army was collected in three distinct masses. In the centre, the artillery, the king’s guards, the reserve, and the fifth corps, under marshal Mortier, were established at Santa Cruz and Elviso, close to the mouths of the Despenas Perros and the Puerto del Rey. On the left, Sebastiani, with the fourth corps, occupied Villa Nueva de los Infantes, and prepared to penetrate, by Venta Quemada and Puerto San Esteban, into the kingdom of Jaen. On the right, the duke of Belluno, placing a detachment in Agudo, to watch Albuquerque, occupied Almaden de Azogues, with the first corps, pushed an advanced guard into the pass of Mochuelo, and sent patrols through Benalcazar and Hinojosa towards Guadalcanal. By these dispositions, Areizaga’s line of defence in the Morena, and Albuquerque’s line of retreat from Estremadura, were alike threatened. On the 20th, Sebastiani, after a slight skirmish, forced the defiles of Esteban, making a number of prisoners; and when the Spaniards rallied behind the Guadalen, one of the tributary torrents of the Guadalquiver, he again defeated them, and advancing into the plains of Ubeda, secured the bridges over the Guadalquiver. In the centre Dessolles carried the Puerto del Rey without firing a shot, and Gazan’s division crowning the heights right and left of the Despenas Perros, turned all the Spanish works in that pass, which was abandoned. Mortier, with the main body and the artillery, then poured through, reached La Carolina in the night, and the next day took possession of Andujar, having passed in triumph over the fatal field of Baylen; more fatal to the Spaniards than to the French, for the foolish pride, engendered by that victory, was one of the principal causes of their subsequent losses. Meanwhile the duke of Belluno pushed detachments to Montoro, Adamuz, and Pozzoblanco, and his patrols appeared close to Cordoba. His and Sebastini’s flanking parties communicated also with the fifth corps at Andujar; and thus, in two days, by skilful combinations upon an extent of fifty miles, the lofty barrier of the Morena was forced, and Andalusia beheld the French masses portentously gathered on the interior slopes of the mountains. In Seville all was anarchy: Palafox and Montijo’s partisans were secretly preparing to strike, and the Ancient Junta openly discovered a resolution to resume their former power. The timid, and those who had portable property, endeavoured to remove to Cadiz; but the populace opposed this, and the peasantry came into the city so fast that above a hundred thousand persons were within the walls, and the streets were crowded with multitudes that, scarcely knowing what to expect or wish, only wanted a signal to break out into violence. The Central Junta, fearing alike, the enemy, and their own people, prepared to fly, yet faithful to their system of delusion, while their packages were actually embarking for Cadiz, assured the people that the enemy had indeed forced the pass of Almaden, leading from La Mancha into Estremadura, but that no danger could thence arise. Because the duke Del Parque was in full march to join Albuquerque; and those generals when united being stronger than the enemy would fall upon his flank, while Areizaga would co-operate from the Morena and gain a great victory. It was on the 20th of January, and at the very moment when the Morena was being forced at all points, that this deluding address was published, it was not until the day after that the Junta despatched orders for the duke Del Parque (who was then in the mountains beyond Ciudad Rodrigo) to effect that junction with Albuquerque from which such great things were expected! Del Parque received the despatch on the 24th, and prepared to obey. Albuquerque, alive to all the danger of the crisis, had left general Contreras at Medellin, with four thousand five hundred men, destined to form a garrison for Badajos, and marched himself on the 22d, with about nine thousand, towards Agudo, intending to fall upon the flank of the first corps; but he had scarcely commenced his movement, when he learned that Agudo and Almaden were occupied, and that the French patrols were already at Benalcazar and Hinojosa, within one march of his own line of retreat upon Seville. In this conjuncture, sending Contreras to Badajos, and his own artillery through the defile of Monasterio, he marched with his infantry to Guadalcanal. During the movement, he continued to receive contradictory and absurd orders from the Junta, some of which, he disregarded, and others he could not obey; but conforming to circumstances, when the Morena was forced, he descended into the basin of Seville, crossed the Guadalquivir a few leagues from that city, at the ferry of Cantillana, reached Carmona on the 24th, and immediately pushed with his cavalry for Ecija to observe the enemy’s progress. Meanwhile the storm, so long impending over the Central Junta, burst at Seville. Early on the 24th a great tumult arose. Mobs traversing all the quarters of the city, called out, some for the deposition of the Junta, others for the heads of the members. Francisco Palafox and Montijo were released, and the Junta of Seville being re-established by acclamation, the Central Junta, committed to their hands the defence of Andalusia, and endeavoured themselves to reach Cadiz, each as he could; but with the full intention of reuniting and resuming their authority. On the road however, some of them were cast into prison by the people, some were like to be slain at Xerez, and the Junta of Seville had no intention that the Central Junta should ever revive. Saavedra, the President of the former, by judicious measures calmed the tumult in the city, restored Romana to the command of his old army, which was now under the duke Del Parque, made some other popular appointments, and in conjunction with his colleagues sent a formal proposition to the Junta at Badajos, inviting them to take into consideration the necessity of constituting a Regency, which was readily acceded to. But the events of war crowding on, overlaid their schemes; and three days after the flight of the Central Junta, treason and faction being busy amongst the members of the Seville Junta, they also disbanded, some remaining in the town; others, and amongst them Saavedra, repairing to Cadiz. The tumults were then renewed with greater violence, and Romana was called upon to assume the command and defend the city; but he evaded this dangerous honour, and proceeded to Badajos. Thus abandoned to themselves, the people of Seville, discovered the same disposition, as the people of other towns in the Peninsula, had done upon like occasions. If men like the Tios of Zaragoza, had assumed command, they might have left a memorable tale and a ruined city, but there were none so firm, or so ferocious; and finally, a feeling of helplessness produced fear in all, and Seville was ready to submit to the invaders. When the passage of the mountains was completely effected, the French corps again received their artillery, but the centre and right wing of the army remained stationary, and a detachment of the first corps, which had approached Cordoba, returned to Montoro. Areizaga rallied his troops at Jaen, but Sebastiani marching from Ubeda, drove him upon Alcala Real, and Jaen surrendered with forty-six guns mounted on the walls. The Spanish general made one more stand; but being again beaten, and all his artillery captured, his army dispersed. Five thousand infantry and some squadrons of cavalry throwing away their arms escaped to Gibraltar; and Areizaga himself, with a remnant of horse, flying into the kingdom of Murcia, was there superceded by Blake. Meanwhile, Sebastiani marched upon Grenada, and entering it the 28th of January, was received with apparent joy, so entirely had the government of the Central Junta extinguished the former enthusiasm of the people. [Sidenote: Suchet’s Memoirs.] As the capture of Jaen secured the left flank of the French, the king with the centre and right, moved on Cordoba the 27th, and there also, as at Jaen and Grenada, the invaders were received without any mark of aversion,[7] and thus the upper country was conquered. But the projects of Joseph were not confined to Andalusia; he had opened a secret communication with Valencia, where his partisans undertook to raise a commotion whenever a French force should appear before the city. Hence, judging that no serious opposition would be made in Andalusia, he directed Sebastiani to cross the Sierra Nevada, and seize the Grenadan coast, an operation that would enable him with greater facility to act against Valencia. To ensure the success of the latter enterprise, he wrote from Cordoba to Suchet, urging him to make a combined movement from Aragon, and promising a powerful detachment from Andalusia, to meet him under the walls of Valencia. Dessolles, with the reserve, occupied Cordoba and Jaen; but the first and fifth corps, followed by the king’s guards, proceeded without delay towards Ecija, where it will be remembered, Albuquerque’s cavalry had been posted since the night of the 24th. As the French approached, the duke fell back upon Carmona, from whence he could retreat either to Seville, or Cadiz, the way to the latter being through Utrera. But from Ecija there was a road through Moron to Utrera, shorter than that leading through Carmona, and along this road the cavalry of the first corps was pushed on the 27th. Albuquerque now despairing for Seville, resolved to make for Cadiz, and lest the enemy should reach Utrera before him, gained that town with great expedition, and thence moving through Lebrija and Xeres, by long marches, journeying day and night, reached Cadiz on the 3d of February. Some French cavalry overtook and skirmished with his rear at Utrera; but he was not pursued further, save by scouting parties; for the king had altered the original plan of operations, and ordered the first corps which was then pushing for Cadiz, to change its direction and march by Carmona against Seville, and the 30th, the advanced guards came on that city. Some entrenchments and batteries had been raised for defence, and the mob still governing, fired upon the bearer of the first French summons, and announced in lofty terms a resolution to fight. Besides the populace, there were about seven thousand troops, composed partly of fugitives from the Morena, partly of the original garrison of the town; nevertheless, the city, after some negotiation, surrendered on the 31st, with all its stores, founderies, and arsenals complete, and on the 1st of February the king entered in triumph. The lower country was thus conquered, and there remained only Cadiz, and the coast tract lying between the Mediterranean and the Sierra de Nevada to subdue. The first corps was immediately sent against Cadiz, and the fifth against Estremadura; and Sebastiani having placed fifteen hundred men in the Alhambra, and incorporated among his troops, a Swiss battalion, composed of those who had abandoned the French service in the battle of Baylen, seized Antequera. He was desirous to establish himself firmly in those parts before he crossed the Nevada, but his measures were precipitated by unexpected events. At Malaga, the people had imprisoned the members of the local Junta, and headed by a Capuchin friar, resolved to fight the French, and a vast multitude armed in all manners took post above Antequera and Alhama, where the road from Grenada enters the hills. [Sidenote: General Campbell’s Correspondence from Gibraltar. MSS.] As this insurrection was spreading, not only in the mountains, but through the plains of Grenada, Sebastiani resolved to fall on at once, lest the Grenadans having Gibraltar on the one flank, Murcia on the other, and in their own country, many sea-ports and fortified towns, should organize a regular system of resistance. The 5th of February, after a slight skirmish at Alhama, he penetrated the hills, driving the insurgents upon Malaga; but near that place they rallied, and an engagement, with the advanced guard of the French, under general Milhaud, taking place, about five hundred Spaniards fell, and the conquerors entered the town fighting. A few of the vanquished took refuge on board some English ships of war; the rest submitted, and more than a hundred pieces of heavy, and about twenty pieces of field artillery with ammunition, stores, and a quantity of British merchandize, became the spoil of the conquerors. Velez-Malaga opened its gates the next day, Motril was occupied, and the insurrection was quelled; for in every other part, both troops and peasantry, were terrified and submissive to the last degree. Meanwhile, Victor followed the traces of Albuquerque with such diligence, as to reach Chiclana on the 5th of February, and it is generally supposed, that he might have rendered himself master of Leon, for the defensive works at Cadiz, and the Isla were in no way improved, but rather deteriorated since the period of Sir George Smith’s negotiation. The bridge of Zuazo was indeed broken, and the canal of Santa Petri a great obstacle; but Albuquerque’s troops were harassed, dispirited, ill clothed, badly armed, and in every way inefficient; the people of Cadiz were apathetic, and the authorities, as usual, occupied with intrigues and private interests. In this state, eight thousand Spanish soldiers could scarcely have defended a line of ten miles against twenty-five thousand French, if a sufficient number of boats could have been collected to cross the canal. Venegas was governor of Cadiz; but when it was known that the Central Junta had been deposed at Seville, a Municipal Junta, chiefly composed of merchants, was elected by general ballot. This body, as inflated and ambitious of power as any that had preceded it, would not suffer the fugitive members of the Central Junta to assume any authority; and the latter, maugre their extreme reluctance, were obliged to submit, but, by the advice of Jovellanos, appointed a Regency, composed of men not taken from amongst themselves. The Municipal Junta vehemently opposed this proceeding, but finally, the judicious intervention of Mr. Bartholomew Frere induced them to acquiesce; and the 29th of January, the bishop of Orense, general Castaños, Antonio de Escaño, Saavedra, and Fernandez de Leon, were appointed Regents, until the Cortes could be assembled. Leon was afterwards replaced by one Lardizabal, a native of New Spain. The council of Castile, which had been reinstated before the fall of Seville, now charged the deposed Junta, and truly, with usurpation--the public voice added peculation and other crimes; and the Regency, which they had themselves appointed, seized their papers, sequestered their effects, threw some of the members into prison, and banished others to the provinces: thus completely extinguishing this at once odious, ridiculous, and unfortunate oligarchy. Amongst the persons composing it, there were undoubtedly, some of unsullied honour and fine talents, ready and eloquent of speech, and dexterous in argument; but it is not in Spain only, that men possessing all the “grace and ornament” of words have proved to be mean and contemptible statesmen. [Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence, MSS.] Albuquerque, elected president of the Municipal Junta, and commander of the forces, endeavoured to place the Isla de Leon in a state to resist a sudden attack; and the French, deceived as to its strength, after an ineffectual summons, proceeded to gird the whole bay with works. Meanwhile, Marshal Mortier, leaving a brigade of the fifth corps at Seville, pursued a body of four thousand men, that, under the command of the Visconde de Gand, had retired from that town towards the Morena; they evaded him, and fled to Ayamonte, yet were like to be destroyed, because the bishop of Algarve, from national jealousy, would not suffer them to pass the Portuguese frontier. Mortier disregarding these fugitives, passed the Morena, by Ronquillos and Monasterio, and marching against Badajos, summoned it, the 12th of February. Contreras’ detachment had however, arrived there on the 26th of January, and Mortier, finding, contrary to his expectation, that the place was in a state of defence, retired to Merida. This terminated the first series of operations in the fourth epoch of the war; operations which, in three weeks, had put the French in possession of Andalusia and Southern Estremadura, with the exception of Gibraltar and Cadiz in the one, and of Badajos, Olivenza, and Albuquerque in the other province. Yet, great as were the results of this memorable irruption, more might have been obtained; and the capture of Cadiz would have been a fatal blow to the Peninsula. From Andujar to Seville is only a hundred miles, yet the French took ten days to traverse that space; a tardiness for which there appears no adequate cause. The king, apparently elated at the acclamations and seeming cordiality with which the towns, and even villages, greeted him, moved slowly. He imagined that Seville would open her gates at once; and thinking that the possession of that town, would produce the greatest moral effect, in Andalusia, and all over Spain, changed the first judicious plan of campaign, and marched thither in preference to Cadiz. The moral influence of Seville, was however transferred, along with the government, to Cadiz; and Joseph was deceived in his expectations of entering the former city as he had entered Cordoba. When he discovered his error there was still time to repair it by a rapid pursuit of Albuquerque, but he feared to leave a city with a hundred thousand people in a state of excitement upon his flank; and resolving first to reduce Seville, he met indeed with no formidable resistance, yet so much of opposition, as left him only the alternative of storming the town or entering by negotiation. The first his humanity forbad; the latter cost him time, which was worth his crown, for Albuquerque’s proceedings were only secondary: the ephemeral resistance of Seville was the primary cause of the safety of Cadiz. The march by which the Spanish duke secured the Isla de Leon, is only to be reckoned from Carmona. Previous to his arrival there, his movements, although judicious, were more the result of necessity than of skill. After the battle of Ocaña, he expected that Andalusia would be invaded; yet, either fettered by his orders or ill-informed of the enemy’s movements, his march upon Agudo was too late, and his after-march upon Guadalcanal, was the forced result of his position; he could only do that, or abandon Andalusia and retire to Badajos. From Guadalcanal, he advanced towards Cordoba on the 23d, and he might have thrown himself into that town; yet the prudence of taking such a decided part, was dependent upon the state of public sentiment, of which he must have been a good judge. Albuquerque indeed, imagined, that the French were already in possession of the place, whereas they did not reach it until four days later; but they could easily have entered it on the 24th: and as he believed that they had done so, it is apparent that he had no confidence in the people’s disposition. In this view, his determination to cross the Guadalquivir, and take post at Carmona, was the fittest for the occasion. It was at Carmona he first appears to have considered Seville a lost city; and when the French approached, we find him marching, with a surprising energy, towards Cadiz, yet he was again late in deciding; for the enemy’s cavalry, moving by the shorter road to Utrera, overtook his rear-guard: and the infantry would assuredly have entered the Island of Leon with him, if the king had not directed them upon Seville. The ephemeral resistance of that city therefore saved Albuquerque; and he, in return, saved Cadiz. CHAPTER II. Lord Wellington’s plans were deeply affected by the invasion of Andalusia: but before treating of the stupendous campaign he was now meditating, it is necessary, once more to revert to the operations in the other parts of the Peninsula, tracing them up to a fixed point; because, although bearing strongly on the main action of the war, to recur to them chronologically, would totally destroy, the unity of narrative indispensable to a just handling of the subject. OPERATIONS IN NAVARRE, ARAGON, AND VALENCIA. Suchet, being ordered to quell the disorders in Navarre, repaired to Pampeluna, but previously directed an active pursuit of the student Mina, who, availing himself of the quarrel between the military governor and the viceroy, was actually master of the country between that fortress and Tudela, and was then at Sanguessa. General Harispe, with some battalions, marched straight against him from Zaragoza, while detachments from Tudela and Pampeluna endeavoured to surround him by the flanks, and a fourth body moving into the valleys of Ainsa and Medianoz, cut him off from the Cinca river. [Sidenote: Suchet’s Memoirs.] Harispe quickly reached Sanguessa, but the column from Pampeluna being retarded, Mina, with surprising boldness, crossed its line of march, and attacked Tafalla, thus cutting the great French line of communication; the garrison, however, made a strong resistance, and Mina disappeared the next day. At this period, however, reinforcements from France were pouring into Navarre, and a division, under Loison, was at Logroño, wherefore Harispe having, in concert with this general and with the garrison of Pampeluna, occupied Sanguessa, Sos, Lodosa, Puenta de Reyna, and all the passages of the Arga, Aragon, and Ebro rivers, launched a number of moveable columns, that continually pursued Mina, until chased into the high parts of the Pyrenees, cold and hunger obliged his band to disperse. The enterprising chief himself escaped with seven followers, and when the French were tracking him from house to house, he, with a romantic simplicity, truly Spanish, repaired to Olite, that he might see Suchet pass on his way from Zaragoza to Pampeluna. But that general, while seemingly occupied with the affairs of Pampeluna, was secretly preparing guns and materials, for a methodical war of invasion, beyond the frontiers of Aragon, and when general Reynier, coming soon afterwards from France, with troops intended to form an eighth corps, was appointed governor of Navarre, Suchet returned to Zaragoza. During his absence, some petty actions had taken place, but his general arrangements were not disturbed, and the emperor having promised to increase the third corps to thirty thousand men, with the intention of directing it at once against Valencia, all the stores befitting such an enterprise were collected at Terruel in the course of January. The resistance of Gerona, and other events in Catalonia having, however, baffled Napoleon’s calculations, this first destination of the third corps was changed. Suchet was ordered to besiege Tortoza or Lerida; the eighth corps, then forming at Logroño, was directed to cover his rear, and the seventh corps to advance to the Lower Ebro and support the siege. Nor was this arrangement definitive; fresh orders sent the eighth corps towards Castile, and just at this moment Joseph’s letter from Cordoba, calling upon Suchet to march against Valencia, arrived, and gave a new turn to the affairs of the French in Spain. A decree of the emperor, dated the 8th of January, and constituting Aragon a particular government, rendered Suchet independent of the king’s orders, civil or military. But this decree, together with a renewed order to commence the siege of Lerida, had been intercepted, and the French general, doubtful of Napoleon’s real views, undertook the enterprise against Valencia. Desirous, however, of first intimidating the partisans hanging on the borders of Aragon, he detached Laval against Villa Campa, and the latter being defeated on the side of Cuença, his troops dispersed for the moment. Suchet then fortified a post at Terruel, to serve as a temporary base of operations, and drew together at that place twelve battalions of infantry, a regiment of cuirassiers, several squadrons of light cavalry, and some field artillery, and, at the same time, caused six battalions and three squadrons of cavalry to be assembled at Alcanitz, under general Habert. The remainder of the third corps was distributed on the line of the Cinca, and on the right bank of the Ebro. The castles of Zaragoza, Alcanitz, Monzon, Venasque, Jaca, Tudela, and other towns, were placed in a state of defence, and four thousand men, newly arrived from France, were pushed to Daroca, to link the active columns to those left in Aragon. These arrangements occupied the whole of February, and, on the 1st of March, a duplicate of the order, directing Suchet to commence the siege of Lerida, reached Terruel. But as Habert’s column having marched on the 27th, by the road of Morella, was already committed in the province of Valencia, the operation went on. INCURSION TO VALENCIA. The first day, brought Suchet’s column, in presence of the Valencian army, for Ventura Caro, captain-general of that province, was in march to attack the French at Terruel, and his advanced guard of five or six thousand regulars, accompanied by armed peasants, was drawn up on some high ground behind the river Mingares, the bed of which is a deep ravine so suddenly sunk, as not to be perceived until close upon it. The village and castle of Alventoza, situated somewhat in advance of the Spaniard’s centre, were occupied, and commanded a bridge over the river. Their right rested on the village and bridge of Puenseca, and their left on the village of Manzanera, where the ground was rather more practicable. Suchet, judging that Caro would not fight so far from Valencia, while Habert’s column was turning his right, sent a division before daylight, on the 2d, to turn the left of the position, and cut off the retreat; but, although the French, after a skirmish, crossed the ravine, the Spaniards retired with little loss upon Segorbe, and Caro fell back to the city of Valencia. Suchet entered Segorbe the 3d, and on the 4th was at Murviedro, the ancient Saguntum, four leagues from Valencia. At the same time, Habert, who had defeated a small corps at Morella, arrived at Villa Real on the sea coast. The country between their lines of march was mountainous and impracticable, but after passing Saguntum, the Huerta, or garden of Valencia, the richest and most delightful part of Spain, opened, the two columns, united, and arriving before the city on the 5th of March, seized the suburb Seranos, and the harbour called the Grao. Suchet’s spies at first confirmed the hopes of an insurrection within the walls, but the treason was detected, the leader, a baron Pozzo Blanco, publicly executed, and the archbishop and many others imprisoned; in fine, the plan had failed, the populace were in arms, and there was no movement of French troops on the side of Murcia. Five days the French general remained before the city, vainly negotiating, and then, intrigue failing, and his army being inadequate to force the defences, he resolved to retire. In the night of the 10th he commenced his retreat in one column by Segorbe and Terruel. Meanwhile the Spanish partisans were gathering on his rear. Combats had already taken place at Liria and Castellon de la Plana, and general Villa Campa, who had reassembled his dispersed troops, captured four guns, with their ammunition and escort, between Terruel and Daroca; cut off another detachment of a hundred men left at Alventoza, and, having invested the post at Terruel, on the 7th, by a bold and ready witted attempt, nearly carried the castle. The 12th, however, the head of Suchet’s column came in sight, Villa Campa retired, and the 17th the French general reached Zaragoza. During his absence, Perena had invested Monzon, and when the garrison of Fraga marched to its relief, the Spaniards from Lerida, entered the latter town, and destroyed the bridge and French entrenchments. Mina, also, was again become formidable, and, although several columns were sent in chase of him, it is probable, that they would have done no more than disperse his band for the moment, but for an accident, which threw him into their hands a prisoner. Suchet’s failure at Valencia was more hurtful to the French than would at first sight appear. It happened at the moment when the National Cortes, so long desired, was at last directed to assemble; and as it seemed to balance the misfortunes of Andalusia, it was hailed by the Spaniards as the commencement of a better era. But the principal military advantage was the delaying of the sieges of Lerida and Mequinenza, whereby the subjection of Catalonia was retarded: and although Suchet labours, and successfully, to show that he was drawn into this enterprise by the force of circumstances, Napoleon’s avowed discontent was well founded. The operations in Catalonia were so hampered by the nature of the country, that it was only at certain conjunctures, any progress could be made, and one of the most favourable of those conjunctures, was lost, for want of the co-operation of the third corps; but to understand this, the military topography of Catalonia must be well considered. [Sidenote: Vol. I. Book I. Chap. VI.] That province is divided in its whole length by shoots from the Pyrenees, which, with some interruptions, run to the Atlantic shores; for the sierras separating Valencia, Murcia, and Andalusia from the central parts of Spain, are but continuations of those shoots. The Ebro, forcing its way transversely through the ridges, parts Catalonia from Valencia, but the hills, thus broken by the river, push their rocky heads southward to the sea, cutting off Taragona from Tortoza, and enclosing what may be called the eastern region of Catalonia, which contains Rosas, Gerona, Hostalrich, Vich, Barcelona, Manreza, Taragona, Reus, and many more towns. The torrents, the defiles, and other military features of this region have been before described. The western portion of Catalonia lying beyond the principal spine, is bounded partly by Aragon, partly by Valencia; and, like the eastern region, it is an assemblage of small plains and rugged valleys, each, the bed of a river, descending towards the Ebro from the Pyrenees. It contains the fortresses of Balaguer, Lerida, Mequinenza, Cervera, and, near the mouth of the Ebro, Tortoza, which, however, belongs in a military view rather to Valencia than Catalonia. Now the mountain ridge, parting the eastern from the western region of Catalonia, could only be passed by certain routes, for the most part impracticable for artillery, and those practicable, leading upon walled towns at both sides of the defiles. Thus Cervera is situated on the principal and direct line from Lerida to Barcelona; Balaguer, Cardona, and Montserrat, on another and more circuitous road to the same city. Between Lerida and Taragona, stands Momblanch, and between Taragona, and Tortoza, the Fort St. Felippe blocks the Col de Balaguer. All these places were in the hands of the Spaniards, and a number of smaller fortresses, or castles, such as Urgel, Berga, and Solsona, served as rallying points, where the warlike Somatenes, of the higher valleys, took refuge from the moveable columns, and from whence, supplied with arms and ammunition, they sallied, to harass, the flanks and rear, of both the French corps. In the eastern region, the line of operations for the seventh corps, was between the mountains and the sea-coast, and parallel with both; hence, the Spanish irregular forces, holding all the communications, and the high valleys on both sides of the great dividing spine, could at all times descend upon the rear and flanks of the French, while the regular troops, opposed to them on a narrow front, and supported by the fortresses of Gerona, Hostalrich, and Taragona, could advance or retire as circumstances dictated. And upon this principle, the defence of Catalonia was conducted. Detachments and sometimes the main body of the Spanish army, passing by the mountains, or by sea from Taragona, harassed the French flanks, and when defeated, retired on Vich, Manresa, Montserrat, or Cervera, and finally to Taragona. From this last, the generals communicated with Tortoza, Valencia, Gibraltar, the Balearic Isles, and even Sicily, and drew succours of all kinds from those places, and meanwhile the bands in the mountains continued to vex the French communications; and it was only during the brief period of lassitude in the Spanish army, following any great defeat, that the seventh corps could chase those mountaineers. Nor, until Gerona and Hostalrich fell, was it easy to make any but sudden and short incursions towards Taragona, because the Miguelettes from the higher valleys, and detachments from the army at Taragona, again passing by the hills or by sea, joined the garrisons, and interrupted the communications; and thus obliged the French to retire, because the country beyond the Llobregat could never feed them long. But when Barcelona could not be succoured by sea, it was indispensable to conduct convoys by land, and to insure their arrival, the whole army was obliged to make frequent movements in advance, retiring again when the object was effected; and this being often renewed, offered many opportunities for cutting off minor convoys, detachments, and even considerable bodies isolated by the momentary absence of the army. Thus, during the siege of Gerona, Blake passed through the mountains and harassed the besiegers. When the place fell, he retired again to Taragona, and Augereau took the occasion to attack the Miguelettes, and Somatenes, in the high valleys; but in the midst of this operation admiral Baudin’s squadron, was intercepted by admiral Martin; and the insatiable craving of Barcelona, obliged Augereau to reassemble his army, and conduct a convoy there by land. Yet he was soon obliged to return again, lest he should himself consume the provisions he brought for the city. This retreat, as usual, drew on the Spaniards, who were again defeated; and Augereau once more advanced, in the intention of co-operating with the third corps, which, he supposed, would, following the Emperor’s design, be before Lerida or Tortoza. However, when Augereau thus advanced, Suchet was on the march to Valencia; and Henry O’Donnel who had succeeded Blake in the command, recommenced the warfare on the French communications, and forced Augereau again to retire to Gerona, at the moment when Suchet, having returned to Aragon, was ready to besiege Lerida; thus, like unruly horses in a chariot dragging different ways, the French impeded each other’s movements. I shall now briefly narrate the events touched upon above. OPERATIONS OF THE SEVENTH CORPS. Gerona having fallen, general Souham with a division, scoured the high valleys, beating the Miguelettes of Claros and Rovira, at Besalu, Olot, Ribas, and Campredon; and at Ripoll, he destroyed a manufactory for arms. Being afterwards reinforced with Pino’s division, he marched from Olot, by the road of Esteban and Manlieu; the Somatenes disputed the defiles near the last point, but the French forcing the passage, again took possession of Vich. Meanwhile Blake having been called to Andalusia, the Provincial Junta of Catalonia rejecting the duke Del Parque, took upon themselves to give the command to Henry O’Donnel, whose courage during the siege of Gerona had gained him a high reputation. He was now with the remains of Blake’s army at Vich, and as the French approached that town he retired to the pass of Col de Sespina, from whence he had a free retreat upon Moya and Manresa. Souham’s advanced guard, pursued, and at Tona, captured some baggage, but the Spaniard turned on finding his rear pressed, and when the pursuers mounted the heights of Sespino, charged with a shock, that sent them headlong down the hills again. Souham rallied the beaten troops in the plain, and the next day offered battle; but O’Donnel continued his retreat, and the French general returned to Vich. During these events, Augereau, leaving a detachment in Hostalrich to blockade the castle, marched to Barcelona, by the road of Cardedieu, having previously ordered Duhesme, to post three battalions and five squadrons of cuirassiers, with some guns, near the junction, of the roads of Cardedieu and Manresa, to watch O’Donnel. Colonel Guery, commanding this detachment, placed one battalion at Granollers, a second at Santa Perpetua, and with the remainder occupied Mollet, taking however no military precautions; and O’Donnel who had been joined by Campo Verde, from the side of Cervera, sent him to fall upon the French posts. Campo Verde, passing by Tarrassa and Sabadel, surprised and put to the sword or captured all the troops at Santa Perpetua and Mollet; but those at Granollers, threw themselves into a large building, and defended it for three days, when by the approach of Augereau they were relieved. The marshal finding the streets of Mollet strewed with French carcasses, ordered up the division of Souham from Vich, but passed on himself to Barcelona. When there, he became convinced how oppressive Duhesme’s conduct had been, and sent him to France in disgrace; after which, unable to procure provisions without exhausting the magazines of Barcelona, he resumed his former position at Gerona, and Souham, passing the defiles of Garriga, returned to Vich. All this time the blockade of Hostalrich continued; but the retreat of Augereau, and the success of Campo Verde’s enterprise, produced extraordinary joy over all Catalonia. The prisoners taken, were marched from town to town, and the action everywhere exaggerated; the decree for enrolling a fifth of the male population was enforced with vigour, and the execution entrusted to the Baron d’Erolles, a native of Talarn, who afterwards obtained considerable celebrity. The army, in which there was still a large body of Swiss troops, was thus reinforced; the confidence of the people increased hourly, and a Local Junta was established at Arenys de Mar, to organise the Somatenes on the coast, and to direct the application of succours from the sea. The Partisans, also reassembling their dispersed bands in the higher valleys, again vexed the Ampurdan, and incommoded the troops blockading the citadel of Hostalrich. O’Donnel himself, moving to Manresa, called the Miguelettes from the Lerida side, to his assistance; and soon formed a body of more than twelve thousand fighting-men, with which he took post at Moya, in the beginning of February, and harassed the French in front of Vich, while, in the rear of that town, Rovira occupied the heights above Roda. Souham, seeing the crests of the hills thus swarming with enemies, and, having but five thousand men of all arms to oppose to them, demanded reinforcements; but Augereau paid little attention to him: and, on the 20th, O’Donnel, descending the mountain of Centellas, entered the plains in three columns, and the French general had scarcely time to draw up his troops a little in front of the town, ere he was attacked with a vigour hitherto unusual with the Spaniards. COMBAT OF VICH. Rovira commenced the action, by driving the enemy’s posts, on the side of Roda, back upon the town, and soon afterwards O’Donnel, coming close up on the front of the French position, opened all his guns, and, throwing out skirmishers along the whole of the adverse line, filed his cavalry, under cover of their fire, to the right, intending to outflank Souham’s left; but the latter general, leaving a battalion to hold Rovira in check, encouraged his own infantry, and sent his dragoons against the Spanish horsemen, who, at the first charge, were driven back in confusion. The foot then fell in on the French centre, but, failing to make any serious impression, the Spanish general, whose great superiority of numbers enabled him to keep heavy masses in reserve, endeavoured to turn both flanks of the enemy at the same time. Souham was now hard pressed, his infantry were few, his reserves all engaged, and himself severely wounded in the head. O’Donnel, who had rallied his cavalry, and brought up his Swiss regiments, was full of confidence, and in person fiercely led the whole mass once more against the left; but, at this critical period, the French infantry, far from wavering, firmly closed their ranks, and sent their volleys more rapidly into the hostile ranks, while the cavalry, sensible that the fate of all (for there was no retreat) hung upon the issue of their charge, met their adversaries with such a full career that horse and man went down before them, and the Swiss, being separated from the rest, surrendered. Rovira was afterwards driven away, and the Spanish army returned to the hills, having lost a full fourth of its own numbers, and killed or wounded twelve hundred of the enemy. O’Donnel’s advance, had been the signal, for all the irregular bands to act against the various quarters of the French; they were, however, with the exception of a slight succour, thrown into Hostalrich, unsuccessful, and, being closely pursued by the moveable columns, dispersed. Thus the higher valleys were again subdued, the Junta fled from Arenys de Mar, Campo Verde returned to the country about Cervera, and O’Donnel, quitting the Upper Llobregat, retired by Taraza, Martorel, and Villa Franca to the camp of Taragona, leaving only an advanced guard at Ordal. It was at this moment, when Upper Catalonia was in a manner abandoned by the Spanish general, that the emperor, directed the seventh corps upon the Lower Ebro, to support Suchet’s operations against Lerida and Mequinenza. Augereau, therefore, leaving a detachment under Verdier, in the Ampurdan, and two thousand men to blockade Hostalrich, ordered his brother and general Mazzucchelli (the one commanding Souham’s, and the other Pino’s division) to march upon Manreza, while he himself, with the Westphalian division, repaired once more to Barcelona, and from thence directed all the subsequent movements. General Augereau, passing by Col de Sespina, entered Manreza, the 16th of March, and there joined Mazzucchelli; but the inhabitants abandoned the place, and general Swartz was sent with a brigade, from Moncada, to take possession, while the two divisions continued their movement, by Montserrat, upon Molino del Rey. The 21st they advanced to Villa Franca, and the Spaniards retired from Ordal towards Taragona. But the French, acting under orders from Barcelona, left a thousand men in Villa Franca, and, after scouring the country on the right and left, passed the Col de San Cristina, and established their quarters about Reus, by which the Spanish army at Taragona was placed between them and the troops at Villa Franca. O’Donnel, whose energy and military talents, were superior to his predecessors, saw, and instantly profited from this false position. By his orders, general Juan Caro marched, with six thousand men, against the French in Villa Franca, and, on the 28th, killed many and captured the rest, together with some artillery and stores; but, being wounded himself, resigned the command to general Gasca, after the action. Augereau, alarmed for Manreza, detached troops, both by Olesa and Montserrat, to reinforce Swartz. The first reached their destinations, but the others, twelve hundred strong, were intercepted by Gasca, and totally defeated at Esparaguera on the 3d of April. Campo Verde then, coming down from the side of Cervera, took the chief command, and proceeded against Manreza, by Montserrat, while Milans de Boch, and Rovira, hemmed in the French on the opposite side, and the Somatenes gathered on the hills to aid the operations. Swartz evacuated the town in the night, and thinking to baffle the Spaniards, by taking the road of Taraza and Sabadel, was followed closely and beaten, by Rovira and Milans, on the 5th of April, and, with great difficulty and the loss of all his baggage, reached Barcelona. These operations having insulated the French divisions at Reus, an officer was despatched, by sea, with orders to recall them to Barcelona. Meanwhile count Severoli, who had taken the command of them, and whose first instructions were to co-operate with Suchet, feared to pass the mountains between Reus and the Ebro, lest he should expose his rear to an attack from Taragona, and perhaps fail of meeting the third corps at last. Keeping, therefore, on the defensive at Reus, he detached colonel Villatte, at the head of two battalions and some cavalry, across the hills, by Dos Aguas and Falcet, to open a communication with the third corps, a part of which had just seized Mora and Flix, on the Lower Ebro. Villatte accomplished his object, and returned with great celerity, fighting his way through the Somatenes, who were gathering round the defiles in his rear. He regained Reus, just as Severoli, having received the order of recall, was commencing his march for Barcelona. [Sidenote: Vacani Istoria Militáre degl’Italiani in Ispagna.] In the night of the 6th, this movement took place, but in such confusion, that, from Taragona, O’Donnel perceived the disorder; and sending a detachment, under colonel Orry, to harass the French, followed himself with the rest of his army. Nevertheless, Severoli’s rear guard, covered the retreat successfully, until a position was attained near Villa Franca; and there Orry, pressing on too closely, was wounded and taken, and his troops rejoined their main body. As these divisions arrived, Campo Verde fell back to Cervera, Severoli reached Barcelona, and Augereau retired to Gerona, having lost more than three thousand men, by a series of most unskilful movements. The situation in which he voluntarily placed himself, was precisely such as a great general would rejoice to see his adversary choose. Barcelona, the centre of his operations, was encircled by mountains, to be passed only at certain defiles; now Reus and Manresa, were beyond those defiles, and several days march from each other. Rovira and Milans being about San Culgat, cut the communication between Manresa and Barcelona; and O’Donnel, at Taragona, was nearer to the defiles of Cristina, than the French divisions at Reus. His communication with Campo Verde, was open by Valls, Pla, and Santa Coloma de Querault; and with Milans and Rovira, by Villa Franca, San Sadurni, and Igualada. Augereau indeed, placed a battalion in Villa Franca, but this only rendered his situation worse; for what could six hundred men effect in a mountainous country against three considerable bodies of the enemy? The result was inevitable. The battalion, at Villa Franca, was put to the sword; Swartz only saved a remnant of his brigade by a timely flight; the divisions at Reus with difficulty made good their retreat; and O’Donnel, who, one month before, had retired from the battle of Vich, broken and discomfited by only five thousand French, now, with that very beaten army, baffled Augereau, and obliged him, although at the head of more than twenty thousand men, to abandon Lower Catalonia, and retire to Gerona with disgrace: a surprising change, yet one in which fortune had no share. [Sidenote: Napoleon’s Memoirs.] Augereau’s talents for handling small corps in a battle, have been recorded by a master hand. There is a vast difference between that and conducting a campaign; but the truth is, that Catalonia had, like Aragon, been declared a particular government, and Augereau, afflicted with gout, remained in the palace of Barcelona, affecting the state of a viceroy, when he should have been at the head of his troops in the field. On the other hand, his opponent, a hardy resolute man, excited by a sudden celebrity, was vigilant, indefatigable, and eager. He merited the success he obtained; and, with better and more experienced troops, that success would have been infinitely greater. Yet if the expedition to Valencia had not taken place, O’Donnel, distracted by a double attack, would have remained at Taragona; and neither the action of Vich, nor the disasters at Mollet, Villa Franca, and Esparaguera, would have taken place. Napoleon, discontented, as he well might be, with these operations, appointed M’Donald, duke of Tarentum, to supersede Augereau; but, in the meantime, the latter, having reached Gerona, disposed his troops in the most commodious manner to cover the blockade of Hostalrich, giving Severoli the command. FALL OF HOSTALRICH CASTLE. [Sidenote: Napoleon’s Memoirs.] This citadel was invested early in January. Situated on a high rock, armed with forty guns, well garrisoned, and commanded by a brave man, it was nearly impregnable; and the French at first endeavoured to reduce it by a simple blockade: but, towards the middle of February, commenced the erection of mortar-batteries. Severoli also pressed the place more vigorously than before, and although O’Donnel, collecting convoys on the side of Vich and Mattaro, caused the blockading troops to be attacked at several points by the Miguelettes, every attempt to introduce supplies failed. The garrison was reduced to extremity, and honourable terms were offered, but the governor, Julian Estrada, rejected them, and prepared to break through the enemy’s line, an exploit always expected from a good garrison in Turenne’s days, and, as Napoleon has shewn by numerous examples, generally successful. O’Donnel, who could always communicate with the garrison, being aware of their intention, sent some vessels to Arenys de Mar, and made demonstrations from thence, and from the side of St. Celoni, to favour the enterprise; and in the night of the 12th, Estrada, leaving his sick behind, came forth with about fourteen hundred men. He first made as if for St. Celoni, but afterwards turning to his right, broke through on the side of St. Felieu de Buxalieu and pushed for Vich; but the French closing rapidly from the right and left, pursued so closely, that Estrada himself was wounded, and taken, together with about three hundred men; many also were killed, the rest dispersed in the mountains, and eight hundred reached Vich in safety. This courageous action was therefore successful. Thus, on the 14th of May, after four months of blockade and ten weeks of bombardment, the castle fell, the line of communication with Barcelona was completed, and the errors committed by Duhesme were partly remedied, but at an expense of two years of field operations, many battles, and four sieges. [Sidenote: Victoires et Conquêtes des Français.] Two small islands, called Las Medas, situated at the mouth of the Ter, and affording a safe anchorage, were next seized, and this event which facilitated the passage of the French vessels, stealing from port to port with provisions, or despatches, finished Augereau’s career. It had been the very reverse of St. Cyr’s. The latter, victorious in the field, was humane afterwards; but Augereau endeavouring, to frighten those people into submission, who he had failed to beat, erected gibbets along the high-roads, upon which every man taken in arms was hung up without remorse, producing precisely the effect that might be expected. The Catalans more animated by their successes, than daunted by this barbarous severity, became incredibly savage in their revenge, and thus all human feeling lost, both parties were alike steeped in blood and loaded with crimes. CHAPTER III. While Augereau lost, in Barcelona, the fruits of his success at Gerona, Suchet, sensible how injurious the expedition to Valencia had proved, was diligently repairing that error. Reinforcements from France, had raised his fighting men to about twenty-three thousand, and of these, he drew out thirteen thousand to form the siege of Lerida; the remainder, were required to maintain the forts in Aragon, and to hold in check the Partisans, principally in the higher valleys of the Pyrenees. Villa Campa however, with from three to four thousand men, still kept about the lordship of Molina, and the mountains of Albaracin. Two lines of operation were open to Suchet, the one, short and direct, by the high road leading from Zaragoza through Fraga to Lerida; the other circuitous, over the Sierra de Alcubierre, to Monzon, and from thence to Lerida. The first was inconvenient, because the Spaniards, when they took Fraga, destroyed the bridge over the Cinca. Moreover, the fortress of Mequinenza, the Octogesa of Cæsar, situated at the confluence of the Segre and the Ebro, was close on the right flank, and might seriously incommode the communications with Zaragoza, whereas the second route, although longer, was safer, and less exhausted of forage and provisions. Monzon was already a considerable military establishment, the battering train consisting of forty pieces, with seven hundred rounds of ammunition attached to each, was directed there, and placed under the guard of Habert’s division, which occupied the line of the Cinca. Leval leaving general Chlopiski with a brigade at Daroca, to observe Villa Campa, drew nearer to Zaragoza with the rest of his division. Musnier marched with one brigade to Alcanitz, and was there joined by his second brigade, which had been conducted to that point, from Terruel, across the Sierra de Gudar. And while these movements were executing, the castles of Barbastro, Huesca, Ayerbe, Zuera, Pina, Bujarola, and other points on the left of the Ebro, were occupied by detachments. The right bank of that river, being guarded by Leval’s division, and the country on the left bank, secured by a number of fortified posts, there remained two divisions of infantry, and about nine hundred cavalry, disposable for the operations against Lerida. On the Spanish side, Campo Verde was with O’Donnel at Manreza, and Garcia Novaro at Taragona, having small detachments on the right bank of the Ebro to cover Tortoza; Perenna with five battalions occupied Balaguer on the Upper Segre. Such were the relative situations of both parties, when general Musnier quitting Alcanitz towards the end of March, crossed the Guadalupe, drove Novarro’s detachments within the walls of Tortoza, and then remounting the Ebro, seized some boats, and passing that river at Mora and at Flix, communicated as I have before related, with colonel Villatte of the seventh corps. And while this was passing on the Ebro, general Habert crossed the Cinca in two columns, one of which moved straight upon Balaguer, while the other passed the Segre at Camarasa. Perenna, fearing to be attacked on both sides of that river, and not wishing to defend Balaguer, retired down the left bank, and using the Lerida bridge, remounted the right bank to Corbins, where he took post behind the Noguerra, at its confluence with the Segre. Suchet himself repaired to Monzon the 10th of April, and placed a detachment at Candasnos to cover his establishments from the garrison of Mequinenza, and the 13th he advanced with a brigade of infantry, and all his cavalry, by Almacellas, against Lerida; meanwhile Habert, descending the right bank of the Segre, forced the passage of the Noguerra, and obliged Perenna to retire within the place. The same day Musnier came up from Flix, and the town being thus encompassed, the operations of the seventh and third corps were connected. Suchet’s line of operations from Aragon, was short, direct, and easy to supply, because the produce of that province was greater than the consumption; but Augereau’s line, was long and unsafe, and the produce of Catalonia was at no time equal to the consumption. Lerida, celebrated in ancient and modern times, contained about eighteen thousand inhabitants. Situated upon the high road from Zaragoza to Barcelona, and about sixty-five miles from each; it possessed a stone bridge over the Segre, and was only a short distance from the Ebro, and the Cinca rivers; its strategic importance was therefore great, and the more so, that it in a manner commanded the plains of Urgel, called the granary of Catalonia. The regular governor was named Gonsalez, but Garcia Conde had been appointed chief commandant, to appease his discontent at O’Donnel’s elevation; and the troops he brought with him had encreased the garrison to nine thousand regulars, besides the armed inhabitants. The river Segre covered the town on the south-east, and the head of the bridge was protected on the left bank, by a rampart and ditch enclosing a square stone building. The body of the place on the north side, was defended by a wall, without either ditch or covered way, but strengthened and flanked by bastions, and by towers. This wall on the east, was joined to a rocky hill more than two hundred and fifty feet high, the top of which sustained the citadel, an assemblage of huge solid edifices, clustered about a castle of great height, and surrounded by an irregular work flanked by good bastions with ramparts from forty to fifty feet high. The descent from this rock into the town, was gentle, and the works were there strengthened by ditches; on the other parts, the walls could be seen to their base; yet the great height of the rock rendered it impossible to breach them, and the approaches were nearly inaccessible. Between the citadel-rock and the river, the town was squeezed out, about two or three hundred yards, and the salient part was secured by an entrenchment, and by two bastions called the Carmen and the Magdalen. To the westward of the town, at the distance of seven or eight hundred yards, the hill, on which Afranius and Petrieus encamped to oppose Cæsar, was crowned, on the end next to Lerida, by Fort Garden, which was again covered by a large horn-work, with ditches above twenty feet deep; and at the farthest extremity of the Afranian hill, two large redoubts called the Pilar and San Fernando, secured the whole of the flat summit. All the works of Lerida were in good condition, and armed with more than one hundred pieces of artillery; the magazines were full, and the people enthusiastic. A local Junta also had been formed to excite public feeling; and two officers of artillery had already been murdered and their heads nailed to the gates of the town. The siege was to be a joint operation by the third and seventh corps, but the information derived from colonel Villatte, and the appearance of Spanish Partisans on the lower Ebro, led Suchet to suspect that the seventh corps had already retired, and that the burthen would rest on him alone, wherefore he still kept his battering train at Monzon, intending to wait until O’Donnel’s plans should be clearly indicated, before he commenced the siege. Meanwhile, he established a communication across the Segre, by means of a rope ferry, one league above Lerida, and after closely examining the defences, prepared materials for the construction of batteries. Two battalions of the investing troops had been left at Monzon and Balaguer, but the remainder were thus distributed. On the left bank of the Segre, at Alcoteletge, four thousand men, including the cavalry, which was composed of a regiment of cuirassiers and one of hussars, were stationed as a corps of observation; and Harispe, with three battalions, invested the bridge-head of Lerida. By this disposition, the ferry-boat was protected, and all danger from the sudden rising of the Segre obviated, because the stone bridge of Balaguer furnished a certain communication. The rest of the troops occupied different positions, on the roads to Monzon, Fraga, and Corbins, but as the number was insufficient to complete the circle of investment round Fort Garden, that part was continually scoured by patrols. Scarcely were these arrangements completed when a Spanish officer, pretending to bear propositions for an exchange of prisoners, was stopped on the left bank of the Segre, and the French general detained him, suspecting his real object was to gain information; for rumours obtained, that O’Donnel was collecting troops at Momblanch, that Campo Verde was at Cervera, and that the Somatenes of the high valleys were in arms on the upper Segre. Suchet anxious to ascertain the truth of these reports, reinforced Harispe with three hundred hussars on the 19th of April, and carried the corps of observation to Balaguer. The governor of Lerida took that opportunity to make a sally, but was repulsed, and the 21st, the French general, to strengthen his position at Balaguer, caused the bridge of Camarasa, above that town, to be broken, and then advanced as far as Tarrega, forty miles on the road to Barcelona, to obtain intelligence; for he was still uncertain of Augereau’s movements, and like every other general, French or English, found it extremely difficult to procure authentic information. On this occasion, however, by a happy fortune, he ascertained that O’Donnel, with two divisions, was at Momblanch, ready to descend the mountains and succour Lerida; wherefore returning by one forced march to Balaguer, he directed Musnier to resume his former position at Alcoleletge. This rapidity was well-timed, for O’Donnel had passed the defiles of Momblanch, with eight thousand chosen infantry, and six hundred cavalry, and encamped at Vinaxa, about twenty-five miles from Lerida, on the 22d. There a note from Garcia Conde, saying that, the French reserve being drawn off, the investing force was weak, reached him, and he being willing to seize the favourable moment, immediately pushed forward, reached Juneda, fourteen miles from Lerida, by ten o’clock in the morning of the 23d, and, after a halt of two hours, resumed his march with the cavalry and one division of infantry, leaving the other to follow more leisurely. COMBAT OF MARGALEF. Four miles from Juneda, stood the ruined village of Margalef, and from thence to Lerida was an open country, on which O’Donnel could perceive no covering force. Hence, trusting implicitly to Conde’s information (already falsified by Suchet’s activity), the Spanish general descended the hills, and crossed the plain in three columns, one following the high road and the other two marching on the right and left. The centre outstripping the flankers, soon beat back the advanced posts of Harispe; but that general, charged with his three hundred hussars, upon the Spanish column, so suddenly, that it was thrown into confusion, and fled towards Margalef, to which place, the flank columns also retreated, yet in good order. During this skirmish, the garrison sallied over the bridge, but the French infantry stood firm, and the besieged, seeing the rout of O’Donnel’s column, returned to the town. Meanwhile, Musnier, hearing the firing, guessed the real state of affairs, and marched at once with his infantry and four hundred cuirassiers from Alcoteletge across the plain towards Margalef, hoping to cut off the Spaniards’ retreat. O’Donnel had, however, rallied his troops, and was already in line of battle, the artillery on the right and the cavalry on the left, his second division being, however, still in the rear. The French cuirassiers and a battery of light artillery, came up at a quick pace, a cannonade commenced, and the Spanish cavalry rode forward, but the cuirassiers, commanded by general Boussard, charged hotly, and forced them back on the line of battle in such a manner that the latter wavered, when Boussard, observing the confusion, came with a rude shock upon the flank of the infantry. The Walloon guards made an effort to form square, but the confusion was extreme, and nearly all the Spanish infantry threw down their arms or were sabred. The cuirassiers, elated with their success, then met and overthrew a Swiss regiment, forming the advanced guard of the second Spanish division; but the main body of the latter checked their fury, and O’Donnel retreated in good order, and without further loss to the defile of Momblanch. This action, although not discreditable to O’Donnel, was very unfortunate. The plain was strewed with carcases; three Spanish guns, one general, eight colonels, and above five thousand men were captured; and the next day the prisoners, being first ostentatiously marched under the walls of the town, were shown to the Spanish officer who had been detained on the 19th, after which he was dismissed by the road of Cervera, that he might spread the news of the defeat. Suchet wishing to profit from the effect of this victory upon the besieged, attempted the night after the battle, to storm the redoubts of San Fernando and Pilar. He was successful with the latter, and the assailants descended into the ditch of San Fernando, from whence the Spaniards, only fifty in number and unprovided with hand grenades, could not drive them, and a parley ensuing it was agreed that the French should retire without being molested. Thus the Pilar was also saved, for being commanded by San Fernando, it was necessarily evacuated. Previous to this attempt, Suchet had summoned the city to surrender, offering safe conduct for commissioners to count the dead on the field of Margalef, and to review the prisoners; but Garcia Conde replied, “_that Lerida never looked for external succour in her defences_.” SIEGE OF LERIDA. The absolute retreat of Augereau, was now fully ascertained, yet the victory of Margalef, and the apathy of the Valencians, encouraged Suchet to commence the siege in form. The prisoners were sent to France by the way of Jaca; the battering train was brought up from Monzon, and all the other necessary preparations being completed, the Spanish outposts were driven within the walls between the 26th and 27th. The following night, under the direction of general Haxo, ground was broken three hundred yards from the bastions of the Carmen and Magdalen; the Spaniards threw some fire-balls, and opened a few guns, but without interrupting the workmen, and when day broke, the besiegers were well covered in the trenches. In the night of the 30th the first parallel was completed. Breaching and counter-batteries were commenced, six sixteen-pounders were destined to batter the left face of the Carmen, four long twelve-pounders, to ruin the defences of the Magdalen, and four mortars of eight inches to throw shells into the citadel. The weather was rainy and the labour heavy, yet the works advanced rapidly, and on the 2d of May, a fourth battery, armed with two mortars and two sixteen-pounders, was raised against the Carmen. Meanwhile the Spanish musqueteers, incommoded the trenches from the left bank of the Segre, which obliged the French to contract the circle of investment on that side. In the evening of the 4th of May, six hundred Spaniards, sallying from the Carmen, carried the fourth battery and all the left of the trenches, while another body, coming from the Magdalen, menaced the right of the French works. The French guards held the latter in check, and the reserves finally drove the former back into the town, but after this attack, a ditch and rampart, to serve as a place of arms, was carried from the battery which had been taken, down to the river, and as the light troops still continued to ply the trenches from the other side of the Segre, ground was broken there, close to the water, and a battery of two guns was constructed to answer six Spanish field-pieces, posted on the bridge itself. The parallel of the main attack was also extended on the right, embracing a part of the northern front of the citadel, and two mortars were placed at this extremity. All the French batteries opened at day-break on the 7th, the mortars played into the town and citadel, and four Spanish guns were dismounted in the Carmen. Nevertheless, the counter fire silenced three French batteries, the dismounted guns were replaced, and three hundred men stealing out at dusk by the Puerta Nueva, fell upon the right of the parallels, took the two mortars, and penetrated as far as the approaches against the Magdalen. This sally was repulsed by the French reserves, but the latter pursuing too far, suffered from grape, and in the night a violent storm, with rain, damaged the batteries and overflowed the trenches. From the 8th to the 11th the French only laboured at the works, and opened a second parallel one hundred and fifty yards in advance of the first, with the intention of forming fresh batteries; that being closer under the citadel-rock, would be less exposed to its plunging fire. More guns, and of a larger size, were also mounted; three new batteries were constructed; and marksmen were planted to harass the Spanish cannoneers. On the 12th the besiegers recommenced their fire from eight batteries, containing fifteen guns and nineteen mortars. The besieged replied at first sharply, but in a little time stammered in their answers, and the French artillery taking the ascendent, the walls of the Carmen and Magdalen crumbled under their salvos, and a portable magazine blew up in the citadel. Towards evening two breaches in the Carmen, and one in the Magdalen appeared practicable, and after dark, some Swiss deserters coming out through the openings, brought intelligence, that the streets of the town behind the breaches, were retrenched and defended by batteries. Suchet’s hopes of an early termination to the siege now rose high. He had from the first supposed, that the vehemence of the citizens, and of the armed peasantry who had entered the place, would oblige the governor to fight the town to the last, instead of reserving his efforts for the defence of the citadel. He knew that armed mobs easily excited, are as easily discouraged, and he projected to carry the breaches briskly, and, with one sweep, to force all the inhabitants into the citadel, being well assured that they would hamper, if not entirely mar, the defence of that formidable fortress: but he resolved first, to carry the forts of San Fernando and the Pilar and the horn-work of Fort Garden, lest the citizens, flying from the assault of the breaches, should take refuge on that side. To effect this, three columns, provided with ladders and other necessary implements, simultaneously mounted the hill of Afranius that night; one marched against the redoubts, and the others were ordered to storm the horn-work on two sides. The Pilar was carried without difficulty, and the garrison flying towards Fort Garden, fell in with the second French column, which arrived with the fugitives at the ditch of the horn-work, and being there joined by the third column, which had taken a wrong direction, the whole mass entered the place fighting. The Spaniards saved themselves in Fort Garden, and meanwhile the people in Fernando resisted desperately, and that redoubt was not taken until two-thirds of the defendants were put to the sword. Thus the French effected their object with the loss of a hundred men. During this operation the great batteries only played into the citadel, but, at daybreak, renewed their fire on the breaches; steps were also cut in the parallel, to facilitate the advance of the troops to the assault; and all the materials, necessary to effect a solid lodgement on the walls, were conveyed into the trenches. On the other hand, the Spaniards were preparing a grand sally, to retake the horn-work of Fort Garden, but the French arrangements being first completed, at seven o’clock, in the evening of the 13th, four shells were thrown as a signal, and the storming-parties, jumping out of the trenches, rushed towards the breaches, two advancing against the Carmen, a third attacking the Magdalen, and a fourth, moving close by the river, endeavouring to break in on that side. The Spaniards, unexpectant of the attack, at first permitted the French to mount the breaches unmolested; but, soon recovering, poured such a fire of musquetry and artillery upon the head of the principal columns that they staggered, yet, being encouraged by general Habert, finally forced their way into the town; and, at the same moment, the troops on the right and left, being also successful, turned all the retrenchments in the streets. On the other side of the river, general Harispe carried the bridge, and Suchet himself, with the reserve, followed close upon the steps of the storming-parties; the Spaniards were thus overpowered, and the regular troops commenced a retreat into the citadel. [Sidenote: Suchet’s Memoirs.] It was now that the French general put his design in execution. Harispe’s brigade passing the bridge, made for the gate of St. Anthony, looking towards Fort Garden, and cut off all egress from the town; and this done, the French columns advanced from every side, in a concentric direction, upon the citadel, and, with shouts, and stabs, and musquetry, drove men, women, and children before them, while the guns of the castle smote friends and foes alike. Then, flying up the ascent, the shrieking and terrified crowds rushed into the fortress with the retiring garrison, and crowded the summit of the rock; but, all that night, the French shells fell amongst the hapless multitude, and, at daylight, the fire was redoubled, and the carnage swelled, until Garcia Conde, overpowered by the cries and sufferings of the miserable people, hoisted the white flag. At twelve o’clock, the horrible scene terminated, and the capitulation that followed was honourable in terms to the besieged; but Fort Garden being included, Suchet became master of Lerida, with its immense stores and near eight thousand prisoners, for the whole loss of the garrison had been only twelve hundred men. Thus suddenly was this powerful fortress reduced, by a proceeding, politic indeed, but scarcely to be admitted within the pale of civilized warfare. For, though a town, taken by assault, be considered the lawful prey of a licentious soldiery, this remnant of barbarism, disgracing the military profession, does not warrant the driving of unarmed helpless people, into a situation, where they must perish from the fire of the enemy, unless a governor fail in his duty. Suchet justifies it, on the ground, that he thus spared a great effusion of blood which must necessarily have attended a protracted siege, and the fact is true. But this is to spare soldiers’ blood at the expense of women’s and children’s, and, had Garcia Conde’s nature been stern, he, too, might have pleaded expediency, and the victory would have fallen to him who could longest have sustained the sight of mangled infants and despairing mothers. CHAP. IV. When Lerida fell, Conde was accused of treachery, but there seems no foundation for the charge; the cause stated by Suchet is sufficient for the effect; yet the defence was very unskilful. The walls, on the side of the attack, could not be expected, and scarcely did, offer an impediment to the French general; hence the citadel should have been the better prepared, and, as the besiegers’ force, the corps of observation being deducted, did not exceed the garrison in number, it might have baffled Suchet’s utmost efforts. Engineers require that the relative strength of besiegers and besieged, should not be less than four to one; yet here the French invested a force equal to themselves, and in a short time reduced a great fortress in the midst of succouring armies, for Lerida had communications, 1º. With the armed population of the high valleys; 2º. With O’Donnel’s corps of fourteen thousand; 3º. With Cervera, where Campo Verde was posted with four thousand men; 4º. With Tortoza, where the marquis of Lazan, now released from his imprisonment, commanded from five to six thousand; 5º. With Valencia, in which province there was a disposable army of fifteen thousand regular and more than thirty thousand irregular soldiers. It is evident that, if all these forces had been directed with skill and concert upon Lerida, not only the siege would have been raised, but the very safety of the third corps endangered; and it was to obviate this danger that Napoleon directed the seventh corps to take such a position on the Lower Ebro as would keep both O’Donnel and the Valencians in check; but Augereau, as we have seen, failed to do this; and St. Cyr asserts that the seventh corps could never safely venture to pass the mountains, and enter the valley of the Ebro. On the other hand, Suchet affirms that Napoleon’s instructions could have been obeyed without difficulty. St. Cyr himself, under somewhat similar circumstances, blockaded Taragona for a month; Augereau, who had more troops and fewer enemies, might have done the same, and yet spared six thousand men to pass the mountains; Suchet would then have been tranquil with respect to O’Donnel, and would have had a covering army to protect the siege, and these troops, fed from the resources of Aragon, would have relieved Catalonia. Augereau has been justified, on the ground, that the blockade of Hostalrich would have been raised while he was on the Ebro. The danger of this could not have escaped the emperor, yet his military judgement, unerring in principle, was often false in application, because men measure difficulties by the standard of their own capacity, and Napoleon’s standard only suited the heroic proportions. One thing is, however, certain, that Catalonia presented the most extraordinary difficulties to the invaders. The powerful military organization of the Miguelettes and Somatenes,--the well-arranged system of fortresses,--the ruggedness and sterility of the country,--the ingenuity and readiness of a manufacturing population thrown out of work,--and, finally, the aid of an English fleet, combined to render the conquest of this province a gigantic task. Nevertheless, the French made progress, each step planted slowly indeed and with pain, but firmly, and insuring the power of making another. Hostalrich and Lerida fell on the same day. The acquisition of the first consolidated the French line of communication with Barcelona; and, by the capture of the second, Suchet obtained large magazines, stores of powder, ten thousand muskets, the command of several dangerous rivers, easy access to the higher valleys, and a firm footing in the midst of the Catalonian strong holds; and he had taken or killed fifteen thousand Spanish soldiers. Yet this was but the prelude to greater struggles. The Miguelettes supplied O’Donnel with abundance of men, and neither his courage nor his abilities were at fault. Urgel, Cardona, Berga, Cervera, Mequinenza, Taragona, San Felippe Balaguer, and Tortoza the link of connexion between Valencia and Catalonia, were still to be subdued, and, during every great operation, the Partisans, being unmolested, recovered strength. Thus while the siege of Lerida was going on, the marquis of Lazan entered the town of Alcanitz with five thousand men, and would have carried the castle, but that general Laval despatched two thousand men, from Zaragoza, to its succour, when the Spaniards, after a skirmish in the streets, retired; and, while this was passing at Alcanitz, Villa Campa, intercepted four hundred men conducting a convoy of provisions from Calatayud to Zaragoza. Colonel Petit, the commander, being attacked in the defile of Frasno, was forced to abandon his convoy, and, under a continued fire, to fight his way for ten miles, until his detachment, reduced to one hundred and eighty wounded men, passed the Xalon river, and, at the village of Arandiza, finally repulsed the assailants. The remainder of this desperate band were taken or killed, and Petit himself, wounded, a prisoner, and sitting in the midst of several Spanish officers, was basely murdered the evening after the action. Villa Campa put the assassin to death, but, at the same time, suffered the troops to burn alive the Alcalde of Frasno, an old man taken among the French. This action happened the day Lerida fell; and, the next day, Chlopiski, following Villa Campa’s march from Daroca, reached Frasno. The Spaniards were no longer there, and Chlopiski, dividing his forces, pursued them, by the routes of Calatayud and Xarava, to Molina, where he destroyed a manufactory for arms, and so pressed the Spanish general, that his troops disbanded, and several hundred retired to their homes. At the same time, an attack, made from the side of Navarre, on the garrison of Ayerbe, was repulsed. But these petty events, while they evinced the perseverance of the Spaniards, proved also the stability of Suchet’s power in Aragon. His system was gradually sapping the spirit of resistance in that province. In Lerida his conduct was as gentle and moderate as the nature of this unjust war would permit; and, however questionable, the morality of the proceeding by which he reduced the citadel, it must be acknowledged that his situation required most decided measures, for the retreat of the seventh corps set free not only O’Donnel’s army, but Campo Verde’s and all the irregular bands. The Somatenes of the high valleys appeared in force, on the Upper Segre the very day of the assault; eight hundred Miguelettes attacked Venasque three days after; and Campo Verde, marching from Cervera, by Agramunt, took post in the mountains of Lliniana, above Talarn and Tremp, where great bodies of the Somatenes also assembled. Their plans were disconcerted by the sudden fall of Lerida; the Miguelettes were repulsed from Venasque; the Somatenes defeated at Tremp; and general Habert, marching from Balaguer, cut off Campo Verde from Cervera, and forced him to retreat upon Cardona. But, if the citadel of Lerida had held out, and O’Donnel, less hasty, had combined his march, at a later period, with these Somatenes and with Campo Verde, the third corps could scarcely have escaped a disaster; whereas, now the plain of Urgel and all the fertile valleys opening upon Lerida fell to the French, and Suchet, after taking measures to secure them, turned his arms against Mequinenza, which, by its situation at the confluence of the Segre and the Ebro, just where the latter begins to be navigable, was the key to further operations. The French general could not advance in force against Tortoza, nor avail himself of the water-carriage, until Mequinenza should fall. Suchet’s activity was extreme; one detachment, sent the day after the assault of Lerida, by the left bank of the Segre, was already before the place, and general Musnier’s division, descending the right bank of that river, drove in some of the outposts and commenced the investment on the 20th of May. Mequinenza, built on an elbow of land formed by the meeting of the Segre and Ebro, was fortified by an old Moorish wall, and strengthened by modern batteries, especially on the Fraga road, the only route by which artillery could approach. A shoot from the Sierra de Alcubierre filled the space between the two rivers, and narrowing as they closed, ended in a craggy rock, seven hundred feet high and overhanging the town, which was built between its base and the water. This rock was crowned by a castle, with a rampart, which being inaccessible on two sides from the steepness, and covered, on a third, by the town, could only be assailed, on the fourth, along a high neck of land, three hundred yards wide, that joined the rock to the parent hills; and the rampart on that side, was bastioned, lined with masonry, and protected by a ditch, counterscarp, and covered way with palisades. No guns could be brought against this fort, until the country people, employed by Suchet, had opened a way from Torriente, over the hills, and this occupied the engineers until the 1st of June. Meanwhile the brigade, which had defeated Lazan, at Alcanitz, arrived on the right bank of the Ebro, and completed the investment. The 30th of May, general Rogniat, coming from France, with a reinforcement of engineer-officers, and several companies of sappers and miners, also reached the camp, and, taking the direction of the works, contracted the circle of investment, and commenced active operations. SIEGE OF MEQUINENZA. The Spaniards made an ineffectual sally the 31st; and, the 2d of June, the French artillery, consisting of eighteen pieces, of which six were twenty-four-pounders, being brought over the hills, the advanced posts of the Spaniards were driven into the castle, and, during the night, ground was broken two hundred yards from the place, under a destructive fire of grape. The workmen suffered severely; and, while this was passing on the height, approaches were made against the town, in the narrow space between the Ebro and the foot of the rock. Strong infantry posts were also entrenched, close to the water, on the right bank of that river, to prevent the navigation; yet eleven boats, freighted with inhabitants and their property, quitted the town, and nine effected their escape. In the night of the 3d the parallels on the rock were perfected, the breaching-batteries commenced, and parapets of sand-bags were raised, from behind which the French infantry plied the embrasures of the castle with musketry. The works against the town were also advanced; but, in both places, the nature of the ground greatly impeded the operations. The trenches above, being in a rocky soil, were opened chiefly by blasting; those below were in a space too narrow for batteries, and, moreover, searched by a plunging fire, both from the castle, and from a gun mounted on a high tower in the town wall. The troops on the right bank of the Ebro, however, opened their musketry with such effect on the wall, that a part of the garrison quitted it; both it and the tower were then escaladed without difficulty; and the Spaniards all retired to the castle. The French placed a battalion in the houses, and put those next the rock in a state of defence; and although the garrison of the castle rolled down large stones from above; they killed more of the inhabitants than of the enemy. The 6th the French batteries on the rock, three in number, were completed; and, in the night, forty grenadiers carried by storm a small outwork called the horse-shoe. The 7th Suchet, who had been at Zaragoza, arrived in the camp; and, on the 8th, sixteen pieces of artillery, of which four were mortars, opened on the castle. The Spaniards answered with such vigour, that three French guns were dismounted; yet the besiegers acquired the superiority, and, at nine o’clock in the morning, the place was nearly silenced, and the rampart broken in two places. The Spaniards endeavoured to keep up the defence with musketry, while they mounted fresh guns, but the interior of the castle was so severely searched by the bombardment, that, at ten o’clock, the governor capitulated. Fourteen hundred men became prisoners of war; forty-five guns, large stores of powder and of cast iron were captured, and provisions for three months were found in the magazines. Two hours after the fall of Mequinenza, general Mont-Marie, commanding the troops on the right bank of the Ebro, marched, with his brigade, against Morella, in the kingdom of Valencia, and took it on the 13th of June; for the Spaniards, with a wonderful negligence, had left that important fortress, commanding one of the principal entrances into the kingdom of Valencia, without arms or a garrison. When it was lost, general O’Donoju, with a division of the Valencian army, advanced to retake it, but Mont-Marie defeated him. The works were then repaired, and Morella became a strong and important place of arms. By these rapid and successful operations Suchet secured, 1º. A fortified frontier against the regular armies of Catalonia and Valencia; 2º. Solid bases for offensive operations, and free entrance to those provinces; 3º. The command of several fertile tracts of country and of the navigation of the Ebro; 4º. The co-operation of the seventh corps, which, by the fall of Lerida, could safely engage beyond the Llobregat. But, to effect the complete subjugation of Catalonia, it was necessary to cut off its communications by land with Valencia, and to destroy O’Donnel’s base. The first could only be attained, by taking Tortoza, the second by capturing Taragona. Hence the immediate sieges of those two great places, the one by the third, and the other by the seventh corps, were ordered by the emperor. Suchet was ready to commence his part, but many and great obstacles arose: the difficulty of obtaining provisions, in the eastern region of Catalonia, was increased by O’Donnel’s measures, and that general, still commanding above twenty thousand men, was neither daunted by past defeats, nor insensible to the advantages of his position. His harsh manners and stern sway, rendered him hateful to the people, but he was watchful to confirm the courage, and to excite the enthusiasm of his troop’s by conferring rewards and honours on the field of battle; and, being of singular intrepidity himself, his exhortations had more effect. Two years of incessant warfare had also formed several good officers, and the full strength and importance of every position and town were, by dint of experience, becoming known. With these helps O’Donnel long prevented the siege of Tortoza, and found full employment for the enemy during the remainder of the year. Nevertheless, the conquest of Catalonia advanced, and the fortified places fell one after another, each serving, by its fall, to strengthen the hold of the French, in the same proportion that it had before impeded their progress. The foundations of military strength were however, deeply cast in Catalonia. There the greatest efforts were made by the Spaniards, and ten thousand British soldiers, hovering on the coast, ready to land on the rear of the French, or to join the Catalans in an action, would at any period of 1809 and 1810, have paralized the operations of the seventh corps, and saved Gerona, Hostalrich, Tortoza, Taragona, and even Lerida. While those places were in the hands of the Spaniards and their hopes were high, English troops from Sicily were reducing the Ionian islands or loitering on the coast of Italy, but when all the fortresses of Catalonia had fallen, when the regular armies were nearly destroyed, and when the people were worn out with suffering, a British army which could have been beneficially employed elsewhere, appeared, as if in scorn of common sense, on the eastern coast of Spain. Notwithstanding the many years of hostility with France, the English ministers were still ignorant of every military principle; and yet too arrogant to ask advice of professional men; for it was not until after the death of Mr. Perceval, and when the decisive victory of Salamanca shewed the giant in his full proportions, that even Wellington himself was permitted the free exercise of his judgement, although he was more than once reminded by Mr. Perceval, whose narrow views continually clogged the operations, that the whole responsibility of failure would rest on his head. CHAPTER V. Suchet’s preparations equally menaced Valencia, and Catalonia, and the authorities in the former province, perceiving, although too late, that an exclusive and selfish policy would finally bring the enemy to their own doors, resolved to co-operate with the Catalonians, while the Murcians, now under the direction of Blake, waged war on the side of Grenada, and made excursions against the fourth corps. The acts of the Valencians shall be treated of when the course of the history leads me back to Catalonia, but those of the Murcian army belong to the OPERATIONS IN ANDALUSIA. [Sidenote: King Joseph’s Correspondence, captured at Victoria. MSS.] During the month of February, the first corps was before Cadiz, the fourth in Grenada, Dessolles’ division at Cordoba, Jaen, and Ubeda, and the fifth corps (with the exception of six battalions and some horse left at Seville) in Estremadura. The king, accompanied by marshal Soult, moved with his guards and a brigade of cavalry, to different points, and received from all the great towns assurances of their adhesion to his cause. But as the necessities of the army demanded immediate and heavy contributions, both of money and provisions, moveable columns were employed to collect them, especially for the fourth corps, and with so little attention to discipline as soon to verify the observations of St. Cyr, that they were better calculated to create than to suppress insurrections. The people exasperated by disorders, and violence, and at the same time excited by the agents of their own and the British government, suddenly rose in arms and Andalusia, like other parts of Spain, became the theatre of a petty and harassing warfare. The Grenadans of the Alpujarras, were the first to resist, and this insurrection spreading on the one hand through the Sierra de Ronda, and on the other, towards Murcia, received succours from Gibraltar, and was aided by the troops and armed peasantry under the command of Blake. The communication between the first and fourth corps across the Sierra de Ronda, was maintained by a division of the former, posted at Medina Sidonia, and by some infantry and hussars of the latter quartered in the town of Ronda. From this place, the insurgents, principally smugglers, drove the French, while at the other extremity Blake marching from Almeria, took Ardra and Motril. The mountaineers of Jaen and Cordoba at the same time interrupted Dessolles’ communications with La Mancha. [Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence. MSS.] These movements took place in the beginning of March, and the king and Soult being then in the city of Grenada, sent one column across the mountain by Orgiva to fall upon the flank of Blake at Motril, while a second moving by Guadix and Ohanes upon Almeria, cut off his retreat. This obliged the Murcians to disperse, and at the same time, Dessolles defeated the insurgents on the side of Ubeda; and the garrison of Malaga, consisting of three battalions, marched to restore the communications with the first corps. Being joined by the detachment beaten at Ronda, they retook that post on the 21st of March; but during their absence the people from the Alpuxaras entered Malaga, killed some of the inhabitants as favourers of the enemy, and would have done more, but that another column from Grenada came down on them, and the insurrection was thus strangled in its birth. It had however, sufficed to prevent the march of the troops designed to co-operate with Suchet at Valencia, and it was of so threatening a character, that the fifth corps was recalled from Estremadura, and all the French troops at Madrid, consisting of the garrison, and a part of the second corps, were directed upon Almagro in La Mancha, the capital itself being left in charge of some Spanish battalions in the invader’s service. The king then repaired to La Mancha, fearing an offensive movement, by the Valencian and Murcian armies, but after a time returned to Madrid. The duke of Dalmatia then remained chief commander of Andalusia, and proceeded to organize a system of administration so efficacious, that neither the efforts of the Spanish government, nor of the army in Cadiz, nor the perpetual incursions of Spanish troops issuing from Portugal, and supported by British corps on that frontier, could seriously shake his hold, but this will be better shewn hereafter; at present, it is more convenient to notice. THE BLOCKADE OF CADIZ. Marshal Victor declining, as we have seen, an assault on the Isla, spread his army round the margin of the bay, and commenced works of contravallation on an extent of not less than twenty-five miles. The towns, the islands, castles, harbours, and rivers, he thus enclosed are too numerous, and in their relative bearings, too intricate for minute description; yet, looking as it were from the French camps, I shall endeavour to point out the leading features. The blockade was maintained in three grand divisions or entrenched positions, namely, Chiclana, Puerto Real, and Santa Maria. The first, having its left on the sea coast near the Torre Bermeja, was from thence carried across the Almanza, and the Chiclana rivers, to the Zuraque, on a line of eight miles, traced along a range of thickly wooded hills, and bordering a marsh from one to three miles broad. This marsh, traversed in its breadth by the above-mentioned rivers, and by a number of navigable water courses or creeks, was also cut in its whole length by the Santi Petri, a natural channel connecting the upper harbour of Cadiz with the open sea. The Santi Petri, nine miles long, from two to three hundred yards wide, and of depth to float a seventy-four, received the waters of all the creeks crossing the marsh and was the first Spanish line of defence. In the centre, the bridge of Zuazo, by which the only road to Cadiz passes, was broken and defended by batteries on both sides. On the right hand, the Caraccas, or Royal Arsenal, situated on an island just in the harbour mouth of the channel, and on account of the marsh inattackable, save by water or by bombardment, was covered with strong batteries and served as an advanced post. On the left hand the castle of Santi Petri, also built on an island, defended the sea mouth of the channel. Beyond the Santi Petri was the Isla de Leon, in form a triangular island, the base of which rests on that channel, the right side on the harbour, the left on the open sea, and the apex points towards Cadiz. All this island was a salt-marsh, except one high and strong ridge in the centre, about four miles long, upon which the large town of La Isla stands, and which being within cannon shot of the Santi Petri, offered the second line of defence. From the apex, called the Torre Gardo, a low and narrow isthmus about five miles long, connected the island with the rocks upon which Cadiz stood, and across the centre of this narrow isthmus, a cut called the Cortadura, defended by the large unfinished fort of Fernando, offered a third line of defence. The fourth and final line, was the land front of the city itself, regularly and completely fortified. On the Chiclana side therefore, the hostile forces were only separated by the marsh; and although the Spaniards commanded the Santi Petri, the French having their chief depôts in the town of Chiclana, could always acquire the mastery in the marsh and might force the passage of the channel, because the Chiclana, Zuraque, and Almanza creeks, were navigable above the lines of contravallation. The thick woods behind, also afforded the means of constructing an armed flotilla, and such was the nature of the ground bordering the Santi Petri itself, on both sides, that off the high road, it could only be approached by water, or by narrow footpaths, leading between the salt-pans of the marsh. The central French or Puerto Real division extending from the Zuraque on the left, to the San Pedro, a navigable branch of the Guadalete on the right; measured about seven miles. From the Zuraque to the town of Puerto Real, the line was traced along a ridge skirting the marsh, so as to form with the position of Chiclana a half circle. Puerto Real itself was entrenched, but a tongue of land four miles long projected from thence perpendicularly on to the narrow isthmus of Cadiz. This tongue, cloven in its whole length by the creek or canal of Troccadero, separated the inner from the outward harbour, and at its extreme points stood the village of Troccadero, and the fort of Matagorda; opposed to which there was on the isthmus of Cadiz a powerful battery called the Puntales. From Matagorda to the city was above four thousand yards, but across the channel to Puntales was only twelve hundred, it was the nearest point to Cadiz and to the isthmus, and was infinitely the most important post of offence. From thence the French could search the upper harbour with their fire and throw shells into the Caraccas and the fort of Fernando, while their flotilla safely moored in the Troccadero creek, could make a descent upon the isthmus, and thus turn the Isla, and all the works between it and the city. Nevertheless, the Spaniards dismantled and abandoned Matagorda. The third or Santa Maria division of blockade, followed the sweep of the bay, and reckoning from the San Pedro, on the left, to the castle of Santa Catalina the extreme point of the outer harbour, on the right, was about five miles. The town of Santa Maria, built at the mouth of the Guadalete in the centre of this line, was entrenched and the ground about Santa Catalina was extremely rugged. Besides these lines of blockade which were connected by a covered way, concealed by thick woods, and when finished armed with three hundred guns, the towns of Rota and San Lucar de Barameda were occupied. The first, situated on a cape of land opposite to Cadiz, was the northern point of the great bay or roadstead. The second commanded the mouth of Guadalquivir. Behind the line of blockade, Latour Maubourg, with a covering division, took post at Medina Sidonia, his left being upon the upper Guadalete, and his advanced posts watching the passes of the Sierra de Ronda. Such was the position of the first corps. I shall now relate the progress of events within the blockaded city. [Sidenote: Albuquerque’s Manifesto.] The fall of the Central Junta, the appointment of the regency and the proclamation for convoking the national Cortes have been already touched upon. Albuquerque, hailed as a deliverer, elected governor, commander in chief, and president of the Junta, appeared to have unlimited power; but in reality, possessed no authority except over his own soldiers, and he did not meddle with the administration. The regency appointed provisionally and composed of men without personal energy or local influence, was obliged to bend and truckle to the Junta of Cadiz; and that imperious body without honour, talents, or patriotism, sought only to obtain the command of the public revenue for dishonest purposes, and meanwhile, privately trafficked with the public stores. [Sidenote: Private Correspondence of Officers from Cadiz. 1810. MSS.] Albuquerque’s troops were in a deplorable state; the whole had been long without pay, and the greater part were without arms, accoutrements, ammunition, or clothes. When he demanded supplies, the Junta declared that they could not furnish them; but the duke affirming this to be untrue, addressed a memorial to the Regency, and the latter, anxious to render the Junta odious, yet fearing openly to attack them, persuaded Albuquerque to publish his memorial. The Junta replied by an exposition, false as to facts, base and ridiculous in reasoning; for although they had elected the duke president of their own body, they accused him amongst other things, with retreating from Carmona too quickly; and they finished with an intimation, that, supported by the populace of Cadiz, they were able and ready to wreak their vengeance on all enemies. Matters being thus brought to a crisis, both Albuquerque and the Regency gave way, and the former being sent ambassador to England, died in that country some months after of a phrenzy brought on, as it is said, by grief and passion at the unworthy treatment he received. But the misery of the troops, the great extent of the positions, the discontent of the seamen, the venal spirit of the Junta, the apathy of the people, the feebleness of the Regency, the scarcity of provisions, and the machinations of the French, who had many favourers and those amongst the men in power, all combined to place Cadiz in the greatest jeopardy; and this state of affairs would have led to a surrender, if England had not again filled the Spanish store-houses, and if the Regency had not consented to receive British troops into the city. [Sidenote: General Campbell’s Correspondence. MSS.] At the same time, general Colin Campbell (who had succeeded Sir John Cradock as governor of Gibraltar) performed a great service to his country, for, by persevering negotiation, he obtained that an English garrison should likewise enter Ceuta, and that the Spanish lines of San Roque, and the forts round the harbour of Algesiras should be demolished. Both measures were very essential to the present and permanent interests of England; but the first especially, because it cleared the neighbourhood of the fortress, and gave it a secure harbour. Gibraltar, at this time, contained a mixed and disaffected population of more than twelve thousand persons, and merchandize to the value of two millions sterling, which could have been easily destroyed by bombardment; and Ceuta which was chiefly garrisoned by condemned troops, and filled with galley-slaves, and its works miserably neglected, had only six days’ provisions, and was at the mercy of the first thousand French that could cross the streights. The possession of it would have availed the enemy in many ways, especially in obtaining provisions from Barbary, where his emissaries were exceedingly active. [Sidenote: Official Abstract of Operations at Cadiz. 1810. MSS.] General William Stewart arrived in Cadiz, on the 11th of February, with two thousand men, a thousand more joined him from Gibraltar, and the whole were received with an enthusiasm, that proved sir George Smith’s perception to have been just, and that Mr. Frere’s unskilful management of the Central Junta, had alone prevented a similar measure the year before. The 17th of February, a Portuguese regiment, thirteen hundred strong, was also admitted into the city, and Spanish troops came in daily in small bodies. Two ships of war, the Euthalion and Undaunted, arrived from Mexico with six millions of dollars; and another British battalion, a detachment of artillery, and more native troops, having joined the garrison, the whole force assembled behind the Santi Petri, was not less than four thousand Anglo-Portuguese, and fourteen thousand Spaniards. Yet there was little of enthusiasm amongst the latter; and in all this time, not a man among the citizens had been enrolled or armed, or had volunteered, either to labour or to fight. The ships recovered at Ferrol, had been transferred to Cadiz, so there were in the bay, twenty-three men of war, of which four of the line and three frigates were British; and thus, money, troops, and a fleet, in fine, all things necessary to render Cadiz formidable, were collected, yet to little purpose, because procrastination, jealousy, ostentation, and a thousand absurdities, were the invariable attendants of Spanish armies and governments. General Stewart’s first measure, was to recover Matagorda. In the night of the 22d, a detachment consisting of fifty seamen and marines, twenty-five artillery-men, and sixty-seven of the ninety-fourth regiment, the whole under the command of captain M’Lean, pushed across the channel during a storm, and taking possession of the dismantled fort, before morning effected a solid lodgement, and although the French cannonaded the work with field-artillery all the next day, the garrison, supported by the fire of Puntales, was immoveable. The remainder of February passed without any event of importance, yet the people suffered from the want of provisions, especially fresh meat; and from the 7th to the 10th of March, a continued tempest, beating upon the coast, drove three Spanish and one Portuguese sail of the line, and a frigate and from thirty to forty merchantmen, on shore, between San Lucar and St. Mary’s. One ship of the line was taken, the others burnt and part of the crews brought off by boats from the fleet; but many men, and amongst others a part of the fourth English regiment fell into the hands of the enemy, together with an immense booty. [Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3, Sect. 1.] Early in March, Mr. Henry Wellesley, minister plenipotentiary arrived, and on the 24th of that month, general Graham coming from England assumed the chief command of the British, and immediately caused an exact military survey of the Isla to be made. It then appeared, that the force hitherto assigned for its defence, was quite inadequate, and that to secure it against the utmost efforts of the enemy, twenty thousand soldiers, and a system of redoubts, and batteries, requiring the labour of four thousand men for three months, were absolutely necessary. Now, the Spaniards had only worked beyond the Santi Petri, and that without judgement; their batteries in the marsh were ill placed, their entrenchments on the tongue of land at the sea mouth of that channel, were of contemptible strength, and the Caraccas which they had armed with one hundred and fifty guns, being full of dry timber could be easily burned by carcasses. The interior defences of the Isla were quite neglected, and while they had abandoned the important posts of Matagorda, and the Troccadero, they had pushed their advanced batteries, to the junction of the Chiclana road with the Royal Causeway, in the marsh, that is to say, one mile and a half beyond the bridge of Zuazo, and consequently exposed, without support, to flank attacks both by water and land. It was in vain that the English engineers presented plans, and offered to construct the works; the Spaniards would never consent to pull down a house, or destroy a garden; their procrastination, paralized their allies, and would have lost the place, had the enemy been prepared to press it vigorously. Nor were the English works (when the Spaniards would permit any to be constructed) well and rapidly completed, for the Junta furnished bad materials, there was a paucity of engineer-officers, and, from the habitual negligence of the ministerial departments at home, neither the proper stores, nor implements had been sent out. Indeed, an exact history, drawn from the private journals of commanders of British expeditions, during the war with France, would show an incredible carelessness of preparation on the part of the different cabinets. The generals were always expected to “make bricks without straw,” and thus the laurels of the British army were for many years blighted. Even in Egypt, the success of the venerable hero, Abercrombie, was due, more to his perseverance and unconquerable energy before the descent, than to his daring operations afterwards. Additional reinforcements reached Cadiz the 31st of March, and both sides continued to labour, but the allies slowly and without harmony, and, the supplies being interrupted, scarcity increased, many persons were forced to quit Cadiz, and two thousand men were sent to Ayamonte to collect provisions on the Guadiana. But now Matagorda, which, though frequently cannonaded, had been held fifty-five days, impeded the completion of the enemy’s works at the Troccadero point. This small fort, of a square form, without a ditch, with bomb-proofs insufficient for the garrison, and with one angle projecting towards the land, was little calculated for resistance, and, as it could only bring seven guns to bear, a Spanish seventy-four and an armed flotilla were moored on the flanks, to co-operate in the defence. The French had however raised great batteries behind some houses on the Troccadero, and, as daylight broke, on the 21st of April, a hissing shower of heated shot, falling on the seventy-four, and in the midst of the flotilla, obliged them to cut their cables and take shelter under the works of Cadiz. Then the fire of forty-eight guns and mortars, of the largest size, was concentrated upon the little fort of Matagorda, and the feeble parapet disappeared in a moment before this crashing flight of metal. The naked rampart and the undaunted hearts of the garrison remained, but the troops fell fast, the enemy shot quick and close, a staff, bearing the Spanish flag, was broken six times in an hour, and the colours were at last fastened to the angle of the work itself, while the men, especially the sailors, besought the officers to hoist the British ensign, attributing the slaughter to their fighting under a foreign flag. Thirty hours the tempest lasted, and sixty-four men out of one hundred and forty were down, when general Graham, finding a diversion he had projected impracticable, sent boats to carry off the survivors. The bastion was then blown up, under the direction of major Lefebre, an engineer of great promise, and he also fell, the last man whose blood wetted the ruins thus abandoned. Here I must record an action of which it is difficult to say whether it were most feminine or heroic. A sergeant’s wife, named Retson, was in a casemate with the wounded men, when a very young drummer was ordered to fetch water from the well of the fort; seeing the child hesitate, she snatched the vessel from his hand, braved the terrible cannonade herself, and, although a shot cut the bucket-cord from her hand, she recovered the vessel, and fulfilled her mission.[8] [Sidenote: General Campbell’s Correspondence. MSS.] After the evacuation of Matagorda, the war languished at Cadiz; but Sebastiani’s cavalry infested the neighbourhood of Gibraltar, and he himself entered the capital of Murcia, on the 23d of April, when Blake retired upon Alicant and Carthagena. Meanwhile the French covered Matagorda point with batteries; but they were pressed for provisions, and general Campbell, throwing a detachment into Tarifa, drove their foragers from that vicinity, which abounds with cattle. The Spaniards at San Roque promised to reinforce this detachment, but their tardiness enabled the enemy to return with four hundred foot and some cavalry, and although the former were repulsed, the horse foraged the country, and drove off several herds of cattle during the action. General Campbell then increased the detachment to five hundred men, joining some guns, and placing the whole under the command of major Brown of the 28th. In May the French prisoners, cutting the cables of two hulks, drifted in a heavy gale to the French side of the bay; and the boats sent against them being beat off, by throwing cold shot from the decks, above fifteen hundred men saved themselves, in despite of the fire from the allied fleet, and from Puntales, which was continued after the vessels had grounded, although the miserable creatures, thus struggling for life, had been treated with horrible cruelty, and, being all of Dupont’s or Vedel’s corps, were prisoners only by a dishonourable breach of faith. Meanwhile, in Cadiz, disorder was daily increasing. The Regency having recalled Cuesta to their military councils, he published an attack on the deposed Central Junta, and was answered so as to convince the world, that the course of all parties had been equally detrimental to the state. Thus fresh troubles were excited. The English general was hampered by the perverse spirit of the authorities, and the Spanish troops were daily getting more inefficient from neglect, when the departure of Albuquerque enabled Blake to take the chief command in the Isla, and his presence produced some amelioration in the condition and discipline of the troops. At his instance, also, the Municipal Junta consented, although reluctantly, that the British engineers should commence a regular system of redoubts for the defence of the Isla. [Sidenote: General Graham’s Despatches. MSS.] English reinforcements continued to arrive, and four thousand Spaniards, from Murcia, joined the garrison, or, rather, army now within the lines; but such was the state of the native troops, and the difficulty of arranging plans, that hitherto the taking of Matagorda had been the only check given to the enemy’s works. It was, however, necessary to do something; and, after some ill-judged plans of the Regency had been rejected by Graham, general Lacy was embarked, with three thousand infantry and two hundred cavalry, to aid the armed peasants, or Serranos, of the Ronda. These people had been excited to arms, and their operations successfully directed by captain Cowley and Mr. Mitchel, two British artillery-officers, sent from Gibraltar, and general Campbell offered to reinforce Lacy, from Gibraltar, if he would attack Malaga, where there were twenty thousand males fit to carry arms. The French were only two thousand, and cooped in the citadel, a Moorish castle, containing but twelve guns, and dependent for water on the town, which was itself only supplied by aqueducts from without. Lacy rejected this enterprise, but demanded that eight hundred men, from Gibraltar, should make a diversion to the eastward, while he, landing at Algesiras, moved on Ronda; and, this being assented to, the English armament sailed under the command of general Bowes. Lacy made good his movement upon Ronda the 18th of June; but the French, having fortified it, were too strong at that point, or, rather, Lacy, a man of no enterprise, durst not act, and, when he was joined by many thousand mountaineers, he arrested their leaders for some offence, which so disgusted the men that they disbanded. The enemy, alarmed by these operations, which were seconded from the side of Murcia, and by an insurrection at Baeza, put all their disposable troops in motion; but the insurrection at Baeza was quickly crushed, and general Rey, marching from Seville, against Lacy, entirely defeated and cut him off from Gibraltar, so that he was forced to re-embark with a few men at Estipona, and returned to Cadiz in July. Here it is impossible not to reflect on the little use made of the naval power, and the misapplication of the military strength in the southern parts of Spain. The British, Portuguese, and Spanish soldiers, at Cadiz, were, in round numbers, 30,000, the British in Gibraltar 5000, in Sicily 16,000, forming a total of more than fifty thousand effective troops, aided by a great navy, and favourably placed for harassing that immense, and, with the exception of the Valencian and Murcian coasts, uninterrupted French line of operations, which extended from the south of Italy to Cadiz, for, even from the bottom of Calabria, troops and stores were brought to Spain. Yet a Neapolitan rabble, under Murat, in Calabria, and from fifteen to twenty thousand French around Cadiz, were allowed to paralize this mighty power. It is true that vigilance, temper, and arrangement, and favourable localities, are all required, in the combined operations of a fleet and army, and troops disembarking, also require time to equip for service. But Minorca offered a central station, and a place of arms for the army, and a spacious port for the fleet; the operations would always have been short, and independent of the Spanish authorities, and lord Collingwood was fitted, by his talents, discretion, zeal, experience, and accurate knowledge of those coasts, successfully to direct such a floating armament. What coast-siege, undertaken by the seventh or third corps, could have been successfully prosecuted, if the garrison had been suddenly augmented with fifteen or twenty thousand men from the ocean? After one or two successful descents, the very appearance of a ship of war would have checked the operations of a siege, and obliged the enemy to concentrate: whereas, the slight expeditions of this period, were generally disconcerted by the presence of a few French companies. In July the British force, in Cadiz, was increased to eight thousand five hundred men, and Sir Richard Keats arrived to take the command of the fleet. The enemy, intent upon completing his lines, and constructing flotillas at Chiclana, Santa Maria, and San Lucar de Barameda, made no attacks, and his works, have been much censured, as ostentatiously extended, and leading to nothing. This is however a rash criticism; for the Chiclana camp was necessary to blockade the Isla, and, as the true point for offensive operations, was at the Troccadero, the lines of Puerto Real and Santa Maria, were necessary to protect that position, to harass the fleet, to deprive the citizens of good water, which, in ordinary times, was fetched from Puerto Maria, and finally to enable the flotilla, constructing at San Lucar, to creep round the coast. The chances from storms, as experience proved, almost repaid the labour, and it is to be considered that Soult contemplated a serious attack upon Cadiz, not with a single corps, generally weaker than the blockaded troops, but, when time should ripen, with a powerful army. Events in other parts of the Peninsula first impeded, and finally frustrated this intention, yet the lines were, in this view, not unnecessary or ostentatious. Neither was it a slight political advantage, that the duke of Dalmatia should hold sway in Seville for the usurper’s government, while the National Cortes, and the Regency, were cooped up in a narrow corner of the province. Moreover the preparations at Matagorda constantly and seriously menaced Cadiz, and a British division was necessarily kept there, for the English generals were well assured, that otherwise, some fatal disaster would befall the Spaniards. Now if a single camp of observation at Chiclana had constituted all the French works, no mischief could have been apprehended, and Graham’s division, consisting of excellent soldiers would have been set free, instead of being cooped up, without any counterbalance in the number of French troops at the blockade; for the latter aided indirectly, and at times directly, in securing the submission of Andalusia, and if not at Cadiz, they must have been covering Seville as long as there was an army in the Isla. CHAPTER VI. While the blockade of Cadiz proceeded, Seville scarcely required a garrison, and in March, six hundred infantry, under colonel Remond, and two hundred cavalry, commanded by the duke D’Aremberg, were despatched from thence, against the viscount De Gand, who was still at Ayamonte, vainly demanding refuge in Portugal. He had four thousand troops, but declining an engagement, passed by his left through Gibraleon into the Sierra de Aroche, bordering on the Condado de Niebla. The French then occupied Moguer and Huelva, towns situated at the mouths of the Odiel and Tinto rivers, from whence Cadiz had hitherto drawn supplies, and the viscount returning to Ayamonte, sailed with his troops to Cadiz, being replaced by general Copons, who came with two thousand men to gather provisions on the lower Guadiana, and in the Tinto and Odiel districts. On the other side of Seville, Sebastiani had an uneasy task. The vicinity of Gibraltar and of the Murcian army, the continued descents on the coast, and the fierceness of the Moorish blood, rendered Grenada the most disturbed portion of Andalusia, and a great part of that fine province, visited by the horrors of insurrectional war, was ravaged and laid waste. In the northern parts of Andalusia, about Jaen and Cordoba, Dessolles reduced the struggle to a trifling Guerilla warfare; but it was not so in La Mancha, where the Partidas became so numerous and the war so onerous, that one of Joseph’s ministers, writing to a friend, described that province as peopled with beggars and brigands. Meanwhile Estremadura was the scene of various complicated movements and combats, producing no great results, indeed, but important as being connected with and bearing on the defence of Portugal. The Spanish and Portuguese line of frontier, south of the Tagus, may be divided into three parts. 1º. From the Tagus to Badajos, on the Guadiana. 2º. From Badajos to the Morena. 3º. From the Morena to the sea. Each of these divisions is about sixty miles. Along the first, two-thirds of which is mountainous and one-third undulating plains and thick woods, a double chain of fortresses guard the respective frontiers. Alcantara, Valencia de Alcantara, Albuquerque, and Badajos are the Spanish; Montalvao, Castello de Vide, Marvao, Aronches, Campo Mayor, and Elvas, the Portuguese places. The three first on either side are in the mountains, the others in the open country, which spreads from the Guadiana to Portalegre, a central point, from whence roads lead to all the above-named fortresses. From Badajos to the Morena, forms the second division of the country, it is rugged and the chain of fortresses continued. On the Portuguese side, Juramenha, Mourao and Moura; on the Spanish, Olivenza (formerly Portuguese), Xeres de los Cavalleros, and Aroche. From the Morena to the sea, the lower Guadiana separates the two kingdoms. The Spanish side, extremely rugged, contained the fortresses of San Lucar de Guadiana, Lepe, and Ayamonte. The Portuguese frontier, Serpa, Mertola, Alcontin, and Castro Marin, and, although the greater number of these places were dismantled, the walls of all were standing, some in good repair, and those of Portugal for the most part garrisoned by militia and ordenanza. [Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence. MSS.] When Mortier attempted Badajos, on the 12th of February, Romana was near Truxillo, and the place was so ill provided, that a fortnight’s blockade would have reduced it; but the French general, who had only brought up eight thousand infantry and a brigade of cavalry, could not invest it in face of the troops assembling in the vicinity, and therefore retired to Zafra, leaving his horsemen near Olivenza. In this position he remained until the 19th of February, when his cavalry was surprised at Valverde, and the commander Beauregard slain. Romana returned to Badajos the 20th and the 27th, and Mortier then leaving some troops in Zafra, marched to Merida, to connect himself with the second corps, which had arrived at Montijo, on the Guadiana. It will be remembered that this corps, commanded by general Mermet, occupied the valley of the Tagus in its whole length during the invasion of Andalusia, and communicating with the sixth corps through the pass of Baños, formed an intermediate reserve between Mortier and Kellerman. The latter was at Bejar, and Miranda de Castanar, watching the duke Del Parque, in the early part of January; but withdrew to Salamanca, when the British army arrived in the valley of the Mondego, and the duke Del Parque, leaving Martin Carrera with a weak division in the Sierra de Gata, marched, with thirteen thousand men, through the pass of Perales, crossed the Tagus at Barca de Alconete on the 10th of February, and on the 12th, the day Mortier summoned Badajos, was in position with his right at Albuquerque and his left on the Guadiana. When Mermet, whose advanced guard was at Placentia, knew of this movement, he first detached three thousand men across the Tagus, by Seradillo, to observe Del Parque, and soon afterwards Soult’s brother, with four thousand men from Talavera, crossed the bridge of Arzobispo, and advancing by Caceres, surprised some Spanish troops at Villa del Rey and reaching Montijo, pushed patrols close to Badajos. The remainder of the second corps arrived at Caceres by degrees; general Reynier then took the command, and, as I have said, was joined by Mortier, who immediately commenced defensive works at Merida, and prepared gabions and facines as if to besiege Badajos. These demonstrations attracted the notice of general Hill, who advanced with ten thousand men from Abrantes to Portalegre, and Romana, finding himself, by the junction of the duke Del Parque’s army, at the head of twenty-five thousand men, resolved to act against the communications of the French. His first division, commanded by Charles O’Donnel, brother to the Catalan general, occupied Albuquerque. The second, under Mendizabel, was posted near Castello de Vide. The third, consisting of five thousand Asturians, was sent, under Ballasteros, to Olivenza, and the fourth remained at Badajos. The fifth, under Contreras, was detached to Monasterio, with orders to interrupt Mortier’s communication with Seville. Contreras reached Xeres de los Cavalleros the 1st of March, but a detachment from Zafra soon drove him thence, and Romana retired to Campo Mayor with three divisions, leaving Ballasteros with the fourth at Olivenza. On the other hand, Mortier, uneasy about Contreras’ movements, repaired to Zafra, leaving the second corps at Merida, and the 10th, Romana, advanced again towards Albuquerque; but having pushed a detachment beyond the Salor river, it was surprised by general Foy. The 14th O’Donnel endeavoured to surprise Foy, but the latter, with very inferior numbers, fought his way through the Puerto de Trasquillon, and the Spaniards took possession of Caceres. At this period the insurrections in Grenada, the movements of the Murcian army, and the general excitement of Valencia, in consequence of Suchet’s retreat, caused Joseph to recall Mortier for the defence of Andalusia, and the latter, after holding a council of war with Reynier, destroyed the works at Merida, the 19th of March, and retired to Seville, leaving Gazan’s division at Monasterio. Reynier having sent his stores to Truxillo drove the Spaniards out of Caceres the 20th, and followed them to the Salor, but afterwards took post at Torremacho, and O’Donnel returned to Caceres. There are two routes leading from Merida and Badajos to Seville: 1º. The Royal Causeway, which passes the Morena by Zafra, Los Santos, Monasterio, and Ronquillo. 2º. A shorter, but more difficult, road, which, running westward of the causeway, passes the mountains by Xeres de los Cavalleros, Fregenal, and Araceña. These parallel routes, have no cross communications in the Morena, but on the Estremaduran side, a road runs from Xeres de los Cavalleros to Zafra, and on the Andalusian side, from Araceña to Ronquillo. When, therefore, Mortier retired, Ballasteros marched from Olivenza to Xeres de los Cavalleros, and being joined by Contreras, their united corps, amounting to ten thousand men, gained the Royal Causeway by Zafra, and, on the evening of the 29th of March, came up with Gazan, and fought an undecided action; but the next day, the Spaniards being repulsed, Ballasteros retired to Araceña and Contreras to the high mountains above Ronquillo. From Araceña, Ballasteros marched to Huerva, within a few leagues of Seville, but Gerard’s division drove him back to Araceña, and defeated him there; yet again entering the Condado de Neibla, he established himself at Zalamea de Real on the Tinto river. [Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence. MSS.] Meanwhile, Romana detached a force to seize Merida, and cut the communication of the fifth corps with Reynier, but that general, marching with eight thousand men from Torremocha, passed through to Medellin before the Spaniards arrived, and pushed troops, the 2d of April, into the Morena, intending to take Contreras in rear, while Gazan attacked him in front; and this would have happened, but that O’Donnel, immediately threatened Merida, and so drew Reynier back. Nevertheless, Contreras was attacked by Gazan, at Pedroche, and so completely defeated, that he regained Zafra in the night of the 14th, with only two thousand men, and Ballasteros also, assailed by a detachment from Seville, retired to Araceña. The 20th, Reynier marched to Montijo, and O’Donnel retired from Caceres, but his rear guard was defeated at La Rocca the 21st, and his division would have been lost, if Mendizabel and Hill also had not come to his aid, when Reynier declining a general action, retired to Merida. The insurrection in the Alpuxaras was now quelled, the Valencians remained inactive, Joseph re-entered Madrid, Soult assumed the government of Andalusia, and Mortier returned to Estremadura. While on the Spanish side, Contreras was displaced, and Imas, his successor, advanced to Ronquillo, in Mortier’s rear; Ballasteros remained at Aroche; Hill returned to Portalegre; and Romana encamped, with fourteen thousand men, near Bajados, where a Spanish plot was formed to assassinate him. It was discovered, but the villain who was to have executed the atrocious deed escaped. Notwithstanding Romana’s presence, Reynier and the younger Soult, passed the Guadiana below Badajos, with only four hundred cavalry, and closely examined the works of that fortress, in despite of the whole Spanish army; and at the same time, Mortier’s advanced guards arrived on the Guadiana, and a reinforcement of four thousand men joined the second corps from Toledo. But as the want of provisions would not permit the French to remain concentrated, Mortier returned to the Morena, to watch Imas. The 14th of May, a French detachment again came close up to Badajos, then took the road to Olivenza, and would have cut off Ballasteros, if Hill had not by a sudden march to Elvas, arrested their movements. Meanwhile, Ballasteros again menaced Seville, and was again driven back upon Aroche, with a loss of three hundred men. To check these frequent incursions, the French threatened the frontier of Portugal, by the Lower Guadiana; sometimes appearing at Gibraleon, and Villa Blanca, sometimes towards Serpa, the possession of which would have lamed Ballasteros’ movements, yet the advantages were still chequered. A Portuguese flotilla intercepted, at the mouth of the Guadiana, a convoy of provisions going to the first corps; and O’Donnel having made an attempt during Reynier’s absence, to surprise Truxillo, was repulsed, and regained Albuquerque with great difficulty. It would be perplexing, to trace in detail all the movements, on the line from Badajos to Ayamonte, yet two circumstances there were, of historical importance. In the beginning of July, when Lacy was in the Sierra de Ronda, Ballasteros near Aroche, and Copons in the Condado Neibla, the French marched against Lacy, leaving Seville garrisoned solely by Spaniards in Joseph’s service; and while this example was furnished by the enemy, the Portuguese and Spanish troops on the frontier, complaining, the one of inhospitality, the other of robbery and violence, would, but for the mediation of the British authorities, have come to blows, for the mutual spirit of hatred extended to the governments on both sides. Hitherto, Hill had not meddled in the Spanish operations, save, when Romana was hardly pressed, but the latter’s demands for aid were continual, and most of his projects were ill judged, and contrary to lord Wellington’s advice. On the 26th of June however, Reynier passing the Guadiana, foraged all the country about Campo Mayor, and then turned by Montijo to Merida; it was known that his corps belonged to the army assembling in Castile for the invasion of Portugal, and that he had collected mules and other means of transport in Estremadura; and the spies asserted, that he was going to cross the Tagus. Hill, therefore, gathered his divisions well in hand, ready to move as Reynier moved, to cross the Tagus if he crossed it, and by parallel operations to guard the frontier of Beira. The march of the second corps was, however, postponed, and the after operations belonging to greater combinations, will be treated of in another place. Although, apparently complicated, the movements in Estremadura were simple in principle. The valley of the Guadiana as far as Badajos, is separated from the valley of the Tagus, by a range of heights, connecting the Guadalupe mountains with those of Albuquerque, and the country between those hills and the Tagus, contained fertile valleys, and considerable towns; such as Valencia de Alcantara and Caceres. To profit from their resources was an object to both parties. Reynier, whose base was at Truxillo, could easily make incursions as far as Caceres, but beyond that town, the Salor, presented a barrier, from behind which, the Spaniards supported by the fort of Albuquerque, could observe whether the incursion was made in force, and act accordingly; hence O’Donnel’s frequent advances and retreats. Reynier could not operate seriously, unless in unison with the fifth corps, and by the valley of the Guadiana; and, therefore, Merida, on account of its stone bridge, was the key of his movements; but Mortier’s base of operations, being in Andalusia, his front, was spread, from Zafra to Merida, to cover his line of retreat, and to draw provisions from about Llerena; but the road of Xeres de los Cavalleros was open to the Spaniards, and the frequent advances of Ballasteros and Contreras, were to harass Mortier’s line of communication. The clue of affairs was this; Romana, holding Badajos, and being supported by Hill, acted on both flanks of the French, and the Portuguese frontier furnished a retreat from every part of his lines of operation; but, as his projects were generally vague and injudicious, lord Wellington forbad Hill to assist, except for definite and approved objects. [Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 1.] To put an end to the Spanish system, Mortier had only to unite the two corps and give battle, or, if that was refused, to besiege Badajos, which, from its influence, situation, and the advantage of its stone bridge, was the key to the Alemtejo; and this he ardently desired. Soult, however, would not permit him to undertake any decisive operation while Andalusia was exposed to sudden insurrections and descents from Cadiz, and to say that either marshal was wrong would be rash, because two great interests clashed. Mortier and Reynier united, could have furnished twenty thousand infantry, fifty guns, and more than three thousand cavalry, all excellent troops. Romana having garrisoned Badajos, Olivenza, and Albuquerque, could not bring more than fifteen thousand men into line, and must have joined Hill. But with a mixed force and divided command, the latter could not have ventured a battle in the plain country beyond Portalegre. A defeat would have opened Lisbon to the victor, and lord Wellington must then have detached largely from the north, the king and Soult could have reinforced Mortier, and the ultimate consequences are not to be assumed. On the other hand, Soult, judging, that ere further conquests were attempted, the great province of Andalusia, should be rendered a strong hold and independent of extraneous events, bent all his attention to that object. An exact and economical arrangement, provided for the current consumption of his troops; vast reserve magazines were filled without overwhelming the people; and the native municipal authorities, recognized and supported in matters of police and supply, acted zealously, yet without any imputation upon their patriotism; for those who see and feel the miseries, flowing from disorderly and wasting armies, may honestly assist a general labouring to preserve regularity. Yet all this could not be the work of a day, and meanwhile the marshals under Soult’s orders, being employed only in a military capacity, desired the entire control of their own corps, and to be engaged in great field operations, because, thus only could they be distinguished; whereas the duke of Dalmatia while contributing to the final subjugation of Spain, by concentrating the elements of permanent strength in Andalusia, was also well assured, that, in fixing a solid foundation for future military operations, he should obtain reputation as an able administrator and pacificator of a conquered country. [Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence. MSS.] His views, however, clashed, not more with those of the generals, than with the wishes of the king, whose poverty, forced him to grasp at all the revenues of Andalusia, and who having led the army, in person across the Morena, claimed both as monarch and conqueror. But he who wields the sword will always be first served. Soult, guided by the secret orders of Napoleon, resisted the king’s demands, and thus excited the monarch’s hatred to an incredible degree; nevertheless, the duke of Dalmatia, never lost the emperor’s confidence, and his province, reference being had to the nature of the war, was admirably well governed. The people were gradually tranquillized; the military resources of the country drawn forth, and considerable bodies of native troops raised, and even successfully employed, to repress the efforts of the Partisan chiefs. The arsenal of construction at Seville was put into full activity; the mines of lead at Linares were worked; the copper of the river Tinto gathered for the supply of the founderies, and every provision for the use of a large army collected; privateers also were fitted out, a commerce was commenced with neutral nations in the ports of Grenada, and finally, a secret, but considerable, traffic carried on with Lisbon itself, demonstrated the administrative talents of Soult. Andalusia soon became the most powerful establishment of the French in Spain. Both marshals appear to have entertained sound views, and the advantages of either plan being considered, leads to the reflection that they might have been reconciled. A reinforcement of twenty-five thousand men in Estremadura, during the months of June and July, would have left scarcely a shadow of defence for Portugal; and it would seem that Napoleon had an eye to this, as we find him directing Suchet, in July, to co-operate with fifteen thousand men in the invasion, whenever Tortoza should fall. The application of this reasoning will, however, be better understood as the narrative advances; and whether Napoleon’s recent marriage with the Austrian princess drew him away from business, or that, absorbed by the other many and great interests of his empire, he neglected Spanish affairs, or whether deceived by exaggerated accounts of successes, he thought the necessity for more troops less than it really was, I have not been able to ascertain. Neither can I find any good reason, why the king, whose army was increased to twenty thousand men before the end of June, made no movement to favour the attack on Portugal. It is, however, scarcely necessary to seek any other cause, than the inevitable errors, that mar all great military combinations not directed by a single hand. CHAPTER VII. The operations, south of the Tagus, having been described, those which occurred, north of that river, shall now be traced; for previous to the invasion of Portugal, the French, stretching in one great line across the Peninsula, from Cadiz to Gihon, eagerly discussed the remnants of the Spanish armies. It will be remembered, that the duke Del Parque left Martin Carrera in the Gata mountains, to interrupt the communication, between the Salamanca country and the valley of the Tagus. Julian Sanchez also, issuing from time to time out of Ciudad Rodrigo, cut off the French foragers in the open country between the Agueda and the Douro; and beyond the Douro, the Gallician army, under Garcia (in number about ten thousand), occupied Puebla de Senabria, Puente Ferrada, Villa Franca, and Astorga, and menaced the right flank, and rear, of the sixth corps. Mahy was organising a second army at Lugo, and in the Asturias, the captain-general D’Arco, commanded seven thousand men, three thousand of which were posted at Cornellana, under general Ponte. Thus an irregular line of defence, six hundred miles long, was offered to the invaders, but without depth or substance, save at Badajos and Ciudad Rodrigo, behind which the British and Portuguese troops were lying. On the other hand, the French, holding the interior line, kept their masses only on the principal routes, communicating by moveable columns, and thus menacing all the important points without scattering their forces. The influx of fresh troops from France, continually added to their solidity, especially in Old Castile, where Ney had resumed the command, and was supported by Kellerman with the force of his government, and by an eighth corps under the duke of Abrantes. The invasion of Andalusia was the signal for a general movement of all the French in Spain; and while Victor and Mortier, menaced Cadiz and Badajos, Ney summoned Ciudad Rodrigo, and Bonet, entering the Asturias, threatened Gallicia by the Concija d’Ibas. At the same time, Loison, with eight thousand fresh men, occupied Leon and Medina del Campo, and the advanced guard of the eighth corps passed Valladolid. Loison gave out that he would invade Gallicia by Puebla de Senabria, and on the 15th of February, his cavalry cut to pieces five hundred Spanish troops at Alcanizas, but he finally marched against Astorga, and, at the same time, Bonet destroyed Ponte’s force at Potes de Sierra, and advanced to Nava de Suarna. These movements alarmed the Spaniards. Garcia, menaced at once by Bonet and by Loison, and fearing equally for Astorga and Lugo, threw two-thirds of his army into the former, and carried the remainder to Villa Franca, to support Mahi. Ney, however, made only a feint of escalading Ciudad Rodrigo, and Loison, although supported by the men from Leon, who advanced to Puente Orbijo, was repulsed from Astorga. Junot then concentrated the eighth corps at Benevente, intending to besiege Astorga in form; but he was suddenly called towards Madrid, lest disorders should arise in the capital during the king’s absence, and Mahi and Garcia being apprised of this, immediately brought up the new levies to the edge of the mountains, thinking that they might relieve the Asturians by threatening an irruption into the plains of Leon. But as Loison still remained at Benevente, they were unable to effect their object, and, after drawing off five thousand men from Astorga, retired to Villa Franca. Bonet, however, did not pass Nava de Suarna, and when general Arco had rallied the Asturian fugitives at Louarca, Garcia, leaving Mahi to command in Gallicia, marched himself with the remnant of the old army of the left, to join Romana at Badajos. Meanwhile Kellerman advanced to Alba de Tormes, and detachments from his and Ney’s force chased Carrera from the Gata and Bejar mountains, driving him sometimes over the Alagon, sometimes into Portugal. But it is unnecessary to trace all these movements, for the French, while preparing for greater operations, were continually spreading false reports, and making demonstrations in various directions to mislead the allies, and to cover their own projects. Those projects were at first obscure. It is certain that the invasion of Portugal by the northern line, was not finally arranged, until a later period, yet it seems probable that, while Bonet drew the attention of the Gallician army towards Lugo, the duke of Abrantes designed to penetrate by Puebla Senabria, not as Loison announced, for the invasion of Gallicia, but to turn the Tras os Montes and descend by the route of Chaves upon Oporto, while Ney, calling the second corps to the aid of the sixth, should invest Ciudad Rodrigo. But whatever designs might have been contemplated, they were frustrated partly by the insurrection in Grenada and the failure of Suchet against Valencia, partly by disunion amongst the generals, for here also Ney and Junot complained reciprocally, and every where it was plainly seen that the French corps d’armée, however formidable in themselves, would not, in the absence of Napoleon, act cordially in a general system. [Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence, MSS.] When the commotions in the south subsided, Junot returned to Old Castile, Loison joined the sixth corps on the Tormes, Kellerman retired to Valladolid, detachments, placed on the Douro, maintained the communications between Ney and Junot, and the latter, having drawn a reinforcement from Bonet, invested Astorga with ten thousand infantry, two thousand cavalry, eighteen field-guns, six twenty-four pounders, and two mortars. His covering-divisions were placed, one at Benevente, to watch the road of Mombuey, one near Puebla de Senabria, and one at Puente Ferrada. Mahi immediately concentrated the Gallician army at Villa Franca and Fonceabadon, and detached fifteen hundred men, under Echevarria, to Mombuey and Puebla, to harass the flank and rear of the investing army; yet his force was weak. The Gallician authorities had frequently assured lord Wellington that it amounted to twenty thousand well-organized troops; but it now appeared that only eight thousand were in the field, and those ill provided, and prone to desertion. SIEGE OF ASTORGA. Santocildes, governor of this place, was an officer of courage; his garrison consisted of two thousand five hundred infantry, besides cannoneers and armed peasantry, and the Moorish ramparts had been strengthened by fresh works; but there was little ammunition, scarcely twenty days’ rations, and nothing outside the walls, capable of seriously disturbing the enemy. The town stood in an open plain, and had three suburbs: Puerto de Hierro, to the north; St. Andreas, to the east; and Retebia, to the west. On the two last Junot made false attacks, but conducted his real approaches, against the front, between Puerto de Hierro and Retebia. The place was invested the 22d of March; and Puerto de Hierro was carried by storm, two sallies repulsed, and the trenches opened, before the end of the month. A breach was then commenced, but the battering-guns soon became unserviceable, and the line of approach was flanked by the houses of Retebia, which were filled with Spanish infantry. Nevertheless, the town suffered from shells, and the wall was so much broken, on the 20th of April, that an assault was ordered. A previous attack on Retebia had failed; but Santocildes was distressed for ammunition, and, during the preparations for storming, offered to capitulate. Junot refused the terms demanded, and, at five o’clock in the evening of the 21st, some picked troops ran up to the breach; but it was well retrenched and stockaded, and defended with great obstinacy, and the flank fire from Retebia stopped the supporting columns. The storming-party, thus abandoned to its own exertions, was held at bay on the summit of the breach; and being plied on both flanks, and in front, with shot from the houses of the town, and in rear by the musketry from Retebia, would have been totally destroyed, but for the scarcity of ammunition, which paralized the Spanish defence. Three hundred French fell on the breach itself, but the remainder finally effected a lodgement in the ruins, and, during the night, a second attack on Retebia proving successful, a communication was opened from the parallels to the lodgement, and strong working-parties were sent forward, who cut through the stockade into the town, when the governor surrendered. Mahi, who had advanced to the edge of the mountains, as if he would have succoured the place, hearing of this event, retired to Bembibre, where his rear was overtaken and defeated by general Clausel on the 24th. He then fell back to Lugo, and recalled his detachment from Mombuey; but the French from Benevente were already in that quarter, and, on the 25th, totally defeated Echevaria at Castro Contrijo. Meanwhile, Junot placed garrisons in Astorga and Leon, and restored Bonet his division. That general, who had retired to Santander during the siege, then re-occupied Oviedo and Gihon, defeated the Asturians, and once more menaced Gallicia by the road of Concija, and by that of Sales; several slight actions ensued; but the French did not penetrate farther, and the Junta of Gallicia reinforced the Asturians with three thousand men. During the siege of Astorga, the sixth corps was concentrated at Salamanca, a strong detachment of Kellerman’s troops siezed the pass of Baños, and Martin Carrera, quitting the hills, joined the English light division near Almeida. In fine, the great operations were commencing, and the line of communication with France, was encumbered with the advancing reinforcements. A large battering-train, collected from Segovia, Burgos, and Pampeluna, arrived at Salamanca; general Martineau, with ten thousand men for the eighth corps, reached Valladolid; general Drouet passed the Pyrennees with a ninth corps, composed of the fourth battalions of regiments already in Spain; and these were followed by seventeen thousand of the imperial guards, whose presence gave force to the rumour, that the emperor himself was coming to take the chief command. Fortunately for the allies, this report, although rife amongst all parties, and credited both by Joseph’s ministers, and the French ambassador at Madrid, proved groundless; and a leader for the projected operations was still to be named. I have been informed that marshal Ney resumed the command of the sixth corps, under the impression that he was to conduct the enterprise against Portugal, that the intrigues of marshal Berthier, to whom he was obnoxious, frustrated his hopes, and that Napoleon, fatigued with the disputes of his lieutenants, had resolved to repair in person to the Peninsula: that his marriage, and some important political affairs, diverted him from that object, and that Massena, prince of Esling, was finally chosen, partly for his great name in arms, and partly that he was of higher rank than the other marshals, and a stranger to all the jealousies and disputes in the Peninsula. His arrival was known in May amongst the allies, and lord Wellington had no longer to dread the formidable presence of the French emperor. That Massena’s base of operations might not be exposed to the interference of any other authority in Spain, the four military governments, of Salamanca, Valladolid, Asturias, and St. Andero were placed under his temporary authority, which thus became absolute in the northern provinces. But previous to taking the command of the troops, he repaired to Madrid, to confer with the king; and it would seem that some hesitation as to the line of invasion still prevailed in the French councils, because, in the imperial muster-rolls, the head-quarters of the army of Portugal are marked as being at Caceres in Estremadura, and the imperial guards are returned as part of that army, yet during the month of April only; a circumstance strongly indicating Napoleon’s intention to assume the command himself. The northern line was, however, definitively adopted; and, while the prince of Esling was still in the capital, the eighth corps passed the Tormes, and Ney commenced the FIRST SIEGE OF CIUDAD RODRIGO. [Sidenote: Lord Wellington’s Correspondence. MSS.] This fortress had been commanded, in the beginning of the year, by a person whose conduct had been so suspicious, that lord Wellington demanded his removal. But don Andreas Herrasti, the actual governor, was a veteran of fifty years’ service, whose silver hairs, dignified countenance, and courteous manners excited respect; and whose courage, talents, and honour were worthy of his venerable appearance. His garrison amounted to six thousand fighting men, besides the citizens; and the place, built on a height overhanging the northern bank of the Agueda river, was amply supplied with artillery and stores of all kinds. The works were, however, weak, consisting of an old rampart, nearly circular, about thirty feet in height, and without other flanks than a few projections containing some light guns: a second wall, about twelve feet high, called a “_fausse braie_,” with a ditch and covered way, surrounded the first; but was placed so low on the hill, as scarcely to offer any cover to the upper rampart. There were no bomb-proofs, even for the magazine, and Herrasti was forced to place his powder in the church, which he secured as he might. Beyond the walls, and totally severed from the town, the suburb of Francisco, defended by an earthern entrenchment, and strengthened by two large convents, formed an outwork to the north-east of the place. The convent of Santa Cruz served a like purpose on the north-west; and between these posts there was a ridge called the Little Teson, which, somewhat inferior in height to the town, was only a hundred and fifty yards from the body of the place. There was also a Greater Teson, which, rising behind the lesser at the distance of six hundred yards from the walls, overlooked the ramparts, and saw into the bottom of the ditch. The country immediately about Ciudad Rodrigo, although wooded, was easy for troops; especially on the left bank of the Agueda, to which the garrison had access by a stone bridge within pistol-shot of the castle-gate. But the Agueda itself, rising in the Sierra de Francia, and running into the Douro, is subject to great and sudden floods; and six or seven miles below the town, near San Felices, the channel deepens into one continued and frightful chasm, many hundred feet deep, and overhung with huge desolate rocks. During February and March, the French departed as lightly as they had advanced against Ciudad Rodrigo; but, on the 25th of April, a camp was pitched upon a lofty ridge five miles eastward of the city; and, in a few days, a second, and then a third, arose: and these portentous clouds continued to gather on the hills until June, when fifty thousand fighting men came down into the plain, and throwing two bridges over the Agueda, begirt the fortress. This multitude, composed of the sixth and eighth corps, and a reserve of cavalry, was led by Ney, Junot, and Montbrun. The sixth corps invested the place; the eighth occupied San Felices Grande, and other points, and the cavalry swarmed on both sides of the river; but the battering train and a great escort was still two days’ march in the rear; for the rains inundating the flat country between the Agueda and the Tormes, rendered the roads impassable. The bridges were established on the 2d and 7th of June; the one above, the other below the town; and on the 13th, ground was broken on the Greater Teson. The 22d, the artillery arrived, and preparations were made to contract the circle of investment on the left bank of the Agueda, which had hitherto been but slightly watched. But that night, Julian Sanchez, with two hundred horsemen, passed silently out of the castle-gate, and, crossing the river, fell upon the nearest French posts, pierced their line in a moment, and reached the English light division, then behind the Azava, six miles from Ciudad Rodrigo. This event, induced Ney, to reinforce his troops on the left bank, and a movement, to be hereafter noticed, was directed against general Crawfurd the 25th, on which day, also, the French batteries opened. [Sidenote: Intercepted French Correspondence. MSS.] Ney’s plan, was to breach the body of the place without attending to the Spanish fire. Salvos, from forty-six guns, constantly directed on one point, soon broke the old masonry of the ramparts; but the besieged, who could bring twenty-four guns to bear on the Teson, shot so well that three magazines blew up at once in the trenches, and killed above a hundred of the assailants. On the 27th, the prince of Esling arrived in the camp, and summoned the governor to surrender. Herrasti answered in the manner to be expected from so good a soldier; and the fire was resumed until the 1st of July, when Massena, sensible that the mode of attack was faulty, directed the engineers to raise counter-batteries, to push their parallels to the Lesser Teson, work regularly forward, blow in the counterscarp, and pass the ditch in form. Meanwhile, to facilitate the progress of the new works, the convent of Santa Cruz, on the right flank, was carried after a fierce resistance; and, on the left, the suburb was attacked, taken, and retaken by a sally, in which great loss was inflicted on the French. Howbeit, the latter remained masters of every thing beyond the walls. During the cessation of fire, consequent upon the change in the French dispositions, Herrasti removed the ruins from the foot of the breach, and strengthened his flank defences: but, on the 9th of July, the besieger’s batteries, being established on the Lesser Teson, re-opened with a terrible effect. In twenty-four hours, the fire of the Spanish guns was nearly silenced, part of the town was in flames, a reserve magazine exploded on the walls, the counterscarp was blown in by a mine, on an extent of thirty-six feet, the ditch filled by the ruins, and a broad way made into the place. At this moment, three French soldiers, of heroic courage, suddenly running out of the ranks, mounted the breach, looked into the town, and having thus, in broad daylight, proved the state of affairs, discharged their muskets, and, with matchless fortune, retired unhurt to their comrades. The columns of assault immediately assembled. The troops, animated by the presence of Ney, and excited by the example of the three men who had so gallantly proved the breach, were impatient for the signal. A few moments would have sent them raging into the midst of the city, when the white flag waved on the rampart, and the venerable governor was seen standing alone on the ruins, and signifying, by his gestures, that he desired to capitulate. He had stricken manfully, while reason warranted hope, and it was no dishonour to his silver hairs, that he surrendered when resistance could only lead to massacre and devastation. Six months had now elapsed, since the French resuming the plan of conquest interrupted by the Austrian war and by the operations of sir Arthur Wellesley, had retaken the offensive. Battle after battle they had gained, fortress after fortress they had taken, and sent the Spanish forces, broken and scattered, to seek for refuge in the most obscure parts: solid resistance there was none; and the only hope of deliverance for the Peninsula rested upon the British general. How he realized that hope shall be related in the next book. Meanwhile, the reader should bear in mind that the multifarious actions related in the foregoing chapters, were contemporaneous; and that he has been led, as it were, round the margin of a lake, whose turbulent waters spread on every side. Tedious to read, and trifling many of the circumstances must appear, yet, as a whole, they form what has been called the Spanish military policy: and, without accurate notions on that head, it would be impossible to appreciate the capacity of the man who, like Milton’s phantom, paved a broad way through the chaotic warfare. I have been charged with incompetence to understand, and, most unjustly, with a desire to underrate the Spanish resistance; but it is the province of history to record, foolish as well as glorious deeds, that posterity may profit from all: and neither will I mislead those who read my work, nor sacrifice the reputation of my country’s arms to shallow declamation upon the unconquerable spirit of independence. To expose the errors is not to undervalue the fortitude of a noble people; for in their constancy, in the unexampled patience, with which they bore the ills inflicted alike by a ruthless enemy, and by their own sordid governments, the Spaniards were truly noble: but shall I say that they were victorious in their battles, or faithful in their compacts; that they treated their prisoners with humanity; that their Juntas were honest or wise; their generals skilful; their soldiers firm? I speak but the bare truth, when I assert, that they were incapable of defending their own cause! Every action, every correspondence, every proceeding of the six years that the war lasted, rise up in support of this fact; and to assume that an insurrection so conducted did, or could possibly baffle the prodigious power of Napoleon is an illusion. Spain baffle him! Her efforts were amongst the very smallest causes of his failure. Portugal has far greater claims to that glory. Spain furnished the opportunity; but it was England, Austria, Russia, or rather fortune, that struck down that wonderful man. The English, more powerful, more rich, more profuse, perhaps more brave than the ancient Romans; the English, with a fleet, for grandeur and real force, never matched, with a general equal to any emergency, fought as if for their own existence. The Austrians brought four hundred thousand good troops to arrest the conqueror’s progress, the snows of Russia destroyed three hundred thousand of his best soldiers; and finally, when he had lost half a million of veterans, not one of whom died on Spanish ground, Europe, in one vast combination, could only tear the Peninsula from him, by tearing France along with it. What weakness, then, what incredible delusion to point to Spain, with all her follies, and her never-ending defeats, as a proof that a people fighting for independence must be victorious. She was invaded, because she adhered to the great European aristocracy; she was delivered, because England enabled that aristocracy to triumph for a moment, over the principles of the French revolution. BOOK XI. CHAPTER I. The defence of Portugal, was not the result of any fortuitous combination of circumstances, nor was lord Wellington moved thereto, by any hasty ambition to magnify his own reputation, but calmly and deliberately, formed his resolution, after a laborious and cautious estimate of the difficulties and chances of success. Reverting then to the period, when, by retreating upon Badajos, he divorced his operations from the folly of Spain, I shall succinctly trace his military and political proceedings up to the moment, when, confident in the soundness of his calculations, he commenced his project, unmoved by the power of his enemy, the timidity of his friends, the imprudence of his subordinates, or the intrigues of discontented men, who secretly, and with malignant perseverance, laboured to thwart his measures and to ruin his designs. [Sidenote: Lord Castlereagh’s Statement] [Sidenote: Mr. Canning’s Statement] After the retreat from Spain in 1809, he repaired to Seville, partly to negotiate with the Central Junta, upon matters touching the war, but principally to confer with his brother, ere the latter quitted the Peninsula. Lord Wellesley’s departure was caused by the state of politics in England, where a change in the administration was about to take place,--a change, sudden indeed, but not unexpected; because the ineptitude of the government, was, in private, acknowledged by many of its members, and the failure of the Walcheren expedition, was only the signal, for a public avowal of jealousies and wretched personal intrigues, which had rendered the Cabinet of St. James’s the most inefficient, Spain excepted, of any in Europe. Mr. Canning, the principal mover of those intrigues, had secretly, denounced lord Castlereagh to his colleagues, as a man incapable of conducting the public affairs, and exacted from them a promise to dismiss him. Nevertheless, he permitted that nobleman, ignorant of the imputation on his abilities, to plan, and conduct the fitting out, of the most powerful armament that ever quitted England. But when it became evident that only loss and ruin waited on this unhappy expedition, Mr. Canning claimed the fulfilment of the promise, and the intrigue thus becoming known to lord Castlereagh, was by him characterised as “_a breach of every principle of good faith, both public and private_.” This was followed by a duel; and by the dissolution of the administration. Mr. Perceval and lord Liverpool were then empowered to form another Cabinet; and after a fruitless negotiation with lord Grey, and lord Grenville, assumed the lead themselves, and offered the department of foreign affairs to lord Wellesley. Contrary to the general expectation, he accepted it. His brother had opened to him those great views for the defence of Portugal, which were afterwards so gloriously realized, but which could never have been undertaken with confidence by the general, unless secure of some powerful friend in the administration, embued with the same sentiments, bound by a common interest, and resolute, to support him when the crisis of danger arrived. It was therefore wise, and commendable, in lord Wellesley, to sacrifice something of his own personal pretensions, to be enabled to forward projects, promising so much glory to the country and his own family, and the first proceedings in parliament justified his policy. [Sidenote: See Parliamentary Debates.] Previous to the change in the Cabinet, sir Arthur Wellesley had been created baron Douro, and viscount Wellington; but those honours, although well deserved, were undoubtedly conferred as much from party as from patriotic feeling, and greatly excited the anger of the opposition members, who with few exceptions, assailed the general, personally, and with an acrimony not to be justified. His merits, they said, were nought; his actions silly, presumptuous, rash; his campaign one deserving not reward, but punishment. Yet he had delivered Portugal, cleared Gallicia and Estremadura, and obliged one hundred thousand French veterans to abandon the offensive and concentrate about Madrid! Lord Grey opposing his own crude military notions, to the practised skill of sir Arthur, petulantly censured the latter’s dispositions at Talavera; others denied that he was successful in that action; and some, forgetting that they were amenable to history, even proposed to leave his name out of the vote of thanks to the army! That battle, so sternly fought, so hardly won, they would have set aside with respect to the commander, as not warranting admission to a peerage always open to venal orators; and the passage of the Douro, so promptly, so daringly, so skilfully, so successfully executed, that it seemed rather the result of inspiration than of natural judgement, they would have cast away as a thing of no worth! This spirit of faction was, however, not confined to one side: there was a ministerial person, at this time, who in his dread of the opposition, wrote to lord Wellington complaining of his inaction, and calling upon him to do something that would excite a public sensation: _any thing provided blood was spilt_. A calm but severe rebuke, and the cessation of all friendly intercourse with the writer, discovered the general’s abhorrence of this detestable policy; but when such passions were abroad, it is evident that lord Wellesley’s accession to the government, was essential to the success of lord Wellington’s projects. Those projects delivered the Peninsula and changed the fate of Europe; and every step made towards their accomplishment merits attention, as much from the intrinsic interest of the subject, as that it has been common to attribute his success to good fortune and to the strenuous support he received from the Cabinet at home. Now it is far from my intention to deny the great influence of fortune in war, or that the duke of Wellington has always been one of her peculiar favourites; but I will make it clearly appear, that if he met with great success, he had previously anticipated it, and upon solid grounds, that the Cabinet did not so much support him as it was supported by him; and finally, that his prudence, foresight, and firmness were at least as efficient causes as any others that can be adduced. Immediately after the retreat from Jaraceijo, and while the ministers were yet unchanged, lord Castlereagh, brought, by continual reverses, to a more sober method of planning military affairs, had demanded lord Wellington’s opinion upon the expediency, the chance of success, and the expense of defending Portugal. This letter reached the general on the 14th of September, 1809; but the subject required many previous inquiries and a careful examination of the country; and, at that period, any plan for the defence of Portugal, was necessarily to be modified, according to the energy or feebleness of the Spaniards in Andalusia. Hence it was not until after his return from Seville, a few days previous to the defeat at Ocaña, that lord Wellington replied to lord Liverpool, who, during the interval, had succeeded lord Castlereagh in the war department. [Sidenote: Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool. Badajos, 14th Nov. 1809. MSS.] Adverting to the actual state of the French troops in the Peninsula, he observed, that, unless the Spanish armies met with some great disaster, the former _could not then make an attack upon Portugal_; yet, if events should enable them to do so, that the forces at that moment in the latter might defend it. “But the peace in Germany,” he said, “might enable France to reinforce her armies in Spain largely, when the means of invading Portugal would be increased, not only in proportion to the additional troops then poured in, but also in proportion to the effect which such a display of additional strength would necessarily have upon the spirit of the Spaniards. Even in that case, _until Spain should have been conquered and rendered submissive_, the French would find it difficult, if not impossible, to obtain possession of Portugal, _provided England employed her armies in defence of that country, and that the Portuguese military service was organised to the full extent of which it was capable._ But the number of British forces employed should not be less than thirty thousand effective men. Although the Portuguese regular force, actually enrolled, consisted of thirty-nine thousand infantry, three thousand artillery, and three thousand cavalry; and the militia amounted to forty-five thousand, exclusive of the ordenanças.” The next point of consideration was the probable expense. “The actual yearly cost of the British army in Portugal, exclusive of the hire of transport-vessels, was about £1,800,000, being only half a million sterling more than they would cost if employed in England. Hence the most important consideration was the expense of renovating, and supporting the Portuguese military, and civil services. The British government, had already subsidised the Portuguese Regency, at the rate of six hundred thousand pounds yearly, being the expense of twenty thousand men, which the latter were bound by treaty to place at the service of the English commander-in-chief. “But this was far from sufficient to render the Portuguese army efficient for the impending contest. The revenue of Portugal was between eight and nine millions of dollars, the expenses between fourteen and fifteen millions, leaving a deficiency of more than six millions of dollars. Hence, for that year, the most pressing only of the civil and military demands had been paid, and the public debt and the salaries of the public servants were in arrear. The advances already made by Great Britain amounted to two millions of dollars; there remained a deficiency of four millions of dollars, which, after a careful inquiry, it appeared could not be made good by Portugal; and it was obvious that the administration would, when distressed, gradually appropriate the subsidy to support the civil authorities to the detriment of the military service. Nay, already money from the English military chest had been advanced to prevent the Portuguese army from disbanding from want of food. “It was impossible to diminish the expenses of the Regency, and yet the French invasion and the emigration to the Brazils had so impoverished the country that it was impossible to raise the revenue or to obtain money by loans. The people were unable to pay the taxes already imposed, and the customs, which formed the principal branch of Portuguese revenue, were reduced to nothing by the transfer of the Brazilian trade from the mother-country to Great Britain. This transfer, so profitable to the latter, was ruinous to Portugal, and, therefore, justice as well as policy required that England should afford pecuniary assistance to the Regency. “Without it, nothing could be expected from the Portuguese army. The officers of that army had, for many years, done no duty, partly that their country having been, with some trifling exceptions, at peace nearly half a century, they had continued in the same garrisons, and lived with their families; and, to these advantages, added others arising from abuses in the service. Now the severe but necessary discipline introduced by marshal Beresford, had placed the Portuguese officers in a miserable situation. All abuses had been extirpated, additional expenses had been inflicted, and the regular pay was not only insufficient to support them in a country where all the necessaries of life were enormously dear, but it was far below the pay of the English, Spanish, and French officers, with whom, or against whom, they were to fight. “If, therefore, the war was to be carried on, it was advisable to grant a subsidy of one hundred and thirty thousand pounds yearly, to enable the Regency to increase the pay of the Portuguese officers; and to this sum, for the reasons before-mentioned, should be added a further subsidy of about three hundred thousand pounds, to supply the actual deficiency in the Portuguese revenues. Or, if the English cabinet preferred it, they might take ten thousand more Portuguese troops into pay, which could be done at an expense of two hundred and fifty thousand pounds. With such assistance, the difficulties of the moment might be overcome; but, without it, he lord Wellington, felt assured, that the whole financial and military system of the Portuguese would break down at once; all the expense, hitherto incurred, would be cast away, and all hopes of defending the country extinguished. It was for the ministers to decide. “There remained two other points to consider--the re-embarkation of the British army, in the event of failure, and the chances of the Portuguese nation continuing the contest alone. As to the first, he could carry off everything safely, except the horses of the cavalry and artillery, those could not be carried off, if the embarkation took place after a lost battle; and, if under other circumstances, the expense of horse-transports would be more than the worth of the animals. As to the second point, if the British army evacuated Portugal, under any circumstances, he could not give hopes that the contest could be prolonged effectually by the natives. Although I,” he said, “_consider the Portuguese government and army as the principals in the contest for their own independence, and that their success or failure must depend principally upon their own exertions and the bravery of their army, and that I am sanguine in my expectations of both, when excited by the example of British officers and troops, I have no hope of either, if his Majesty should now withdraw the army from the Peninsula, or if it should be obliged to evacuate it by defeat. There is no doubt that the immediate consequences will be the possession of Lisbon by the enemy, probably without a contest; and other consequences will follow, affecting the state of the war, not only in Portugal but Spain._ If, therefore, it should be thought advisable now to withdraw, or if, eventually the British army should be obliged to withdraw from Portugal, I would recommend a consideration of the means of carrying away such of the Portuguese military as should be desirous of emigrating, rather than continue, by their means, the contest in this country.” Peniché and Setuval offered secure points of embarkation in the event of failure, but neither were likely to come within the scope of the operations, and lord Wellington’s opinion as to the facility of carrying off the army from Lisbon was founded chiefly upon admiral Berkeley’s assurances that the embarkation would not take longer than four hours, during which time, even though the left bank of that river should be occupied by the enemy, the ships of war could sustain the fire and at the same time sweep with their own guns all the ground above Passo d’Arcos, which, from the circumstance of its having no surf, was thought preferable to St. Julian’s for an embarkation. But the admiral’s views, as I shall have occasion to observe hereafter, were erroneous; the fleet could not remain in the Tagus, if the enemy were in possession of the left bank. Although alarmed at the number of men demanded, a number which, from the recent loss sustained on the Walcheren expedition, they truly observed, would, in case of disaster, endanger the safety of England, the ministers assented to lord Wellington’s proposals, undertook to pay ten thousand additional Portuguese troops, and to advance money for the increased stipends to the officers; but thus pledging themselves to an annual subsidy of nearly one million, they with justice required that the Portuguese Regency, under pain of the subsidy being stopped, should keep all that part of the military establishment which remained under their own direction in a state of complete efficiency. Thus supported, lord Wellington proceeded with vigorous intelligence to meet the impending contest. His troops removed from the Guadiana, took healthy cantonments on the north-eastern frontier of Portugal, and he expected a reinforcement of five thousand infantry and a regiment of cavalry from England. Smaller detachments had already reached him, and the army when it commenced its march from the Guadiana was numerically thirty thousand strong; but those actually under arms scarcely amounted to twenty thousand; nine thousand were in hospital, and many in the ranks were still tottering from the effects of past illness. The 20th of January, the head-quarters, and the artillery parcs, were established at Viseu, in Upper Beira. The cavalry, was quartered, by single regiments, at Golegao, Punhete, Torres Novas, Celerico, and Santarem. General Hill, was left with five thousand British, and a like number of Portuguese at Abrantes, and the remainder of the infantry (one regiment, forming the garrison of Lisbon, excepted) was distributed along the valley of the Mondego. The plans of the English general, were--at first, grounded, upon the supposition, that the French would follow the right or northern line, in preference to the centre or southern line of operations, against the Peninsula, that is, _attack Portugal from the side of Old Castile_, rather than _Andalusia from the side of La Mancha_. In this he was mistaken. The movements were again directed by Napoleon, his views were as usual gigantic, and not Andalusia alone, but every part of the Peninsula, was destined to feel the weight of his arms. Fresh troops, flushed with their recent German victories, were crowding into Spain, reinforcing the corps to their right and left, scouring the main communications, and following the footsteps of the old bands, as the latter were impelled forward in the career of invasion. Hence, the operations against Andalusia so deeply affected the defence of Portugal, that, on the 31st of January, at the moment Seville was opening her gates, lord Wellington demanded fresh instructions, reiterating the question, whether _Portugal should be defended at all_, but at the same time transmitting, one of those clear and powerful statements, which he invariably drew up for the ministers’ information previous to undertaking any great enterprise; statements, in which, showing the bearings of past and present events, and drawing conclusions as to the future with a wonderful accuracy, he has given irrefragable proofs, that envious folly has attributed to fortune, and the favour of the cabinet, successes, which were the result of his own sagacity and unalterable firmness. [Sidenote: Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, 31st Jan. 1810. MSS.] “The enemy,” he said, “aimed at conquering the south; he would no doubt obtain Seville with all its resources, and the defeat and dispersion of the Spanish armies would be the consequences of any action, in which either their imprudence or necessity, or even expediency, might engage them. The armies might, however be lost and the authorities dispersed, but the war of Partisans would continue; Cadiz might possibly hold out, and the Central Junta even exist within its walls; but it would be without authority, because the French would possess all the provinces. This state of affairs, left Portugal untouched; but it was chiefly to that country he wished to draw the ministers’ attention. “They already knew its military situation and resources. If arms could be supplied to the militia, a gross force of ninety thousand men, regularly organized, could be calculated upon, exclusive of the armed population and of the British army. Much had been done within the last nine months, for the enrollment, organization, and equipment of this great force; but much remained to be done, and with very insufficient means, before the fifty thousand men, composing the militia, could possibly contend with the enemy; and although this should be effected, the whole army would still want that confidence in themselves and in their officers, which is only to be acquired by military experience. “When the affairs of Spain should, as before supposed, be brought to that pass, _that a regular resistance would cease, no possibility existed of the contest in that country being renewed on such a scale as to afford a chance of success, although the possession of each part might be precarious, depending upon the strength of the French force holding it, and that the whole might prove a burthen rather than an advantage to the French government_. Thence arose this question, ‘Will the continuation of the contest in Portugal, afford any reasonable prospect of advantage against the common enemy, or of benefit to the allies?’ “It was impossible to calculate upon any certain grounds the degree of assistance to be expected from the Portuguese troops. For the regulars every thing that discipline could effect had been done, and they had been armed and equipped as far as the means of the country would go. The militia also had been improved to the extent which the expense of keeping them embodied would permit. The Portuguese had confidence in the British nation and army; they were loyal to their Prince; detested the French government, and were individually determined to do every thing for the cause. Still they were not to be certainly calculated upon until inured to war, because the majority of their officers were of an inferior description and inexperienced in military affairs.” Under these circumstances, and _adverting to the approaching subjection of Spain_, he demanded to know whether “_the enemy, bending the greatest part of his force against Portugal, that country should be defended, or measures taken to evacuate it, carrying off all persons, military and others, for whose conveyance means could be found_. But, under any circumstances, (he said) the British army could always be embarked in despite of the enemy.” [Sidenote: Mr. James Moore’s Narrative]. [Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 12.] Such being the view taken of this important subject by lord Wellington, it may seem proper here to notice an argument which, with equal ignorance and malice, has often been thrust forward in disparagement of sir John Moore, namely, that he declared Portugal could not be defended, whereas lord Wellington did defend that country. The former general premising that he was not prepared to answer a question of such magnitude, observed, that the frontier, being, although rugged, open, could not be defended against a superior force; yet that Almeida, Guarda, Belmonte, Baracal, Celerico, Viseu, might be occupied as temporary positions to check the advance of an enemy, and cover the embarkation of stores, &c. which could only be made at Lisbon, that the Portuguese in their own mountains would be of much use, and that he hoped that they could alone defend the Tras os Montes. That, if the French succeeded in Spain, it would be vain to resist them in Portugal “_because the latter was without a military force_,” and if it were otherwise, from the experience of Roriça and Vimiero, no reliance was to be placed on their troops. But this opinion, hastily given, had reference only to the _state of affairs existing at that moment_, being expressly founded on the _miserable condition and unpromising character of the Portuguese military_, Spain also being supposed conquered. [Sidenote: Letter to Lord Liverpool, Nov. 14. 1809. MSS.] [Sidenote: Ibid. Jan. 31, 1810. MSS.] Lord Wellington, after two campaigns in the country; after the termination of the anarchy, which prevailed during sir John Cradock’s time; after immense subsidies had been granted to Portugal, her whole military force re-organized, and her regular troops disciplined, paid, and officered by England; after the war in Germany had cost Napoleon fifty thousand men, the campaign in the Peninsula at least fifty thousand more; in fine, after mature consideration, and when Spain was still fighting, when Andalusia, Catalonia, Murcia, Valencia, Gallicia, and the Asturias, were still uninvaded; when Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, most important posts with reference to this question, were still in possession of the Spaniards, and prepared for defence, lord Wellington, I say, came to the conclusion, that Portugal might be defended against the enemy then in the Peninsula, provided _an enormous additional subsidy and a powerful auxiliary army were furnished by England, and that one earnest and devoted effort was made by the whole Portuguese nation_. And when Andalusia fell, he warned his government, that, _although success could only be expected from the devotion and ardour of the Portuguese, their army could not even then be implicitly trusted_. Lisbon also, he considered as the only secure point of resistance, and he occupied Viseu, Guarda, Almeida, Belmonte, and Celerico, as temporary posts. But, in all things concerning this war, there was between those generals, a remarkable similarity of opinion and plan of action. [Sidenote: Mr. James Moore’s Narrative.] “_The French_,” said sir John Moore, “_will find the Spaniards troublesome subjects, but in the first instance they will have little more than a march to subdue the country_.” [Sidenote: Letter to Lord Liverpool, Jan. 31, 1810. MSS.] “_The defeat and dispersion of the Spanish armies will be_,” said lord Wellington, “_the probable consequence of any action in which either imprudence, necessity, or even expediency, may lead them to engage. The armies may be lost, the authorities dispersed, but the war of Partisans will probably continue._” [Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 3.] And when the edge of the sword was, in 1810, as in 1808, descending on the unguarded front of Andalusia, lord Wellington, on the first indication of Joseph’s march, designed to make a movement similar in principle to that executed by sir John Moore on Sahagun, that is, by an irruption into Castile, to threaten the enemy’s rear, in such sort that he should be obliged to return from Andalusia or suffer his forces in Castile to be beaten. Nor was he at first deterred from this project, by the knowledge, that fresh troops were entering Spain. The Junta, indeed, assured him that only eight thousand men had reinforced the French; but, although circumstances led him to doubt this assertion, he was not without hopes to effect his purpose before the reinforcements, whatever they might be, could come into line. He had even matured his plan, as far as regarded the direction of the march, when other considerations obliged him to relinquish it, and these shall be here examined, because French and Spanish writers then, and since, have accused him of looking on with indifference, if not with satisfaction, at the ruin of the Central Junta’s operation, as if it only depended upon him to render them successful. Why he refused to join in the Spanish projects has been already explained. He abandoned his own,-- 1º. Because the five thousand men promised from England had not arrived, and his hospitals being full, he could not, including Hill’s division, bring more than twenty thousand British soldiers into the field. Hill’s division, however, could not be moved without leaving the rear of the army exposed to the French in the south,--a danger, which success in Castile, by recalling the latter from Andalusia, would only increase. [Sidenote: Lord Wellington’s Correspondence. MSS.] 2º. The Portuguese had suffered cruelly during the winter from hunger and nakedness, the result of the scarcity of money before-mentioned. To bring them into line, was to risk a total disorganization, destructive alike of present and future advantages. On the other hand, the French in Castile, consisting of the sixth corps and the troops of Kellerman’s government, lord Wellington knew to be at least thirty thousand strong, of which twenty thousand were in one mass; and, although the rest were dispersed from Burgos to Avila, and from Zamora to Valladolid, they could easily have concentrated in time to give battle, and would have proved too powerful. That this reasoning was sound shall now be shewn. [Sidenote: Rolls of the French army.] Mortier’s march from Seville would not have terminated at Badajos, if the British force at Abrantes, instead of advancing to Portalegre, had been employed in Castile. The invasion of Andalusia, was only part of a general movement throughout Spain; and when the king placed himself at the head of the army, to force the Morena, Kellerman marched from Salamanca to Miranda del Castanar and Bejar, with the sixth corps, and thus secured the defiles leading into the valley of the Tagus, and at the same time, the second corps coming down that valley, communicated with the sixth by the pass of Baños, and with the fifth by Seradillo and Caceres. Hence, without losing hold of Andalusia, three _corps d’armée_, namely, the sixth, second, and fifth, amounting to fifty thousand men, could, on an emergency, be brought together to oppose any offensive movement of lord Wellington’s. Nor was this the whole of the French combinations; for, in rear of all these forces, Napoleon was crowding the Peninsula with fresh armies, and not eight thousand, as the Central Junta asserted, but one hundred thousand men, rendered disposable by the peace with Austria and the evacuation of Walcheren, were crossing, or to cross, the western Pyrennees. Of these, the first detachments reinforced the divisions in the field, but the succeeding troops formed an eighth and ninth corps, and the former, under the command of the duke of Abrantes, advancing gradually through Old Castile, was actually in the plains of Valladolid, and would, in conjunction with Kellerman, have overwhelmed the British army; but for that sagacity, which the French, with derisive but natural anger, and the Spaniards, with ingratitude, have termed “_The selfish caution of the English system_.” Truly, it would be a strange thing, to use so noble and costly a machine, as a British army, with all its national reputation to support, as lightly as those Spanish multitudes, collected in a day, dispersed in an hour, reassembled again without difficulty, incapable of attaining, and consequently, incapable of losing, any military reputation. CHAPTER II. The greatness of the French reinforcements having dispelled the idea of offensive operations, lord Wellington turned his whole attention to Portugal, and notwithstanding the unfavourable change of circumstances, the ministers consented that he should undertake its defence; yet, the majority yielding to the influence of his brother, rather than to their own conviction of its practicability, and throwing the responsibility entirely on the shoulders of the general. The deep designs, the vast combinations, and the mighty efforts, by which he worked out the deliverance of that country, were beyond the compass of their policy; and even now, it is easier to admire than to comprehend, the moral intrepidity which sustained him under so many difficulties, and the sagacity which enabled him to overcome them; for he had an enemy with a sharp sword to fight, the follies and fears of several weak cabinets to correct, the snares of unprincipled politicians to guard against, and finally to oppose public opinion. Failure was every where anticipated, and there were but few who even thought him serious in his undertaking. But having now brought the story of the war down to the period, when not Spain nor Portugal, but England was to contend with France; before I enter upon the narrative of this memorable contest, it will be well to take a survey of the respective conditions and plans of the belligerents, and to shew how great the preparations, how prodigious the forces on both sides, and with what a power each was impelled forward to the shock. _State of the French._--France victorious, and in a state of the highest prosperity, could with ease, furnish double the number of men, required to maintain the struggle in the Peninsula for many years. But the utmost strength of the Spaniards having been proved, it was evident that if the French could crush the British armies, disorder and confusion might indeed be prolonged for a few years, yet no effectual resistance made, and as in the war of succession, the people would gradually accommodate themselves to the change of dynasty, especially as the little worth of Ferdinand was now fully demonstrated, by an effort to effect his release. The agent, a baron Kolli being detected, and his place supplied by one of the French police to ascertain the intentions of the captive king, the latter, influenced by personal fears alone, not only refused to make the attempt, but dishonourably denounced Kolli to the French government. The only real obstacles then to the entire conquest of the Peninsula were Cadiz and Portugal. The strength of the former was precarious, and the enormous forces assembled to subdue the latter appeared to be equal to the task. Yet in war, there are always circumstances, which, though extraneous to the military movements, influence them as much as the wind influences the sailing of a ship, and amongst the most important of these, must be reckoned the conduct of the intrusive king. Joseph was a man of so amiable a nature, that even the Spaniards never accused him of any thing worse than being too convivial; but it is evident that he was unequal to his task and mistook his true situation, when, resisting Napoleon’s policy, he claimed the treatment of an independent king. He should have known that he was a tool, and in Spain, could only be a tool of the emperor’s. To have refused a crown, like his brother Lucien, would have been heroic firmness, but like his brother Louis, first to accept, and then to resist the hand that conferred it, was a folly that, without ameliorating the condition of the Spaniards, threw fatal obstacles in Napoleon’s path. Joseph’s object was to create a Spanish party for himself by gentle and just means, but the scales fell from the hands of justice when the French first entered the Peninsula, and while the English supported Spain, it was absurd to expect even a sullen submission, much less attachment from a nation so abused, neither was it possible to recast public feeling, until the people had passed through the furnace of war. The French soldiers were in Spain for conquest, and without them the intrusive monarch could not keep his throne. [Sidenote: Appendix, No. IV. Section 1.] Now Joseph’s Spanish ministers, were men who joined him upon principle, and who, far from shewing a renegado zeal in favour of the French, were as ardently attached to their own country, as any of those who shouted for Ferdinand VII.; and whenever Spanish interests clashed (and that was constantly) with those of the French armies, they as well as the king invariably supported the former; and so strenuously, that in Paris it was even supposed that they intended to fall on the emperor’s troops. Thus civil contention weakened the military operations, and obliged Napoleon either to take the command in person, or to adopt a policy which however defective, will upon inspection prove perhaps, to have been the best adapted to the actual state of affairs. He suffered, or as some eager to lower a great man’s genius to their own level, have asserted, he fomented disputes between the marshals and the king, but the true question is, could he prevent those disputes? A wise policy, does not consist in pushing any one point to the utmost perfection of which it may be susceptible, but in regulating and balancing opposing interests, in such a manner, that the greatest benefit shall arise from the working of the whole. To arrive at a sound judgement of Napoleon’s measures, it would be necessary to weigh all the various interests of his political position, but there are not sufficient materials yet before the world, to do this correctly, and we may be certain, that his situation with respect both to foreign and domestic policy, required extraordinary management. It must always be remembered, that, he was not merely a conqueror, but the founder, of a political structure too much exposed to storms from without, to bear any tampering with its internal support. If money be the sinew of war, it is the vital stream of peace, and there is nothing more remarkable in Napoleon’s policy, than the care with which he handled financial matters; avoiding as he would the plague, that fictitious system of public credit, so fatuitously cherished in England. He could not without hurting France, transmit large quantities of gold to Spain, and the only resource left was to make “_the war maintain the war_.” [Sidenote: See Vol. I. p. 420.] [Sidenote: Appendix, No. IV. Sections 2 and 3.] But Joseph’s desire of popularity, and the feelings of his ministers, were much opposed to this system; nor were the proceeds always applied for the benefit of the troops. This demanded a remedy; yet openly to declare the king of no consideration would have been impolitic in the highest degree. The emperor adopted an intermediate course, and formed what were called “_particular military governments_,” such as Navarre, Aragon, Catalonia, and Andalusia; in which the marshal, or general, named governor possessed both the civil and military power: in short, he created viceroys as he had threatened to do when at Madrid; and, though many disadvantages attended this arrangement, it appears to have been wise and consistent with the long reach which distinguishes all Napoleon’s measures. The principal disadvantages were, that it mortally offended the king, by thwarting his plans for establishing a national party; that many of the governors were wantonly oppressive, and attentive only to their own situation, without regarding the general objects of the war; that both the Spanish ministers and the people regarded it as a step towards dismembering Spain, and especially with respect to the provinces beyond the Ebro; and, indeed, the annexing those parts to France, if not resolved upon, was at one time contemplated by the emperor. [Sidenote: Memoires de St. Helene.] On the other hand, experience proved, that Joseph was not a general equal to the times. Napoleon himself admits, that, at this period, the marauding system necessary to obtain supplies, joined to the Guerilla warfare, had relaxed the discipline of the French armies, and introduced a horrible license, while the military movements were feebly pushed. Hence, perhaps, the only effectual means to obtain the resources of Spain for the troops, with least devastation, was to make the success of each “_corps d’armée_,” and the reputation of its commander, dependent upon the welfare of the province in which it was fighting. And, although some of the governors, had neither the sense nor the justice to fulfil this expectation; others, such as Soult and Suchet, did tranquillize the people, and yet provided all necessary things for their own troops; results which would certainly not have been attained under the supreme government of the king, because he knew nothing of war, loved pleasure, was of an easy, obliging disposition, and had a court to form and maintain. I am aware that the first-named generals, especially Soult, were included by Joseph amongst those who, by oppressing the people, extended the spirit of resistance; but this accusation was the result of personal enmity; and facts, derived from less interested quarters, as well as the final results, prove that those officers had a longer reach in their policy than the king could understand. There is yet another view in which the matter may be considered. Napoleon says he left many provinces of Italy under the harsh government of Austria, that the spirit of jealousy, common to the small states of that country, might be broken, and the whole rendered amenable and ready to assimilate, when he judged the time ripe to re-form one great kingdom. Now the same policy may be traced in the military governments of Spain. The marshal’s sway, however, wisely adapted to circumstances, being still the offspring of war and violence, must, of necessity, be onerous and harsh; but the Peninsula once subdued, this system would have been replaced by the peaceful government of the king, who would then have been regarded as a deliverer. Something of this nature was also necessary to sweep away the peculiar privileges which many provinces possessed, and of which they were extremely tenacious; and the iron hand of war, only, could introduce that equality which was the principal aim and scope of the constitution of Bayonne. [Sidenote: King Joseph’s Correspondence. MSS.] [Sidenote: Suchet’s Memoirs.] Nevertheless, the first effects of the decree establishing this system, were injurious to the French cause. Fresh contributions were exacted to supply the deficiency occasioned by the cessation of succours from France; and, to avoid these, men, who would otherwise have submitted tranquilly, fled from the military governments. The Partidas also suddenly and greatly increased, and a fresh difficulty arose about their treatment when prisoners. These bodies, although regardless of the laws of war themselves, claimed all the rights of soldiers from their adversaries, and their claim was supported by the Spanish government. Thus, when Soult, as major-general for the king, proclaimed that military execution would be done on the bands in Andalusia, as assassins, and beyond the pale of military law, the Regency answered, by a retaliatory declaration; and both parties had strong grounds for what they did: the Junta, because the defence of the country now rested chiefly on the Partidas; Joseph, because the latter, while claiming the usages of war, did not act upon them, and were, by the Junta, encouraged in assassination. Mina, and, indeed, all the chiefs, put their prisoners to death whenever it became inconvenient to keep them; and Saraza publicly announced his hope of being able to capture Madame Suchet when she was pregnant, that he might destroy the mother and the infant together! And such things were common during this terrible war. The difficulties occurring in argument were, however, overcome in practice; the question of the treatment of the prisoners was generally decided by granting no quarter on either side. [Sidenote: Appendix, No. IV. Section 2.] [Sidenote: Appendix, No. IV. Section 5.] Joseph, incensed at the edict establishing the governments, sent the marquis of Almenara to Paris, to remonstrate with his brother, and to complain of the violence and the injustice of the French generals, especially Ney and Kellerman; and he denounced one act of the latter, which betrayed the most wanton contempt of justice and propriety; namely, the seizure of the national archives at Simancas; by which, infinite confusion was produced, and the utmost indignation excited, without obtaining the slightest benefit, political or military. Another object of Almenara’s mission was to ascertain if there was really any intention of seizing the provinces beyond the Ebro; and this gave rise to a curious intrigue; for his correspondence, being intercepted, was brought to Mr. Stuart, the British envoy, and he, in concert with Romana, and Cabanes the Spanish historian, simulated the style and manner of Napoleon’s state-papers, and composed a counterfeit “_senatus consultum_” and decree for annexing the provinces beyond the Ebro to France, and transmitted them to Joseph, whose discontent and fears were thereby greatly increased. Meanwhile, his distress for money was extreme; and his ministers were at times actually destitute of food. [Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 1.] These political affairs impeded the action of the armies, but the intrinsic strength of the latter was truly formidable; for, reckoning the king’s French guards, the force in the Peninsula was not less than _three hundred and seventy thousand men, and eighty thousand horses_. Of these, forty-eight thousand men were in hospital, four thousand prisoners, and twenty-nine thousand detached; leaving nearly two hundred and eighty thousand fighting men actually under arms, ready either for battle or siege: and moreover, a fresh reserve, eighteen thousand strong, was in march to enter Spain. In May, this prodigious force had been re-organized; and in July was thus distributed:-- _Governments or Armies in the 2d Line._ Total Strength. 1. Catalonia Seventh corps Duke of Tarento 55,647 2. Aragon Third corps Gen. Suchet 33,007 { Detachments and } 3. Navarre { a division of the } Gen. Reille 21,887 { Imperial Guards } 4. Biscay Detachments Gen. Caffarelli 6,570 5. Old Castile, { Divisions of the } comprising Burgos, { Imperial Guards } Gen. Dorsenne 10,303 Aranda, and Soria { and Cavalry } 6. Valladolid, &c. Detachments Gen. Kellerman 6,474 7. Asturias One division Gen. Bonet 9,898 ------- Total for the governments 143,786 ------- _Armies in the 1st Line._ _Army of the South_, composed of the first, fourth, and fifth corps, under the command of Soult 72,769 _Army of the Centre_, composed of the Royal Guards, two divisions of infantry, and two of cavalry, under the personal command of the king 24,187 _Army of Portugal_, composed of a reserve of cavalry and the second, sixth, and eighth corps, under the command of Massena 86,896 The ninth corps, commanded by general Drouet, distributed, by divisions, along the great line of communication from Vittoria to Valladolid 23,815 A division under general Serras, employed as a moveable column to protect the rear of the army of Portugal 10,605 ------- 218,272 ------- Thus the plan of invasion was determined in three distinct lines, namely, the third and seventh corps on the left; the army of the south in the centre; the army of Portugal on the right. But the interior circle was still held by the French; and their lines of communication were crowded with troops. [Sidenote: Memoirs of Contreras, published by himself.] _State of Spain._--On the right, the armies of Valencia and Catalonia, were opposed to the third and seventh corps; but the utmost efforts of the last could only retard, not prevent the sieges of Taragona and Tortoza. In the centre, the Murcian troops and those assembled at Cadiz, were only formidable by the assistance of the British force under general Graham. On the left, Romana, supported by the frontier fortresses, maintained a partizan warfare from Albuquerque to Ayamonte, but looked to Hill for safety, and to Portugal for refuge. In the north, the united forces of Gallicia and Asturias, did not exceed fifteen thousand men; and Mahi declared his intention of retiring to Coruña if Bonet advanced beyond the frontiers. Indeed, the Gallicians were so backward to join the armies, that, at a later period, Contreras was used to send through the country moveable columns, attended by an executioner, to oblige the villages to furnish their quota of men. Yet, with all this severity, and with money and arms continually furnished by England, Gallicia never was of any signal service to the British operations. [Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Papers, MSS.] But, as in the human body livid spots and blotches appear as the vital strength decays, so, in Spain, the Partidas suddenly and surprisingly increased as the regular armies disappeared. Many persons joined these bands, as a refuge from starvation; others from a desire to revenge the licentious conduct of the marauding French columns; and, finally, the Regency, desirous of pushing the system to its utmost extent, established secret Guerilla Juntas, in each province, enjoining them, diligently to collect stores and provisions in secure places. District inspectors and paymasters, selected by the nearest general officer in command of regular troops, were also appointed, as superintendents of details relative to the discipline and payment of the Partidas, and particular tracts were charged with the supplies, each according to its means. Lastly, every province was divided into three parts, each part, following its population, being to furnish seven, eight, or nine squadrons of this irregular force; and the whole, whenever circumstances required it, to unite and act in mass. The first burst of these bands, occasioned the French considerable loss, impeded their communications, and created great alarm. It was a second insurrection of the whole country. The Murcians, in concert with the peasants of Grenada and Jaen, waged war in the mountains of Andalusia; Franquisette and Palarea beset the neighbourhood of Ciudad Real, and Toledo in La Mancha. El Principe, Saornil, and Juan Abril, descending from the Carpentino mountains, sometimes on the side of Segovia, sometimes on the side of Madrid, carried off small French posts, close to the capital, and slew the governor of Segovia, at the very gates of that town. On the other side of Madrid, the Empecinado, with twelve hundred cavalry and infantry, kept the hills above Guadalaxara, and ventured sometimes to give battle in the plain. Espoz y Mina was formidable in Navarre. Longa and Campillo, at the head of two thousand men, harassed Biscay and the neighbourhood of Vittoria, and the chain of communication, between these great bands and the Empecinado, was maintained by Amor, Merino, and the Friar Sapia, the two first acting about Burgos, and the third holding the mountains above Soria. In the Asturias, Escaidron, continually hanging upon the flanks and rear of Bonet, between St. Andero and Oviedo, acted in concert with Campillo on one side, and with Porlier on the other, and this last chief, sometimes throwing himself into the mountains on the borders of Gallicia, and sometimes sailing from Coruña, constantly troubled the Asturias by his enterprises. To curb these bands, the French fortified all their own posts of communication and correspondence, slew numbers of the Guerillas, and suppressed others. Many were robbers who, under pretence of acting against the enemy, merely harassed their own countrymen; and few were really formidable, though all were vexatious. Enough, however, has been said upon this point! But, while reduced to this irregular warfare, for preventing the entire submission of Old Spain, the Regency, with inconceivable folly and injustice, were alienating the affections of their colonies, and provoking civil war; as if the terrible struggle in the Peninsula were not sufficient for the ruin of their country. The independence of Spain was, with them, of subordinate interest to the continuance of oppression in South America. Money, arms, and troops, were withdrawn from the Peninsula, to subdue the so-called rebellious colonists; nor was any reflection made on the inconsistency, of expecting Napoleon’s innumerable hosts to be beaten close to their own doors, by Guerilla operations, and yet attempting, with a few divisions, to crush whole nations, acting in the same manner, at three thousand miles distance. Such being the state of French and Spanish affairs, it remains to examine the condition of England and Portugal, as affecting the war in the Peninsula. _England._--The contentions of party were vehement, and the ministers’ policy resolved itself into three principal points: 1º. The fostering the public inclination for the war; 2º. The furnishing money for the expenses; and, 3º. The recruiting of the armies. The last was provided for by an act passed in the early part of 1809, which offered eleven guineas bounty to men passing from the militia to the line, and ten guineas bounty to recruits for the militia; this was found to furnish about twenty-four thousand men in the year; but the other points were not so easily disposed of. The opposition, in parliament, was powerful, eloquent, and not very scrupulous. The desperate shifts which formed the system of the ministers, were, indeed, justly attacked, but when particulars, touching the contest in Portugal, were discussed, faction was apparent. The accuracy of Beresford’s report of the numbers and efficiency of the native forces, was most unjustly questioned, and the notion of successful resistance, assailed by arguments and by ridicule, until gloom and doubt were widely spread in England, and disaffection wonderfully encouraged in Portugal; nor was the mischief thus caused, one of the smallest difficulties encountered by the English general. On the other side, the ministers, trusting to their majorities in parliament, reasoned feebly and ignorantly, yet wilfully, and like men expecting that fortune would befriend them, they knew not why or wherefore, and they dealt also more largely than their adversaries in misrepresentations to mislead the public mind. Every treasury newspaper teemed with accounts of battles which were never fought, plans which were never arranged, places taken which were never attacked, and victories gained where no armies were. The plains of the Peninsula could scarcely contain the innumerable forces of the Spaniards and Portuguese; cowardice, weakness, treachery, and violence were the only attributes of the enemy; if a battle was expected, his numbers were contemptible; if a victory was gained, his host was countless. Members of parliament related stories of the enemy which had no foundation in truth, and nothing, that consummate art of intrigue could bring to aid party spirit, and to stifle reason, was neglected. [Sidenote: Paper against Gold.] But the great and permanent difficulty was to raise money. The country, inundated with bank-notes, was destitute of gold; Napoleon’s continental system burthened commerce, the exchanges were continually rising against England, and all the evils which sooner or later are the inevitable result of a fictitious currency, were too perceptible to be longer disregarded in parliament. A committee appointed to investigate the matter, made early in the following session, a report in which the evils of the existing system, and the causes of the depreciation were elaborately treated, and the necessity of returning to cash payments enforced: but the authors did not perceive, or at least did not touch upon the injustice, and the ruin, attending a full payment in coin of sterling value, of debts contracted in a depreciated paper currency. The celebrated writer, William Cobbett, did not fail, however, to point out this very clearly, and subsequent experience has confirmed his views. The government endeavoured to stave off the discussion of the bullion question, but lord King, by demanding gold from those of his tenants whose leases were drawn before the depreciation of bank-notes, proved the hollowness of the system, and drove the ministers to the alternative, of abandoning the prosecution of the war, or of denying the facts adduced in the bullion report. They adopted the latter; and at the instance of Vansittart, the chancellor of the exchequer, the house voted in substance, that a pound-note and a shilling, were equal in value to a golden guinea of full weight, at the moment when light guineas were openly selling at twenty-eight shillings. This vote, although well calculated to convince the minister’s opponents, that no proposition could be too base, or absurd, to meet with support in the existing parliament, did not, however, remove the difficulties of raising money, and no resource remained, but that of the desperate spendthrift, who never intending to pay, cares not on what terms he supplies his present necessities. The peculiar circumstances of the war, had, however, given England a monopoly of the world’s commerce by sea, and the ministers affirming, that, the country, was in a state of unexampled prosperity, began a career of expense, the like of which no age or nation had ever seen; yet without one sound or reasonable ground for expecting ultimate success, save the genius of their general, which they but half appreciated, and which the first bullet might have extinguished for ever. _State of Portugal._--In this country, three parties were apparent. That of the _people_ ready to peril body and goods for independence. That of the _fidalgos_, who thought to profit from the nation’s energy without any diminution of ancient abuses. That of the _disaffected_, who desired the success of the French; some as thinking that an ameliorated government must follow, some from mere baseness of nature. This party, looked to have Alorna, Pamplona, and Gomez Freire, as chiefs if the enemy triumphed; for those noblemen, in common with many others, had entered the French service in Junot’s time, under the authority of the prince regent’s edict to that effect. Freire more honourable than his companions, refused to bear arms against his country, but the two others had no scruples, and Pamplona even sketched a plan of invasion, which is at this day in the military archives at Paris. The great body of the people, despising both their civil governors and military chiefs, relied on the British general and army; but the fidalgos, or cast of nobles, working in unison with, and supported by the regency, were a powerful body, and their political proceedings after the departure of sir John Cradock, demand notice. The patriarch, formerly bishop of Oporto, the Monteiro Mor, and the marquess of Das Minas, composed the regency, and they and every other member of the government were jealous of each other, exceedingly afraid of their superiors in the Brazils, and, with the exception of the secretary, Miguel Forjas, unanimous in support of abuses; and as the military organization carried on by Beresford, was only a restoration of the ancient institutions of the country, it was necessarily hateful to the regency, and to the fidalgos, who profited by its degeneracy. This, together with the unavoidable difficulties in finance, and other matters, retarded the progress of the regular army towards efficiency during 1809, and rendered the efforts to organize the militia, and ordenança, nearly nugatory. Nevertheless, the energy of lord Wellington and of Beresford, and the comparatively zealous proceedings of Forjas, proved so disagreeable to Das Minas, who was in bad health, that he resigned, and immediately became a centre, round which all discontented persons, and they were neither few, nor inactive, gathered. The times, obliged the government, to permit an unusual freedom of discussion in Lisbon; it naturally followed that the opinions of designing persons were most obtruded, and those opinions being repeated in the British parliament, were printed in the English newspapers, and re-echoed in Lisbon. Thus a picture of affairs was painted in the most glaring colours of misrepresentation, at the moment when the safety of the country depended upon the devoted submission of the people. After Das Minas’ resignation, four new members were added to the regency, namely, Antonio, commonly called, Principal Souza, the Conde de Redondo, the marquis de Olhao, and doctor Noguiera. The two last were men of some discretion, but the first, daring, restless, irritable, indefatigable, and a consummate intriguer, created the utmost disorder, seeking constantly to thwart the proceedings of the British generals. He was strenuously assisted by the patriarch, whose violence and ambition were no way diminished, and whose influence amongst the people was still very considerable. An exceedingly powerful cabal, was thus formed, whose object was to obtain the supreme direction, not only of the civil, but military affairs, and to control both Wellington and Beresford. The Conde Linhares, head of the Souza family, was prime minister in the Brazils; the Principal was in the regency at Lisbon; the chevalier Souza was envoy at the British court, and a fourth of the family, don Pedro de Souza, was in a like situation near the Spanish regency; so that playing into each others hands, and guided by the subtle Principal, they were enabled to concoct very dangerous intrigues; and their proceedings, as might be expected, were at first supported with a high hand by the cabinet of Rio Janeiro. Lord Wellesley’s energetic interference reduced the latter, indeed, to a reasonable disposition, yet the cabal secretly continued their machinations, and what they durst not attempt by force, they sought to attain by artifice. In the latter end of the year 1809, Mr. Villiers was replaced as envoy, by Mr. Charles Stuart, and this gentleman, well experienced in the affairs of the Peninsula, and disdaining the petty jealousies which had hitherto marked the intercourse of the principal political agents with the generals, immediately applied his masculine understanding, and resolute temper, to forward the views of lord Wellington. It is undoubted, that the dangerous political crisis which followed his arrival, could not have been sustained, if a diplomatist less firm, less able, or less willing to support the plans of the commander had been employed. To resist the French was the desire of two of the three parties in Portugal, but with the fidalgos, it was a question of interest more than of patriotism. Yet less sagacious than the clergy, the great body of which perceiving at once that they must stand or fall with the English army heartily aided the cause, the fidalgos clung rather to the regency. Now the caballers in that body, who were the same people that had opposed sir Hew Dalrymple, hoped not only to beat the enemy, but to establish the supremacy of the northern provinces (of which they themselves were the lords) in the administration of the country, and would therefore consent to no operations militating against this design. Another spring of political action, was the hatred and jealousy of Spain common to the whole Portuguese nation. It created difficulties during the military operations, but it had a visibly advantageous effect upon the people, in their intercourse with the British. For when the Spaniards shewed a distrust of their allies, the Portuguese were more minded to rely implicitly on the latter, to prove that they had no feeling in common with their neighbours. Yet, notwithstanding this mutual dislike, the princess Carlotta, wife to the Prince Regent, and sister to Ferdinand, claimed, not only the succession to the throne of Spain in the event of her brother’s death or perpetual captivity, but the immediate government of the whole Peninsula as hereditary Regent; and to persuade the tribunals to acknowledge her claims, was the object of Pedro Souza’s mission to Cadiz. The council of Castile, always ready to overthrow the Spanish Regency, readily recognized Carlotta’s pretensions in virtue of the decision of the secret Cortes of 1789 which abolished the Salique law of Philip the Fifth: but the regents would pay no attention to them, yet Souza renewing his intrigues when the Cortes assembled, by corruption obtained an acknowledgement of the princess’s claim. His further progress was, however, promptly arrested by lord Wellington, who foresaw that his success would not only affect the military operations in Portugal, by placing them under the control of the Spanish government, but the policy of England afterwards, if power over the whole Peninsula was suffered thus to centre in one family. Moreover, he judged it a scheme, concocted at Rio Janeiro, to embarrass himself and Beresford; for it was at first kept secret from the British Cabinet, and it was proposed that the princess should reside at Madeira, where, surrounded by the contrivers of this plan, she could only have acted under their directions. Thus it is plain that arrogance, deceit, and personal intrigues, were common to the Portuguese and Spanish governments; and why they did not produce the same fatal effects in the one as in the other country, will be shewn in the succeeding chapters. CHAPTER III. [Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 9.] When lord Wellington required thirty thousand British troops to defend Portugal, he considered the number that could be fed, rather than what was necessary to fight the enemy; and hence it was, that he declared success would depend upon the exertions and devotion of the native forces. Yet knowing, from his experience in Spain, how passions, prejudices, and abuses would meet him at every turn, he would trust neither the simple enthusiasm of the people, nor the free promises of their governors, but insisted that his own authority as _marshal-general of Portugal_ should be independent of the local government, and absolute over all arrangements concerning the English and Portuguese forces, whether regulars, militia, or “ordenanças;” for his designs were vast, and such as could only be effected by extraordinary means. Armed with this power, and with the influence derived from the money supplied by England, he first called upon the Regency, to revive and enforce the ancient military laws of the realm, by which all men were to be enrolled, and bear arms. That effected, he demanded that the people should be warned and commanded to destroy their mills, to remove their boats, break down their bridges, lay waste their fields, abandon their dwellings, and carry off their property, on whatever line the invaders should penetrate: and that this might be deliberately and effectually performed, he designed at the head of all the allied regular forces, to front the enemy, in such sort, that, without bringing on a decisive battle, the latter should yet be obliged to keep constantly in a mass, while the whole population, converted into soldiers, and closing on the rear and flanks, should cut off all resources, save those carried in the midst of the troops. But it was evident, that if the French could find, or carry, supplies, sufficient to maintain themselves until the British commander, forced back upon the sea, should embark or giving battle be defeated, the whole of this system must necessarily fall to pieces, and the miserable ruined people submit without further struggle. To avoid such a calamitous termination, it was necessary to find a position, covering Lisbon, where the allied forces could neither be turned by the flanks, nor forced in front by numbers, nor reduced by famine, and from which a free communication could be kept up with the irregular troops closing round the enemy. The mountains filling the tongue of land upon which Lisbon is situated, furnished this key-stone to the arch of defence. Accurate plans of all the positions, had been made under the directions of sir Charles Stuart in 1799, and, together with the French colonel Vincent’s minutes, shewing how they covered Lisbon, were in lord Wellington’s possession; and from those documents the original notion of the celebrated lines of Torres Vedras are said to have been derived; but the above-named officers only contemplated such a defence as might be made by an army in movement, before an equal or a greater force. It was lord Wellington, who first conceived the design, of turning those vast mountains into one stupendous and impregnable citadel, wherein to deposit the independence of the whole Peninsula. Hereafter the lines shall be described more minutely; at present it must suffice to observe, that intrenchments, inundations, and redoubts secured more than five hundred square miles of mountainous country lying between the Tagus and the ocean. Nor was this the most gigantic part of the English general’s undertaking. He was a foreigner, ill supported by his own government, and holding power under that of Portugal by a precarious tenure; he was vehemently opposed by the local authorities, by the ministers, and by the nobility of that country; and yet, in this apparently weak position, he undertook at one and the same time, to overcome the abuses engendered by centuries of misgovernment, and to oblige a whole people, sunk in sloth, to arise in arms, to devastate their own lands, and to follow him to battle against the most formidable power of modern times. Notwithstanding the secret opposition of the Regency, and of the _fidalgos_, the ancient military laws were revived, and so effectually, that the returns for the month of May gave a gross number of more than four hundred and thirty thousand men in arms, of which about fifty thousand were regular troops, fifty-five thousand militia, and the remainder “ordenanças;” but this multitude was necessarily subject to many deductions. The “_capitans mor_,” or chiefs of districts, were at first exceedingly remiss in their duty, the total number of “ordenanças” really assembled, fell far short of the returns, and all were ill-armed. This also was the case with the militia, only thirty-two thousand of which had muskets and bayonets: and deserters were so numerous, and the native authorities connived at absence under false pretences, to such an extent, that scarcely twenty-six thousand men ever remained with their colours. Of the regular troops the whole were in good condition, and thirty thousand being in the pay of England, were completely equipped, clothed, disciplined, and for the most part commanded by British officers; but, deduction being made for sick men and recruits, the actual number under arms did not exceed twenty-four thousand infantry, three thousand five hundred cavalry, and three thousand artillery. Thus the disposable native force was about fifty-six thousand men, one-half of which were militia. At this period, the British troops employed in the Peninsula, exclusive of the garrison of Gibraltar, somewhat exceeded thirty-eight thousand men of all arms, but six thousand were in hospital or detached, and above seven thousand were in Cadiz. The latter city was protected by an allied force of nearly thirty thousand men, while the army, on whose exertions the fate of the Peninsula rested, was reduced to twenty-five thousand British; such was the policy of the English Cabinet; for this was the ministers’ and not the general’s arrangement. The ordenanças being set aside, the actual force at the disposition of lord Wellington, cannot be estimated higher than eighty thousand men, and the frontier to defend, reckoning from Braganza to Ayamonte, four hundred miles long. The great military features, and the arrangements made to take advantage of them in conformity with the general plan of defence, shall now be described. The Portuguese land frontier presents four great divisions open to invasion:-- 1º. The northern line of the Entre Minho and the Tras os Montes, extending from the mouth of the Minho, to Miranda on the Douro. 2º. The eastern line of the Tras os Montes following the course of the Douro from Miranda to Castel Rodrigo. 3º. The frontier of Beira from Castel Rodrigo to Rosaminhal on the Tagus. 4º. The Alemtejo and the Algarve frontiers, stretching, in one line from the Tagus to the mouth of the Guadiana. But these divisions may be simplified with respect to the military aspect of the country; for Lisbon taken as the centre, and the distance from thence to Oporto as the radius, a sweep of the compass to Rosaminhal will trace the frontier of Beira; and the space lying between this arc, the Tagus, and the sea-coast, furnished the main body of the defence. The southern and northern provinces being considered as the wings, were rendered subservient to the defence of the whole, but had each a separate system for itself, based on the one general principle, that the country should be wasted, and the best troops opposed to the enemy without risking a decisive action, while the irregular forces closed round the flanks and rear of the invaders. The northern and southern provinces have been already described, Beira remains to be noticed. Separated by the Douro from the Entre Minho and Tras os Montes, it cannot well be invaded on that line, except one or both of those provinces be first subdued; but from Castel Rodrigo to Rosaminhal, that is from the Douro to the Tagus, the frontier touches upon Spain, and perhaps the clearest method to describe the conformation of the country will be to enter the camp of the enemy. An invading army then, would assemble at Ciudad Rodrigo, or at Coria, or at both those places. In the latter case, the communications could be maintained, directly over the Gata mountains by the pass of Perales, or circuitously, by Placentia and the pass of Baños, and the distance being by Perales not more than two marches, the corps could either advance simultaneously, or unite and force their way at one point only. In this situation, the frontier of Beira between the Douro and the Tagus, would offer them an opening of ninety miles against which to operate. But in the centre, the Sierra de Estrella, lifting its snowy peaks to the clouds and stretching out its gigantic arms, would seem to grasp and claim the whole space; the summit is impassable, and streaming down on either hand, numerous rivers cleaving deeply, amidst ravines and bristled ridges, continually oppose the progress of an army. Nevertheless, the invaders could penetrate to the right and left of this mountain in the following directions:-- _From Ciudad Rodrigo._--1º. By the valley of the Douro.--2º. By the valley of the Mondego.--3º. By the valley of the Zezere. _From Coria._--1º. By Castello Branco and the valley of the Tagus; and, 2º. By the mountains of Sobreira Formosa. To advance by the valley of the Douro, would be a flank movement through an extremely difficult country, and would belong rather to an invasion of the northern provinces than of Beira, because a fresh base must be established at Lamego or Oporto, before the movement could be prosecuted against Lisbon. To gain the valley of the Mondego there are three routes. The first passing by Almeida and Celerico, the second by Trancoso and Viseu, the third by Alfayates and Guarda over the high ridges of the Estrella. To gain the valley of the Zezere, the march is by Alfayates, Sabugal, and Belmonte, and whether to the Zezere or the Mondego, these routes, although rugged, are practicable for artillery; but between Guarda and Belmonte some high table-land offers a position where an army could seal the passage on either side of the mountain, except by the Trancoso road. In fact, the position of Guarda may be called the breast-plate of the Estrella. On the side of Coria, an invading army must first force or turn the passages of the Elga and Ponçul rivers, to reach Castello Branco, and that done, proceed to Abrantes by the valley of the Tagus or over the savage mountain of Sobreira Formosa. But the latter is impracticable for heavy artillery, even in summer, the ways broken and tormented by the deep channels of the winter torrents, the country desert, and the positions if defended, nearly impregnable. Nor is the valley of the Tagus to be followed, save by light corps, for the villages are few, the ridges not less steep than those of Sobreira, and the road quite impracticable for artillery of any calibre. Such, and so difficult, being the lines of invasion through Beira, it would seem that a superior enemy might be met with advantage on the threshold of the kingdom; but it is not so. For, first, the defending army must occupy all the positions on this line of ninety miles, while the enemy, posted at Ciudad Rodrigo and Coria, could, in two marches, unite and attack on the centre, or at either extremity, with an overwhelming force. Secondly, the weakness of the Beira frontier consists in this, _the Tagus along its whole course is, from June to December, fordable as low down as Salvatierra, close under the lines_. A march through the Alemtejo and the passage of the river at any place below Abrantes would, therefore, render all the frontier positions useless; and although there were no enemy on the borders of the Alemtejo itself, the march from Ciudad Rodrigo by Perales, Coria, and Alcantara, and thence by the southern bank to the lowest ford in the river, would be little longer than the route by the valley of the Mondego or that of the Zezere. For these reasons _the frontier of Portugal must be always yielded to superior numbers_. Both the conformation of the country, and the actual situation of the French corps, led lord Wellington to expect, that the principal attacks would be by the north of Beira and by the Alemtejo, while an intermediate connecting corps would move by Castello Branco upon Abrantes, and, under this impression, he made the following dispositions. Elvas, Almeida, and Valença, in the first, and Peniché, Abrantes, and Setuval, in the second line of fortresses, were garrisoned with native troops, part regulars, part militia. General Baccellar, having Silveira and the British colonels, Trant, Miller, and J. Wilson, under his orders, occupied the provinces beyond the Douro, with twenty-one regiments of militia, including the garrison of Valença, on the Minho. The country between Penamacor and the Tagus, that is to say, the lines of the Elga and the Ponçul, was guarded by ten regiments of militia, a regiment of native cavalry, and the Lusitanian legion. In the Alemtejo, including the garrisons, four regiments of militia were stationed, and three regiments held the fortresses of the Algarves. There remained in reserve, twelve regiments of the fifty composing the whole militia force, and these were distributed in Estremadura on both sides of the Tagus, but principally about Setuval. The regular Portuguese troops, deducting those in garrison at Almeida Elvas and Cadiz, were at Thomar and Abrantes. But the British, organized in five divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, were distributed as follows:-- Men. 1st Division General Spencer, about 6000 Viseu. 2d Division, including } General Hill, ” 5000 Abrantes. the 13th Dragoons } 3d Division General Picton, ” 3000 Celerico. 4th Division General Cole, ” 4000 Guarda. Light Division Robert Crawfurd, ” 2400 Pinhel. The Cavalry General Cotton, ” 3000 { Valley of { Mondego. ------ Total 23,400 under arms. ------ Thus the wings of the defence were composed solely of militia and ordenança, and the whole of the regular force was in the centre. The Portuguese at Thomar, and the four British divisions of infantry posted at Viseu, Guarda, Pinhel, and Celerico, formed a body of thirty-eight thousand men, the greater part of which could, in two marches, be united either at Guarda or between that position and the Douro. On the other side Beresford and Hill could, in as short a period, unite by the boat-bridge of Abrantes, and thus thirty-two thousand men would be concentrated on that line. If the enemy should attempt the passage of the Elga either direct from Coria, or by a flank movement of the second corps from Estremadura, across the Tagus, Beresford could succour the militia by moving over the Sobreira Formosa to Castello Branco, while Hill could reach that place much quicker than general Reynier, in consequence of an arrangement which merits particular attention. It has been already said that the march from Abrantes to Castello Branco is over difficult mountains; to have repaired the roads between these places would have been more useful to the enemy than to the allies, as facilitating a passage for superior numbers to penetrate by the shortest line to Lisbon. But lord Wellington, after throwing boat-bridges over the Tagus and the Zezere, and fortifying Abrantes, established between the latter and Castello Branco a line of communication by the left bank of the Tagus, through Niza, to the pass of Vilha Velha, where, by a flying bridge, the river was recrossed, and from thence a good road led to Castello Branco. Now the pass of Vilha Velha is prodigiously strong for defence, and the distance from Abrantes to Castello Branco being nearly the same by Niza as by the other bank of the river, the march of troops was yet much accelerated, for the road near Vilha Velha being reconstructed by the engineers, was excellent. Thus all the obstacles to an enemy’s march by the north bank were preserved, and the line by Vilha Velha, enabled not only Hill to pass from Portalegre, or Abrantes, to Castello Branco by a flank movement in less time than Reynier, but it also provided a lateral communication for the whole army, which we shall hereafter find of vital importance in the combinations of the English general, supplying the loss of the road by Alcantara and the pass of Perales, which otherwise would have been adopted. The French, also, in default of a direct line of communication between Estremadura and the Ciudad Rodrigo country, were finally forced to adopt the circuitous road of Almaraz and the pass of Baños, and it was in allusion to this inconvenience that I said both parties sighed over the ruins of Alcantara. But, notwithstanding this facility of movement and of concentration, the allies could not deliver a decisive battle near the frontier, because the enemy could unite an overwhelming force in the Alemtejo, before the troops from the north could reach that province, and a battle lost there, would, in the dry season, decide the fate of Lisbon. To have concentrated the whole army in the south, would have been to resign half the kingdom and all its resources to the enemy; but to save those resources for himself, or to destroy them, was the very basis of lord Wellington’s defence, and all his dispositions were made to oblige _the French to move in masses_, and to _gain time himself_, time to secure the harvests, time to complete his lines, time to perfect the discipline of the native troops, and to give full effect to the arming and organization of the ordenança, and, above all things, time to consolidate that moral ascendancy over the public mind which he was daily acquiring. A closer examination of his combinations will shew, that they were well adapted to effect these objects. 1º. The enemy durst not advance, except with _concentrated masses_, because, on the weakest line of resistance, he was sure to encounter above twenty thousand men. 2º. If, choosing the Alemtejo, he suddenly dispersed Romana’s troops and even forced back Hill’s, the latter passing the Tagus at Abrantes, and uniting with Beresford, could dispute the passage of the Tagus until the arrival of the army from the north; and no regular and sustained attempt could be made on that side without first besieging Badajos or Elvas to form a place of arms. 3º. A principal attack on the central line could not be made without sufficient notice being given by the collection of magazines at Coria, and by the passage of the Elga and Ponçul, Beresford and Hill could then occupy the Sobreira Formosa. But an invasion on this line, save by a light corps in connexion with other attacks, was not to be expected; for, although the enemy should force the Sobreira and reach Abrantes, he could not besiege the latter, in default of heavy artillery. The Zezere, a large and exceedingly rapid river, with rugged banks, would be in his front, the Tagus on his left, the mountains of Sobreira in his rear, and the troops from Guarda and the valley of the Mondego would have time to fall back. 4º. An attack on Guarda could always be resisted long enough to gain time for the orderly retreat of the troops near Almeida, to the valley of the Mondego, and moreover the road from Belmonte towards Thomar by the valley of the Zezere was purposely broken and obstructed. [Illustration: _Vol. 3, Plate 5._ Defence of _Portugal_ 1810. _Published by T. & W. Boone 1830._] The space between Guarda and the Douro, an opening of about thirty miles leading into the valley of the Mondego, remains to be examined. Across this line of invasion, the Agueda, the Coa, and the Pinel, run, in almost parallel directions from the Sierra de Francia and Sierra de Estrella, into the Douro, all having this peculiarity, that as they approach the Douro their channels invariably deepen into profound and gloomy chasms, and there are few bridges. But the principal obstacles were the fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, both of which it was necessary to take before an invading army could establish a solid base of invasion. After this the lines of the Douro and of the Mondego would be open; if the French adopted the second, they could reach it by Guarda, by Alverca, and by Trancoso, concentrating at Celerico, when they would have to choose between the right and the left bank. If the latter, they must march between the Mondego and the Estrella mountains, until they reached the Alva, a river falling at right angles into the Mondego, and behind which they would find the allied army in a position of surprising strength. If, to avoid that, they marched by the right of the Mondego upon Coimbra, there were other obstacles to be hereafter noticed; but, in either case, the allied forces, having _interior lines of communication_, could, as long as the Belmonte road was sealed, concentrate in time behind the Alva, or in front of Coimbra. Hence it was on the side of the Alemtejo that danger was most to be apprehended; and it behoved general Hill to watch vigilantly and act decisively in opposition to general Reynier; for the latter having necessarily the lead in the movements, might, by skilful evolutions and rapid marches, either join the sixth and eighth corps before Hill was aware of his design, and thus overwhelm the allied divisions on the Mondego, or drawing Hill across the Tagus, furnish an opportunity for a corps from Andalusia to penetrate by the southern bank of that river. In these dispositions the English general had regard only to the enemy’s actual situation, and expecting the invasion in summer; but in the winter season the rivers and torrents being full, and the roads deteriorated, the defence would be different; fewer troops would then suffice to guard the Tagus, and the Zezere, the Sobreira Formosa would be nearly impassable, a greater number of the allied troops, could be collected about Guarda, and a more stubborn resistance made on the northern line. [Sidenote: Lord Wellington’s Correspondence. MSS.] Every probable movement being thus previously well considered, lord Wellington trusted that his own military quickness, and the valour of the British soldiers, could baffle any unforeseen strokes during the retreat, and once within the Lines, (the Portuguese people and the government doing their part) he looked confidently to the final result. He judged that, in a wasted country, and with thirty regiments of militia, in the mountains on the flank and rear of the enemy, the latter could not long remain before the Lines, and his retreat would be equivalent to a victory for the allies. There were however many hazards. The English commander, sanguine and confident as he was, knew well how many counter-combinations were to be expected; in fine, how much fortune was to be dreaded in a contest with eighty thousand French veterans having a competent general at their head. Hence, to secure embarkation in the event of disaster, a third line of entrenchments was prepared, and twenty-four thousand tons of shipping were constantly kept in the river to receive the British forces; measures were also taken to procure a like quantity for the reception of the Portuguese troops, and such of the citizens as might wish to emigrate. It only remained to feed the army. In the Peninsula generally, the supplies were at all times a source of infinite trouble on both sides, and this, not as some have supposed, because Spain is incapable of supplying large armies; there was throughout the war an abundance of food in that country but it was unevenly distributed; some places were exhausted, others overflowing, the difficulty was to transport provisions, and in this the allies enjoyed a great advantage; their convoys could pass unmolested, whereas the French always required strong guards first to collect food and then to bring it up to their armies. In Portugal there was however a real deficiency, even for the consumption of the people, and after a time scarcely any food for man or beast, (some cattle and straw from the northern provinces excepted,) was to be obtained in that country: nay, the whole nation was at last in a manner fed by England. Every part of the world accessible to ships and money was rendered subservient to the cravings of this insatiable war, and even thus, it was often a doubtful and a painful struggle against famine, while near the sea, but at a distance from that nurse of British armies, the means of transport necessarily regulated the extent of the supply. Now wheel-carriage was scarce and bad in Portugal, and for the most part the roads forbade its use; hence the only resource, for the conveyance of stores, was water-carriage, to a certain distance, and afterwards beasts of burthen. Lisbon, Abrantes, and Belem Castle, on the Tagus; Figueras and Raiva de Pena Cova, on the Mondego; and, finally, Oporto and Lamego, on the Douro, were the principal depôts formed by lord Wellington, and his magazines of consumption were established at Viseu, Celerico, Condeixa, Leiria, Thomar, and Almeida. From those points four hundred miserable bullock-cars and about twelve thousand hired mules, organized in brigades of sixty each, conveyed the necessary warlike stores and provisions to the armies; when additional succours could be obtained, it was eagerly seized, but this was the ordinary amount of transport. With such means and with such preparations was the defence of Portugal undertaken, and it must be evident to the most superficial observer, that, amidst so many difficulties, and with such a number of intricate combinations, lord Wellington’s situation was not one in which a general could sleep, and that, due allowance being made for fortune, it is puerile to attribute the success to aught but his talents and steel-hardened resolution. In the foregoing exposition of the political and military force of the powers brought into hostile contact, I have only touched, and lightly, upon the points of most importance, designing no more than to indicate the sound and the diseased parts of each. The unfavourable circumstances for France would appear to be the absence of the emperor,--the erroneous views of the king,--the rivalry of the marshals,--the impediments to correspondence,--the necessity of frequently dispersing from the want of magazines,--the iniquity of the cause, and the disgust of the French officers, who, for the most part, spoiled by a rapid course of victories on the continent, could not patiently endure a service replete with personal dangers, over and above the ordinary mishaps of war, yet promising little ultimate reward. For the English, the quicksands were--the memory of former failures on the continent,--the financial drain,--a powerful and eloquent opposition pressing a cabinet so timid and selfish that the general dared not risk a single brigade, lest an accident should lead to a panic amongst the ministers which all lord Wellesley’s vigour would be unable to stem,--the intrigues of the Souza party,--and the necessity of persuading the Portuguese to devastate their country for the sake of defending a _European cause_. Finally, the babbling of the English newspapers, from whose columns the enemy constantly drew the most certain information of the strength and situation of the army. On the other side, France had possession of nearly all the fortified towns of the Peninsula, and, while her enormous army threatened to crush every opponent, she offered a constitution, and recalled to the recollection of the people that it was but a change of one French dynasty for another. The church started from her touch, but the educated classes did not shrink less from the British government’s known hostility to all free institutions. What, then, remained for England to calculate upon? The extreme hatred of the people to the invaders, arising from the excesses and oppressions of the armies,--the chances of another continental war,--the complete dominion of the ocean with all its attendant advantages,--the recruiting through the militia, which was, in fact, a conscription with two links in the chain instead of one; and, not least, the ardour of the troops to measure themselves with the conquerors of Europe, and to raise a rival to the French emperor. And here, as general Foy has been at some pains to misrepresent the character of the British soldiers, I will set down what many years’ experience gives me the right to say is nearer the truth than his dreams. That the British infantry soldier is more robust than the soldier of any other nation, can scarcely be doubted by those who, in 1815, observed his powerful frame, distinguished amidst the united armies of Europe, and, notwithstanding his habitual excess in drinking, he sustains fatigue, and wet, and the extremes of cold and heat with incredible vigour. When completely disciplined, and three years are required to accomplish this, his port is lofty, and his movements free; the whole world cannot produce a nobler specimen of military bearing, nor is the mind unworthy of the outward man. He does not, indeed, possess that presumptuous vivacity which would lead him to dictate to his commanders, or even to censure real errors, although he may perceive them; but he is observant, and quick to comprehend his orders, full of resources under difficulties, calm and resolute in danger, and more than usually obedient and careful of his officers in moments of imminent peril. It has been asserted that his undeniable firmness in battle, is the result of a phlegmatic constitution uninspired by moral feeling. Never was a more stupid calumny uttered! Napoleon’s troops fought in bright fields, where every helmet caught some beams of glory, but the British soldier conquered under the cold shade of aristocracy; no honours awaited his daring, no despatch gave his name to the applauses of his countrymen, his life of danger and hardship was uncheered by hope, his death unnoticed. Did his heart sink therefore! Did he not endure with surpassing fortitude the sorest of ills, sustain the most terrible assaults in battle unmoved, and, with incredible energy overthrow every opponent, at all times proving that, while no physical military qualification was wanting, the fount of honour was also full and fresh within him! The result of a hundred battles and the united testimony of impartial writers of different nations have given the first place, amongst the European infantry, to the British; but, in a comparison between the troops of France and England, it would be unjust not to admit that the cavalry of the former stands higher in the estimation of the world. CHAPTER IV. In resuming the thread of military events, it is necessary to refer back to the commencement of the year, because the British operations on the frontier of Beira were connected, although not conducted, in actual concert with those of the Spaniards; and here I deem it right to notice the conduct of Miguel Alava, that brave, generous, and disinterested Spaniard, through whom this connexion was kept up. Attached to the British head-quarters, as the military correspondent of the Junta, he was too sagacious not to perceive the necessity of zealously seconding the English general; yet, in the manner of doing it, he never forgot the dignity of his own country, and, as he was too frank and honest for intrigues, his intercourse was always honourable to himself and advantageous to both nations. [Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 1.] It will be remembered that, in February, Ney threatened Ciudad Rodrigo at the same time that Mortier menaced Badajos and that Hill advanced from Abrantes to Portalegre; lord Wellington immediately reinforced the line between Pinhel and Guarda, and sent the light division across the Coa, to observe the enemy’s proceedings. The Portuguese Regency were alarmed, and demanded more British troops; but lord Wellington replying that the numbers already fixed would be as great as he could feed, took occasion to point out, that the measures agreed upon, with respect to the native forces, were neither executed with vigour nor impartiality, and that the carriages and other assistance, required for the support of the British soldiers then in the country were not supplied. These matters he urgently advised them to amend before they asked for more troops; and, at the same time, as the Regency in the hope of rendering him unpopular with the natives, intimated a wish that he should take the punishment of offenders into his own hands; he informed them that, although he advised the adoption of severe measures, he would not be made the despotic punisher of the people, while the actual laws were sufficient for the purpose. When the siege of Astorga was commenced by the French, the Portuguese army was brought up to Cea and Viseu, and the militia in the northern provinces, were ordered to concentrate at Braganza to guard the Tras os Montes. Ciudad Rodrigo, being soon afterwards seriously menaced, lord Wellington sent a brigade of heavy cavalry to Belmonte, and transferred his own quarters to Celerico, intending to succour Ciudad if occasion offered; but the conduct of the Portuguese Regency cramped his operations. The resources of the country were not brought forward, and the English general could scarcely maintain his actual position, much less advance; yet the Regency treated his remonstrances lightly, exactly following the system of the Spanish Central Junta during the campaign of Talavera: lord Wellington was, however, in a different situation. [Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 1.] Writing sharply, he told them that “their conduct was evasive and frivolous; that the army could neither move forward nor remain without food; that the time was one which would not admit of idle or hollow proceedings, or partiality, or neglect of public for private interests; that the resources were in the country, could be drawn forth, and must be so if the assistance of England was desired; finally, that punishment should follow disobedience, and, to be effectual, must begin with the higher classes.” Then, issuing a proclamation, he pointed out the duties and the omission of both magistrates and people, and by this vigourous conduct procured some immediate relief for his troops. Meanwhile, Crawfurd commenced a series of remarkable operations. His three regiments of infantry were singularly fitted for any difficult service; they had been for several years under sir John Moore, and, being carefully disciplined in the peculiar school of that great man, came to the field with such a knowledge of arms that, in six years of real warfare, no weakness could be detected in their system. But the enemy’s posts on the Agueda rendered it impossible for the light division to remain, without cavalry, beyond the Coa, unless some support was at hand nearer than Guarda or Celerico. Crawfurd proposed that, while he advanced to the Agueda, Cole, with the fourth division, should take up the line of the Coa. But that general would not quit his own position at Guarda; and lord Wellington approving, and yet desirous to secure the line of the Coa with a view to succour Ciudad Rodrigo, brought up the third division to Pinhel, and reinforcing Crawfurd with the first German hussars, (consisting of four hundred excellent and experienced soldiers,) and with a superb troop of horse-artillery, commanded by captain Ross, gave him the command of all the outposts, ordering Picton and Cole to support him, if called upon. In the middle of March, Crawfurd lined the bank of the Agueda with his hussars, from Escalhon on the left, to Navas Frias on the right, a distance of twenty-five miles, following the course of the river. The infantry were disposed in small parties in the villages between Almeida and the Lower Agueda; the artillery was at Fort Conception, and two battalions of Portuguese caçadores soon afterwards arrived, making a total of four thousand men, and six guns. The French at this period were extended in divisions from San Felices to Ledesma and Salamanca, but they did not occupy the pass of Perales; and Carrera’s Spanish division being at Coria, was in communication with Crawfurd, whose line, although extended, was very advantageous. From Navas Frias to the Douro, the Agueda was rendered unfordable by heavy rain, and only four bridges crossed it on that whole extent, namely, one at Navas Frias; one at Villar, about a league below the first; one at Ciudad Rodrigo; and one at San Felices, called the bridge of Barba del Puerco. While therefore, the hussars kept a good watch at the two first bridges which were distant, the troops could always concentrate under Almeida before the enemy could reach them from that side; and on the side of Barba del Puerco, the ravine was so profound that a few companies of the ninety-fifth were considered capable of opposing any numbers. This arrangement sufficed while the Agueda was swollen; but that river was capricious, often falling many feet in a night without apparent reason: when it was fordable, Crawfurd always withdrew his outposts, and concentrated his division; and his situation demanded a quickness and intelligence in the troops, the like of which has never been surpassed. Seven minutes sufficed for the division to get under arms in the middle of the night; and a quarter of an hour, night or day, to bring it in order of battle to the alarm-posts, with the baggage loaded and assembled at a convenient distance in the rear. And this not upon a concerted signal, or as a trial, but at all times and certain. The 19th of March, general Ferey, a bold officer, either to create a fear of French enterprise at the commencement of the campaign, or to surprise the division, collected six hundred grenadiers close to the bridge of San Felices, and, just as the moon, rising behind him, cast long shadows from the rocks, and rendered the bottom of the chasm dark, he silently passed the bridge, and, with incredible speed, ascending the opposite side, bayonetted the sentries, and fell upon the piquet so fiercely that friends and enemies went fighting into the village of Barba del Puerco while the first shout was still echoing in the gulf below. So sudden was the attack, and so great the confusion, that the British companies could not form, but each soldier encountering the nearest enemy, fought hand to hand; and their colonel, Sydney Beckwith, conspicuous by his lofty stature and daring actions, a man capable of rallying a whole army in flight, urged the contest with such vigour that, in a quarter of an hour, the French column was borne back, and pushed over the edge of the descent. This skirmish proved that, while the Agueda was swollen, the enemy could gain nothing by slight operations; but it was difficult to keep in advance of the Coa: the want of money had reduced the whole army to straits, and Crawfurd, notwithstanding his prodigious activity, being unable to feed his division, gave the reins to his fiery temper, and seized some church-plate, with a view to the purchasing of corn. For this impolitic act he was immediately rebuked, and such redress granted that no mischief followed; and the proceeding itself had some effect in procuring supplies, as it convinced the priests that the distress was not feigned. When the sixth corps again approached Ciudad Rodrigo in the latter end of April, lord Wellington, as I have before said, moved his head-quarters to Celerico, and Carrera took post at St. Martin Trebeja, occupying the pass of Perales; being, however, menaced there by Kellerman’s troops, he came down, in May, from the hills to Ituero on the Azava river, and connected his left with the light division, which was then posted at Gallegos Espeja and Barba del Puerco. Crawfurd and he then agreed that, if attacked, the British should concentrate in the wood behind Espeja, and, if unable to maintain themselves there, unite with the Spaniards at Nava d’Aver, and finally retire to Villa Mayor, a village covering the passage of the Coa by the bridge of Seceira, from whence there was a sure retreat to Guarda. It was at this period that Massena’s arrival in Spain became known to the allies; the deserters, for the first time, ceased to speak of the emperor’s commanding in person; yet all agreed that serious operations would soon commence. Howbeit, as the river continued unfordable, Crawfurd maintained his position; but, towards the end of May, certain advice of the march of the French battering-train was received through Andreas Herrasti: and, the 1st of June, Ney, descending upon Ciudad Rodrigo, threw a bridge, on trestles, over the Agueda at the convent of Caridad, two miles above; and, a few days afterwards, a second at Carboneras, four miles below the fortress. As this concentration of the French relieved the northern provinces of Portugal from danger, sixteen regiments of militia were brought down from Braganza to the Lower Douro; provisions came by water to Lamego, and the army was enabled to subsist. The 8th of June four thousand French cavalry crossed the Agueda, Crawfurd concentrated his forces at Gallegos and Espeja, and the Spaniards occupied the wood behind the last-named village. It was at this moment, when Spain was overwhelmed, and when the eye could scarcely command the interminable lines of French in his immediate front, that Martin Carrera thought fit to invite marshal Ney to desert! Nothing could be more critical than Crawfurd’s position. From the Agueda to the Coa the whole country, although studded with woods and scooped into hollows, was free for cavalry and artillery, and there were at least six thousand horsemen and fifty guns within an hour’s march of his position. His right was at Espeja, where thick woods in front rendered it impossible to discover an enemy until close upon the village; while wide plains behind, almost precluded hope, in a retreat before the multitude of French cavalry and artillery. The confluence of the Azava with the Agueda offered more security on his left, because the channel of the former river there became a chasm, and the ground rose high and rugged at each side of the bridge of Marialva, two miles in front of Gallegos. Nevertheless, the bank on the enemy’s side was highest, and, to obtain a good prospect, it was necessary to keep posts beyond the Azava; moreover the bridge of Marialva could be turned by a ford, below the confluence of the streams. The 10th, the Agueda became fordable in all parts, but, as the enemy occupied himself raising redoubts, to secure his bridge at Carboneras, and making preparations for the siege of Rodrigo, Crawfurd, trusting to his own admirable arrangements, and to the surprising discipline of his troops, still maintained his dangerous position: thus encouraging the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, and protecting the villages in the plain between the Azava and the Coa from the enemy’s foraging parties. On the 18th, the eighth corps was seen to take post at San Felices, and other points; and all the villages, from the Sierra de Francia to the Douro, were occupied by the French army. The 23d, Julian Sanchez, breaking out of Ciudad, came into Gallegos. On the 25th, the French batteries opened against the fortress, their cavalry closed upon the Azava, and Crawfurd withdrew his outposts to the left bank. The 26th, it was known that Herrasti had lost one hundred and fifty killed, and five hundred wounded; and, the 29th, a Spaniard, passing the French posts, brought Carrera a note, containing these words: “_O venir luego! luego! luego! a socorrer esta plaza_.” (“Oh! come, now! now! now! to the succour of this place.”) And, on the 1st of July, the gallant old man repeated his _“Luego, luego, luego, por ultimo vez_.” Meanwhile, lord Wellington (hoping that the enemy, by detaching troops, would furnish an opportunity of relieving Ciudad Rodrigo) transferred his quarters to Alverca, a village half-way between Almeida and Celerico. The Spaniards supposed he would attack; and Romana, quitting Badajos, came to propose a combined movement for carrying off the garrison. This was a trying moment! The English general had come from the Guadiana with the avowed purpose of securing Rodrigo; he had, in a manner, pledged himself to make it a point in his operations; his army was close at hand; the garrison brave and distressed; the governor honourably fulfilling his part. To permit such a place to fall without a stroke struck, would be a grievous disaster, and a more grievous dishonour to the British arms; the troops desired the enterprise; the Spaniards demanded it, as a proof of good faith; the Portuguese to keep the war away from their own country: finally, policy seemed to call for an effort, lest the world might deem the promised defence of Portugal a heartless and a hollow boast. Nevertheless, Romana returned without his object. Lord Wellington absolutely refused to venture even a brigade; and thus proved himself a truly great commander, and of a steadfast mind. It was not a single campaign but a terrible war that he had undertaken. If he lost but five thousand men, his own government would abandon the contest; if he lost fifteen, he must abandon it himself. His whole disposable force did not exceed fifty-six thousand men: of these, twelve thousand were with Hill, and one-half of the remainder were untried and raw. But this included all, even to the Portuguese cavalry and garrisons. All could not, however, be brought into line, because Reynier, acting in concert with Massena, had, at this period, collected boats, and made demonstrations to pass the Tagus and move upon Coria; French troops were also crossing the Morena, in march towards Estremadura, which obliged lord Wellington to detach eight thousand Portuguese to Thomar, as a reserve, and these and Hill’s corps being deducted, not quite twenty-five thousand men were available to carry off the garrison in the face of sixty thousand French veterans. This enterprise would also take the army two marches from Guarda, and Coria was scarcely more distant from that place, hence, a division must have been left at Guarda, lest Reynier, deceiving Hill, should reach it first. [Sidenote: Appendix, No. VII. Section I.] Twenty thousand men of all arms remained, and there were two modes of using them. 1º. In an open advance and battle. 2º. In a secret movement and surprise. To effect the last, the army might have assembled in the night upon the Azava, and filed over the single bridge of Ciudad Rodrigo, with a view of capturing the battering train, by a sally, or of bringing off the garrison. But, without dwelling on the fact that Massena’s information was so good that he knew, in two days after it occurred, the object of Romana’s visit, such a movement could scarcely have been made unobserved, even in the early part of the siege, and, certainly, not towards the end, when the enemy were on the Azava. An open battle a madman only would have ventured. The army, passing over a plain, in the face of nearly three times its own numbers, must have exposed its flanks to the enemy’s bridges on the Agueda, because the fortress was situated in the bottom of a deep bend of the river, and the French were on the convex side. What hope then for twenty thousand mixed soldiers cooped up between two rivers, when eight thousand cavalry and eighty guns should come pouring over the bridges on their flanks, and fifty thousand infantry followed to the attack? What would even a momentary success avail? Five thousand undisciplined men brought off from Ciudad Rodrigo, would have ill supplied the ten or twelve thousand good troops lost in the battle, and the temporary relief of the fortress would have been a poor compensation for the loss of Portugal. For what was the actual state of affairs in that country?--The militia deserting in crowds to the harvest, the Regency in full opposition to the general, the measures for laying waste the country not perfected, and the public mind desponding! The enemy would soon have united his whole force and advanced to retrieve his honour, and who was to have withstood him? Massena, sagacious and well understanding his business, only desired that the attempt should be made. He held back his troops, appeared careless, and in his proclamations taunted the English general, that he was afraid!--that the sails were flapping on the ships prepared to carry him away--that he was a man, who, insensible to military honour, permitted his ally’s towns to fall without risking a shot to save them, or to redeem his plighted word! But all this subtlety failed; lord Wellington was unmoved, and abided his own time. “If thou art a great general, Marius, come down and fight! If thou art a great general, Silo, make me come down and fight!” Ciudad Rodrigo left to its fate, held out yet a little longer, and meanwhile the enemy pushing infantry on to the Azava; Carrera retired to the Dos Casas river, and Crawfurd, reinforced with the sixteenth and fourteenth light dragoons, placed his cavalry at Gallegos, and concentrated his infantry in the wood of Alameda, two miles in rear. From thence he could fall back, either to the bridge of Almeida by San Pedro or to the bridge of Castello Bom by Villa Formosa. Obstinate however not to relinquish a foot of ground that he could keep either by art or force, he disposed his troops in single ranks on the rising grounds, in the evening of the 2d of July, and then sending some horsemen to the rear to raise the dust, marched the ranks of infantry in succession, and slowly, within sight of the enemy, hoping that the latter would imagine the whole army was come up to succour Ciudad Rodrigo. He thus gained two days; but, on the 4th of July, a strong body of the enemy assembled at Marialva, and a squadron of horse, crossing the ford below that bridge, pushed at full speed towards Gallegos driving back the picquets. The enemy then passed the river, and the British retired skirmishing upon Alameda, leaving two guns, a troop of British and a troop of German hussars to cover the movement. This rear-guard drew up on a hill half-cannon shot from a streamlet with marshy banks, which crossed the road to Alameda; in a few moments a column of French horsemen was observed coming on at a charging pace, diminishing its front as it approached the bridge, but resolute to pass, and preserving the most perfect order, notwithstanding some well-directed shots from the guns. Captain Kraüchenberg, of the hussars, proposed to charge. The English officer did not conceive his orders warranted it; and the gallant German rode full speed against the head of the advancing columns with his single troop, and with such a shock, that he killed the leading officers, overthrew the front ranks, and drove the whole back. Meanwhile the enemy crossed the stream at other points, and a squadron coming close up to Alameda was driven off by a volley from the third caçadores. This skirmish not being followed up by the enemy, Crawfurd took a fresh post with his infantry and guns in a wood near Fort Conception. His cavalry, reinforced by Julian Sanchez and Carrera’s divisions, were disposed higher up on the Duas Casas, and the French withdrew behind the Azava, leaving only a piquet at Gallegos. Their marauding parties however entered the villages of Barquillo and Villa de Puerco for three nights successively; and Crawfurd, thinking to cut them off, formed an ambuscade in a wood near Villa de Puerco with six squadrons, another of three squadrons near Barquillo, and disposed his artillery, five companies of the ninety-fifth and the third caçadores in reserve, for the enemy were again in force at Gallegos and even in advance of it. A little after day-break, on the 11th, two French parties were observed, the one of infantry near Villa de Puerco, the other of cavalry at Barquillo. An open country on the right would have enabled the six squadrons to get between the infantry in Villa de Puerco and their point of retreat. This was circuitous, and Crawfurd preferred pushing straight through a stone enclosure as the shortest road: the enclosure proved difficult, the squadrons were separated, and the French, two hundred strong, had time to draw up in square on a rather steep rise of land; yet so far from the edge, as not to be seen until the ascent was gained. The two squadrons which first arrived, galloped in upon them, and the charge was rough and pushed home, but failed. The troopers received the fire of the square in front and on both sides, and in passing saw and heard the French captain Guache and his serjeant-major exhorting the men to shoot carefully. Scarcely was this charge over when the enemy’s cavalry came out of Barquillos, and the two squadrons riding against it, made twenty-nine men and two officers prisoners, a few being also wounded. Meanwhile colonel Talbot mounting the hill with four squadrons of the fourteenth dragoons, bore gallantly in upon captain Guache; but the latter again opened such a fire, that Talbot himself and fourteen men went down close to the bayonets, and the stout Frenchman made good his retreat; after which Crawfurd returned to the camp, having had thirty-two troopers, besides the colonel, killed or wounded in this unfortunate affair. That day Ciudad Rodrigo surrendered, and the Spanish troops, grieved and irritated, separated from the light division, and marching by the pass of Perales, rejoined Romana; but Crawfurd assumed a fresh position, a mile and a half from Almeida, and demanded a reinforcement of two battalions. Lord Wellington replied that he would give him two divisions, if he could hold his ground; but that he could not do so; yet, knowing the temper of the man, he repeated his former orders _not to fight beyond the Coa_. On the 21st, the enemy’s cavalry again advanced, Fort Conception was blown up, and Crawfurd fell back to Almeida, apparently disposed to cross the Coa. Yet nothing was further from his thoughts. Braving the whole French army, he had kept with a weak division, for three months, within two hours march, of sixty thousand men, appropriating the resources of the plains entirely to himself; but this exploit, only to be appreciated by military men, did not satisfy his feverish thirst of distinction. Hitherto he had safely affronted a superior power, and forgetting that his stay beyond the Coa was a matter of sufferance, not real strength, with headstrong ambition, he resolved, in defiance of reason and of the reiterated orders of his general, to fight on the right bank. COMBAT OF THE COA. Crawfurd’s whole force under arms consisted of four thousand infantry, eleven hundred cavalry, and six guns, and his position, one mile and a half in length, extended in an oblique line towards the Coa. The cavalry piquets were upon the plain in his front, his right on some broken ground, and his left resting on an unfinished tower, eight hundred yards from Almeida, was defended by the guns of that fortress; but his back was on the edge of the ravine forming the channel of the Coa, and the bridge was more than a mile distant, in the bottom of the chasm. A stormy night ushered in the 24th of July. The troops, drenched with rain, were under arms before day-light, expecting to retire, when a few pistol shots in front, followed by an order for the cavalry reserves and the guns to advance, gave notice of the enemy’s approach; and as the morning cleared, twenty-four thousand French infantry, five thousand cavalry, and thirty pieces of artillery were observed marching beyond the Turones. The British line was immediately contracted and brought under the edge of the ravine; but meanwhile Ney, who had observed Crawfurd’s false disposition, came down with the stoop of an eagle. Four thousand horsemen and a powerful artillery swept the plain. The allied cavalry gave back, and Loison’s division coming up at a charging pace, made towards the centre and left of the position. While the French were thus pouring onward, several ill-judged changes were made on the English side, part of the troops were advanced, others drawn back, and the forty-third most unaccountably placed within an enclosure of solid masonry, at least ten feet high, situated on the left of the road with but one narrow outlet about half-musket shot down the ravine. While thus imprisoned, the firing in front redoubled, the cavalry, the artillery, and the caçadores successively passed by in retreat, and the sharp clang of the ninety-fifth rifle was heard along the edge of the plain above. A few moments later, and the forty-third would have been surrounded; but that here, as in every other part of this field, the quickness and knowledge of the battalion officers remedied the faults of the general. One minute sufficed to loosen some large stones, a powerful effort burst the enclosure, and the regiment, re-formed in column of companies, was the next instant up with the riflemen; there was no room to array the line, no time for any thing but battle, every captain carried off his company as an independent body, and joining as he could with the ninety-fifth or fifty-second, the whole presented a mass of skirmishers, acting in small parties and under no regular command; yet each confident in the courage and discipline of those on his right and left, and all regulating their movements by a common discretion and keeping together with surprising vigour. It is unnecessary to describe the first burst of French soldiers. It is well known with what gallantry the officers lead, with what vehemence the troops follow, and with what a storm of fire they waste a field of battle. At this moment, with the advantage of ground and numbers, they were breaking over the edge of the ravine, their guns ranged along the summit, played hotly with grape, and their hussars, galloping over the glacis of Almeida, poured down the road, sabring every thing in their way. Ney, desirous that Montbrun should follow this movement with the whole of the French cavalry, and so cut off the troops from the bridge, sent five officers in succession to urge him on, and so mixed were friends and enemies at the moment, that only a few guns of the fortress durst open, and no courage could have availed against such overwhelming numbers. But Montbrun enjoyed an independent command, and, as the attack was made without Massena’s knowledge, he would not stir. Then the British regiments, with singular intelligence and discipline, extricated themselves from their perilous situation. For falling back slowly, and yet stopping and fighting whenever opportunity offered, they made their way through a rugged country tangled with vineyards, in despite of their enemies, who were so fierce and eager, that even the horsemen rode in amongst the enclosures, striking at the soldiers as they mounted the walls or scrambled over the rocks. As the retreating troops approached the river, they came upon a more open space; but the left wing being harder pressed, and having the shortest distance, arrived while the bridge was still crowded and some of the right wing distant. Major M’Leod, of the forty-third, seeing this, rallied four companies on a hill just in front of the passage, and was immediately joined by a party of the ninety-fifth, and at the same time, two other companies were posted by brigade-major Rowan, on another hill flanking the road, these posts were thus maintained until the enemy, gathering in great numbers, made a second burst, when the companies fell back. At this moment the right wing of the fifty-second was seen marching towards the bridge, which was still crowded with the passing troops, M’Leod, a very young man, but with a natural genius for war, immediately turned his horse round, called to the troops to follow, and, taking off his cap, rode with a shout towards the enemy. The suddenness of the thing, and the distinguished action of the man, produced the effect he designed; a mob of soldiers rushed after him, cheering and charging as if a whole army had been at their backs, and the enemy’s skirmishers, astonished at this unexpected movement, stopped short. Before they could recover from their surprise, the fifty-second crossed the river, and M’Leod, following at full speed, gained the other side also without a disaster. As the regiments passed the bridge, they planted themselves in loose order on the side of the mountain. The artillery drew up on the summit and the cavalry were disposed in parties on the roads to the right, because two miles higher up the stream there were fords, and beyond them the bridge of Castello Bom, and it was to be apprehended that, while the sixth corps was in front, the reserves, and a division of the eighth corps, then on the Agueda, might pass at those places and get between the division and Celerico. The river was, however, rising fast from the rains, and it was impossible to retreat farther. The French skirmishers, swarming on the right bank, opened a biting fire, which was returned as bitterly; the artillery on both sides played across the ravine, the sounds were repeated by numberless echoes, and the smoke, rising slowly, resolved itself into an immense arch, spanning the whole chasm, and sparkling with the whirling fuzes of the flying shells. The enemy gathered fast and thickly; his columns were discovered forming behind the high rocks, and a dragoon was seen to try the depth of the stream above, but two shots from the fifty-second killed horse and man, and the carcasses, floating between the hostile bands, showed that the river was impassable. The monotonous tones of a French drum were then heard, and in another instant, the head of a noble column was at the long narrow bridge. A drummer and an officer in a splendid uniform, leaped forward together, and the whole rushed on with loud cries. The depth of the ravine at first deceived the soldiers’ aim, and two-thirds of the passage was won ere an English shot had brought down an enemy; yet a few paces onwards the line of death was traced, and the whole of the leading French section fell as one man! Still the gallant column pressed forward, but no foot could pass that terrible line; the killed and wounded railed together, until the heap rose nearly even with the parapet, and the living mass behind melted away rather than gave back. The shouts of the British now rose loudly, but they were confidently answered, and, in half an hour, a second column, more numerous than the first, again crowded the bridge. This time, however, the range was better judged, and ere half the distance was won, the multitude was again torn, shattered, dispersed, and slain; ten or twelve men only succeeded in crossing, and took shelter under the rocks at the brink of the river. The skirmishing was renewed, and a French surgeon coming down to the very foot of the bridge, waved his handkerchief and commenced dressing the wounded under the hottest fire; nor was his appeal unheeded: every musket turned from him, although his still undaunted countrymen were preparing for a third attempt. The impossibility of forcing the passage was, however, become too apparent, and this last effort, made with feebler numbers and less energy, failed almost as soon as it commenced. [Illustration: _Vol. 3, Plate 6._ CRAWFURD’S _OPERATIONS_ 1810. _Published by T. & W. Boone 1830._] Nevertheless, the combat was unnecessarily continued. By the French, as a point of honour, to cover the escape of those who had passed the bridge. By the English, from ignorance of their object. One of the enemy’s guns was dismantled, a powder-magazine blew up, and many continued to fall on both sides until about four o’clock; when a heavy rain causing a momentary cessation of fire the men amongst the rocks returned, unmolested, to their own party, the fight ceased, and Crawfurd retired behind the Pinhel river. Forty-four Portuguese, two hundred and seventy-two British, including twenty-eight officers, were killed, wounded, or taken, and it was at first supposed that lieutenant Dawson and half a company of the fifty-second, which had been posted in the unfinished tower, were also captured: but that officer kept close until the evening, and then, with great intelligence, passed all the enemy’s posts, and, crossing the Coa at a ford, rejoined his regiment. In this action the French lost above a thousand men, the slaughter at the bridge was fearful to behold; but Massena claimed to have taken two pieces of artillery, and it was true; for the guns intended to arm the unfinished tower, near Almeida, were lying dismounted at the foot of the building. They, however, belonged to the garrison of Almeida, not to the light division, and that they were not mounted and the tower garrisoned was a great negligence; the enemy’s cavalry could not otherwise have fallen so dangerously on the left of the position, and the after-investment of Almeida would have been retarded. In other respects, the governor, severely censured by Crawfurd, at the time, for not opening his fire sooner and more vigorously, was unblameable; the whole affair had been so mismanaged by the general himself, that friends and enemies were mingled together from the first, and the shots from the fortress would have killed both. During the fight, general Picton came up alone from Pinhel, Crawfurd desired the support of the third division; it was refused; and, excited by some previous disputes, the generals separated after a sharp altercation. Picton was decidedly wrong, because Crawfurd’s situation was one of extreme danger; he durst not retire, and Massena might undoubtedly have thrown his reserves, by the bridge of Castello Bom, upon the right flank of the division, and destroyed it, between the Coa and the Pinhel rivers. Picton and Crawfurd were, however, not formed by nature to act cordially together. The stern countenance, robust frame, saturnine complexion, caustic speech, and austere demeanour of the first promised little sympathy with the short thick figure, dark flashing eyes, quick movements, and fiery temper of the second; nor, indeed, did they often meet without a quarrel. Nevertheless, they had many points of resemblance in their characters and fortunes. Both were inclined to harshness, and rigid in command, both prone to disobedience, yet exacting entire submission from inferiors, and they were alike ambitious and craving of glory. They both possessed decided military talents, were enterprising and intrepid, yet neither were remarkable for skill in handling troops under fire. This, also, they had in common, that both, after distinguished services, perished in arms, fighting gallantly, and being celebrated as generals of division while living, have, since their death, been injudiciously spoken of, as rivalling their great leader in war. That they were officers of mark and pretension is unquestionable, and Crawfurd more so than Picton, because the latter never had a separate command, and his opportunities were necessarily more circumscribed; but to compare either to the duke of Wellington displays ignorance of the men and of the art they professed. If they had even comprehended the profound military and political combinations he was conducting; the one would have carefully avoided fighting on the Coa; and the other, far from refusing, would have eagerly proffered his support. CHAPTER V. During the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, Mahi, coming down from the Gallician mountains, menaced Astorga, and a detachment of his army, under Toboado Gil, occupied Puebla de Senabria; acting in concert with Silveira; and an expedition sailing from Coruña, under Porlier, seized Santona, and dismantled that and other points on the coast, near Santander. Mahi’s movements could not be well opposed by either Kellerman or Serras, during the siege, because the former had a strong detachment in Baños, and the troops of the latter were spread over too great an extent of ground; but, when the place fell, the eighth corps, being detached beyond the Tormes, to gather provisions, enabled Serras to act against the Gallicians. The latter were driven into the mountains, and Toboado Gil, removing his stores from Puebla Senabria, drew closer to Silveira, in expectation of an attack; but Serras, only placing a Swiss battalion and sixty dragoons at Puebla, fell back to Zamora, and the eighth corps re-occupied the country between the Tormes and the Agueda. Bonet defeated the Spaniards at Sales, and entered Castropol, on the frontier of Gallicia, but returned to Oviedo, on hearing of the expedition to Santona. The Spaniards then re-embarked for Coruña, the project of a larger armament, to be directed against Santander itself, was adopted, and Mahi affirmed that, if more arms and ammunition were sent to him from England, he would clear the plains of Leon, as far as the Esla river. His demands were complied with; sir Home Popham was appointed to superintend the naval expeditions against the coast of the Asturias and Biscay, and a serious interruption of the French communications was planned, but never realised. Meanwhile, general Reynier passed the Tagus with the second corps, but it appears that this movement should have been executed in June; for boats were collected at Barca de Alconete, in the middle of that month, and the French only waited for a detachment from Andalusia, when Mendizabel, taking the road of Zafra, attacked that detachment, at Los Santos, on the 23d, and Reynier immediately moved to its succour with one division of infantry and all his cavalry. But, at this period, the insurrection caused by Lascy’s expedition to the Ronda, had drawn all the troops of the fifth corps from Seville to that side, the duke of Aremberg and general Remond had fallen back behind the river Tinto, and Copons had advanced to collect provisions on the Odiel. In this threatening state of affairs, instead of returning to Merida, Reynier endeavoured to surprise Imas, at Xeres de los Cavalleros, and failing in that, pushed across the Morena against Ballasteros, the latter being at Campo Frio, beyond Araceña, and, ignorant that Imas had retreated, could only save himself by a hasty flight across the frontier of Portugal. Meanwhile, Lascy was beaten in the Ronda, the fifth corps retired to Seville, D’Aremberg and Remond re-occupied Huelva and Moguer; and Reynier, going back to Merida, resumed his design of passing the Tagus. His boats were still at Alconete, for the Spaniards had neglected this opportunity of destroying them; but, as it was necessary to cover the operations both from Hill’s division which was concentrated at Campo Mayor, and from the Portuguese troops behind the Elga river, a strong rear guard was placed on the Salor to watch the former, and the French division at Baños advanced to Coria to awe the latter. Reynier then quitting Merida the 10th of July, marched, by Truxillo and Caceres, upon Alconete and Almaraz, and effected the passage; his rear guard following on the 16th. This cautious operation saved him from an attack meditated by Hill, who had received orders to unite with Romana, and drive the second corps back, with a view to gather the harvest for the victualling of Badajos and the other frontier fortresses. But the passage of the Tagus being thus effected by the French, general Hill made a parallel movement, which, on his part, only required thirty-six hours; and meanwhile, lord Wellington assembled a reserve at Thomar, under the command of general Leith, consisting of eight thousand Portuguese and two thousand British infantry, just arrived from England. Soon after Reynier had reached Coria, he detached a force, by Perales, upon Sabugal, but recalled it when he found that Hill, having crossed the Tagus by Vilha Velha, was at Castello Branco on the 21st. The two generals then faced each other. Hill, joined by a strong body of Portuguese cavalry, under general Fane, encamped, with sixteen thousand men and eighteen guns, at Sarzedas, just in front of the Sobreira Formosa; his advanced guard in Castello Branco; his horsemen on the line of the Ponçul; and a brigade of Portuguese infantry at Fundao, to keep up the communication with Guarda, and to cover the Estrada Nova. Behind him, Leith occupied the line of the Zezere: and thus twenty-six thousand men, besides the militia, were in observation between the Estrella and the Tagus. Reynier first made demonstrations on the side of Salvatierra; but being repulsed by some Portuguese cavalry, divided his forces between Penamacor and Zarza Mayor, established a post of one hundred and fifty men on the left bank of the Tagus, near the mouth of the Rio Del Monte, and, by continual movements, rendered it doubtful whether he meant to repass the Tagus or to advance upon Sarzedas, or to join Massena. Meanwhile, Ballasteros returned to Araceña, Imas to Xeres de los Cavalleros, O’Donnel entered Truxillo, and Carlos d’España cut off the French post on the Rio del Monte. Romana was, however, soon obliged to concentrate his troops again; for Mortier was on the Guadalquivir, with a view to re-enter Estremadura. Such was the situation of the armies in the beginning of August; and when Massena was assured that Reynier had crossed the Tagus, he directed the sixth corps and the cavalry upon Almeida, which led, as we have seen, to the combat on the Coa; during which, Loison, imagining the governor to be a native, pressed him to desert the cause of the English: “_that vile people, whose object was to enslave the Portuguese_.” Lord Wellington’s situation was critical. Ciudad Rodrigo furnished the French with a place of arms; they might disregard Almeida: and their tardy investment of it, viewed in conjunction with the great magazines collecting at Ciudad Rodrigo, indicated an intention of so doing. But Massena’s dispositions were such as rendered his true designs difficult to be discovered. The sixth corps and the reserve cavalry were, indeed, around Almeida; but, by telegraphic intercourse with the garrison, it was known that the investment was not real, and the heads of the columns pointed towards Celerico. Loison’s advanced guard was in Pinhel the day after Crawfurd’s action; the second corps, divided between Zarza Mayor and Penamacor, and with boats, near Alcantara, on the Tagus, menaced equally the line of that river and the line of the Zezere; and it was as likely that Massena would join Reynier as that Reynier would join Massena. The eighth corps and the divisions of Serras and Kellerman were between the Tormes and the Esla, and might break into the northern provinces of Portugal, while the sixth and second corps should hold the allies in check: and this was undoubtedly the surest course; because the taking of Oporto would have furnished many resources, stricken the natives with terror, opened the great coast-road to Lisbon, and enabled Massena to avoid all the difficult country about the Mondego. The English general must then have retired before the second and sixth corps, unless he attacked Ney; an unpromising measure, because of the enemy’s strength in horse: in fine, Massena had one hundred and sixteen thousand men and the initial operations in his power, and lord Wellington was obliged to wait upon his movements. The actual position of the allies was too extended and too forward; yet to retire at once would have seemed timid: hence lord Wellington remained quiet during the 25th, 26th, and 27th of July, although the enemy’s posts were thickening on the Pinhel river. But the 28th, the British cavalry advanced to Frexadas, and the infantry withdrew behind the Mondego, except the fourth division, which remained at Guarda. The light division occupied Celerico; the other divisions were posted at Penhancos, Carapichina, and Fornos; the Portuguese troops being a day’s march behind. The sick and wounded men transferred daily to the rear, and the line of retreat kept free from encumbrance. The enemy then made a demonstration towards St. Joa de Pesquera, and defeated some militia at Fosboa, on the Douro, but finally retired across the Coa, and, after a few skirmishes with the garrison on the 3d of August, left the communication with Almeida again free. At the same time, a detachment of Reynier’s horse was encountered at Atalaya, near Fundao, and beaten by the Portuguese cavalry and ordenança, with a loss of fifty killed or taken. On the side of Gallicia, Kellerman advanced from Benevente to Castro Contrijo, and detachments from Serras’s division penetrated towards Monterey, ordering provisions for ten thousand men on the road to Braganza. But Silveira, marching on Senabria, defeated the enemy’s cavalry there on the 6th; invested the Swiss on the 7th; and, on the 10th, obliged them to capitulate at the moment when Serras was coming to their relief. Five hundred men and an eagle were taken, and Silveira, who did not lose a man, would have given battle to Serras also, if Beresford, alarmed at such rashness, had not sent him imperative orders to retreat; an operation he effected with some difficulty. This advantage in the north was balanced by a disaster in Estremadura. The Spanish generals, never much disposed to respect lord Wellington’s counsels, were now less so than before, from the discontent engendered by the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo. He had pressed upon Romana the policy of avoiding battles; had procured permission that Campo Mayor should be given to him as a place of arms, with leave to retire into Portugal when overmatched by the enemy; and he had shewn him that Hill’s departure greatly augmented the necessity of caution. Nevertheless, Romana joined Ballasteros; and, as their united force amounted to fourteen thousand infantry and fifteen hundred horse, the English general immediately foresaw that they would offer battle, be defeated, and lay open the whole frontier of the Alemtejo; he, therefore, directed Hill to send Madden’s brigade of Portuguese cavalry to their assistance. Madden reached Campo Mayor the 14th of August, but Romana’s advanced guard had been already intercepted at Benvenida, and having lost six hundred men, was going to lay down its arms, when fortunately Carrera arrived with the Spanish cavalry and disengaged them. The whole then retreated across the Morena to Monte Molin and Fregenal, but the French pursued and slew or took four hundred more. The following day Mortier entered Zafra, and Romana retired to Almendralejos. The enemy did not, however, press this advantage, because Lascy with three thousand men from Cadiz convoyed by Capt. Cockburn of the British navy, had landed near Moguer and driven the duke of Aremberg towards Seville, while Copons drove Remond upon Zalamea; and although the French soon rallied and obliged Lascy to re-embark, Mortier was withdrawn towards the Morena, and Romana again advanced to Zafra. This affair at Moguer was very trifling, but a tumid description in Cockburn’s despatches obtained for it a momentary celebrity. It would appear that Massena had been waiting for Mortier’s movements to develope his own plans, for on the day that the latter entered Zafra, the sixth corps formally invested Almeida; and lord Wellington immediately bringing up the Portuguese, recrossed the Mondego; the British being at Pinhel, Frexadas, and Guarda, and the Portuguese at Celerico, Govea, Melho, and Trancoso. In this situation, expecting a vigorous defence from Almeida, he had good hopes to delay the enemy for six weeks or two months, when the rains setting in would give him additional advantages in the defence of the country. He had intended to keep the light division on the Cabeça Negro overhanging the bridge of the Coa, and thus secure a communication with the garrison, or force the French to invest the place with their whole army: Crawfurd’s rashness marred this plan, and he himself was so dispirited by the action on the 24th, that the commander-in-chief did not think it prudent to renew the project. Yet Massena’s tardiness and the small force with which he finally invested the place, led lord Wellington to think of assembling secretly a large and chosen body of men behind the Cabeça Negro, with the view of suddenly forcing the bridge and the fords and taking the French battering train, or at least bringing off the garrison; but while revolving this great stroke in his mind, an unexpected and terrible disaster broke his measures. SIEGE OF ALMEIDA. [Sidenote: Colonel Cox’s Narrative.] This fortress, although regularly constructed with six bastions, ravelins, an excellent ditch, and covered way, was extremely defective. The ramparts were too high for the glacis, and from some near ground, on the side of the attack, the bottom of the ditch might be seen. An old square castle, built on a mound in the centre of the town, contained three bomb proofs, the doors of which were not secure; but with the exception of some damp casements in one bastion, there was no other magazine for the powder. Colonel Cox was governor, and his garrison composed of one regular and two militia regiments, a body of artillery and a squadron of cavalry, amounted to about four thousand men. On the 18th, the trenches were begun under cover of a false attack, and in the morning of the 26th (the second parallel being commenced) sixty-five pieces of artillery mounted in ten batteries opened at once. Many houses were soon in flames and the garrison was unable to extinguish them; the counter fire was, however, briskly maintained, little military damage was sustained, and towards evening the cannonade slackened on both sides; but just after dark the ground suddenly trembled, the castle bursting into a thousand pieces, gave vent to a column of smoke and fire, and with a prodigious noise the whole town sunk into a shapeless ruin! Treason or accident had caused the magazines to explode, and the devastation was incredible. The ramparts were breached, the greatest part of the guns thrown into the ditch, five hundred people were struck dead on the instant, and only six houses left standing; the stones thrown out hurt forty of the besiegers in the trenches, and the surviving garrison, aghast at the horrid commotion, disregarded all exhortations to rally. Fearing that the enemy would take the opportunity to storm the ramparts, the governor beat to arms, and, running to the walls with the help of an artillery officer, fired off the few guns that remained; but the French shells fell thickly all the night, and in the morning of the 27th, two officers appeared at the gates, with a letter from Massena, offering terms. Cox, sensible that further resistance was impossible, still hoped that the army would make a movement to relieve him, if he could impose upon the enemy for two or three days; and he was in act of refusing the prince of Esling’s offer, when a mutiny, headed openly by the lieutenant-governor, one Bernardo Costa, and secretly by José Bareiros, the chief of artillery, who had been for some time in secret correspondence with the French, obliged him to yield. The remainder of the native officers disturbed by fear, or swayed by the influence of those two, were more willing to follow than to oppose their dishonourable proceedings, and Costa expressed his resolution to hoist the white flag. The governor seeing no remedy by force, endeavoured to procrastinate, and, being ignorant of Bareiros’ treason, sent him to the enemy with counter propositions. Bareiros immediately informed Massena of the true state of garrison, and never returned; and the final result was a surrender upon agreement that the militia should retire to their homes, and the regulars remain prisoners of war. [Sidenote: Justification of Colonel W. Cox.] [Sidenote: Note by Gen. Pelet. Appendix to Vol. XII. Victoires et Conquestes des Français.] While the treaty was pending and even after the signature of the articles, in the night of the 27th, the French bombarded the place. This act, unjustifiable and strange, because Massena’s aide-de-camp, colonel Pelet, was actually within the walls when the firing commenced, was excused, on the ground of an error in the transmission of orders; it, however, lasted during the whole night, and Cox also asserts that the terms of the capitulation with respect to the militia were violated. Pelet indignantly denies this, affirming that when the garrison still amounting to three thousand men perceived the marquis d’Alorna amongst the French generals, the greatest part immediately demanded service, and formed a brigade under general Pamplona. Yet, so easily are men’s minds moved by present circumstances, that the greater number deserted again, when they afterwards saw the allied armies. Bareiros, having joined the enemy, escaped punishment, but De Costa, being tried, was afterwards shot as a traitor, by the orders of marshal Beresford. His cowardice and mutiny merited this chastisement, yet the principal evidence against him was an explanatory letter, written to lord Liverpool, by Cox, while a prisoner at Verdun. The explosion, the disappearance of the steeple, and cessation of fire, proclaimed the misfortune of Almeida in the allied camp; but the surrender was first ascertained by lord Wellington on the 29th, when, with a telescope, he observed many French officers on the glacis of the place. The army then withdrew to its former position behind the Mondego; and while these things were passing on the Coa, the powder-magazine in Albuquerque, being struck with lightning, also exploded and killed four hundred men; and, on the 1st of September, general Reynier, after several demonstrations towards Castello Branco, in one of which he lost a squadron of horse, suddenly reached Sabugal. The British piquets on the Pinhel were attacked the following day by the horsemen of the sixth corps, the enemy’s plans seemed to be ripe for execution; and lord Wellington transferring his quarters to Govea, withdrew his infantry behind Celerico, and fixed his cavalry at that place with posts of observation at Guarda and at Trancoso. Reynier, however, suddenly returned to Zarza Mayor, and, throwing a bridge over the Tagus at Alcantara, again involved the French projects in obscurity. Massena experienced considerable difficulty in feeding his forces, and he seemed at first, either disinclined to commence the invasion or undecided as to the mode. Two months had elapsed since the surrender of Ciudad Rodrigo, Almeida had only resisted for ten days, the French army was still behind the Coa, and it would seem, by an intercepted letter, dictated by Napoleon, in September, that he expected further inaction: “Lord Wellington,” he observed to Massena, “has only eighteen thousand men, Hill has only six thousand; and it would be ridiculous to suppose that twenty-five thousand English can balance sixty thousand French, if the latter do not trifle, but fall boldly on after having _well observed where the blow may be given_. You have twelve thousand cavalry, and four times as much artillery as is necessary for Portugal. Leave six thousand cavalry and a proportion of guns between Ciudad Rodrigo, Alcantara, and Salamanca, and with the rest commence operations. The emperor is too distant, and the positions of the enemy change too often, to direct how you should attack; but it is certain that the utmost force the English can muster, including the troops at Cadiz, will be twenty-eight thousand men.” This letter was accurate as to the numbers of the English army, but Napoleon was ignorant how strongly lord Wellington was thrusting Portugal forward in the press. Massena had commenced the invasion before these instructions reached him; but to understand his operations it is essential to have a clear idea of the country in which they were conducted. The advanced positions of the allies extended from Almeida over the Sierra de Estrella, by Guarda to Fundao, Sarzedas, and Castello Branco: no enemy could penetrate that line unless by force, and a serious attack on any one point was to be the signal for a gradual retreat of the whole, in concentric directions towards the Lines. But, if Guarda were evacuated, the enemy while menacing Celerico, could move either by Belmonte or Covilhao and separate general Hill from lord Wellington, the distance between those generals being twice as great as the enemy’s perpendicular line of march would be. To balance this disadvantage, the road from Covilhao was broken up, a Portuguese brigade placed in Fundao, and general Leith’s corps was stationed at Thomar, between two entrenched positions, which formed the second temporary line of resistance. The first of those positions was behind the Zezere, extending from the Barca de Codies to the confluence of that river with the Tagus. The second behind the Alva, a strong and swift stream descending from the Estrella and falling into the Mondego some miles above Coimbra. Both were strong, the rivers deep and difficult of access, and the Sierra de Murcella closely hugs the left bank of the Alva. Hill’s line of retreat from Sarzedas to the Zezere, has been already noticed, and from that river to the Alva, there was a military road constructed through the mountains to Espinhal. But the country from Celerico to the Murcella, a distance of about sixty miles, is one long defile, lying between the Sierra Estrella and the Mondego. The ridge upon which Celerico stands, being a shoot from the Estrella, and encircled by a sweep of the Mondego, closes this defile in front. In like manner the Sierra Murcella, covered by the Alva river, closes it in the rear, and the intermediate parts are but a succession of smaller streams and lower ridges. The principal road was repaired and joined to the road of Espinhal, and a branch was also carried across the Mondego to Coimbra. Thus an internal communication was established for the junction of all the corps. Nevertheless, between Celerico and the Alva, the country was not permanently tenable, because, from Guarda and Covilhao, there were roads over the Estrella to Gouvea, Cea, and Gallices, towns in rear of Celerico; and the enemy could also turn the whole tract by moving through Trancoso and Viseu, and so down the right bank of the Mondego to Coimbra. But lord Wellington keeping the head of his army one march behind Celerico, in observation of the routes over the Estrella, and his rear close to the Alva, was master of his retreat; and as the Mondego was fordable in summer and bridged at several points, he could pass it by a flank movement in a few hours. Now the right bank was also one great defile, lying between the river and the Sierra de Alcoba or Caramula. This mountain stretching with some breaks from the Douro to Coimbra, separates the valley of the Mondego from the coast line, and in approaching Coimbra sends out a lofty transverse shoot, called the Sierra de Busaco, exactly in a line with the Sierra de Murcella, and barring the way on the right bank of the Mondego in the same manner that the latter Sierra bars it on the left bank. Moreover this route to Coimbra was the worst in Portugal, and crossed by several deep tributaries of the Mondego, the most considerable of which were the Criz and Dao. The Vouga, however, opened a passage through the Alcoba near Viseu, and that way the French could gain the great road from Oporto, and so continue their movement upon Coimbra. Such being the ground on both sides of the Mondego, the weakest point was obviously towards the Estrella, and lord Wellington kept the mass of his forces there. But Massena was ill-acquainted with the military features, and absolutely ignorant of the lines of Torres Vedras. Indeed, so circumspectly had those works been carried on, that only vague rumours of their existence reached the bulk of the English army; and many British officers imagined that the campaign was only to cloak the general’s intention of embarking when he reached Lisbon. In England the opposition asserted that he would do so: the Portuguese dreaded it; the French army universally believed it; and the British minsters seem to have entertained the same opinion; for at this time an officer of engineers arrived at Lisbon, whose instructions, received personally from lord Liverpool, were unknown to lord Wellington, and commenced thus:--“_As it is probable that the army will embark in September._” CHAPTER VI. THIRD INVASION OF PORTUGAL. Massena’s command, extended from the banks of the Tagus to the Bay of Biscay, from Almeida to Burgos, and the number of his troops present under arms exceeded one hundred and ten thousand men. From these must be deducted thirteen thousand in the Asturias and province of Santander, four thousand in the government of Valladolid, eight thousand under Serras at Zamora and Benevente, and lastly, the reserve of Bayonne under general Drouet, nineteen thousand strong, which, organized as a ninth corps had only entered Spain in August, being replaced at Bayonne by a fresh reserve under general Caffarelli. Thus, the active army of invasion did not much exceed seventy thousand; and as every man, combatant or non-combatant, is borne on the strength of a French army, not more than fifty-five thousand infantry and about eight thousand horsemen were with the eagles. The ninth corps had however orders to follow the traces of the prince of Esling, and the void thus left at Burgos and Valladolid was supplied by sixteen thousand of the young guard. This arrangement shows how absurdly Napoleon has been called a rash warrior, and one never thinking of retreat. No man ever made bolder marches, but no man ever secured his base with more care. Here he would not suffer any advance to fresh conquests until his line of communication had been strengthened with three additional fortresses,--namely, Astorga, Ciudad, and Almeida; and while he employed sixty-five thousand men in the invasion of Portugal, he kept more than eighty thousand in reserve. Thus, even the total loss of the army destined to make what is technically termed “a point” upon Lisbon, would, as a mere military disaster, have scarcely shaken his hold of Spain. Massena’s instructions were to convert, Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, into places of arms for the conquest of Portugal, and to move on both sides of the Tagus against Lisbon in the beginning of September. Either thinking his force too weak to act upon two lines at the same time, or trusting to the co-operation of Soult’s army from Andalusia, he relinquished the Alemtejo, looking only to the northern bank of the Tagus; and hence, as the experience of Junot’s march in 1807, warned him off the Sobreira mountains, his views were confined to the three roads of Belmonte, Celerico, and Viseu. [Sidenote: Note by General Pelet.] The strength of the positions about the Alva was known to him, as were also the measures taken to impede a descent from Covilhao to Espinhal; but Alorna, Pamplona, and the other Portuguese in the French camp, with a singular ignorance, asserted that the road by Viseu and Coimbra was easy, and that no important position covered the latter town. Wherefore the French general resolved suddenly to assemble all his forces, distribute thirteen days’ bread to the soldiers, and pour in one solid mass down the right bank of the Mondego, not doubting to reach Coimbra before general Hill could join lord Wellington. In pursuance of this project the three corps were directed to concentrate on the 16th of September; Reynier’s at Guarda; Ney’s, and the heavy cavalry, at Maçal da Chao, and Junot’s at Pinhel. By this disposition all three roads were alike menaced; and the allies being kept in suspense as to the ultimate object, Massena hoped to gain one march, a great thing, seeing that from Coimbra he was not more than a hundred miles, whereas Hill’s distance from that town was longer. But, to cover the real object with more care, and to keep Hill as long as possible at Sarzedas, the French general caused Guarda to be siezed on the 12th, by a detachment, which withdrew again immediately, as if it were only a continuation of the former feints; and meanwhile Reynier, having first ascertained that Mortier was at Monasterio, threatening Estremadura, suddenly destroyed the boat-bridge at Alcantara, and marched towards Sabugal. On the 13th the allies re-established their post at Guarda; but on the 15th, it was again driven away by a considerable mass of the enemy, and retired up the side of the Estrella. At the same time the cavalry in front of Celerico was forced back in the centre, and the post at Trancoso chased towards Mongualde on the left. Lord Wellington then felt assured that the invasion was at last in serious progress; and having ascertained, beyond a doubt, that the troops in Guarda were of Reynier’s corps, despatched his final orders for Hill and Leith to concentrate on the Alva. On the 16th, Reynier descended from Guarda to the plains bordering the Mondego; and being there joined by the sixth corps and Montbrun’s horsemen, the whole passed the river, and, pushing through Celerico, drove back the cavalry posts of the allies to the village of Cortiço; but there the first German hussars turning, overthrew the leading squadrons, and made some prisoners. Near Cortiço, the road branching off to the bridge of Fornos and to Gouvea; a French brigade took the latter to cover the march of the main body which made for Fornos. But this feint was closely watched; for there is a custom, peculiar to the British army, of sending mounted officers, singly to observe the enemy’s motions; and, such is their habit, that they will penetrate through the midst of his cantonments, cross the line of his movement, and hover, just out of musket-shot, for whole days, on the skirts of his columns, until they obtain a clear notion of the numbers and the true direction of the march. Colonel Waters, one of these exploring officers, being close on the left of Reynier’s troops during this day, reported their movements, and in the evening, leading some of the German cavalry behind the enemy, took several prisoners and the baggage of a general. The French operations were decisive. Lord Wellington directed the first, third, and fourth divisions upon the Alva, withdrew his heavy cavalry from the front, and placed the light division at St. Romao, in the Estrella, to cover the head-quarters, which were transferred, that night, to Cea. The 17th, the whole of the second and sixth corps were observed to pass the bridge of Fornos, and the advanced guard entered Mongualde; but the eighth corps still kept the road leading towards Oporto, for ten thousand militia of the northern provinces, forming the brigades of Trant, Wilson, and Miller, were collected upon the Douro to harass the enemy’s right flank and rear, and Trant, with about three thousand, was already at Moimenta de Beira, in the defiles leading through the hills to Lamego. The country between the Coa and Coimbra, on both sides of the Mondego, had been before laid waste, the mills were destroyed, the ordenança were in arms, and the helpless population hidden amongst the highest mountains. On the 18th, the French advanced guard reached the deserted city of Viseu. Pack’s Portuguese brigade immediately passed the Mondego at Fosdao, and took post beyond the Criz; and general Pakenham, with a brigade of the first division, entered Coimbra, to protect it from the enemy’s scouting parties. On the 19th, captain Somers Cocks, a very gallant and zealous officer, commanding the cavalry post which had been driven from Guarda, came down from the Estrella, and following the enemy through Celerico, ascertained that neither sick men nor stores were left behind: hence it was evident that Massena, relinquishing his communications, had thrown his cavalry, infantry, artillery, parcs, baggage and hospital waggons, in one mass, upon the worst road in Portugal. The allies were now in motion also to cross the Mondego, when a false report, that the enemy was again on the left bank, arrested the general movement. The next day, however, the third, fourth, and light divisions, and the British cavalry passed the river at Pena Cova, Olivarez, and other places, and were distributed; the light division at Mortagao supporting Pack; the third and fourth in the villages between the Sierra de Busaco and Mortagao; and the horse on a plain in front of the latter place, connecting the light division with Pack’s brigade. But the eighth corps still pointed towards the valley of the Vouga; and it was doubtful whether Massena would not that way gain the main road from Oporto to Coimbra; wherefore general Spencer, with the first division, marched upon Milheada, and Trant was directed to join him by a march through San Pedro de Sul to Sardao. Meanwhile Leith arrived on the Alva, and general Hill was only one march behind; for having discovered Reynier’s movements on the 12th, and, at the same time, getting intelligence that all the French boats on the Tagus had been destroyed, he, with a ready decision, anticipating lord Wellington’s orders, directed his artillery by Thomar, and putting his troops in motion that evening, reached Espisnal on the 20th, and was there joined by general Lecor, who, with equal vigour and judgement, had brought the Portuguese brigade, by long marches, from Fundao. On the 21st, Hill arrived on the Alva, and pushed his cavalry in observation beyond that river. Thus the two corps of the allied army were united on the same day that the main body of the enemy entered Viseu; and, although the French horsemen were on the Criz, the bridges had been destroyed by Pack; and the project of surprising Coimbra was baffled. Neither had Massena failed to experience other evil consequences from his false movement. He had been obliged to repair the road from day to day for his artillery; and it was still twenty miles from Viseu on the 19th. Trant, aware of this, formed the hardy project of destroying it; and quitting Moimenta de Beira in the night, with a squadron of cavalry, two thousand militia, and five guns, on the 20th, surprised a patrole of ten men, from whom he learnt that the convoy was at hand, and that Montbrun’s cavalry was close in the rear. The defiles were, however, narrow, and, Trant charging the head of the escort, took a hundred prisoners and some baggage. The convoy then fell back, and the militia followed; the ways being so narrow that Montbrun could never come up to the front. At this time, a resolute attack would have thrown all into confusion, but the militia were unmanageable; and the enemy, having at last rallied a few men, and repulsed the Portuguese cavalry, with a loss of twelve troopers, the whole got into disorder, and Trant, seeing nothing more was to be effected, returned to Moimenta de Beira, and from thence marched to Lamego with his prisoners. The French, ignorant of the number and quality of their assailants, still fell back, and did not finally reach Viseu until the 23d; by which, Massena lost two most important days. While these events were passing in the valley of Mondego, a small expedition from Cadiz again landed at Moguer, to aid Copons in collecting provisions on the Tinto. It was, however, quickly obliged to re-embark; and Copons was defeated by general Remond, with the loss of three hundred men on the 15th. Meanwhile, Romana attacked the French posts near Monasterio, pushing his cavalry towards Seville. Soult sent the fifth corps against him, and he retired; but was beaten at Los Santos on the same day that Copons had been defeated on the Tinto. The pursuit was continued to Fuente del Maestre; and the whole army was like to disperse in flight, when Madden’s Portuguese cavalry came up, and, charging the pursuers with signal gallantry, overthrew the leading squadrons, recovered some prisoners, and gained time for the Spaniards to rally. Nevertheless, the French entered Zafra, and Romana retreated, by Almendralejo and Merida to Montijo, on the 18th, throwing a garrison into Olivenza, and three battalions into Badajos. Being, however, sensible that the latter place was in no condition to resist a serious attack, he directed the Junta to repair to Valencia d’Alcantara, and took refuge himself at Elvas. Lord Wellington’s anticipations were thus realized and the Alemtejo laid open. Fortunately for the allies, Sebastiani was at this moment near Carthagena in pursuit of the Murcian army, and a fresh insurrection breaking out in the mountains of Grenada the castles of Motril and Almunecar were taken; Copons also advanced to the Tinto, and all these calls upon Soult taking place at one time, he was unable to bring quite twelve thousand men to Zafra; a number inadequate to the invasion of the Alemtejo, the more especially that several regiments withdrawn from Cadiz, and others coming from England had reached Lisbon about this period, and formed a reserve for the allies, of more than five thousand British troops. Wherefore the French returned to Ronquillo, the Spaniards again advanced to Xeres de los Cavalleros, and Araceña, and this dangerous crisis glided gently away. But, to understand this, it is necessary to shew how encreasing political embarrassments had thwarted the original plan of the English general. [Sidenote: Appendix, No. II.] [Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Papers. MSS.] The first vexatious interference of the Souza faction had been checked, but the loss of Almeida furnished a favourable opportunity to renew their clamorous hostility to the military proceedings. Falsely asserting, that the provisions of that fortress had been carried away by the English commissaries; and as falsely pretending that lord Wellington had promised to raise the siege, this party hypocritically assumed, that his expressions of sorrow for its fall were indications of an intention to remove by a splendid victory the public despondency. They vehemently insisted, also, on a defence of the frontier, inveighed against the destruction of the mills, and endeavoured to force their own friends of the fidalgo faction even on to the staff of marshal Beresford, that they might the more readily embarrass the operations. Meanwhile, neglecting or delaying the measures agreed upon for laying waste the country, they protected the minor authorities when disobedient, refrained from punishing delinquents, and took every occasion to mislead the public mind at the very moment when the enemy commenced the invasion. Nor was there wanting either accident or indiscretion to encrease the growing confusion. When Almeida fell, an officer of the guards writing to a friend at Oporto, indiscreetly asserted, that Massena was advancing in front with a hundred thousand French, and that eighty thousand more were moving in rear of the allies upon Lisbon. This letter being immediately made public, created such a panic amongst the English merchants, that one and all applied for ships to carry their families and property away, and there arose such a tumult that Trant was obliged to quit his command for the purpose of suppressing the commotion. To dry this source of mischief lord Wellington issued proclamations; and, in the orders of the day, declared that he would not seek to ascertain the author of this and similar letters, being assured that the feelings and sense of the officers would prevent any repetition. To the regency he addressed himself in a more peremptory and severe manner, reproving them for the false colouring given to his communications, and informing them that he would never “_permit public clamour and panic to induce him to change, in the smallest degree, a system and plan of operation which he had adopted after mature consideration, and which daily experience proved to be the only one likely to produce a good end_.” But this remonstrance only increased the virulence of his opponents; and such was their conduct, that, before lord Wellington reached Busaco, he was obliged to tell them, “_their miserable intrigues must cease or he would advise his own government to withdraw the British army_.” Meanwhile their proceedings had been so mischievously successful, that the country between the Mondego, the Tagus, and the Lines, still contained provisions sufficient for the French during the ensuing winter, and the people were alike unprepared to expect an enemy or to attempt a removal of their property. Lord Wellington could but choose then, between stopping the invaders on the Mondego, or wasting the country by force as he retreated. But what an act the last! His hopes depended upon the degree of moral strength he was enabled to call forth, and he would have had to retire with a mixed force before a powerful army and an eminent commander, his rear guard engaged, and his advance driving miserable multitudes before it to the capital, where nothing was prepared to save them from famine, but where the violent and powerful faction in the regency was ready to misrepresent every proceeding, and inflame the people’s minds; and this, when the court of Rio Janeiro was discontented, and the English ministers, as I shall have occasion to shew, panic-stricken by the desponding letters of some general officers about the commander-in-chief! It was evidently necessary to fight, although Massena had above sixty thousand veterans, and lord Wellington could only bring about fifty thousand men into line, more than half of which were untried soldiers. The consequences of such a battle were not, however, to be estimated by the result on the field. The French general might indeed gain every thing by a victory; but, if defeated, his powerful cavalry and the superior composition and experience of his army would prevent it from being very injurious; or a serious check might induce him to turn his attention from Coimbra towards Oporto, contenting himself with the capture of that city, and the reduction of the northern provinces, until more formidable preparations should enable him to renew his first design. Nor could the time thus gained by the allies be as profitably employed in the defence. The French could be reinforced to any amount, whereas the English general’s resources could not be much improved, and it was very doubtful if either England or Portugal would longer endure the war, without some palpable advantage to balance the misery and the expense. Such was the state of affairs, when the allies passed to the right bank of the Mondego with a view to fight the battle thus forced upon their general. While the French remained concentrated at Viseu, the first division, under Spencer, was held at Milheada in observation of the great road from Oporto; the light division at Mortagao watching the road from Viseu, and the remainder of the army in reserve ready to move to either side. But when the French advanced guard had repaired the bridges over the Criz, and passed that river, lord Wellington recalled the first division, and fixed upon the Sierra de Busaco for his position of battle. This mountain, about eight miles in length, abuts to the right on the Mondego, and on the left is connected with the Sierra de Caramula by a hilly rugged country, impervious to the march of an army. A road along the crest of Busaco afforded an easy communication, and at Pena Cova, just behind the right hand extremity, a ford in the Mondego permitted the troops to pass in a few hours to the Murcella ridge, behind the Alva. The face of Busaco was steep, rough, and fit for defence. The artillery of the allies fixed on certain points, could play along the front freely, and there was some ground on the summit suitable for a small body of cavalry; but neither guns nor horsemen of the enemy had a fair field, their infantry were to contend with every difficulty, and the approach to the position was also unfavourable to an attacking army. After passing the Criz, a table-land permitted Massena to march, in a wide order of battle, to Mortagao; but then a succession of ascending ridges led to the Sierra Busaco, which was separated from the last by a chasm, so profound, that the naked eye could hardly distinguish the movement of troops in the bottom, yet in parts so narrow that twelve-pounders could range to the salient points on the opposite side. From Mortagao four roads conducted to Coimbra. The first, unfrequented and narrow, crossed the Caramula to Boyalva, a village situated on the western slope of that sierra, and from thence led to Sardao and Milheada. The other roads, penetrating through the rough ground in front, passed over the Sierra de Busaco; one by a large convent on the right hand of the highest point of the ridge; a second on the left hand of this culminating point, by a village called St. Antonio de Cantara; and a third, which was a branch from the second, followed the Mondego to Pena Cova. When this formidable position was chosen, some officers expressed their fears that Massena would not assail it. “_But, if he does, I shall beat him_,” was the reply of the English general, who was well assured that the prince would attack; for his advanced guard was already over the Criz, the second and sixth corps were in mass on the other side of that river, and it was improbable that so celebrated a commander would, at the mere sight of a strong position, make a retrograde movement, change all his dispositions, and adopt a new line of operations by the Vouga, which would be exposed also to the militia under Baccellar. Massena was, indeed, only anxious for a battle, and, being still under the influence of Alorna’s and Pamplona’s false reports, as to the nature of the country in his front, never doubted that the allies would retire before him. CHAPTER VII. General Pack, on the 22d, destroyed the bridges over the Criz, and fell back upon the light division; but, the 23d, the enemy re-established the communications, passed the river, and obliged the British horse to quit the plain, and take to the hills behind Mortagao. Three squadrons of light and one regiment of heavy cavalry were retained there by lord Wellington; but the rest he sent over the Sierra de Busaco to the low country about Milheada, whence he recalled Spencer, and at the same time caused the third and fourth divisions to take their ground on the position, the former at St. Antonio de Cantara, the latter at the convent. But the light division falling back only a league, encamped in a pine-wood, where happened one of those extraordinary panics that, in ancient times, were attributed to the influence of a hostile god. No enemy was near, no alarm was given, yet suddenly the troops, as if seized with a phrenzy, started from sleep, and dispersed in every direction; nor was there any possibility of allaying this strange terror, until some persons called out that the enemy’s cavalry were amongst them, when the soldiers mechanically run together in masses, and the illusion was instantly dissipated. The 24th, the enemy appeared in force, and skirmished with the picquets in front of Montagao, when the light division, again retiring four miles, occupied strong ground, and, in the evening, some of the enemy’s cavalry approaching too close, were charged by a squadron of the fourteenth dragoons, and overthrown, with the loss of twenty or thirty men. Early on the 25th, Crawfurd moved down from his post, and appeared somewhat disposed to renew the scene at the Coa; for the enemy’s cavalry were gathering in front, and the heads of three infantry columns were plainly descried on the table-land above Mortagao, coming on abreast, and with a most impetuous pace, while heavy clouds of dust, rising and loading the atmosphere for miles behind, showed that the whole French army had passed the Criz, and was in full march to attack. The cavalry skirmishers were already exchanging pistol-shots, when lord Wellington, suddenly arriving, ordered the division to retire, and, taking the personal direction, covered the retreat with the fifty-second and ninety-fifth, the cavalry, and Ross’s troop of horse-artillery. Nor was there a moment to lose: the enemy, with incredible rapidity, brought up both infantry and guns, and fell on so briskly, that all the skill of the general and the readiness of the excellent troops composing the rear guard, could scarcely prevent the division from being dangerously engaged. Howbeit, a series of rapid and beautiful movements, a sharp cannonade, and an hour’s march, brought everything back, in good order, to the great position; but, almost at the same moment, the opposite ridge was crowned by the masses of the sixth corps, and the French batteries opened as the English troops mounted the steep ascent on which the convent was situated. Meanwhile, Reynier, taking the left hand route, along which a Portuguese battalion had retired, arrived at St. Antonio de Cantara, in front of the third division, and before three o’clock, forty thousand French infantry were embattled on the two points, and the sharp musketry of the skirmishers arose from the dark-wooded chasms beneath. Ney, whose military glance was magical, perceived in an instant that the position, a crested not a table mountain, could not hide any strong reserve, that it was scarcely half occupied, and that great part of the allied troops were moving from one place to another, with that sort of confusion which generally attends the first taking up of unknown ground. He desired to make an early and powerful attack; but the prince of Esling was at Montagao, ten miles in the rear, and an aide-de-camp, despatched to inform him of the state of affairs, after attending two hours for an audience, was (as I have been informed) told that everything must await Massena’s arrival. Thus a most favourable opportunity was lost; for the first division of the allies, although close at hand, was not upon the ridge; Leith’s troops, now called the fifth division, were in the act of passing the Mondego; Hill was still behind the Alva; scarcely twenty-five thousand men were actually in line, and there were great intervals between the divisions. [Sidenote: Appendix, No. 5.] Reynier coincided with Ney; and they wrote in concert to Massena, on the 26th, intimating their joint desire to attack. The prince of Esling, however, did not reach the field until twelve o’clock, bringing with him the eighth corps, with which, and the cavalry, he formed a reserve, connecting the sixth and second corps, and then sending out his skirmishers along the whole front, proceeded carefully to examine the position from left to right. The situation of the allies was now greatly changed. Hill’s corps, having crossed the Mondego, was posted athwart the road leading over the Sierra to Pena Cova; on his left Leith prolonged the line of defence, having the Lusitanian legion in reserve. Picton, with the third division, supported by Champlemond’s Portuguese brigade, was next to Leith, and Spencer, with the first division, occupied the highest part of the ridge, being between Picton and the convent. The fourth division closed the extreme left, covering a path leading to Milheada, where the cavalry held the flat country, one heavy regiment only being kept in reserve on the summit of the sierra. Pack’s brigade, forming an advanced guard to the first division, was posted half way down the descent, and the light division, supported by a German brigade, occupied a piece of ground jutting out nearly half a mile in front of and about two hundred feet lower than the convent, the space between being naturally scooped like the hollow of a wave before it breaks. Along the whole of the front skirmishers were thrown out on the mountain side, and about fifty pieces of artillery were disposed upon the salient points. Ney was averse to attack after the delay which had taken place, but Massena resolved to attempt carrying the position. Reynier thought that he had only to deal with a rear-guard of the allies, and the prince, whether partaking of this error, or confident in the valour of his army, directed the second and sixth corps to fall on the next day, each to its own front, while the eighth corps, the cavalry, and the artillery remained in reserve. To facilitate the attack the light French troops, dropping by twos and threes into the lowest parts of the valley, endeavoured, in the evening, to steal up the wooded dells and hollows, and to establish themselves unseen close to the picquets of the light division. Some companies of rifle corps and caçadores checked this, but similar attempts made with more or less success at different points of the position, seeming to indicate a night attack, excited all the vigilance of the troops. Yet, were it otherwise, none but veterans, tired of war, could have slept, for the weather was calm and fine, and the dark mountain masses, rising on either side, were crowned with innumerable fires, around which more than a hundred thousand brave men were gathered. BATTLE OF BUSACO. Before day-break on the 27th, the French formed five columns of attack; three under Ney, opposite to the convent, and two under Reynier, at St. Antonio de Cantara, these points being about three miles asunder. Reynier’s troops had comparatively easier ground before them, and were in the midst of the picquets and skirmishers of the third division almost as soon as they could be perceived to be in movement. The allies resisted vigorously, and six guns played along the ascent with grape, but in less than half an hour the French were close upon the summit, so swiftly and with such astonishing power and resolution did they scale the mountain, overthrowing every thing that opposed their progress. The right of the third division was forced back; the eighth Portuguese regiment was broken to pieces, and the hostile masses gained the highest part of the crest, just between the third and the fifth divisions. The leading battalions immediately established themselves amongst the crowning rocks, and a confused mass wheeled to the right, intending to sweep the summit of the sierra, but at that moment lord Wellington caused two guns to open with grape upon their flank, while a heavy musketry was still poured into their front, and, in a little time, the forty-fifth and the eighty-eighth regiments charged so furiously that even fresh men could not have withstood them. The French, quite spent with their previous efforts, opened a straggling fire, and both parties, mingling together, went down the mountain side with a mighty clamour and confusion; the dead and dying strewing the way even to the bottom of the valley. Meanwhile the French who first gained the summit had re-formed their ranks with the right resting upon a precipice overhanging the reverse side of the Sierra, and thus the position was in fact gained, if any reserve had been at hand, for the greatest part of the third division, British and Portuguese, were fully engaged, and a misty cloud capped the summit, so that the enemy, thus ensconced amongst the rocks, could not be seen, except by general Leith. That officer had put his first brigade in motion to his own left as soon as he perceived the vigorous impression made on the third division, and he was now coming on rapidly; yet he had two miles of rugged ground to pass in a narrow column before he could mingle in the fight. Keeping the royals in reserve, he directed the thirty-eighth to turn the right of the French; but the precipice prevented this; and meanwhile colonel Cameron, informed by a staff-officer of the critical state of affairs, formed the ninth regiment in line under a violent fire, and, without returning a single shot, ran in upon and drove the grenadiers from the rocks with irresistible bravery, plying them with a destructive musketry as long as they could be reached, and yet with excellent discipline refraining from pursuit, lest the crest of the position should be again lost, for the mountain was so rugged that it was impossible to judge clearly of the general state of the action. The victory was, however, secure. Hill’s corps edged in towards the scene of action; the second brigade of Leith joined the first, and a great mass of fresh troops was thus concentrated, while Reynier had neither reserves nor guns to restore the fight. Ney’s attack had as little success. From the abutment of the mountain upon which the light division was stationed, the lowest parts of the valley could be discerned. The ascent was steeper and more difficult than where Reynier had attacked, and Crawfurd, in a happy mood of command, had made masterly dispositions. The table-land between him and the convent was sufficiently scooped to conceal the forty-third and fifty-second regiments, drawn up in line; and a quarter of a mile behind them, but on higher ground and close to the convent, a brigade of German infantry appeared to be the only solid line of resistance on this part of the position. In front of the two British regiments, some rocks, overhanging the descent, furnished natural embrasures, in which the guns of the division were placed, and the whole face of the hill was planted with the skirmishers of the rifle corps and of the two Portuguese caçadores battalions. While it was yet dark, a straggling musketry was heard in the deep hollows separating the armies; and when the light broke, the three divisions of the sixth corps were observed entering the woods below and throwing forward a profusion of skirmishers; soon afterwards Marchand’s division emerging from the hollow, took the main road, as if to turn the right of the light division, Loison’s made straight up the face of the mountain in front, and the third remained in reserve. General Simon’s brigade, which led Loison’s attack, ascended with a wonderful alacrity, and though the light troops plied it unceasingly with musketry, and the artillery bullets swept through it from the first to the last section, its order was never disturbed, nor its speed in the least abated. Ross’s guns were worked with incredible quickness, yet their range was palpably contracted every round, and the enemy’s shot came singing up in a sharper key, until the skirmishers, breathless and begrimed with powder, rushed over the edge of the ascent, when the artillery suddenly drew back, and the victorious cries of the French were heard within a few yards of the summit. Crawfurd, who standing alone on one of the rocks, had been intently watching the progress of the attack, then turned, and in a quick shrill tone desired the two regiments in reserve to charge. The next moment a horrid shout startled the French column, and eighteen hundred British bayonets went sparkling over the brow of the hill. Yet so truly brave and hardy were the leaders of the enemy, that each man of the first section raised his musket, and two officers and ten soldiers fell before them. Not a Frenchman had missed his mark! They could do no more! The head of their column was violently overturned and driven upon the rear, both flanks were lapped over by the English wings, and three terrible discharges at five yards’ distance completed the route. In a few minutes a long trail of carcasses and broken arms indicated the line of retreat. The main body of the British stood fast; but several companies followed the pursuit down the mountain, until Ney moving forward his reserve, and opening his guns from the opposite height killed some men, and thus warned the rest to recover their own ground. The German brigade then spread over the hill, and the light division resumed its original position. Loison shewed no disposition to renew the attack, but Marchand’s people, who had followed the main road, broke into several masses, gained a pine wood half-way up the mountain, and sent a cloud of their skirmishers against the highest part, at the very moment that Simon was defeated. Such however was the difficulty of ascending, that Pack alone held the enemy in check, and half a mile higher up, Spencer shewed a line of the royal guards which forbade any hope of success; and from the salient point of land occupied by the light division, Crawfurd’s artillery took the main body of the French in the wood, in flank. Ney, who was there in person, after sustaining this murderous fire for an hour, relinquished the attack. The desultory fighting of the light troops then ceased, and before two o’clock Crawfurd having assented to a momentary truce, parties of both armies were mixed amicably together searching for the wounded men. Towards evening, however, a French company having, with signal audacity, seized a village within half-musket shot of the light division, refused to retire; which so incensed Crawfurd that, turning twelve guns on the village, he overwhelmed it with bullets for half an hour. After paying the French captain this distinguished honour, the English general recovering his temper, sent a company of the forty-third down, which cleared the village in a few minutes. Meanwhile an affecting incident, contrasting strongly with the savage character of the preceding events, added to the interest of the day. A poor orphan Portuguese girl, about seventeen years of age, and very handsome, was seen coming down the mountain and driving an ass, loaded with all her property, through the midst of the French army. She had abandoned her dwelling in obedience to the proclamation, and now passed over the field of battle with a childish simplicity, totally unconscious of her perilous situation, and scarcely understanding which were the hostile and which the friendly troops, for no man on either side was so brutal as to molest her. In this battle of Busaco, the French after astonishing efforts of valour, were repulsed, in the manner to be expected from the strength of the ground, and the goodness of the soldiers opposed to them; and their loss, although prodigiously exaggerated at the time, was great. General Graind’orge and about eight hundred men were slain, generals Foy and Merle wounded, Simon made prisoner, and the sum total may be estimated at four thousand five hundred men, while that of the allies did not exceed thirteen hundred. For on the one side musketry and artillery were brought into full activity, but the French sought to gain the day by resolution and audacity rather than by fire. [Illustration: _Vol. 3, Plate 7._ OPERATIONS on the MONDEGO, 1810. _Published by T. & W. Boone 1830._] After this Massena judged the position of Busaco impregnable, and to turn it by the Mondego impossible, as the allies could pass that river quicker than himself. But a peasant informed him of the road leading from Mortagao over the Caramula to Boyalva, and he resolved to turn lord Wellington’s left. To cover this movement the skirmishing was renewed with such vigour on the 28th, that a general battle was for some time expected. Yet an ostentatious display of men, the disappearance of baggage, and the throwing up of entrenchments on the hill covering the roads to Mortagao plainly indicated some other design. Howbeit, it was not until evening when the enemy’s masses in front being sensibly diminished, and his cavalry descried winding over the distant mountains, that the project became quite apparent. Hill then crossed the Mondego, and retired by Espinal upon Thomar, while the centre and left of the army defiled in the night by the other roads upon Milheada. In this manner Busaco was evacuated before the 29th, the guns followed the convent road, and the light division furnished the rear-guard until they passed Fornos, when the open country enabled the cavalry to relieve them. Massena’s scouts reached Boyalva in the evening of the 28th, and it has been erroneously asserted, that Trant’s absence from Sardao alone enabled the French general to execute his design. Trant was however at Sardao, four miles from Boyalva before one o’clock on the 28th; but having, through a mistake of Baccellar’s, marched from Lamego, by the circuitous route of Oporto, instead of the direct road through San Pedro do Sul, he lost men from fatigue and desertion, and could bring only fifteen hundred militia into line; hence his absence or presence could have produced no effect whatever, even though he had, as lord Wellington intended, been at Boyalva itself. Accordingly, the French cavalry, pushing between him and the British horse, on the 29th cut off one of his patroles, and the next morning drove him, with the loss of twenty men, behind the Vouga. When Massena’s main body had cleared the defiles of Boyalva, it marched upon Coimbra, and the allies, crossing the Mondego at that city, commenced the passage of the defiles leading upon Condexa and Pombal. The commissariat stores, which had been previously removed from Raiva de Pena Cova to Figueras, were embarked at Peniché; the light division and the cavalry remained on the right bank of the river; and Baccellar was directed to bring down all the militia of the northern provinces upon the Vouga. But, notwithstanding the proclamations and the urgent, and even menacing remonstrances of the English general, the Portuguese Regency had not wasted the country behind the Mondego. During the few days that the enemy was stopped at Busaco, only the richest inhabitants had quitted Coimbra; when the allied army retreated, that city was still populous; and when the approach of the enemy left no choice but to fly or to risk the punishment of death and infamy announced in the proclamation, so direful a scene of distress ensued that the most hardened of men could not behold it without emotion. Mothers, with children of all ages; the sick, the old, the bedridden, and even lunatics, went or were carried forth; the most part, with little hope and less help, to journey for days in company with contending armies. Fortunately for this unhappy multitude, the weather was fine, and the roads firm, or the greatest number must have perished in the most deplorable manner. And, notwithstanding all this misery, the object was not gained: the people fled, but the provisions were left, and the mills were but partially and imperfectly ruined. On the 1st of October, the outposts were attacked, and driven from the hills bounding the plain of Coimbra to the north. The French, on entering this plain, suffered some loss from a cannonade, and the British cavalry were drawn up in line, but with no serious intention of fighting, and were soon after withdrawn across the Mondego, yet somewhat unskilfully; for the French following briskly, cut down some men even in the middle of the river, and were only prevented from forcing the passage by a strong skirmish, in which fifty or sixty men fell. This scrambling affair obliged the light division to march hastily through the city, to gain the defiles of Condeixa, which commence at the end of the bridge; and all the inhabitants who had not before quitted the place rushed out, each with what could be caught up in the hand, and driving before them a number of animals loaded with sick people or children. At the entrance to the bridge, the press was so great that the troops halted for a few moments, just under the prison; the jailor had fled with the keys, the prisoners, crowding to the windows, were endeavouring to tear down the bars with their hands, and even with their teeth, and bellowing in the most frantic manner, while the bitter lamentations of the multitude increased, and the pistol-shots of the cavalry, engaged at the ford below, were distinctly heard. Captain William Campbell, an officer of Crawfurd’s staff, burst the prison-doors, and released the wretched inmates, while the troops forced their way over the bridge; yet, at the other end, the up-hill road, passing between high rocks, was so crowded that no effort, even of the artillery, could make way. A troop of French dragoons crossed a ford, and hovering close upon the flank, increased the confusion; and a single regiment of foot would have sufficed to destroy the division, wedged in, as it was, in a hollow way, and totally incapable of advancing, retreating, or breaking out on either side. At last, some of the infantry opened a passage on the right flank, and, by great exertions, the road was cleared for the guns; but it was not until after dusk that the division reached Condeixa, although the distance was less than eight miles. Head-quarters were that night at Redinha, and the next day at Leiria. Hitherto the marches had been easy, the weather fine, and provisions abundant; nevertheless, the usual disorders of a retreat had already commenced. In Coimbra, a quantity of harness and intrenching tools were scattered in the streets; at Leiria, the magazines were plundered by the troops and camp-followers; and, at Condeixa, a magazine of tents, shoes, spirits, and salt meat was destroyed, or abandoned to the enemy: and, while the streets were flowing, ancle deep, with rum, the light division and Pack’s Portuguese brigade, at the distance of a quarter of a mile, were obliged to slaughter their own bullocks, and received only half rations of liquor. Lord Wellington arrested this growing disorder with a strong hand. Three men, taken in the fact at Leiria, were hanged on the spot; and some regiments, whose discipline was more tainted than others, were forbidden to enter a village. This vigorous exercise of command, aided by the fine weather and the enemy’s inactivity, restored order amongst the allies; while Massena’s conduct, the reverse of the English general’s, introduced the confusion of a retreat in the pursuing army. In Coimbra, the French general permitted waste; and, in a few days, resources were dissipated that, under good arrangements, would have supplied his troops for two months: and, during this licentious delay, the advantage gained by his dangerous flank march to Boyalva was lost. OBSERVATIONS. 1º. “_Attack vigorously, after having observed well where to strike._” This simple, but profound expression in Napoleon’s letter of service, forms the test by which the prince of Esling’s operations should be judged. 2º. The design of turning the strong ground behind Celerico, by the route of Viseu, required close and rapid movements; yet the French general did not quit Viseu, to march against Coimbra, until the tenth day after passing the Pinhel. This was not a “_a vigorous attack_.” 3º. Massena should have brought the allies to action in a forward position; and he might have done so either when Almeida fell, or before that event, because the complement of mules for the service of the army not being then full, the commissariat was dependent upon the country carts; and when the first retrograde movement took place from Alverca, the drivers fled with their animals, producing infinite confusion in the rear. The commissary-general Kennedy contrived, indeed, to procure fifteen hundred additional mules; but, intermediately, a brisk advance of the enemy would have forced the English general to fight, or retire more hastily than would have beseemed his reputation, or suited his political position. 4º. If the prince of Esling had not been misled by Alorna and Pamplona, and the more readily that the estates of the latter were situated about Coimbra, he would have judged that the line his adversary had studied for eight months, and now so carefully and jealously guarded, was more likely to afford advantages, than the circuitous route by Viseu, which was comparatively neglected. The French general, ill acquainted with the scene of action, but having the stronger and more moveable army, should have followed closely. A rapid pursuit, through Celerico, would have brought the French army on to the Alva before Hill or even Leith could have joined lord Wellington. The latter must then have fought with half his own army, or he must have retreated to the Lines. If he offered battle, his position could be turned either by the right or left; on the left by the slopes of the Estrella, on the right by crossing the Mondego, for Busaco was too extensive to be occupied before Hill and Leith arrived. Now, the road by Viseu being the longest and least practicable, demanded great diligence to compensate for the difficulties of the way, and to gain Coimbra and force the allies to a battle before Hill arrived, were objects more readily to be attained by the left bank of the Mondego. The point where to strike was therefore not “_well considered_,” and it is clear that Massena did not rightly estimate the greatness of his enterprise. 5º. When the rocks of Busaco glittering with bayonets first rose on the prince of Esling’s view, two fresh questions were to be solved. Was he to attack or to turn that formidable post? Or, availing himself of his numerical strength and central situation, was he to keep the allies in check, seize Oporto, and neglect Lisbon until better combinations could be made? The last question has been already discussed; but, contrary to the general opinion, the attack upon Busaco appears to me faulty in the execution rather than in the conception; and the march by which that position was finally turned, a violation of the soundest principles of war. In a purely military view, the English general may be censured for not punishing his adversary’s rashness. With respect to the attack, sixty-five thousand French veterans had no reason to believe that fifty thousand mixed and inexperienced troops, distributed on a mountain more than eight miles long, were impregnably posted. It would have been no overweening presumption in the French general to expect, that three corps well disposed, supported by a numerous artillery, and led on the first day, (as Ney desired,) might carry some part of the position, and it is an error, also, to suppose that guns could not have been used: the light division were constantly within range, and thirty pieces of artillery employed on that point would have wonderfully aided the attack by the sixth corps. But when a general in chief remains ten miles from a field of battle, gives his adversary two days to settle in a position, makes his attacks without connection, and without artillery, and brings forward no reserves, success is impossible even with the valiant soldiers Massena commanded. 6º. “_An army should always be in condition to fight._” “_A general should never abandon one line of communication without establishing another._” “_Flank marches within reach of an enemy are rash and injudicious._” These maxims of the greatest of all generals have been illustrated by many examples; Senef, Kollin, Rosbach, the valley of the Brenta, Salamanca, attest their value. Now, Massena violated all three, by his march to Boyalva, and some peculiar circumstances, or desperate crisis of affairs should be shewn, to warrant such a departure from general principles. Sir Joshua Reynolds, treating of another art says, “_genius begins where rules end_.” But here genius was dormant, and rules disregarded. Massena was not driven to a desperate game. The conquest of Oporto was open to him, or a march by Viseu upon the Vouga, which, though demanding time, was safe; while in that by Boyalva, he threw his whole army into a single and narrow defile, within ten miles of an enemy in position; and that also (as I have been informed by an officer of marshal Ney’s staff) with much disorder: the baggage and commissariat, the wounded and sick, the artillery, cavalry, and infantry, mixed together; discord raging amongst the generals, confusion amongst the soldiers, and in the night season when every difficulty is doubled. His “_army was not, then, in a condition to fight_.” He was making “_a flank march within reach of an enemy in position_,” and he was “_abandoning his line of communication without having established another_.” 7º. Lord Wellington was within four hours march of either end of the defile, through which the French army was moving. He might have sent the first division and the cavalry (forming with Portuguese regular troops, and Trant’s militia, a mass of twelve or fourteen thousand men) to Sardao, to head the French in the defile; while the second, third, fourth, fifth, and light divisions, advancing by Martagao, assailed their rear. That he did not do so, is to be attributed to his political position. War is full of mischances, and the loss of a single brigade might have caused the English government to abandon the contest altogether. Nevertheless, his retreat was more critically dangerous than such an attack would have been, and in a military view the battle of Busaco should not have been fought: it was extraneous to his original plan, it was forced upon him by events, and was in fine a political battle. 8º. Massena’s march, being unopposed, was successful. The allied army could not cope with him in the open country between Busaco and the sea, where his cavalry would have had a fair field; hence lord Wellington, reverting to his original plan, retreated by the Coimbra and Espinhal roads. But the prince of Esling was at Avelans de Cima and Milheada on the 30th, the allied cavalry and the light division being still on the right bank of the Mondego, which was fordable in many places below Coimbra. Had the French general, directing his march through Tentugal, crossed at those fords, and pushed rapidly on to Leiria, by the route sir Arthur Wellesley followed, in 1808, against Junot, the communication with Lisbon would have been cut: terror and confusion would then have raged in the capital, the patriarch’s faction would have triumphed, and a dangerous battle must have been risked before the Lines could be reached. 9º. When the allies had gained Leiria, and secured their line of retreat, the fate of Portugal was still in the French general’s hands. If he had established a fresh base at Coimbra, employed the ninth corps to seize Oporto, secured his line of communication with that city and with Almeida by fortified posts, and afterwards, extending his position by the left, attacked Abrantes, and given his hand to a corps sent by Soult from the south; not only would the campaign have been so far a successful one, but in no other manner could he have so effectually frustrated his adversary’s political and military projects. Lord Wellington dreaded such a proceeding, and hailed the renewed advance of the French army, as the rising of a heavy cloud discovering a clear sky in the horizon beneath. [Sidenote: Appendix, No. VII. Sect. 2.] Even at Coimbra, the prince was unacquainted with the existence of the lines, and believed that, beyond Santarem, the country was open for the usage of all arms. It is strange that, when Junot, Loison, Foy, and many other officers, who had served in Portugal, were present, better information was not obtained; but every part of this campaign illustrated Massena’s character, as drawn by Napoleon:--“Brave, decided, and intrepid; dull in conversation, but in danger acquiring clearness and force of thought; ambitious, filled with self-love, neglectful of discipline, regardless of good administration, and, consequently, disliked by the troops; his dispositions for battle were bad, but his temper was pertinacious to the last degree, and he was never discouraged!” 10º. It appears that the French reached Coimbra at the moment when the fourteen days’ bread, carried by the soldiers, was exhausted, and it is worthy of consideration that French soldiers are accustomed to carry so much bread. Other nations, especially the English, would not husband it; yet it was a practice of the ancient Romans, and it ought to be the practice of all armies. It requires a long previous discipline and well-confirmed military habits; but, without it, men are only half efficient, especially for offensive warfare. The secret of making perfect soldiers is only to be found in national customs and institutions; men should come to the ranks fitted, by previous habits, for military service, instead of being stretched as it were upon the bed of Procrustes, by a discipline which has no resource but fear. CHAPTER VIII. From the 1st of October until the 3d, the French army was in disorder. The 4th, Massena resumed his march by Condeixa and Leiria, leaving his sick and wounded, with a slender guard, (in all about four thousand seven hundred men,) at Coimbra. His hospital was established at the convent of Santa Clara, on the left bank of the river, and all the inhabitants, who were averse or unable to reach the Lines, came down from their hiding-places in the mountains. But scarcely had the prince left the city, when Trant, Miller, and Wilson, with nearly ten thousand militia, closed upon his rear, occupying the sierras on both sides of the Mondego, and cutting off all communication with Almeida. On the evening of the 4th, the French drove the English picquets from Pombal, and, the next morning, pushed so suddenly upon Leiria, as to create some confusion; but the road being crossed at right angles, by a succession of parallel ravines, captain Somers Cocks took advantage of one, to charge the head of the enemy, and checked him until general Anson’s brigade of cavalry, and captain Bull’s troop of artillery, arrived to his support. The French then, forming three columns, endeavoured to bear down the British with the centre, while the others turned the flanks. The ravines were, however, difficult to pass; Bull’s artillery played well into the principal body, and Anson, charging as it emerged from every defile, slew a great number. The British lost three officers and about fifty men, the enemy considerably more, and, in five hours, he did not gain as many miles of ground, although he had thirty-six squadrons opposed to ten. During this delay, Leiria was cleared, and the army retreated; the right by Thomar and Santarem, the centre by Batalha and Rio Mayor, the left by Alcobaça and Obidos, and at the same time a native force, under colonel Blunt, was thrown into Peniché. Massena followed, in one column, by the way of Rio Mayor; but, meanwhile, an exploit, as daring and hardy as any performed by a Partizan officer during the war, convicted him of bad generalship, and shook his plan of invasion to its base. SURPRISE OF COIMBRA. Colonel Trant reached Milheada, intending to form a junction with Wilson and Miller; but these last were still distant, and, believing that his own arrival was unknown at Coimbra, he resolved, alone to attack the French in that city. Having surprised a small post at Fornos early in the morning of the 7th, he sent his cavalry, at full gallop, through the streets of Coimbra, with orders to pass the bridge, and cut off all communication with the French army, of whose progress he was ignorant. Meanwhile, his infantry penetrated at different points into the principal parts of the town, and the enemy, astounded, made little or no resistance. The convent of Santa Clara surrendered at discretion, and thus, on the third day after the prince of Esling had quitted the Mondego, his depôts and hospitals, and nearly five thousand prisoners wounded and unwounded, amongst which there was a company of the marines of the imperial guards, fell into the hands of a small militia force! The next day, Miller and Wilson, arriving, spread their men on all the lines of communication, and picked up above three hundred more prisoners, while Trant conducted his to Oporto. [Sidenote: Appendix, No. VIII.] During the first confusion, the Portuguese committed some violence on the prisoners; and the Abbé du Pradt and other French writers have not hesitated to accuse Trant of disgracing his country and his uniform by encouraging this conduct; whereas, his exertions repressed it; and if the fact, that not more than ten men lost their lives under such critical circumstances, was not sufficient refutation, the falsehood is placed beyond dispute in a letter of thanks, written to colonel Trant, by the French officers who fell into his hands. This disaster made no change in Massena’s dispositions. He continued his march, and, on the 8th, his advanced guard drove the cavalry picquets out of Rio Mayor. General Slade, who commanded, took no heed of this; and the enemy, pushing rapidly on, was like to have taken the brigade of artillery in Alcoentre; a good deal of confusion ensued, but the royals and the sixteenth drove the French out of the town, sabred many, and made twelve prisoners. The next day the skirmish was renewed with various turns of fortune, but, finally, the British retreated. Meanwhile the allied army was entering the Lines. The first, fourth, and fifth divisions in the centre by Sobral, the third division on the left by Torres Vedras, and Hill’s corps on the right by Alhandra. The light division and Pack’s brigade should also have entered by Aruda. But Crawfurd, who had reached Alemquer on the 9th, was still there, at three o’clock, p. m. on the 10th. The weather being stormy, the men were placed under cover, and no indication of marching was given by the general. The cavalry had already filed into the Lines; yet no guards were posted, no patroles sent forward, nor any precaution taken against surprise, although the town, situated in a deep ravine, was peculiarly favourable for such an attempt. Some officers, uneasy at this state of affairs, anxiously watched the height in front, and, about four o’clock, observed some French dragoons on the summit, which was within cannon shot. The alarm was given, and the regiments got under arms, but the posts of assembly had been marked on an open space, very much exposed, and from whence the road led through an ancient gateway to the top of the mountain behind. The enemy’s numbers increased every moment, and they endeavoured to create a belief that their artillery was come up. This feint was easily seen through, but the general desired the regiments to break and re-form on the other side of the archway, out of gun range, and in a moment all was disorder. The baggage animals were still loading, the streets were crowded with the followers of the division, and the whole in one confused mass rushed or were driven headlong to the archway. Several were crushed, and with worse troops, a general panic must have ensued; but the greatest number of the soldiers, ashamed of the order, stood firm in their ranks until the first confusion had abated. Nevertheless the mischief was sufficiently great, and the enemy’s infantry descending the heights, endeavoured some to turn the town on the left, while others pushed directly through the streets in pursuit, and thus with his front in disorder, and his rear skirmishing, Crawfurd commenced a retreat. The weather was, however, so boisterous that the fire soon ceased, and a few men wounded and the loss of some baggage was all the hurt sustained; yet so uncertain is every thing in war, that this affair had like to have produced the most terrible results in another quarter. The division, instead of marching by Caregada and Cadafaes, followed the route of Sobral, and was obliged in the night to make a flank march of several miles along the foot of the Lines to gain Aruda, which was meanwhile left open to the enemy. Hence, the cavalry patroles from Villa Franca, meeting some stragglers and followers of the camp near Caregada, were by them told that the light division was cut off, a report confirmed in some measure by the unguarded state of Aruda, and by the presence of the enemy’s scouts on that side. This information alarmed general Hill for the safety of the second line, and the more so that the weakest part was in the vicinity of Aruda; he made a retrograde movement towards Alverca with a view to watch the valley of Calandrix, or to gain the pass of Bucellas according to circumstances. Hence, when the enemy was in full march against the Lines, the front from Alhandra to the forts above Sobral, a distance of eight or nine miles, was quite disgarnished of troops. The true state of affairs was, however, quickly ascertained, and Hill regained Alhandra before day-light on the 11th. During this time the second and the eighth corps passed Alemquer, the former marching upon Villa Franca, the latter upon Sobral. Reynier’s movements were languid, he did not discover the unguarded state of Alhandra, and his picquets did not enter Villa Franca until the next day; but general Clausel, one of the most distinguished officers in the French army, coming upon Sobral in the dusk with the head of the eighth corps dislodged the troops of the first division, occupied the ridge on which the town is built, and in the night threw up some entrenchments close under the centre of the allies position. It is however time to give a more detailed description of those celebrated works, improperly called THE LINES OF TORRES VEDRAS. [Sidenote: Memoranda of the lines, &c. by Col. J. T. Jones, Royal Engineers, printed for private circulation.] It has been already said, that they consisted of three distinct ranges of defence. The first, extending from Alhandra on the Tagus to the mouth of the Zizandre on the sea-coast, was, following the inflections of the hills, twenty-nine miles long. The second, traced at a distance varying from six to ten miles in rear of the first, stretched from Quintella on the Tagus to the mouth of the St. Lorenza, being twenty-four miles in length. The third, intended to cover a forced embarkation, extended from Passo d’Arcos on the Tagus to the tower of Junquera on the coast. Here an outer line, constructed on an opening of three thousand yards, enclosed an entrenched camp designed to cover the embarkation with fewer troops, should the operation be delayed by bad weather; and within this second camp, Fort St. Julian’s (whose high ramparts and deep ditches defied an escalade) was armed and strengthened to enable a rear-guard to protect both itself and the army. The nearest part of the second line was twenty-four miles from these works at Passo d’Arcos, and some parts of the first line were two long marches distant; but the principal routes led through Lisbon, where measures were taken to retard the enemy and give time for the embarkation. Of these stupendous Lines, the second, whether regarded for its strength or importance, was undoubtedly the principal, and the others only appendages, the one as a final place of refuge, the other as an advanced work to stem the first violence of the enemy, and to enable the army to take up its ground on the second line without hurry or pressure. Massena having, however, wasted the summer season on the frontiers, the first line acquired such strength, both from labour and from the fall of rain, that lord Wellington resolved to abide his opponent’s charge there. The ground presented to the French being, as it were, divided into five parts or positions, shall be described in succession from right to left. 1º. From Alhandra to the head of the valley of Calandrix. This distance, of about five miles, was a continuous and lofty ridge, defended by thirteen redoubts, and for two miles rendered inaccessible by a scarp fifteen to twenty feet high, executed along the brow. It was guarded by the British and Portuguese divisions under general Hill, and flanked from the Tagus by a strong flotilla of gun-boats, manned by British seamen. 2º. From the head of the vale of Calandrix to the Pé de Monte. This position, also five miles in length, consisted of two salient mountains forming the valley of Aruda, that town being exactly in the mouth of the pass. Only three feeble redoubts, totally incapable of stopping an enemy for an instant, were constructed here; the defence of the ground was entrusted to general Crawfurd and the light division. 3º. The Monte Agraça. This lofty mountain overtopped the adjacent country in such a manner, that from its summit the whole of the first line could be distinctly observed. The right was separated from the Aruda position, by a deep ravine which led to nothing, the left overlooked the village and valley of Zibreira, and the centre overhung the town of Sobral. The summit of this mountain was crowned by an immense redoubt, mounting twenty-five guns, and having three smaller works, containing nineteen guns, clustered around. The garrisons, amounting to two thousand men, were supplied by Pack’s brigade, and on the reverse of the position, which might be about four miles in length, the fifth division, under general Leith, was posted in reserve. 4º. From the valley of Zibreira to Torres Vedras. This position, seven miles long, was at first without works, because it was only when the rains had set in, that the resolution to defend the first line permanently, was adopted. But the ground being rough and well defined, and the valley in front watered by the Zizandre, now become a considerable river, it presented a fine field of battle for a small army. The first and fourth, and a sixth division formed of troops just arrived from England and from Cadiz, were there posted, under the immediate command of lord Wellington himself; and his head-quarters were fixed at Pero Negro, near the Secorra, a rock, on which a telegraph was erected, communicating with every part of the Lines. 5º. From the heights of Torres Vedras to the mouth of the Zizandre. The right flank of this position and the pass in front of the town of Torres Vedras were secured, first, by one great redoubt, mounting forty guns, and, secondly, by several smaller forts, judiciously planted so as to command all the approaches. From these works to the sea a range of moderate heights were crowned with small forts; but the chief defence there, after the rains had set in, was to be found in the Zizandre, which was not only unfordable, but overflowed its banks, and formed an impassable marsh. A paved road, parallel to the foot of the hills, run along the whole front, that is, from Torres Vedras, by Runa Sobral and Aruda, to Alhandra. This was the nature of the _first_ line of defence; the _second_ was still more formidable. 1º. From the mouth of the St. Lourença to Mafra, a distance of seven miles, there was a range of hills naturally steep, artificially scarped, and covered by a deep, and in many parts impracticable ravine. The salient points were secured by forts, which flanked and commanded the few accessible points; but as this line was extensive, a secondary post was fortified a few miles in the rear, to secure a road leading from Ereceira to Cintra. 2º. On the right of the above line the Tapada, or royal park of Mafra, offered some open ground for an attack. Yet it was strong, and, together with the pass of Mafra, was defended by a system of fourteen redoubts, constructed with great labour and care, well considered with respect to the natural disposition of the ground, and, in some degree, connected with the secondary post spoken of above: in front, the Sierra de Chypre, covered with redoubts, obstructed all approaches to Mafra itself. 3º. From the Tapada to the pass of Bucellas, a space of ten or twelve miles, which formed the middle of the second line, the country is choked by the Monte Chique, the Cabeça, or head of which is in the centre of, and overtopping all the other, mountain masses. A road, conducted along a chain of hills, high and salient, but less bold than any other parts of the line, connected Mafra with the Cabeça, and was secured by a number of forts. The country in front was extremely difficult, and a second and stronger range of heights, parallel to and behind the first, offered a good fighting position, which could only be approached with artillery by the connecting road in front, and to reach that, either the Sierra de Chypre, on the left, or the pass of the Cabeça de Monte Chique, on the right, must have been carried. Now the works covering the latter consisted of a cluster of redoubts constructed on the inferior rocky heads in advance of the Cabeça, and completely commanding all the approaches, and both from their artificial and natural strength, nearly impregnable to open force. The Cabeça and its immediate flanks were considered secure in their natural precipitous strength; and, in like manner, the ridges connecting the Cabeça with the pass of Bucellas, being impregnable, were left untouched, save the blocking of one bad mule road that led over them. 4º. From Bucellas (the pass of which was difficult and strongly defended by redoubts on each side) a ridge, or rather a collection of impassable rocks, called the Sierra de Serves, stretches to the right for two miles without a break, and then dies away by gradual slopes in the low ground about the Tagus. These declivities and the flat banks of the river offered an opening two miles and a half wide, which was laboriously and carefully strengthened by redoubts, water-cuts, and retrenchments, and connected by a system of forts with the heights of Alhandra, but it was the weakest part of the whole line in itself, and the most dangerous from its proximity to the valleys of Calandrix and Aruda. There were five roads practicable for artillery piercing the _first line_ of defence, namely, two at Torres Vedras, two at Sobral, and one at Alhandra; but as two of these united again at the Cabeça, there were, in fact, only four points of passage through the _second line_, that is to say, at Mafra, Monte Chique, Bucellas, and Quintella in the flat ground. The aim and scope of all the works was to bar those passes and to strengthen the favourable fighting positions between them, without impeding the movements of the army. These objects were attained, and it is certain that the loss of the _first line_ would not have been injurious, save in reputation, because the retreat was secure upon the _second and stronger line_, and the guns of the first were all of inferior calibre, mounted on common truck carriages, and consequently immoveable and useless to the enemy. The movements of the allies were free and unfettered by the works. But the movements of the French army were impeded and cramped by the great Monte Junta, which, rising opposite the centre of the first line, sent forth a spur called the Sierra de Baragueda in a slanting direction, so close up to the heights of Torres Vedras that the narrow pass of Ruña alone separated them. As this pass was commanded by heavy redoubts, Massena was of necessity obliged to dispose his forces on one or other side of the Baragueda, and he could not transfer his army to either without danger; because the sierra, although not impassable, was difficult, and the movement, which would require time and arrangement, could always be overlooked from the Monte Agraça, whence, in a few hours, the allied forces could pour down upon the head, flank, or rear of the French while in march. And this with the utmost rapidity, because communications had been cut by the engineers to all important points of the Lines, and a system of signals were established, by which orders were transmitted from the centre to the extremities in a few minutes. Thus much I have thought fit to say respecting _the Lines_, too little for the professional reader, too much, perhaps, for a general history. But I was desirous to notice, somewhat in detail, works, more in keeping with ancient than modern military labours, partly that a just idea might be formed of the talents of the British engineers who constructed them, and partly to show that lord Wellington’s measures of defence were not, as some French military writers have supposed, dependent upon the first line. Had that been stormed, the standard of Portuguese independence could still have been securely planted amidst the rocks of the second position. To occupy fifty miles of fortification, to man one hundred and fifty forts, and to work six hundred pieces of artillery, required a number of men; but a great fleet in the Tagus, a superb body of marines sent out from England, the civic guards of Lisbon, the Portuguese heavy artillery corps, the militia and the ordenança of Estremadura furnished, altogether, a powerful reserve. The native artillery and the militia supplied all the garrisons of the forts on the second, and most of those on the first line. The British marines occupied the third line: the navy manned the gun-boats on the river, and aided, in various ways, the operation in the field. The recruits from the depôts, and all the men on furlough, being called in, rendered the Portuguese army stronger than it had yet been; and the British army, reinforced, as I have said, both from Cadiz and England, and remarkably healthy, presented such a front as a general would desire to see in a dangerous crisis. [Illustration: _Vol. 3, Plate 8._ LINES of _Torres Vedras_ 1810. _Published by T. & W. Boone 1830._] It was, however, necessary not only to have strength, but the appearance of strength; and lord Wellington had so dealt with Romana that, without much attention to the wishes of his own government, the latter agreed to join the allies with two divisions. The first, under his own command, crossed the Tagus at Aldea Gallega on the 19th of October, reached head-quarters the 24th, and was posted at Enxara de los Cavalleros, just behind the Monte Agraça; the other followed in a few days: and thus, before the end of October, not less than one hundred and thirty thousand fighting men received rations within the Lines; more than seventy thousand being regular troops, completely disposable and unfettered by the works. Meanwhile, Mendizabel, with the remainder of the Spanish army, reinforced by Madden’s Portuguese dragoons, advanced towards Zafra. Ballasteros, at the same time, moved upon Araceña; and Mortier, ignorant of Romana’s absence, retired across the Morena on the 8th, for Soult was then seriously menacing Cadiz. Thus fortune combined, with the dispositions of the English general, to widen the distance, and to diversify the objects of the French armies, at the moment when the allies were concentrating the greatest force on the most important point. Massena, surprised at the extent and strength of works, the existence of which had only become known to him five days before he came upon them, employed several days to examine their nature. The heights of Alhandra he judged inattackable; but the valleys of Calandrix and Aruda attracted his attention. Through the former he could turn Hill’s position, and come at once upon the weakest part of the second line; yet the abattis and the redoubts erected, and hourly strengthening, gave him little encouragement to attack there; while the nature of the ground about Aruda was such that he could not ascertain what number of troops guarded it, although he made several demonstrations, and frequently skirmished with the light division, to oblige Crawfurd to shew his force. That general, by making the town of Aruda an advanced post, rendered it impossible to discover his true situation without a serious affair; and, in a short time, his division, with prodigious labour, secured the position in a manner really worthy of admiration. Across the ravine on the left, a loose stone wall, sixteen feet thick and forty feet high, was raised; and across the great valley of Aruda, a double line of abattis was drawn; not composed, as is usual, of the limbs of trees, but of full-grown oaks and chestnuts, dug up with all their roots and branches, dragged, by main force, for several hundred yards, and then reset and crossed, so that no human strength could break through. Breast-works, at convenient distances, to defend this line of trees, were then cast up; and along the summits of the mountain, for a space of nearly three miles, including the salient points, other stone walls, six feet high and four in thickness, with banquettes, were built; so that a good defence could have been made against the attacks of twenty thousand men. The next points that drew Massena’s attention were the Monte Agraça and the vale of the Upper Zizandre, where, from the recent period at which lord Wellington had resolved to offer battle on the first line, no outworks had been constructed; and the valley of Zibreira, and even the hills above Runa, had not been fortified. Here it was possible to join battle on more equal terms, but the position of the allies was still very formidable; the flanks and rear were protected by great forts, and not only was a powerful mass of troops permanently posted there, but six battalions, drawn from Hill’s corps, and placed at Bucellas, could, in a very short time, have come into action. Beyond Runa, the Baragueda ridge and the forts of Torres Vedras forbad any flank movement by the French general; and it only remained for him to dispose his troops in such a manner between Villa Franca and Sobral that, while the heads of the columns menaced the weakest points of the Lines, a few hours would suffice to concentrate the whole army at any part between the Tagus and the Baragueda ridge. The second corps, still holding the hills opposite Alhandra, extended its right along some open ground as far as Aruda, and being covered, at that point, by a force of cavalry, was connected with the eighth corps; the head of which was pushed forward on Sobral, occupying the lower ridges of the Baragueda, and lining the banks of the Zizandre as far as Duas Portas on the road to Runa: the outposts of the two armies being nearly in contact. Massena did not bring the sixth corps beyond Otta, and his dispositions were not made without several skirmishes, especially near Sobral, on the morning of the 14th, when, attempting to dislodge the seventy-first regiment from a field-work, his troops were repulsed, pursued, and driven from their own retrenchments, which were held until evening; and only evacuated because the whole of the eight corps was advancing for the purpose of permanently establishing its position. The loss of the allies in these petty affairs amounted to one hundred and fifty; of which, the greatest part fell at Sobral; that of the enemy was estimated higher. The English general Harvey was wounded, and at Villa Franca the fire of the gun-boats killed the French general St. Croix, a young man of signal ability and promise. The war was now reduced to a species of blockade: Massena’s object being to feed his army until reinforcements reached it; lord Wellington’s to starve the French before succour could arrive. The former spread his moveable columns in the rear to seek for provisions, and commenced forming magazines at Santarem, where his principal depôt was established; but the latter drew down all the militia and ordenança of the north on the French rear, putting their right in communication with the garrison of Peniché, and their left with the militia of Lower Beira. To strengthen the latter he prevailed on Carlos d’España to cross the Tagus, and act between Castello Branco and Abrantes; and thus the French were completely enclosed, without any weakening of the regular army. To aid the communication between Peniché and the militia, a Spanish light battalion and a strong body of English cavalry advanced to Ramalhal. Obidos, surrounded by old walls, was placed in a temporary state of defence, and garrisoned by three hundred Portuguese, under major Fenwick; and a moveable column, under colonel Waters, issuing from Torres Vedras, made incursions against the enemy’s marauding detachments, capturing many prisoners, and part of a considerable convoy which was passing the Baragueda. The French were thus continually harassed, yet their detachments scoured the whole country, even beyond Leiria, and obtained provisions in considerable quantities. [Sidenote: See Annals of the Peninsular War, Vol. II. p. 331.] Meanwhile, the main bodies of the hostile forces remained quiet, although the French right was greatly exposed. Lord Wellington had four British divisions and Romana’s corps, forming a mass of twenty-five thousand men, close round Sobral, and, by directing the greatest part of his cavalry and the six battalions, at Bucellas, upon Aruda, he could have assembled from eight to ten thousand men there also, who, advancing a short distance into the plain, could, in conjunction with Hill, have kept the second corps in check; while the twenty-five thousand, pouring down at daylight from the Monte Agraça, from the valley of Zibreira, and from the side of Ruña, could have enveloped and crushed the head of the eighth corps long before the sixth could have reached the scene of action. But war is a curious and complicated web! and while the purely military part was thus happily situated and strong, the political part was one of weakness and alarm. Scarcely could the English general maintain a defensive attitude, struggling as he was against the intrigues and follies of men who have, nevertheless, been praised for their “earnest and manly co-operation.” CHAPTER IX. [Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Papers. MSS.] The presence of the enemy, in the heart of the country, embarrassed the finances, and the Regency applied to England for an additional subsidy. Mr. Stuart, seeing the extreme distress, took upon himself to direct the house of Sampayo to furnish provisions to the troops on the credit of the first subsidy; he also made the greatest exertions to feed the fugitive inhabitants, forty thousand of whom arrived before the 13th of October, and others were hourly coming in, destitute and starving. Corn, purchased at any price, was sought for in all countries; from Ireland, America, and Egypt; and one thousand tons of government shipping were lent to merchants to fetch grain from Algiers. One commission of citizens was formed to facilitate the obtaining cattle and corn from the northern provinces; another to regulate the transport of provisions to the army, and to push a trade with Spain through the Alemtejo. Small craft were sent up the Tagus to carry off both the inhabitants and their stock, from the islands and from the left bank, and post-vessels were established along the coast to Oporto. Bullion and jewels were put on board the men of war, a proclamation was issued, calling upon the people to be tranquil, and a strong police was established to enforce this object. Finally, to supply the deficiency of tonnage created by the sending off the transports in search of corn, an embargo was laid upon the port of Lisbon; it was strongly protested against by the Americans, but an imperious necessity ruled. All these measures were vehemently opposed by the Patriarch and his faction; and that nothing might be wanting to shew how entirely the fate of the Peninsula depended, in that hour, upon lord Wellington’s firmness, the fears of the British cabinet, which had been encreasing as the crisis approached, were now plainly disclosed. During the retreat from the north, affairs seemed so gloomy to the eyes of some officers of rank, that their correspondence bore evidence of their feelings; and the letters of general Spencer and general Charles Stewart appeared so desponding to lord Liverpool, that he transmitted them to lord Wellington, and, by earnestly demanding an opinion upon their contents, shewed how deeply they had disturbed his own mind. Thus beset on every side, the English general rose like a giant. Without noticing either the arguments or the forebodings in these letters, he took a calm historical review of the grounds upon which he had undertaken the defence of Portugal, and which he had before pointed out to the minister he was addressing; then shewing that, up to that period, his views had been in every instance borne out by the results, he demonstrated that it was reasonable to confide in his judgement of what was to come. Having thus vindicated his own prudence and foresight by irresistible facts, he proceeded to trace the probable course of future events, entered largely into both his own and the enemy’s designs, and with such a judgement and sagacity that the subsequent course of the war never belied his anticipations. This remarkable letter exists, and, were all other records of lord Wellington’s genius to be lost, it would alone suffice to vindicate his great reputation to posterity. [Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 3.] Having with conscious superiority replied to his own government, he, with a fierceness rendered necessary by the crisis, turned upon the patriarch and his coadjutors. Reproaching them for their unpatriotic, foolish, and deceitful conduct, he told them plainly, that they were unfaithful servants of their country and their prince, and threatened _to withdraw the British army altogether_, if the practices of which he complained were not amended. “The king of England and the prince regent of Portugal had,” he said, “entrusted him with the conduct of the military operations, and he would not suffer any person to interfere. He knew what to do, and he would not alter his plans to meet the _senseless suggestions of the Regency_. Let the latter look to their own duties! Let them provide food for the army and the people, and keep the capital tranquil.” “With principal Souza,” he said, “it was not possible to act, and, if that person continued in power, the country would be lost. Either the principal or himself must quit their employments; if himself, he would take care that the world should know the reasons; meanwhile he would address the prince upon the conduct of the Regency.” [Sidenote: Appendix No. V. Section 4.] “He had hoped,” he resumed in another letter, “that the Portuguese government was satisfied with his acts, and that instead of endeavouring to render all defence useless by disturbing the minds of the populace at Lisbon, they would have adopted measures to secure the tranquillity of that capital. But, like other weak individuals, they added duplicity to weakness, and their past expressions of approbation and gratitude he supposed were intended to convey censure. All he asked from them was to preserve tranquillity, to provide food for their own troops while employed in the Lines, and to be prepared, in case of disaster, to save those persons and their families who were obnoxious to the enemy.” “I have,” he said “little doubt of final success, but _I have fought a sufficient number of battles to know, that the result of any is not certain, even with the best arrangements_.” These reproaches were neither too severe nor ill-timed, for the war had been hanging in even balance, and the weight of interested folly thus thrown in by the Regency, was beginning to sink the scale. Yet to shew the justice of lord Wellington’s complaints, it is necessary to resume the thread of those intrigues which have been before touched upon. [Sidenote: Appendix No. V. Section 8.] Instead of performing their own duties, the government assumed, that the struggle could be maintained on the frontier, and when they should have been removing the people and the provisions from the line of retreat, they were discussing the expediency of military operations which were quite impracticable. When convinced of their error by facts, they threw the burthen of driving the country upon the general, although they knew that he was ignorant even of the names and places of abode of those officers and magistrates who were to execute it, and that there was but one Portuguese agent at head-quarters to give assistance in translating the necessary orders. When this was remarked to them, they issued the orders themselves, but made the execution referable to the general, without his knowledge, and well knowing that he had no means of communicating with the country people, and this at the very moment of the enemy’s advance. The battle of Busaco, by delaying the French army, alone enabled the orders even to reach the persons to whom they were addressed. But it was the object of the Regency, by nourishing and soothing the national indolence, to throw the odium of harsh and rigorous measures upon the British authorities. Lord Wellington, however, while he reproached them for this conduct, never shrunk from the odium; he avowed himself, in his proclamations, the author of the plan for wasting the country, and he was willing the Regency should shelter themselves under his name, but he was not willing to lose the fruit of his responsibility, or, that those whose courage did shrink from the trial, “should seek popularity with the populace at the expense of the best interests of the country.” After the disputes which followed the fall of Almeida, the English government convinced that a more secure and powerful grasp must be taken of Portugal, insisted, at the instance of lord Wellington, that their envoy, Mr. Stuart, should have a seat in the Regency, and that the subsidy should be placed under the control of the British instead of the native authorities. The 2d of October, Mr. Stuart took his seat, and together with doctor Noguera, the Conde de Redondo, and the marquis Olhao (the former of whom was decidedly averse to the Souzas’ faction, and the two latter moderate in their conduct) proceeded to control the intrigues and violence of the Patriarch and principal Souza. It was full time, for both were formally protesting against the destruction of the mills in Beira, and vigorously opposing every measure proposed by lord Wellington. They were deeply offended by the suppression of the Lusitanian legion, which about this time was incorporated with the regular forces; and they had openly declared, that the Portuguese troops should not retreat from the frontiers, and that if the enemy obliged the British army to embark, not a native, whether soldier or citizen, should go with it. When the allies, notwithstanding this, fell back to the Lines, Souza proposed that the Regency should fly to the Algarves, which being indignantly protested against by Mr. Stuart, Souza threatened to quit the government. The dispute was then referred to lord Wellington, and, on the 6th of October, drew from him those severe expressions of which an abstract has been given above. Meanwhile, the restless Principal pursued his designs with activity, and, in conjunction with his brothers and the Patriarch, established a regular and systematic opposition to lord Wellington’s plans of defence. Factious in council, they were also clamorous out of doors, where many echoed their sentiments, from anger at some wanton ravages, that, in despite of the general’s utmost efforts, had marked the retreat. They courted the mob of Lisbon servilely and grossly; and Antonio Souza getting the superintendence of the succours for the fugitive population, became the avowed patron of all persons preferring complaints. He took pains to stimulate and exasperate the public griefs, and to exaggerate the causes of them, frequently hinting that the Portuguese people and not the British army had formerly driven out the French. All these calumnies being echoed by the numerous friends and partisans of the caballers, and by the fidalgos, who endeavoured to spread discontent as widely as possible; there wanted but slight encouragement from the Brazils, to form a national party, and openly attack the conduct of the war. To obtain this encouragement, Raymundo, the old tool of the party in the Oporto violences, was sent to the court of Rio Janeiro, to excite the prince regent against lord Wellington; and the Patriarch himself wrote to the prince of Wales and to the duke of Sussex, thinking to incense them also against the English general. The extent and nature of the intrigues may be estimated from a revelation made at the time by baron Eben, and by the editor of a Lisbon newspaper, called the _Brazilienza_. Those persons abandoning the faction, asserted that the Patriarch, the Souzas, and (while he remained in Portugal) the ex-plenipotentiary, Mr. Villiers, were personally opposed to lord Wellington, marshal Beresford, and Mr. de Forjas, and had sought to remove them from their situations, and to get the duke of Brunswick appointed generallissimo in Portugal; that they had also endeavoured to engage the duke of Sussex to take a leading part, but that his royal highness had repulsed them at the outset; that their plan was to engage a newspaper to be their organ in London, as the _Brazilienza_ was to have been in Lisbon; that in their correspondence lord Wellington was designated under the name of _Alberoni_; lord Wellesley, _Lama_; Beresford, _Ferugem_; Mr. Stuart, _Labre_; the Patriarch, _Saxe_; Antonio Souza, _Lamberti_; colonel Bunbury and Mr. Peel, then under secretaries of state, as _Thin_ and _By-Thin_. That after Mr. Villier’s departure, the intrigue was continued by the Patriarch and the Souzas, but upon a different plan; for, overborne by the vigour of Mr. Stuart in the council, they agreed to refrain from openly opposing either him or Forjas, but resolved to write down what either might utter, and transmit, that which suited their purpose, to the Conde de Linhares and the chevalier Souza; these persons undertaking to represent the information so received, after their own fashion, to the cabinets of St. James’ and Rio Janeiro. The violent temper of the Patriarch unfitted him to execute this plan; he made open display of his hostility to the English general; and it is worthy of observation that, while thus thwarting every measure necessary to resist the enemy, his faction did not hesitate to exercise the most odious injustice and cruelty against those whom they denominated well-wishers to the French. By a decree of the prince regent’s, dated the 20th of March, 1809, private denunciations in cases of disaffection, were permitted, the informer’s name to be kept secret; and in September, 1810, this infamous system, although strenuously opposed by Mr. Stuart, was acted upon, and many persons suddenly sent to the islands, and others thrown into dungeons. Some might have been guilty; and the government pretended that a traitorous correspondence with the enemy was carried on through a London house, which they indicated; but it does not appear that a direct crime was brought home to any, and it is certain that many innocent persons were oppressed. All these things shewing that vigorous measures were necessary to prevent the ruin of the general cause, lord Wellesley dealt so with the Brazilian court, that every intrigue there was soon crushed, lord Wellington’s power in Portugal confirmed, and his proceedings approved of. Authority was also given him to dismiss or to retain Antonio Souza and even to remove lord Strangford, the British envoy at Rio Janeiro, if it suited him so to do. The subsidies were placed under his and Mr. Stuart’s control; admiral Berkeley was appointed to a seat in the Regency; and, in fine, Portugal was reduced to the condition of a vassal state. A policy which could never have been attempted, however necessary, if the people at large had not been willing to acquiesce; but firm in their attachment to independence and abhorring the invaders, they submitted cheerfully to this temporary assumption of command, and fully justified the sagacity of the man, who thus dared to grasp at the whole power of Portugal with one hand, while he kept the power of France at bay with the other. Although so strongly armed, lord Wellington removed no person, but with equal prudence and moderation reserved the exercise of this great authority until further provocation should render it absolutely necessary. But this remedy for the disorders above related was not perfected for a long time, nor until after a most alarming crisis of affairs had been brought on by the conduct of the Lisbon cabal. [Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 5.] From the strength of the Lines, it is plain that offensive operations were far more to be dreaded on the left, than on the right bank of the Tagus. In the Alemtejo, the enemy could more easily subsist, more effectually operate to the injury of Lisbon, and more securely retreat upon his own resources. Now lord Wellington had repeatedly urged the Regency to oblige the inhabitants to abandon their dwellings, and carry off their herds and grain, especially those near the banks, and on the numerous islands in the river, and above all things to destroy or remove every boat. To carry this into effect a commission had been appointed, but so many delays and obstacles were interposed by the Patriarch and his coadjutors, that the commissioners did not leave Lisbon until the enemy were close upon that river; both banks being still stocked with cattle and corn, and what was worse forty large boats on the right side, by which the French immediately made themselves masters of the islands, especially of Lizirias, where they obtained abundance of provisions. But while the Regency thus provided for the enemy, they left the fortresses of Palmella, St. Felippe de Setuval, and Abrantes with empty magazines. Lord Wellington thinking that the ordenança on the left bank, of whom four hundred were armed with English muskets and furnished with three pieces of artillery, would be sufficient to repel plundering parties attempting to cross the Tagus, was unwilling to spare men from the Lines. He wanted numbers there and he also judged that the ordenança would, if once assisted by a regular force, leave the war to their allies. But Antonio Souza was continually urging the planting of ambuscades, and other like frivolities, upon the left bank of the Tagus; and as his opinions were spread abroad by his party, the governor of Setuval adopted the idea, and suddenly advanced with his garrison to Salvatierra on the river side. This ridiculous movement attracted the enemy’s attention, and lord Wellington fearing they would pass over a detachment, disperse the Portuguese troops, and seize Setuval before it could be succoured, peremptorily ordered the governor to return to that fortress. This retrograde movement caused the dispersion of the ordenança, and consternation reigned in the Alemtejo. The supply of grain coming from Spain was stopped, the chain of communications broken, and, the alarm spreading to Lisbon, there was no remedy but to send general Fane, with some guns and Portuguese cavalry, that could be ill spared from the Lines, to that side. Fane immediately destroyed all the boats he could find, hastened the removal of provisions, and patrolling the banks of the river as high as the mouth of the Zezere, kept a strict watch upon the enemy’s movements. Other embarrassments were however continually arising. The number of prisoners in Lisbon had accumulated so as to become a serious inconvenience; because, for some reason which does not appear, the English Admiralty would not permit them to be transported to England in ships of war, and other vessels could not be spared. About this time also admiral Berkeley, whose elaborate report the year before, stated that, although the enemy should seize the heights of Almada, he could not injure the fleet in the river, now admitted that he was in error; and the engineers were directed to construct secondary lines on that side. [Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 7.] Another formidable evil, arising from the conduct of the Regency, was the state of the Portuguese army. The troops were so ill supplied that more than once they would have disbanded, had they not been relieved from the British magazines. Ten thousand soldiers of the line deserted between April and December, and the militia and ordenança abandoned their colours in far greater numbers; for, as no remonstrance could induce the Regency to put the laws in force against the delinquents, that which was at first the effect of want became a habit; so that even when regularly fed from the British stores within the Lines, the desertion was alarmingly great. [Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 10.] Notwithstanding the mischiefs thus daily growing up, neither the Patriarch nor the Principal ceased their opposition. The order to fortify the heights of Almada caused a violent altercation in the Regency, and lord Wellington, greatly incensed, denounced them to the Prince Regent; and his letter produced such a paroxysm of anger in the Patriarch, that he personally insulted Mr. Stuart, and vented his passion in the most indecent language against the general. Soon after this, the deplorable state of the finances obliged the government to resort to the dangerous expedient of requisitions in kind for the feeding of the troops: and in that critical moment the Patriarch, whose influence was, from various causes, very great, took occasion to declare that “he would not suffer burthens to be laid upon the people which were evidently for no other purpose than _to nourish the war in the heart of the kingdom_.” [Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 7.] But it was his and his coadjutors’ criminal conduct that really nourished the war, for there were ample means to have carried off in time ten-fold the quantity of provisions left for the enemy. Massena could not then have remained a week before the Lines, and his retreat would have been attended with famine and disaster, if the measures previously agreed to by the Regency had been duly executed. Whereas now, the country about Thomar, Torres Novas, Gollegao, and Santarem was absolutely untouched; the inhabitants remained; the mills, but little injured, were quickly repaired, and lord Wellington had the deep mortification to find that his well considered design was frustrated by the very persons from whom he had a right to expect the most zealous support. There was, indeed, every reason to believe that the prince of Esling would be enabled to maintain his positions until an overwhelming force should arrive from Spain to aid him. “_It is heart-breaking_,” was the bitter reflection of the British general, “_to contemplate the chance of failure from such obstinacy and folly_.” CHAPTER X. The increasing strength of the works, and the report of British deserters (unhappily very numerous at this period), soon convinced Massena that it was impracticable to force the Lines without great reinforcements. His army suffered from sickness, from the irregular forces in the rear, and from the vengeance of individuals, driven to despair by the excesses which many French soldiers, taking advantage of the times, committed in their foraging courses. Nevertheless, with an obstinate pertinacity, only to be appreciated by those who have long made war, the French general maintained his forward position, until the country for many leagues behind him was a desert, and then, reluctantly yielding to necessity, he sought for a fresh camp in which to make head against the allies, while his foragers searched more distant countries for food. Early in October artillery officers had been directed to collect boats for crossing both the Tagus and the Zezere. Montbrun’s cavalry, stretching along the right bank of the former, gathered provisions, and stored them at Santarem, and both there and at Barquiña (a creek in the Tagus, below the mouth of the Zezere), rafts were formed and boats constructed with wheels, to move from one place to another; but, from the extreme paucity of materials and tools, the progress was necessarily slow. Meanwhile Fane, reinforced by some infantry, watched them closely from the left bank; Carlos d’España came down from Castello Branco to Abrantes; Trant acted sharply on the side of Ourem, and Wilson’s Portuguese militia so infested the country from Espinhal to the Zezere, that Loison’s division was detached upon Thomar to hold him in check. Towards the end of October, however, all the hospitals, stores, and other incumbrances of the French army were removed to Santarem, and, on the 31st, two thousand men forded the Zezere above Punhete to cover the construction of a bridge. From this body, four hundred infantry and two hundred dragoons, under general Foy, moved against Abrantes, and, after skirmishing with the garrison, made towards Sobreira Formosa. The allies’ bridge of Villa Velha was foolishly burnt, but Foy, with a smaller escort, pushed for Pena Macor, and the 8th had gained Ciudad Rodrigo, on his way to France, having undertaken to carry information of the state of affairs to Napoleon; a task which he performed with singular rapidity, courage, and address. The remainder of his escort retiring down the Zezere, were attacked by Wilson, and suffered some loss. The bridge on the Zezere was destroyed by floods, the 6th; but the enemy having entrenched the height over Punhete, not only restored it, but cast a second at Martinchel, higher up the river. Massena then commenced his retrograde march, but with great caution, because his position was overlooked from the Monte Agraça, and the defile of Alemquer being in the rear of the eighth corps, it was an operation of some danger to withdraw from before the Lines. To cover the movement from the knowledge of the Partizans in the rear, Montbrun’s cavalry marched upon Leiria and his detachments scoured the roads to Pombal, on the one side, and towards the Zezere, on the other. Meanwhile the sixth corps marched from Otta and Alemquer to Thomar, and Loison removed to Golegao with his division, reinforced by a brigade of dragoons. These dispositions being made, general Clausel withdrew from Sobral during the night of the 14th, and the whole of the eighth corps passed the defile in the morning of the 15th, under the protection of some cavalry left in front of Aruda, and of a strong rear-guard on the height covering Alemquer. The second corps then retreated from Alhandra by the royal causeway upon Santarem, while the eighth corps marched by Alcoentre upon Alcanhede and Torres Novas. This movement was not interrupted by lord Wellington. The morning of the 15th proved foggy, and it was some hours after day-break ere he perceived the void space in his front which disclosed the ability of the French general’s operations. Fane had reported on the 14th that boats were collecting at Santarem, and information arrived at the same time that reinforcements for Massena were on the march from Ciudad Rodrigo. The enemy’s intention was not clearly developed. It might be a retreat to Spain; it might be to pass round the Monte Junta, and so push the head of his army on Torres Vedras, while the allies were following the rear. Lord Wellington, therefore, kept the principal part of the army stationary, but directed the second and light divisions to follow the enemy, the former along the causeway to Villa Franca, the latter to Alemquer, at the same time calling up his cavalry, and requesting admiral Berkeley to send all the boats of the fleet up the Tagus, to enable the allies to pass rapidly to the other bank, if necessary. [Sidenote: Private Journal of the Hon. Captain Somers Cocks, 16th Dragoons.] Early on the 16th the enemy was tracked, marching in two columns, the one upon Rio Mayor, the other upon Santarem. Having passed Alcoentre, it was clear that he had no views on Torres Vedras; but whether he was in retreat to cross the Zezere by the bridges at Punhete and Martinchel, or making for the Mondego, was still uncertain. In either case, it was important to strike a blow at the rear, before the reinforcements and convoy, said to be on the road from Ciudad Rodrigo, could be met with. The first division was immediately brought up to Alemquer, the fifth entered Sobral, the light division and cavalry marched in pursuit, four hundred prisoners were made, principally marauders; and a remarkable exploit was performed by one Baxter, a serjeant of the sixteenth dragoons. This man, having only five troopers, came suddenly upon a piquet of fifty men, who were cooking. The Frenchmen ran to their arms, and killed one of the dragoons; but the rest broke in amongst them so strongly, that Baxter, with the assistance of some countrymen, made forty-two captives. The 17th, the eighth corps marched upon Alcanhede and Pernes, the head of the second corps reached Santarem, and Fane, deceived by some false movements, reported that they were in full retreat, and the troops at Santarem only a rear guard. This information seeming to be confirmed by the state of the immense plains skirting the Tagus, which were left covered with straw-ricks, it was concluded that Massena intended to pass the Zezere, over which it was known that he had cast a second bridge. Hill was immediately ordered to cross the Tagus with the second division and thirteenth dragoons, and move upon Abrantes, either to succour that fortress or to head the march of the French. Meanwhile, the fourth, fifth, and sixth divisions were directed upon Alemquer, the first division and Pack’s brigades upon Cartaxo, and the light division reached El Valle, a village on the Rio Mayor, where a considerable rear guard was formed, and an unequal engagement would have ensued, but for the opportune arrival of the commander-in-chief. In the evening the enemy joined their main body on the heights of Santarem. Hitherto, lord Wellington, regarding the security of the Lines with a jealous eye, acted very cautiously. On the 15th and 16th, while the French were still hampered by the defiles, his pursuit was slack, although it would in no degree have risked the safety of the Lines, or of the pursuing troops, to have pushed the first, second, and light divisions and Pack’s brigade vigorously against the enemy’s rear. On the 18th, however, when Hill had passed the Tagus at Villada, and Fane was opposite to Abrantes, lord Wellington, whether deceived by false reports, or elated at this retrograde movement, this proof of his own superior sagacity, prepared, with a small force, to assail what he conceived the rear guard of an army in full retreat. But the French general had no intention of falling back any farther; his great qualities were roused by the difficulty of his situation, he had carried off his army with admirable arrangement, and his new position was chosen with equal sagacity and resolution. Santarem is situated on a mountain, which, rising almost precipitously from the Tagus, extends about three miles inland. In front, a secondary range of hills formed an outwork, covered by the Rio Mayor, which is composed of two streams, running side by side to within a mile of the Tagus, but there they unite and flow in a direction parallel with that river for many miles; the ground between being an immense flat, called the plain of Santarem. In advancing by the royal road from Lisbon, the allies ascended the Rio Mayor, until they reached the Ponte Seca, a raised causeway, eight hundred yards long, leading to the foot of the French position. On the right hand, as far as the Tagus, a flat sedgy marsh, not impassable, but difficult from deep water-cuts, covered the French left. On the other hand, the two streams of the Rio Mayor overflowing, presented a vast impassable sheet of water and marsh, covering the French right, and, in the centre, the causeway offered only a narrow line of approach, barred at the enemy’s end, by an abattis, and by a gentle eminence, with a battery looking down the whole length. To force this dangerous passage was only a preliminary step; the secondary range of hills was then to be carried before the great height of Santarem could be reached; finally, the town, with its old walls, offered a fourth point of resistance. In this formidable position, the second corps covered the rich plain of Golegao, which was occupied by Loison’s division of the sixth corps, placed there to watch the Tagus, and keep up the chain of communication with Punhete. On Reynier’s right, in a rugged country, which separated Santarem from the Monte Junta and the Sierra de Alcoberte, the eighth corps was posted; not in a continuous line with the second, but having the right pushed forward to Alcanhete, the centre at Pernes, and the left thrown back to Torres Novas, where Massena’s head-quarters were fixed. On the right of Alcanhete, the cavalry were disposed as far as Leiria, and the sixth corps was at Thomar, in reserve, having previously obliged Wilson’s militia to retire from the Zezere upon Espinhal. Massena thus enclosed an immense tract of fertile country; the plain of Golegao supplied him with maize and vegetables, and the Sierra de Alcoberte with cattle. He presented a formidable head to the allies at Santarem, commanded the road, by Leiria, to Coimbra, with the eighth corps and the cavalry; that from Thomar, by Ourem, to Coimbra, with the sixth corps; and, by his bridges over the Zezere, opened a line of operations towards the Spanish frontier, either through Castello Branco, or by the Estrada Nova and Belmonte. Preserving the power of offensive operations, by crossing the Tagus on his left, or of turning the Monte Junta by his right, he necessarily paralized a great part of the allied force, and appeared, even in retreating, to take the offensive. His first dispositions were, however, faulty in detail. Between Santarem and the nearest division of the eighth corps there was a distance of ten or twelve miles, where the British general might penetrate, turn the right of the second corps, and cut it off from the rest of the army. Reynier, fearing such an attempt, hurried off his baggage and hospitals to Golegao, despatched a regiment up the Rio Mayor to watch two bridges on his right, by which he expected the allies to penetrate between him and the eighth corps, and then calling upon Junot for succour, and upon Massena for orders, proceeded to strengthen his own position. It was this march of Reynier’s baggage, that led Fane to think the enemy was retreating to the Zezere, which, corresponding with lord Wellington’s high-raised expectations, induced him to make dispositions; not for a general attack, by separating the second corps from the rest of the army, but, as I have before said, for assaulting Santarem in front with a small force, thinking he had only to deal with a rear guard. On the 19th, the light division entering the plain between the Rio Mayor and the Tagus advanced against the heights by the sedgy marsh. The first division under Spencer, was destined to attack the causeway, and Pack’s Portuguese brigade and the cavalry were ordered to cross the Rio Mayor at the bridges of Saliero and Subajeira and turn the right of the French. The columns were formed for the attack, and the skirmishers of the light division were exchanging shots with the enemy in the sedgy marsh, when it was found that the guns belonging to Pack’s brigade had not arrived; and lord Wellington, not quite satisfied with the appearance of his adversary’s force, after three hours’ demonstrations, ordered the troops to retire to their former ground. It was, indeed, become evident, that the French were determined to maintain this position. Every advantageous spot of ground was fully occupied, the most advanced centinels boldly returned the fire of the skirmishers, large bodies of reserve were descried, some in arms, others cooking, the strokes of the hatchet, and the fall of trees, resounded from the woods clothing the hills, and the commencement of a triple line of abattis, and the fresh earth of entrenchments were discernible in many places. On the 20th the demonstrations were renewed; but, as the enemy’s intention to fight was no longer doubtful, they soon ceased, and orders were sent to general Hill to halt at Chamusca, on the left bank of the Tagus. General Crawfurd, however, still thought it was but a rear-guard at Santarem; his eager spirit was chafed, he seized a musket, and, followed only by a serjeant, advanced in the night along the causeway, commencing a personal skirmish with the French piquets, from whose fire he escaped by miracle, convinced at last that the enemy were not yet in flight. Meanwhile Clausel brought his division from Alcanhete close up to Santarem, and Massena carefully examining the dispositions of the allies, satisfied himself, that no great movement was in agitation; wherefore, recalling the baggage of the second corps, he directed Clausel to advance towards Rio Mayor; a feint which instantly obliged lord Wellington to withdraw the first division and Pack’s brigade to Cartaxo; and the light division was also held in readiness to retreat. In truth, Massena was only to be assailed by holding the second corps in check at the Ponte Seca, while a powerful mass of troops penetrated in the direction of Tremes and Pernes; but heavy rains rendered all the roads impracticable, and as the position of Santarem was maintained for several months, and many writers have rashly censured the conduct of both generals, it may be well to shew here that they acted wisely and like great captains. It has been already seen how, without any extreme dissemination of his force, the French general contrived to menace a variety of points and to command two distinct lines of retreat; but there were other circumstances that equally weighed with him. He expected momentarily to be joined by the ninth corps, which had been added to his command, and by a variety of detachments; his position, touching upon Leiria and upon the Zezere, enabled him to give his hand to his reinforcements and convoys, either by the line of the Mondego or that of Belmonte and the Estrada Nova; at the same time he was ready to communicate with any troops coming from Andalusia to his assistance. He was undoubtedly open to a dangerous attack, between Santarem and Alcanhete; but he judged that his adversary would not venture such a decisive operation, requiring rapid well-timed movements, with an army composed of three different nations and unpractised in great evolutions. In this, guided by his long experience of war, he calculated upon moral considerations with confidence, and he that does not understand this part of war is but half a general. Like a great commander, he calculated likewise upon the military and political effect, that his menacing attitude would have. While he maintained Santarem, he appeared, as it were, to besiege Lisbon; he also prolonged the sufferings of that city, and it has been estimated that forty thousand persons died from privations within the Lines during the winter of 1810: moreover he encouraged the disaffected, and shook the power which the English had assumed in Portugal, thus rendering their final success so doubtful in appearance, that few men had sagacity enough to judge rightly upon the subject. At this period also, as the illness of George the Third, by reviving the question of a Regency in England, had greatly strengthened the opposition in parliament, it was most important that the arguments of the latter against the war should seem to be enforced by the position of the French army. It is plain therefore that, while any food was to be obtained, there were abundant reasons to justify Massena in holding his ground; and it must be admitted that, if he committed great errors in the early part of his campaign, in the latter part he proved himself a daring, able, and most pertinacious commander. On the side of the British general, such were the political difficulties, that a battle was equally to be desired and dreaded. Desirable, because a victory would have silenced his opponents both in England and Portugal, and placed him in a situation to dictate the measures of war to the ministers instead of having to struggle incessantly against their fears. Desirable to relieve the misery of the Portuguese people, who were in a state of horrible suffering; but, above all things desirable, lest a second and a third army, now gathering in Castile and in Andalusia, should reach Massena, and again shut up the allies in their works. Dreaded, because a defeat or even a repulse would have been tantamount to the ruin of the cause; for it was at this period that the disputes in the Regency, relative to the Lines, at Almada, were most violent, and the slightest disaster would have placed the Patriarch at the head of a national party. Dreaded, because of the discussions relative to the appointment of a Regency in England, as any serious military check would have caused the opposition to triumph, and the troops to be withdrawn from Portugal. In this balanced state it was essential that a battle, upon which so many great interests hung, should not be fought, except on terms of advantage. Now those terms were not to be had. Lord Wellington, who had received some reinforcements from Hallifax and England, had indeed more than seventy thousand fighting men under arms, and the enemy at this time was not more than fifty thousand: nevertheless, if we analyze the composition and situation of both, it will be found that the latter, from the advantage of position, could actually bring more soldiers into the fight. [Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Papers, MSS.] In the Portuguese army, since the month of April, the deaths had been four thousand, the disbanded four thousand, the deserters ten thousand, the recruits thirty thousand; the numbers were therefore increased, but the efficiency for grand evolutions rather decreased. The Spanish auxilliaries also, ill-governed and turbulent, were at open discord with the Portuguese, and their general was neither able in war himself nor amenable to those who were. While the heights of Almada were naked, the left bank of the Tagus could not be watched with less than twelve thousand men; and as from Alcanhete the march to Torres Vedras was shorter than from Cartaxo, two British divisions were employed to protect the Lines; during the attack upon Pernes, Reynier also might break out from Santarem, and ten thousand men were required to hold him in check: thus, the disposable troops would have fallen short of forty-five thousand, comprehending soldiers of three nations and many recruits. Lord Wellington’s experience in the movement of great armies was not at this period equal to his adversary’s, and the attack was to be made in a difficult country, with deep roads, where the Alviella, the Almonda, and other rivers, greatly swelled by incessant rain, furnished a succession of defensive lines to the enemy, and the means of carrying off two-thirds of his army. Victory might crown the attempt, but the stakes were unequal. If Massena lost even a third of his force, the ninth corps could have replaced it. If lord Wellington failed, the Lines were gone, and with them the whole Peninsula. He judged it best to remain on the defensive; to strengthen the Lines; and to get the works at Almada sufficiently forward; meanwhile, quieting the troubles occasioned by the Patriarch, to perfect the discipline of the Portuguese troops, and improve the organization of the militia in rear of the enemy. In this view, the light division, supported by a brigade of cavalry, occupied Valle and the heights overlooking the marsh and inundation; the bridge at the English end of the causeway was mined; a sugar-loaf hill, looking straight down the approach, was crowned with embrasures for artillery and laced in front with a zigzag covered way, capable of containing five hundred infantry: thus the causeway being blocked, the French could not, while the inundation kept up, make any sudden irruption from Santarem. On the left of the light division, posts were extended along the inundation to Malhorquija; thence, by a range of heights to Rio Mayor; and behind the latter place, Anson’s cavalry was stationed in observation of the roads leading from Pernes and Alcanhede. In rear of Anson, a position was entrenched at Alcoentre, and occupied by a division of infantry. Thus all the routes leading upon the Lines between the Tagus and the Monte Junta, were secured by what are technically called heads of cantonments, under cover of which, the other divisions were disposed in succession; the first and the head-quarters being at Cartaxo, a few miles in the rear of Valle; the remainder at Alemquer and Sobral. Torres Vedras was, however, always occupied in force, lest the enemy should make a sudden march round the Monte Junta. Massena, satisfied that his front was safe, continued to build boats, fortified a post at Tancos, on the Tagus, and expected, with impatience, the arrival of a convoy escorted by five thousand men, with which general Gardanne was coming from Ciudad Rodrigo. This reinforcement, consisting of detachments and convalescents left in Castile when the army entered Portugal, marched by Belmonte and the Estrada Nova, and the 27th, was at Cardijos, within a few leagues of the French bridges on the Zezere. The advance of a cavalry patrol on either side would have opened the communications, and secured the junction; but, at that moment, Gardanne, harassed by the ordenança, and deceived by a false rumour that general Hill was in Abrantes, ready to move against him, suddenly retreated upon Sabugal, with such haste and blindness that he sacrificed a part of his convoy, and lost many men. Notwithstanding this event, Massena, expecting to be joined by the ninth corps, greatly strengthened his position at Santarem, which enabled him to draw the bulk of his forces to his right, and to continue his marauding excursions in the most daring manner. General Ferey, with a strong detachment of the sixth corps, crossing the Zezere, foraged the country as far as Castello Branco without difficulty, and returned without loss: Junot occupied Leiria and Ourem with detachments of the eighth corps, and on the 9th of December a battalion endeavoured to surprise Coimbra: Trant, however, baffled that project. Meanwhile, Drouet avowed a design to invade the Tras os Montes, but the 22d of December occupied the line of the Coa with the ninth corps, and Massena’s patroles appeared again on the Mondego above Coimbra, making inquiries about the fords: all the spies likewise reported that a great reunion of forces from the south was to have place near Madrid. These things gave reason to fear, either that Massena intended to file behind the Mondego and seize Oporto, or that the reinforcements coming to him were so large that he meant to establish bridges over the Mondego, and occupy the northern country also. It was known that a tenth corps was forming at Burgos; the head of the fifth corps was again in Estremadura; the French boats at Punhete and Barquiña were numerous and large; and in all parts there was evidence of great forces assembling for a mighty effort on both sides of the Tagus. It was calculated that, before the end of January, more than forty thousand fresh troops would co-operate with Massena; and preparations were made accordingly. An outward line of defence, from Aldea Gallega to Setuval, was already in a forward state; Abrantes, Palmella, and St. Felippe de Setuval had been at last provisioned; and a chain of forts parallel to the Tagus were constructing on the hills lining the left bank from Almada to Traffaria. Labourers had also been continually employed in strengthening the works of Alhandra, Aruda, and Monte Agraça, which were now nearly impregnable, soldiers only being wanting to defy the utmost force that could be brought against them. To procure these, lord Wellington wrote earnestly to lord Liverpool on the 29th of December, demonstrating the absolute necessity of reinforcing the army; and, on the receipt of his letter, five thousand British were ordered to embark for Lisbon, and three regiments were drafted from Sicily. Sickness obliged general Hill to go home in December; and, as Soult was known to be collecting a disposable force behind the Morena, the troops on the left bank of the Tagus were augmented, and marshal Beresford assumed the command: for the Portuguese army was now generally incorporated with the British divisions. His force, composed of eighteen guns, two divisions of infantry, and five regiments of cavalry, Portuguese and British, was about fourteen thousand men, exclusive of Carlos d’Espana’s brigade, which, being at Abrantes, was under the marshal’s orders. [Sidenote: Appendix, No. X. Section 1.] To prevent the passage of the Tagus; to intercept all communication between Massena and Soult; to join the main body of the army, by Vellada if in retreat; and by Abrantes if in advance; were the instructions given to Beresford; hence, fixing his quarters at Chamusca, he disposed his troops along the Tagus, from Almeyrim by Chamusca, as high as the mouth of the Zezere, establishing signals between his different quarters. He also beat the roads leading towards Spanish Estremadura; established a sure and rapid intercourse with Elvas and the other frontier fortresses; organized good sources of intelligence at Golegao, at Santarem, and especially at Thomar, and, in addition to these general precautions, erected batteries opposite the mouth of the Zezere. But, against the advice of the engineers, he placed them at too great distance from the river, and in other respects unsuitable, and offering nothing threatening to the enemy: for the French craft dropped down frequently towards Santarem, without hindrance, until colonel Colborne, of the sixty-sixth regiment, moored a guard-boat close to the mouth of the Zezere, disposing fires in such a manner on the banks of the Tagus that nothing could pass without being observed. On the side of Santarem, as all the country between Alcanhete and the Ponte Seca continued impracticable from the rain, the main bodies of both armies were, of necessity, tranquil. Anson’s cavalry, however, acting in concert with major Fenwick, who came down from Obidos towards Rio Mayor, harassed the enemy’s foraging parties; and in the Upper Beira several actions of importance had taken place with the militia, which it is time to notice as forming an essential part of lord Wellington’s combinations. It will be remembered that the ninth corps, being ordered to scour Biscay and Upper Castile in its progress towards the frontier of Portugal, was so long delayed that, instead of keeping the communications of Massena free, and securing his base, Drouet lost all connexion with the army of Portugal. Meanwhile the Partidas of Leon and Salamanca gave such employment to Serras’ division that the Tras os Montes were unmolested, and Silveira, falling down to the Lower Douro, appeared, on the 29th, before Almeida. Its former garrison had entered the French service, yet immediately deserted to their countrymen, and Silveira then blockaded the place closely, and made an attempt to surprise a French post at San Felices, but failed. In November, however, the head of the ninth corps reached Ciudad Rodrigo, bringing a large convoy of provisions, collected in Castile, for Massena. Lord Wellington, anxious to prevent this from reaching its destination, directed Silveira to intercept it if possible, and ordered Miller on the 16th to Viseu, in support. On the 13th, general Gardanne, with four thousand infantry and three squadrons of cavalry, raised the blockade of Almeida, took possession of Pinhel, and, supported by the ninth corps, conducted the convoy towards Sabugal and Penamacor. The 16th, he was between Valverde and Pereiro Gavillos, but Silveira falling upon him killed some of his men, took many prisoners, and then retiring to Trancoso on the 17th, united with Miller, the latter taking post at Guarda. Nevertheless, Gardanne pursued his march, but finally, as we have seen, retreated from Cardigos in a panic. Drouet had not yet received the orders to put himself under Massena’s command, but, at the representation of Foy, moved forward into Portugal, and to hide his object, spread the report, already noticed, of his intention to penetrate the Tras os Montes; the 17th December, however he passed the Coa with fourteen thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, and crossing the Mondego the 18th, encamped near Gouvea, the 22d. Thence the cavalry and one division under general Claparede, marched against Silveira, and after a skirmish occupied Trancoso; meanwhile, Drouet with eleven battalions, and the troops under Gardanne, made for the Alva and reached Ponte Murcella the 24th. Hitherto lord Wellington’s communications with Baccellar, had been carried on, through Trant on the side of Coimbra, and through Wilson on that of Espinhal and Abrantes. But this sudden advance of the ninth corps obliged Wilson to cross the Mondego to avoid being enclosed, and Drouet effecting his junction with Massena by Espinhal, established his division at Leiria; and then spreading towards the sea cut off all communication between the allies and the northern provinces. On the 2d of January, however, Trant intercepted a letter from Drouet to Claparede, giving an account of his own arrival, and of the state of Massena’s army; intimating also, that a great operation was in contemplation, and that the fifth corps was daily expected in the Alemtejo: Claparede was desired to seize Guarda, to forage the neighbouring villages, and to watch the road of Belmonte; and if Silveira should be troublesome, to defeat him. Silveira, an insufficient man, naturally vain, and inflated with his former successes, had indeed, already attacked Claparede, and was defeated with the loss of two hundred men at Ponte Abad, on the side of Trancoso. Baccellar, alarmed for the safety of Oporto, then recalled Miller and Wilson. The first moved upon Viseu; the last who had already repassed the Mondego and taken a hundred stragglers of Drouet’s division, marched hastily towards the same point. Meanwhile, Silveira again provoked Claparede, who pressed him so closely, from the 10th to the 13th of January, that he drove him with loss over the Douro at Pezo de Ragoa, seized Lamego, and menaced Oporto before any troops could concentrate to oppose him. Yet when Baccellar brought up his reserve to the Pavia, and Miller’s and Wilson’s corps reached Castro d’Airo, Claparede returned to Moimenta de Beira, being followed by Wilson. Meanwhile, the arrival of the ninth corps having relieved the French troops in Leon, the latter again menaced Tras os Montes, and Silveira marched to Braganza. Miller died at Viseu, but Wilson and Trant continued to harass the enemy’s parties. Claparede taking post at Guarda, according to his instructions, seized Covilhao; while Foy, who in returning from France had collected about three thousand infantry and cavalry convalescents, was marching by the road of Belmonte. Foy had escaped innumerable perils. At Pancorbo he was fain to fly from the Partidas, with the loss of his despatches and half his escort, and now at Enxabarda entering the Estrada Nova, he was harassed by colonel Grant with a corps of ordenança from the Lower Beira; and although he suffered nothing here by the sword, three hundred of his men died on the mountain from cold. On the 2d of February he reached Santarem, where affairs were working to a crisis. During December and January, the country being always more or less flooded, the armies continued in observation; but Massena’s positions were much strengthened, his out posts were reinforced, and his marauding excursions extended in proportion to his increasing necessities. The weak point on either side was towards Rio Mayor, any movement there created great jealousy, especially as the season advanced and the roads became firmer. Hence, on the 19th of January (some reinforcements having landed at Lisbon a few days before) a fear lest the allies should be concentrating at Alcoentre, induced Junot to drive the out posts from Rio Mayor to probe the state of affairs, and a general attack was expected; but after a skirmish he returned with a wound which disabled him for the rest of the campaign. Early in February, a column of six thousand French again scouring all the country beyond the Zezere, got much concealed food near Pedragoa; while other detachments arriving on the Mondego below Coimbra, even passed that river, and carried off four hundred oxen and two thousand sheep intended for the allies. These excursions gave rise to horrible excesses, which broke down the discipline of the French army, and were not always executed with impunity; the British cavalry at various times redeemed many cattle and brought in a considerable number of prisoners, amongst them an aide-de-camp of general Clausel’s. Meanwhile, Massena, organized a secret communication with Lisbon, through the Portuguese general Pamplona, who effected it by the help of the fidalgos in that capital: their agents, under the pretence of selling sugar to the inhabitants of Thomar and Torres Novas, passed by the road of Caldas and thence through the mountains of Pedragoa. Lord Wellington, on the other hand, was understood to have gained a French officer of rank, and it is certain that both generals had excellent information. In this manner hostilities were carried on, each commander impatiently waiting for reinforcements which should enable him to act offensively. How both were disappointed, and how other events hitherto unnoticed, bore upon the plans of each, must be the subject of another book. OBSERVATIONS. 1º. “_War is not a conjectural art._” Massena forgetting this, assumed that the allies would not make a stand in front of Lisbon, and that the militia would not venture to attack Coimbra, but the battle of Busaco and the capture of his hospitals evinced the soundness of the maxim. Again, he conjectured that the English would re-embark if pressed; the Lines put an end to his dream; yet once awake, he made war like a great man, proving more formidable with reduced means and in difficulties, than he had been when opportunity was rife and his numbers untouched. His stay at Santarem shews what thirty thousand additional men acting on the left bank of the Tagus could have done, had they arrived on the heights of Almada before admiral Berkeley’s error was discovered: the supply of provisions from Alemtejo and from Spain would then have been transferred from Lisbon to the French armies, and the fleet would have been driven from the Tagus; when, the misery of the inhabitants, the fears of the British cabinet, the machinations of the Patriarch, and the little chance of final success would probably have induced the British general to embark. 2º. It has been observed, that Massena, in the first week might have easily passed the Tagus, secured the resources of the Alemtejo, and sent the British fleet out of the port. This was not so practicable as it might at first sight appear. The rains were heavy; the fords impassable; the French had not boats sufficient for a bridge; a weak detachment would have been useless, a strong detachment would have been dangerous: to collect boats, cast a bridge, and raise the entrenchments necessary to defend it, in the face of the allied forces, would have been neither a safe nor certain operation; moreover, Massena would then have relinquished the certain aid of the ninth for the uncertain assistance of the fifth corps. 3º. Lord Wellington conjecturing the French to be in full retreat, had like to have received a severe check at Santarem; he recovered himself in time, and with this exception, it would be difficult to support essential objections to his operations: yet, many have been urged, as that, he might have straightened the enemy’s quarters more effectually at Santarem; and that Hill’s corps, passing through Abrantes, could have destroyed the bridges at Punhete, and lining the Zezere cut off Massena’s reinforcements, and obliged him to abandon his positions or even to capitulate. This last idea, advanced at the time by colonel Squires, an engineer of great zeal and ability, perfectly acquainted with the localities, merits examination. As a simple operation it was feasible, but the results were not so certain; the Lines of Almada being unfinished, the rashness of leaving the Tagus unguarded, before an enemy who possessed eighty large boats, exclusive of those forming the bridges on the Zezere, is apparent; Hill’s corps must then have been replaced, and the army before Santarem would have been so weak as to invite a concentrated attack, to the great danger of the Torres Vedras Lines. Nor was the forcing of the French works at Punhete a matter of certainty; the ground was strong, there were two bridges over the Zezere, and the sixth corps, being within a short march, might, by passing at Martinchel, have taken Hill in flank. 4º. The same officer, at a later period, miscalculating the enemy’s numbers at thirty thousand men, and the allies at more than seventy thousand regulars, proposed that Beresford should cross the Tagus at Azingha, behind the Almonda, and march upon Golegao, while lord Wellington, concentrating at Rio Mayor, pushed upon Torres Novas. It was no common head that conceived this project, by which seventy thousand men would, in a single march, have been placed in the midst of the enemy’s extended quarters; but the hand of Napoleon could scarcely have launched such a thunder-bolt. Massena had still fifty thousand fighting-men; the boats from Abrantes must have been brought down, to pass the Tagus; the concentration of troops at Rio Mayor could scarcely have escaped the enemy’s notice; exact concert, in point of time, was essential, yet the eighth corps could have held the allies in check on the Alviella, while Reynier, from Santarem, and Ney, from Thomar, crushed Beresford between the Almonda and the Tagus: moreover the roads about Tremes were nearly impassable from rain during December; in January, Soult, of whose operations I shall speak in the next book, was menacing the Alemtejo, and a disaster happening to the allies would have relieved the enemy’s difficulties, when nothing else could. A campaign is like other works of art; accessaries, however splendid, must be rejected when not conducive to the main object. That judgement, which duly classes the value of every feasible operation, is the best quality of a general, and lord Wellington possessed it in a remarkable degree; to it, his genius and his courage were both subservient; without it he might have performed many brilliant exploits in the Peninsula, but could never have conducted the war to a successful end. BOOK XII. CHAPTER I. In the preceding book, Spanish affairs have been little noticed, although lord Wellington’s combinations were deeply affected by them. The general position of the allies, extending from Coruña to Cadiz, presented a great crescent, in the convex of which the French armies were operating, and it was clear that, when checked at Lisbon, the most important point, their wings, could reinforce the centre, unless the allied forces, at the horns of the crescent, acted vigorously on a system which the harbours and fortresses, at either extremity, pointed out as suitable to those who possessed the absolute command of the sea. A British army and fleet were therefore established at Cadiz, and a squadron of frigates at Coruña; and how far this warfare relieved the pressure on lord Wellington I shall now show. The Gallician troops, under Mahi, usually hanging on the borders of Leon, were always reported to be above twenty thousand men when arms or stores were demanded from England; but there were never more than ten or twelve thousand in line, and, although Serras’ division, of only eight thousand, was spread over the plains, from Benevente to the Agueda, during Massena’s advance, no stroke of importance was effected against it; the arrival of the ninth corps, in October, put an end to all hopes from the Gallicians in that quarter, although the Partidas often surprised both posts and convoys. Behind Mahi there was, however, a second army, from four to six thousand strong, embodied to defend the coast line towards the Asturias; and, in the latter province, about eight thousand men, including the irregular bands of Porlier and other chiefs, constantly watched Bonet’s movements. That general frequently mastered the Asturias, but could never maintain himself there; because the country is a long defile, lying between the great mountains and the sea, and being crossed by a succession of parallel ridges and rivers, is admirably calculated for partizan warfare in connexion with a fleet. Thus, if he penetrated towards Gallicia, British and Spanish frigates, from Coruña, landing troops at the ports of Gihon, Santander, or Santona, could always form a junction with the great bands of Longa, Mina, and Amor, and excite insurrections on his rear. [Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Papers. MSS.] In this manner Porlier, as before related, forced him to withdraw from Castropol, after he had defeated general Ponte at Sales, about the period of Almeida being invested; and the advantages of such operations being evident, the British government sent sir Home Popham to direct the naval, and general Walker the military affairs at Coruña. Preparations were then made to embark a considerable force, under Renovales, to renew the attack at Santona and Santander; the Partidas of the interior were to move at the same time; a battalion of marines was assembled, in England, to garrison Santona, when taken; and Mahi promised to co-operate by an incursion. Serras, however, threatened the frontier of Gallicia, and Mahi remained in suspense, and this, together with the usual procrastination of the Spaniards, and the late arrival of sir Home Popham, delayed the expedition until October. Meanwhile, Porlier, Escadron, and other chiefs commenced an isolated attack in the beginning of September. Serras returned to Zamora, Mahi sent a division into Leon, and Bonet, aware of the preparations at Coruña, first concentrated at Oviedo, and then fell back towards Santander, leaving a post at Gihon. On the 16th of October Renovales sailed but with only thirteen hundred men; accompanied, however, by general Walker, who carried ten thousand stand of arms and ammunition. The 19th, entering the harbour of Gihon, they captured some French vessels; and Porlier, coming up on the land side, took some treasure and eighty prisoners. The next day, Renovales proceeded to Santona, but tempests impeded his landing, and he returned to Coruña the 2d of November, with only eight hundred and fifty men: a frigate and a brig had foundered, with the remainder of his troops, in a dreadful gale, which destroyed all the Spanish naval force along the coast, twelve vessels being wrecked even in the harbour of Coruña. Meanwhile, Mahi, leaving Toboado Gil’s division to watch Serras, entered the Asturias with the rest of the Gallicians, and being joined first by the troops of that province, and soon after by Renovales, was very superior to the French; yet he effected nothing, and Bonet maintained his line from Gihon, through Oviedo, to the borders of Leon. [Sidenote: Abstract of General Walker’s Military Reports from Gallicia. MSS.] In this manner hostilities wore feebly on; the Junta of the Asturias continued, as from the first, distinguished by their venality and indifference to the public good; their province was in a miserable and exhausted state; and the powers of the British naval officers on the coast not being defined, occasioned some dispute between them and general Walker; and gave opportunity to the Junta to interfere improperly with the distribution of the English stores. Gallicia was comparatively rich, but its Junta culpably inactive in the discharge of duties and oppressive in government, disgusted the whole province, and a general desire to end their power was prevalent. In the course of the winter a combination of the clergy was formed to oppose both the Local Junta and the General Cortes, and assumed so threatening an aspect that Mahi, who was then on the coast, applied to be taken in an English vessel to Coruña, to ensure his personal safety; one Acuña was soon after arrested at Ponferrada, the discontent spread, and the army was more employed to overawe these factions than to oppose the enemy. Little advantage, therefore, was derived from the Spanish operations in the north, and general Walker, despairing to effect any thing useful, desired either that a British force should be placed at his disposal or that he might join the army in Portugal. These expeditions from Coruña naturally encreased the audacity of the inland partidas, who could only become really dangerous, by having a sea-port where they could receive supplies and reinforcements, or embarking save themselves in extremity, and change the theatre of operations. To prevent this, the emperor employed considerable numbers of men in the military governments touching on the Bay of Biscay, and directed, as we have seen, the corps d’armée, in their progress towards Portugal, to scour all the disturbed countries to the right and left. The ninth corps was thus employed during the months of August and September, but when it passed onward, the partidas resumed their activity. Mina, Longa, Campillo, and Amor, frequently united about Villar Caya and Espinosa in numbers sufficient to attack large French detachments with success; and to aid them, general Walker repeatedly recommended the taking possession of Santona with a corps of British troops. That town, having the best winter harbour along the coast, and being built on a mountain promontory joined to the main by a narrow sandy neck, could have been made very strong; it would have cut off Bonet’s communication with France by sea, have given the British squadron a secure post from whence to vex the French coasts; and it offered a point of connexion with the partidas of the Rioja, Biscay, and Navarre. [Sidenote: Letter to Lord Liverpool. 7th May, 1811. MSS.] Lord Liverpool, swayed by these considerations, desired to employ a corps of four thousand men to secure it; but, having first demanded lord Wellington’s opinion, the latter “earnestly recommended that no such maritime operations should be undertaken. For,” said he, “unless a very large force was sent, it would scarcely be able to effect a landing, and maintain the situation of which it might take possession. Then that large force would be unable to move or effect any object at all adequate to the expense, or to the expectations which would be formed from its strength, owing to the want of those equipments and supplies in which an army landed from its ships must be deficient. It was vain to hope for any assistance, even in this way, much less military assistance from the Spaniards; the first thing they would require uniformly would be money; then arms, ammunition, clothing of all descriptions, provisions, forage, horses, means of transport, and every thing which the expedition would have a right to require from them; and, after all, _this extraordinary and perverse people would scarcely allow the commander of the expedition to have a voice in the plan of operations, to be followed when the whole should be ready to undertake any, if indeed they ever should be ready_.” Meanwhile Napoleon caused Caffarelli’s reserve to enter Spain, ordered Santona to be fortified, directed other reinforcements from France upon the northern provinces, and finally sent marshal Bessieres to command the young guard, the third and fourth governments, and that of the Asturias, including Bonet’s division, the whole forming a distinct force, called the army of the north. [Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 6.] The 1st of January, 1811, this army exceeded seventy thousand, of which fifty-nine thousand men and eight thousand horses, were present under arms; and Bessieres, who had received unusual powers, was especially ordered to support and furnish all necessary assistance to the army of Portugal. This was the state of the northern parts of Spain. In the middle parts, the army of the centre, or that immediately under the king, at first about twenty thousand, was, before the end of the year, carried up to twenty-seven thousand, exclusive of French and Spanish guards and juramentados, or native troops, who had taken the oath of allegiance: with this power he protected his court, watched the movements of the Valencians, and chased the Guerillas of the interior. The summer and autumn of 1810 were, however, for reasons before-mentioned, the period of greatest activity with these irregulars; numerous petty actions were constantly fought around the capital, many small French posts, and numbers of isolated men and officers, were cut off, and few despatches reached their destinations without a considerable escort. To remedy this, the lines of correspondence were maintained by small fortified posts which run from Madrid; through Guadarama and Segovia to the provinces of Valladolid and Salamanca; through Buitrago and Somosierra to the army of the north; through Guadalaxara and Calatayud to the army of Aragon; through La Mancha to the army of the south; and by the valley of the Tagus, Arzobispo, and Truxillo, to the fifth corps during its incursions into Estremadura; a brigade of cavalry, was also generally stationed at Truxillo. As the warfare of the Partidas was merely a succession of surprises and massacres, little instruction, and no pleasure, can be derived from the details; but in the course of the summer and autumn, not less than twelve considerable, and an infinite number of trifling affairs, took place between the moveable columns and these bands: and the latter being almost always beaten; at the close of the year, only the Empecinado, Sanchez, Longa, Campillo, Porlier, and Mina retained any reputation, and the country people were so harassed, that counter Partidas, in many places assisted the French. [Sidenote: Appendix, No. IV. Section 4.] The situation of the army of the centre enabled the king to aid Massena, either by an advance upon the Elga, or by reinforcing, or, at least, supporting the fifth corps in Estremadura. But Joseph, troubled by the Partidas, and having many convoys to protect, was also averse to join any of the marshals, with all of whom, except Massena, he was on ill terms; neither were his relations with Napoleon such as to induce him to take an interest in any military operations, save those which affected the immediate security of his court. His poverty was extreme; he was surrounded by French and Spanish intriguers; his plan of organizing a national party was thwarted by his brother’s regulations; plots were formed, or supposed to be formed, against his person, and, in this uneasy posture, the secondary part he was forced to sustain, combined with his natural gentleness which shrunk from the terrible scenes of bloodshed and devastation continually before his eyes, rendered his situation so irksome, that he resolved to vacate the throne and retire to France, a resolution which he soon afterwards partially executed. Such being the course of affairs in the northern and central provinces, it remains to trace the more important military operations at the southern horn of the crescent, where the allies were most favourably situated to press the left flank of the invaders. Sebastiani was peculiarly exposed to a harassing warfare, because of the city of Grenada and other towns in the interior, which he was obliged to hold at the same time with those on the coast, although the two districts were completely separated by the mountains. Hence a large body of troops were necessarily kept in the strip of country bordering the Mediterranean, although menaced, on the one flank by Gibraltar and the Spanish troops at San Roque, on the other by the Murcian army, and, in front by continual descents from the sea; yet, from the shallowness and length of their position, unable to concentrate in time to avoid being cut off in detail. Now the Murcian army, nominally twenty thousand, was based upon the cities of Murcia and Carthagena, and menaced alike the coast-line and that of Grenada by the route of Baza and Guadix; and any movement towards the latter was sure to attract the French, while troops landing from Cadiz or Gibraltar fell upon their disseminated posts along the coast. To meet this system, Sebastiani, keeping his reserves about Grenada, where he had entrenched a permanent camp, made sudden incursions, sometimes against the Murcians, sometimes against the Spanish forces on the side of Gibraltar; but that fortress afforded a refuge to the patriots on one side, and Carthagena, surrounded by arid lands, where, for two marches, no water is to be found, always offered a sure retreat on the other. Meanwhile the French general endeavoured to gain the important castles on the coast, and to put them into a state of defence; yet Estipona and Marbella were defended by the Spaniards, and the latter sustained many attacks, nor was it finally reduced until the 9th of December, when the garrison, of one hundred men, took refuge on board the Topaze frigate. But Sebastiani’s hold of these towns, and even the security of the French troops along the coast, depended upon the communications across the mountains with Grenada, Chiclana, and Seville, and to impede these, general Campbell sent British officers into the Ronda, who successfully directed the wild mountaineers of that district, until their operations were marred by Lascy’s misconduct. The various movements and insurrections in Grenada during the summer of 1810 have been already noted, but, in October, general Campbell and admiral Penrose, conjointly with the governor of Ceuta, renewed the design of surprising Malaga, where were many privateers and a flotilla of gun-boats, supposed to be destined against the islands near Ceuta. The French depôt for the siege of Marbella was at Fuengirola, which is only thirty miles from Malaga, and it was judged that an attack there would draw the troops from the latter place; and the more surely, as general Valdemoro, commanding the Spanish force at San Roque, engaged to co-operate on the side of Ronda. EXPEDITION OF FUENGIROLA. [Sidenote: General C. Campbell’s Correspondence. MSS.] [Sidenote: Appendix, No. XI.] On the 13th of October, captain Hope, in the Topaze, sailed from Ceuta, with a division of gun-boats and a convoy, containing a brigade of twelve-pounders, sixty-five gunners, a battalion of the eighty-ninth regiment, a detachment of foreign deserters, and the Spanish imperial regiment of Toledo, in all fifteen hundred men, including serjeants. Lord Blayney, commanding this force, was directed to make a false attack on Fuengirola, and should the enemy come out from Malaga, he was to sail against that place. A landing was effected the same day, and Sebastiani instantly marched, leaving only three hundred men in Malaga: lord Blayney was as instantly apprised of the success of the demonstration, yet he remained two days cannonading the castle with twelve-pounders, although the heavier metal of the gun-boats and of the frigate, had failed to make any impression on the walls; and during this time his dispositions betrayed the utmost contempt of military rules. On the second day, while he was on board a gun-boat himself, the garrison, which did not exceed two hundred men, having first descried Sebastiani’s column, made a sally, took the battery, and drove the British part of the investing force headlong towards the boats. Lord Blayney landed, rallied his men, and retook the artillery; but at this moment two squadrons of French cavalry came up, and his lordship, mistaking them for Spaniards, ordered the firing to cease. He was immediately made prisoner; his troops again fled to the beach, and would have been sabred but for the opportune arrival of the Rodney with the eighty-second regiment, the flank companies of which were immediately disembarked and first checked the enemy. The Spanish regiment, untouched by the panic, regained the ships regularly and without loss; but, of the British, two officers and thirty men were killed or wounded, and one general, seven inferior officers, and nearly two hundred serjeants and privates taken. Thus an expedition, well contrived and adequate to its object, was ruined by misconduct, and terminated in disaster and disgrace. [Sidenote: General Campbell’s Correspondence. MSS.] Scarcely was this affair finished, when Valdemoro and the marquis of Portasgo appeared in the Ronda, an insurrection commenced at Velez Malaga and in the neighbouring villages; and Blake, who had returned from Cadiz to the army in Murcia, advanced, with eight thousand men, towards Cullar on the side of Baza. General Campbell immediately furnished money to Portasgo, and embarked a thousand stand of arms for the people of Velez Malaga. An English frigate was also sent to cruize along the coast, yet Sebastiani, relieved from the fear of a descent, soon quelled this insurrection; and then sending Milhaud on before with some cavalry, followed himself with reinforcements for general Rey, who was opposed to Blake. The latter, retiring behind the Almanzora river, was overtaken by Milhaud, and, being defeated on the 4th of November, his army dispersed: at the same time, a contagious fever, breaking out at Carthagena, spread along the coast to Gibraltar and Cadiz, and the Spanish operations on the side of Murcia ceased. In the kingdom of Seville, the war turned chiefly upon the blockade of the Isla, and the movements of the Spanish armies in Estremadura. Provisions for Cadiz were principally drawn from the Condado de Neibla, and it has been seen that Copons, aided by descents from the ocean, endeavoured to secure this important resource; but neither his efforts, nor the descents, would have availed, if Ballasteros had not co-operated by constantly menacing Seville from Araceña and the Aroche mountains. Neither could Ballasteros have maintained the war there, were it not for the support of Badajos and Olivenza; under cover of which, Romana’s army protected his line of operation, and sent military supplies and reinforcements. On the possession of Badajos, therefore, the supply of Cadiz chiefly depended. Seville was the French point of defence; Cadiz Estremadura and the Condado de Neibla their points of offence. The want of provisions, or the desire to cut off the Spanish convoys, or the sudden irruption of troops from Cadiz, threatening their posts at Moguer and Huelva, always drew them towards the coast; the enterprises of Ballasteros brought them towards Araceña; and, in like manner, the advance of Romana towards the mountains brought them to Estremadura; but Romana had wasted the greater part of the latter province, and as the fifth corps alone was disposable either for offensive movements, or for the defence of the country around Seville, Soult contented himself with such advantages as could be gained by sudden strokes; frequently, however, crossing the mountains to prevent the Spaniards from permanently establishing themselves on the frontier of Andalusia. In October, Romana entered the Lines of Torres Vedras, and Mendizabal, who remained with two divisions, finding that Mortier, unconscious of Romana’s absence, had retired across the mountains, occupied Merida. He would also have established himself in the yet unwasted country about Llerena; but the appearance of a moveable column on the frontier of La Mancha, sent him back to Badajos, and, on the 20th of November, he united with Ballasteros. The French then fortified Gibraleon and other posts in the Condado de Neibla; Girard’s division re-appeared at Guadalcanal, and being joined by the column from La Mancha, foraged the country towards Llerena: whereupon Mendizabel took post at Zafra with nine thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, including Madden’s Portuguese brigade. Meanwhile, Copons, who had four thousand men, was totally defeated at Castillejos by D’Aremberg, and retired to Puebla de Gusman. At Cadiz, no change or military event had occurred after the affair of Matagorda, save the expeditions against Moguer already noticed, and a slight attempt of the Spaniards against the Chiclana works in September; but all men’s hopes and expectations had been wonderfully raised by political events which it was fondly hoped would secure both independence and a good constitution to Spain. After two years of intrigues and delay, the National Cortes was assembled, and the long suppressed voice of the people was at last to be heard. Nevertheless the members of the Cortes could not be duly and legally chosen in the provinces possessed by the enemy; and as some members were captured by the French on their journey to Cadiz, many persons unknown, even by name, to their supposed constituents, were chosen: a new principle of election, unknown to former Cortes, was also adopted; for all persons twenty-five years old, not holding office or pension under the government, nor incapacitated by crime, nor by debts to the state, nor by bodily infirmity, were eligible to sit if chosen. A supplement of sixty-eight members was likewise provided to supply accidental vacancies; and it was agreed that twenty-six persons then in Spain, natives of the colonies, should represent those dependencies. Towards the latter end of September this great assembly met, and immediately took the title of Majesty: it afterwards declared the press free in respect of political, but not of religious matters, abolished some of the provincial juntas, re-appointed captains-general, and proceeded to form a constitution worded in the spirit of republican freedom. These things, aided by a vehement eloquence, drew much attention to the proceedings of the Cortes, and a fresh impulse seemed given to the war: but men brought up under despotism do not readily attain the fashions of freedom. The Provincial Junta, the Central Junta, the Junta of Cadiz, the Regency, had all been, in succession, violent and tyrannical in act, while claiming only to be popular leaders, and this spirit did not desert the Cortes. Abstract principles of liberty were freely promulgated, yet tyrannical and partial proceedings were of common occurrence; and the reformations, by outstripping the feelings and understandings of the nation, weakened the main springs of its resistance to the French. It was not for liberty, but for national pride and from religious influence, that the people struck. Freedom had no attractions for the nobles, nor for the monastics, nor even for the merchants; and the Cortes, in suppressing old establishments and violating old forms and customs, wounded powerful interests, created active enemies, and shocked those very prejudices which had produced resistance to Napoleon. In the administration of the armies, in the conduct of the war, in the execution of the laws, and the treatment of the colonies, there was as much of vanity, of intrigue, of procrastination, negligence, folly, and violence as before. Hence the people were soon discontented; and when the power of the religious orders was openly attacked by a proposition to abolish the inquisition, the clergy became active enemies of the Cortes. The great cause of feudal privileges being once given up, the natural tendency of the Cortes was towards the enemy. A broad line of distinction was thus drawn between the objects of the Spanish and English governments in the prosecution of the war; and, ere the contest was finished, there was a schism between the British cabinet and the Spanish government, which would inevitably have thrown the latter into Napoleon’s hands, if fortune had not, at the moment, betrayed him in Russia. The Regency, jealous of the Cortes, and little pleased with the inferior title of highness accorded them, were far from partaking of the republican spirit, and so anxious to check any tendency towards innovation, that early in the year they had invited the duke of Orleans to command the provinces bordering on France, permitted him to issue proclamations, and received him at Cadiz with the honours of a royal prince; intending to oppose his authority to that of the Local Juntas at the moment, and finally to that of the Cortes. The latter, however, refused their sanction to this appointment, obliged the duke to quit Spain, and soon afterwards displaced the Regency of Five; appointing Joachim Blake, Gabriel Cisgar, and Pedro Agar in their stead. During the absence of the two first, substitutes were provided, but one of them (Palacios) making some difficulty about taking the oath to the Cortes, was immediately declared to have forfeited the confidence of the nation; so peremptorily did the Cortes proceed. Nevertheless, the new regents, not more pleased with the democratic spirit than their predecessors, and yet wishing to retain the power in their own hands, refused to listen to the princess of Brazils’ claim, and thus factions sprung up on every side; for the republicans were not paramount in the Cortes at first, and the majority were so subtilely dealt with by Pedro Souza, as actually to acknowledge Carlotta’s hereditary claim to the succession and to the immediate control of the whole Peninsula; and, as I have before noticed, would have proclaimed her sole Regent, but for the interference of lord Wellington. [Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Papers. MSS.] Don Manuel Lapeña being declared captain-general of Andalusia, and commander of the forces in the Isla, was subservient to the views of the Cortes; but the new Regency, anxious to have a counterbalancing force, and being instigated also by persons from Badajos, enemies to Romana, removed that officer in December, and ordered his divisions to separate from the British army and come to Cadiz. The conduct of those divisions had, indeed, given little satisfaction either to the British or Portuguese, but numbers were so absolutely necessary to lord Wellington, that colonel O’Neal was sent to remonstrate with the Regency; and, by shewing that the fall of Estremadura, and the total loss of communication with the interior of Spain would ensue, obtained a momentary respite. In matters relating to the war against the French, or to the administration of the country, the Spanish leaders were incapable of acting cordially on any mature plan; but with respect to the colonies, all parties agreed to push violence, injustice, cruelty, and impolicy to their utmost bounds. To please the British government, the first Regency had published, in May, a decree, permitting the South Americans to export their own products, under certain conditions. This legalizing of a trade, which could not be suppressed, and which was but a decent return to England for her assistance, gave offence to the Municipal Junta of Cadiz, and its resentment was so much dreaded that the Regency, in June, disowned their own decree of the previous month, and even punished the printers, as having given birth to a forged instrument. Exasperated at this treatment, the colonies, who had resisted all the intrigues of the French, with a firmness and singleness of purpose very displeasing to the government in Old Spain, openly discovered their discontent, and then the authorities in the Mother Country, throwing off the mask of liberality and patriotism, exposed their own secret views. “It is not enough that Americans should be Spanish subjects now, but that in all cases they should belong to Spain,” was the proclamation of the Regency, in answer to a declaration from the Caraccas, avowing attachment to the cause of Ferdinand: meaning that, if Spain should pass under the power of the usurper America must follow, as having no right to decide in any case for herself. When the Cortes met, America expected more justice; she had contributed ninety millions of dollars for the support of the war, and many of her sons had served zealously in person; she had also been declared an integral part of the empire by the Central Junta, and her deputies were now permitted to sit in the Great National Assembly. She was however soon made to understand, that the first of these privileges meant eternal slavery, and that the second was a mere form. “The Americans complain of having been tyrannized over for three hundred years! they shall now suffer for three thousand years,” and “I know not to what class of beast the Americans belong:” such were the expressions heard and applauded in the Cortes, when the rights of the colonists were agitated in that assembly. Better to lose Spain to Joseph, if America be retained, than to save Spain if America be separated from her, was a feeling deeply rooted in every Spanish heart, a sentiment covertly expressed in many public documents, and openly acted upon; for, when repeated insults, treachery, and continued violence, had driven the colonists to defend their rights in arms, the money and stores, supplied by England for the support of the war against the French, were applied to the fitting out of expeditions against America. Thus the convocation of the National Cortes, far from improving the posture of affairs, dried up the chief sources of revenue, weakened the army in the field, offended many powerful bodies in the state, involved the nation in a colonial war, and struck at the root of the alliance with England. CHAPTER II. While the Spaniards were occupied with the debates of the Cortes, the French works were laboured with care. The chain of forts was perfected, each being complete in itself with ditch and palisades and a week’s provisions; the batteries at the Trocadero were powerful, and the flotillas at San Lucar de Barameda, Santa Maria, Puerto Real, and Chiclana, were ready for action. Soult repaired in person to San Lucar, and in the last night of October, thirty pinnaces and gun-boats slipping out of the Guadalquivir eluded the allied fleet, passed along the coast to Rota, and from thence, aided by shore batteries, fought their way to Santa Maria and the San Pedro. But, to avoid the fire of the fleet and forts in doubling Matagorda, the duke of Dalmatia, remembering what he had formerly effected at Campo Saucos on the Minho, transported his flotilla on rollers, overland; and in November, one hundred and thirty armed vessels and transports were assembled in the Trocadero canal. This success was, however, alloyed by the death of general Senarmont, an artillery officer of the highest reputation. At the Trocadero point there were immense batteries, and some notable pieces of ordnance called cannon-mortars, or Villantroys, after the inventor. These huge engines were cast in Seville, and, being placed in slings, threw shells with such prodigious force as to range over Cadiz, a distance of more than five thousand yards. But to obtain this flight the shells were partly filled with lead, and their charge of powder was too small for an effective explosion. Nevertheless, they produced some alarm in the city, and were troublesome to the shipping. But Soult’s real design was first to ruin, by a superior fire, the opposite fort of the Puntales, then pass the straits with his flotilla, and establish his army between the Isla and the city; nor was this plan chimerical, for on the side of besieged there was neither concert nor industry. Two drafts, made, in August and September, by lord Wellington, had reduced Graham’s force to five thousand men, and in October the fever broke out in Cadiz; but as Soult’s preparations became formidable, reinforcements were drawn from Gibraltar and Sicily, and, at the end of the year, seven thousand British, Germans, and Portuguese, were still behind the Santi Petri. Graham felt confident, 1º. that, with due preparation, he could maintain the Puntales even though its fire should be silenced. 2º. That Soult must establish a stronger flotilla than the allies, or his communication with Matagorda could not be maintained. 3º. That the intercourse between the army in Isla and the garrison of Cadiz could not be interrupted, unless the great redoubt of the Cortadura was lost. [Sidenote: Graham’s Despatches MSS.] [Sidenote: Appendix, No. III. Sections 1, 2, 3, 4.] To ensure a superiority of naval means, admiral Keats drew all the armed craft from Gibraltar. To secure the land defence, general Graham perseveringly urged the Regency to adopt certain plans, and he was warmly seconded by sir Henry Wellesley; but neither their entreaties, nor the imminence of the danger, could overcome the apathy of the Spaniards. Their army, reinforced by a small body from Ceuta, was wanting in discipline, clothing, and equipments, and only sixteen thousand men of all arms were effective on a muster-roll of twenty-three thousand. The labour of the British troops, far from being assisted, were vexatiously impeded; it was the end of December, and after many sharp altercations, ere Graham could even obtain leave to put the interior line of the Cortadura in a state of defence, although, by a sudden disembarkation, the enemy might enter it from the rear, and cut off the army of the Isla from the city. But while the duke of Dalmatia was thus collecting means of attack, the events in Portugal prevented the execution of his design. [Sidenote: The King’s Correspondence, captured at Vittoria] When Massena passed the frontier, his communications with France became so uncertain, that the emperor’s principal source of information was through the English newspapers. Foy brought the first exact intelligence of the posture of affairs. It was then that the army of the north was directed to support the army of Portugal; that the ninth corps was made a component part of the latter; that the prince of Esling was enjoined to hold fast between Santarem and the Zezere; to besiege Abrantes; and to expect the duke of Dalmatia, who had been already several times commanded to move through the Alemtejo, to his assistance. The emperor seems even to have contemplated the evacuation of Andalusia and the concentration of the whole army of the south on the Tagus, a project that would have strengthened rather than weakened the French in the Peninsula, because it was more important to crush the regular warfare in Portugal, than to hold any particular province. Massena’s instructions reached him in due time, Soult’s were intercepted by the Guerillas, and the duplicates did not arrive before the end of December; a delay affording proof that thirty thousand men would scarcely have compensated for the uncertainty of the French communications. Postponing his design against Cadiz, the duke of Dalmatia repaired to Seville, carrying with him Latour Maubourg’s cavalry and five thousand infantry from the first corps. His instructions neither prescribed a line of movement nor enjoined any specific operation; the prince of Esling was to communicate his plan to which Soult’s was to be subordinate. But no certain intelligence even of Massena’s early proceedings had reached Seville, and such were the precautions of lord Wellington, such the activity of the Partidas, that from the time Soult quitted Cadiz, until his operation terminated, no communication could be effected between the two marshals, and each acted in perfect ignorance of the plans and situation of the other. [Sidenote: Marshal Soult’s Correspondence. MSS.] [Sidenote: King Joseph’s Correspondence. MSS.] The duke of Dalmatia considering that Sebastiani had his hands full, and that the blockade of Cadiz, the protection of Seville on the side of Neibla and of Araceña, would not permit the drawing off more than twenty thousand men, represented to the emperor that with such a force, he durst not penetrate the Alemtejo, leaving Olivenza and Badajos, and Ballasteros, (who would certainly join Mendizabel) on his rear; while Romana alone, without reckoning British troops, could bring ten thousand men against his front; hence he demanded leave to besiege those places, and Napoleon consented. Meanwhile, order was taken to secure Andalusia during the operations. Dessolles’ division had been recalled to form the army of the centre, and general Godinot took his place at Cordoba; a column of observation was posted under general Digeon at Ecija; Seville entrenched on the side of Neibla, was given over to general Daricau, and a detachment under Remond was posted at Gibraleon. The expeditionary army, consisting of sixteen thousand infantry, artillery, sappers and miners, and about four thousand cavalry and fifty-four guns, was assembled on the 2d January. An equipage of siege, a light pontoon train, and seventeen hundred carts, for stores and provisions were also prepared, and Soult’s administration was now so efficient, that he ordered a levy of five thousand young Spaniards, called “_escopeteros_” (fuzileers) to maintain the police of the province. SOULT’S FIRST EXPEDITION TO ESTREMADURA. [Sidenote: 1811.] [Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Sect. 5, 6.] Mortier moving from Guadalcanal, entered Zafra on the 5th January, Mendizabel retired to Merida, and Ballasteros, in consequence of orders from the Regency, passed over the mountains to Frejenal. Winter tempests raged, and the French convoy which moved on Araceña, being overwhelmed by storms, was detained at the foot of the mountains, and to cover it, Gazan marching from Zafra, drove Ballasteros out of Frejenal. Meanwhile, the Spanish leaders, as well those in Estremadura, as in Cadiz, were quite ignorant of Soult’s intentions, some asserting that he was going to pass the Tagus at Almaraz, others, that his object was only to crush Ballasteros. Lord Wellington alone divined the truth, and it was he who first gave Mendizabel notice, that the French were not assembling at Seville at all, so destitute of intelligence and of military knowledge were the Spaniards. Now when the French were breaking into Estremadura, terror and confusion spread far and wide; Badajos was ill provisioned, Albuquerque in ruins, Olivenza nearly dismantled; and, in the midst of this disorder, Ballasteros was drawn off towards the Condada de Neibla by the Regency, who thus deprived Estremadura of half its defenders at the moment of invasion. Lord Wellington had advised that the troops should be concentrated, the bridges over the Guadiana mined for destruction, and the passage of that river disputed to gain time; but these things being neglected, an advanced guard of cavalry alone carried the bridge of Merida on the 6th. Soult then turned upon Olivenza with the infantry, and while Latour Maubourg’s dragoons held Mendizabel in check on the side of Badajos, Briche’s light horsemen collected cattle on the side of Estremadura; Gazan’s division, still posted near Frejenal, protected the march of the artillery and convoy, and La Houssaye’s brigade, belonging to the army of the centre, quitting Truxillo, marched against the Partidas and scoured the banks of the Tagus from Arzobispo to Alcantara. FIRST SIEGE OF OLIVENZA. This place, although regularly fortified with nine bastions, a covered way, and some unfinished ravelins, was incapable of a good defence. With an old breach slightly repaired, very few guns mounted, and commanding no passage of the Guadiana, it was of little importance to the French, yet, as containing four thousand troops, it was of some consequence to reduce it. Lord Wellington had pressed Romana to destroy the defences entirely, or to supply it with the means of resistance, and the marquis decided on the former; but Mendizabel slighting his orders, had thrown his best division into the place. It was invested the 11th of January; an abandoned outwork, three hundred and forty yards south of the town, was taken possession of the first night; and breaching batteries of eight guns, and counter-batteries of six guns were then marked out. The trenches were opened on the west, and approaches carried on by the flying sap against the old breach; but the rains were heavy and continual, the scarcity of entrenching-tools great, and it was not until the 18th, when the head of the convoy had passed the mountains, that the works could be properly advanced. On the 19th the covered way was crowned, and the 20th the breaching batteries opened their fire; two mortars also threw shells into the town, and a globe of compression was prepared to blow in the counterscarp. In the evening, the governor of Badajos skirmished unsuccessfully with Latour Maubourg’s horsemen, and, on the 21st, the mine was completed and preparations made for the passage of the ditch. Mendizabel, unable from the absence of Ballasteros’ division to relieve Olivenza, demanded succour, and Romana sent Carlos D’España’s brigade from Abrantes the 18th, and general Virues, with his own Spanish division, from Cartaxo on the 20th. The 21st, the governor of Olivenza was informed of this, and replied that he would maintain the place to the last moment; but the next day he capitulated, having still provisions, ammunition, eighteen guns, and four thousand one hundred effective soldiers. The 26th Soult marched against Badajos. Meanwhile Ballasteros advanced upon Neibla, but being followed by Gazan, was overtaken at Castillejos on the 28th, and, after a sharp battle, driven with the loss of a thousand men over the Guadiana. The Spanish artillery was saved in the castle of Paymigo, the infantry took refuge at Alcontin and Mertola; and, that nothing might be left to alarm the French in that quarter, the Regency recalled Copon’s force to Cadiz. In this manner a fortress was taken, and twelve thousand men, who, well employed, might have frustrated the French designs against Badajos, were all dispersed, withdrawn, or made prisoners in twenty days after the commencement of Soult’s expedition. For many months previous to these events lord Wellington had striven to teach the Spanish commander that there was but one safe mode of proceeding in Estremadura, and Romana had just yielded to his counsels, when the sudden arrival of the French threw every thing into confusion. The defence of the Guadiana, the dismantling of Olivenza, the concentration of the forces were all neglected. Romana, however, had sent his divisions towards the frontier, and they reached Montemor the 22d; the 23d they received Mendizabel’s orders to halt as Olivenza had surrendered; and the 24th Romana died of an aneurism in the heart. He was a worthy man and of quick parts, although deficient in military talent. His death was a great loss, yet his influence was on the wane; he had many enemies, and his authority was chiefly sustained by the attachment of his troops, and by his riches, for his estates being in the Balearic Isles, his revenues did not suffer by the war. [Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 6.] Mendizabel now commanded in Estremadura. He had received Romana’s orders to adopt lord Wellington’s plan, which was still to concentrate all the Spanish troops, amounting to at least ten thousand men, on the frontier, and, before the enemy appeared on the right bank of the Guadiana, to occupy a certain position of great natural strength close to Badajos; the right touching the fort of St. Christoval, the front covered by the Gebora river and by the Guadiana, the fortress of Campo Mayor immediately in rear of the left, and Elvas behind the centre. When Mendizabel was entrenched on this position, and a strong garrison in Badajos, the English general thought Soult could not invest or even straighten the communications of the town, yet, knowing well the people he dealt with, prophetically observed, “_with soldiers of any other nation success is certain, but no calculation can be made of any operation in which Spanish troops are engaged_.” When Olivenza fell, a small garrison was in Albuquerque, and another in Valencia d’Alcantara; Carlos d’España was in Campo Mayor, and Virues, with Romana’s divisions, at Montemor. When Soult drove back the outposts of Badajos on the 26th, Mendizabel shut himself up with six thousand men in that fortress; but, although a siege had been expected for a year, the place was still unprovisioned. It was, however, still possible to execute the English general’s plan, yet no Spaniard moved, and, on the 27th, Latour Maubourg, crossing the Guadiana at Merida, forded the Gebora, and cut off the communications with Campo Mayor and Elvas! FRENCH SIEGE OF BADAJOS. This city stands on a tongue of land at the confluence of the Guadiana with the Rivillas; the first is a noble river five hundred yards broad, the second a trifling stream. A rock, one hundred feet high, and crowned by an old castle, overhangs the meeting of the waters, and the town, spreading out like a fan as the land opens between the rivers, is protected by eight regular curtains and bastions, from twenty-three to thirty feet in height, with good counterscarps, covered way, and glacis. On the left bank of the Guadiana the outworks were, 1º. the Lunette of San Roque, covering a dam and sluice on the Rivillas, by which an inundation could be commanded; 2º. an isolated redoubt, called the Picurina, situated beyond the Rivillas, and four hundred yards from the town; 3º. the Pardaleras, a defective crown-work, central between the Lower Guadiana and the Rivillas, and two hundred yards from the ramparts. On the right bank of the Guadiana a hill, crowned by a regular fort three hundred feet square, called San Christoval, overlooked the interior of the castle, and a quarter of a mile farther down the stream, the bridge, six hundred yards in length, was protected by a bridge-head, slightly connected with San Christoval, but commanded on every side. [Sidenote: Conquête de l’Andalusie, par Edouard Lapéne.] Soult constructed a ferry on the Guadiana, above the confluence of the Gebora, and three attacks were opened against the town the 28th, two on the side of Picurina and one on that of the Pardaleras. The 29th and 30th slight sallies were repulsed, but tempestuous weather spoiled the works. Gazan’s division was distant; the infantry before the place were few, and, on the 30th, the garrison making a vigorous sally from the Pardaleras, killed or wounded sixty men and cleared the trenches. Meanwhile some Spanish cavalry, gliding round the left of the French, sabred several engineers and sappers, and then retired. [Sidenote: Siege de Badajos, par le Col. Lamare.] [Sidenote: Lord Wellington’s Correspondence. MSS.] [Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Papers. MSS.] In the night of the 2d of February a violent tempest flooded the Rivillas, carried away the French bridges, drowned men and horses, damaged the depôts, and reduced the besiegers to the greatest distress. The cavalry employed in the investment could no longer forage; scarcity was felt in the camp; the convoys could only arrive by detachments; the rigour of winter bivouacs caused sickness, and, on the 3d, the Spaniards, making a second sally from Pardaleras, killed or wounded eighty men and ruined a part of the parallel. The same day Gazan arrived in camp, but the French cavalry being withdrawn from the right bank of the Guadiana, in consequence of rigorous weather, the communication was re-established with Elvas, and Mendizabel called the divisions in Portugal to his assistance. Virues immediately marched upon Elvas, Carlo d’España, and Madden united at Campo Mayor, and Julian Sanchez brought down his Partida from Upper Estremadura. In the night of the 5th, Mendizabel repaired to Elvas in person; passed the Caya the next day, and being joined on the road by the troops from Campo Mayor, pushed the few French horsemen still on the right of the Guadiana over the Gebora. The Portuguese brigade crossed that river in pursuit, and captured some baggage; but the infantry entered Badajos, for Mendizabel again neglecting lord Wellington’s counsel, designed not to take up a position behind the Gebora, but to raise the siege by a sally; yet he delayed this until the next day, thus risking to have his whole army shut up in an ill-provided fortress; for Latour Maubourg, seeing that Madden was unsupported, turned and drove him back over the Gebora with loss. Badajos now contained sixteen thousand men, and, early on the 7th, Carrera and Carlos d’España, at the head of five thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry, breaking out at the Picurina side, with one burst carried the trenches and the batteries; the soldiers fought with surprising ardour, but the entire want of arrangement on the part of the generals (unworthy to command the brave men under them) ruined all. They had not even provided the means to spike the guns, and when Mortier brought his reserves against the front and flank of the attack, the whole driven back in disorder, re-entered the city, having eighty-five officers and near six hundred soldiers killed and wounded; the enemy also lost several engineers and four hundred men. While this action took place on the left bank, Latour Maubourg occupied the ground between the Gebora and the Caya, and again cut off the communication with Elvas and Campo Mayor; but his forces were too weak to maintain themselves there, and Mendizabel, leaving the defence of the town entirely to the governor, Rafael Menacho, pitched his own camp round San Christoval. Some days previous to this, the French had bombarded Badajos, a proceeding only mischievous to themselves; for the inhabitants, terrified by the shells, fled in great numbers while the communication was open, but left behind their provisions; which enabled Menacho to feed his garrison without difficulty. [Sidenote: Appendix, No. X. Section 2.] [Sidenote: Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool. MSS.] Soult observing the numbers, and awake to all the real resources of the Spanish succouring army, feared lest delay should produce a change of commanders, or of system, and resolved to bring matters to a crisis. On the 11th he stormed the Pardaleras; on the 12th, he sent fifteen hundred cavalry across the Guadiana to Montijo; and, on the 14th, threw shells into the camp about Christoval, which obliged Mendizabel to remove from the heights in front of that fort. Meanwhile, intelligence that Castaños was appointed captain-general of Estremadura created the greatest anger amongst Romana’s soldiers: they had long considered themselves independent of the central government, and in this mood, although the position behind the Gebora, recommended by lord Wellington, was at last occupied, little attention was paid to military discipline. The English general had expressly advised Mendizabel to increase the great natural strength of this position with entrenchments; for his design was that the Spaniards, whom he thought quite unequal to open field-operations, should have an impregnable post, whence they could safely aid in the defence of the town, and yet preserve a free communication with the Alemtejo, until the arrival of his own reinforcements (which he expected in the latter end of January) should enable him to raise the siege. Mendizabel, with that arrogance which is peculiar to his nation, rejected this counsel, and hung twelve days on the heights of Christoval in a torpid state; and, when driven thence by the French shells, merely destroyed a small bridge over the Gebora, but neither cast up entrenchments, nor kept a guard in his front, nor disposed his men with care. Soult observing these things, suddenly leaped upon him. BATTLE OF THE GEBORA. The Guadiana and the Gebora rivers covered the Spanish position; this did not deter the duke of Dalmatia from attempting to pass both and surprise the camp. But first to deprive Mendizabel of the aid of San Christoval, and to create a diversion, the French mortar-batteries again threw shells on the 17th: yet the swell of the rivers would not permit the main operation to be commenced before the evening of the 18th, when the cavalry drew down the right bank of the Guadiana from Montijo, and the artillery and infantry crossed at the French ferry, four miles above the confluence of the Gebora. These combinations were so exactly executed, that, at daybreak, on the 19th, six thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry were in order of battle on the right bank of the Guadiana; the Gebora was however still to be forded, and, behind it, the Spaniards had ten thousand infantry, a considerable artillery, and fifteen hundred cavalry, besides many armed followers of the camp; the whole number not being less than fifteen thousand. A thick mist covered the country, no Spanish posts were in advance, and Soult, riding through the French ranks, and exhorting the soldiers to fight manfully, commenced the passage of the Gebora. His cavalry forded five miles up the stream, but his infantry passed in two columns, on the right and left of the ruined bridge: a few shots, near the latter, first alarmed the Spaniards, and, as the instant clamour amongst the multitude indicated that the surprise was complete, Mortier, who directed the movements, rapidly formed the line of battle. [Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 8.] At eight o’clock the fog cleared away, and the first beams of the sun and the certainty of victory, flashed together on the French soldiers; for the horsemen were already surrounding the Spanish left; and in the centre, infantry, cavalry, and guns, heaped together, were waving to and fro in disorder; while the right having fallen away from San Christoval was unsupported. In one moment, Girard, with three battalions, stood between the Spaniards and the fort; the artillery roared on both sides; and the French bore forward as one man to the attack: six battalions pressed the centre; Girard moved perpendicularly on the right, and Latour Maubourg charged the left. Thus surrounded, Mendizabel’s people instinctively crowding together on the centre, resisted, for some time, by their inert weight; but the French infantry closed with a destroying musketry, the horsemen rode in with loose bridles, and the Spaniards were shaken, divided, and slaughtered. Their cavalry fled outright, even Madden’s Portuguese, either from panic, or from hatred of their allies, disregarded alike his exhortations and example, and shamefully turned their backs. At ten o’clock the fight was over; Virues was taken, Mendizabel and Carrera escaped with difficulty, España alone made good his retreat to Campo Mayor with two thousand men; a few more reached Elvas, three thousand got into Badajos, by the bridge, and nine hundred bodies strewed the field: eight thousand, including armed followers, were made prisoners; and guns, colours, muskets, ammunition, baggage, all, fell into the enemy’s hands. It was a disastrous and a shameful defeat. In the depth of winter, Soult, with a small force, had passed two difficult rivers, carried a strong position, and annihilated an army which had been two years in constant service. Mendizabel, instead of destroying the bridge over the Gebora, should have cast others, that he might freely issue to attack the French while crossing the Guadiana; he should have opposed them again in passing the Gebora; or he might have passed through Badajos, and fallen on the troops in the trenches, with his whole army, while Soult was still entangled between the rivers. In the evening after the action the French cast up entrenchments, posting three battalions and the heavy cavalry on the important position they had gained; and the next day the works of the siege were renewed with greater activity; yet the difficulty of Soult’s undertaking was rendered apparent by his victories. The continual rains, interrupting the arrival of his convoys, obliged him to employ a number of men at a great distance to gather provisions; nearly two thousand French had been killed or wounded in the two sieges and in this battle, many also were sick, and Badajos was still powerful. The body of the place was entire, the garrison nine thousand strong, and, by the flight of the inhabitants, well provided with food; and there was no want of other stores: the governor was resolute and confident; the season rigorous for the besiegers; no communication had been yet opened with Massena; and lord Wellington, in momentary expectation that his reinforcements would arrive, was impatient to bring on a crisis; meanwhile, the duke of Dalmatia’s power, in Andalusia, was menaced in the most serious manner. CONTINUATION OF THE BLOCKADE OF CADIZ. [Sidenote: Official Abstract of Military Reports. MSS.] [Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 5.] When general Graham was aware of Soult’s departure, and knew, also, that the fifth corps had quitted Seville, he undertook, in concert with the Spaniards, to drive Victor out of his lines. A force, sailing from Cadiz the 29th of January, was to have been joined, in rear of the enemy, by the troops from Tarifa under major Brown, and by three thousand Spaniards, from Algesiras and San Roque under general Beguines; but contrary winds detained even the vessels carrying counter orders to Beguines and Brown, and they advanced, the first to Medina, the other to Casa Vieja. Victor, having notice of this project, at first kept close, but afterwards sent troops to retake Medina and Casa Vieja; and, in the course of February, twelve thousand men, drawn from the northern governments, were directed upon Andalusia, to reinforce the different corps. The first corps was thus increased to twenty thousand men, of which fifteen thousand were before Cadiz, and the remainder at San Lucar, Medina, Sidonia, and other quarters. Nevertheless, on the 21st of February, ten thousand infantry and near six hundred cavalry, of the allies, were again embarked at Cadiz; being to land at Tarifa, and march upon the rear of the enemy’s camp at Chiclana. Meanwhile, general Zayas, commanding the Spanish forces left in the Isla, was to cast a bridge over the San Petri, near the sea mouth; Ballasteros, also, with the remains of his army, was directed to menace Seville, the irregular bands were to act against Sebastiani, and insurrections were expected in all quarters. [Sidenote: Appendix, No. IX. Section 2.] The British troops passed their port in a gale, the 22d, but, landing at Algesiras, marched to Tarifa the next day. Being there joined by the twenty-eighth, and the flank companies of the ninth and eighty-second regiments, somewhat more than four thousand effective troops (including two companies of the twentieth Portuguese and one hundred and eighty German hussars) were assembled under general Graham; all good and hardy troops, and himself a daring old man and of a ready temper for battle. General La Peña arrived on the 27th, with seven thousand Spaniards, and Graham, for the sake of unanimity, ceded the chief command, although it was contrary to his instructions. The next day, the whole, moving forward about twelve miles, passed the mountain ridges that, descending from Ronda to the sea, separate the plains of San Roque from those of Medina and Chiclana: but being now within four leagues of the enemy’s posts, the troops were re-organized. The vanguard was given to Lardizabal; the centre to the prince of Anglona; the reserve, composed of two Spanish regiments and the British were confided to Graham; but the cavalry of both nations, formed in one body, was commanded by colonel Whittingham, then in the Spanish service. [Sidenote: Intercepted Letter of General Werlé to Sebastiani, Alhama, March 12.] [Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 6.] The French covering division, under general Cassagne, consisted of three battalions and a regiment of horse at Medina, with outposts at Vejer de la Frontera and Casa Viejas. Before La Peña’s arrival, the irregulars had attacked Casa Viejas, and general Beguines had even taken Medina; but Cassagne, reinforced by a battalion of infantry from Arcos, retook and entrenched it the 29th; and the signal of action being thus given, the French generals in the higher provinces, perceiving that the people were ready for commotion, gathered in their respective forces at Seville, Ecija, and Cordoba; following the orders left by Soult. In Grenada the insurgents were especially active; Sebastiani, doubtful if the storm would not break on his head, concentrated a column at Estipona as a good covering point to the coast line, and one whence he could easily gain Ronda. Victor manned his works at Rota, Santa Maria, Puerto Real, and the Trocadero with a mixed force, of refugee French, juramentados, and regular troops; but he assembled eleven thousand good soldiers near Chiclana, taking post between the roads of Conil and Medina, to await the development of the allies’ project. At first, La Peña’s march pointed to Medina Sidonia, his vanguard stormed Casa Viejas on the 2d of March, and the troops from Algesiras, amounting to sixteen hundred infantry, besides several hundreds of irregular cavalry, came in to him; encreasing his force to twelve thousand infantry, eight hundred horsemen, and twenty-four guns. The 3d he resumed his march, but hearing that Medina Sidonia was entrenched, turned towards the coast, and drove the French from Vejer de la Frontera. The following evening he continued his movement, and at nine o’clock on the morning of the 5th, after a skirmish, in which his advanced guard of cavalry was routed by a French squadron, he reached the Cerro de Puerco, called by the English, the heights of Barosa; being then only four miles from the sea mouth of the Santi Petri. Barosa is a low ridge, creeping in from the coast, about one mile and a half, and overlooking a high and broken plain of small extent. This plain was bounded on the left by the coast clifts, on the right by the forest of Chiclana, and in front by a pine-wood, beyond which rose the narrow height of Bermeja, filling the space between the Almanza creek and the sea. The Bermeja hill, could be reached either by moving through the wood in front, or along the beach under the clifts. [Sidenote: Appendix, No. IX. Section 1.] At Tarifa, Graham, judging that Victor would surely come out of his lines to fight, had obtained from La Peña a promise to make short marches; to keep the troops fresh for battle; and not to approach the enemy except in a concentrated mass. Nevertheless, the day’s march from Casa Vieja, being made through bad roads, with ignorant guides, had occupied fifteen hours, and the night march to Barosa had been still more fatiguing. The troops came up in a straggling manner, and ere they had all arrived, La Peña, as if in contempt of his colleague, without either disclosing his own plans, or communicating by signal or otherwise with Zayas, sent the vanguard, reinforced by a squadron and three guns, straight against the mouth of the Santi Petri. Zayas had, indeed, cast his bridge there on the 2d, and commenced an entrenchment; but, in the following night, being surprised by the French, was driven again into the Isla: hence the movement of the vanguard was exceedingly dangerous. Lardizabal, however, after a sharp skirmish, in which he lost nearly three hundred men, forced the enemy’s posts between the Almanza creek and the sea, and effected a junction with Zayas. Graham was extremely desirous of holding the Barosa height, as the key both to offensive and defensive movements, and he argued that no general in his senses would lend his flank to an enemy, by attacking the Bermeja while Barosa was occupied in force. Lascy, the chief of the Spanish staff, having however opposed this reasoning, La Peña commanded Graham to march the British troops through the wood to Bermeja. With great temper, he obeyed this uncourteous order; and leaving the flank companies of the ninth and eighty-second, under major Brown, as a guard for the baggage, commenced his march, in the full persuasion that La Peña would remain with Anglona’s division and the cavalry at Barosa; and the more so, as a Spanish detachment was still on the side of Medina. But scarcely had the British entered the wood, when La Peña, without any notice, carried off the corps of battle, directed the cavalry to follow by the sea-road, and repaired himself to Santi Petri, leaving Barosa crowded with baggage, and protected only by a rear guard of four guns and five battalions. [Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 7.] During these movements, Victor remained close in the forest of Chiclana, and the patrols of the allied cavalry reported that they could see no enemy; Graham’s march therefore, being only of two miles, seemed secure. The French marshal was, however, keenly watching the allies’ progress; having recalled his infantry from Medina Sidonia as soon as La Peña had reached Barosa, he momentarily expected their arrival; but he felt so sure of success, that the cavalry at Medina and Arcos were directed upon Vejer and other places, to cut off the fugitives after the approaching battle. The duke of Belluno had in hand fourteen pieces of artillery and nine thousand excellent troops, of the divisions of Laval, Ruffin, and Villatte; from these he drew three grenadier battalions as reserves, attaching two of them and three squadrons of cavalry to the division of Ruffin, which formed his left wing, the other to the division of Laval, which formed his centre. Villatte’s troops, about two thousand five hundred in number, after being withdrawn from Bermeja, were posted close to a bridge on the Almanza creek, to cover the works of the camp, and to watch the Spanish forces at Santi Petri and Bermeja. BATTLE OF BAROSA. When Victor observed that Graham’s corps was in the wood, that a strong body of Spaniards was on the Bermeja, that a third body, with all the baggage, was at Barosa, and a fourth still in march from Vejer; he took Villatte’s division as his pivot, and coming forth with a rapid pace into the plain, directed Laval against the English, while himself, with Ruffin’s brigade, ascending the reverse side of Barosa, cut off the Spanish detachment on the road to Medina, and drove the whole of the rear guard off the height towards the sea; dispersing the baggage and followers of the army in all directions, and taking three Spanish guns. Major Brown, seeing the general confusion, and being unable to stem the torrent, slowly retired into the plain, sending notice of what was passing to Graham, and demanding orders. That general, being then near Bermeja, answered, that he was to fight; and instantly facing about himself, regained the plain with the greatest celerity, expecting to find La Peña, with the corps of battle and the cavalry, on the height: but when the view opened, he beheld Ruffin, flanked by the chosen battalions, near the top of Barosa at the one side, the Spanish rear guard and baggage flying in confusion on the other, the French cavalry between the summit and the sea, and Laval close on his own left flank; but La Peña he could see no where. In this desperate situation, he felt that to retreat upon Bermeja, and thus bring the enemy, pell mell with the allies on to that narrow ridge, must be disastrous, hence, without a moment’s hesitation, he resolved to attack, although the key of the field of battle was already in the enemy’s possession. Ten guns, under major Duncan, instantly opened a terrific fire against Laval’s column, while colonel Andrew Barnard, with the riflemen and the Portuguese companies, running out to the left, commenced the fight: the remainder of the British troops, without any attention to regiments or brigades, so sudden was the affair, formed two masses, one of which under general Dilke marched hastily against Ruffin, and the other under colonel Wheately against Laval. Duncan’s guns ravaged the French ranks; Laval’s artillery replied vigorously; Ruffin’s batteries took Wheately’s column in flank; and the infantry on both sides pressed forward eagerly, and with a pealing musketry; but, when near together, a fierce, rapid, prolonged charge of the British overthrew the first line of the French, and, notwithstanding its extreme valour, drove it in confusion, over a narrow dip of ground upon the second, which was almost immediately broken in the same manner, and only the chosen battalion, hitherto posted on the right, remained to cover the retreat. Meanwhile Brown, on receiving his orders, had marched headlong against Ruffin. Nearly half of his detachment went down under the enemy’s first fire; yet he maintained the fight, until Dilke’s column, which had crossed a deep hollow and never stopt even to re-form the regiments, came up, with little order indeed, but in a fierce mood, when the whole run up towards the summit; there was no slackness on any side, and at the very edge of the ascent their gallant opponents met them. A dreadful, and for some time a doubtful, fight ensued, but Ruffin and Chaudron Rousseau, commanding the chosen grenadiers, both fell mortally wounded; the English bore strongly onward, and their incessant slaughtering fire forced the French from the hill with the loss of three guns and many brave soldiers. The discomfitted divisions, retiring concentrically, soon met, and with infinite spirit endeavoured to re-form and renew the action; but the play of Duncan’s guns, close, rapid, and murderous, rendered the attempt vain. Victor was soon in full retreat, and the British having been twenty-four hours under arms, without food, were too exhausted to pursue. While these terrible combats of infantry were fighting, La Peña looked idly on, neither sending his cavalry, nor his horse-artillery, nor any part of his army, to the assistance of his ally, nor yet menacing the right of the enemy, which was close to him and weak. The Spanish Walloon guards, the regiment of Ciudad Real, and some Guerilla cavalry, indeed turned without orders, coming up just as the action ceased; and it was expected that colonel Whittingham, an Englishman commanding a powerful body of horse, would have done as much; but no stroke in aid of the British was struck by a Spanish sabre that day, although the French cavalry did not exceed two hundred and fifty men, and it is evident that the eight hundred under Whittingham might, by sweeping round the left of Ruffin’s division, have rendered the defeat ruinous. So certain, indeed, was this, that colonel Frederick Ponsonby, drawing off the hundred and eighty German hussars belonging to the English army, reached the field of battle, charged the French squadrons just as their retreating divisions met, overthrew them, took two guns, and even attempted, though vainly, to sabre Rousseau’s chosen battalions. Such was the fight of Barosa. Short, for it lasted only one hour and a half, but most violent and bloody; for fifty officers, sixty serjeants, and above eleven hundred British soldiers, and more than two thousand Frenchmen were killed and wounded; and from the latter, six guns, an eagle, and two generals (both mortally wounded) were taken, together with four hundred other prisoners. [Sidenote: Appendix, No. IX. Section 1.] After the action, Graham remained some hours on the height, still hoping that La Peña would awake to the prospect of success and glory, which the extreme valour of the British had opened. Four thousand men and a powerful artillery had come over the Santi Petri; hence the Spanish general was at the head of twelve thousand infantry and eight hundred cavalry, all fresh troops; while before him were only the remains of the French line of battle retreating in the greatest disorder upon Chiclana. But all military feeling being extinct in La Peña, Graham would no longer endure such command. The morning of the 6th saw the British filing over Zaya’s bridge into the Isla. [Illustration: _Vol. 3, Plate 9._ BATTLE of BAROSA _5^{th} March, 1811_. _London Published by T. & W. BOONE Nov^r 1830._] [Sidenote: Official Abstracts of Military Reports, MSS.] On the French side, Cassagne’s reserve came in from Medina, a council of war was held in the night of the 5th, and Victor, although of a disponding nature, proposed another attack; but the suggestion being ill received, nothing was done; and the 6th, Admiral Keats, landing his seamen and marines, dismantled, with exception of Catalina, every fort from Rota to Santa Maria, and even obtained momentary possession of the latter place. Confusion and alarm then prevailed in the French camp; the duke of Belluno, leaving garrisons at the great points of his lines, and a rear guard at Chiclana, retreated behind the San Pedro, where he expected to be immediately attacked. If La Peña had even then pushed to Chiclana, Graham and Keats were willing to make a simultaneous attack upon the Trocadero; but the 6th and 7th passed, without even a Spanish patrole following the French. On the 8th Victor returned to Chiclana, and La Peña instantly recrossing the Santi Petri, destroyed the bridge, and his detachment on the side of Medina being thus cut off from the Isla, was soon afterwards obliged to retire to Algesiras. All the passages in this extraordinary battle were so broadly marked, that observations would be useless. The contemptible feebleness of La Peña furnished a surprising contrast to the heroic vigour of Graham, whose attack was an inspiration rather than a resolution, so wise, so sudden was the decision, so swift, so conclusive was the execution. The original plan of the enterprise having however been rather rashly censured, some remarks on that head may be useful. “Sebastiani, it is said, might, by moving on the rear of the allies, have crushed them, and they had no right to calculate upon his inactivity.” This is weak. Graham, weighing the natural dislike of one general to serve under another, judged, that Sebastiani, harassed by insurrections in Grenada, would not hastily abandon his own district to succour Victor, before it was clear where the blow was to be struck. The distance from Tarifa to Chiclana was about fifty miles, whereas, from Sebastiani’s nearest post to Chiclana was above a hundred, and the real object of the allies could not be known until they had passed the mountains separating Tarifa from Medina. [Sidenote: Appendix, No. IX. Section 5.] Combining these moral and physical considerations, Graham had reason to expect several days of free action; and thus indeed it happened, and with a worthy colleague he would have raised the blockade: more than that could scarcely have been hoped, as the French forces would have concentrated either before Cadiz or about Seville or Ecija; and they had still fifty thousand men in Andalusia. Victor’s attack on the 5th, was well-judged, well-timed, vigorous; with a few thousand more troops he alone would have crushed the allies. The unconquerable spirit of the English prevented this disaster; but if Graham or his troops had given way, or even hesitated, the whole army must have been driven like sheep into an enclosure; the Almanza creek on one side, the sea on the other, the San Petri to bar their flight, and the enemy hanging on their rear in all the fierceness of victory. Indeed, such was La Peña’s misconduct, that the French, although defeated, gained their main point; the blockade was renewed, and it is remarkable that, during the action, a French detachment passed near the bridge of Zuazo without difficulty, and brought back prisoners; thus proving that with a few more troops Victor might have seized the Isla. Meanwhile Ballasteros, who had gone against Seville, was chased, in a miserable condition, to the Aroche hills, by Daricau. In Cadiz violent disputes arose. La Peña, in an address to the Cortes, claimed the victory for himself. He affirmed that all the previous arrangements were made with the knowledge and approbation of the English general, and the latter’s retreat into the Isla he indicated as the real cause of failure: Lascy and general Cruz-Murgeon also published inaccurate accounts of the action, and even had deceptive plans engraved to uphold their statements. Graham, stung by these unworthy proceedings, exposed the conduct of La Peña in a letter to the British envoy; and when Lascy let fall some expressions personally offensive, he enforced an apology with his sword; but having thus shewn himself superior to his opponents at all points, the gallant old man soon afterwards relinquished his command to general Cooke, and joined lord Wellington’s army. CHAPTER III. While discord prevailed at Cadiz, the siege of Badajos continued. Early in March, the second parallel being completed and the Pardaleras taken into the works, the approaches were carried by sap to the covered way, and mines were prepared to blow in the counterscarp. Nevertheless, Rafael Menacho, the governor, was in no manner dismayed; his sallies were frequent and vigorous, his activity and courage inspired his troops with confidence, he had begun to retrench in the streets behind the part attacked, and as the fire of the besiegers was also inferior to that of the besieged, every thing seemed to promise favourably for the latter: but, on the evening of the 2d, during a sally, in which the nearest French batteries were carried, the guns spiked, and trenches partly ruined, Menacho was killed, and the command fell to Imas, a man so unworthy that a worse could not be found. At once the spirit of the garrison died away, the besiegers’ works advanced rapidly, the ditch was passed, a lodgement was made on one of the ravelins, the rampart was breached, and the fire of the besieged being nearly extinguished, on the 10th of March the place was summoned in a peremptory manner. [Sidenote: Lord Wellington’s Despatch.] At this time the great crisis of the campaign had passed, and a strong body of British and Portuguese troops were ready to raise the siege of Badajos. In three different ways, by telegraph, by a letter, and by a confidential messenger, the governor was informed, that Massena was in full retreat and that the relieving army was actually in march. The breach was still impracticable, provisions were plentiful, the garrison above eight thousand strong, the French army reduced, by sickness, by detachments and the previous operations, to less than fourteen thousand men. Imas read the letter, and instantly surrendered, handing over at the same moment the intelligence thus obtained to the enemy. But he also demanded that his grenadiers should march out of the breach, it was granted, and he was obliged to enlarge the opening himself ere they could do so! Yet this man so covered with opprobrium, and who had secured his own liberty while consigning his fellow soldiers to a prison, and his character to infamy, was never punished by the Spanish rulers: lord Wellington’s indignant remonstrances forced them, indeed, to bring him to trial, but they made the process last during the whole war. When the place fell, Mortier marched against Campo Mayor, and Latour Maubourg seizing Albuquerque and Valencia d’Alcantara, made six hundred prisoners; but Soult, alarmed by the effects of the battle of Barosa, returned to Andalusia, having, in fifty days, mastered four fortresses and invested a fifth; having killed or dispersed ten thousand men, and having taken twenty thousand with a force which, at no time, exceeded the number of his prisoners: yet great and daring and successful as his operations had been, the principal object of his expedition was frustrated, for Massena was in retreat. Lord Wellington’s combinations had palsied the hand of the conqueror. While the siege of Badajos was proceeding, no change took place in the main positions of either army at Santarem. The English general, certain that the French, who were greatly reduced by sickness, must soon quit their ground if he could relieve Badajos, was only waiting for his reinforcements to send Beresford with fourteen thousand men against Soult; when the battle of the Gebora ruined this plan and changed his situation. The arrival of the reinforcements could not then enable him to detach a sufficient number of men to relieve Badajos, and it was no longer a question of starving Massena out, but of beating him, before Soult could take Badajos and the two armies be joined. In this difficulty, abandoning the design of raising the siege by a detachment, lord Wellington prepared to attack Massena’s army in front on the side of Tremes, while Beresford, crossing at Abrantes, fell upon the rear; he hoped thus to force back the French right and centre, and to cut off the left and to drive it into the Tagus. However, nothing could be attempted until the troops from England arrived, and day after day passed in vain expectation of their coming. Being embarked in January, they would have reached Lisbon before the end of that month, had sir Joseph Yorke, the admiral, charged to conduct the fleet, taken advantage of a favourable wind, which blew when the troops were first put on board; but he neglected this opportunity, contrary gales followed, and a voyage of ten days was thus prolonged for six weeks. [Sidenote: See Vol. II] On the other hand, the French general’s situation was becoming very perilous. To besiege Abrantes was above his means, and although that fortress was an important strategic point for the allies who had a moveable bridge, it would not have been so for the French. Massena could only choose then, to force the passage of the Tagus alone, or to wait until Soult appeared on the left bank, or to retreat. For sometime he seemed inclined to the first, shewing great jealousy of the works opposite the mouth of the Zezere, and carrying his boats on wheel-carriages along the banks of the Tagus, as if to alarm Beresford and oblige him to concentrate to his left: yet that general relaxed nothing of his vigilance, neither spy nor officer passed his lines of observation, and Massena knew, generally, that Soult was before Badajos, but nothing more. However, time wore away, sickness wasted the army, food became daily scarcer, the organization of the troops was seriously loosened, the leading generals were at variance, and the conspiracy to put St. Cyr at the head of the army in Spain was by no means relinquished. Under these accumulating difficulties even Massena’s obstinacy gave way; he promised to retreat when he had no more provisions left than would serve his army for the march. A tardy resolution; yet adopted at the moment, when to maintain his position was more important than ever, as ten days longer at Santarem would have insured the co-operation of Soult. General Pelet says, that the latter marshal, by engaging in the siege of Badajos and Olivenza, instead of coming directly down upon the Tagus, was the cause of Massena’s failure; this can hardly be sustained. Before those sieges and the battle of the Gebora, Mendizabel could have assembled twenty thousand men on Soult’s rear, and there was a large body of militia on the Ponçul and the Elga; Beresford had fourteen thousand British and Portuguese regulars, besides ordenança; while the infinite number of boats at lord Wellington’s command would have enabled him to throw troops upon the left bank of the Tagus, with a celerity that would have baffled any effort of Massena to assist the duke of Dalmatia. Now, if the latter had been defeated; with what argument could he have defended his reputation as a general, after having left three or four garrisoned fortresses and thirty-five thousand men upon his flank and rear; to say nothing of the results threatened by the battle of Barosa. The true cause of Massena’s failure was the insufficiency of his means to oppose the English general’s combinations. The French army reduced by sickness to forty thousand fighting men, exclusive of Drouet’s troops at Leiria, would have been unable to maintain its extended position against the attack meditated by lord Wellington; and when Massena, through the means of the fidalgos, knew that the English reinforcements were come, he prepared to retreat. Those troops landed the 2d of March, and, the 6th, the French had evacuated the position of Santarem. [Sidenote: Muster-Rolls of the French Army.] [Sidenote: Appendix, No. VII.] At this time Napoleon directed the armies of Spain to be remodelled. The king’s force was diminished; the army of the south increased; general Drouet was ordered to march with eleven thousand men to the fifth corps, which he was appointed to command, in place of Mortier; the remainder of the ninth corps was to compose two divisions, under the command of Clausel and Foy, and to be incorporated with the army of Portugal. Marmont was appointed to relieve Ney in the command of the sixth corps; Loison was removed to the second corps; and Bessieres was ordered to post six thousand men at Ciudad Rodrigo, to watch the frontiers of Portugal and support Claparede. Of the imperial guards; seven thousand were to assemble at Zamora, to hold the Gallicians in check, and the remainder at Valladolid, with strong parties of cavalry in the space between those places, that intelligence of what was passing in Portugal might be daily received. Thus Massena was enabled to adopt any operation that might seem good to him, without reference to his original base; but the order for the execution of these measures did not reach the armies until a later period. RETREAT OF THE FRENCH FROM SANTAREM. Several lines of operation were open to the prince of Esling. 1º. He could pass the Tagus, between Punhete and Abrantes, by boats or by fords, which were always practicable after a week of dry weather. 2º. He could retire, by the Sobreira Formosa, upon Castello Branco, and open a communication with the king by Placentia, and with the duke of Dalmatia by Alcantara. 3º. He could march, by the Estrada Nova and Belmonte, to Sabugal, and afterwards act according to circumstances. 4º. He could gain the Mondego, and ascend the left bank of that river towards Guarda and Almeida; or, crossing it, march upon Oporto through an untouched country. Of these four plans, the first was perilous, and the weather too unsettled to be sure of the fords. The second and third were difficult, from the ruggedness of the Sobreira, and exposed, because the allies could break out by Abrantes upon the flank of the army while in retreat. Massena decided on the last, but his actual position being to the left of the line of retreat, he was necessarily forced to make a flank movement, with more than ten thousand sick men and all his stores, under the beard of an adversary before he could begin his retreat. Yet this he executed, and in a manner bespeaking the great commander. Commencing his preparations by destroying munition, and all guns that could not be horsed, he passed his sick and baggage, by degrees, upon Thomar, keeping only his fighting-men in the front, and at the same time indicating an intention of passing the Zezere. But when the impediments of the army had gained two marches, Ney suddenly assembled the sixth corps and the cavalry on the Lys, near Leiria, as if with the intention of advancing against Torres Vedras, a movement that necessarily kept lord Wellington in suspense. Meanwhile, the second and eighth corps, quitting Santarem, Tremes, and Alcanhete, in the night of the 5th, fell back, by Pernes, upon Torres Novas and Thomar, destroying the bridges on the Alviella behind them. The next morning the boats were burnt at Punhete, and Loison retreated by the road of Espinal to cover the flank of the main line of retreat; the remainder of the army, by rapid concentric marches, made for a position in front of Pombal: the line of movement to the Mondego was thus secured, and four days gained; for lord Wellington, although aware that a retreat was in execution, was quite unable to take any decided step, lest he should open the Lines to his adversary. Nevertheless he had caused Beresford to close to his right on the 5th, and at daylight, on the 6th, discovering the empty camps of Santarem, followed the enemy closely with his own army. Thomar seemed to be the French point of concentration; but as their boats were still maintained at Punhete, general William Stewart crossed the Tagus, at Abrantes, with the greatest part of Beresford’s corps, while the first, fourth, and sixth divisions, and two brigades of cavalry, marched to Golegao; the light division also reached Pernes, where the bridge was rapidly repaired by captain Tod, of the royal staff-corps. The 7th, the enemy having burnt his boats on the Zezere, the Abrantes bridge was brought down to that river, and Stewart, crossing, moved to Thomar; on which place the divisions at Golegao were likewise directed. But the retreat being soon decidedly pronounced for the Mondego, the troops at Thomar were ordered to halt; and the light division, German hussars, and royal dragoons followed the eighth corps, taking two hundred prisoners. This day’s march disclosed a horrible calamity. A large house, situated in an obscure part of the mountains, was discovered, filled with starving persons. Above thirty women and children had sunk, and, sitting by the bodies, were fifteen or sixteen survivors, of whom one only was a man, but all so enfeebled as to be unable to eat the little food we had to offer them. The youngest had fallen first; all the children were dead; none were emaciated in the bodies, but the muscles of the face were invariably drawn transversely, giving the appearance of laughing, and presenting the most ghastly sight imaginable. The man seemed most eager for life; the women appeared patient and resigned, and, even in this distress, had arranged the bodies of those who first died, with decency and care. While one part of the army was thus in pursuit, the third and fifth divisions moved, from the Lines, upon Leiria; the Abrantes’ boats fell down the river to Tancos, where a bridge was fixed; and the second and fourth divisions, and some cavalry, were directed to return from Thomar to the left bank of the Tagus, to relieve Badajos: Beresford also, who remained with a part of his corps near Barca, had already sent a brigade of cavalry to Portalegre for that purpose. This was on the morning of the 9th; but the enemy, instead of continuing his retreat, concentrated the sixth and eighth corps and Montbrun’s cavalry on a table-land, in front of Pombal, where the light division skirmished with his advanced posts, and the German horse charged his cavalry with success, taking some prisoners. Lord Wellington, finding the French disposed to accept battle, was now compelled to alter his plans. To fight with advantage, it was necessary to bring up, from Thomar, the troops destined to relieve Badajos; not to fight, was giving up to the enemy Coimbra, and the untouched country behind, as far as Oporto: Massena would thus retire with the advantages of a conqueror. However, intelligence received that morning, from Badajos, described it as being in a sufficient state, and capable of holding out yet a month. This decided the question. The fourth division and the heavy cavalry, already on the march for the Alemtejo, were countermanded; general Nightingale, with a brigade of the first division and some horse, was directed by the road of Espinal, to observe the second corps; and the rest of the army was concentrically directed upon Pombal. How dangerous a captain Massena could be, was here proved. His first movement began the 4th, it was the 11th before a sufficient number of troops could be assembled to fight him at Pombal, and, during these seven days, he had executed one of the most difficult operations in war, gained three or four marches, and completely organized his system of retreat. SKIRMISH AT POMBAL. Pack’s brigade and the cavalry, the first, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and light divisions, and the Portuguese troops, which were attached, like the ancient Latin auxiliaries of the Roman legion, to each British division, were assembling in front of the enemy on the 10th; when Massena, who had sent his baggage over the Soure river in the night by the bridge of Pombal, suddenly retired through that town. He was so closely followed by the light division, that the streets being still encumbered, Ney drew up a rear-guard on a height behind the town, and threw a detachment into the old castle of Pombal. He had, however, waited too long. The French army was moving in some confusion and in a very extended column of march, by a narrow defile, between the mountains and the Soure river, which was fordable; and the British divisions were in rapid motion along the left bank, with the design of crossing lower down, and cutting Massena’s line of retreat. But darkness came on too fast, and the operation terminated with a sharp skirmish at Pombal, whence the ninety-fifth and the third caçadores of the light division, after some changes of fortune, drove the French from the castle and town with such vigour, that the latter could not destroy the bridge, although it was mined. About forty of the allies were hurt, and the loss of the enemy was somewhat greater. In the night Massena continued his retreat, which now assumed a regular and concentrated form. The baggage and sick, protected by the reserve cavalry, marched first; these were followed by the eighth corps; and the sixth, with some light cavalry, and the best horsed of the artillery, were destined to stem the pursuit. Ney had been ordered to detach Marcognet’s brigade on the 10th, from the Lys, to seize Coimbra; but some delay having taken place, Montbrun was now appointed for that service. Lord Wellington’s immediate object was to save Coimbra, and he designed, by skilful, rather than daring, operations, to oblige Massena to quit the Portuguese territory: the moral effect of such an event, he judged, would be sufficient; but as his reinforcements were still distant, he was obliged to retain the fourth division and the heavy cavalry from the relief of Badajos, and was therefore willing to strike a sudden stroke, if a fair occasion offered. Howbeit the country was full of strong positions, the roads hollow and confined by mountains on either hand, every village formed a defile; the weather also, being moderate, was favourable to the enemy, and Ney, with a wonderfully happy mixture of courage, readiness, and skill, illustrated every league of ground by some signal combination of war. Day-break, on the 12th, saw both armies in movement, and eight miles of march, and some slight skirmishing, brought the head of the British into a hollow way, leading to a high table-land on which Ney had disposed five thousand infantry, a few squadrons of cavalry, and some light guns. His centre was opposite the hollow road, his wings were covered by wooded heights, which he occupied with light troops; his right rested on the ravine of the Soure, his left on the Redinha, which circling round his rear fell into the Soure. Behind him the village of Redinha, situated in a hollow, covered a narrow bridge and a long and dangerous defile; and, beyond the stream, some very rugged heights, commanding a view of the position in front of the village, were occupied by a division of infantry, a regiment of cavalry, and a battery of heavy guns; all so skilfully disposed as to give the appearance of a very considerable force. COMBAT OF REDINHA. After examining the enemy’s position for a short time, lord Wellington first directed the light division, now commanded by sir William Erskine, to attack the wooded slopes covering Ney’s right: in less than an hour these orders were executed. The fifty-second, the ninety-fifth, and the caçadores, assisted by a company of the forty-third, carried the ascent and cleared the woods, and their skirmishers even advanced on to the open plain; but the French battalions, supported by four guns, immediately opened a heavy rolling fire, and at the same moment, colonel Ferriere, of the third French hussars, charged and took fourteen prisoners. This officer, during the whole campaign, had never failed to break in upon the skirmishers in the most critical moments; sometimes with a squadron, sometimes with only a few men; he was, however, sure to be found in the right place, and was continually proving how much may be done, even in the most rugged mountains, by a small body of good cavalry. Erskine’s line, consisting of five battalions of infantry and six guns, being now formed in such a manner that it outflanked the French right, tending towards the ford of the Redinha, was reinforced with two regiments of dragoons; meanwhile Picton seized the wooded heights protecting the French left, and thus Ney’s position was laid bare. Nevertheless, that marshal observing that lord Wellington, deceived as to his real numbers, was bringing the mass of the allied troops into line; far from retreating, even charged Picton’s skirmishers, and continued to hold his ground with an astonishing confidence if we consider his position; for the third division was nearer to the village and bridge than his right, and there were already cavalry and guns enough on the plain to overwhelm him. In this posture both sides remained for about an hour, when, three shots were fired from the British centre as a signal for a forward movement, and a most splendid spectacle of war was exhibited. The woods seemed alive with troops; and in a few moments thirty thousand men, forming three gorgeous lines of battle, were stretched across the plain; but bending on a gentle curve, and moving majestically onwards, while horsemen and guns, springing forward simultaneously from the centre and from the left wing, charged under a general volley from the French battalions: the latter were instantly hidden by the smoke, and when that cleared away no enemy was to be seen. Ney keenly watching the progress of this grand formation, had opposed Picton’s foremost skirmishers with his left, and, at the same moment, withdrew the rest of his people with such rapidity, that he gained the village ere the cavalry could touch him: the utmost efforts of Picton’s skirmishers and of the horse-artillery scarcely enabled them to gall the hindmost of the French left with their fire. One howitzer was, indeed, dismounted close to the bridge, but the village of Redinha was in flames; and the marshal wishing to confirm the courage of his soldiers at the commencement of the retreat, in person superintended the carrying it off: this he effected, yet with the loss of fifteen or twenty men, and with great danger to himself, for the British guns were thundering on his rear, and the light troops of the third division, chasing like heated blood hounds, passed the river almost at the same time with the French. The reserves of the latter cannonaded the bridge from the heights beyond, but a fresh disposition of attack being made by lord Wellington, while the third division continued to press the left, Ney fell back upon the main body, then at Condeixa, ten miles in the rear. The British had twelve officers and two hundred men killed and wounded in this combat, and the enemy lost as many; but he might have been utterly destroyed; for there is no doubt, that the duke of Elchingen remained a quarter of an hour too long upon his first position, and that, deceived by the skilful arrangement of his reserve, lord Wellington paid him too much respect. Yet the extraordinary facility and precision with which the English general handled so large a force, was a warning to the French commander, and produced a palpable effect upon the after operations. On the 13th, the allies renewed the pursuit, and before ten o’clock discovered the French army, the second corps which was at Espinhal excepted, in order of battle. The crisis of Massena’s retreat had arrived, the defiles of Condeixa, leading upon Coimbra, were behind him; those of Miranda de Corvo, leading to the Puente de Murcella, were on his left; and in the fork of these two roads Ney was seated on a strong range of heights covered by a marsh, his position being only to be approached by the highway leading through a deep hollow against his right. Trees were felled to obstruct the passage; a palisado was constructed across the hollow; breast-works were thrown up on each side, and Massena expected to stop the pursuit, while Montbrun seized Coimbra: for he designed to pass the Mondego, and either capture Oporto or maintain a position between the Douro and the Mondego, until the operations of Soult should draw the British away; or until the advance of Bessieres with the army of the north, should enable himself again to act offensively. Hitherto the French general had appeared the abler tactician, but now his adversary assumed the superiority. When at Thomar lord Wellington had sent Baccellar orders to look to the security of Oporto, and had directed Wilson and Trant also to abandon the Mondego and the Vouga the moment the fords were passable, retiring across the Douro; breaking up the roads as they retreated, and taking care to remove or to destroy all boats and means of transport. Now, Wilson was in march for the Vouga, but Trant having destroyed an arch of the Coimbra bridge on the city side, and placed guards at the fords as far as Figueras, resolved to oppose the enemy’s passage; for the sound of guns had reached his outposts, the river was rising, and he felt assured that the allied army was close upon the heels of the enemy. [Sidenote: Campagne des Français en Portugal.] As early as the evening of the 11th, the French appeared at the suburb of Santa Clara, and a small party of their dragoons actually forded the Mondego at Pereiras that day: on the 12th, some French officers examined the bridge of Coimbra, but a cannon-shot from the other side wounded one of them, and a general skirmish took place along the banks of the river, during which a party attempting to feel their way along the bridge, were scattered by a round of grape. The fords were, however, actually practicable for cavalry, and there were not more than two or three hundred militia and a few guns at the bridge; for Baccellar had obliged Trant to withdraw the greatest part of his force on the 11th; nevertheless the latter opposed the enemy with the remainder, and it would appear that the French imagined the reinforcement, which reached Lisbon the 2d of March, had been sent by sea to the Mondego and was in Coimbra. This was an error. Coimbra was saved by the same man and the same militia that had captured it during the advance. Montbrun sent his report to Massena early on the 13th, and the latter too readily crediting his opinion of Trant’s strength, relinquished the idea of passing the Mondego, and determined to retire by the Puente de Murcella: but to ensure the power of changing his front, and to secure his communication with Reynier and Loison, he had carried Clausel’s division to Fonte Coberta, a village about five miles on his left; situated at the point where the Anciao road falls into that leading to Murcella. There Loison rejoined him, and being thus pivotted on the Anciao Sierra, and covering the line of communication with the second corps while Ney held Condeixa, he considered his position secure. His baggage was, however, observed filing off by the Murcella road when the allies first came upon Ney, and lord Wellington instantly comprehending the state of affairs, as instantly detached the third division by a very difficult path over the Sierra de Anciao to turn the enemy’s left. For some time all appeared quiet in the French lines. Massena, in repairing to Fonte Coberta, had left Ney orders, it is said, to fire Condeixa at a certain hour when all the divisions were simultaneously to concentrate at Casal Nova, in a second position, perpendicular to the first, and covering the road to Puente Murcella. But towards three o’clock Picton was descried winding round the bluff end of a mountain, about eight miles distant, and as he was already beyond the French left, instant confusion pervaded their camp: a thick smoke arose from Condeixa, the columns were seen hurrying towards Casal Nova; and the British immediately pushed forward. The felled trees and other obstacles impeded their advance at first, and a number of fires, simultaneously kindled, covered the retreating troops with smoke, while the flames of Condeixa stopped the artillery, hence the skirmishers and some cavalry only could close with the rear of the enemy, but so rapidly, as to penetrate between the division at Fonte Coberta and the rest of the French; and it is affirmed that the prince of Esling, who was on the road, only escaped capture by taking the feathers out of his hat and riding through some of the light troops. Condeixa being thus evacuated, the British cavalry pushed towards Coimbra, opened the communication with Trant, and cutting off Montbrun, captured a part of his horsemen. The rest of the army kindled their fires, and the light division planted piquets close up to the enemy; but, about ten at night, the French divisions, whose presence at Fonte Coberta was unknown to lord Wellington, stole out, and passing close along the front of the British posts, made for Miranda de Corvo. The noise of their march was heard, but the night was dark, it was imagined to be the moving of the French baggage to the rear, and being so reported to sir William Erskine, that officer, without any further inquiry, put the light division in march at day-light on the 14th. COMBAT OF CASAL NOVA. The morning was so obscured that nothing could be descried at the distance of a hundred feet, but the sound of a great multitude was heard on the hills in front; and it being evident that the French were there in force, many officers represented the rashness of thus advancing without orders and in such a fog; but Erskine, with an astounding negligence, sent the fifty-second forward in a simple column of sections, without a vanguard or other precaution, and even before the piquets had come in from their posts. The road dipped suddenly, descending into a valley, and the regiment was immediately lost in the mist, which was so thick, that the troops unconsciously passing the enemy’s outposts had like to have captured Ney himself, whose bivouac was close to the piquets. The riflemen followed in a few moments, and the rest of the division was about to plunge into the same gulf; when the rattling of musketry and the booming of round shot were heard, and the vapour slowly rising, discovered the fifty-second on the slopes of the opposite mountain, engaged, without support, in the midst of the enemy’s army. At this moment lord Wellington arrived. His design had been to turn the left of the French, for their front position was very strong, and behind it they occupied the ridges, in succession, to the Deuca river and the defiles of Miranda de Corvo. There was, however, a road leading from Condeixa to Espinhal, and the fourth division was already in march by it for Panella, having orders, to communicate with Nightingale; to attack Reynier; and to gain the sources of the Deuca and Ceira rivers: between the fourth division and Casal Nova the third division was more directly turning the enemy’s left flank; and meanwhile the main body was coming up to the front, but as it marched in one column, required time to reach the field. Howbeit Erskine’s error forced on this action, and the whole of the light division were pushed forward to succour the fifty-second. The enemy’s ground was so extensive, and his skirmishers so thick and so easily supported, that, in a little time, the division was necessarily stretched out in one thin thread, and closely engaged in every part, without any reserve; nor could it even thus present an equal front, until Picton sent the riflemen, of the sixtieth, to prolong the line. Nevertheless, the fight was vigorously maintained amidst the numerous stone enclosures on the mountain side; some advantages were even gained, and the right of the enemy was partially turned; yet the main position could not be shaken, until Picton near and Cole further off, had turned it by the left. Then, the first, fifth, and sixth divisions, the heavy cavalry, and the artillery, came up on the centre, and Ney commenced his retreat, covering his rear with guns and light troops, and retiring from ridge to ridge with admirable precision, and, for a long time, without confusion and with very little loss. Towards the middle of the day, however, the British guns and the skirmishers got within range of his masses, and the retreat became more rapid and less orderly; yet he finally gained the strong pass of Miranda de Corvo, which had been secured by the main body of the French. Montbrun also rejoined the army at Miranda. He had summoned Coimbra on the 13th at noon, and, without waiting for an answer, passed over the mountain and gained the right bank of the Deuca by a very difficult march. The loss of the light division this day was eleven officers and a hundred and fifty men; that of the enemy was greater, and about a hundred prisoners were taken. During the action of the 14th, Reynier, seeing the approach of the fourth division, hastily abandoned Panella; and Cole having effected a junction with Nightingale, passed the Deuca; when Massena fearing lest they should gain his rear, set fire to the town of Miranda, and passed the Ceira that night. His whole army was now compressed and crowded in one narrow line, between the higher sierras and the Mondego; and to lighten the march, he destroyed a great quantity of ammunition and baggage; yet his encumbrances were still so heavy, and the confusion in his army so great, that he directed Ney to cover the passage with a few battalions; yet charged him not to risk an action. Ney, however, disregarding this order, kept on the left bank, ten or twelve battalions, a brigade of cavalry, and some guns. COMBAT OF FOZ D’ARONCE. The 15th, the weather was so obscure that the allies could not reach the Ceira, before four o’clock in the evening, and the troops, as they came up, proceeded to kindle fires for the night; thinking that Ney’s position being strong, nothing would be done. The French right rested on some thickly wooded and rugged ground, and their left upon the village of Foz d’Aronce, but lord Wellington, having cast a rapid glance over it, directed the light division, and Pack’s brigade, to hold the right in play, ordered the third division against the left, and at the same moment the horse-artillery, galloping forward to a rising ground, opened with a great and sudden effect. Ney’s left wing being surprised and overthrown by the first charge of the third division, dispersed in a panic, and fled in such confusion towards the river, that some, missing the fords, rushed into the deeps and were drowned, and others crowding on the bridge were crushed to death. On the right the ground was so rugged and close that the action resolved itself into a skirmish, and thus Ney was enabled to use some battalions to check the pursuit of his left, but meanwhile darkness came on and the French troops in their disorder fired on each other. Only four officers and sixty men fell on the side of the British. The enemy’s loss was not less than five hundred, of which one-half were drowned; and an eagle was afterwards found in the bed of the river when the waters subsided. In the night Massena retired behind the Alva; yet Ney, notwithstanding this disastrous combat, maintained the left bank of the Ceira, until every encumbrance had passed; and then blowing up seventy feet of the bridge, sent his corps on, but remained himself, with a weak rear guard, on the opposite bank. Thus terminated the first part of the retreat from Santarem, during which the French commander, if we except his errors with regard to Coimbra, displayed infinite ability, but withal a harsh and ruthless spirit. [Sidenote: Lord Wellington’s Despatches] I pass over the destruction of Redinha, Condeixa, Miranda de Corvo, and many villages on the route; the burning of those towns covered the retrograde movements of the army, and something must be attributed to the disorder, which usually attends a forced retreat: but the town of Leiria, and the convent of Alcobaça, were given to the flames by express orders from the French head-quarters; and, although the laws of war rigorously interpreted, authorize such examples when the inhabitants take arms, it can only be justly done, for the purpose of overawing the people, and not from a spirit of vengeance when abandoning the country. But every horror that could make war hideous attended this dreadful march! Distress, conflagrations, death, in all modes! from wounds, from fatigue, from water, from the flames, from starvation! On every side unlimited violence, unlimited vengeance! I myself saw a peasant hounding on his dog, to devour the dead and dying; and the spirit of cruelty once unchained smote even the brute creation. On the 15th the French general, to diminish the encumbrances of his march, ordered a number of beasts of burthen to be destroyed; the inhuman fellow, charged with the execution, hamstringed five hundred asses and left them to starve, and thus they were found by the British army on that day. The mute but deep expression of pain and grief, visible in these poor creatures’ looks, wonderfully roused the fury of the soldiers; and so little weight has reason with the multitude, when opposed by a momentary sensation, that no quarter would have been given to any prisoner at that moment. Excess of feeling would have led to direct cruelty. This shews how dangerous it is in war to listen to the passions at all, since the most praiseworthy could be thus perverted by an accidental combination of circumstances. CHAPTER IV. On the 16th the allies halted, partly because the Ceira was swollen and unfordable, partly from the extreme exhaustion of the troops who had suffered far greater privations than the enemy. The latter, following his custom, carried fifteen days’ bread; the allies depended upon a commissariat, which broke down under the difficulties; not from any deficiency in the chief (Mr. Kennedy), who was distinguished alike for zeal, probity, and talent; but from the ill conduct of the Portuguese government; who, deaf to the repeated representations of lord Wellington and Beresford, would neither feed the Portuguese troops regularly while at Santarem, nor fill their magazines, nor collect the means of transport for the march. Hence, after passing Pombal, the greater part of the native force had been unable to continue the pursuit; and the brigades under general Pack and colonel Ashworth, which did keep up and engaged daily with the enemy, were actually four days without food of any sort. Numbers died of inanition on the roads, and to save the whole from destruction, the British supplies were shared with them. The commissary-general’s means were thus overlaid, the whole army suffered, and an imperative necessity obliged lord Wellington to halt. Nevertheless he had saved Coimbra, forced the enemy into a narrow, intricate, and ravaged country, and, with an inferior force, turned him out of every strong position; and this, by a series of movements, based on the soundest principles of war. For, noting the skill and tenacity with which Massena and Ney clung to every league of ground and every ridge defensible, against superior numbers, he seized the higher slopes of the mountains by Picton’s flank march on the 13th; and again by Cole’s on the 14th; and thus, continually menacing the passes in rear of the French, obliged them to abandon positions which could scarcely have been forced: and this method of turning the strength of the country to profit is the true key to mountain warfare. He who receives battle in the hills has always the advantage; and he who first seizes the important points chooses his own field of battle. In saying an inferior force, I advert to the state of the Portuguese army and to Badajos; for lord Wellington, having saved Coimbra, and seen that the French would not accept a general battle, except on very advantageous terms, had detached a brigade of cavalry, some guns, and a division of native infantry, from Condeixa, to the Alemtejo. He had, therefore, actually less than twenty-five thousand men in hand, during the subsequent operations. In the night of the 13th, also, he received intelligence that Badajos had surrendered, and, feeling all the importance of this event, detached the fourth division likewise to the Alemtejo, for he designed that Beresford should immediately retake the lost fortress: but, as the road of Espinhal was the shortest line to the Tagus, general Cole, as we have seen, moved into it by Panella, thus threatening Massena’s flank and rear at the same moment that he gained a march towards his ultimate destination. Meanwhile, Trant and Wilson, with the militia, moving up the right bank of the Mondego, parallel to the enemy’s line of retreat, forbad his foragers to pass that river, and were at hand either to interfere between him and Oporto, or to act against his flank and rear. [Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 9.] [Sidenote: Ibid.] Such were the dispositions of the English general; but the military horizon was still clouded. Intelligence came from the north that Bessieres, after providing for his government, had been able to draw together, at Zamora, above seven thousand men, and menaced an invasion of Gallicia; and, although Mahi had an army of sixteen thousand men, lord Wellington anticipated no resistance. In the south, affairs were even more gloomy. The battle of Barosa, the disputes which followed, and the conduct of Imas and Mendizabel, proved that, from Spain, no useful co-operation was ever to be expected. Mortier, also, had invested Campo Mayor, and it was hardly expected to hold out until Beresford arrived. The Spaniards, to whom it had been delivered, under an engagement of honour, entered into by Romana, to keep it against the enemy, had disloyally neglected and abandoned it at the very moment when Badajos fell, and two hundred Portuguese militia, thrown in at the moment, had to defend this fortress, which required a garrison of five thousand regulars. Nor was the enemy, immediately in the British front, the last to be considered. Ney withdrew from the Ceira in the evening of the 16th, and on the 17th the light division forded that river with great difficulty, while the rest of the army passed over a trestle bridge, thrown in the night by the staff-corps. The French were, however, again in position immediately behind the Alva and on the Sierra de Moita, and they destroyed the Ponte Murcella and the bridge near Pombeira; while the second corps moved towards the upper part of the river, and Massena spread his foraging parties to a considerable distance, designing to halt for several days. Nevertheless the first, third, and fifth divisions were directed on the 18th, by the Sierra de St. Quiteria, to menace the French left, and they made way over the mountains with a wonderful perseverance and strength, while the sixth and light divisions cannonaded the enemy on the Lower Alva. As the upper course of the river, now threatened by lord Wellington’s right, was parallel to the line of Massena’s retreat, that marshal recalled the second corps, and, quitting the Lower Alva also, concentrated on the Sierra de Moita, lest the divisions, moving up the river, should cross, and fall on his troops while separated and in march. It then behoved the allies to concentrate also, lest the heads of their columns should be crushed by the enemy’s masses. The Alva was deep, wide, and rapid, yet the staff-corps succeeded in forming a most ingenious raft-bridge, and the light division immediately passed between Ponte Murcella and Pombeira; and at the same time the right wing of the army entered Arganil, while Trant and Wilson closed on the other side of the Mondego. Massena now recommenced his retreat with great rapidity, and being desirous to gain Celerico and the defiles leading upon Guarda betimes, he again destroyed baggage and ammunition, and abandoned even his more distant foraging parties, who were intercepted and taken, to the number of eight hundred, in returning to the Alva: for lord Wellington, seeing the success of his combinations, had immediately directed all his columns upon Moita, and the whole army was assembled there the 19th. The pursuit was renewed the 20th, through Penhancos, but only with the light division and the cavalry; the communication was, however, again opened with Wilson and Trant who had reached the bridge of Fornos, and with Silveira, who was about Trancoso. The third and sixth divisions followed in reserve, but the remainder of the army halted at Moita, until provisions, sent by sea from Lisbon to the Mondego, could come up to them. The French reached Celerico the 21st, with two corps and the cavalry, and immediately opened the communication with Almeida, by posting detachments of horse on the Pinhel, and at the same time Reynier, who had retired through Govea, occupied Guarda with the second corps. Massena had now regained his original base of operations, and his retreat may be said to have terminated; but he was far from wishing to re-enter Spain, where he could only appear as a baffled general, and shorn of half his authority; because Bessieres commanded the northern provinces, which, at the commencement of the invasion, had been under himself. Hence, anxious to hold on to Portugal, and that his previous retreat might appear as a mere change of position, he formed the design of throwing all his sick men and other incumbrances into Almeida, and then, passing the Estrella at Guarda, make a countermarch, through Sabugal and Pena Macor, to the Elga; establishing a communication across the Tagus with Soult, and by the valley of the Tagus with the king. [Sidenote: General Pelet’s Notes. See Vol. xxi. Victoires et Conquêtes des Français.] But now the factions in his army had risen to such a height that he could no longer command the obedience of his lieutenants; Montbrun, Junot, Drouet, Reynier, and Ney were all at variance with each other and with him. The first had, in the beginning of the retreat, been requested to secure Coimbra; instead of which he quitted Portugal, carrying with him Claparede’s division; Marcognet’s brigade was then ordered for that operation, but it did not move; finally, Montbrun undertook it, and failed in default of vigour. Junot was disabled by his wound, but his faction did not the less shew their discontent. Reynier’s dislike to the prince was so strong, that the officers carrying flags of truce, from his corps, never failed to speak of it to the British; and Ney, more fierce than all of them, defied his authority. To him the dangerous delay at Pombal, the tardiness of Marcognet’s brigade, and, finally, the too-sudden evacuation of the position at Condeixa, have been attributed: and it is alleged that, far from being ordered to set fire to that town on the 13th, as the signal for a preconcerted retreat, that he had promised Massena to maintain the position for twenty-four hours longer. The personal risk of the latter, in consequence of the hasty change of position, would seem to confirm this; but it is certain that, when Picton was observed passing the Sierra de Anciao by a road before unknown to the French, and by which the second corps could have been separated from the army, and the passes of Miranda de Corvo seized, Ney would have been frantic to have delayed his movement. At Miranda, the long gathering anger broke out in a violent altercation between the prince and the marshal; and at Celerico, Ney, wishing to fall back on Almeida, to shorten the term of the retreat, absolutely refused to concur in the projected march to Coria; and even marched his troops in a contrary direction. Massena, a man not to be opposed with impunity, then deprived him of his command, giving the sixth corps to Loison; and each marshal sent confidential officers to Paris to justify their conduct to the emperor. From both of those officers I have derived information, but as each thinks that the conduct of his general was approved by Napoleon, their opinions are irreconcilable upon many points; I have, therefore, set down in the narrative the leading sentiments of each, without drawing any other conclusions than those deducible from the acknowledged principles of art and from unquestioned facts. Thus judging, it appears that Massena’s general views were as superior to Ney’s as the latter’s readiness and genius in the handling of troops in action were superior to the prince’s. Yet the duke of Elchingen often played too near the flame, whereas nothing could be grander than the conceptions of Massena: nor was the project now meditated by him the least important. From Guarda to Zarza Mayor and Coria was not two days longer march than to Ciudad Rodrigo, but the army of Portugal must have gone to the latter place a beaten army, seeking for refuge and succour in its fortresses and reserves, and being separated from the central line of invasion: whereas, by gaining Coria, a great movement of war, wiping out the notion of a forced retreat, would have been accomplished. A close and concentric direction would also have been given to the three armies of the south, of the centre, and of Portugal; and a powerful demonstration effected against Lisbon, which would inevitably bring lord Wellington back to the Tagus. Thus the conquests of the campaign, namely, Ciudad Rodrigo, Almeida, Badajos, and Olivenza, would have been preserved, and meanwhile the army of the north could have protected Castile and menaced the frontier of Portugal. Massena, having maturely considered this plan, gave orders, on the 23d, for the execution; but Ney, as we have seen, thwarted him. Meanwhile the English horse and the militia, hovering round Celerico, made, in different skirmishes, a hundred prisoners, and killed as many more; and the French cavalry posts withdrew from the Pinhel. The sixth corps then took a position at Guarda; the second corps at Belmonte; the eighth corps and the cavalry in the eastern valleys of the Estrella. Ney’s insubordination had rendered null the plan of marching upon the Elga; but Massena expected still to maintain himself at Guarda with the aid of the army of the south, and to hold open the communications with the king and with Soult. His foragers had gathered provisions in the western valleys of the Estrella, and he calculated upon being able to keep his position for eight days with his own force alone; and, independent of the general advantage, it was essential to hold Guarda for some time, because Drouet had permitted Julian Sanchez to cut off a large convoy destined for Ciudad Rodrigo, and had left Almeida with only ten days’ provisions. Lord Wellington’s ready boldness, however, disarranged all the prince’s calculations. The troops had come up from Moita on the 28th, and with them the reinforcements, which were organized as a seventh division. The light division and the cavalry then passed the Mondego at Celerico, and, driving the French out of Frexadas, occupied the villages beyond that place: at the same time, the militia took post on the Pinhel river, cutting the communication with Almeida, while the third division was established at Porca de Misarella, half way up the mountain, to secure the bridges over the higher Mondego. Early on the 29th the third, sixth, and light divisions, and two regiments of light cavalry, disposed in five columns of attack on a half circle round the foot of the Guarda mountain, ascended by as many paths, all leading upon the town of Guarda, and outflanking both the right and left of the enemy; they were supported on one wing by the militia, on the other by the fifth division, and in the centre by the first and seventh divisions. A battle was expected, but the absence of Ney was at once felt by both armies; the appearance of the allied columns threw the French into the greatest confusion, and, without firing a shot, this great and nearly impregnable position was abandoned. Had the pursuit been as vigorous as the attack, it is not easy to see how the second corps could have rejoined Massena; but Reynier quitting Belmonte in the night, recovered his communication with a loss of only three hundred prisoners, although the horse-artillery and cavalry had been launched against him at daylight on the 30th. Much more could however have been done, if general Slade had pushed his cavalry forward with the celerity and vigour the occasion required. On the 1st of April, the allied army descended the mountains, and reached the Coa; but the French general, anxious to maintain at once his hold of Portugal and the power of operating either on the side of Coria or of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, was in position on the right bank of that river. The sixth corps was at Rovina, with detachments guarding the bridge of Seceiras and the ford of Atalayon, and the communication with Almeida was maintained by a brigade of the ninth corps, which was posted near the ford of Junça. The second corps was on the hills behind Sabugal, stretching towards Alfayates, but having strong detachments at the bridge of Sabugal and the ford of Rapoulha de Coa. The eighth corps was at Alfayates, and a post was established at Rendo to maintain the communication between the second and the sixth corps. In this situation, the French army was disposed on two sides of a triangle, the apex of which was at Sabugal, and both fronts were covered by the Coa, because Sabugal was situated in a sharp bend of the stream: by holding Alfayates, Massena also commanded the passes leading through St. Martin Trebeja to Coria. Along the whole course of the Coa, which is a considerable river, the banks are rugged, but the ravine continually deepens as the stream flows; and, during the first two days of April, the allies occupied a line parallel to the enemy’s right, which could not be attacked. Meanwhile Trant and Wilson, passing the Coa below Almeida, penetrated between that fortress and Ciudad Rodrigo, as if the passage of the river was to be made on that side. Lord Wellington’s aim was, however, against the other flank, and, to protect the left and rear of the army, he placed the sixth division opposite the sixth corps, and a battalion of the seventh division at the bridge of Seceiras. At daylight, on the 3d of April the cavalry under general Slade, being on the extreme right, was directed to cross the Upper Coa; the light division was ordered to ford a little below; the third division still lower; and the fifth division, with the artillery, to force the bridge of Sabugal; the first and seventh, with the exception of the battalion at Seceiras, were held in reserve. The English general having thus, ten thousand men pivotted on the fifth division at Sabugal, designed to turn Reynier’s left, to separate him from the eighth corps, and to surround him before he could be succoured by the sixth corps. One of those accidents which are frequent in war marred this well-concerted plan, and brought on the COMBAT OF SABUGAL. The morning was so foggy, that the troops could not gain their respective posts of attack with that simultaneous regularity which is so essential to success; and in the light division no measures were taken by sir William Erskine to put the columns in a right direction: the brigades were not even held together, and he carried off the cavalry and the third caçadores without communicating with colonel Beckwith. This officer, who commanded the first brigade, being without any instructions, halted at a ford to await further orders, and at that moment a staff officer rode up, and somewhat hastily asked, why he did not attack? The thing appeared rash, but with an enemy in his front he could make no reply, and instantly passing the river, which was deep and rapid, mounted a very steep wooded hill on the other side. Four companies of the ninety-fifth led in skirmishing order, and were followed by the forty-third regiment; but the caçadores and the other brigade, being in movement to the true point, were already distant, and a dark heavy rain setting in rendered it impossible for some time to distinguish friends or foes. The attack was thus made too soon, for, owing to the obscurity, none of the divisions of the army had reached their respective posts. It was made also in a partial, disseminated, and dangerous manner, and on the wrong point; for Reynier’s whole corps was directly in front, and Beckwith, having only one bayonet regiment and four companies of riflemen, was advancing against more than twelve thousand infantry, supported by cavalry and artillery. Scarcely had the riflemen reached the top of the hill, when a compact and strong body of French drove them back upon the forty-third; the weather cleared at that instant, and Beckwith at once saw and felt all his danger; but he met it with a heart that nothing could shake. Leading a fierce charge he beat back the enemy, and the summit of the hill was attained, but at the same moment two French guns opened with grape at the distance of a hundred yards, a fresh body appeared in front, and considerable forces came on either flank of the regiment. Fortunately, Reynier, little expecting to be attacked, had for the convenience of water, placed his principal masses in the low ground behind the height on which the action commenced; his renewed attack was therefore up hill; yet the musketry, heavy from the beginning, now encreased to a storm; the French sprung up the acclivity with great clamour, and it was evident that nothing but the most desperate fighting could save the regiment from destruction. Captain Hopkins, commanding a flank company of the forty-third, immediately ran out to the right, and with admirable presence of mind seized a small eminence, close to the French guns and commanding the ascent up which the French troops turning the right flank were approaching. His first fire was so sharp, that the assailants were thrown into confusion; they rallied and were again disordered by the volleys of this company; a third time they endeavoured to form a head of attack; when Hopkins with a sudden charge increased the disorder, and at the same moment the two battalions of the fifty-second regiment, which had been attracted by the fire, entered the line. Meanwhile, the centre and left of the forty-third were furiously engaged and wonderfully excited; for Beckwith wounded in the head, and with the blood streaming down his face, rode amongst the foremost of the skirmishers, directing all with ability, and praising the men, in a loud cheerful tone. The musket-bullets flew thicker and closer every instant, but the French fell fast, a second charge cleared the hill, a howitzer was taken, and the British skirmishers were even advanced a short way down the descent, when small bodies of French cavalry came galloping in from all parts, and obliged them to take refuge with the main body of the regiment. The English line was instantly formed behind a stone wall above; yet one squadron of dragoons surmounted the ascent, and, with incredible desperation, riding up to this wall, were in the act of firing over it with their pistols, when a rolling volley laid nearly the whole of them lifeless on the ground. By this time however a second and stronger column of infantry had rushed up the face of the hill, endeavouring to break in and retake the howitzer which was on the edge of the descent and only fifty yards from the wall; but no man could reach it and live, so deadly was the forty-third’s fire. Meanwhile two English guns came into action, and the two battalions of the fifty-second charging upon the flank of the assailants, vindicated the right of the division to the height. A squadron of French cavalry, which had followed the columns in their last attack, then fell in amongst the fifty-second men, extended as they were from the circumstances of the action, and at first created considerable confusion, but it was finally repulsed. [Illustration: _Vol. 3, Plate 10._ MASSENA’S RETREAT Combat of Sabugal 1811. _London Published by T. & W. BOONE Nov^r 1830._] [Sidenote: Official Despatch.] Reynier, convinced at last that he had acted unskilfully in sending up his troops piece-meal, put all his reserves, amounting to nearly six thousand infantry with artillery and cavalry, in motion, and outflanking the division on its left, appeared resolute to storm the contested height. But, at this critical period, the fifth division passed the bridge of Sabugal, the British cavalry appeared on the hills beyond the enemy’s left, and general Colville with the leading brigade of the third division issuing out of the woods on Reynier’s right, opened a fire on that flank, which instantly decided the fate of the day. The French general hastily retreated upon Rendo, where the sixth corps, which had been put in march when the first shots were heard, met him, and together they fell back upon Alfayates, pursued by the English cavalry. The loss of the allies in this bloody encounter, which did not last quite an hour, was nearly two hundred killed and wounded, that of the enemy was enormous; three hundred dead bodies were heaped together on the hill, the greatest part round the captured howitzer, and more than twelve hundred were wounded; so unwisely had Reynier handled his masses and so true and constant was the English fire. Although, the principal causes of this disproportion undoubtedly was, first, the heavy rain which gave the French only a partial view of the British, and secondly, the thick wood which ended near the top of hill, leaving an open and exposed space upon which the enemy mounted after the first attack; yet it was no exaggeration in lord Wellington to say, “that this was one of the most glorious actions that British troops were ever engaged in.” [Sidenote: Appendix, No. IV. Section 2.] The next day, the light division took the route of Valdespina, to feel for the enemy on the side of the passes leading upon Coria; but Massena was in full retreat for Ciudad Rodrigo, and on the 5th crossed the frontier of Portugal. Here the vigour of the French discipline on sudden occasions was surprisingly manifested. Those men who had for months been living by rapine, whose retreat had been one continued course of violence and devastation, passed an imaginary line of frontier, and became the most orderly of soldiers; not the slightest rudeness was offered to any Spaniard, and every thing demanded was scrupulously paid for, although bread was sold at two shillings a pound! Massena himself also, fierce and terrible as he was in Portugal, always treated the Spaniards with gentleness and moderation. While these events were passing at Sabugal, Trant crossing the Lower Coa with four thousand militia, had taken post two miles from Almeida, when the river suddenly flooded behind him. Near fort Conception, there was a brigade of the ninth corps, which had been employed to cover the march of the battering train from Almeida to Ciudad Rodrigo; but ere those troops discovered Trant’s dangerous situation, he constructed a temporary bridge and was going to retire on the 6th, when he received a letter from the British head-quarters, desiring him to be vigilant in cutting the communication with Almeida, and fearless, because the next day a British force would be up to his assistance. Marching then to Val de Mula, he interposed between the fortress and the brigade of the ninth corps. The latter were already within half a mile of his position, and his destruction appeared inevitable; but suddenly two cannon shots were heard to the southward, the enemy immediately formed squares and commenced a retreat, and six squadrons of British cavalry and Bull’s troop of horse-artillery came sweeping over the plain in their rear. Military order and coolness, marked the French retreat across the Turones, yet the cannon shots ploughed with a fearful effect through their dense masses, and the horsemen continually flanked their line of march: they however gained the rough ground, and finally escaped over the Agueda by Barba del Puerco; but with the loss of three hundred men killed, wounded, and prisoners. The prince of Esling had reached Ciudad Rodrigo two days before, and lord Wellington now stood victorious on the confines of Portugal, having executed what to others appeared incredibly rash and vain even to attempt. CHAPTER V. Massena entered Portugal with sixty-five thousand men; his reinforcements while at Santarem were about ten thousand; he repassed the frontier with forty-five thousand; hence the invasion of Portugal cost him about thirty thousand men, of which fourteen thousand might have fallen by the sword or been taken. Not more than six thousand were lost during the retreat; but had lord Wellington, unrestrained by political considerations, attacked him vigorously at Redinha, Condeixa, Casal Nova, and Miranda de Corvo, half the French army would have been lost. It is unquestionable that a retreating army should fight as little as possible. When Massena reached the Agueda, his cavalry detachments, heavy artillery, and convalescents, again augmented his army to more than fifty thousand men, but the fatigues of the retreat and the want of provisions, would not suffer him to shew a front to the allies; wherefore, drawing two hundred thousand rations from Ciudad, he fell back to Salamanca, and lord Wellington invested Almeida. The light division occupied Gallegos and Espeja, the rest of the army were disposed in villages on both sides of the Coa, and the head-quarters were transferred to Villa Formosa. Here colonel Waters, who had been taken near Belmonte during the retreat, rejoined the army. Confident in his own resources, he had refused his parole, and, when carried to Ciudad Rodrigo, rashly mentioned his intention of escaping to the Spaniard in whose house he was lodged. This man betrayed him; but a servant, detesting his master’s treachery, secretly offered his aid, and Waters coolly desired him to get the rowels of his spurs sharpened. When the French army was near Salamanca, Waters, being in the custody of _gens d’armes_, waited until their chief, who rode the only good horse in the party, had alighted, then giving the spur to his own beast, he galloped off! an act of incredible resolution and hardihood, for he was on a large plain, and before him, and for miles behind him, the road was covered with the French columns. His hat fell off, and, thus distinguished, he rode along the flank of the troops, some encouraging him, others firing at him, and the _gens d’armes_, sword in hand, close at his heels; but suddenly breaking at full speed, between two columns, he gained a wooded hollow, and, having baffled his pursuers, evaded the rear of the enemy’s army. The third day he reached head-quarters, where lord Wellington had caused his baggage to be brought, observing that he would not be long absent. [Sidenote: Appendix, No. VII.] Massena, having occupied Salamanca, and communicated with Bessieres, sent a convoy to Ciudad Rodrigo, and lord Wellington was unable to prevent its entrance. He had sent the militia to their homes, disposed his army between the Coa and the Agueda, and blockaded Almeida; but the Portuguese regulars were in a dreadful state, and daily decreasing in numbers; while the continued misconduct of the Regency, and the absolute want of money gave no hope of any amelioration; it was therefore impossible to take a position beyond the Agueda. The depôts were re-established at Lamego on the Douro, and at Raiva on the Mondego; and magazines of consumption were formed at Celerico, from whence the mule-brigades brought up the provisions by the way of Castello Bom: measures were also taken at Guarda, Pena Macor, and Castello Branco, to form commissariat establishments which were to be supplied from Abrantes. But the transport of stores was difficult, and this consideration, combined with the capricious nature of the Agueda and Coa, rendered it dangerous to blockade both Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida; seeing that the troops would have those rivers behind them, while the position itself would be weak and extended. The blockade of Almeida was undertaken because, from intercepted letters and other sources, it was known to have provisions only for a fortnight; but the operation formed no part of the plan which lord Wellington was now revolving in his mind, and he was even prepared to relinquish it altogether if hardly pressed. [Sidenote: Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, May 7th, 1810. MSS.] The success in Portugal had given stability to the English ministers; and it would appear that they at first meant to limit their future efforts to the defence of that country, for lord Liverpool required the return of many battalions. But offensive warfare in Spain, occupied the general’s thoughts, and two lines of operation had presented themselves to his mind.--1º. Under the supposition that it would be long ere Massena could again make any serious attempt on Portugal; to remain on the defensive in Beira, and march against the army of the South to raise the siege of Cadiz. 2º. If Almeida fell to the blockade, to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo; or if Almeida did not so fall, to besiege both together, and, when they were taken, march at once into the heart of Spain, and open a communication with Valencia and with the army of Sicily. This great and lofty conception would have delivered Andalusia as certainly as any direct operation; for thus Madrid, the great depôt of the French, would have been taken, the northern and southern armies cut asunder, and the English base momentarily fixed on the Mediterranean coast: then the whole of the Spanish and British force could have been concentrated, and one or two great battles must have decided the fate of Spain. Filled with this grand project lord Wellington demanded reinforcements from England, and leave to carry his design into execution, if occasion offered: yet he checked his secret aspirations, when reflecting upon the national pride and perverseness of the Spaniards, and on their uncertain proceedings, and the great difficulty, if not impossibility, of ensuring any reasonable concert and assistance. When to this he also added the bad disposition of the Portuguese Regency, and the timid temper of the English ministers, so many jarring elements were presented that he could make no fixed combinations. Nevertheless, maturing the leading points of action in his own mind, he resolved to keep them in view; adapting his proceedings to circumstances as they should arise. His projects were however necessarily conditional upon whether Napoleon reinforced his armies again, which would create new combinations; and before any other measure, it was essential to recapture Badajos; not only as its possession by the enemy affected the safety of Cadiz, but, as it bore upon the execution of both the above-mentioned plans, and upon the safety of Portugal, by enabling the enemy to besiege Elvas: yet so deeply and sagaciously had he probed the nature of the contest, that we shall find his after operations strictly conformable to these his first conceptions, and always successful. Judging now that Massena would be unable to interrupt the blockade of Almeida, lord Wellington left the command of the northern army to general Spencer, and departed for the Alemtejo, where Beresford was operating: but, as this was one of the most critical periods of the war, it is essential to have a clear notion of the true state of affairs in the South, at the moment when Beresford commenced his memorable campaign. [Sidenote: Intercepted Letter from Chief of Engineers, Garbé, Mar. 25th.] [Sidenote: Official Abstract of Military Reports, from Cadiz, 1811. MSS.] Soult returned to Andalusia immediately after the fall of Badajos, leaving Mortier to besiege Campo Mayor, and his arrival at Seville and the fame of his successes restored tranquillity in that province, and confidence amongst the troops. Both had been grievously shaken by the battle of Barosa, and the works of Arcos, Lucar, Medina, and Alcalade Gazules, intended to defend the rear of the first corps, had been stopped, and the utmost despondency prevailed. Discontent and gloom were, however, also strong in Cadiz, the government had for some days pretended to make a fresh effort against Victor; but the fall of Badajos menaced the city with famine, and hence Zayas was finally detached with six thousand infantry and four hundred cavalry to Huelva. His object was to gather provisions in the Conda de Neibla, where Ballasteros had, on the 10th, surprised and dispersed Remond’s detachment. The French, were however soon reinforced, Zayas was checked by D’Aremberg, and as many of his men deserted to Ballasteros, he withdrew the rest. Blake then assumed the command, Ballasteros and Copons were placed under his orders, and the united corps, amounting to eleven thousand infantry and twelve hundred cavalry, were called the _fourth army_. Meanwhile Mendizabal rallying his fugitives from the battle of the Gebora, at Villa Viciosa, re-formed a weak corps, called the _fifth army_; during these proceedings, Mortier occupied Albuquerque and Valencia d’Alcantara, and carried on the SIEGE OF CAMPO MAYOR. This fortress being commanded, at four hundred yards distance, by a hill, on which there was an abandoned horn-work, would have fallen at once, but for the courage and talents of major Tallaia, a Portuguese engineer. With only two hundred men and five mounted guns, he made such skilful dispositions, that the French opened regular trenches, battered the wall in breach with six guns, bombarded the palace with eleven mortars, and pushed a sap to the crest of the glacis. At the end of five days a breach was made, but Tallaia, although ill seconded by the garrison, repulsed one partial assault, and, being summoned for the second time, demanded and obtained twenty-four hours to wait for succour. None arrived, and this brave man surrendered the 21st of March. Mortier then returned to the Guadiana, leaving Latour Maubourg to dismantle the works and remove the artillery and stores to Badajos. Such was the posture of affairs when Beresford who had quitted the northern army after the combat of Foz d’Aronce, arrived at Portalegre with twenty thousand infantry, two thousand cavalry, and eighteen guns. His instructions were to relieve Campo Mayor, and to besiege Olivenza and Badajos. The first had already surrendered, but the marshal, being within two marches of it, judged that he might surprise the besieging corps, and, with this view, put his troops in motion the 23d. In the morning of the 25th his advanced guard of cavalry, supported by a detachment of infantry, under colonel Colborne, came suddenly upon Campo Mayor, just as Latour Maubourg was marching out in confusion, with twelve hundred cavalry, three battalions of infantry, some horse-artillery and the battering train of thirteen guns. The allies pursued him, and passing over a wooded rise of ground, issued forth at the other side by some gentle slopes on either flank of the French, who were in a fine plain. Colonel Colborne was on the right and at a considerable distance from the enemy, but colonel Head, with the thirteenth light dragoons, was on the left, close to them, and supported by colonel Otway with two squadrons of the seventh Portuguese. The heavy cavalry was in reserve; and while in this state the French hussars, suddenly charging with a loose rein from behind their infantry, fell some on the Portuguese and some on the thirteenth dragoons. So fiercely did these last on both sides come together, that many men were dismounted by the shock, and both parties pierced clear through to the opposite side, then re-formed, and passed again in the same fearful manner to their own ground: but Head’s troopers rallied quicker than the French, and riding a third time closely in upon them, overthrew horse and man, receiving at the same time the fire of the infantry squares. Nevertheless, without flinching, they galloped upon the battering train, hewed down the gunners, and, drawing up beyond the French line of march, barred the way, in expectation that the heavy cavalry would also fall on; but Beresford would not suffer the latter to charge, and the French infantry returned for their guns and resumed their march. The thirteenth and the Portuguese, however, continued the pursuit, in a rash and disorderly manner, even to the bridge of Badajos, and being repulsed by the guns of that fortress, were followed by Mortier in person, and lost some prisoners. Of the allies one hundred men were killed or hurt, and above seventy taken. Of the enemy about three hundred suffered, one howitzer was captured, and the French colonel Chamorin was slain in single combat by a trooper of the thirteenth. _To profit from sudden opportunities, a general must be constantly with his advanced guard in an offensive movement._ When this combat commenced, Beresford was with the main body, and baron Trip, a staff-officer, deceived by appearances, informed him, that the thirteenth had been cut off. Hence the marshal, anxious to save his cavalry, which he knew could not be reinforced, would not follow up the first blow, truly observing that the loss of one regiment was enough. But the regiment was not lost, and, the country being open and plain, the enemy’s force and the exact posture of affairs were easy to be discerned. The thirteenth were reprimanded, perhaps justly, for having pursued so eagerly without orders, yet the unsparing admiration of the whole army consoled them. Campo Mayor was thus recovered so suddenly, that the French left eight hundred rations of bread in the magazines; and they also evacuated Albuquerque and Valencia d’Alcantara, being infinitely dismayed by the appearance of so powerful an army in the south: indeed, so secretly and promptly had lord Wellington assembled it, that its existence was only known to the French general by the blow at Campo Mayor. But, to profit from such able dispositions, it was necessary to be as rapid in execution, giving the enemy no time to recover from his first surprise; and this was the more essential, because the breach in Badajos was not closed, nor the trenches obliterated, nor the exhausted magazines and stores replenished. Soult had carried away six battalions and a regiment of cavalry, four hundred men were thrown into Olivenza, three thousand into Badajos; thus, with the losses sustained during the operations, Mortier’s numbers were reduced to less than ten thousand men: he could not therefore have maintained the line of the Guadiana and collected provisions also, and Beresford should have instantly marched upon Merida, driven back the fifth corps, and opened a fresh communication by Jerumenha with Elvas; the fall of Badajos would then have been inevitable. The confusion occasioned by the sudden appearance of the army at Campo Mayor and the charge of the thirteenth dragoons guaranteed the success of this march; the English general might even have passed the river at Merida before Mortier could have ascertained his object. Beresford, neglecting this happy opportunity, put his troops into quarters round Elvas, induced thereto by the fatigue and wants of the soldiers; especially those of the fourth division, who had been marching incessantly since the 6th of the month, and were bare-footed and exhausted. He had been instructed, by lord Wellington, to throw a bridge over the Guadiana at Jerumenha; to push back the fifth corps; and to invest Olivenza and Badajos. The Portuguese government had undertaken not only to provide the means for these operations, but had actually reported that they were collected at Elvas and Jerumenha; that is to say, that provisions, shoes, battering guns, ammunition, and transport were there; that the Guadiana abounded in serviceable craft; that twenty large boats, formerly belonging to Cuesta, which had been brought away from Badajos before the siege, were at Elvas; and that all other necessaries would be sent from Lisbon. It now appeared that no magazines of provisions or stores had been formed; that very little transport was provided; that only five of Cuesta’s boats had been brought from Badajos; that there was no serviceable craft on the river, and that some small pontoons, sent from Lisbon, were unfit to bear the force of the current, or to sustain the passage of guns. The country, also, was so deficient in provisions, that the garrison-stores of Elvas were taken to feed the army. All these circumstances combined to point out Merida as the true line of operations; moreover, plenty of food was to be had on the left bank of the Guadiana, and the measures necessary to remedy the evil state of affairs on the right bank, did not require the presence of an army to protect them. The great distress of the fourth division for shoes, alone offered any serious obstacle; but, under the circumstances, it would not have been too much to expect a momentary effort from such an excellent division, or, it might without danger even have been left behind. Marshal Beresford preferred halting until he could procure the means of passing at Jerumenha; an error which may be considered as the first and principal cause of those long and bloody operations which afterwards detained lord Wellington nearly two years on the frontiers of Portugal. For, during Beresford’s delay, general Phillipon, one of the ablest governors that ever defended a fortress, levelled the trenches, restored the glacis, and stopped the breach; meanwhile Latour Maubourg, who had succeeded Mortier in command of the troops, covered the country with foraging parties and filled the magazines. Captain Squires, of the engineers, now undertook to bridge the Guadiana under Jerumenha, by fixing trestle-piers on each side in the shallows, and connecting them with the five Spanish boats; wherefore, a squadron of cavalry was secretly passed over, by a ford, to protect the workmen from surprise. The 3d of April, the bridge being finished, the troops assembled during the night in the woods near Jerumenha, being to cross at daylight; but the river suddenly swelling, swept away the trestles, rendered the ford impassable, and stopped the operations. No more materials could be immediately procured, and the Spanish boats were converted into flying bridges for the cavalry and artillery, while Squires constructed a slight narrow bridge for infantry with the pontoons and with casks taken from the neighbouring villages. To cover this operation a battalion was added to the squadron already on the left bank, and the army commenced passing the 5th of April; but it was late in the night of the 6th, ere the whole had crossed and taken up their position, which was on a strong range of hills, covered by a swampy rivulet. During this time, Latour Maubourg was so entirely occupied in securing and provisioning Badajos, that his foragers were extended fifty miles to the rear, and he took no notice whatever of Beresford’s proceedings; an error savouring rather of the Spanish than of the French method of making war: for it is evident that a moveable column of five thousand infantry, with guns and cavalry, could have easily cut off the small detachment of the British on the left bank, and thus have completely frustrated the operations. The allied troops, being most numerous, should have been carried over in the boats, and entrenched on the other side in sufficient force to resist any attack before the construction of the bridge was attempted: it is not easy to say which general acted with most imprudence; Latour Maubourg in neglecting, or Beresford in unnecessarily tempting fortune. When the British were in possession of the left bank, the French general awaking, collected three thousand infantry, five hundred cavalry, and four guns at Olivenza, whence he marched, at daylight on the 7th, to oppose a passage which had been completed the day before. He, however, surprised a squadron of the thirteenth, which was in front, and then came so close up to the main body as to exchange shots; yet he was permitted to retire unmolested, in the face of more than twenty thousand men! During these proceedings, the fifth Spanish army re-occupied Valencia d’Alcantara and Albuquerque; having cavalry posts at La Rocca and Montijo. Ballasteros also entered Fregenal, and Castaños, who was appointed to command in Gallicia as well as Estremadura, arrived at Elvas. This general was in friendly intercourse with Beresford, but had a grudge against Blake. At first, he pretended to the chief command, as the elder captain-general; but Blake demanded a like authority over Beresford, who was not disposed to admit the claim. Now Castaños, having little liking for a command under such difficult circumstances, and being desirous to thwart Blake, and fearful lest Beresford should, under these circumstances, refuse to pass the Guadiana, arranged, that he who brought the greatest force in the field should be generalissimo. Thus the youngest officer commanded in chief. Beresford, being joined by Madden’s cavalry, and having traced out entrenchments capable of covering several thousand men, ordered his bridges to be reconstructed in a more substantial manner; brought up a Portuguese regiment of militia to labour at the works; left a strong detachment of British infantry and some Portuguese horse for their protection, and advanced with the remainder of the army. Hereupon Latour Maubourg retired upon Albuera, and Beresford summoned Olivenza on the 9th, apparently expecting no defence; but the governor having rejected the summons, the army encamped round the place, and major A. Dickson was despatched to Elvas to prepare battering-guns for the siege. The communication was now opened with Ballasteros at Fregenal, and Castaños having carried Morillo’s division of infantry and Penne Villamur’s cavalry from Montijo to Merida, pushed a part on to Almendralejos. Latour Maubourg then retired to Llerena; and, on the 11th, Beresford, leaving general Cole with the fourth division, Madden’s cavalry, and a brigade of nine pounders to besiege Olivenza, took post himself at Albuera; communicating, by his left, with Almendralejos, and spreading his cavalry in front, so as to cut off all communication with Badajos. The army now lived on the resources of the country; and a brigade was sent to Talavera Real to collect supplies. The 14th, six twenty-four pounders reached Olivenza, and, being placed in a battery constructed on the abandoned horn-work formerly noticed, played with such success that the breach became practicable before the morning of the 15th. Some riflemen posted in the vineyards kept down the fire of the place, and the garrison, consisting of three hundred and eighty men, with fifteen guns, surrendered at discretion. Cole was immediately directed upon Zafra by the road of Almendral; and Beresford, who had recalled the brigade from Talavera, was already in movement for the same place by the royal causeway. This movement was to drive Latour Maubourg over the Morena, and cut off general Maransin. The latter general had been in pursuit of Ballasteros ever since the retreat of Zayas, and having defeated him at Fregenal on the 12th, was following up his victory towards Salvatierra: an alcalde, however, gave him notice of the allies approach, and he retreated in safety. Meanwhile two French regiments of cavalry, advancing from Llerena to collect contributions, had reached Usagre, where meeting with the British cavalry, they were suddenly charged by the thirteenth dragoons, and followed for six miles so vigorously that three hundred were killed or taken, without the loss of a man on the part of the pursuers. On the 16th general Cole arrived from Olivenza, and the whole army being thus concentrated about Zafra, Latour Maubourg retired on the 18th to Guadalcanal; the Spanish cavalry then occupied Llerena, and the resources of Estremadura were wholly at the service of the allies. During these operations, general Charles Alten, coming from Lisbon with a brigade of German light infantry, reached Olivenza, and lord Wellington also arrived at Elvas, where Beresford, after drawing his infantry nearer to Badajos, went to meet him. The presence of the general-in-chief was very agreeable to the troops; they had seen, with surprise, great masses put in motion without any adequate results, and thought the operations had been slow, without being prudent. The whole army was over the Guadiana on the 7th, and, including the Spaniards from Montijo, Beresford commanded at least twenty-five thousand men, whereas Latour Maubourg never had more than ten thousand, many of whom were dispersed foraging, far and wide: yet the French general had maintained himself in Estremadura for ten days; and during this time, no corps being employed to constrain the garrison of Badajos, the governor continued to bring in timber and other materials for the defence, at his pleasure. Lord Wellington arrived the 21st. The 22d, he forded the Guadiana just below the mouth of the Caya with Madden’s cavalry and Alten’s Germans, pushing close up to Badajos. A convoy, escorted by some infantry and cavalry, was coming in from the country, and an effort was made to cut it off; but the governor sallied, the allies lost a hundred men, and the convoy reached the town. Lord Wellington, now considering that Soult would certainly endeavour to disturb the siege with a considerable force, demanded the assent of the Spanish generals to the following plan of combined operations, before he would commence the investment of the place. 1º. That Blake, marching up from Ayamonte, should take post at Xeres de los Cavalleros. 2º. That Ballasteros should occupy Burquillo on his left. 3º. That the cavalry of the fifth army, stationed at Llerena, should observe the road of Guadalcanal, and communicate through Zafra, by the right, with Ballasteros. These dispositions were to watch the passes of the Morena. 4º. That Castaños should furnish three battalions for the siege, and keep the rest of his corps at Merida, to support the Spanish cavalry. 5º. That the British army should be in second line, and, in the event of a battle, Albuera, centrically situated with respect to the roads leading from Andalusia to Badajos, should be the point of concentration for all the allied forces. In consequence of the neglect of the Portuguese government, the whole of the battering-train and stores for the siege were necessarily taken from the ramparts and magazines of Elvas; the utmost prudence was therefore required to secure the safety of these guns, lest that fortress, half dismantled, should be exposed to a siege. Hence, as the Guadiana, by rising ten feet, had again carried away the bridge at Jerumenha on the 24th, lord Wellington directed the line of communication with Portugal to be re-established by Merida, until settled weather would admit of fresh arrangements. [Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 10.] Howbeit, political difficulties intervening obliged him to delay the siege. The troops under Mendizabel had committed many excesses in Portugal; the disputes between them and the inhabitants were pushed so far, that the Spanish general pillaged the town of Fernando; while the Portuguese government, in reprisal, meant to seize Olivenza, which had formerly belonged to them. The Spanish Regency publicly disavowed Mendizabel’s conduct, and Mr. Stuart’s strenuous representations deterred the Portuguese from plunging the two countries into a war; but this affair, joined to the natural slowness and arrogance of the Spaniards, prevented both Castaños and Blake from giving an immediate assent to the English general’s plans: meanwhile, intelligence reached the latter that Massena was again in force on the Agueda; wherefore, reluctantly directing Beresford to postpone the siege until the Spanish generals should give in their assent, or until the fall of Almeida should enable a British reinforcement to arrive, he repaired with the utmost speed to the Agueda. OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH. During his absence, the blockade of Almeida had been closely pressed, while the army was so disposed as to cut off all communication. The allied forces were, however, distressed for provisions, and great part of their corn came from the side of Ledesma; being smuggled by the peasants through the French posts, and passed over the Agueda by ropes, which were easily hidden amongst the deep chasms of that river, near its confluence with the Douro. Massena was, however, intent upon relieving the place. His retreat upon Salamanca had been to restore the organization and equipments of his army, which he could not do at Ciudad Rodrigo, without consuming the stores of that fortress. His cantonments extended from San Felices by Ledesma to Toro, his cavalry was in bad condition, his artillery nearly unhorsed: but from Bessieres he expected, with reason, aid, both of men and provisions, and in that expectation was prepared to renew the campaign immediately. Discord, that bane of military operations, interfered. Bessieres had neglected and continued to neglect the army of Portugal; symptoms of hostilities with Russia were so apparent, even at this period, that he looked rather to that quarter than to what was passing before him; his opinion that a war in the north was inevitable was so openly expressed as to reach the English army; and meanwhile, Massena vainly demanded the aid, which was necessary to save the only acquisition of his campaign. A convoy of provisions had entered Ciudad Rodrigo on the 13th of April; on the 16th a reinforcement and a second convoy also succeeded in gaining that fortress, although general Spencer crossed the Agueda, with eight thousand men, to intercept them; a rear-guard of two hundred men was indeed, overtaken; but, although surrounded by the cavalry in an open plain, they made their way into the place. Towards the end of the month, the new organization, decreed by Napoleon, was put in execution. Two divisions of the ninth corps joined Massena; and Drouet was preparing to march with the remaining eleven thousand infantry and cavalry, to reinforce and take the command of the fifth corps; when Massena, having collected all his own detachments, and received a promise of assistance from Bessieres, prevailed upon him to defer his march until an effort had been made to relieve Almeida. With this view the French army was put in motion towards the frontier of Portugal. The light division immediately resumed its former positions, the left at Gallegos and Marialva, the right at Espeja; the cavalry were dispersed, partly towards the sources of the Azava, and partly behind Gallegos, and, while in this situation, colonel O’Meara and eighty men of the Irish brigade were taken by Julian Sanchez; the affair having been, it was said, preconcerted, to enable the former to quit the French service. On the 23d, two thousand French infantry and a squadron of cavalry marching out of Ciudad Rodrigo, made a sudden effort to seize the bridge of Marialva; but the passage was bravely maintained by captain Dobbs, with only a company of the fifty-second and some riflemen. On the 25th, Massena reached Ciudad Rodrigo; and the 27th, his advanced guards felt all the line of the light division from Espeja to Marialva. Lord Wellington arrived on the 28th, and immediately concentrated the main body of the allies behind the Dos Casas river. The Azava being swollen and difficult to ford, the enemy continued to feel the line of the outposts; but, on the 2d of May, the waters having subsided, the whole French army was observed coming out of Ciudad Rodrigo, wherefore, the light division, after a slight skirmish of horse at Gallegos, commenced a retrograde movement, from that place and from Espeja, upon Fuentes Onoro. The country immediately in rear of those villages was wooded as far as the Dos Casas, but an open plain between the two lines of march offered the enemy’s powerful cavalry an opportunity of cutting off the retreat. As the French appeared regardless of this advantage, the division remained in the woods bordering the right and left of the plain until the middle of the night, when the march was renewed, and the Dos Casas was crossed at Fuentes Onoro. This beautiful village had escaped all injury during the previous warfare, although occupied alternately, for above a year, by both sides. Every family in it was well known to the light division, it was therefore a subject of deep regret to find that the preceding troops had pillaged it, leaving only the shells of houses where, three days before, a friendly population had been living in comfort. This wanton act, was so warmly felt by the whole army, that eight thousand dollars were afterwards collected by general subscription for the poor inhabitants; yet the injury sunk deeper than the atonement. Lord Wellington had determined not to risk much to maintain his blockade, and he was well aware that Massena, reinforced by the army of the north and by the ninth corps, could bring down superior numbers. Nevertheless, when the moment arrived, trusting to the valour of his troops and the ascendancy which they had acquired over the enemy during the pursuit from Santarem, he resolved to abide a battle; but not to seek one, because his force, reduced to thirty-two thousand infantry, twelve hundred cavalry in bad condition, and forty-two guns, was unable, seeing the superiority of the French horse, to oppose the enemy’s march. The allies occupied a fine table-land, lying between the Turones and the Dos Casas, the left at Fort Conception; the centre opposite to the village of Alameda; the right at Fuentes Onoro; the whole distance being five miles. The Dos Casas, flowing in a deep ravine, protected the front of this line, and the French general could not, with any prudence, venture to march, by his own right, against Almeida, lest the allies, crossing the ravine at the villages of Alameda and Fuentes Onoro, should fall on his flank, and drive him into the Agueda. Hence, to cover the blockade, which was maintained by Pack’s brigade and an English regiment, it was sufficient to leave the fifth division near Fort Conception, and the sixth division opposite Alameda. The first and third were then concentrated on a gentle rise, about a cannon-shot behind Fuentes Onoro, where the steppe of land which the army occupied turned back, and ended on the Turones, becoming rocky and difficult as it approached that river. FIRST COMBAT OF FUENTES ONORO. The French came up in three columns abreast, the cavalry, the sixth corps, and Drouet’s division against Fuentes Onoro; but the eighth and second corps against Alameda and Fort Conception, seeming to menace the left of the position; wherefore, the light division, after passing the Dos Casas, reinforced the sixth division. General Loison however, without waiting for Massena’s orders, fell upon Fuentes Onoro, which was occupied by five battalions of chosen troops, detached from the first and third divisions. Most of the houses of this village were quite in the bottom of the ravine, but an old chapel and some buildings on a craggy eminence, overhung one end. The low parts were vigorously defended; yet the violence of the attack was so great, and the cannonade so heavy, that the British abandoned the streets, and could scarcely maintain the upper ground about the chapel. Colonel Williams, the commanding officer, fell badly wounded, and the fight was becoming very dangerous, when the twenty-fourth, the seventy-first, and the seventy-ninth regiments, coming down from the main position, charged so roughly, that the French were forced back, and, after a severe contest, finally driven over the stream of the Dos Casas. During the night the detachments were withdrawn; but the twenty-fourth, the seventy-first, and seventy-ninth regiments were left in the village, where two hundred and sixty of the allies and somewhat more of the French had fallen. On the 4th Massena arrived, and, being joined by Bessieres with twelve hundred cavalry and a battery of the imperial guard, examined all the line, and made dispositions for the next day. His design was to hold the left of the allies in check with the second corps, but to turn the right with the remainder of the army. Forty thousand infantry, and five thousand horse, with thirty pieces of artillery, were under arms, and they had shewn in the action of the 3d that their courage was not abated; it was, therefore, a very audacious resolution in the English general to receive battle on such dangerous ground. His position, as far as Fuentes Onoro, was indeed strong and free for the use of all arms, and it covered his communication by the bridge of Castello Bom; but, on his right flank, the plain was continued in a second steppe to Nava d’Aver, where a considerable hill overlooking all the country, commanded the roads leading to the bridges of Seceiras and Sabugal. The enemy could, therefore, by a direct march from Ciudad Rodrigo, place his army at once in line of battle upon the right flank of the allies, and attack them while entangled between the Dos Casas, the Turones, the Coa, and the fortress of Almeida; and the bridge of Castello Bom only would have been open for retreat. To prevent this stroke, and to cover his communications with Sabugal and Seceiras, lord Wellington, yielding to general Spencer’s earnest suggestions, stretched his right wing out to Nava d’Aver, the hill of which he caused Julian Sanchez to occupy, supporting him by the seventh division, under general Houston. Thus the line of battle was above seven miles in length, besides the circuit of blockade. The Dos Casas, indeed, still covered the front; but above Fuentes Onoro, the ravine became gradually obliterated, resolving itself into a swampy wood, which extended to Poço Velho, a village half way between Fuentes and Nava d’Aver. The left wing of the seventh division occupied this wood and the village of Poço Velho, but the right wing was refused. BATTLE OF FUENTES ONORO. It was Massena’s intention to have made his dispositions in the night, in such a manner as to commence the attack at day-break on the 5th; but a delay of two hours occurring, the whole of his movements were plainly descried. The eighth corps withdrawn from Alameda, and supported by all the French cavalry, was seen marching above the village of Poço Velho, and at the same time the sixth corps and Drouet’s division took ground to their own left, but still keeping a division in front of Fuentes. At this sight the light division and the English horse hastened to the support of general Houston; while the first and third divisions made a movement parallel to that of the sixth corps. The latter, however, drove the left wing of the seventh division, consisting of Portuguese and British, from the village of Poço Velho with loss, and was gaining ground in the wood also, when the riflemen of the light division arriving at that point, restored the fight. The French cavalry, then passing Poço Velho, commenced forming in order of battle on the plain, between the wood and the hill of Nava d’Aver. Julian Sanchez immediately retired across the Turones, partly in fear, but more in anger, at the death of his lieutenant, who, having foolishly ridden close up to the enemy, making many violent gestures, was mistaken for a French officer, and shot by a soldier of the guards, before the action commenced. Montbrun occupied himself with this weak partida for an hour; but when the Guerilla chief had fallen back, the French general turned the right of the seventh division, and charged the British cavalry, which had moved up to its support. The combat was unequal; for, by an abuse too common, so many men had been drawn from the ranks as orderlies to general officers, and for other purposes, that not more than a thousand troopers were in the field. After one shock, in which the enemy were partially checked and the French colonel Lamotte taken fighting hand to hand, by general Charles Stewart, the cavalry withdrew behind the light division. Houston’s people, being thus entirely exposed, were charged strongly, and captain Ramsay’s horse-artillery was cut off and surrounded. The light division instantly threw itself into squares, but the main body of the French horsemen were upon the seventh division, ere a like formation could be effected: nevertheless the troops stood firm, and, although some were cut down, the chasseurs Brittaniques, taking advantage of a loose wall, received the attack with such a fire that the enemy recoiled. Immediately after this, a great commotion was observed amongst the French squadrons; men and officers closed in confusion towards one point where a thick dust was rising, and where loud cries and the sparkling of blades and flashing of pistols, indicated some extraordinary occurrence. Suddenly the multitude was violently agitated, an English shout arose, the mass was rent asunder, and Norman Ramsay burst forth at the head of his battery, his horses breathing fire and stretching like greyhounds along the plain, his guns bounding like things of no weight, and the mounted gunners in close and compact order protecting the rear. But while this brilliant action was passing in one part, the enemy were making progress in the wood, and the English divisions being separated and the right wing turned, it was abundantly evident that the battle would soon be lost, if the original position was not immediately regained. In this posture of affairs lord Wellington directed the seventh division to cross the Turones and move down the left bank to Frenada, the light division to retire over the plain, the cavalry to cover the rear. He also withdrew the first and third divisions, placing them and the Portuguese in line on the steppe, before described as running perpendicular to the ravine of Fuentes Onoro. General Crawfurd, who had resumed the command of the light division, first covered the passage of the seventh division over the Turones, and then retired slowly over the plain in squares, having the British cavalry principally on his right flank. He was followed by the enemy’s horse, which continually outflanked him, and near the wood surprised and sabred an advanced post of the guards, making colonel Hill and fourteen men prisoners, but then continuing their charge against the forty-second regiment, the French were repulsed. Many times Montbrun made as if he would storm the light division squares, but the latter were too formidable to be meddled with; yet, in all this war, there was not a more dangerous hour for England. The whole of that vast plain as far as the Turones was covered with a confused multitude, amidst which the squares appeared but as specks, for there was a great concourse, composed of commissariat followers of the camp, servants, baggage, led horses, and peasants attracted by curiosity, and finally, the broken piquets and parties coming out of the woods. The seventh division was separated from the army by the Turones, five thousand French cavalry, with fifteen pieces of artillery, were close at hand impatient to charge; the infantry of the eighth corps was in order of battle behind the horsemen; the wood was filled with the skirmishers of the sixth corps, and if the latter body, pivoting upon Fuentes, had issued forth, while Drouet’s divisions fell on that village, while the eighth corps attacked the light division, and while the whole of the cavalry made a general charge; the loose multitude encumbering the plain would have been driven violently in upon the first division, in such a manner as to have intercepted the latter’s fire and broken their ranks. No such effort was made; Montbrun’s horsemen merely hovered about Crawfurd’s squares, the plain was soon cleared, the cavalry took post behind the centre, and the light division formed a reserve to the right of the first division, sending the riflemen amongst the rocks to connect it with the seventh division, which had arrived at Frenada and was there joined by Julian Sanchez. At sight of this new front, so deeply lined with troops, the French stopped short, and commenced a heavy cannonade, which did great execution from the closeness of the allied masses; but twelve British guns replied with vigour and the violence of the enemy’s fire abated; their cavalry then drew out of range, and a body of French infantry attempting to glide down the ravine of the Turones was repulsed by the riflemen and the light companies of the guards. But all this time a fierce battle was going on at Fuentes Onoro. Massena had directed Drouet to carry this village at the very moment when Montbrun’s cavalry should turn the right wing; it was, however, two hours later ere the attack commenced. The three British regiments made a desperate resistance, but overmatched in number, and little accustomed to the desultory fighting of light troops, they were pierced and divided; two companies of the seventy-ninth were taken, colonel Cameron was mortally wounded, and the lower part of the town was carried; the upper part was, however, stiffly held, and the rolling of the musketry was incessant. Had the attack been made earlier, and the whole of Drouet’s division thrown frankly into the fight, while the sixth corps moving through the wood closely turned the village, the passage must have been forced and the left of the new position outflanked; but now lord Wellington having all his reserves in hand, detached considerable masses to the support of the regiments in Fuentes. The French continued also to reinforce their troops until the whole of the sixth corps and a part of Drouet’s division were engaged, when several turns of fortune occurred. At one time the fighting was on the banks of the stream and amongst the lower houses; at another upon the rugged heights and round the chapel, and some of the enemy’s skirmishers even penetrated completely through towards the main position; but the village was never entirely abandoned by the defenders, and, in a charge of the seventy-first, seventy-ninth, and eighty-eighth regiments, led by colonel M’Kinnon against a heavy mass which had gained the chapel eminence, a great number of the French fell. In this manner the fight lasted until evening, when the lower part of the town was abandoned by both parties, the British maintaining the chapel and crags, and the French retiring a cannon shot from the stream. [Illustration: _Vol. 3. Plate 11._ Battle of FUENTES ONORO _5^{TH} MAY, 1811._ _London Published by T. & W. BOONE Nov^r 1830._] When the action ceased, a brigade of the light division relieved the regiments in the village; and a slight demonstration by the second corps near Fort Conception, having been repulsed by a battalion of the Lusitanian legion, both armies remained in observation. Fifteen hundred men and officers, of which three hundred were prisoners, constituted the loss of the allies; that of the enemy was estimated at the time to be near five thousand, but this exaggerated calculation was founded upon the erroneous supposition that four hundred dead were lying about Fuentes Onoro. All armies make rash estimates on such occasions. Having had charge to bury the carcasses at that point, I can affirm that, immediately about the village, not more than one hundred and thirty bodies were to be found, one-third of which were British. During the battle, the French convoy for the supply of Almeida, being held at Gallegos, in readiness to move, lord Wellington sent Julian Sanchez from Frenada, to menace it, and to disturb the communication with Ciudad Rodrigo. This produced no effect, and a more decisive battle being expected on the 6th, the light division made breast-works amongst the crags of Fuentes Onoro, while lord Wellington entrenched that part of the position, which was immediately behind this village, so that the carrying of it would have scarcely benefitted the enemy. Fuentes Onoro, strictly speaking, was not tenable; there was a wooded tongue of land on the British right, that overlooked, at half-cannon shot, all the upper as well as the lower part of the village both in flank and rear, yet was too distant from the position to be occupied by the allies: had Ney been at the head of the sixth corps, he would have quickly crowned this ridge, and then Fuentes could only have been maintained by submitting to a butchery. On the 6th the enemy sent his wounded to the rear, making no demonstration of attack, and as the 7th passed in a like inaction, the British entrenchments were perfected. The 8th Massena withdrew his main body to the woods leading upon Espeja and Gallegos, but still maintained posts at Alameda and Fuentes. On the 10th, without being in any manner molested, he retired across the Agueda; the sixth and eight corps, and the cavalry, at Ciudad Rodrigo, the second corps by the bridge of Barba del Puerco. Bessieres also carried off the imperial guards, for Massena had been recalled to France, and Marmont assumed the command of the army of Portugal. Both sides claimed the victory; the French, because they won the passage at Poço Velho, cleared the wood, turned our right flank, obliged the cavalry to retire, and forced lord Wellington to relinquish three miles of ground, and to change his front. The English, because the village of Fuentes so often attacked, was successfully defended, and because the principal object (the covering the blockade of Almeida) was attained. Certain it is, that Massena at first gained great advantages. Napoleon would have made them fatal! but it is also certain that, with an overwhelming cavalry, on ground particularly suitable to that arm, the prince of Esling having, as it were, indicated all the errors of the English general’s position, stopped short at the very moment when he should have sprung forward. By some this has been attributed to negligence, by others to disgust at being superseded by Marmont; but the true reason seems to be, that discord in his army had arisen to actual insubordination. The imperial guards would not charge at his order; Junot did not second him cordially; Loison neglected his instructions; Drouet sought to spare his own divisions in the fight; and Reynier remained perfectly inactive. Thus the machinery of battle being shaken, would not work. [Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 8.] General Pelet censures lord Wellington for not sending his cavalry against Reynier after the second position was taken up; asserting that any danger, on that side, would have forced the French to retreat; but the criticism is unsustainable, being based on the notion that the allies had fifty thousand men in the field, whereas, including Sanchez’ Partida, they had not thirty-five thousand. It may be with more justice objected to Massena that he did not launch some of his numerous horsemen, by the bridge of Seceiras, or Sabugal, against Guarda and Celerico, to destroy the magazines, cut the communication, and capture the mules and other means of transport belonging to the allied army. The vice of the English general’s position would then have been clearly exposed, for, although the second regiment of German hussars was on the march from Lisbon, it had not passed Coimbra at this period, and could not have protected the depôts. But it can never be too often repeated that war, however adorned by splendid strokes of skill, is commonly a series of errors and accidents. All the operations, on both sides, for six weeks, furnished illustration of this truth. Ney’s opposition had prevented Massena’s march upon Coria, which would have secured Badajos and Campo Mayor, and, probably, added Elvas to them. Latour Maubourg’s tardiness had like to have cost Mortier a rear guard and a battering-train. By refusing the line of Merida, Beresford enabled the French to secure Badajos. At Sabugal, the petulance of a staff-officer marred an admirable combination, and produced a dangerous combat. Drouet’s negligence placed Almeida at the mercy of the allies, and a mistaken notion of Massena’s sufferings during the retreat, induced lord Wellington to undertake two great operations at the same time, which were above his strength. In the battle of Fuentes Onoro, more errors than skill were observable on both sides, and the train of accidents did not stop there. The prize contended for presented another example of the uncertainty of war. EVACUATION OF ALMEIDA. General Brennier, a prisoner at Vimiero, and afterwards exchanged, was governor of this fortress. During the battle of Fuentes Onoro, his garrison, consisting of fifteen hundred men, skirmished boldly with the blockading force, and loud explosions, supposed to be signals of communication with the relieving army, were frequent in the place. When all hopes of succour vanished, a soldier, named Tillet, contrived, with extraordinary courage and presence of mind, to penetrate, although in uniform, through the posts of blockade, carrying Brennier orders to evacuate the fortress. The French general had, however, by crossing the Agueda, left Almeida to its fate; the British general placed the light division in its old position on the Azava with cavalry posts on the Lower Agueda, and desired sir William Erskine to send the fourth regiment to Barba del Puerco, while general Alexander Campbell continued the blockade with the sixth division and with general Pack’s brigade. Campbell’s dispositions were either negligently made, or negligently executed. Erskine never transmitted the orders to the fourth regiment, and, in the mean time, Brennier, undismayed by the retreat of the French army, was preparing, like Julian Estrada, at Hostalrich, to force his way through the blockading troops. An open country and a double line of posts greatly enhanced the difficulty, yet Brennier was resolute not only to cut his own passage but to render the fortress useless to the allies. To effect this, he ruined all the principal bastions, and kept up a constant fire of his artillery in a singular manner, for always he fired several guns at one moment with very heavy charges, placing one across the muzzle of another, so that, while some shots flew towards the besiegers and a loud explosion was heard, others destroyed pieces without attracting notice. At midnight of the 10th, all being ready, he sprung his mines, sallied forth in a compact column, broke through the piquets, and passed between the quarters of the reserves, with a nicety that proved at once his talent of observation and his coolness. General Pack following, with a few men collected on the instant, plied him with a constant fire, yet nothing could shake or retard his column, which in silence, and without returning a shot, gained the rough country leading upon Barba del Puerco. Here it halted for a moment, just as daylight broke, and Pack, who was at hand, hearing that some English dragoons were in a village, a short distance to the right, sent an officer to bring them out upon the French flank, thus occasioning a slight skirmish and consequent delay. The troops of blockade had paid little attention at first to the explosion of the mines, thinking them a repetition of Brennier’s previous practice; but Pack’s fire having roused them, the thirty-sixth regiment was close at hand, and the fourth, also, having heard the firing at Valde Mula, was rapidly gaining the right flank of the enemy. Brennier, having driven off the cavalry, was again in march; yet the British regiments, throwing off their knapsacks, followed at such a pace, that they overtook the rear of his column in the act of descending the deep chasm of Barba del Puerco, killed and wounded many, captured about three hundred, and even passed the bridge in pursuit; there however the second corps, which was in order of battle, awaiting Brennier’s approach, repulsed them with a loss of thirty or forty men. Had sir William Erskine given the fourth regiment its orders, the French column would have been lost. Lord Wellington, stung by this event, and irritated by several previous examples of undisciplined valour, issued a remonstrance to the army. It was justly strong, and the following remarks are as applicable to some writers as to soldiers:--“_The officers of the army may depend upon it that the enemy to whom they are opposed is not less prudent than powerful. Notwithstanding what has been printed in gazettes and newspapers, we have never seen small bodies, unsupported, successfully opposed to large; nor has the experience of any officer realized the stories which all have read of whole armies being driven by a handful of light infantry and dragoons._” CHAPTER VI. [Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 11.] When Marmont had thus recovered the garrison of Almeida, he withdrew the greatest part of his army towards Salamanca. Lord Wellington then leaving the first, fifth, sixth, and light divisions, under general Spencer, on the Azava, directed the third and seventh divisions and the second German hussars upon Badajos: and on the 15th, hearing that Soult, although hitherto reported, by Beresford, to be entirely on the defensive, was actually marching into Estremadura, he set out himself for that province; but, ere he could arrive, a great and bloody battle had terminated the operations. While awaiting the Spanish generals accession to lord Wellington’s plan, Beresford fixed his head-quarters at Almendralejos; but Latour Maubourg remained at Guadalcanal, and his parties were foraging the most fertile tracts between the armies. Penne Villamur was, therefore, reinforced with five squadrons; and colonel John Colborne was detached with a brigade of the second division, two Spanish guns, and two squadrons of cavalry, to curb the French inroads, and to raise the confidence of the people. Colborne, a man of singular talent for war, by rapid marches and sudden changes of direction, in concert with Villamur, created great confusion amongst the enemy’s parties. He intercepted several convoys, and obliged the French troops to quit Fuente Ovejuna, La Granja, Azuaga, and most of the other frontier towns, and he imposed upon Latour Maubourg with so much address, that the latter, imagining a great force was at hand, abandoned Guadalcanal also and fell back to Constantino. Having cleared the country on that side, Colborne attempted to surprise the fortified post of Benelcazar, and, by a hardy attempt, was like to have carried it; for, riding on to the drawbridge with a few officers in the grey of the morning, he summoned the commandant to surrender, as the only means of saving himself from the Spanish army which was close at hand and would give no quarter. The French officer, amazed at the appearance of the party, was yet too resolute to yield, and Colborne, quick to perceive the attempt had failed, galloped off under a few straggling shot. After this, taking to the mountains, he rejoined the army without any loss. During his absence, the Spanish generals acceded to lord Wellington’s proposition; Blake was in march for Xeres Caballeros, and Ballasteros was at Burgillos. The waters of the Guadiana had also subsided, the bridge under Jerumenha was restored, and the preparations completed for the FIRST ENGLISH SIEGE OF BADAJOS. The 5th of May, general William Stewart invested this place, on the left bank of the Guadiana, with two squadrons of horse, six field-pieces, and three brigades of infantry, while the formation of the depôt of the siege was commenced by the engineers and artillery. On the 7th the remainder of the infantry, reinforced by two thousand Spaniards under Carlos d’España, encamped in the woods near the fortress; but Madden’s Portuguese remained in observation near Merida, and a troop of horse-artillery arriving from Lisbon was attached to the English cavalry, which was still near Los Santos and Zafra. The flying bridge was at first brought up from Jerumenha, and re-established near the mouth of the Caya; it was however again drawn over, because the right bank of the Guadiana being still open, some French horse had come down the river. The 8th general Lumley invested Christoval on the right bank, with a brigade of the fourth division, four light Spanish guns, the seventeenth Portuguese infantry, and two squadrons of horse drafted from the garrison of Elvas; nevertheless the troops did not arrive simultaneously, and sixty French dragoons, moving under the fire of the place, disputed the ground, and were only repulsed, after a sharp skirmish, by the Portuguese infantry. Thus the first serious siege undertaken by the British army in the Peninsula was commenced, and, to the discredit of the English government, no army was ever so ill provided with the means of prosecuting such enterprises. The engineer officers were exceedingly zealous, and, notwithstanding some defects in the constitution and customs of their corps tending rather to make regimental than practical scientific officers, many of them were very well versed in the theory of their business. But the ablest trembled when reflecting on their utter destitution of all that belonged to real service. Without a corps of sappers and miners, without a single private who knew how to carry on an approach under fire, they were compelled to attack fortresses defended by the most warlike, practised, and scientific troops of the age: the best officers and the finest soldiers were obliged to sacrifice themselves in a lamentable manner, to compensate for the negligence and incapacity of a government, always ready to plunge the nation into war, without the slightest care of what was necessary to obtain success. The sieges carried on by the British in Spain were a succession of butcheries, because the commonest resources of their art were denied to the engineers. Colonel Fletcher’s plan was to breach the castle of Badajos, while batteries established on the right bank of the Guadiana should take the defences in reverse; false attacks against the Pardaleras and Picurina were also to be commenced by re-opening the French trenches; but it was necessary to reduce the fort of Christoval ere the batteries for ruining the defences of the castle could be erected. [Sidenote: Appendix, No. X. Section 3.] In double operations, whether of the field or of siege, it is essential to move with an exact concert, lest the enemy should crush each in detail, yet neither in the investment nor in the attack was this maxim regarded. Captain Squires, although ill provided with tools, was directed to commence a battery against Christoval on the night of the 8th, under a bright moon, and at the distance of only four hundred yards from the rampart. Exposed to a destructive fire of musketry from the fort, and of shot and shells from the town, he continued to work, with great loss, until the 10th, when the enemy, making a furious sally, carried his battery. The French were, indeed, immediately driven back, but the allies pursuing too hotly, were taken in front and flank with grape, and lost four hundred men. Thus five engineer and seven hundred officers and soldiers of the line were already on the long and bloody list of victims offered to this Moloch; and only one small battery against a small outwork was completed! On the 11th it opened, but before sunset the fire of the enemy had disabled four of its five guns, and killed many more of the besiegers; nor could any other result be expected, seeing that this single work was exposed to the undivided fire of the fortress, for the approaches against the castle were not yet commenced, and two distant batteries on the false attacks scarcely attracted the notice of the enemy. To check future sallies, a second battery was erected against the bridge-head, but this was also overmatched, and meanwhile Beresford, having received intelligence that the French army was again in movement, arrested the progress of all the works. On the 12th, believing this information premature, he resumed the labour, directing the trenches to be opened against the castle: the intelligence was, however, true, and being confirmed at twelve o’clock in the night, the working-parties were again drawn off, and measures taken to raise the siege. SOULT’S SECOND EXPEDITION TO ESTREMADURA. [Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 11.] The duke of Dalmatia resolved to succour Badajos the moment he heard of Beresford’s being in Estremadura; the tardiness of the latter not only gave the garrison time to organize a defence, but permitted the French general to tranquillise his province and arrange a system of resistance to the allied army in the Isla. With that view, he commenced additional fortifications at Seville, renewing also the construction of those which had been suspended in other places by the battle of Barosa, and thus deceived Beresford, who believed that, far from thinking to relieve Badajos, he was trembling for his own province. Nothing could be more fallacious. There were seventy thousand fighting men in Andalusia, and Drouet, who had quitted Massena immediately after the battle of Fuentes Onoro, was likewise in march for that province by the way of Avila and Toledo, bringing with him eleven thousand men. All things being ready, Soult quitted Seville the 10th, with thirty guns, three thousand heavy dragoons, and a division of infantry, reinforced by a battalion of grenadiers belonging to the first corps, and by two regiments of light cavalry belonging to the fourth corps. The 11th he entered Olalla, where general Marasin joined him, and at the same time a brigade of Godinot’s division marched from Cordoba upon Constantino, to reinforce the fifth corps, which was falling back from Guadalcanal in consequence of Colborne’s operations. The 13th a junction was effected with Latour Maubourg, who assumed the command of the heavy cavalry, while Girard taking that of the fifth corps, advanced to Los Santos. The 14th the French head-quarters reached Villa Franca. Being then within thirty miles of Badajos, Soult caused his heaviest guns to fire salvos during the night, to give notice of his approach to the garrison; but the expedient failed of success, and the 15th, in the evening, the army was concentrated at Santa Marta. Beresford, as I have before said, remained in a state of uncertainty until the night of the 12th, when he commenced raising the siege, contrary to the earnest representations of the engineers, who promised to put him in possession of the place in three days, if he would persevere. This promise was ill-founded, and, if it had been otherwise, Soult would have surprised him in the trenches: his firmness, therefore, saved the army, and his arrangements for carrying off the stores were admirably executed. The artillery and the platforms were removed in the night of the 13th, and, at twelve o’clock, on the 15th, all the guns and stores on the left bank, having been passed over the Guadiana, the gabions and fascines were burnt, and the flying bridge removed. These transactions were completely masked by the fourth division, which, with the Spaniards, continued to maintain the investment; it was not until the rear guard was ready to draw off, that the French, in a sally, after severely handling the piquets of Harvey’s Portuguese brigade, learned that the siege was raised. But of the cause they were still ignorant. Beresford held a conference with the Spanish generals at Valverde, on the 13th, when it was agreed to receive battle at the village of Albuera. Ballasteros’ and Blake’s corps having already formed a junction at Baracotta, were then falling back upon Almendral, and Blake engaged to bring them into line at Albuera, before twelve o’clock, on the 15th. Meanwhile, as Badajos was the centre of an arc, sweeping through Valverde, Albuera, and Talavera Real, it was arranged that Blake’s army should watch the roads on the right; the British and the fifth Spanish army guard those leading upon the centre; and that Madden’s Portuguese cavalry should observe those on the left, conducting through Talavera Real. The main body of the British being in the woods near Valverde, could reach Albuera by a half march, and no part of the arc was more than four leagues from Badajos; but the enemy being, on the 14th, at Los Santos, was eight leagues distant from Albuera: hence, Beresford, thinking that he could not be forestalled on any point of importance to the allies, continued to keep the fourth division round the fortress. Colborne’s moveable column joined the army on the 14th, Madden then retired to Talavera Real, Blake’s army reached Almendral, and the allied cavalry, under general Long, fell back before the enemy from Zafra and Los Santos, to Santa Marta, where it was joined by the dragoons of the fourth army. In the morning of the 15th, the British occupied the left of the position of Albuera, which was a ridge about four miles long, having the Aroya Val de Sevilla in rear and the Albuera river in front. The right of the army was prolonged towards Almendral, the left towards Badajos, and the ascent from the river was easy, the ground being in all parts practicable for cavalry and artillery. Somewhat in advance of the centre were the bridge and village of Albuera, the former commanded by a battery, the latter occupied by Alten’s brigade. The second division, under general William Stewart, was drawn up in one line, the right on a commanding hill over which the Valverde road passed; the left on the road of Badajos, beyond which the order of battle was continued in two lines, by the Portuguese troops under general Hamilton and colonel Collins. The right of the position, which was stronger, and higher, and broader than any other part, was left open for Blake’s army, because Beresford, thinking the hill on the Valverde road to be the key of the position, as protecting his only line of retreat, was desirous to secure it with the best troops. The fourth division and the infantry of the fifth army were still before Badajos, but general Cole had orders to send the seventeenth Portuguese regiment to Elvas; to throw a battalion of Spaniards into Olivenza; to bring his second brigade, which was before Christoval, over the Guadiana, by a ford above Badajos, if practicable, and to be in readiness to march at the first notice. In this posture of affairs, about three o’clock in the evening of the 15th, while Beresford was at some distance on the left, the whole mass of the allied cavalry, closely followed by the French light horsemen, came in from Santa Marta in a hurried manner, and passing the Albuera abandoned all the wooded heights in front to the enemy, whose dispositions being thus effectually concealed at the distance of cannon-shot, the strength of the position was already sapped. Beresford immediately formed a temporary right wing with the cavalry and artillery, stretching his piquets along the road to Almendral, and sending officers to hasten Blake’s movements; but that general, who had only a few miles of good road to march, and who had promised to be in line at noon, did not reach the ground before eleven at night; and his rear was not there before three o’clock in the morning of the 16th; meanwhile, as the enemy was evidently in force on the Albuera road, Cole and Madden were ordered up. The orders failed to reach the latter, but, at six o’clock in the morning, the former reached the position with the infantry of the fifth army, two squadrons of Portuguese cavalry, and two brigades of the fourth division; the third brigade, under colonel Kemmis, being unable to cross the Guadiana, above Badajos, was in march by Jerumenha. The Spanish troops immediately joined Blake on the right, and the two brigades of the fourth division, were drawn up in columns behind the second division. The Portuguese squadrons reinforced colonel Otway, whose horsemen, of the same nation, were pushed forward in front of the left wing; and, as general Long seemed oppressed by the responsibility of directing the troops of so many different nations, general Lumley assumed the chief command of the allied squadrons, which were concentrated in rear of the centre. The position was now occupied by thirty thousand infantry, above two thousand cavalry, and thirty-eight pieces of artillery, of which eighteen were nine-pounders; but, the brigade of the fourth division being still absent, the British infantry, the pith and strength of battle, did not amount to seven thousand, and already Blake’s arrogance was shaking Beresford’s authority. The French had fifty guns, and above four thousand veteran cavalry, but only nineteen thousand chosen infantry; yet being of one nation, obedient to one discipline, and animated by one spirit, their excellent composition amply compensated for the inferiority of numbers, and their general’s talent was immeasurably greater than his adversary’s. Soult examined Beresford’s position, without hindrance, on the evening of the 15th, and having heard that the fourth division was left before Badajos, and that Blake would not arrive before the 17th, he resolved to attack the next morning, for he had detected all the weakness of the English general’s dispositions for battle. The hill in the centre, commanding the Valverde road, was undoubtedly the key of the position if an attack was made parallel to the front; but the heights on the right presented a sort of table-land, trending backwards towards the Valverde road, and looking into the rear of the line of battle. Hence it was evident that, if a mass of troops could be placed there, they must be beaten, or the right wing of the allied army would be rolled up on the centre and pushed into the narrow ravine of the Aroya: the Valverde road could then be seized, the retreat cut, and the powerful cavalry of the French would complete the victory. Now the right of the allies and the left of the French approximated to each other, being only divided by a wooded hill, about cannon-shot distance from either but separated from the allies by the Albuera, and from the French by a rivulet called the Feria. This height, neglected by Beresford, was ably made use of by Soult. During the night he placed behind it the artillery under general Ruty; the fifth corps under Girard; and the heavy dragoons under Latour Maubourg; thus concentrating fifteen thousand men and forty guns within ten minutes’ march of Beresford’s right wing, and yet that general could neither see a man nor draw a sound conclusion as to the real plan of attack. The light cavalry; the division of the first corps under general Werlé; Godinot’s brigade, and ten guns, still remained at the French marshal’s disposal. These he formed in the woods, extending along the banks of the Feria towards its confluence with the Albuera, and Godinot was ordered to attack the village and bridge, and to bear strongly against the centre of the position, with a view to attract Beresford’s attention, to separate his wings, and to double up his right at the moment when the principal attack should be developed. BATTLE OF ALBUERA. During the night, Blake and Cole, as we have seen, arrived with above sixteen thousand men; but so defective was the occupation of the ground, that Soult had no change to make in his plans from this circumstance, and, a little before nine o’clock in the morning, Godinot’s division issued from the woods in one heavy column of attack, preceded by ten guns. He was flanked by the light cavalry, and followed by Werlé’s division of reserve, and, making straight towards the bridge, commenced a sharp cannonade, attempting to force the passage; at the same time Briché, with two regiments of hussars, drew further down the river to observe colonel Otway’s horse. The allies’ guns on the rising ground above the village answered the fire of the French, and ploughed through their columns, which were crowding without judgement towards the bridge, although the stream was passable above and below. But Beresford observing that Werlé’s division did not follow closely, was soon convinced that the principal effort would be on the right, and, therefore, sent Blake orders to form a part of the first and all the second line of the Spanish army, on the broad part of the hills, at right angles to their actual front. Then drawing the Portuguese infantry of the left wing to the centre, he sent one brigade down to support Alten, and directed general Hamilton to hold the remainder in columns of battalions, ready to move to any part of the field. The thirteenth dragoons were posted near the edge of the river, above the bridge, and, meanwhile, the second division marched to support Blake. The horse-artillery, the heavy dragoons, and the fourth division also took ground to the right, and were posted; the cavalry and guns on a small plain behind the Aroya, and the fourth division in an oblique line about half-musket shot behind them. This done, Beresford galloped to Blake, for that general had refused to change his front and, with great heat, told colonel Hardinge, the bearer of the order, that the real attack was at the village and bridge. Beresford had sent again to entreat that he would obey, but this message was as fruitless as the former, and, when the marshal arrived, nothing had been done. The enemy’s columns were, however, now beginning to appear on the right, and Blake, yielding to this evidence, proceeded to make the evolution, yet with such pedantic slowness, that Beresford, impatient of his folly, took the direction in person. Great was the confusion and the delay thus occasioned, and ere the troops could be put in order the French were amongst them. For scarcely had Godinot engaged Alten’s brigade, when Werlé, leaving only a battalion of grenadiers and some squadrons to watch the thirteenth dragoons and to connect the attacks, countermarched with the remainder of his division, and rapidly gained the rear of the fifth corps as it was mounting the hills on the right of the allies. At the same time the mass of light cavalry suddenly quitted Godinot’s column, and crossing the river Albuera above the bridge, ascended the left bank at a gallop, and, sweeping round the rear of the fifth corps, joined Latour Maubourg, who was already in face of Lumley’s squadrons. Thus half an hour had sufficed to render Beresford’s position nearly desperate. Two-thirds of the French were in a compact order of battle on a line perpendicular to his right, and his army, disordered and composed of different nations, was still in the difficult act of changing its front. It was in vain that he endeavoured to form the Spanish line sufficiently in advance to give room for the second division to support it; the French guns opened, their infantry threw out a heavy musketry, and their cavalry, outflanking the front and charging here and there, put the Spaniards in disorder at all points; in a short time the latter gave way, and Soult, thinking the whole army was yielding, pushed forward his columns, while his reserves also mounted the hill, and general Ruty placed all the batteries in position. At this critical moment general William Stewart arrived at the foot of the height with colonel Colborne’s brigade, which formed the head of the second division. The colonel, seeing the confusion above, desired to form in order of battle previous to mounting the ascent, but Stewart, whose boiling courage overlaid his judgement, led up without any delay in column of companies, and attempted to open out his line in succession as the battalions arrived at the summit. Being under a destructive fire the foremost charged to gain room, but a heavy rain prevented any object from being distinctly seen, and four regiments of hussars and lancers, which had passed the right flank in the obscurity, came galloping in upon the rear of the line at the instant of its developement, and slew or took two-thirds of the brigade. One battalion only (the thirty-first) being still in column, escaped the storm and maintained its ground, while the French horsemen, riding violently over every thing else, penetrated to all parts. In the tumult, a lancer fell upon Beresford, but the marshal, a man of great strength, putting his spear aside cast him from his saddle, and a shift of wind blowing aside the mist and smoke, the mischief was perceived from the plains by general Lumley, who sent four squadrons out upon the lancers and cut many of them off. During this first unhappy effort of the second division, so great was the confusion, that the Spanish line continued to fire without cessation, although the British were before them; whereupon Beresford, finding his exhortations to advance fruitless, seized an ensign and bore him and his colours, by main force, to the front, yet the troops would not follow, and the man went back again on being released. In this crisis, the weather, which had ruined Colborne’s brigade, also prevented Soult from seeing the whole extent of the field of battle, and he still kept his heavy columns together. His cavalry, indeed, began to hem in that of the allies, but the fire of the horse-artillery enabled Lumley, covered as he was by the bed of the Aroya and supported by the fourth division, to check them on the plain, while Colborne still maintained the heights with the thirty-first regiment; the British artillery, under major Dickson, was likewise coming fast into action, and William Stewart, who had escaped the charge of the lancers, was again mounting the hill with general Houghton’s brigade, which he brought on with the same vehemence, but, instructed by his previous misfortune, in a juster order of battle. The weather now cleared, and a dreadful fire poured into the thickest of the French columns convinced Soult that the day was yet to be won. Houghton’s regiments soon got footing on the summit, Dickson placed the artillery in line, the remaining brigade of the second division came up on the left, and two Spanish corps at last moved forward. The enemy’s infantry then recoiled, yet soon recovering, renewed the fight with greater violence than before; the cannon on both sides discharged showers of grape at half range, and the peals of musketry were incessant and often within pistol shot; but the close formation of the French embarrassed their battle, and the British line would not yield them one inch of ground nor a moment of time to open their ranks. Their fighting was, however, fierce and dangerous. Stewart was twice hurt, colonel Duckworth, of the forty-eighth, was slain, and the gallant Houghton, who had received many wounds without shrinking, fell and died in the act of cheering his men. Still the struggle continued with unabated fury. Colonel Inglis, twenty-two other officers, and more than four hundred men out of five hundred and seventy that had mounted the hill, fell in the fifty-seventh alone, and the other regiments were scarcely better off, not one-third were standing in any. Ammunition failed, and, as the English fire slackened, the enemy established a column in advance upon the right flank; the play of Dickson’s artillery checked them a moment, but again the Polish lancers charging, captured six guns. And in this desperate crisis, Beresford, who had already withdrawn the thirteenth dragoons from the banks of the river and brought Hamilton’s Portuguese into a situation to cover a retrograde movement, wavered! destruction stared him in the face, his personal resources were exhausted, and the unhappy thought of a retreat rose in his agitated mind. Yet no order to that effect was given, and it was urged by some about him that the day might still be redeemed with the fourth division. While he hesitated, colonel Hardinge boldly ordered general Cole to advance, and then riding to colonel Abercrombie, who commanded the remaining brigade of the second division, directed him also to push forward into the fight. The die being thus cast, Beresford acquiesced, and this terrible battle was continued. The fourth division had only two brigades in the field; the one Portuguese under general Harvey, the other commanded by sir W. Myers and composed of the seventh and twenty-third British regiments, was called the fuzileer brigade. General Cole directed the Portuguese to move between Lumley’s dragoons and the hill, where they were immediately charged by some of the French horsemen, but beat them off with great loss: meanwhile he led the fuzileers in person up the height. At this time six guns were in the enemy’s possession, the whole of Werlé’s reserves were coming forward to reinforce the front column of the French, and the remnant of Houghton’s brigade could no longer maintain its ground; the field was heaped with carcasses, the lancers were riding furiously about the captured artillery on the upper part of the hill, and on the lower slopes, a Spanish and an English regiment in mutual error were exchanging volleys: behind all, general Hamilton’s Portuguese, in withdrawing from the heights above the bridge, appeared to be in retreat. The conduct of a few brave men soon changed this state of affairs. Colonel Robert Arbuthnot, pushing between the double fire of the mistaken troops, arrested that mischief, while Cole, with the fuzileers, flanked by a battalion of the Lusitanian legion under colonel Hawkshawe, mounted the hill, dispersed the lancers, recovered the captured guns, and appeared on the right of Houghton’s brigade exactly as Abercrombie passed it on the left. [Illustration: _Vol. 3, Plate 12._ BATTLE of ALBUERA _16^{TH} MAY, 1811._ _London Published by T. & W. BOONE Nov^r 1830._] Such a gallant line, issuing from the midst of the smoke and rapidly separating itself from the confused and broken multitude, startled the enemy’s heavy masses, which were increasing and pressing onwards as to an assured victory: they wavered, hesitated, and then vomiting forth a storm of fire, hastily endeavoured to enlarge their front, while a fearful discharge of grape from all their artillery whistled through the British ranks. Myers was killed; Cole and the three colonels, Ellis, Blakeney, and Hawkshawe, fell wounded, and the fuzileer battalions, struck by the iron tempest, reeled, and staggered like sinking ships. Suddenly and sternly recovering, they closed on their terrible enemies, and then was seen with what a strength and majesty the British soldier fights. In vain did Soult, by voice and gesture, animate his Frenchmen; in vain did the hardiest veterans, extricating themselves from the crowded columns, sacrifice their lives to gain time for the mass to open out on such a fair field; in vain did the mass itself bear up, and fiercely striving, fire indiscriminately upon friends and foes, while the horsemen hovering on the flank threatened to charge the advancing line. Nothing could stop that astonishing infantry. No sudden burst of undisciplined valour, no nervous enthusiasm, weakened the stability of their order; their flashing eyes were bent on the dark columns in their front; their measured tread shook the ground; their dreadful volleys swept away the head of every formation; their deafening shouts overpowered the dissonant cries that broke from all parts of the tumultuous crowd, as foot by foot and with a horrid carnage it was driven by the incessant vigour of the attack to the farthest edge of the hill. In vain did the French reserves, joining with the struggling multitude, endeavour to sustain the fight; their efforts only increased the irremediable confusion, and the mighty mass giving way like a loosened cliff, went headlong down the ascent. The rain flowed after in streams discoloured with blood, and fifteen hundred unwounded men, the remnant of six thousand unconquerable British soldiers, stood triumphant on the fatal hill! CHAPTER VII. While the fuzileers were thus striving on the upper part of the hill, the cavalry and Harvey’s brigade continually advanced, and Latour Maubourg’s dragoons, battered by Lefebre’s guns, retired before them, yet still threatening the British with their right, and covering the flank of their own infantry from a charge of Lumley’s horse. Beresford, seeing that colonel Hardinge’s decision had brought on the critical moment of the battle, then endeavoured to secure a favourable result. Blake’s first line had not been at all engaged, and were ordered to move upon the village; Alten’s Germans and Hamilton’s and Collins’s Portuguese were thus rendered disposable, forming a mass of ten thousand fresh men with which the English general followed up the attack of the fuzileers and Abercrombie’s brigade, and at the same time the Spanish divisions of Zayas, Ballasteros, and España advanced. Nevertheless, so rapid was the execution of the fuzileers, that the enemy’s infantry were never attained by these reserves, which yet suffered severely; for general Ruty got the French guns altogether, and worked them with prodigious activity, while the fifth corps still made head, and, when the day was irrevocably lost, he regained the other side of the Albuera, and protected the passage of the broken infantry. Beresford, being too hardly handled to pursue, formed a fresh line with his Portuguese, parallel to the hill from whence Soult had advanced to the attack in the morning, and where the French troops were now rallying with their usual celerity. Meanwhile the fight continued at the village, but Godinot’s division and the connecting battalion of grenadiers on that side were soon afterwards withdrawn, and the action terminated before three o’clock. The serious fighting had endured only four hours, and in that space of time, nearly seven thousand of the allies and above eight thousand of their adversaries were struck down. Three French generals were wounded, two slain, and eight hundred soldiers so badly hurt as to be left on the field. On Beresford’s side only two thousand Spaniards, and six hundred Germans and Portuguese, were killed or wounded; hence it is plain with what a resolution the pure British fought, for they had only fifteen hundred men left standing out of six thousand! The laurel is nobly won when the exhausted victor reels as he places it on his bleeding front. The trophies of the French were five hundred unwounded prisoners, a howitzer, and several stand of colours; the British had nothing of that kind to boast of; but the horrid piles of carcasses within their lines told, with dreadful eloquence, who were the conquerors, and all the night the rain poured down, and the river and the hills and the woods on each side, resounded with the dismal clamour and groans of dying men. Beresford, obliged to place his Portuguese in the front line, was oppressed with the number of his wounded; they far exceeded that of the sound amongst the British soldiers, and when the latter’s piquets were established, few men remained to help the sufferers. In this cruel situation he sent colonel Hardinge to demand assistance from Blake; but wrath and mortified pride were predominant in that general’s breast, and he refused; saying it was customary with allied armies for each to take care of its own men. Morning came, and both sides remained in their respective situations, the wounded still covering the field of battle, the hostile lines still menacing and dangerous. The greater multitude had fallen on the French part, but the best soldiers on that of the allies; and the dark masses of Soult’s powerful cavalry and artillery, as they covered all his front, seemed alone able to contend again for the victory: the right of the French also appeared to threaten the Badajos road, and Beresford, in gloom and doubt, awaited another attack. On the 17th, however, the third brigade of the fourth division came up by a forced march from Jerumenha, and enabled the second division to retake their former ground between the Valverde and the Badajos roads. On the 18th, Soult retreated. He left to the generosity of the English general several hundred men too deeply wounded to be removed; but all that could travel he had, in the night of the 17th, sent towards Seville, by the royal road, through Santa Marta, Los Santos, and Monasterio: then, protecting his movements with all his horsemen and six battalions of infantry, he filed the army, in the morning, to its right, and gained the road of Solano. When this flank march was completed, Latour Maubourg covered the rear with the heavy dragoons, and Briché protected the march of the wounded men by the royal road. The duke of Dalmatia remained the 19th at Solano. His intention was to hold a position in Estremadura until he could receive reinforcements from Andalusia; for he judged truly that, although Beresford was in no condition to hurt Badajos, lord Wellington would come down, and that fresh combats would be required to save that fortress. On the 14th he had commenced repairing the castle of Villalba, a large structure between Almendralejos and Santa Marta, and he now continued this work; designing to form a head of cantonments, that the allies would be unable to besiege before the French army could be reinforced. When Beresford discovered the enemy’s retreat, he despatched general Hamilton to make a show of re-investing Badajos, which was effected at day-break the 19th, but on the left bank only. Meanwhile the allied cavalry, supported by Alten’s Germans, followed the French line of retreat. Soult then transferred his head-quarters to Fuente del Maestre, and the Spanish cavalry cutting off some of his men menaced Villalba. Lord Wellington reached the field of battle the same day, and, after examining the state of affairs, desired the marshal to follow the enemy cautiously; then returning to Elvas himself, he directed the third and seventh divisions, which were already at Campo Mayor, to complete the re-investment of Badajos on the right bank. Meanwhile Beresford, advanced by the Solano road to Almendralejos, where he found some more wounded men. His further progress was not opposed. The number of officers who had fallen in the French army, together with the privations endured, had produced despondence and discontent; the garrison at Villalba was not even disposed to maintain the castle, and under these circumstances, the duke of Dalmatia evacuated it, and continued his own retreat in the direction of Llerena, where he assumed a position on the 23d, his cavalry being near Usagre. This abandonment of the royal road to Seville was a well-considered movement. The country through which Soult passed being more fruitful and open, he could draw greater advantage from his superior cavalry; the mountains behind him were so strong he had nothing to fear from an attack; and by Belalcazar and Almaden, he could maintain a communication with La Mancha, from whence he expected Drouet’s division. The road of Guadalcanal was in his rear, by which he could draw reinforcements from Cordoba and from the fourth corps, and meanwhile the allies durst not venture to expose their left flank by marching on Monasterio. From Llerena, a detachment was sent to drive away a Spanish Partizan corps which had cut his communications with Guadalcanal, and at the same time Latour Maubourg was directed to scour the country beyond Usagre; this led to an action; for that town, built upon a hill, and covered towards Los Santos by a river with steep and rugged banks, had only the one outlet by the bridge on that side, and when Latour Maubourg approached, Lumley retired across the river. The French light cavalry then marched along the right bank, with the intention of crossing lower down and thus covering the passage of the heavy horsemen; but before they could effect this object, general Bron rashly passed the river with two regiments of dragoons, and drew up in line just beyond the bridge. Lumley was lying close behind a rising ground, and when the French regiments had advanced a sufficient distance, Lefebre’s guns opened on them, and the third, and fourth dragoon guards, charged them in front while Madden’s Portuguese fell on their flank. They were overthrown at the first shock, and fled towards the bridge, but that being choked by the remainder of the cavalry advancing to their support, the fugitives, turned to the right and left, endeavouring to save themselves amongst some gardens situated on the banks of the river; there they were pursued and sabred until the French on the opposite side, seeing their distress, opened a fire of carbines and artillery that obliged the British to discontinue the attack. Forty killed, above a hundred wounded, and eighty prisoners were the fruits of this brilliant action of general Lumley’s, which terminated Beresford’s operations, for the miserable state to which the Regency had reduced the Portuguese army imperatively called for the marshal’s presence. General Hill, who had returned to Portugal, then re-assumed the command of the second division, amidst the eager rejoicings of the troops, and lord Wellington directed the renewed siege of Badajos in person. OBSERVATIONS. No general ever gained a great battle with so little increase of military reputation as marshal Beresford. His personal intrepidity and strength, qualities so attractive for the multitude, were conspicuously displayed, yet the breath of his own army withered his laurels, and his triumph was disputed by the very soldiers who followed his car. Their censures have been reiterated, without change and without abatement, even to this hour; and a close examination of his operations, while it detects many ill-founded objections, and others tainted with malice, leaves little doubt that the general feeling was right. When he had passed the Guadiana and driven the fifth corps upon Guadalcanal, the delay that intervened, before he invested Badajos, was unjustly attributed to him: it was lord Wellington’s order, resulting from the tardiness of the Spanish generals, that paralyzed his operations. But when the time for action arrived, the want of concert in the investment, and the ill-matured attack on San Christoval belonged to Beresford’s arrangements; and he is especially responsible in reputation for the latter, because captain Squires personally represented the inevitable result, and his words were unheeded. During the progress of the siege, either the want of correct intelligence, or a blunted judgement, misled the marshal. It was remarked that, at all times, he too readily believed the idle tales of distress and difficulties in the French armies, with which the spies generally, and the deserters always, interlarded their information. Thus he was incredulous of Soult’s enterprise, and that marshal was actually over the Morena before the orders were given for the commencing of the main attack of the castle of Badajos. However, the firmness with which Beresford resisted the importunities of the engineers to continue the siege, and the quick and orderly removal of the stores and battering-train, were alike remarkable and praiseworthy. It would have been happy if he had shewn as much magnanimity in what followed. When he met Blake and Castaños at Valverde, the alternative of fighting or retiring behind the Guadiana was the subject of consideration. The Spanish generals were both in favour of giving battle. Blake, who could not retire the way he had arrived, without danger of having his march intercepted, was particularly earnest to fight; affirming that his troops, who were already in a miserable state, would disperse entirely if they were obliged to enter Portugal. Castaños was of the same opinion. Beresford also argued that it was unwise to relinquish the hope of taking Badajos, and ungenerous to desert the people of Estremadura; that a retreat would endanger Elvas, lay open the Alemtejo, and encourage the enemy to push his incursions further, which he could safely do, having such a fortress as Badajos with its bridge over the Guadiana, in his rear; a battle must then be fought in the Alemtejo with fewer troops and after a dispiriting retreat; there was also a greater scarcity of food in the Portuguese than in the Spanish province, and, finally, as the weather was menacing, the Guadiana might again rise before the stores were carried over, when the latter must be abandoned, or the army endangered to protect their passage. But these plausible reasons were but a mask; the true cause why the English general adopted Blake’s proposals was the impatient temper of the British troops. None of them had been engaged in the battles under lord Wellington. At Busaco the regiments of the fourth division were idle spectators on the left, as those of the second division were on the right, while the action was in the centre. During Massena’s retreat they had not been employed under fire, and the combats of Sabugal and Fuentes Onoro had been fought without them. Thus a burning thirst for battle was general, and Beresford had not the art either of conciliating or of exacting the confidence of his troops. It is certain that if he had retreated, a very violent and unjust clamour would have been raised against him, and this was so strongly and unceremoniously represented to him, by an officer on his own staff, that he gave way. These are what may be termed the moral obstacles of war. Such men as lord Wellington or sir John Moore can stride over them, but to second-rate minds they are insuperable. Practice and study may make a good general as far as the handling of troops and the designing of a campaign, but that ascendancy of spirit which leads the wise, and controls the insolence of folly, is a rare gift of nature. Beresford yielded with an unhappy flexibility to the clamour of the army and the representations of Blake, for it is unquestionable that the resolution to fight was unwarrantable on any sound military principle. We may pass over the argument founded upon the taking of Badajos, because neither the measures nor the means of the English general promised the slightest chance of success; the siege would have died away of itself in default of resources to carry it on. The true question to consider was, not whether Estremadura should be deserted or Badajos abandoned, but whether lord Wellington’s combinations and his great and well considered design for the deliverance of the Peninsula, should be ruined and defaced at a blow. To say that the Alemtejo could not have been defended until the commander-in-chief arrived from the north with reinforcements was mere trifling. Soult, with twenty or even thirty thousand men, durst not have attempted the siege of Elvas in the face of twenty-four thousand men such as Beresford commanded. The result of the battle of Fuentes Onoro was known in the English and in the French camps, before Beresford broke up from Badajos, hence he was certain that additional troops would soon be brought down to the Guadiana; indeed, the third and seventh divisions were actually at Campo Mayor the 23d of May. The danger to the Alemtejo was, therefore, slight, and the necessity of a battle being by no means apparent, it remains to analyze the chances of success. Soult’s numbers were not accurately known, but it was ascertained that he had not less than twenty thousand veteran troops. He had also a great superiority of cavalry and artillery, and the country was peculiarly suitable for these arms; the martial character of the man was also understood. Now the allies could bring into the field more of infantry by ten thousand than the French, but they were of various tongues, and the Spanish part ill armed, starving, and worn out with fatigue, had been repeatedly and recently defeated by the very troops they were going to engage. The French were compact, swift of movement, inured to war, used to act together, and under the command of one able and experienced general. The allied army was unwieldy, each nation mistrusting the other, and the whole without unity of spirit, or of discipline, or of command. On what, then, could marshal Beresford found his hopes of success? The British troops. The latter were therefore to be freely used. But was it a time to risk the total destruction of two superb divisions and to encounter a certain and heavy loss of men, whose value he knew so well when he calculated upon them alone for victory in such circumstances? To resolve on battle was, however, easier than to prepare for it with skill. Albuera, we have seen, was the point of concentration. Colonel Colborne’s brigade did not arrive until the 14th, and these was no certainty that it could arrive before the enemy did. Blake did not arrive until three in the morning of the 16th. The fourth division not until six o’clock. Kemmis with three fine British regiments, and Maddens cavalry, did not come at all. These facts prove that the whole plan was faulty, it was mere accident that a sufficient force to give battle was concentrated. Beresford was too late, and the keeping up the investment of Badajos, although laudable in one sense, was a great error; it was only an accessary, and yet the success of the principal object was made subservient to it. If Soult, instead of passing by Villa Franca, in his advance, had pushed straight on from Los Santos to Albuera, he would have arrived the 15th, when Beresford had not much more than half his force in position; the point of concentration would then have been lost, and the allies scattered in all directions. If the French had even continued their march by Solano instead of turning upon Albuera, they must inevitably have communicated with Badajos, unless Beresford had fought without waiting for Blake, and without Kemmis’s brigade. Why, then, did the French marshal turn out of the way to seek a battle, in preference to attaining his object without one? and why did he neglect to operate by his right or left until the unwieldy allied army should separate or get into confusion, as it inevitably would have done? Because the English general’s dispositions were so faulty that no worse error could well be expected from him, and Soult had every reason to hope for a great and decided victory; a victory which would have more than counterbalanced Massena’s failure. He knew that only one half of the allied force was at Albuera on the 15th, and when he examined the ground, every thing promised the most complete success. Marshal Beresford had fixed upon and studied his own field of battle above a month before the action took place, and yet occupied it in such a manner as to render defeat almost certain; his infantry were not held in hand, and his inferiority in guns and cavalry was not compensated for by entrenchments. But were any other proofs of error wanting, this fact would suffice, he had a greater strength of infantry on a field of battle scarcely four miles long, and three times the day was lost and won, the allies being always fewest in number at the decisive point. It is true that Blake’s conduct was very perplexing; it is true that general William Stewart’s error cost one brigade, and thus annihilated the command of colonel Colborne, a man capable of turning the fate of a battle even with fewer troops than those swept away from him by the French cavalry: but the neglect of the hill beyond the Albuera, fronting the right of the position, was Beresford’s own error and a most serious one; so also were the successive attacks of the brigades, and the hesitation about the fourth division. And where are we to look for that promptness in critical moments which marks the great commander? It was colonel Hardinge that gave the fourth division and Abercrombie’s brigade orders to advance, and it was their astounding valour in attack, and the astonishing firmness of Houghton’s brigade in defence that saved the day; the person of the general-in-chief was indeed seen every where, a gallant soldier! but the mind of the great commander was seen no where. Beresford remained master of the field of battle, but he could not take Badajos, that prize was the result of many great efforts, and many deep combinations by a far greater man: neither did he clear Estremadura, for Soult maintained positions from Llerena to Usagre. What then did he gain? The power of simulating a renewal of the siege, and holding his own cantonments on the left bank of the Guadiana; I say simulating, for, if the third and seventh divisions had not arrived from Beira, even the investment could not have been completed. These illusive advantages he purchased at the price of seven thousand men. Now lord Wellington fought two general and several minor actions, with a smaller loss, and moreover turned Massena and seventy thousand men out of Portugal! Such being the fruit of victory, what would have been the result of defeat? There was no retreat, save by the temporary bridge of Jerumenha, but, had the hill on the right been carried in the battle, the Valverde road would have been in Soult’s possession, and the line of retreat cut; and, had it been otherwise, Beresford, with four thousand victorious French cavalry at his heels, could never have passed the river. Back, then, must have come the army from the north, the Lines of Lisbon would have been once more occupied--a French force fixed on the south of the Tagus--Spain ruined--Portugal laid prostrate--England in dismay. Could even the genius of lord Wellington have recovered such a state of affairs? And yet, with these results, the terrible balance hung for two hours, and twice trembling to the sinister side, only yielded at last to the superlative vigour of the fuzileers. The battle should never have been fought. The siege of Badajos could not have been renewed without reinforcements, and, with them, it could have been renewed without an action, or at least without risking an unequal one. But would even the bravery of British soldiers have saved the day, at Albuera, if the French general had not also committed great errors. His plan of attack and his execution of it, up to the moment when the Spanish line fell back in disorder, cannot be too much admired; after that, the great error of fighting in dense columns being persisted in beyond reason, lost the fairest field ever offered to the arms of France. Had the fifth corps opened out while there was time to do so, that is, between the falling back of the Spaniards and the advance of Houghton’s brigade, what on earth could have saved Beresford from a total defeat? The fire of the enemy’s columns alone destroyed two-thirds of his British troops; the fire of their lines would have swept away all! It has been said that Latour Maubourg and Godinot did not second Soult with sufficient vigour; the latter certainly did not display any great energy, but the village was maintained by Alten’s Germans, who were good and hardy troops, and well backed up by a great body of Portuguese. Latour Maubourg’s movements seem to have been objected to without reason. He took six guns, sabred many Spaniards, and overthrew a whole brigade of the British, without ceasing to keep in check their cavalry. He was, undoubtedly, greatly superior in numbers, but general Lumley handled the allied squadrons with skill and courage, and drew all the advantage possible from his situation, and, in the choice of that situation, none can deny ability to marshal Beresford. The rising ground behind the horsemen, the bed of the Aroya in their front, the aid of the horse-artillery, and the support of the fourth division, were all circumstances of strength so well combined that nothing could be better, and they dictated Latour Maubourg’s proceedings, which seem consonant to true principles. If he had charged in mass, under the fire of Lefebre’s guns, he must have been thrown into confusion in passing the Aroya at the moment when the fourth division, advancing along the slopes, would have opened a musketry on his right flank; Lumley could then have charged, or retired up the hill, according to circumstances. In this case, great loss might have been sustained, and nothing very decisive could have accrued to the advantage of the French, because no number of cavalry, if unsustained by infantry and artillery, can make a serious impression against the three arms united. On the other hand, a repulse might have been fatal not only to himself but to the French infantry on the hill, as their left would have been open to the enterprises of the allied cavalry. If Latour Maubourg had stretched away to his own left, he would, in like manner, have exposed the flank of Soult’s infantry, and his movements would have been eccentric, and contrary to sound principles; and, (in the event of a disaster to the corps on the hill, as really happened,) destructive to the safety of the retreating army. By keeping in mass on the plain, and detaching squadrons from time to time, as favourable opportunities offered for partial charges, he gained, as we have seen, great advantages during the action, and kept his troopers well in hand for the decisive moment; finally, he covered the retreat of the beaten infantry. Still it may be admitted that, with such superior numbers, he might have more closely pressed Lumley. When Soult had regained the hills at the other side of the Albuera, the battle ceased, each side being, as we have seen, so hardly handled that neither offered to renew the fight. Here was the greatest failure of the French commander; he had lost eight thousand men, but he had still fifteen thousand under arms, and his artillery and his cavalry were comparatively untouched. On the side of the allies, only fifteen hundred British infantry were standing; the troops were suffering greatly from famine; the Spaniards had been feeding on horseflesh, and were so extenuated by continual fatigue and misery, that, for several days previous to the battle, they had gone over in considerable numbers even to the French, hoping thus to get food: these circumstances should be borne in mind, when reflecting on their conduct in the battle; under such a commander as Blake, and, while enduring such heavy privations, it was a great effort of resolution, and honourable to them that they fought at all. Their resistance feeble, when compared to the desperate valour of the British, was by no means weak in itself or infirm; nor is it to be wondered at that men so exhausted and so ill-managed should have been deaf to the call of Beresford, a strange general, whose exhortations they probably did not understand. When the fortune of the day changed they followed the fuzileers with alacrity, and at no period did they give way with dishonour. Nevertheless, all circumstances considered, they were not and could not be equal to a second desperate struggle, a renewed attack on the 17th, would have certainly ended in favour of the French; and so conscious was Beresford of this, that, on the evening of the 16th, he wrote to lord Wellington, avowing that he anticipated a certain and ruinous defeat the next day. The resolution with which he maintained the position notwithstanding, was the strongest indication of military talent he gave during the whole of his operations; had Soult only persisted in holding his position with equal pertinacity, Beresford must have retired. It was a great and decided mistake of the French marshal not to have done so. There is nothing more essential in war than a confident front; a general should never acknowledge himself vanquished, for the front line of an army always looks formidable, and the adversary can seldom see the real state of what is behind. The importance of this maxim is finely indicated in Livy, where he relates that, after a drawn battle, a god called out in the night, the Etruscans had lost one man more than the Romans! Hereupon the former retired, and the latter, remaining on the field, gathered all the fruits of a real victory. PAPERS RELATING TO THE FORMER VOLUMES. _Letter from major-general F. Ponsonby to colonel Napier._ After the very handsome manner in which you have mentioned my name, in your account of the battle of Talavera, it may appear extraordinary that I should trouble you with this letter; but my silence might be interpreted into the wish of taking praise to myself which I do not deserve. The whole of your account of the charge made by general Anson’s brigade is substantially correct; you have given the reason for it, and the result; but there are two points, in the detail, which are inaccurate. The first affecting the German hussars; the other respecting myself. The Germans, on the left of the twenty-third, could not reach the French columns, from the impracticability of the ravine where they charged; this I ascertained, by personal observation, the following day; the obstacle was much less serious where the twenty-third attacked, headed by general Anson and colonel Seymour. The mountain torrent, which gradually decreased as it descended into the plain, was about thirty yards in front of the enemy, and the twenty-third, though much broken in passing this obstacle, charged up to the columns, and was repulsed, no rally could be attempted; but the right squadron, under captain Drake, having an easier passage of the ravine, and no French column immediately in front, passed through the intervals, and caused much confusion, which, together with the delay occasioned by the charge, prevented the masses of infantry which were in readiness on the French right flank, from joining in the general attack on our line. You will perceive that this account, which I believe to be the exact truth, does not, in the slightest degree, affect the accuracy of your description of the movement; but, if I am correct, it proves that the Germans were obliged to halt by an insuperable difficulty, and that I had no particular merit in the execution of the charge of the twenty-third. Believe me Very sincerely yours, F. PONSONBY. _Malta, Dec. 30, 1829._ _Note sur la Situation actuelle de l’Espagne._ _Rochefort, le Août, 1808._ 1º. Les événemens inattendus du général Dupont sont une preuve de plus que le succès de la guerre dépend de la prudence, de la bonne conduite, et de l’expérience du général. 2º. A la seule lecture du rapport du colonel d’Affry, on avoit diviné tous les événemens; après une perte aussi considérable, on ne peut être surpris que le roi et les généraux jugent convenable de concentrer l’armée et d’évacuer Madrid. En examinant avec attention, non les rapports mensongers des individus qui parlent dans leur sens, mais les faits tels qu’ils se sont passés, on est convaincu: premièrement, que le général Castaños n’avoit pas plus de vingt-cinq mille hommes de troupe de ligne et de quinze mille paysans; un jour on sera à même de vérifier ce qui sera avancé ici. Secondement, que si le général Dupont les eut attaqués ou se fût battû; avec tout son corps réuni, il les eut complettement défaits. 3º. On pense qu’on aura tout le tems d’évacuer les blessés de Madrid qui arrivent à Aranda; il faudra occuper aussi longtems qu’il sera possible les hauteurs de Buitrago, afin de donner le temps au maréchal Bessières de revenir de son mouvement de Gallice; qu’il faut réorganiser la province de Burgos, les trois Biscayes, et la province de Navarre; elle comprendront facilement que, dans ce moment plus que jamais, elles doivent rester fidèles et se bien conduire sous peine d’être traitées avec toute la rigueur de la guerre. 4º. On pense que l’armée doit être divisée en trois corps, _le corps principal_, ou de centre, où commande le roi, qu’on porteroit à 30,000 hommes campé à Aranda; le corps de droite, du maréchal Bessières d’environ 15 mille hommes faisant face à ce qui pourroit arriver de Gallice ou d’Estramadura, occupant Valladolid par une division, ayant une autre division intermédiaire avec le corps du centre, et une troisième division de plus sur sa droite, selon les circonstances; enfin le _corps de gauche_, ou d’Arragon destiné à maintenir la Navarre et le pays environnant, occupant Logrono et Tudela et liant sa droite au corps du centre, par une division qui au besoin renforceroit ce corps et devra maintenir Soria par un corps volant. Le corps du centre, et le corps de droite doivent s’appuyer sur Burgos et le corps d’Arragon doit avoir son appui sur Pampelune. 5º. Pour organiser le corps du centre dans ce bût, on croit qu’on doit le renforcer de la brigade du 14^{me} et 44^{me} de ligne, 200 chevaux et 8 pièces de canon, qu’on tireroit du corps devant Saragosse; de la brigade du général Mouton composée du 4^{me} legère, 15^{me} legère, du bataillon de Paris, et de huit pièces de canon; de la brigade commandée par le maréchal Ney, et qui est déjà à une marche en avant de Bayonne, composée du 43^{me}, et du 51^{me} de ligne, du 26^{me} de chasseurs, et de 6 pièces de canon; enfin de 4 escadrons de marche de dragons et d’une régiment Polonais de la garde; on réuniroit le 3^{me} bataillon aux deux premiers de tous les régimens d’infanterie, et on méleroit les jeunes soldats aux anciens. On évalue à environ dix mille hommes de renfort que recevroit le corps du centre, qui seroit alors composé: savoir des 18,000 qui le forment à présent 18,000 Du renfort évalué à 10,000 Le détachement du depôt du 4^{me} legère, 15^{me} legère. 14^{me}, 44^{me}, 43^{me}, et 51^{me} de ligne, le 2^{me} et 12^{me} legère rejoindront insensiblement et porteront ce corps à 30,000 hommes. Ces trente mille hommes ne sauroient être en meilleure mains, que sous les ordres du maréchal Ney, hormis une réserve de 4 à 5 mille hommes destinés à la garde du roi, et que le roi conserveroit auprès de sa personne et feroit marcher avec le général Saligny, ou avec le général Savary quand il le jugeroit nécessaire. Le corps du centre ce tiendrait à la hauteur d’Aranda, ses communications bien assurées avec le maréchal Bessières à Valladolid, des têtes de pont bien établies à Aranda et à Valladolid. Ce corps se nourrira par Burgos et devra non seulement maintenir la tranquillité dans cette province, mais encore assurer ses communications avec le corps de Saragosse qui occupera Tudela et Logrono. Le corps du maréchal Bessières, fort de quinze mille hommes, devra occuper Valladolid en faisant face à ce qui arrivera d’Estramadure et de Castille, ayant ses trois divisions en échélons et se nourrissant de la province de Valladolid, Placentia, et Leon. On enverra le maréchal Moncey pour commander le corps du général Verdier, et on chargera le maréchal du commandement de la Biscaye et de tous les derrières. On estime qu’on peut retirer du camp sous Saragosse le 14^{me} et 44^{me} de ligne, 200 chevaux, et 8 pièces de canon, le reste doit être formé en trois divisions, et destiné, à maintenir la Navarre. La position de Logrono est trop près, il faut occuper au moins jusqu’à Tudela pour soumettre la Navarre, et tout ce qui bougeroit. Dans l’ordre offensif, deux divisions peuvent se porter en marche forcée sur l’armée. 6º. Il ne faut point faire une guerre timide, ni souffrir aucun rassemblement armé à deux marches d’aucun corps d’armée. Si l’ennemi s’approche, il ne faut point se laisser décourager par ce qui s’est passé, se confier dans sa supériorité, marcher à lui et le battre. L’ennemi prendra lui même probablement une marche très circonspecte: il y sera réduit du moment qu’il aura eu quelque exemple. Dans cette situation de choses, toutes les fois qu’on seroit sérieusement attaqué par l’ennemi, on pourra lui opposer le corps du roi, qui doit toujours être ensemble, et les deux tiers du corps du maréchal Bessières. Se maréchal doit toujours tenir un tiers de son corps, à une demi journée, un tiers à une journée du corps du centre, et un tiers sur la droite, suivant les circonstances, également, un tiers du corps du général Verdier doit se tenir à la gauche du roi, pour le joindre si cela étoit nécessaire, de sorte que dans un jour le roi puisse réunir 40 mille hommes. 7º. Il faut débuter par des coups d’éclât, qui rélévent le moral du soldat et qui fassent comprendre à l’habitant qu’il doit rester tranquille, un des premiers coups le plus important à porter, et qui seroit utile pour réléver l’opinion et compenser l’évacuation de Madrid, seroit que la brigade du 14^{me} et 44^{me} qu’on rappelle de Saragosse, aidée d’une détachement du corps du centre, soumette Soria, le désarme et le fasse rester tranquille. Attaquer et culbuter tout ce qui se présentera doit être l’instruction générale, donnée au maréchal Bessières, au maréchal Ney, et au général Verdier, de sorte qu’à une marche, ou à une marche et demie du corps François, il n’y ait aucun rassemblement d’insurgés; on est d’opinion que si l’avant garde du général Castaños s’avance sur l’Aranda et dépasse les montagnes de Buitrago il faut, avec tout ce qu’on réunira dans un jour, marcher à lui sans lui donner le tems de s’y établir sérieusement, le culbuter, le jetter au delà des montagnes, et si l’affaire est décisive, se reporter sur Madrid. L’ennemi doit essayer de déloger l’armée Françoise de cette position, par trois points, par la Gallice et l’Estramadure, par la droite d’Aranda, et enfin par les rassemblemens des provinces d’Arragon, de Valence et autres de Castille. Toutes ces combinaisons sont difficiles à l’ennemi, et si on dissipe ces rassemblemens à mesure qu’ils se formeront sur tous les points et qu’on les tienne à distance d’une ou deux marches du cantonnement François, si alternativement les François prennent l’offensive, tantôt à leur droite, en renforçant le maréchal Bessières, pendant que le centre se tiendra dans une bonne position derrière la rivière, et à l’abri de toute attaque, tantôt au centre avec le corps du roi, les deux tiers du corps de droite, et un tiers du corps de gauche, l’ennemi sera bientôt obligé à la plus grande circonspection. 8º. On auroit pu aussi conserver Madrid en renforçant le corps qui s’y trouve, du 14^{me} et 44^{me} de ligne, de la brigade du général Mouton, de celle du général Le Fevbre, qui en dernier lieu a été renvoyée au marshal Bessières, et enfin du renfort qu’amène le maréchal Ney. On auroit ainsi renforcé le corps de Madrid de plus de 14 mille hommes, et il est douteux que l’ennemi eut voulu se mesurer avec des forces aussi considérables et s’exposer à une perte certaine. 9º. Si de fortes raisons obligoient d’évacuer Aranda, on perdroit l’espoir de rétablir ses communications avec le Portugal. Dans le cas où un évènement quelconque porteroit à évacuer le Duero et à se concentrer sur Burgos pour se réunir là avec le maréchal Bessières, le corps du général Verdier peut communiquer par l’Ebre, et avoir toujours son mouvement isolé pour maintenir la Navarre, contenir l’Arragon, tous les rassemblemens de ce côté, et protéger la route principale.[9] Pendant cet intervalle des renforts journaliers arriveront à l’armée, jusqu’à ce qu’enfin les divisions de la grande armée qui sont en marche, soient sur les Pyrénées. On a recommandé de tous tems le petit fort de Pancorvo. Il est nécessaire de l’occuper, même quand on ne garderoit pas la ligne de l’Ebre, c’est une vedette d’autant plus utile qu’elle domine la plaine, et seroit un obstacle si jamais l’ennemi s’en emparoit.[9] 10º. La troisième position qui se présente à l’armée, c’est la gauche à Pampelune, et la droite sur Vittoria, maintenant ainsi ses communications avec les places importantes de St. Sebastien et de Pampelune. Au reste toutes ces notes peuvent difficilement être de quelque utilité, les évènemens modifient nécessairement les dispositions, tout dépend d’ailleurs de saisir un moment. 11º. Résumé. Le premier but est de se maintenir à Madrid si cela est possible. Le second, de maintenir ses communications avec le Portugal en occupant la ligne du Duero. Le troisième, de conserver l’Ebre. Le quatrième de conserver ses communications avec Pampelune et St. Sebastien afin que la grande armée arrivant, on puisse en peu de tems culbuter et anéantir tous les révoltés. LIEUT.-GEN. BERTRAND. _Rochefort, 6 Août, 1808._ APPENDIX. APPENDIX. No. I. SECTION 1.--GENERAL STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN THE PENINSULA, EXTRACTED FROM THE IMPERIAL MUSTER ROLLS. King Joseph commanding, 1st Oct. 1809. Present under arms Detached. Absent. Effective. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Hosp. Prison. Men. Cav. Draught. 180,814 28,091 10,407 3,165 46,109 4,124 237,330 23,196 8,060 Deduct for the governments 10,407 3,165 ------- ------ Real total 226,927 28,091 ------- ------ 15th July, 1810. 273,403 52,336 29,462 7,846 47,107 4,915 349,972 41,848 18,334 In march to join 6,121 736 ” ” 636 ” 6,757 736 ------- ------ ------ ----- ------ ----- ------- ------ 279,524 53,072 29,462 7,846 47,743 4,915 356,729 60,918 ------- ------ ------ ----- ------ ----- ------- ------ 15th August, 1810. 279,639 52,063 25,340 6,017 46,982 5,995 351,961 41,446 16,634 In march to join 1,957 681 511 ------- ------ ------ Total effective in Spain 353,918 42,127 17,145 Troops destined for Spain, quartered on the frontier 16,006 1,447 ” ------- ------ ------ Grand total 369,924 43,574 17,145 ------- ------ ------ _Note._--By this state it appears that allowance being made for casualties, the reinforcements for Spain, in consequence of the peace with Austria, were not less than one hundred and fifty thousand men. 15th Jan. 1811. Present under arms. Detached. Absent. Effective. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Hosp. Men. Cav. Draught. 295,227 52,462 17,780 4,714 48,831 361,838 41,189 15,987 15th April, 1811. 276,575 46,990 15,121 2,166 40,079 331,776 37,855 11,301 These states shew a decrease of nearly thirty thousand men in three months. During this period the siege of Badajos, the retreat of Massena, the battles of the Gebora, Barrosa, and Fuentes Onoro took place. Hence, if the deaths in hospital be added to the losses sustained in those operations we shall find that, at the period of its greatest activity, the Guerilla system was more harassing than destructive to the French army. SECTION 2.--STATE OF THE ARMY OF PORTUGAL. April, 1810.--Head-quarter Caceres. Massena, Prince of Esling, commanding. Pris- Under arms. Detached. Hosp. oners. Effective. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Men. Men. Cav. Draught. 2d corps d’armée 18,372 4,449 1,119 132 1,628 7 21,126 3,520 1,061 6th Ditto 33,759 10,159 496 110 5,086 349 39,690 3,140 3,129 8th Ditto 28,045 7,070 25 ” 5,976 99 34,145 5,312 1,758 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Total active army 80,176 21,678 1,640 242 12,690 455 94,961 15,972 5,948 Imperial guards 17,380 3,800 174 15 733 ” 18,287 2,831 954 Province of St. Ander 13,464 752 276 ” 1,774 377 15,891 15,752 ” Province of Valladolid 4,509 124 123 ” 859 145 6,136 ” 126 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Total under Massena’s command 116,029 26,254 2,213 257 16,056 977 135,275 19,555 7,056 --------------------------------------------------------------------- 15th May, 1810. Etat major et gend’armes 229 241 ” ” ” ” 229 241 ” 2d corps Reynier 16,903 2,921 992 231 1,337 42 19,232 2,186 966 6th do. Ney 28,883 5,421 1,224 964 4,940 357 35,067 2,152 4,233 8th do. Junot 30,782 4,228 7 30 5,642 75 2,643 2,142 2,116 Reserve of cavalry. Montbrun 4,776 4,851 246 189 95 ” 5,117 5,040 11 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Total active army 71,573 17,662 2,489 1,414 12,014 474 86,076 11,761 7,315 --------------------------------------------------------------------- 15th August, 1810. Etat major, &c 199 222 ” ” 3 ” 202 222 ” 2d corps 16,418 2,894 2,494 397 3,006 ” 21,913 1,969 1,304 6th corps 23,456 2,496 1,865 577 5,541 193 30,862 1,701 1,372 8th corps 18,803 1,959 436 169 4,996 98 24,235 2,016 1,112 Reserve of cavalry 4,146 4,322 1,138 831 157 31 5,441 4,907 246 Artillerie et genie et du siege 2,724 2,969 205 159 409 ” 3,339 108 3,128 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Total active army 65,746 15,862 6,139 2,119 14,112 302 85,997 10,815 7,162 6th Government Valladolid. Division Serras 12,693 3,045 639 20 1,775 641 15,107 2,931 134 Asturias et St. Ander. Bonet 12,913 ” 1,394 15 1,578 107 14,885 434 ” --------------------------------------------------------------------- Total under Massena 91,352 18,907 8,172 2,154 17,465 1,050 115,989 13,746 7,296 9th corps, Drouet Comte D’Erlon 19,144 2,436 24 ” 3,147 ” 22,315 2,436 ” --------------------------------------------------------------------- General Total 110,496 21,343 8,196 2,154 20,612 1,050 138,304 16,616 7,296 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Army of Portugal, 27th September, 1810. The 9th corps to the 15th October. The reserve of cavalry, and the artillery of siege to the 1st September only. Under arms. Detached. Hosp. Effective. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Men. Cav. Draught. Etat major 192 219 ” ” 4 196 219 ” 2d corps 16,575 2,921 2,397 287 2,214 21,186 1,872 1,336 6th do. 23,224 2,478 1,708 600 5,418 30,350 1,730 1,348 8th do. 18,807 2,958 663 140 4,656 24,126 2,027 1,071 Reserve of cavalry 4,146 4,322 1,138 831 157 5,441 4,907 246 Artilleries of siege 3,022 3,115 206 159 409 3,637 146 3,128 Battalion of march which quitted Bayonne the 2d of October ” ” 474 16 ” 474 16 ” -------------------------------------------------------------- Total 65,966 16,013 6,586 2,033 12,858 85,410 10,917 7,129 9th corps 19,062 2,072 413 ” 3,516 22,991 1,755 317 Division Serras 8,586 1,015 269 35 1,750 10,605 1,050 ” -------------------------------------------------------------- Grand Total 93,614 19,100 7,268 2,068 18,124 119,006 13,722 7,446 -------------------------------------------------------------- Army of Portugal--1st January, 1811. Head-quarters, Torres Novas. 2d Corps, Head-quarters Santarem. Under arms. Detached. Hosp. Effective. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Men. Cav. Draught. Merle’s division, 9 battalions 4,368 ” 150 ” 1,549 6,067 ” ” Heudelet’s do. 12 do. 5,718 ” 451 ” 2,646 8,815 ” ” Lt. cavalry, Soult, 15 squadrons 1,146 993 523 537 231 1,900 1,530 ” Artillery and engineers 1,284 1,121 52 9 189 1,425 112 1,018 -------------------------------------------------------------- Total 12,516 2,114 1,176 546 4,515 18,207 1,642 1,018 -------------------------------------------------------------- 6th Corps, Thomar. Marchand, 11 battalions 4,987 28 529 ” 1,121 6,637 28 ” Mermet’s, 11 do. 6,252 ” 743 ” 1,077 8,104 ” ” Loison, 12 do. 4,589 ” 1,037 ” 3,291 8,917 ” ” Light cavalry, Lamotte, 7 squadrons 652 651 663 663 117 1,432 1,314 ” Artillery and engineers, 28 companies 1,769 1,372 47 78 165 1,981 52 1,398 -------------------------------------------------------------- Total 18,272 2,051 3,019 741 5,771 27,094 1,394 1,398 -------------------------------------------------------------- 8th Corps, Pernes. Clausel, 11 battalions 4,007 18 484 ” 3,989 8,627 18 ” Solignac, 14 do 4,997 ” 1,953 ” 3,337 10,346 ” ” St. Croix’s dragoons, 12 squadrons 981 1,024 698 698 238 1,917 1,722 ” Artillery and engineers 1,106 859 24 4 359 1,522 151 712 On leave ” ” ” ” ” 206 ” ” -------------------------------------------------------------- Total 11,108 1,901 3,159 702 7,956 22,605 1,191 712 -------------------------------------------------------------- Montbrun, Ourem. Reserve of cavalry 24 squadrons with artillery 2,729 2,871 1,486 1,466 178 4,533 4,337 ------------------------------------------------------------- Artillery, engineers, and equipage of the army 1,546 614 ” ” 283 2,090 614 ------------------------------------------------------------- 9th Corps, Leiria. Claparede, 15 battalions, Almeida 7,863 11 369 ” 432 8,714 ” Couroux, 12 battalions, Leiria 7,592 27 447 ” 1,299 9,338 27 Fournier’s cavalry, 7 squadrons at Toro 1,698 1,591 60 67 114 1,872 1,658 Artillery and engineers, Ciudad Rodrigo 670 464 ” 72 742 ” 464 -------------------------------------------------------------- Total 17,823 2,093 876 139 2,637 19,924 2,149 -------------------------------------------------------------- _Note._--Salamanca constituted a government containing the towns of Alba de Tormes, Penaranda, and Salamanca, in which were deposited the sick men, stragglers, equipages, and depôts, of the army of Portugal. The total amounting to 2,354 men and 1,102 horses. Present under arms. Men. Horses. General Total of the army of Portugal in the position of Santarem 46,171 9,551 9th Corps 17,823 2,093 ------ ------ 63,994 11,644 Deduct troops of the 9th corps not in Portugal 10,231 2,066 ------ ------ Real numbers under Massena 53,763 9,578 ------ ------ Army of Portugal--1st April, 1811. Under arms. Detached. Hosp. Effective. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Men. 8th corps, Junot 13,448 ” 992 ” 5,719 20,159 ” 6th do. Marmont 13,984 ” 1,374 ” 1,576 16,934 ” 2d corps, Reynier 10,837 ” 1,350 ” 4,318 16,505 ” Montbrun { Dragoon, 23 squadrons { 4,173 4,404 ” ” ” 4,173 4,404 { Light cavalry, 14 squadrons { 3,636 3,906 ” ” 38 3,636 3,906 { 1 squadron of gens-d’armes { 190 72 ” ” 5 102 72 Under arms. Detached. Hosp. Effective. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Men. Artillery and Engineers { Foot artillery. Almeida and Rodrigo { 936 ” ” ” 88 1,055 ” { Horse artillery { 410 425 ” ” 23 453 425 { Artillery of the train { 2,181 2,378 ” ” 237 2,448 2,378 { Workmen { 259 ” ” ” 25 295 ” { Engineers { 1,448 60 ” ” 140 1,623 ” { Military equipage { 596 897 ” ” 60 668 897 -------------------------------------------------- Total artilleries, engineers, &c. 5,969 3,335 ” ” 573 6,542 2,760 Total of infantry 37,269 ” 3,716 ” 11,613 53,598 ” Total of cavalry 7,999 8,382 ” ” 43 7,911 8,382 --------------------------------------------------- General Total 51,237 11,717 3,716 ” 12,229 68,051 11,142 --------------------------------------------------- _Note._--In the imperial rolls there was no state of the army of Portugal for May. Two divisions of the 9th corps, directed to be added to the army of Portugal, are included in the state for April, and the prince of Esling was empowered to distribute the cavalry as he pleased, provided the brigade of general Fournier, from the 9th corps, was kept in the reserve. The detached men were in the government of Salamanca. On the 1st of June, however, the army of Portugal is returned as present under arms 44,548 men, 7,253 horses, and 4,620 men detached. Hence, I have estimated the number of fighting men and officers, including the imperial guards, at Fuentes Onoro at 45,000, a number, perhaps, too great, when the artificers, engineers, &c. are deducted. SECTION 3.--ARMY OF THE SOUTH, SOULT, DUKE OF DALMATIA, COMMANDING. Under arms. Detached. Hosp. Effective. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Men. Cav. Draught. 1st of January 55,602 12,092 5,744 1,999 6,412 67,758 10,868 3,223 ------------------------------------------------------- 15th May 75,133 13,124 3,915 1,336 11,420 90,468 12,156 2,304 Deduct the troops of the 9th corps in march from the north 11,917 1,619 ” ” ” 13,310 1,220 399 ------------------------------------------------------ Real total of the army of the South 63,216 11,505 3,915 1,336 11,420 77,158 10,936 1,905 ------------------------------------------------------ SECTION 4. 5th Corps, 15th January. Under arms. Detached. Men. Horses. Men. Horses. 18,766 6,158 3,035 640 16th December, 1810, le Duc de Dalmatie, va faire le siège de Badajos, avec tout le 5^{em} corps d’armée, 8 régimens de cavalerie formant 2,600 chevaux pris dans les l^{ere} et 5^{em} corps d’armée sous les orders de general Latour Maubourg, 900 hommes du 63^{em} regiment de ligne, 2 compagnies d’artillerie légère, 4 compagnies de sappeurs, 1 compagnie de mineurs, et trois escadrons de cavalerie Espagnols. SECTION 5. 1st Corps before Cadiz. Under arms. Detached. Hosp. Effective. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Men. Cav. Train. 15th February, 1811 20,572 1,886 1,331 681 1,254 23,457 1,495 1,072 Reinforcement on the march from the Governments 5,209 775 ” ” 743 5,952 712 62 ------------------------------------------------------------ Total 25,781 2,661 1,331 681 1,997 29,409 2,407 1,035 ------------------------------------------------------------ 4th corps, 15th Feb. 16,706 4,007 741 397 1,699 19,143 3,618 793 Reinforcement on the march from the Governments 6,620 1,457 ” ” 878 6,854 1,451 ” ------------------------------------------------------------ Total 22,726 5,464 741 397 2,577 25,998 5,069 793 ------------------------------------------------------------ _Note._--A reinforcement of more than one thousand men likewise joined the 5th corps while in front of Badajos. SECTION 6.--ARMY OF THE NORTH--BESSIERES, DUKE OF ISTRIA, COMMANDING. Under arms. Detached. Hosp. Effective. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Men. Men. Cav. Train. 1st February, 1811 58,515 8,874 1,992 6,860 67,767 7,979 1,079 ----------------------------------------------------------- 15th April, 1811 53,148 6,930 2,221 5,350 60,719 6,065 879 SECTION 7.--ARMÉE IMPÉRIALE DU MIDI DE L’ESPAGNE 1^{me} CORPS. Situation des présens sous les armes à l’époque du 22d Mars 1811. (Part 1 of 2) Etat des Dans les Emplacement des Troupes Designation des presens Forts et dans les Forts Division 1. Regimens sous les Redoutes. et Redoutes. armes. 9^{me} Infantrie ligne 1,000 24^{me} do. do. 800 400 Depuis et compris le Fort St. Catherine jusqu’au Rio St. Petro 96^{me} do. do. 1,100 Division 2. Regimens 16^{me} do. do. 350 350 Xeres et la Cartuxa 8^{me} do. do. 713 45^{me} do. do. 1,072 744 Depuis et compris le Fort Napoleon jusqu’à Chiese fe 54^{me} do. do. 820 Bataillon d’Elite 236 Division 3. Regimens 27^{me} Infantrie ligne 1,400 63^{me} do. do. 845 94^{me} do. do. 1,500 650 Depuis et compris la Redoute jusqu’à cette de Vellati 95^{me} do. do. 1,414 472 Arcos, Medina, Vejer, et Conil Régiment de Marine. 43^{me} Battalions de 900 900 Au Trocadero marine 2^e do. d’Ouvriers do. 615 615 Do. 5^e Chasseurs 320 Cavalrie. 1^e de Dragoons 230 50 De Montesà, Alcazar de Xeres 2^e do. do. 218 72 Do. et à la Cartuxa Artillerie à pied à Cheval 678 500 Sur la ligne du Blocas Sapeurs 323 323 Au Trocadero Mineurs 77 77 Do. ------ ----- 14,611 5,153 ------ ----- (Part 2 of 2; columns 1, 2 and 3 repeated) Etat des Dans les Designation des presens Forts et Disposeables. Division 1. Regimens sous les Redoutes. armes. 9^{me} Infantrie ligne 1,000 1,000 Sta Maria. 24^{me} do. do. 800 400 400 Do. 96^{me} do. do. 1,100 1,100 Do. San Lucar, Esta, Chipiona, la Viala Atta. Division 2. Regimens 16^{me} do. do. 350 350 8^{me} do. do. 713 713 Port Reale au Trocadero. 45^{me} do. do. 1,072 744 328 Port Reale. 54^{me} do. do. 820 820 Chiclana. Bataillon d’Elite 236 236 Do. Division 3. Regimens 27^{me} Infantrie ligne 1,400 1,400 Do. 63^{me} do. do. 845 845 Port Reale. 94^{me} do. do. 1,500 650 850 Chiclana. 95^{me} do. do. 1,414 472 942 Do. Régiment de Marine. 43^{me} Battalions de 900 900 marine 2^e do. d’Ouvriers do. 615 615 5^e Chasseurs 320 320 Vejer et Conil. Cavalrie. 1^e de Dragoons 230 50 180 Xeres. 2^e do. do. 218 72 146 Arcos. Artillerie à pied à Cheval 678 500 178 Santa Maria, Puerto Reale, et Chiclana. Sapeurs 323 323 Mineurs 77 77 ------ ----- ----- 14,611 5,153 9,458 ------ ----- ----- By this return, which is not extracted from the imperial rolls, but was found amongst Colonel Lejeune’s intercepted papers, it appears that Victor had above nine thousand disposable troops seventeen days after the battle of Barosa. He must, therefore, have had about eleven thousand disposable before that action, and Cassagne’s detachment being deducted leaves about nine thousand for the battle of Barosa. SECTION 8.--STATE OF THE BRITISH AND GERMAN TROOPS ON THE COA, 25TH APRIL, 1811, EXTRACTED FROM THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL’S RETURNS. Under arms. Sick. Detached. Men. Men. Men. Cavalry 4 regiments 1,525 274 542 Infantry 41 battalions 20,700 8,880 3,214 Artillery 1,378 144 1,156 ------ ----- ----- Total of all arms 23,613 9,298 4,912 ------ ----- ----- Guns 24 British, 18 Portuguese Total 42 _Note._--There are no separate returns of the army engaged in the battle of Fuentes Onoro. Hence, the above is only an approximation to the numbers of British and German troops; but if the Portuguese and the Partida of Julian Sanchez be added, the whole number in line will be about thirty-five thousand men of all arms. * * * * * No. II. EXTRACTS OF LETTERS FROM LORD WELLINGTON TO LORD LIVERPOOL. SECTION 1. “_November 30, 1809._ “I enclose copies and extracts of a correspondence which I have had with Mr. Frere on the subject of the co-operation of the British army with the corps of the duke of Albuquerque and the duke Del Parque in this plan of diversion. “Adverting to the opinion which I have given to his majesty’s ministers and the ambassador at Seville, it will not be supposed that I could have encouraged the advance of general Areizaga, or could have held out the prospect of any co-operation by the British army. “The first official information which I had from the government of the movement of general Areizaga was on the 18th, the day before his defeat, and I gave the answer on the 19th regarding the plan of which I now enclose a copy. “I was at Seville, however, when the general commenced his march from the Sierra Morena, and in more than one conversation with the Spanish ministers and members of the Junta, I communicated to them my conviction that general Areizaga would be defeated. The expectation, however, of success from this large army, stated to consist of fifty thousand men, was so general and so sanguine that the possibility of disappointment was not even contemplated, and, accordingly, your lordship will find that, on the 10th only, the government began to think it necessary to endeavour to make a diversion in favour of general Areizaga, and it is probable that it was thought expedient to make this diversion only in consequence of the fall of the general’s own hopes, after his first trial with the enemy on the night of the 10th instant.”--“I am anxious to cross the Tagus with the British army and to station it on the frontiers of Old Castile, from thinking that the point in which I can be of most use in preventing the enemy from effecting any important object, and which best answers for my future operations in the defence of Portugal. With this view, I have requested Mr. Frere to urge the government to reinforce the duke D’Albuquerque’s corps, in order to secure the passage of the lower part of the Tagus. And, although the state of the season would render it desirable that I should make the movement at an early period, I do not propose to make it till I shall see most clearly the consequences of that defeat, and some prospect that the city of Seville will be secure after I shall move.” SECTION 2. “_December 7, 1809._ “----I had urged the Spanish government to augment the army of the duke D’Albuquerque to twenty thousand men, in order that it might occupy, in a sufficient manner, the passage of the Tagus at Almaraz and the passes through the mountains leading from Arzobispo to Truxillo, in which position they would have covered effectually the province of Estremadura, during the winter at least, and would have afforded time and leisure for preparations for farther opposition to the enemy, and I delayed the movement, which I have long been desirous of making, to the northward of the Tagus, till the reinforcements could be sent to the duke D’Albuquerque which I had lately recommended should be drawn from the army of the duke Del Parque. During the discussions upon the subject, the government have given orders to the duke D’Albuquerque to retire with his corps behind the Guadiana, to a position which he cannot maintain, thus leaving open the road into Estremadura, and incurring the risk of the loss of that province whenever the enemy choose to take possession of it.” SECTION 3. “_January 31, 1810._ “----There is no doubt that, if the enemy’s reinforcements have not yet entered Spain, and are not considerably advanced within the Spanish frontiers, the operation which they have undertaken is one of some risk, and I have maturely considered of the means of making a diversion in favour of the allies, which might oblige the enemy to reduce his force in Andalusia, and would expose him to risk and loss in this quarter. But the circumstances, which are detailed in the enclosed copy of a letter to M. Frere, have obliged me to refrain from attempting this operation at present. I have not, however, given up all thoughts of it, and I propose to carry it into execution hereafter, if circumstances will permit.” SECTION 4. “_January 12, 1811._ “My former despatch will have informed your lordship that I was apprehensive that the Spanish troops in Estremadura would not make any serious opposition to the progress which it was my opinion the enemy would attempt to make in that province; but as they had been directed to destroy the bridges on the Guadiana, at Merida and Medellin, and preparations had been ordered for that purpose, and to defend the passage of the Guadiana as long as was practicable, I was in hopes that the enemy would have been delayed at least for some days before he should be allowed to pass that river. But I have been disappointed in that expectation, and the town and bridge of Merida appear to have been given up to an advanced guard of cavalry.” SECTION 5. “_January 19, 1811._ “At the moment when the enemy entered Estremadura from Seville general Ballasteros received an order from the Regency, dated the 21st December last, directing him to proceed with the troops under his command into the Condada de Niebla. The force in Estremadura was thus diminished by one-half, and the remainder are considered insufficient to attempt the relief of the troops in Olivenza.” “The circumstances which I have above related will show your lordship that the military system of the Spanish nation is not much improved, and that it is not very easy to combine or regulate operations with corps so ill organised, in possession of so little intelligence, and upon whose actions so little reliance can be placed. It will scarcely be credited that the first intelligence which general Mendizabel received of the assembly of the enemy’s troops at Seville was from hence; and if any combination was then made, either for retreat or defence, it was rendered useless, or destroyed by the orders from the Regency, to detach general Ballasteros into the Condado de Niebla, which were dated the 21st of December, the very day on which Soult broke up from Cadiz, with a detachment of infantry, and marched to Seville.” SECTION 6. “_February 2, 1811._ “The various events of the war will have shown your lordship that no calculation can be made on the result of any operation in which the Spanish troops are engaged. But if the same number of troops of any other nation (ten thousand) were to be employed on this operation, (the opening the communication with Badajos,) I should have no doubt of their success, or of their ability to prevent the French from attacking Badajos with the forces which they have now employed on this service.” SECTION 7. “_February 9, 1811._ “General Mendizabel has not adhered to the plan which was ordered by the late marquess De la Romana, which provided for the security of the communication with Elvas before the troops should be thrown to the left of the Guadiana. I don’t believe that the strength of the enemy, on either side of the Guadiana, is accurately known, but if they should be in strength on the right of that river, it is to be apprehended that the whole of the troops will be shut up in Badajos, and I have reason to believe that this place is entirely unprovided with provisions, notwithstanding that the siege of it has been expected for the last year.” SECTION 8. “_February 23, 1811._ “Although experience has taught me to place no reliance upon the effect of the exertions of the Spanish troops, notwithstanding the frequent instances of their bravery, I acknowledge that this recent disaster has disappointed and grieved me much. The loss of this army and its probable consequences, the fall of Badajos, have materially altered the situation of the allies in this part of the Peninsula, and it will not be an easy task to place them in the situation in which they were, much less in that in which they would have been, if that misfortune had not occurred. I am concerned to add to this melancholy history, that the Portuguese brigade of cavalry did not behave much better than the other troops. Brigadier-general Madden did every thing in his power to induce them to charge, but in vain.” “The operations of the Guerillas continue throughout the interior; and I have proofs that the political hostility of the people of Spain towards the enemy is increasing rather than diminishing. But I have not yet heard of any measure being adopted to supply the regular funds to pay and support an army, or to raise one.” SECTION 9. “_March 21, 1811._ “It (Campo Mayor) had been given over to the charge of the marquis of Romana, at his request, last year. But, lately, the Spanish garrison had been first weakened and then withdrawn, in a manner not very satisfactory to me, nor consistent with the honourable engagements to defend the place into which the marquis entered when it was delivered over to his charge. I am informed, however, that marshal Bessieres has collected at Zamora about seven thousand men, composed principally of the imperial guard, and of troops taken from all the garrisons in Castile. He thus threatens an attack upon Gallicia, in which province there are, I understand, sixteen thousand men under general Mahi; but, from all I hear, I am apprehensive that that general will make no defence, and that Gallicia will fall into the hands of the enemy.” SECTION 10. “_May 7, 1811._ “Your lordship will have observed, in my recent reports of the state of the Portuguese force, that their numbers are much reduced, and I don’t know what measure to recommend which will have the effect of restoring them. All measures recommended to the existing government in Portugal are either rejected, or are neglected, or are so executed as to be of no use whatever; and the countenance which the prince regent of Portugal has given to the governors of the kingdom, who have uniformly manifested this spirit of opposition to every thing proposed for the increase of the resources of the government and the amelioration of their military system, must tend to aggravate these evils. The radical defect, both in Spain and Portugal, is want of money to carry on the ordinary operations of the government, much more to defray the expenses of such a war as that in which we are engaged.” “I have not received the consent of Castaños and Blake to the plan of co-operation which I proposed for the siege of Badajos; and I have been obliged to write to marshal Beresford to desire him to delay the siege till they will positively promise to act as therein specified, or till I can go to him with a reinforcement from hence.” “Depend upon it that Portugal should be the foundation of all your operations in the Peninsula, of whatever nature they may be, upon which point I have never altered my opinion. If they are to be offensive, and Spain is to be the theatre of them, your commander must be in a situation to be entirely independent of all Spanish authorities; by which means alone he will be enabled to draw some resources from the country and some assistance from the Spanish armies.” SECTION 11. “_May 22, 1811._ “On the night of the 15th instant I received, from marshal sir William Beresford, letters of the 12th and 13th instant, which reported that marshal Soult had broken up from Seville about the 10th, and had advanced towards Estremadura, notwithstanding the reports which had been previously received, that he was busily occupied in strengthening Seville, and the approaches to that city, by works, and that all his measures indicated an intention to remain on the defensive in Andalusia.” SECTION 12. _Letter from sir J. Moore to major-general M’Kenzie, commanding in Portugal._ _Salamanca, 29th November, 1808._ SIR, The armies of Spain, commanded by generals Castaños and Blake, the one in Biscay and the other in Arragon, have been beaten and dispersed. This renders my junction with sir David Baird’s corps impracticable, but if it were, I cannot hope, with the British alone, to withstand the formidable force which France has brought against this country; and there is nothing else now in Spain to make head against it. I have ordered sir David Baird to fall back on Coruña, re-embark, and proceed to the Tagus; I myself, with the corps which marched from Lisbon, mean to retire by Ciudad Rodrigo or Almeida, and, by taking up such positions as offer, endeavour to defend, for a time, the frontier of Portugal, and cover Lisbon. But, looking forward that this cannot be done for any considerable time against superior numbers, it becomes necessary for me to give you this notice, that you may embark the stores of the army, keeping on shore as little as possible that may impede a re-embarkation of the whole army both now with you and that which I am bringing. We shall have great difficulties on the frontier for subsistence; colonel Murray wrote on this subject to colonel Donkin yesterday, that supplies might be sent for us to Abrantes and Coimbra. Some are already at Oporto, and more may be sent. I have desired sir D. Baird, if he has with him a victualler, of small draft of water, to send her there. On the subject of provisions the commissary-general will write more in detail, and I hope you will use your influence with the government of Portugal to secure its aid and assistance. It will be right to consider with the Portuguese officers and engineers what points may be immediately strengthened and are most defensible, and what use you can make of the troops with you to support me in my defence of the frontiers, and I shall be glad to hear from you upon this subject. I cannot yet determine the line I shall take up, but generally it will be Almeida, Guarda, Belmonte, Baracal, Celerico, Viseu. The Portuguese, on their own mountains, can be of much use, and I should hope, at any rate, that they will defend the Tras os Montes. Mr. Kennedy will probably write to Mr. Erskine, who now had better remain at Lisbon; but, if he does not write to him, this, together with colonel Murray’s letter to colonel Donkin, will be sufficient for you and Mr. Erskine to take means for securing to us not only a supply of biscuit and salt provisions, but the supplies of the country for ourselves and horses, &c. In order to alarm as little as possible, it may be said that more troops are expected from England, to join us through Portugal: this will do at first, but gradually the truth will, of course, be known. I am in great want of money, and nothing else will secure the aid of the country. I have the honour to be, &c. J. MOORE. P.S. Elvas should be provisioned. * * * * * No. III. EXTRACTS FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE OF A FIELD-OFFICER OF ENGINEERS, EMPLOYED AT CADIZ. SECTION 1. “_May 7, 1810._ “We have at last broke ground for some works, but I am almost at a loss to explain to you the cause of our delay. The truth is, we left England so ill provided with tools and other requisites for beginning works that till lately it has been positively impossible to commence, even on a small scale, from our own resources and number of men. These facts, with the backwardness of the Spaniards to contribute either stores or workmen to the general cause, has kept us so long inactive. We have now one thousand three hundred men at work, and the Board of Ordnance has supplied us with more tools.” SECTION 2. “_Isla, June 1, 1810._ “We might defy the power of France to expel us by force from hence if all were done that might be done, or even what is projected, but we have only British troops at work on this important position, and our numbers will not permit the progress which the exigency of affairs requires.”--“We have in our respected general (Graham) a confidence which is daily on the increase. He has a mind and temper well adapted to encounter difficulties which less favoured dispositions could not bear. We may possibly maintain our ground. If we do, although our success may have none of the brilliancy of victory, yet his merits, who, by patience, prudence, and self-possession, shall have kept all quiet within our lines, preserved tolerable harmony, and kept an enterprizing enemy off with very inadequate means, should be rewarded by his country’s good opinion, although none but those who have witnessed can fully estimate the value of his exertions. On the whole, our situation may be said to inspire hope, though not security: to animate resistance, though not to promise victory.” SECTION 3. “_June 29, 1810._ “I have been attending a committee of Spanish engineers and artillery officers, to settle some determinate plan for taking up the ground near the town of La Isla; but they will enter into no views which include the destruction of a house or garden. They continue to propose nothing but advanced batteries upon the marsh in front of the town, the evident object of which is to keep the shells of the enemy rather farther from the houses. At a general attack, all this would be lost and carried, by small parties coming in on the flanks and gorges. Instead of deepening the ditches and constructing good redoubts at every seven hundred yards, this is what they propose, although we offer to perform the labour for them. On a barren spot they will agree to our working; but of what service is one redoubt, if unsupported by a collateral defence, and if a general system is not attended to. We have now been here three months, and although they have been constantly urged to construct something at that weak tongue of low land, St. Petri, still nothing of importance is begun upon, nor do I imagine they will agree to any work of strength at that point. I am almost in despair of seeing this place strongly fortified, so as to resist an army of from fifty to one hundred thousand men, which I am convinced it is capable of.”--“We have now one thousand three hundred labourers of the line and eighty carpenters, but, for the latter, the timber we are supplied with from our ally, is so bad that these artificers produce not more than one-fifth or one-sixth what they would be capable of if the materials were good. To judge from their conduct it is impossible to suppose them determined to oppose a vigorous resistance even in La Isla, and I have no idea of there ever being a siege of Cadiz itself.”--“Of our seven subalterns of engineers two are generally ill; we are obliged, therefore, to get assistance from the line. The consequence is that the work is neither so well nor so speedily executed. We ought to have many more (engineers). It is not economy in the governments; and with Lord Wellington they have hardly any with the army.” EXTRACTS FROM THE OFFICIAL ABSTRACT OF MILITARY REPORTS FROM THE BRITISH COMMANDERS AT CADIZ. SECTION 4. _General William Stewart, March 13, 1810._ “The enemy’s force was supposed to be diminished, but no advantage could be taken of it, on account of the inefficient state of the Spanish troops.” _General Graham, March 26, 1810._ “The isle of Leon required for its defence a larger force than had been assigned. Its tenure was, in the then state of the defences, very precarious.” _May, 1810._ “General Blake, appointed to command the Spanish forces, introduced some degree of activity and co-operation, in which the Spaniards had been very deficient.” _October, 1810._ “The progress made by the enemy at the Trocadero assumed a very formidable character; while the Spaniards persisted in their apathy, and neglected to fortify the most vulnerable points of their line.” _General Graham to lord Liverpool, Cadiz, January 2, 1811._ “----As far as the exertions of the British engineers and soldiers under my command have been concerned, I have every reason to be satisfied. I can by no means say the same of the Spaniards, for, besides the reluctance with which some of the most essential measures of the defence were agreed to, our people were not permitted to carry into execution the plan for the intrenchment of the left part of the Cortadura de St. Fernando until after much delay and very unpleasant contests.” * * * * * No. IV. EXTRACTS FROM KING JOSEPH’S CORRESPONDENCE. SECTION 1. _The duke of Santa Fé to the King, Paris, June 20, 1810._ (Translation from the Spanish.) “Will your majesty believe that some politicians of Paris have arrived at saying that in Spain there is preparing a new revolution, very dangerous for the French; and they assert that the Spaniards attached to your majesty will rise against them. Let your majesty consider if ever was heard a more absurd chimera, and how prejudicial it might be to us if it succeeded in gaining any credit. I hope that such an idea will not be believed by any person of judgement, and that it will soon subside, being void of probability.” SECTION 2. _Ministerial letter from the King to the marquis of Almenara._ (Translation from the Spanish.) “_September 21, 1810._ “The impolitic violence of the military governors has attacked not only men, and fields, and animals, but even the most sacred things in the nation, as the memorials and the actions of families, in whose preservation those only are interested to whom they belong, and from which strangers cannot reap the least fruit. In this class are the general archives of the kingdom, called the archives of Simancas, which are found in the province of Valladolid, the governor, Kellerman, has taken possession of them.” “Those archives, from the time of their institution, for centuries past, have contained the treaties of the kings since they were known in Castile; also, ancient manuscripts of the kindred of the princes, the descents and titles of families, pleadings in the tribunals, decisions of the Cortes; in short, all that is publicly interesting to the history of the nation, and privately to individuals.” SECTION 3. _The Spanish secretary of state to the duke of Santa Fé._ “_Madrid, September 12, 1812._ “----Si l’Andalusie n’est pas entièrement pacifiée; si la junte de Cadiz exista encore et si les Anglais y exercent leur fatale influence, on doit l’attribuer en grande partie aux machinations, et aux-trames ourdies par la junta et l’Angleterre au moment où parvint à leur connaissance le décret du 8 Febrier, qui établit des governmens militaire dans la Navarre, la Biscaye, l’Arragon, et la Catalogne. Quelques governeur Françaises ayant traité ces provinces comme si elles étaient absolument détachées de la monarchie.” “----Mais combiens n’est il pas dementi par la conduite de certains governeurs qui paraissent s’obstiner a prolonger l’insurrection d’Espagne plutôt qu’a la soumettre! Car dans plusieurs endroits on ne se contente pas d’exclure toute idée de l’autorité du roi, en faisant administrer la justice au nom de l’empereur mais ce qui est pire, on à exigé que les tribunaux civils de Valladolid et de Palencia, pretassent serment de fidelité et d’obeisance à sa majesté impériale comme si la nation Espagnole n’avoit pas de roi.” SECTION 4. _Memorial from the duke of Santa Fé and marquis of Almenara to the prince of Wagram._ (Translated from the Spanish.) “_Paris, September 16, 1810._ “----The decrees of his majesty the emperor are the same for all the generals. The prince of Esling, who has traversed all the provinces to the borders of Portugal, who appears to be forming immense magazines, and has much greater necessities than the governors of provinces, has applied to the Spanish prefects, who have made the arrangements, and supplied him with even more than he required; and this speaks in favour of the Spanish people, for the prince of Esling receives the blessings of the inhabitants of the provinces through which his troops pass. Such is the effect of good order and humanity amongst a people who know the rules of justice, and that war demands sacrifices, but who will not suffer dilapidations and useless vexations.” SECTION 5. _Intercepted letter of comte de Casa Valencia, counsellor of state, written to his wife, June 18, 1810._ “Il y a six mois que l’on ne nous paie point, et nous perissons. “----Avant hier j’écrivis à Almenara lui peignant ma situation et le pryant de m’accorder quelque argent pour vivre; de me secourir, si non comme ministre, du moins comme ami. Hier je restai trois heures dans son antichambre esperant un reponse, je le vis enfin et elle fut qu’il n’avait rien.” “----Rien que la faim m’attend aujourd’hui.” * * * * * No. V. EXTRACTS OF LETTERS FROM LORD WELLINGTON. SECTION 1. “_Celerico, May 11, 1810._ “----I observe that the minister Don Miguel Forjas considers the inconvenience, on which I had the honour of addressing you, as of ordinary occurrence, and he entertains no doubt that inconveniences of this description will not induce me to desist from making the movements which I might think the defence of the country would require. It frequently happens that an army in operation cannot procure the number of carriages which it requires, either from the unwillingness of the inhabitants to supply them, or from the deficiency of the number of carriages in the country. But it has rarely happened that an army, thus unprovided with carriages, has been obliged to carry on its operations in a country in which there is literally no food, and in which, if there was food, there is no money to purchase it; and, whenever that has been the case, the army has been obliged to withdraw to the magazines which the country had refused or been unable to remove to the army. This is precisely the case of the allied armies in this part of the country; and, however trifling the difficulty may be deemed by the regency and the ministers, I consider a starving army to be so useless in any situation, that I shall certainly not pretend to hold a position or to make any movement in which the food of the troops is not secured. I have no doubt of the ability or of the willingness of the country to do all that can be required of them, if the authority of the government is properly exerted to force individuals to attend to their public duties rather than to their private interests in this time of trial. I have written this same sentiment to the government so frequently, that they must be as tired of reading it as I am of writing it. But if they expect that individuals of the lower orders are to relinquish the pursuit of their private interests and business to serve the public, and mean to punish them for any omission in this important duty, they must begin with the higher classes of society. These must be forced to perform their duty, and no name, however illustrious, and no protection, however powerful, should shield from punishment those who neglect the performance of their duty to the public in these times. Unless these measures are strictly and invariably followed, it is vain to expect any serious or continued exertion in the country, and the regency ought to be aware, from the sentiments of his majesty’s government, which I have communicated to them that the continuance of his majesty’s assistance depends not on the ability or the inclination, but on the actual effectual exertions of the people of Portugal in their own cause. I have thought it proper to trouble you so much at length upon this subject, in consequence of the light manner in which the difficulties which I had stated to exist were noticed by Monsieur de Forjas. I have to mention, however, that, since I wrote to you, although there exist several causes of complaint of different kinds, and that some examples must be made, we have received such assistance as has enabled me to continue till this time in our positions, and I hope to be able to continue as long as may be necessary. I concur entirely in the measure of appointing a special commission to attend the head quarters of the Portuguese army, and I hope that it will be adopted without delay. I enclose a proclamation which I have issued, which I hope will have some effect. It describes nearly the crimes, or rather the omissions, of which the people may be guilty in respect to the transport of the army; these may be as follow:--1st, refusing to supply carts, boats, or beasts of burthen, when required; 2dly, refusing to remove their articles or animals out of the reach of the enemy; 3dly, disobedience of the orders of the magistrates to proceed to and remain at any station with carriages, boats, &c. 4th, desertion from the service, either with or without carriages, &c. 5th, embezzlement of provisions or stores which they may be employed to transport. The crimes or omissions of the inferior magistrates may be classed as follows:--1st, disobedience of the orders of their superiors; 2d, inactivity in the execution of them; 3d, receiving bribes, to excuse certain persons from the execution of requisitions upon them.” SECTION 2. _Lord Wellington to M. Forjas._ _Gouvea, September 6, 1810._ MOST ILLUSTRIOUS SIR, I have received your letter of the 1st of this month, informing me that you had placed before the government of this kingdom my despatch of the 27th of August, announcing the melancholy and unexpected news of the loss of Almeida, and that the government had learned with sorrow that an accident unforeseen had prevented my moving to succour the place, hoping, at the same time, that the depression of the people, caused by such an event, will soon vanish, by the quick and great successes which they expect with certainty from the efforts of the army. I have already made known to the government of the kingdom that the fall of Almeida was unexpected by me, and that I deplored its loss and that of my hopes, considering it likely to depress and afflict the people of this kingdom. It was by no means my intention, however, in that letter, to state whether it had or had not been my intention to have succoured the place, and I now request the permission of the government of the kingdom to say that, much as I wish to remove the impression which this misfortune has justly made on the public, I do not propose to alter the system and plan of operations which have been determined, after the most serious deliberation, as best adequate to further the general cause of the allies, and, consequently, Portugal. I request the government to believe that I am not insensible to the value of their confidence as well as that of the public; as, also, that I am highly interested in removing the anxiety of the public upon the late misfortune; but I should forget my duty to my sovereign, to the prince regent, and to the cause in general, if I should permit public clamour or panic to induce me to change, in the smallest degree, the system and plan of operations which I have adopted, after mature consideration, and which daily experience shows to be the only one likely to produce a good end. (Signed) WELLINGTON. SECTION 3. _Gouvea, September 7, 1810._ ----In order to put an end at once to these miserable intrigues, I beg that you will inform the government that _I will not stay_ in the country, and that I will advise the king’s government to withdraw the assistance which his majesty affords them, if they interfere in any manner with the appointment of marshal Beresford’s staff, for which he is responsible, or with the operations of the army, or with any of the points which, with the original arrangements with marshal Beresford, were referred exclusively to his management. I propose, also, to report to his majesty’s government, and refer to their consideration, what steps ought to be taken, if the Portuguese government refuse or delay to adopt the civil and political arrangements recommended by me, and corresponding with the military operations which I am carrying on. The preparatory measures for the destruction of, or rather rendering useless the mills, were suggested by me long ago, and marshal Beresford did not write to government upon them till I had reminded him a second time of my wishes on the subject. I now beg leave to recommend that these preparatory measures may be adopted not only in the country between the Tagus and the Mondego, laying north of Torres Vedras, as originally proposed, but that they shall be forthwith adopted in all parts of Portugal, and that the magistrates and others may be directed to render useless the mills, upon receiving orders to do so from the military officers. I have already adopted this measure with success in this part of the country, and it must be adopted in others in which it is probable that the enemy may endeavour to penetrate; and it must be obvious to any person who will reflect upon the subject, that it is only consistent with all the other measures which, for the last twelve months, I have recommended to government to impede and make difficult, and if possible prevent, the advance and establishment of the enemy’s force in the country. But it appears that the government have lately discovered that we are all wrong; they have become impatient for the defeat of the enemy, and, in imitation of the Central Junta, call out for a battle and early success. If I had had the power I would have prevented the Spanish armies from attending to this call; and if I had, the cause would now have been safe; and, having the power now in my hands, I will not lose the only chance which remains of saving the cause, by paying the smallest attention to the senseless suggestions of the Portuguese government. I acknowledge that I am much hurt at this change of conduct in the government; and, as I must attribute it to the persons recently introduced into the government, it affords additional reason with me for disapproving of their nomination, and I shall write upon the subject to the prince regent, if I should hear any more of this conduct. I leave you to communicate the whole or any part of this letter that you may think proper to the regency. (Signed) WELLINGTON. SECTION 4. _Rio Mayor, October 6, 1810._ ----You will do me the favour to inform the regency, and above all the principal Souza, that his majesty and the prince regent having entrusted me with the command of their armies, and likewise with the conduct of the military operations, I will not suffer them, or any body else, to interfere with them. That I know best where to station my troops, and where to make a stand against the enemy, and I shall not alter a system formed upon mature consideration, upon any suggestion of theirs. I am responsible for what I do, and they are not; and I recommend to them to look to the measures for which they are responsible, which I long ago recommended to them, viz. to provide for the tranquillity of Lisbon, and for the food of the army and of the people, while the troops will be engaged with the enemy. As for principal Souza, I beg you to tell him, from me, that I have had no satisfaction in transacting the business of this country since he has been a member of the government; that, being embarked in a course of military operations, of which I hope to see the successful termination, I shall continue to carry them on to the end, but that no power on earth shall induce me to remain in the Peninsula for one moment after I shall have obtained his majesty’s leave to resign my charge, if principal Souza is to remain either a member of the government or to continue at Lisbon. Either he must quit the country or I will: and, if I should be obliged to go, I shall take care that the world, or Portugal at least, and the prince regent shall be made acquainted with my reasons. From the letter of the 3d, which I have received from Monsieur Forjas, I had hoped that the government was satisfied with what I had done, and intended to do, and that, instead of endeavouring to render all farther defence fruitless, by disturbing the minds of the populace at Lisbon, they would have done their duty by adopting measures to secure the tranquillity of the town; but I suppose that, like other weak individuals, they add duplicity to their weakness, and that their expressions of approbation, and even gratitude, were intended to convey censure. WELLINGTON. P.S.--All I ask from the Portuguese Regency is tranquillity in the town of Lisbon, and provisions for their own troops while they will be employed in this part of the country. I have but little doubt of success; but, as I have fought a sufficient number of battles to know that the result of any one is not certain, even with the best arrangements, I am anxious that the government should adopt preparatory arrangements, and take out of the enemy’s way those persons and their families who would suffer if they were to fall into their hands. SECTION 5. _Pero Negro, October 28, 1810._ The cattle, and other articles of supply, which the government have been informed have been removed from the island of Lizirias, are still on the island, and most probably the secretary of state, Don M. Forjas, who was at Alhandra yesterday, will have seen them. I shall be glad to hear whether the government propose to take any and what steps to punish the magistrates who have disobeyed their orders and have deceived them by false reports. The officers and soldiers of the militia, absent from their corps, are liable to penalties and punishments, some of a civil, others of a military nature: first, they are liable to a forfeiture of all their personal property, upon information that they are absent from their corps without leave; secondly, they are liable to be transferred to serve as soldiers in the regiments of the line, upon the same information; and, lastly, they are liable to the penalties of desertion inflicted by the military tribunals. The two first are penalties which depend upon the civil magistrate, and I should be very glad to have heard of one instance in which the magistrates of Lisbon, or in which the government had called upon the magistrates at Lisbon to carry into execution the law in either of these respects. I entreat them to call for the names of the officers and soldiers absent without leave from any one of the Lisbon regiments of militia, to disgrace any one or more of the principal officers, in a public manner, for their shameful desertion of their posts in the hour of danger, and to seize and dispose of the whole property of the militia soldiers absent without leave, and to send these men to serve with any of the regiments of the line. I entreat them to adopt these measures without favour or distinction of any individuals in respect to any one regiment, and to execute the laws _bonâ fide_ upon the subject; and I shall be satisfied of their good intentions, and shall believe that they are sincerely desirous of saving the country; but, if we are to go on as we have hitherto, if Great Britain is to give large subsidies and to expend large sums in support of a cause in which those most interested sit by and take no part, and those at the head of the government, with laws and powers to force the people to exertion in the critical circumstances in which the country is placed, are aware of the evil but neglect their duty and omit to put the laws in execution, I must believe their professions to be false, that they look to little dirty popularity instead of to save their country; that they are unfaithful servants to their master, and persons in whom his allies can place no confidence. In respect to the military law, it may be depended upon that it will be carried into execution, and that the day will yet come on which those military persons who have deserted their duty in these critical times will be punished as they deserve. The governors of the kingdom forget the innumerable remonstrances which have been forwarded to them on the defects in the proceedings of courts martial, which, in times of active war, render them and their sentences entirely nugatory. As an additional instance of these defects, I mention that officers of the Olivera regiment of militia, who behaved ill in the action with the enemy at Villa Nova de Fosboa, in the beginning of August last, and a court martial was immediately assembled for this trial, are still, in the end of October, under trial, and the trial will, probably, not be concluded till Christmas. In like manner, the military trial of those deserters of the militia, after assembling officers and soldiers at great inconvenience, for the purpose cannot possibly be concluded till the period will have gone by in which any benefit might be secured from the example of the punishment of any one or number of them. The defect in the administration of the military law has been repeatedly pointed out to the government, and a remedy for the evil has been proposed to them, and has been approved of by the Prince Regent. But they will not adopt it; and it would be much better if there was no law for the government of the army than that the existing laws should continue without being executed. WELLINGTON. SECTION 6. “_October 29, 1810._ “----In answer to lord Wellesley’s queries respecting the Portuguese Regency, my opinion is that the Regency ought to be appointed by the Prince Regent, but during his pleasure; they ought to have full power to act in every possible case, to make appointments to offices, to dismiss from office, to make and alter laws, in short, every power which the prince himself could possess if he were on the spot. They ought to report, in detail, their proceedings on every subject, and their reasons for the adoption of every measure. The prince ought to decline to receive any application from any of his officers or subjects in Portugal not transmitted through the regular channels of the government here, and ought to adopt no measure respecting Portugal not recommended by the Regency. The smaller the number of persons composing the Regency the better; but my opinion is that it is not advisable to remove any of the persons now composing it excepting principal Souza, with whom I neither can nor will have any official intercourse. The patriarch is, in my opinion, a necessary evil. He has acquired a kind of popularity and confidence through the country which would increase if he was removed from office, and he is the kind of man to do much mischief if he was not employed. If we should succeed in removing the principal (which _must_ be done), I think the patriarch will take warning, and will behave better in future. In respect to military operations, there can be no interference on the part of the Regency or any body else. If there is I can no longer be responsible. If our own government choose to interfere themselves, or that the Prince Recent should interfere, they have only to give me their orders in detail, and I will carry them strictly into execution, to the best of my abilities; and I will be responsible for nothing but the execution; but, if I am to be responsible, I must have full discretion and no interference on the part of the Regency or any body else. I should like to see principal Souza’s detailed instructions for his “_embuscados_” on the left bank of the Tagus. If principal Souza does not go to England, or somewhere out of Portugal, the country will be lost. The time we lose in discussing matters which ought to be executed immediately, and in the wrong direction given to the deliberations of the government, is inconceivable. The gentlemen destined for the Alemtejo ought to have been in the province on the evening of the 24th, but, instead of that, three valuable days of fine weather will have been lost because the government do not choose to take part in our arrangements, which, however undeniably beneficial, will not be much liked by those whom it will affect; although it is certain that, sooner or later, these persons must and will be ruined, by leaving behind them all their valuable property, and, as in the case of this part of the country, every thing which can enable the enemy to remain in the country. In answer to Mr. de Forjas’ note of the 22d, enclosed in yours, (without date,) I have to say that I know of no carriages employed by the British army excepting by the commissary-general, and none are detained that I know of. I wish that the Portuguese governors, or its officers, would state the names of those who have detained carriages, contrary to my repeated orders; or the regiment, or where they are stationed; but this they will never do. All that we do with the carriages is to send back sick in them, when there are any. It will not answer to make an engagement that the wheel-carriages from Lisbon shall not come farther than Bucellas, Montachique, &c. many articles required by the army cannot be carried by mules, and the carriages must come on with them here. In many cases the Portuguese troops in particular are ill provided with mules, therefore this must be left to the commissary-general of the army, under a recommendation to him, if possible, not to send the Lisbon wheel-carriages beyond the places above mentioned. I wish, in every case, that a regulation made should be observed, and the makers of regulations should take care always to frame them as that they can be observed, which is the reason of my entering so particularly into this point.” “WELLINGTON.” SECTION 7. “_Pero Negro, October 31, 1810._ “----I am glad that the gentlemen feel my letters, and I hope that they will have the effect of inducing them to take some decided steps as well regarding the provisions in the Alemtejo as the desertion of the militia. The _ordenanza_ artillery now begin to desert from the works although they are fed by us with English rations and taken care of in the same manner as our own troops. Your note, No.--, of 29th, is strictly true in all its parts, the French could not have staid here a week if all the provisions had been removed, and the length of time they can now stay depends upon the quantity remaining of what they have found in places from which there existed means of removing every thing, if the quantity had been ten times greater. They are stopped effectually; in front all the roads are occupied, and they can get nothing from their rear; but all the military arrangements which have been made are useless if they can find subsistence on the ground which they occupy. For what I know to the contrary, they may be able to maintain their position till the whole French army is brought to their assistance. It is heart-breaking to contemplate the chance of failure from such obstinacy and folly!” “WELLINGTON.” SECTION 8. “_Pero Negro, November 1, 1810._ “I have no doubt that the government can produce volumes of papers to prove that they gave orders upon the several subjects to which the enclosures relate, but it would be very desirable if they would state whether any magistrate or other person has been punished for not obeying those orders. The fact is that the government, after the appointment of principal Souza to be a member of the Regency, conceived that the war could be maintained upon the frontier, contrary to the opinion of myself and of every military officer in the country, and, instead of giving positive orders preparatory to the event which was most likely to occur, viz. that the allied army would retire, they spent much valuable time in discussing, with me, the expediency of a measure which was quite impracticable, and omitted to give the orders which were necessary for the evacuation of the country between the Tagus and the Mondego by the inhabitants. Then, when convinced that the army would retire, they first imposed that duty on me, although they must have known that I was ignorant of the names, the nature of the offices, the places of abode of the different magistrates who were to superintend the execution of the measure, and, moreover, I have but one gentleman in my family to give me any assistance in writing the Portuguese language, and they afterwards issued the orders themselves, still making them referable to me, without my knowledge or consent, and still knowing that I had no means whatever of communicating with the country, and they issued them at the very period when the enemy was advancing from Almeida. If I had not been able to stop the enemy at Busaco he must have been in his present situation long before the order could have reached those to whom it was addressed. All this conduct was to be attributed to the same cause, a desire to avoid to adopt a measure which, however beneficial to the real interests of the country, was likely to disturb the habits of indolence and ease of the inhabitants, and to throw the odium of the measure upon me and upon the British government. I avowed, in my proclamation, that I was the author of that measure, and the government might have sheltered themselves under that authority, but the principle of the government has lately been to seek for popularity, and they will not aid in any measure, however beneficial to the real interests of the country, which may be unpopular with the mob of Lisbon. I cannot agree in the justice of the expression of the astonishment by the secretary of state that the measure should have been executed in this part of the country at all. The same measure was carried into complete execution in Upper Beira, notwithstanding that the army was in that province, and the means of transport were required for its service, not a soul remained, and, excepting at Coimbra, to which town my personal authority and influence did not reach, not an article of any description was left behind; and all the mills upon the Coa and Mondego, and their dependent streams, were rendered useless. But there were no discussions there upon the propriety of maintaining the war upon the frontier. The orders were given, and they were obeyed in time, and the enemy suffered accordingly. In this part of the country, notwithstanding the advantage of having a place of security to retire to, notwithstanding the advantage of water-carriage, notwithstanding that the Tagus was fordable in many places at the period when the inhabitants should have passed their property to the left of the river, and fortunately filled at the moment the enemy approached its banks; the inhabitants have fled from their habitations as they would have done under any circumstances, without waiting orders from me or from the government; but they have left behind them every thing which could be useful to the enemy, and could subsist their army, and all the mills untouched; accordingly, the enemy still remain in our front, notwithstanding that their communication is cut off with Spain and with every other military body; and if the provisions which they have found will last, of which I can have no knowledge, they may remain till they will be joined by the whole French army in Spain. I believe that in Santarem and Villa Franca alone, both towns upon the Tagus, and both having the advantage of water-carriage, the enemy found subsistence for their army for a considerable length of time. Thus will appear the difference of a measure adopted in time, and the delay of it till the last moment; and I only wish that the country and the allies may not experience the evil consequences of the ill-fated propensity of the existing Portuguese Regency to seek popularity. In the same manner the other measure since recommended, viz. the removal of the property of the inhabitants of Alemtejo to places of security has been delayed by every means in the power of the government, and has been adopted at last against their inclination: as usual, they commenced a discussion with me upon the expediency of preventing the enemy from crossing the Tagus, they then sent their civil officer to me to receive instructions, and afterwards they conveyed to him an instruction of the ----, to which I propose to draw the attention of his royal highness the Prince Regent and of his majesty’s government. His royal highness and his majesty’s government will then see in what manner the existing Regency are disposed to co-operate with me. The additional order of the 30th of October, marked 5 in the enclosures from Mr. Forjas, shew the sense, which the Regency themselves entertained of the insufficiency of their original instructions to the Disembargador Jacinto Paes de Matos. I may have mistaken the system of defence to be adopted for this country, and principal Souza and other members of the Regency may be better judges of the capacity of the troops and of the operations to be carried on than I am. In this case they should desire his majesty and the Prince Regent to remove me from the command of the army. But they cannot doubt my zeal for the cause in which we are engaged, and they know that not a moment of my time, nor a faculty of my mind, that is not devoted to promote it; and the records of this government will shew what I have done for them and their country. If, therefore, they do not manifest their dissatisfaction and want of confidence in the measures which I adopt by desiring that I should be removed, they are bound, as honest men and faithful servants to their prince, to co-operate with me by all means in their power, and thus should neither thwart them by opposition, or render them nugatory by useless delays and discussions. Till lately I have had the satisfaction of receiving the support and co-operation of the government; and I regret that, his royal highness the Prince Regent should have been induced to make a change which has operated so materially to the detriment of his people and of the allies. In respect to the operations on the left of the Tagus, I was always of opinion that the ordenança would be able to prevent the enemy from sending over any of their plundering parties; and I was unwilling to adopt any measure of greater solidity, from my knowledge, that, as soon as circumstances should render it expedient, on any account, to withdraw the troops, which I should have sent to the left of the Tagus, the ordenança would disperse. The truth is, that, notwithstanding the opinion of some of the government, every Portuguese, into whose hands a firelock is placed, does not become a soldier capable of meeting the enemy. Experience, which the members of the government have not had, has taught me this truth, and in what manner to make use of the different description of troops in this country; and it would be very desirable, if the government would leave, exclusively, to marshal Beresford and me, the adoption of all military arrangements. The conduct of the governor of Setuval is, undoubtedly, the cause of the inconvenience now felt on the left of the Tagus. He brought forward his garrison to the river against orders, and did not reflect, and possibly was not aware as I am, that if they had been attacked in that situation, as they probably would have been, they would have dispersed; and thus Setuval, as well as the regiment, which was to have been its garrison, would have been lost. It was necessary, therefore, at all events, to prevent that misfortune, and to order the troops to retire to Setuval, and the ordenança as usual dispersed, and the government will lose their five hundred stand of new arms, and, if the enemy can cross the Tagus in time, their 3-pounders. These are the consequences of persons interfering in military operations, who have no knowledge of them, or of the nature of the troops which are to carry them on. I am now under the necessity, much to the inconvenience of the army, of sending a detachment to the left of the Tagus.” SECTION 9. “_December 5, 1810._ “All my proceedings have been founded on the following principles: First, That, by my appointment of marshal-general of the Portuguese army with the same powers as those vested in the late duc de la Foéns, I hold the command of that army independent of the local government of Portugal. Secondly, That, by the arrangements made by the governors of the kingdom with the king’s government, when sir William Beresford was asked for by the former to command the Portuguese army, it was settled that the commander-in-chief of the British army should direct the general operations of the combined force. Thirdly, That, supposing that my appointment of marshal-general did not give me the independent control over the operations of the Portuguese army, or that, as commander-in-chief of the British army, I did not possess the power of directing the operation of the whole under the arrangement above referred to; it follows that either the operations of the two armies must have been separated, or the Portuguese government must have had the power of directing the operations of the British army. Fourthly, It never was intended that both armies should be exposed to the certain loss, which would have been the consequence of a disjointed operation; and, undoubtedly, his majesty’s government never intended to give over the British army to the government of the kingdom, to make ducks and drakes of. The government of the kingdom must, in their reply to my letter, either deny the truth of these principles, or they must prove that my charge against them is without foundation, and that they did not delay and omit to adopt various measures, recommended by me and marshal Beresford, calculated to assist and correspond with the operations of the armies, upon the proposition and under the influence of principal Souza, under the pretence of discussing with me the propriety of my military arrangements.” “WELLINGTON.” SECTION 10. “_Cartaxo, January 18, 1811._ “It is necessary that I should draw your attention, and that of the Portuguese government, upon the earliest occasion, to the sentiments which have dropped from the Patriarch, in recent discussions at the meeting of the Regency. It appears that his eminence has expatiated on the inutility of laying fresh burthens on the people, ‘which were evidently for no other purpose than to nourish a war in the heart of the kingdom.’ It must be recollected that these discussions are not those of a popular assembly, they can scarcely be deemed those of a ministerial council, but they are those of persons whom his royal highness the Prince Regent has called to govern his kingdom in the existing crisis of affairs. I have always been in the habit of considering his eminence the Patriarch as one of those in Portugal who are of opinion that all sacrifices are to be made, provided the kingdom could preserve its independence; and, I think it most important that the British government, and the government of the Prince Regent, and the world, should be undeceived, if we have been mistaken hitherto. His eminence objects to the adoption of measures which have for their immediate object to procure funds for the maintenance of his royal highness’s armies, because a war may exist in the heart of the kingdom, but I am apprehensive the Patriarch forgets the manner in which the common enemy first entered this kingdom, in the year 1807, that in which they were expelled from it, having had complete possession of it in 1808, and that they were again in possession of the city of Oporto, and of the two most valuable provinces of the kingdom in 1809, and the mode in which they were expelled from those provinces. He forgets that it was stated to him in the month of February, 1810, in the presence of the Marquis of Olhao, of Don M. Forjas, and of Don Joa Antonio Saltar de Mendoza, and Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, that it was probable the enemy would invade this kingdom with such an army as that it would be necessary to concentrate all our forces to oppose him with any chance of success, and that this concentration could be made with safety in the neighbourhood of the capital only, and that the general plan of the campaign was communicated to him which went to bring the enemy into the heart of the kingdom; and that he expressed before all these persons his high approbation of it. If he recollected these circumstances he would observe that nothing had occurred in this campaign that had not been foreseen and provided for by measures of which he had expressed his approbation, of whose consequences he now disapproves. The Portuguese nation are involved in a war not of aggression, or even defence on their parts, not of alliance, not in consequence of their adherence to any political system, for they abandoned all alliances and all political systems in order to propitiate the enemy. The inhabitants of Portugal made war purely and simply to get rid of the yoke of the tyrant whose government was established in Portugal, and to save their lives and properties; they chose this lot for themselves, principally at the instigation of his eminence the Patriarch, and they called upon his majesty, the ancient ally of Portugal, whose alliance had been relinquished at the requisition of the common enemy, to aid them in the glorious effort which they wished to make, and to restore the independence of their country, and to secure the lives and properties of its inhabitants. I will not state the manner in which his majesty has answered the call, or enumerate the services rendered to this nation by his army; whatever may be the result of the contest, nothing can make me believe that the Portuguese nation will ever forget them; but when a nation has adopted the line of resistance to the tyrant under the circumstances under which it was unanimously adopted by the Portuguese nation in 1808, and has been persevered in, it cannot be believed that they intended to suffer none of the miseries of war, or that their government act inconsistently with their sentiments when they expatiate on ‘the inutility of laying fresh burthens on the people, which were evidently for no other purpose than to nourish a war in the heart of the kingdom.’ The patriarch in particular forgets his old principles, his own actions which have principally involved his country in the contest when he talks of discontinuing it, because, it has again, for the third time, been brought into ‘the heart of the kingdom.’ Although the Patriarch, particularly, and the majority of the existing government approved of the plan which I explained to them in February, 1810, according to which it was probable that this kingdom would be made the seat of war which has since occurred, I admit that his eminence, or any of those members may fairly disapprove of the campaign and of the continuance of the enemy in Portugal. I have pointed out to the Portuguese government, in more than one despatch, the difficulties and risks which attended any attack upon the enemy’s position in this country, and the probable success not only to ourselves but to our allies of our perseverance in the plan which I had adopted, and had hitherto followed so far successfully, as that the allies have literally sustained no loss of any description, and this army is, at this moment, more complete than it was at the opening of the campaign in April last. The inhabitants of one part of the country alone have suffered and are continuing to suffer. But without entering into discussions which I wish to avoid on this occasion, I repeat, that if my counsels had been followed these sufferings would at least have been alleviated, and I observe that is the first time I have heard that the sufferings of a part, and but a small part of any nation have been deemed a reason for refusing to adopt a measure which had for its object the deliverance of the whole. The Patriarch may, however, disapprove of the system I have followed, and I conceive that he is fully justified in desiring his majesty and the Prince Regent to remove me from the command of these armies. This would be a measure consistent with his former conduct in this contest, under the circumstances of my having unfortunately fallen in his opinion, but this measure is entirely distinct from the refusal to concur in laying those burthens upon the people which are necessary to carry on and to secure the object of the war. It must be obvious to his eminence, and to every person acquainted with the real situation of the affairs of Portugal, unless a great effort is made to render the resources more adequate to the necessary expenditure all plans and systems of operation will be alike, for the Portuguese army will be able to carry on none. At this moment although all the corps are concentrated in the neighbourhood of their magazines, with means of transport, easy, by the Tagus, the Portuguese troops are frequently in want of provisions because there is no money to pay the expense of transport, and all the departments of the Portuguese army, including the hospitals, are equally destitute of funds to enable them to defray the necessary expenditure, and to perform their duty. The deficiencies and difficulties have existed ever since I have known the Portuguese army, and it is well known that it must have been disbanded more than once, if it had not been assisted by the provisions, stores, and funds, of the British army. It may likewise occur to his eminence that in proportion as the operations of the armies would be more extended, the expense would increase, and the necessity for providing adequate funds to support it would become more urgent, unless, indeed, the course of their operations should annihilate at one blow both army and expenditure. The objection then to adopt measures to improve the resources of the government, go to decide the question whether the war should be carried on or not in any manner. By desiring his majesty and the Prince Regent to remove me from the command of their armies, his eminence would endeavour to get rid of a person deemed incapable or unwilling to fulfil the duties of his situation. By objecting to improve the resources of the country he betrays an alteration of opinion respecting the contest, and a desire to forfeit its advantages, and to give up the independence of the country, and the security of the lives and properties of the Portuguese nation. In my opinion the Patriarch is in such a situation in this country that he ought to be called upon, on the part of his majesty, to state distinctly what he meant by refusing to concur in the measures which were necessary to insure the funds, to enable this country to carry on the war; at all events, I request that this letter may be communicated to him in the Regency, and that a copy of it may be forwarded to his royal highness the Prince Regent, in order that his royal highness may see that I have given his eminence an opportunity of explaining his motives either by stating his personal objections to me, or the alteration of his opinions, his sentiments, and his wishes, in respect to the independence of his country.” “WELLINGTON.” * * * * * No. VI. EXTRACT FROM A REPORT MADE BY THE DUKE OF DALMATIA TO THE PRINCE OF WAGRAM AND OF NEUFCHATEL. SECTION 1. “_Seville, August 4th, 1810._ “Par une décision de l’Empereur du mois de Fevrier dernier S. M. détermine qu’à compter du 1^{er} Janvier toutes les dépenses d’administration générale du Genie et de l’artillerie seraient au compte du gouvenement Espagnol; aussitôt que j’en fus instruit je sollicitai S. M. C. d’assigner à cet effet une somme; mais je ne pus obtenir que 2,000,000, de réaux (533,000 f.) et encore le Roi entendait il que les payements ne remontassent qu’au mois de Fevrier; cette somme était de beaucoup insuffisante. Je n’ai cessé d’en faire la représentation, ainsi que Monsr. l’Intendant Général; nos demandes n’ont pas été accueillies, et pour couvrir autant que possible la différence j’ai du avoir recours aux recettes extraordinaires faites sans la participation des ministres Espagnols. J’espère que ce moyen réussira, déjà même il a produit quelques sommes. L’état que je mets ci joint fait connaître les recouvremens qui out été opérés sur les fonds de 533,000 f. du crédit mensuel à l’époque du 1^{er} Août lesquels forment la somme de 3,731,000 f. mais indépendamment il y a eu des recettes extraordinaires pour au moins 500,000 f. qui ont reçu la même destination (les dépenses d’administration générale) antérieurement à cette époque. J’avais fait mettre à la disposition de Monsr. l’Intendant Général des Valeurs pour plus d’un million qui devait servir à payer une partie de l’armée. Mr. l’Intendant Général justifie de l’emploi de toutes ces sommes dans ses comptes généraux. Les ministres de S. M. C. n’admettent pas les comptes que je présente; d’abord ils ne veulent pas allouer la somme de 500,000 f. qui a été reportée a l’article des dépenses d’administration générale, s’appuyant sur ce sujet sur la décision du roi qui ne fait remonter ces dépenses que jusqu’au mois de Fevrier, quoique l’empereur ait expressement entendu que le mois de Janvier devait aussi y être compris, ils ne veulent pas non plus reconnaître les recettes extraordinaires, où ils prétendent en précompter le produit sur le crédit mensuel de 533,000 f. Il n’est pas dans mon pouvoir d’admettre leurs motifs, la décision de l’empereur est expresse et tant que je serai dans la situation délicate où je me trouve, mon devoir m’obligera de pourvoir aux besoins du service par tous les moyens praticables. Les recettes qui ont eu lieu en Andalusie ont servi à toutes les dépenses de l’artillerie, du genie, des état majors et de l’administration générale qui sont vraiment immenses, et quoiqu’on ait absolument rien reçu de France ni de Madrid, j’ai en même temps pu faire payer trois mois de solde à l’armée, c’est sans doute bien peu quand il est du 8 à 10 mois d’arrière à la troupe et que l’insuffisance des moyens oblige à augmenter encore cet arrière, mais ne recevant rien je crois qu’il m’était impossible de mieux faire. V. A. en sera elle même convaincue si elle veut s’arrêter un moment sur l’apperçu que je vais lui donner des charges que l’Andalusie supporte. On consomme tous les jours près de 100,000 rations de vivres et 20,000 rations de fourrage; il y a 2000 malades aux hôpitaux. La forteresse de Jaen, le fort de Malaga, l’Alhambra de Grenade, au dessus duquel on a construit un grand camp retranché; tous les châteaux sur les bords de la mer depuis le cap de Gata jusqu’à Fuengirola, le château d’Alcala la Réal, la place de Ronda, les anciens châteaux d’Olbera et de Moron, le château de Belalcazar, le château de Castillo de Los Guardias et plusieurs autres portes sur les frontières de l’Estremadura qu’on a dû aussi occuper. On a pourvu aux dépenses que les travaux devant Cadiz et la construction d’une flottille occasionment. On a établi à Grenade une poudrière et une fabrique d’armes, laquelle jusqu’à présent a peu donné, mais qui par la suite sera très utile. On a rétabli et mis dans une grande activité la fonderie et l’arsenal de Seville où journellement 1500 ouvriers sont employés. Nous manquions de poudre et de projectiles de feu et d’affûts. J’ai fait rétablir deux moulins à poudre à Seville et fait exploiter toutes les nitrières de l’Andalusie, à présent on compte aussi à Seville des projectiles de tous les calibres, jusqu’aux bombes de 12 pouces, tout le vieux fer a été ramassé, on a construit les affûts nécessaires pour l’armement des batteries devant Cadiz. On a fait des réquisitions en souliers et effets d’habillement dont la troupe a profité. J’ai fait lever dans le pays 2000 mules qui out été données à l’artillerie, aux équipages militaires et au Génie. J’ai fait construire et organiser un équipage de 36 pièces de montagnes, dont 12 obusiers, de 12 qui sont portés à dos de mulets et vont être repartis dans tous les corps d’armée. La totalité de ces dépenses ainsi qu’une infinité d’autres dont je ne fais pas l’énumération sont au compte du gouvernement Espagnol, et le pays les supporte indépendamment du crédit mensuel de 533,000 f. et des recettes extraordinaires que je fais opérer lorsqu’il y a possibilité dont l’application a lieu en faveur de l’administration générale de l’armée, du Genie, de l’artillerie, des états majors, des frais de courses et des dépenses secrettes. Ces charges sont immenses et jamais le pays n’aurait pu les supporter si nous n’étions parvenus à mettre de l’ordre et la plus grande régularité dans les dépenses et consommations; mais il serait difficile de les augmenter, peut-être même y aurait il du danger de chercher à le faire; c’est au point que malgré que nous soyons à la récolte il faut déjà penser à faire venir du bled des autres provinces, le produit de l’Andalusie étant insuffisant pour la consommation de ses habitans et celle de l’armée. Cependant S.M.C. et ses ministres qui sont parfaitement instruits de cette situation ont voulu attirer à Madrid les revenues de l’Andalusie: je dis les revenues car leurs demandes dépassaient les recettes; des ordres ont même été expédiés en conséquence aux commissaires Royaux des Préfectures et je me suis trouvé dans l’obligation de m’opposer ouvertement à l’effet de cette mesure dont l’exécution eut non seulement compromis tous les services de l’armée, mais occasionné peut être, des mouvemens séditieux; d’ailleurs il y avait impossibilité de la remplir, à ce sujet j’ai l’honneur de mettre sous les yeux de V.A. extrait d’une lettre que j’eus l’honneur d’écrire au roi le 13 Juillet dernier et copie de celle que j’adressai à Monsieur le marquis d’Almenara, ministre des finances, le 30 du même mois pour répondre à une des siennes, où il me peignait l’état désespérant des finances de S.M.C. Je supplie avec instance V.A. de vouloir bien rendre compte du contenu de ces lettres et du présent rapport à S.M. l’empereur. “J’aurai voulu pour que S.M. fut mieux instruite de tout ce que s’est fait en Andalousie pouvoir entrer dans des détails plus étendus; mais j’ai dû me borner à traiter des points principaux, les détails se trouvent dans ma correspondance, et dans les rapports de Monsieur l’intendant général sur l’administration. Cependant d’après ce que j’ai dit S.M. aura une idée exacte des opérations administratives et autres qui ont eu lieu, ainsi que de l’état de ses troupes et des embarras de ma situation: elle est telle aujourd’hui que je dois supplier avec la plus vive instance S.M. au nom même de son service de daigner la prendre en considération: j’ai des devoirs à remplir dont je sais toute l’étendue, je m’y livre sans réserve mais la responsabilité est trop forte pour que dans la position où je me trouve je puisse la soutenir; en effet j’ai à combattre des prétentions et des intérêts qui sont évidemment en opposition avec ceux de l’armée et par conséquent avec ceux de l’empereur; je suis forcé par mes propres devoirs de m’opposer à l’exécution des divers ordres que le roi donne et faire souvent le contraire. J’ai aussi constamment à lutter contre l’amour propre des chefs militaires, que souvent peuvent différer d’opinion avec moi et naturellement prétendent faire prévaloir leurs idées. Toutes ces considérations me font regarder la tâche qui m’est imposée comme au dessus de mes forces et me portent à désirer que S.M. l’empereur daigne me faire connaître ses intentions ou pourvoir à mon remplacement et mettre à la tête de son armée dans le midi de l’Espagne, un chef plus capable que moi d’en diriger les opérations. Je me permettrai seulement de faire observer à ce sujet que le bien du service de l’empereur commande impérieusement que toutes les troupes qui sont dans le midi de l’Espagne depuis le Tage jusqu’aux deux mers suivent le même système d’opérations, et soyent par conséquent commandés par un seul chef lequel doit être dans la pensée de l’empereur, et avoir ses instructions afin que le cas se présentant où il lui serait fait opposition d’une manière quelconque, il puisse se conduire en conséquence et parvenir au but qui lui sera indiqué; tout autre système retardera la marche des affaires et occasionera inévitablement des désagréments qu’on peut autrement éviter.” “J’ai l’honneur, &c. “(Signé) LE MARÉCHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.” SECTION 2. _Intercepted Letter from marshal Mortier to the emperor, 13th July, 1810._ SIRE, L’état de nullité où je suis depuis que Monsieur le duc de Dalmatie, major général, a pris l’initiative de tous les movemens même le plus minutieux de 5^{eme} corps rend ici ma presence tout à fait inutile, il ne me reste que le chagrin de voir d’excellentes troupes animées du meilleur esprit, disseminées dans toute l’Andalusie et perdant tous les jours de braves gens sans but ni résultat. Dans cet état des choses je prie V.M. de vouloir bien me permettra des me retirer à Burgos pour y attendre des ordres s’il ne juge pas à propos de m’accorder un congé pour retourner en France, congé que reclame ma santé à la suite d’une maladie grave dont je suis à peine convalescent. J’ai l’honneur, &c. &c. LE MARESCHAL DUC DE TRÉVISE. * * * * * No. VII. SECTION 1. _Extract from an intercepted despatch of Massena, dated July 10, 1810._ “Generals Romana and Carrera have gone to lord Wellington’s head-quarters, but the latter has not abandoned his Lines.” _General P. Boyer to S. Swartz, July 8._ “We are covering the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, a place strong by its position and works, and which has been attacked with but little method. The English army is opposite ours, but, for good reasons, does not move: we compose the corps of observation; we are on the look out for them.” SECTION 2. _Extrait du Journal du C. de B. Pelet, premier aide-de-camp du maréchal prince d’Essling._ “1810. 5 Août, à Ciudad Rodrigo.--Le capitaine du génie Boucherat arrive du 2^e corps; il a fait la campagne du Portugal, 1807. Beaucoup causé avec lui sur ce pays. Il a fait la route de Lisbonne à Almeyda avec M. Mairet, et me remet un itinéraire qu’il en a dressé. Il prétend ces routes très difficiles; les rivières très encaissées, et inabordable sur les deux rives du Mondego. Celui-ci a peu d’eau, doit être guéable presque partout; et une partie de ses rives bien difficiles, et en certains endroits il n’y a pas plus de 20 toises de largeur; un seul pont sans chemin (je crois à Fornos;) mais la rivière n’est pas un obstacle aux communications des deux rives. La route d’Idanha, Castelbranco, &c. mauvaise, cependant non absolument impraticable à des pièces légères. Tage, très escarpé, rocailleux, profond jusqu’à Abrantés * * * * Au dessous de cette ville, ou plutôt au confluent du Zézère, le pays devient plat; le lit du Tage s’élargit; il n’y a plus que des collines même éloignées, et tout est très praticable. Les montagnes de Santarem sont des collines peu élevées, praticables, accessibles sur leur sommet, peu propres à être défendues ce qui est commune jusqu’à la mer pour celles de Montachique, qui sont des plateaux arrondis, accessibles à toute les armes; et on pourrait marcher ou manœuvrer dans toutes les directions. J’ai fait copier cet itinéraire.” “1810. 7 Octobre, à Leyria.--Causé avec le général Loison des position de Montachique, ensuite avec le prince.” “1810. 9 Octobre, à Riomajor. On dit que l’ennemi se retranche à Alhandra et Bucella. Les généraux Reynier et Foy ont une carte de Riomajor à Lisbonne; espèce de croquis fait à la hâte, d’après de bons matériaux, mais où la figure est très mauvaise. Je le fais copier.” SECTION 3. _A Monsieur le maréchal prince d’Essling. Sur la hauteur en arrière de Moira, le 26 Septembre, 1810, à 10 heure ½._ J’ai l’honneur de vous adresser une lettre que je viens de recevoir du général Reynier et copie d’une réponse. Vous trouverez également ci-joint une lettre du général Reynier adressée à votre excellence. Je vous renouvelle, prince, l’assurance de ma haute considération. (Signé) LE MARÉCHAL DUC D’ELCHINGEN. _A Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Elchingen. St. Antonio, le 26 Septembre, à 8 heure du matin._ Depuis que le brouillard est dissipé, on apperçoit sur le Serra au delà de St. Antonio, cinq bataillons Portugais qui étoient à mi-côte et qui sont montés sur la crête à mesure que le brouillard s’est éclairci. Il y a de plus au col où passe le chemin, 6 pièces de canon et un détachement d’infantrie Anglaise, et à mi-côte une ligne de tirailleurs partie Anglais qui s’étend depuis le chemin qui monte du village de Carvailha à ma gauche, jusques vis-à-vis des postes du 6^e corps, on voit des troupes sur les sommités qui font face au 6^e corps; mais comme on ne les apperçoit que de revers, ou ne peut juger de leur nombre. On ne peut deviner s’il y a des troupes en arrière, mais d’après l’organisation de la montagne dont les crêtes, sont étroites, et qui a des pentes rapides de chaque côte il ne doit pas avoir de terrain pour y placer de fortes réserves et manœuvres. Cela me parait une arrière garde mais la position est forte, et il faut faire des dispositions pour l’attaquer avec succès. J’attends des nouvelles de ce que l’ennemi fait devant vous pour faire aucun mouvement; si vous jugez que c’est une arrière garde et que vous l’attaquiez, j’attaquerai aussi. Si vous jugez convenable d’attendre les ordres de Monsieur le maréchal prince d’Essling, j’attendrai aussi, comme je pense qu’il viendra vers votre corps, je vous prie de lui faire parvenir le rapport ci-joint avec les vôtres. J’ai l’honneur de vous prier, Monsieur le maréchal, d’agréer l’hommage de mon respect. (Signé) REYNIER. _A Monsieur le Général Reynier. Sur la hauteur en arrière de Moira, le 26 Septembre 1810, à 10 heures ½ du matin._ Je reçois à l’instant, mon cher général, votre lettre de ce jour. Je pense qu’une grande partie de l’armée Anglo-Portugaise a passé la nuit sur la crête des montagnes qui domine toute la vallée de Moira. Un paysan dit qu’il existe de l’autre côté de ces montagnes une plaine assez belle d’une demi-lieue d’étendue, et très garnie d’Oliviers. Depuis ce matin, l’ennemi marche par sa gauche, et semble diriger ses colonnes principales sur la route d’Oporto; cependant il tient encore assez de monde à la droite du parc qui couvre le couvent des minimes nommé Sako; et il montre une 12^{ne} de pièces d’artillerie. Le chemin de Coïmbre passe très près de ce courent. J’ai envoyé ce matin un de mes aides-de-camp au prince d’Essling pour lui dire que nous sommes en présence, et qu’il serait nécessaire qu’il arrivât pour prendre un parti. Si j’avais le commandement, j’attaquerais sans hésiter un seul instant; mais je crois, mon cher général, que vous ne pouvez rien compromettre en vous échelonnant sur la droite de l’ennemi; et en poussant ses avant-postes, car c’est véritablement par ce point qu’il faudrait le forcer à faire sa retraite. Je vous renouvelle, &c. (Signé) LE MARÉCHAL DUC D’ELCHINGEN. SECTION 4. _A Monsieur le maréchal prince d’Essling, Commandant-en-chef, l’armée de Portugal, Paris, le 4 Décembre, 1810._ Monsieur le prince d’Essling, le général Foy que vous avez expédié est arrivé à Paris le 22 Novembre; il a fait connaître à sa majesté et dans le plus grand détail ce qui s’est passé et votre situation. Dès le 4 Novembre le général Gardanne était en avant d’Almeida avec un corps de 6,000 hommes. Le compte d’Erlon avec les divisions Claparede, Conroux, et la division Fournier a dû se trouver à Guarda vers le 20 Novembre. L’Empereur, prince, a vu par les journaux Anglais, que vous aviez établi des ponts sur le Tage et que sous en avez un sur le Zézère, défendu sur les deux rives pas de fortes têtes de pont. Sa majesté pense que vous devez vous retrancher dans la position, que vous occupez devant l’ennemi; qu’Abrantés se trouvant à 800 toises du Tage, vous l’aurez isolé de son pont et bloqué pour en faire le siège. L’Empereur vous recommande d’établir deux ponts sur le Zézère, de défendre ces ponts par des ouvrages considérables, comme ceux du Spitz devant Vienne. Votre ligne d’opérations et de communications devant être établie par la route de Garda, partant du Zézère, passant par Cardigos, suivant la crête des montagnes par Campinha et Belmonte, vous aurez toujours la route de Castelbranco et Salvatera pour faire des vivres. Je viens de donner de nouveau l’ordre déjà réitéré plusieurs fois au duc de Dalmatie, d’envoyer le 5^{me} corps sur le Tage entre Montalveo et Villaflor, pour faire sa jonction avec vous. L’Empereur croit qu’il serait nécessaire de s’emparer d’Alcantara, de fortifier et de consolider tous les ponts sur le Zézère et sur le Tage, d’assurer toutes vos communications en saississant les points favorables que peuvent offrir les localités pour fortifier de petites positions; des châteaux ou maisons qui, occupées par peu de troupes, soient à l’abri des incursions des milices. Vous sentirez, Monsieur le Prince d’Essling, l’avantage de régulariser ainsi la guerre, ce qui vous mettra à même de profiter de la réunion de tous les corps qui vont vous renforcer, pour marcher sur lord Wellington et attaquer la gauche de sa position, soit pour l’obliger à se rembarquer en marchant sur la rive gauche du Tage, ou enfin, si tous ces moyens ne réussissaient pas, vous serez en mesure de rester en position pendant les mois de Décembre et de Janvier, en vous occupant d’organiser vos vivres et de bien établir vos communications avec Madrid et Almeyda. L’armée du centre qui est à Madrid, ayant des détachements sur Placentia, vos communications avec cette capitale ne sont pas difficiles. Deux millions 500 mille francs destinés à la solde de votre armée sont déjà à Valladolid; deux autre millions partent en ce moment de Bayonne. Ainsi votre armée sera dans une bonne situation. Votre position deviendra très embarrassante pour les Anglais, qui, indépendamment d’une consommation énorme d’hommes et d’argent, se trouveront engagés dans une guerre de système, et ayant toujours une immensité de bâtimens à la mer pour leur rembarquement. Il faut donc, Prince, travailler sans cesse à vous fortifier vis-à-vis de la position des ennemis, et pouvoir garder la vôtre avec moins de monde; ce qui rendra une partie de votre armée mobile et vous mettra à même de faire des incursions dans le pays. Vous trouverez ci-joint des moniteurs qui donnent des nouvelles de Portugal, parvenues par la voie de l’Angleterre, datées du 12 Novembre. Le Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel, Major-Général, (Signé) ALEXANDRE. SECTION 5. _A Monsieur le maréchal prince d’Essling, Commandant-en-chef, l’armée de Portugal, Paris, le 22 Décembre, 1810._ Je vous expédie, Prince, le général Foy que l’Empereur a nommé général de division; je vous envoie les moniteurs; vous y verrez que nous apprenons par les nouvelles d’Angleterre qu’au 1 Décembre, vous vous fortifiez dans votre position de Santarem. L’Empereur met la plus grande importance à ce que vous teniez constamment en échec les Anglais, à ce que vous ayez des ponts sur le Zézère et sur le Tage; la saison va devenir bonne pour les opérations militaires, et vous aurez le moyen de harceler les Anglais et de leur faire éprouver journellement des pertes. Par les nouvelles des journaux Anglais, il parait qu’il y a beaucoup de malades dans leur armée, ils ne comptent que -------- 27 à 28 mille hommes sous les armes et un effectif de 31 milles, y compris la cavalerie et l’artillerie. La situation de l’armée Anglaise en Portugal tient Londres dans une angoise continuelle, et l’Empereur regarde comme un grand avantage de tenir les Anglais en échec, de les attirer et de leur faire perdre du monde dans des affaires d’avant-gardes, jusqu’à ce que vous soyez à même de les engager dans une affaire générale. Je réitère encore au maréchal duc de Trévise l’ordre de marcher sur le Tage avec le 5^{me} corps. Le comte d’Erlon, qui réunit son corps à Ciudad-Rodrigo, va profiter de ce moment où les pluies cessent pour reprendre l’offensive et battre tous ces corps de mauvaises troupes que se trouvent sur vos communications et sur vos flancs. Vos ponts étant bien assurés sur le Zézère, la ligne de vos opérations la plus naturelle parait devoir être par la rive gauche de cette rivière. Le général Foy, à qui l’Empereur a parlé longtems vous donnera plus de détails. Le Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel, Major-Général, (Signé) ALEXANDRE. SECTION 6. _A Monsieur le maréchal d’Essling, Commandant-en-chef, l’armée de Portugal, Paris, le 16 Janvier, 1811._ Je vous préviens, Prince, que par décret impérial, en date du 15 de ce mois, l’Empereur a formé une armée du Nord de l’Espagne, dont le commandement est confié à Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie qui va établir son quartier général à Burgos. L’arrondissement de l’armée du Nord de l’Espagne est composé:-- 1º. De la Navarre formant le 3^e governement de l’Espagne. 2º. Des trois provinces de la Biscaye et de la province de Santander, formant le 4^e gouvernement. 3º. De la province des Asturies. 4º. Des provinces de Burgos, Aranda, et Soria, formant le 5^e gouvernement. 5º. Des provinces de Palencia, Valladolid, Leon, Benevente, Toro, et Zamore, formant le 6^e gouvernement. 6º. De la province de Salamanque. Ainsi cet arrondissement comprend tout le pays occupé par les troupes Françaises entre la mer, la France, le Portugal, et les limites de l’arrondissement des armées du centre et de l’Arragon. Cette disposition en centralisant le pourvoir, va donner de l’ensemble et une nouvelle impulsion d’activité aux opérations dans toutes les provinces du Nord de l’Espagne; et Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie mettra un soin particulier à maintenir les communications entre Valladolid, Salamanque, et Almeida. Je vous engage, Prince, à correspondre avec Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie toutes les fois que vous le jugerez utile au service. D’après les ordres de l’Empereur je préviens Monsieur le duc d’Istrie que dans des circonstances imprévues, il doit appuyer l’armée de Portugal et lui porter du secours; je le préviens aussi que le 9^{me} corps d’armée serait sous ses ordres dans le cas où ce corps rentrerait en Espagne. Le Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel, Major-Général, (Signé) ALEXANDRE. SECTION 7. _A Monsieur le maréchal duc de Dalmatie, Paris, le 24 Janvier, 1811._ Vous verrez par le moniteur d’hier, Monsieur le duc de Dalmatie, que les armées de Portugal étaient à la fin de l’année dernière dans la même position. L’Empereur me charge de vous renouveller l’ordre de vous porter au secours du prince d’Essling, qui est toujours à Santarem; il a plusieurs ponts sur le Zézère, et il attend que les eaux soient diminuées pour en jetter un sur le Tage. Il parait certain que le 9^{me} corps a opéré sa jonction avec lui par le Nord, c’est-à-dire, par Almeyda. L’Empereur _espère que le prince d’Essling aura jetté un pont sur le Tage_; ce que lui donnera des vivres. Les corps insurgés de Valence et de Murcie vont se trouver occupé par le corps du général Suchet, aussitôt que Tarragone sera tombé entre nos mains, comme l’a fait la place de Tortose; alors Sa Majesté _pense que le_ 5^{me} corps et une partie _du_ 4^{me} pourront-se porter au _secours_ du prince d’Essling. Le Major Général, (Signé) ALEXANDRE. SECTION 8. _A Monsieur le maréchal prince d’Essling, Paris, le 25 Janvier, 1811._ Je vous préviens, prince, que Monsieur le maréchal duc de Dalmatie s’est mis en marche dans les premiers jours de Janvier avec le 9^{me} corps d’armée, un corps de cavalerie, et un équipage de siège pour se porter sur Badajoz et faire le siège de cette place. Ces troupes ont dû arriver le 10 de ce mois devant Badajoz; je mande au duc de Dalmatie qu’après la prise de cette place il doit se porter sans perdre de tems sur le Tage avec son équipage de siège pour vous donner les moyens d’assiéger et de prendre Abrantés. Le Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel, Major Général, (Signé) ALEXANDRE. SECTION 9. _Au Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel, major-général, Paris, le 6 Fevrier, 1811._ Mon cousin, je pense que vous devez envoyer le moniteur d’aujourd’hui au duc de Dalmatie, au duc de Trévise, au général Belliard, au duc d’Istrie, aux commandans de Cuidad Rodrigo et d’Almeida, aux général Thiébaut, et aux généraux Dorsenne, Cafarelli, et Reille. Ecrivez au duc d’Istrie en lui envoyant le moniteur, pour lui annoncer qu’il y trouvera les dernières nouvelles du Portugal, qui paraissent être du 13; que tout parait prendre une couleur avantageuse; que si Badajoz a été pris dans le courant de Janvier, le duc de _Dalmatie a pû se porter sur le Tage, et faciliter l’établissement du pont au prince d’Essling_; qu’il devient donc très important de faire toutes les dispositions que j’ai ordonnées afin que le général Drouet avec ses deux divisions puisse être tout entier à la disposition du prince d’Essling. Ecrivez en même tems au duc de Dalmatie pour lui faire connaître la situation du duc d’Istrie, et lui réitérer l’ordre _de favoriser le prince d’Essling_ pour son possage du Tage; que j’espère que Badajoz aura été prix dans le courant de Janvier; et que vers le 20 _Janvier sa jonction aura eu lieu sur le Tage_, avec le prince d’Essling; qu’il peut, si cela est nécessaire, retirer des troupes du 4^{me} corps; _qu’enfin tout est sur le Tage._ Sur ce je prie Dieu, mon cousin, qu’il vous ait dans sa sainte et digne garde. (Signé) NAPOLEON. P.S. Je vous renvoie votre lettre au duc d’Istrie, faites le partir. SECTION 10. _A Monsieur le maréchal prince d’Essling, commandant-en-chef l’armée de Portugal, Paris, le 7 Février_, 1811. Je vous envoie, prince, le moniteur du 6, vous y trouverez les dernières nouvelles que nous avons du Portugal; elles vont jusqu’au 13 Janvier, et annoncent _que tout prend une tournure avantageuse. Si Badajoz a été pris dans le courant de Janvier, comme cela est probable, le duc de Dalmatie aura pu faire marcher des troupes sur le Tage, et vous faciliter l’établissement d’un pont._ Je lui en ai donné et je lui en réitère l’ordre; l’Empereur espère que la _jonction des troupes de ce maréchal a eu lieu maintenant avec vous sur le Tage_. Les deux divisions d’infanterie du corps du général Drouet, vout rester entièrement à votre disposition d’après les ordres que je donne à Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, commandant en chef l’armée du nord de l’Espagne; je lui mande de porter son quartier général à Valladolid, d’établir des corps nombreux de cavalerie dans la province de Salamanque afin d’assurer d’une manière journalière sure et rapide la correspondance entre Almeyda, Cuidad Rodrigo et Valladolid, et nous envoyer promptement toutes les nouvelles qui pourront parvenir à l’armée de Portugal. Je lui prescris de tenir à Ciudad Rodrigo, un corps de 6,000 hommes qui puisse éloigner toute espèce de troupe ennemie de Ciudad Rodrigo et d’Almeida, faire même des incursions sur Pinhel et Guarda, empêcher qu’il se forme aucun rassemblement sur les derrières du 9^{me} corps et présenter des dispositions offensives sur cette frontière du Portugal. De réunir une forte brigade de la garde impériale vers Zamora d’où elle sera à portée de soutenir le corps de Ciudad Rodrigo, et où elle se trouvera d’ailleurs dans une position avancée pour agir suivant les circonstances. De réunir une autre forte brigade de la garde à Valladolid où elle sera en mesure d’appuyer la première et de réunir le reste de la garde dans le gouvernement de Burgos. Par ces dispositions, prince, les deux divisions d’infanterie du 9^{me} corps, seront entièrement à votre disposition et avec ce secours vous serez en mesure de tenir longtems la position que vous occupez; de vous porter sur la rive gauche du Tage; ou enfin d’agir comme vous le jugerez convenable sans avoir aucune inquiétude sur le nord de l’Espagne, puisque le duc d’Istrie sera à portée de marcher sur Almeyda et Ciudad Rodrigo et même sur Madrid, si des circonstances inattendues le rendaient nécessaire. Dès que le duc d’Istrie aura fait ses dispositions il enverra un officier au général Drouet, pour l’en instruire et lui faire connoître qu’il peut rester en entier pour vous renforcer. Le général Foy a dû partir vers le 29 Janvier de Ciudad Rodrigo, avec 4 bataillons et 300 hommes de cavalerie pour vous rejoindre. Le Prince de Wagram et d’Neuchâtel, Major Général, (Signé) ALEXANDRE. SECTION 11. _A Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, Guarda, le 29 Mars, 1811._ Mon cher Maréchal, vous aurez appris notre arrivée aux frontières du Portugal, l’armée se trouve dans un pays absolument ruiné; et avec toute ma volonté et la patience de l’armée, je crains de n’y pouvoir tenir 8 jours, et je me verrai forcé de rentrer en Espagne. J’écris à Mr. le Cte. d’Erlon pour qu’il fasse approvisionner Almeyda et Rodrigo; ces deux places n’auraient jamais dû cesser d’avoir pour 3 mois de vivres aux quels ou n’aurait pas dû toucher sous aucun prétexte; et ma surprise est extrême d’apprendre qu’il n’y a que pour 10 jours de vivres à Almeyda. Je lui écris aussi de prendre une position entre Rodrigo et Almeyda, avec ses deux divisions; vous sentez combien il est nécessaire, qu’il se place à portée de marcher au secours d’Almeyda. Si je trouvais des vivres, je ne quitterais pas les frontières d’Espagne et du Portugal, mais comme je vous l’ai dit, je ne vois guère la possibilité d’y rester.... (Signé) LE PRINCE D’ESSLING. SECTION 12. _A Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, Alfayates, le 2 Avril, 1811._ Mon cher Maréchal, le pays que l’armée occupe ne pouvant en aucune manière le faire vivre, je me vois forcé de la faire rentrer en Espagne. Voici les cantonnements que je lui ai assignés et l’itinéraire de marche de chaque corps d’armée.... (Signé) LE PRINCE D’ESSLING. SECTION 13. _A Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, Rodrigo, le 5 Avril, 1811._ Mon cher Maréchal, je suis arrivé avec toute l’armée sur Ciudad Rodrigo, mes troupes depuis plusieurs jours sont sans pain; et je suis obligé de faire prendre sur les approvisionnments de Rodrigo 200 mille rations de biscuit, que je vous prie d’ordonner de remplacer avec les ressources qui peuvent se trouver à Salamanque et Valladolid. Nous partirons ensuite pour les cantonnements que j’ai eu soin de vous faire connaître. J’espère que vous aurez bien voulu faire donner des ordres aux intendans de province, d’y faire préparer des vivres, seul moyen d’y faire maintenir l’ordre. Je compte séjourner 3 à 4 jours ici pour voir si l’ennemi ne s’approcherait pas des places. (Signé) LE PRINCE D’ESSLING. SECTION 14. _A Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, Salamanque, le 15 Avril, 1811._ Mon cher Maréchal, ma position devient toujours plus allarmante; les places appellent des secours; je ne reçois pas de réponses de vous à aucune de mes demandes; et si cet état de chose se prolonge, je serai forcé de faire prendre à l’armée des cantonnements où elle puisse vivre, et d’abandonner les places que je ne suis pas chargé de défendre et encore bien moins d’approvisionner, mes troupes manquant absolument de vivres. (Signé) LE PRINCE D’ESSLING. SECTION 15. _A Monsieur le maréchal due d’Istrie, Paris, le 3 Avril, 1811._ Le general Foy est arrivé, Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, ainsi que les deux aides-de-camp du maréchal prince d’Essling, le capitaine Porcher, et le chef d’escadron Pelet. Il parait que le prince d’Essling avec son corps d’armée prend position à Guarda, Belmonte, et Alfuyates. Ainsi il protège Ciudad Rodrigo, Almeyda, Madrid et l’Andalousie. Ses communications doivent s’établir facilement avec l’armée du midi par Alcantara et Badajoz. Si ce qu’on ne prévoit pas, le prince d’Essling étoit vivement attaqué par l’armée Anglaise, l’empereur pense que _vous pourriez le soutenir avec une 15ne. de milles hommes_. L’armée du centre doit avoir poussé un corps sur Alcantara. L’armée du midi sera renforcée par ce que vous aurez déjà fait partir, et d’après le prince d’Essling, elle va se trouver assez forte pour ne rien craindre de l’ennemi.... (Le reste est sans intérêt.) Le Major Général, (Signé) ALEXANDRE. SECTION 16. _A Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, Salamanque, le 17 Avril, 1811._ MON CHER MARECHAL, Le général Reynaud, commandant supérieur à Rodrigo, ainsi que le général Marchand, qui est avec sa division autour de cette place, me rendent compte que 2 divisions Portugaises avec une division Anglaise ont pris position aux environs d’Almeyda. Quoique cette place ait encore des vivres pour une 20^{ne} de jours, et que les Anglais et les Portugais meurent de faim dans leurs positions, il faut faire des dispositions pour les chasser au delà de la Coa, et pour ravitailler cette place. Je vous propose en conséquence, mon cher maréchal, de mettre à ma disposition 12 à 1500 chevaux, ceux de l’armée de Portugal n’étant en état de rendre aucun service; je vous demande de plus une division d’infanterie pour placer en réserve. Vers le 24 ou le 29, ces forces se joindront aux 6 divisions que je compte réunir de l’armée de Portugal pour attaquer l’ennemi, s’il nous attend dans ses positions et le chasser au delà de la Coa. Il est impossible de faire faire le moindre mouvement à toutes ces troupes, du moins à celles de l’armée de Portugal pour attaquer l’ennemi; si on ne peut leur faire distribuer pour 10 jours de biscuit et avoir de l’eau de vie à la suite de l’armée. Je vous demande encore 15 à 18 pièces d’artillerie bien attelées, celles à mes ordres étant hors d’état de marcher. Avec ces moyens, nul doute que l’ennemi ne soit déposté et chassé hors des frontières de l’Espagne et au delà de la Coa. Mon cher maréchal, je vis ici au jour le jour; je suis sans le sol, vous pouvez tout; il faut donc nous envoyer du biscuit, de l’eau de vie, du pain et de l’orge. Ce sera avec ces moyens que nous pourrons manœuvrer. Il ne faut pas perdre un instant. Il est très urgent de marcher au secours d’Almeyda. C’est à vous à donner vos ordres; et vous me trouverez porté de la meilleure volonté à faire tout ce qui sera convenable aux intérêts de S. M. (Signé) LE PRINCE D’ESSLING. SECTION 17. _A Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, Salamanque, le 22 Avril, 1811._ MON CHER MARECHAL, J’ai reçu votre dépêche. Toutes vos promesses de vous réunir à moi s’évanouissent donc dans le moment où j’en ai besoin, ravitailler Almeida et Rodrigo est la 1^{re} opération et la seule qui peut nous donner la faculté de rendre l’armée de Portugal disponible, lorsqu’on n’aura plus rien à craindre sur le sort des places. En y jettant pour 3 à 4 mois de vivres, on peut ensuite établir plusieurs colonnes mobiles; on peut envoyer des troupes à Avila et Ségovie; on peut au besoin appuyer le mouvement de l’armée d’Andalousie. Mais ne serait il pas honteux de laisser rendre une place faute de vivres, en présence de deux maréchaux de l’Empire? Je vous ai déjà prévenu de la nullité de ma cavalerie, de l’impossibilité où se trouvent les chevaux d’artillerie de rendre aucun service. Vous savez aussi que je dois envoyer le 9^{me} corps en Andalousie; je voulais aussi le faire concourir avant son départ au ravitaillement des places. Pouvez vous, mon cher maréchal, balancer un seul instant à m’envoyer de la cavalerie et des attelages d’artillerie? Si vous voulez garder votre matériel? Ne vous ai-je pas prévenu que je commencerais mon mouvement le 26? et vous paraissez attendre le (22) une seconde demande de ma part. Vous le savez aussi bien que moi, perdre un ou deux jours à la guerre est beaucoup; et ce délai peut avoir des suites fâcheuses qu’on ne répare plus. Quand je vous ai dit que je ne réunerais que 6 divisions; c’était pour ne pas tout dégarnir des points importans occupés par les corps d’armée; mais de la cavalerie et de l’artillerie sont un secours dont je ne puis me passer. Je vous prie en conséquence, mon cher maréchal, de me faire arriver de la cavalerie et des attelages d’artillerie à marches forcées. Réflechissez qu’une fois les places réapprovisionnées, je pourrai disposer des ⅔ de l’armée, et que cette opération passe avant tout. En m’offrant de nous envoyer les attelages pour 16 pièces, vous aurez bien entendu, sans doute, mon cher maréchal y comprendre ceux nécessaires pour les caissons des pièces. (Signé.) LE PRINCE D’ESSLING. SECTION 18. _A Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, Salamanque, le 24 Avril, 1811._ MON CHER MARECHAL, Je me rends demain à Ciudad Rodrigo, où toute l’armée sera réunie le 26. Le ravitaillement de la place d’Almeida est du plus haut intérêt pour les armes de S. M; et il eut été bien à désirer que les secours que j’ai en l’honneur de vous demander nous eussent été envoyés. L’ennemi parait avoir de 20 à 29 mille hommes autour de cette place. Vous dire que je n’aurai en cavalerie que 15 à 1800 hommes, et seulement 20 pièces de canon pour toute l’armée, c’est vous faire sentir, mon cher maréchal, combien votre secours m’eut été nécessaire au moins sous deux rapports, pour votre armée même et pour la tranquillité du nord de l’Espagne. Je n’ai pas ménagé mes instances auprès de vous. Si mes efforts n’étaient pas heureux; votre dévouement pour le service de l’Empereur, vous ferait certainement regretter de ne pas les avoir secondés avec les moyens que vous m’aviez fait espérer, avant que j’en eusse besoin. (Signé.) LE PRINCE D’ESSLING. SECTION 19. _A Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, Rodrigo, le 29 Avril, 1811._ MON CHER MARECHAL, Vos lettres sont inconcevables. Dans celle du 20, vous me dites que vous ne pouvez me donner aucun secours. Par celle du 22, vous me dites que le 25 ou le 26 vous me joindrez partout où je serai, et que la tête de votre colonne arrivera à Salamanque le 26. Par celle que je reçois à l’instant, vous me dites, que votre cavalerie et votre artillerie se trouvent encore le 27 à une journée en arrière de Salamanque; et vous concluez que mon mouvement doit être fini; et vous me témoignez vos regrèts de n’avoir pû y coopérer. Convenez, mon cher maréchal, que si l’armée de Portugal recevait un échec, vous auriez bien des reproches à vous faire. Je vous ai demandé de l’artillerie et des attelages et encore plus positivement de la cavalerie; vous avez sous différens prétextes éludé ma demande. Toutes les troupes qui sont en Espagne, sont de la même famille. Vous êtes, jusques à ce qu’il y ait de nouveaux ordres, chargé de la défense et de l’approvisionnement des places d’Almeida et de Rodrigo. Je n’aurais pas mieux demandé que d’employer l’armée de Portugal sous me ordres à défendre ces places, à marcher au secours de l’armée du midi; mais comment puis-je le faire sans vivres? Je compte faire mon mouvement demain matin. J’ignore quelle pourra être l’issue de ce mouvement; si ma lettre vous arrive dans la journée de demain, votre cavalerie et votre artillerie pourraient toujours se mettre en mouvement dans la nuit pour arriver après demain 1er Mai à Cabrillas. Je vous prie de faire filer sans s’arrêter le biscuit, la farine, le grain que vous n’aurez pas manqué de réunir à la suite de vos troupes. Il est instant que ces ressources comme beaucoup d’autres, arrivent à Rodrigo; cette place n’aura pas pour 15 jours de vivres. A mon départ d’ici, il faudra que des convois considerables y soient envoyés. (Signé) LE PRINCE D’ESSLING. SECTION 20. _A Monsieur le maréchal duc de Raguse, Paris, le 20 Avril, 1811._ MONSIEUR LE DUC DE RAGUSE, Vous trouverez ci-joint l’ordre de l’Empereur qui vous donne le commandement de l’armée de Portugal. Je donne l’ordre au maréchal prince d’Essling de vous remettre le commandement de cette armée. Saisissez les rènes d’une main ferme; faites dans l’armée les changemens qui deviendraient nécessaires. L’intention de l’Empereur est que le duc d’Abrantes et le général Reynier restent sous vos ordres. S. M. compte assez sur le dévouement que lui portent ses généraux, pour être persuadé qu’ils vous seconderont de tous leurs moyens. L’Empereur ordonne, Monsieur le duc de Raguse, que le prince d’Essling en quittant l’armée n’emmène avec lui que son fils et un de ses aides-de-camp. Mais son chef d’état-major, le général Fririon, le colonel Pelet, ses autre aides-de-camp, tous le officiers de son état-major doivent rester avec vous. Toutefois, Monsieur le duc, je vous le répète S. M. met en vous une confiance entière. Le Major Général, &c. (Signé.) ALEXANDRE. * * * * * No. VIII. _Les Officiers Français Prisonniers de Guerre, détenus à la Maison, Rue S. Jean, à Monsieur le Général Trant, Gouverneur de le Ville et Province d’Oporto._ MONSIEUR LE GENERAL, Chacun des officiers Français prisonniers de guerre, détenus à la maison rue S. Jean, pénétré des obligations qu’il vous a désirerait vous offrir individuellement l’expression de sa reconnoissance. C’est nous que ces messieurs ont choisi pour être auprès de vous leur organes et nous sommes d’autant plus flattés de cette commission agréable qu’il n’y en a pas un parmi nous qui dans son particulier n’ait reçu de vous des services importants. Nous osons nous flatter que vous agréerez favorablement ce foible témoignage de notre gratitude et les sincères remerciments que nous venons vous présenter pour toutes les bontés que vous avez eues pour nous. Ce n’est pas sans un vif regret que nous envisageons le moment de votre départ, mais ce que déjà vous avez fait pour nous, nous fait espérer que votre solicitude s’étendra au delà de votre séjour et que pendant votre absence nous continuerons à en éprouver les effets. Ce n’est pas, monsieur le général, d’après l’étendue de notre lettre qu’il faudra mesurer celle de notre reconnoissance; nous sommes mieux en état de sentir que d’éxprimer ce que nous vous devons et lorsque des circonstances plus heureuses nous rameneront vers notre patrie, nous nous ferons un devoir et une satisfaction de faire connaître la manière dont nous avons été traités et les peines que vous vous êtes donnés pour adoucir notre sort. Nous nous recommandons à la continuation de votre bienveillance, et nous vous prions d’agréer l’assurance de gratitude et de haute considération avec lesquelles nous avons l’honneur d’être, monsieur le général, vos très humbles et très obeissants serviteurs, Au nom des officiers Français, prisonniers de guerre. FALLOT, Docteur médecin des armées Françaises attaché au grand quartier général de l’armée de Portugal. Le colonel sous inspecteur au revues des troupes Françaises, CATELOT. H. DELAHAYE, C^{om.} de la marine. * * * * * No. IX. SECTION 1. _Letter from lieut.-general Graham to the right honourable Henry Wellesley, Isla de Leon, 24th March, 1811._ SIR, You will do justice to my reluctance to enter into any controversy for the purpose of counteracting the effects of that obloquy which you yourself and many others assured me my conduct was exposed to by the reports circulated, at Cadiz, relative to the issue of the late expedition. But a copy of a printed statement of general La Peña having been shewn to me, which, by implication at least, leaves the blame of the failure of the most brilliant prospects on me, it becomes indispensably necessary that I should take up my pen in self-defence. Having already sent you a copy of my despatch to the earl of Liverpool, with a report of the action, I will not trouble you with a detail of the first movements of the army, nor with any other observation relative to them, than that the troops suffered much unnecessary fatigue by marching in the night, and without good guides. Considering the nature of the service we were engaged in, I was most anxious that the army should not come into contest with the enemy in an exhausted state, nor be exposed to the attack of the enemy but when it was well collected; and, in consequence of representations to this effect, I understood that the march of the afternoon of the 4th was to be a short one, to take up for the night a position near Conil; to prepare which, staff-officers, of both nations, were sent forward with a proper escort. The march was, nevertheless, continued through the night, with those frequent and harassing halts which the necessity of groping for the way occasioned. When the British division began its march from the position of Barrosa to that of Bermeja, _I left the general on the Barrosa height, nor did I know of his intentions of quitting it_; and, when I ordered the division to countermarch in the wood, I did so to support the troops left for its defence, and believing the general to be there in person. In this belief I sent no report of the attack, which was made so near the spot where the general was supposed to be, and, though confident in the bravery of the British troops, I was not less so in the support I should receive from the Spanish army. The distance, however, to Bermeja is trifling, and no orders were given from head-quarters for the movement of any corps of the Spanish army to support the British division, to prevent its defeat in this unequal contest, or to profit of the success earned at so heavy expense. The voluntary zeal of the two small battalions, (Walloon guards and Ciudad Real,) which had been detached from my division, brought them alone back from the wood; but, notwithstanding their utmost efforts, they could only come at the close of the action. Had the whole body of the Spanish cavalry, with the horse-artillery, been rapidly sent by the sea-beach to form in the plain, and to envelop the enemy’s left; had the greatest part of the infantry been marched through the pine-wood, in our rear, to turn his right, what success might have been expected from such decisive movements? The enemy must either have retired instantly, and without occasioning any serious loss to the British division, or he would have exposed himself to absolute destruction, his cavalry greatly outnumbered, his artillery lost, his columns mixed and in confusion; a general dispersion would have been the inevitable consequence of a close pursuit; our wearied men would have found spirits to go on and would have done so trusting to finding refreshments and repose at Chiclana. This moment was lost. Within a quarter of an hour’s ride of the scene of action, the general remained ignorant of what was passing, _and nothing was done!_ Let not, then, this action of Barrosa form any part of the general result of the transactions of the day; it was an accidental feature; it was the result of no combination, it was equally unseen and unheeded by the Spanish staff; the British division, left alone, suffered the loss of more than one-fourth of its number, and became unfit for future exertion. Need I say more to justify my determination of declining any further co-operation in the field towards the prosecution of the object of the expedition? I am, however, free to confess that, having thus placed myself and the British division under the direction of the Spanish commander-in-chief in the field, (contrary to my instructions,) I should not have thought myself justified to my king and country to risk the absolute destruction of this division in a second trial. But I have right to claim credit for what would have been my conduct from what it was; and I will ask if it can be doubted, after my zealous co-operation throughout, and the ready assistance afforded to the troops left on Barrosa height, that the same anxiety for the success of the cause would not have secured to the Spanish army the utmost efforts of the British division during the whole of the enterprise, _had we been supported as we had a right to expect_? There is not a man in the division who would not gladly have relinquished his claim to glory, acquired by the action of Barrosa, to have shared, with the Spaniards, the ultimate success that was within our grasp as it were. The people of Spain, the brave and persevering people, are universally esteemed, respected, and admired by all who value liberty and independence; the hearts and hands of British soldiers will ever be with them; the cause of Spain is felt by all to be a common one. I conclude with mentioning that the only request expressed to me, at head-quarters, on the morning of the 6th, on knowing of my intention to send the British troops across the river St. Petri, was _that the opportunity of withdrawing the Spanish troops, during the night, was lost_; and on my observing that, after such a defeat, there was no risk of attack from an enemy, a very contrary opinion was maintained. In point of fact, no enemy ever appeared during several days employed in bringing off the wounded and burying the dead. It may be proper to remark on the report published relative to the enemy’s number at St. Petri, (4500 men of Villat’s division,) that, by the concurrent testimony of all the French officers here, general Villat’s division had charge of the whole line,--what, then, must be the strength of that division to have afforded 4500 men to St. Petri alone? In order to establish, by authentic documents, facts which may have been disputed, and to elucidate others, I enclose, by way of appendix, the reports of various officers of this division. I have the honour to be, &c. &c. &c. (Signed) THO^S. GRAHAM, Lt.-General. P.S. I must add this postscript distinctly to deny my having spoken, at head-quarters, in the evening of the 5th, of sending for more troops, or for provisions from the Isla. My visit was a very short one, of mere ceremony. I may have asked if the Spanish troops expected were arrived. This error must have arisen from the difficulty of conversing in a foreign language. With this I send you a sketch of the ground, &c. of the action of Barrosa; by which it will be seen how impossible, according to my judgement, it would be for an enemy to expose his left flank, by making a direct attack through the wood on the Barmeja position, while that of Barrosa was occupied in force by the allied army. SECTION 2. _Adjutant-general’s state of the troops assembled at Tarifa, under the command of the lieut.-general Graham, 25th Feb. 1810._ Number of Designations. bayonets. Commanders. Two squadrons of 2d } ” Major Busche. German Hussars. } Detachment of artillery. Major Duncan. 10 guns Detachment of engineers 47 Captain Birch. Brigade of guards, reinforced } by a detachment } 1221 Brigadier-gen. Dilke. of the 2d battalion 95th } rifles } 1st battalion 28th foot; } 2d battalion 67th; 2d } battalion 87th; reinforced } 1764 Colonel Wheatley. with 2 companies } of the 20th Portuguese } Flank battalion composed } of detachments of the } 3d battalion 95th rifles } 594 Lt.-col. A. Barnard, and two companies of } 95th regt. the 47th foot } Two companies of 2d battalion } 9th regt.; two } companies of 1st battalion } 475 Lt.-col. Brown, 28th regt. 28th regt.; two } companies of 2d battalion } 82 regt. } One Company of the royal } 33 Lieutenant Reid. staff corps } ---- Total number of bayonets 4114 The hussars were about 180 ---- Total of sabres and bayonets 4294, with 10 guns. SECTION 3. _Extract from a letter of general Frederick Ponsonby._ “I proceeded rapidly towards the entrance of the wood, found the Germans, and conducted them along the right flank of our little army. We came in contact with the French dragoons, whom we found nearly abreast of our front line and about three hundred yards apart from it on our right flank, our line had just halted and the firing was gradually decreasing at the time we charged. I do not imagine the French dragoons much exceeded us in number, they behaved well, but if we had had half a dozen stout squadrons the mass of beaten infantry would not have returned to their camp.” SECTION 4.--STATE OF THE FIRST CORPS. (Part 1 of 3) [A] Genereaux de Brigade. [B] Colonels. [C] Chefs de Bt. ou Escadron. [D] Capitaines. [E] Lieutenants. [F] Sous Lieutenants. [G] Sous Officiers et Soldats. [H] Total. (Part 1 of 3) ----------------------------+-----------------------------------++ | || | Tués. || | || +---+---+---+---+---+---+-----+-----++ | | | | | | | | || |[A]|[B]|[C]|[D]|[E]|[F]| [G] | [H] || | | | | | | | | || ----------------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+-----+-----++ St. Petri, 4 {95 de Ligne| | | | | | | 3 | 3 || {Etat Major | | | | | | | | || { {Etat Major | 1 | 1 | | | | | | 2 || { {9 Infr. Ligne| | | | | 1 | | 14 | 15 || { 1 {24 Ligne | | | | 1 | 1 | | 33 | 35 || { {96 Ligne | | 1 | | 1 | | | 39 | 41 || { {1 Br. Elite | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 2 || { {Etat Major | | | | | | | | || { {45 Ligne | | | | 1 | | | 7 | 8 || 5 Mars{ 2 {8 Ligne | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 63 | 74 || { {54 Ligne | | | 1 | 2 | | | 26 | 29 || { {Etat Major | | | | | | | | || { {27 Infr. Ligne| | | | | 1 | | 20 | 21 || { 3 {94 Ligne | | | | | 1 | | 9 | 10 || { {95 Ligne | | | | | | | 1 | 1 || { {1 Regt. | | | | | | | 2 | 2 || {Dragoons {2 Regt. | | | | | | | 3 | 3 || { {Artillerie | | | | | | | 16 | 16 || Puerta St. Maria {45 Ligne | | | | | | | 10 | 10 || {Artillerie| | | | 1 | | | | 1 || Medina, 9 Mars, {94 | | | | | | | 4 | 4 || 8 Dr. {95 | | | | | | | 4 | 4 || +---+---+---+---+---+---+-----+-----++ | 1 | 3 | 3 | 9 | 6 | 3 | 255 | 281 || ----------------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+-----+-----++ (Part 2 of 3) ----------------------------+----------------------------------------++ | || | Blessés. || | || +---+---+---+----+----+----+------+------++ | | | | | | | | || |[A]|[B]|[C]| [D]| [E]| [F]| [G] | [H] || | | | | | | | | || ----------------------------+---+---+---+----+----+----+------+------++ St. Petri, 4 {95 de Ligne| | 2 | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 32 | 37 || {Etat Major | | 2 | | 1 | | | | 3 || { {Etat Major | | | | | | | | || { {9 Infr. Ligne| | 1 | | 1 | 2 | | 70 | 74 || { 1 {24 Ligne | | 1 | | 4 | 2 | | 214 | 221 || { {96 Ligne | | | 1 | 3 | 2 | | 199 | 205 || { {1 Br. Elite | | | | 2 | | 3 | 136 | 141 || { {Etat Major | | | 1 | | 1 | | | 2 || { {45 Ligne | | | | | | | 44 | 44 || 5 Mars{ 2 {8 Ligne | | | | 2 | 6 | 3 | 622 | 633 || { {54 Ligne | | | | 4 | 5 | 1 | 284 | 294 || { {Etat Major | 1 | | | | | | | 1 || { {27 Infr. Ligne| | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 150 | 157 || { 3 {94 Ligne | | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 49 | 52 || { {95 Ligne | | | | | | | 32 | 32 || { {1 Regt. | | | | 3 | 1 | 2 | 30 | 36 || {Dragoons {2 Regt. | | | | | | | 12 | 12 || { {Artillerie | | | | | 3 | | 31 | 34 || Puerta St. Maria {45 Ligne | | | | | | | 43 | 43 || {Artillerie| | | | | | | 2 | 2 || Medina, 9 Mars, {94 | | | | | | | 29 | 29 || 8 Dr. {95 | | | 1 | | | | 18 | 19 || +---+---+---+----+----+----+------+------++ | 1 | 3 | 5 | 23 | 27 | 12 | 1997 | 2008 || ----------------------------+---+---+---+----+----+----+------+------++ (Part 3 of 3) ----------------------------+---------------------------++------- | || | Restes sus les Champ || | grièvement Blessés || +---+---+---+---+-----+-----++------- | | | | | | || |[A]|[B]|[D]|[F]| [G] | [H] || Total | | | | | | ||General ----------------------------+---+---+---+---+-----+-----++------- St. Petri, 4 {95 de Ligne| | | | | 5 | 5 || 42 {Etat Major | | | | | | || 3 { {Etat Major | 1 | | | | | 1 || 3 { {9 Infr. Ligne| | | | 1 | 18 | 19 || 108 { 1 {24 Ligne | | | 2 | 1 | 21 | 24 || 280 { {96 Ligne | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 || 249 { {1 Br. Elite | | | 1 | | 59 | 60 || 203 { {Etat Major | | | | | | || 2 { {45 Ligne | | | | | 3 | 3 || 55 5 Mars{ 2 {8 Ligne | | | | | 19 | 19 || 726 { {54 Ligne | | | | | | || 323 { {Etat Major | | | | | | || 1 { {27 Infr. Ligne| | | | 2 | 21 | 23 || 201 { 3 {94 Ligne | | | | | | || 62 { {95 Ligne | | | | | 1 | 1 || 34 { {1 Regt. | | | 1 | | 3 | 4 || 42 {Dragoons {2 Regt. | | | | | 4 | 4 || 19 { {Artillerie | | 1 | | | | 1 || 51 Puerta St. Maria {45 Ligne | | | | 1 | 27 | 28 || 81 {Artillerie| | | | | 6 | 6 || 9 Medina, 9 Mars, {94 | | | | | | || 33 8 Dr. {95 | | | | | 1 | 1 || 24 +---+---+---+---+-----+-----++------- | 1 | 1 | 5 | 6 | 180 | 202 || 2551 ----------------------------+---+---+---+---+-----+-----++------- Certified copy by Count GAZAN. Total 2551 _Note by the Editor._-- Deduct affair of the 4th about Santa Petri 45 ” ” at Puerta Santa Maria. 81 ” ” at Medina 64 ---- 190 ---- Remains loss at Barrosa 2361 SECTION 5. _Intercepted papers of colonel Lejeune._ ORDRE. Il est ordonné à Monsieur le colonel baron le Jeune, mon A. D. C. de partir sur le champ en poste pour porter les ordres ci-joints et parcourir l’Andalousie et l’Estramadure. Monsieur le colonel le Jeune se rendra d’abord à Grenade auprès de Monsieur le général Sebastiani, commandant du 4^{me} corps d’armée, et il lui remettra les ordres qui le concernent. De Grenade, Monsieur le Jeune se rendra par Séville devant Cadiz, et verra par lui-même la situation des choses, afin de pouvoir à son retour en rendre un compte détaillé à l’Empereur. Monsieur le Jeune remettra à Monsieur le maréchal duc de Dalmatie, les dépêches qui lui sont destinées, soit à Séville, soit à Cadiz, soit partout où il sera. Il se rendra ensuite au 5^{me} corps d’armée commandé par Monsieur le maréchal duc de Trévise en Estremadure: le corps doit être à Badajos, ou même sur le Tage. Monsieur le Jeune prendra une connaissance exacte de sa position, et de celle des troupes de l’armée du centre commandée par le général ---- qui sont réunies sur le Tage. Il verra si ces corps sont en communication avec l’armée de Portugal, et recueillera les nouvelles que l’on pourrait avoir de cette armée de ce côté. Monsieur le Jeune prendra tous les renseignemens nécessaires pour pouvoir réprondre à toutes les questions de l’Empereur, sur la situation des choses en Andalousie, devant Cadiz, et en Estremadure, d’où il viendra me rendre compte de sa mission. LE PRINCE DE WAGRAM ET DE NEUFCHATEL, Major-général. _Paris, le 14 Février, 1811._ SECTION 6. _Extracts from Lejeune’s reports._ CADIZ. “Montagnes de Ronda foyer d’insurrection entre le 4^{me} corps et le premier.” “Les obusiers à la villantrois portent à 2560 toises: l’obus doit peser 75 livres, et contient 11 à 12 onces de poudre: on charge l’obusier à poudre d’un ⅓ du poids de l’obus pour obtenir cette distance. Il n’y en a que le 4 en batterie: à la redoute Napoleon on en a 12 en fondus: mais il manque de projectilles et de la poudre en suffisante quantité. Toutes les obus n’éclatent pas en ville.” “Le pont de St. Pestri a été traversé le jour de l’affaire par un sergent du 24^{me} qui est revenu avec les Espagnols que l’on a pris. Le moment eut été favorable pour s’emparer de l’Isle.” “Le duc de Bellune bien ennuyé, désire beaucoup retourner: bon général mais voyant les choses trop en noir.” SECTION 7. _Puerto Real, 20 Mars, 1811._ MON CHER GENERAL, Enfin après 15 jours des plus cruelles souffrances je me trouve en état de reprendre la plume et de continuer le réçit que j’ai eu l’honneur de vous adresser dans ma lettre du 6 au 7 de ce mois. L’une des choses qui mérite d’abord de fixer votre attention, est la composition de cette armée combinée dont nous avons été tout-à-coup assaillis. J’ai déjà dit que le 26 Février une flotte de 180 voiles était sortie de Cadiz portant 1500 hommes de débarquement, et que de ce nombre étaient environ 4000 Anglais et 1000 Portugais. Cette flotte se dirigea vers Tarifa où le débarquement se fit le lendemain sans aucun accident. Il parait que les Anglais en réunissant les garnisons d’Algéciras et de Gibraltar à quelques restes de troupes venues récemment de Sicile, avaient déjà formé à Tarifa un petit corps de 1000 Anglais et de 2000 Portugais commandé par le général Stuart, et qui forma avec 2 ou 300 hommes de cavalerie, l’avant garde de l’expédition dirigée contre nous. Cette armée ainsi composée de 10 à 12,000 Espagnols bien ou mal équipés, de 4 à 5000 Anglais et de 3000 Portugais se mit enfin en campagne, et vint nous attaquer le 5. Il parait que Monsieur le maréchal Victor ne fut instruit que tard de la vraie direction prise par l’armée ennemie. Il arriva à Chiclana le 5 entre 8 et 9 heures du matin, suivi des bataillons de la 1^e et 2^{de} division: le plan d’opérations auquel il s’arrêta fut d’envoyer sur le champ la division Villate avec un régiment de cavalerie aux lignes de St. Petri, avec ordre de laisser arriver l’ennemi, de lui résister foiblement pour l’engager à suivre notre mouvement de retraite et de l’attirer ainsi sous la position St. Anne, où il ne pouvait manquer de se trouver dans une situation extrêmement desavantageuse. Pendant cette manœuvre Monsieur le maréchal Victor s’était lui-même porté avec la 1^{re} et 2^{de} division entre Conil et St. Petri, à peu près à la hauteur de la Torre Barrosa avec l’intention de couper à l’ennemi la retraite des montagnes. Là, rencontrant la queue de l’armée, qui finissait de se filer, il la fit attaquer vigoureusement, culbuta tout ce qui se rencontra devant lui et accula les Espagnols à la mer, mais les Anglais que cette manœuvre hardie mettaient entre deux feux, et dans l’impossibilité de regagner Conil, revinrent sur leurs pas, et attaquant avec la rage du désespoir, ils forcèrent à la retraite nos deux divisions, qui ne formaient pas ensemble 5000 hommes. Cependant Monsieur le maréchal Victor se croyait si sur de la victoire qu’avant d’attaquer il envoya ordre aux troupes qui étaient à Médina, de se porter entre Veger et Conil, pour ramasser le reste des trainards; les bagages, et les trains de munitions qu’ils pouvaient rencontrer. Le projet d’attirer l’ennemi sur le feu de St. Anne n’avait pas mieux réussi du côté de la division Villatte; car si cette division fut d’abord assaillie par presque toute l’armée combinée, les généraux Anglais et Espagnols, avertis de bonne heure que Monsieur le maréchal les tournaient avec un corps de troupes, arrêterent leurs colonnes sur la rive gauche du ruisseau qui touche au Moulin d’Almanza, et là, naturellement retranchés derrière ce marais, ils n’eurent à garder que le pont et le Moulin, les seuls endroits par lesquels on pouvait les attaquer. Quelque chose de plus malheureux, fut, que des le commencement de l’action, nos lignes de St. Petri, n’étant pas défendues, il sortit par le pont de Radeaux 5000 hommes de troupes fraiches de la Isla, lesquels se plaçant en bataille devant la division Villatte, et couverts par le ruisseau du Moulin d’Almanza laissèrent au reste de l’armée combinée la liberté de se retourner tout entière contre l’attaque de Monsieur le maréchal Victor. Ainsi se termina la battaille du 5, l’ennemi coucha sur son champ de battaille, sans poursuivre les divisions Laval et Rufin dans leur retraite. Je vous ai déjà fait part de notre perte. Le général Rufin que nous croyons tué par une balle, qui lui a traversé la tête, a été porté par les Anglais à la Isla, où après deux jours de léthargie, il a donné signes de vie; on dit qu’il va mieux. La perte de l’ennemi a été à peu près de 3000 Anglais ou Portugais, et de 5 à 600 Espagnols, tués ou blessés; les Anglais ont eu beaucoup des officiers mis hors de combat, on croit les généraux _Grâm_ et Stuart ainsi que le général Peña blessés. Le 6 à la pointe du jour nous nous attendions bien à une attaque générale qui pouvait nous être très funeste; mais l’ennemi se contenta d’occuper avec 2000 hommes, le fort de Médina, que nous avions un peu imprudemment abandonnés; la flotille ennemie fit aussi des démonstrations d’attaque sur le Trocadero, mais sans effet. Elle débarqua 6 à 700 hommes entre le Port de St. Marie, et le fort St. Cataline, qui fût sommé de se rendre; on répondit à coups de canons. Un officier Anglais vint chez le gouverneur de St. Marie le prévenir qu’il allait prendre possession de la ville, mais il avait laissé ses troupes à la porte. Elles courent faire une action d’éclat en brulant et réduisant la petite redoute St. Antoine, qui n’était point gardée; enchantés de ce succès ils se rembarquèrent. M. le maréchal s’attendait bien à être attaqués le 6 à Chiclana, il avait donné des ordres en conséquence, ces ordres furent mal interprétés, et on endommagea mal-à-propos dans la nuit quelques uns de nos ouvrages, mais ils furent sur le champ réparés. Lui-même était venu à Puerto Réal avec la division Laval, et avait envoyé la 1^{re} division à St. Marie pour reprendre la ligne de Blocus comme avant la bataille du 5. Le 5^{me} regiment de chasseurs fut envoyé entre Puerto Real et Médina à la ferme de Guerra en reconnaissance; il y rencontra une poste de cavalerie ennemie, et la tailla en pièces. Le 6 au soir, on essaya de reprendre le fort de Médina, mais sans succès. Le 7 il fallut y envoyer plus de monde, et les Espagnols l’évacuèrent sans opposer de résistance. Dans la nuit du 5 les Espagnols avaient rasés nos lignes de St. Petri, ils employèrent pendant plusieurs jours et plusieurs nuits 6000 hommes, à transporter à la Isla, du bois, dont ils manquaient, quelques jours après, nous avons fait cesser ces approvisionnements, en reprenant la position de St. Petri, où on ne trouva personne; les Espagnols craignant une répétition de l’affaire du 2 Mars, ont détruits eux-même de fort bonne grace leur tête de pont, et replié leur pont de Radeaux, des ce moment chacun resta chez soi, comme avant les hostilités. _Du 21 Mars, 1811._ Il est surprenant que l’armée combinée ne nous ait pas poursuivis le 5, bien plus surprenant encore qu’elle ne nous ait point attaqués le 6 au matin; on en conçoit plusieurs raisons. On conjecture d’abord que la principale perte de la bataille étant tombée sur les Anglais, qui ont eu un grand nombre d’officiers et même leurs généraux mis hors de combat, les Espagnols n’ont pas osé venir seuls nous attaquer. Le général _Grâm_ voulait cependant les y contraindre le lendemain, mais sur leur refus formel, il les a traité de lâches, de gens indignes d’être secourus. Ils ont répondu qu’ils feraient une sortie de la Isla si l’on voulait mettre le tiers d’Anglais ou Portugais avec les deux tiers d’Espagnols, le général Anglais a répondu qu’il n’exposerait plus un seul de ses soldats avec des troupes de cette espèce, et sur le champ il a donné ordre aux Anglais et Portugais de se retirer. A Cadiz ou dans la ville de la Isla. Il parait même que le lendemain les Anglais se sont embarqués pour se rendre à Gibraltar ou peut-être à Lisbonne. Les gens du pays donnent pour certain que le général _Grâm_, en envoyant ces jours derniers à Londres trente-trois officiers des moins blessés, n’a pas dissimulé qu’il les chargeaint d’exposer à son gouvernement quelle folie il y avait de sacrifier de braves gens pour soutenir en Espagne un parti sans moyens, sans bravoure et sans moralité. Si ce qui précède n’est pas vrai, au moins sommes nous certains qu’une grande mésintelligence règne entre les Espagnols et leurs alliés. Le 20, les Espagnols ont encore essayé une sortie de la Carraca mais sans succès; ils s’y prennent un peu tard. Nous sommes à présent très à mesure pour les recevoir. Ils font semblant d’embarquer continuellement des troupes qui n’agissent pas et qui ne peuvent plus nous nuire. Il est arrivé à Médina quelques bataillons du 4^{me} corps, deux bataillons du soixante-trois sont aussi venus de Séville. Nous apprenons avec la prise de Badajos, que M. le maréchal Soult est à Séville. La blessure de M. le commandant Bompar et les miennes vont un peu mieux. LEGENTIL. Excusez les imperfections de cette longue lettre, j’écris de mon lit, dans une posture gênante. _Monsieur le général de division Lery, à Séville._ SECTION 8. _Extracts from the intercepted report of general Garbé, commanding the French engineers, at the Blockade of Cadiz._ _25 Mars, 1811._ “On avait apperçu le 26 de Février au matin un grand convoi partant de la baye de Cadiz, pour se diriger sur Tarifa. Ce convoi portait à peu près 6 ou 7000 hommes des troupes de débarquement, qui allait joindre celles qui étaient déjà réunies sur la Barbate et dans les environs de l’Alcala de los Gazules. Le 2 Mars à la pointe du jour, l’ennemi commença son opération sur Caza Vieja, qui fut évacué, et en même temps, il effectua vers l’embouchure de St. Petri, un passage pour faciliter l’établissement d’un pont de radeaux et d’une tête de pont. Il fit aussi débarquer des troupes dans l’Isletta del Coto, et s’occupa d’y établir deux batteries. Le 3, on fit marcher la division du général Rufin, qui prit position à moitié chemin de Puerto Real à Médina Sidonia. Celle du général Laval, s’établit en avant de Puerto Real, et le général Vilatte garda ses positions auprès de Chiclana. Ce jour on n’apperçut aucun mouvement de l’ennemi. Tous les ouvrages de la ligne étaient gardes par les garnisons qu’on avait désignées auparavant. Santa Marie fut évacué et le pont replié sur la rive gauche. “Puerto Real était défendu par une compagnie de sapeurs, deux du 45^{me} régiment, et par tous les réfugiés Français qu’on avoit armés. “Le 4 Monsieur le maréchal fit attaquer à la pointe du jour l’ennemi dans sa tête de pont de Santi Petri. Cette attaque se fit par 4 compagnies du 95^{me} régiment qui s’emparèrent de l’ouvrage, firent prisonniers 500 hommes, et enlevèrent un drapeau. Il est certain que si on eut employé dans cette opération 2 ou 3000 hommes on enlevait le pont et l’Isle de Léon. L’ennemi fut si disconcerté qu’il avait abandonné ses batteries et ses ouvrages fermés. Un pareil résultat paraissait être d’un très bon augure pour les grandes opérations. On fit partir le même jour de Médina une reconnaissance sur Casa Vieja. On reçut avis dans la nuit que cette reconnaissance n’avait rencontré personne, et que les colonnes ennemies se dirigeant sur Conil, le mouvement ne pouvait avoir pour but que d’opérer la jonction de ce corps d’armée, avec celui qui était resté dans l’île. Le 5, avant le jour, on se mit en marche de la position qu’on occupait à moitié chemin de Médina pour se porter sur Chiclana. Arrivé dans cet endroit, Monsieur le maréchal donna l’ordre au général Villatte de rassembler toute sa division vers les flèches de St. Petri, pour y maintenir l’ennemi qui y paraissait en force, pendant qu’il dirigeait sur la route de Conil, les divisions de Laval et Rufin, et le peu de cavalerie qu’il avait avec lui. Il se porta de ce côté, et ne tarda pas à rencontrer une forte colonne, qui marchait le long de la mer entre St. Petri et Conil, et se dirigeait sur le premier de ses endroits. Les troupes arrivées à portée de canon se formèrent. Le général Rufin prit la gauche pour aller occuper un mamelon où l’ennemi paraissait s’établir. Quand les deux divisions furent formées, elle se trouvèrent en présence d’une armée, beaucoup plus nombreuse qu’on ne l’avait cru d’abord. L’artillerie n’était pas encore arrivée, et celle de l’ennemi commençait à jour de toute parts. Le général Vilatte n’avait pu garder les flèches de St. Petri, qui étaient au moment d’être prises, n’étant alors défendues que par un seul bataillon du 27^{me} d’infantrie légère. “Cette division fut obligée de se replier et de repasser le ravin dans lequel roulent les eaux du Moulin d’Almanza. Ce mouvement empêcha le général Vilatte de se réunir aux deux autres divisions, qui n’ayant en tout que dix bataillons, essuyaient un feu terrible de la part de l’ennemi. Nos pertes devenaient d’autant plus sensible que le nombre des combattans n’était que le tiers de celui de l’ennemi. Des corps entiers se trouvaient accablés avant qu’on eut pu entamer la ligne des Anglais. Il n’y avait point de réserve. Le deux mille hommes de Médina Sidonia étaient en marche pour Conil. Il fallut penser à la retraite qui se fit en bon ordre, jusque sur les hauteurs en avant de Chiclana, où l’on fit camper une division pendant la nuit. Les Anglais firent leur jonction avec les troupes de l’île de Léon, et les Espagnols continuèrent d’occuper notre position du Moulin d’Almanza et de St Petri. Si l’ennemi voulant continuer ses opérations offensives dans la journée du 6, se fut présenté de bonne heure, il est probable que dans la situation où nous nous trouvions après la journée du 5 nous étions obligés d’évacuer le terrain jusqu’à Puerto Réal, où on aurait pris la position dont j’ai parlé plus haut, pour y livrer une seconde bataille, mais les opérations ont manqué d’ensemble. Il s’est contenté de rentrer dans l’île et pendant ce temps un très petit corps de troupes Anglaises opéraient un débarquement entre St. Marie, et la pointe de St. Catherine, qui n’eut d’autre résultat que d’enlever une batterie défendue par quinze hommes et de se promener une ou deux heures dans les rues de St. Marie. Monsieur le maréchal ne voyait aucun mouvement offensif, ordonna de rétablir les grandes communications par St. Marie, chacun rentra dans ses portes et cette mesure produisit beaucoup plus d’effet, sur l’armée et les habitans du Pays, que les dispositions qu’on auraient pu prendre.” * * * * * No. X. EXTRACTS FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE OF CAPTAIN SQUIRES, OF THE ENGINEERS. SECTION 1. “_March 1, 1811._ “I have been employed in constructing batteries, opposite the mouth of the Zezere, for twenty-five guns! though we have only one brigade of nine pounders to arm them. “Thank God, for my own credit, I protested against these batteries from the first, in my reports which were sent to lord Wellington, and now I verily believe the marshal himself is ashamed of their construction. Punhete, you know, is situated precisely at the confluence of the Zezere with the Tagus, the enemy’s bridge is about half a mile from the mouth of the river, and one mile, by measurement, from the nearest of our heights, which we have crowned with an eight-gun battery.” SECTION 2. “I was truly sorry to hear that the Spaniards were so thoroughly routed near Badajos, but Mendizabel was an idiot. On the 18th February, the enemy threw a bridge over the Guadiana, above Badajos. Don Carlos España, an active officer, whom I know very well, reconnoitred the bridge, and made his report to Mendizabel, who was playing at cards. Very well, said the chief, we’ll go and look at it to-morrow! At day-break the Spanish army was surprised.” SECTION 3. “May 17, 1811. I reconnoitred the ground in front of Cristoval, and was pressed, by Colonel Fletcher, who was on the other side of the Guadiana, to commence our operations that evening. The soil was hard and rocky, and our tools infamous. I made, however, no difficulties, and we began our battery on the night of the 8th, the moon being at the full: our work was barely four hundred yards from Cristoval. In spite, however, of a most destructive fire of musketry, and shot, and shells, from various parts of the body of the place, we succeeded in completing our battery on the night of the 10th; and, on the morning of the 11th, at four, a. m. its fire was opened. The enemy’s fire was, however, very superior to our own; and, before sunset, the three guns and one howitzer were disabled, for against our little attack was the whole attention of the enemy directed. On the other side of the river the intended attack had not yet been begun, and we sustained the almost undivided fire of Badajos! I told the marshal, when I saw him on the 11th, that to continue to fight our battery was a positive sacrifice; he did not, however, order us to desist until our guns were silenced. If doubt and indecision had not governed all our operations, and had we begun even on the night of the 9th, I am satisfied that our plan of attack was excellent, and that we should have entered the place on the 15th. It is true that two distant batteries were erected, on the left bank of the river, against the place, but they scarcely excited the enemy’s attention; our little corps bore the brunt of the enemy’s exertions, which were great and spirited. Including those who fell in the sortie, our loss has been from six to seven hundred men. Both officers and men were exhausted, mind and body; they felt and saw that they were absurdly sacrificed.” * * * * * No. XI. EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM GENERAL CAMPBELL TO LORD LIVERPOOL. “_Gibraltar, October 23, 1810._ “The troops at Malaga, with the exception of three hundred men, moved upon Fuengirola, of which lord Blayney was apprised; but, in place of his lordship taking advantage of this fortunate event, he wasted two days in a fruitless attack on the fort of Fuengirola, cannonading it from twelve-pounders, although he perceived that no impression had been made on it by the fire of the shipping and gun-boats, the artillery of which were double the calibre. In this situation he was surprised by an inferior force, and, whilst he was on board of a gun-boat, his guns taken and the whole thrown into confusion; at this moment he was informed of the disaster, and, so far to his credit, he retook his guns, but, immediately after, conceiving a body of French cavalry to be Spaniards, he ordered the firing to cease, when he was surrounded and made prisoner; his men, losing confidence, gave way, and, hurrying to the beach, relinquished their honour and the field.” END OF VOL. III. LONDON: PRINTED BY W. MARCHANT, INGRAM-COURT, FENCHURCH-STREET. FOOTNOTES: [1] Lord Stuart de Rothesay. [2] First aide-de-camp to marshal Massena. [3] Admiral sir Edward Codrington. [4] Lord Lynedoch. [5] Lieut.-gov. of Gibraltar. [6] Governor of Almeida. [7] Dupont’s proceedings at Cordoba, as related in my first volume, have been commented upon in a recent publication, entitled “_Annals of the Peninsular Campaigns_.” Upon the authority of general Foy, the author asserts that Cordoba was sacked, calls it “_a gratuitous atrocity_,” and “_an inhuman butchery_” and no doubt, taking for fiction the stories of Agathocles, Marius, Sylla, and a thousand others, gravely affirms, that, _capacity and cruelty are rarely united_; that _Dupont was a fool_, and that _Napoleon did not poison him in a dungeon_, but that he must have “_dragged on a miserable existence exposed to universal scorn and hatred_.” Unfortunately for the application of this nursery philosophy, Dupont, although a bad officer, was a man of acknowledged talents, and became minister of war at the restoration of the Bourbons, a period fixed by the author of “_the Annals_,” _as the era of good government in France_. But I rejected Foy’s authority, 1st, because his work, unfinished and posthumous, discovered more of the orator than the impartial historian, and he was politically opposed to Dupont. Secondly, because he was not an eye witness, and his relation at variance with the “_official journal of Dupont’s operations_” was also contradicted by the testimony of a _British general of known talents and accuracy, who obtained his information on the spot a few months subsequent to the event_. “Some time after the victory, _order was restored, pillage was forbidden under pain of death, and the chosen companies maintained the police_.”--Journal of Operations. _Cordoba was not pillaged_, being one of the few places where the _French were well received_.--Letters from a British general to colonel Napier. On this point, therefore, I am clear; but the author of the “_Annals_,” after contrasting my account with Foy’s, thus proceeds, “It is only necessary to add, that the preceding statement is given by colonel Napier _without any quotation of authority_.” A less concise writer might have thought it right to add that, _six months_ previous to the publication of the _Annals_, colonel Napier, hearing that some of his statements appeared inconclusive to the author of that work, _because there was no quotation of authority_, transmitted through a mutual friend, an assurance that he had authority for every _statement_, and that he would willingly _furnish the author with any or all of them_: no notice was taken of this offer! [8] An interesting account of this noble-minded woman, is to be found in a small volume, entitled, “_Sketches of a Soldier’s Life, in Ireland_,” by the author of “_The Eventful Life of a Soldier_.” This last work was erroneously designated, in my first volume, as “_The Life of a Sergeant_.” [9] [Note in Napoleon’s own hand.] On ne doit pas oublier qu’en approchant de France tout favourise la desertion. TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE Footnote [9] is referenced twice from page 563. Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within the text and consultation of external sources. Some hyphens in words have been silently removed, some added, when a predominant preference was found in the original book. To save space in the wide tables in Note I of the Appendix, the headings ‘Hospital.’ and ‘Cavalry.’ have been abbreviated to ‘Hosp.’ and ‘Cav.’. The original table in Note I, section 7, was quite wide and has been split into two parts. The original table in Note IX, section 4, was very wide and has been split into three parts. In those sections of the Appendix that are French documents, some corrections to accents have been made silently; primarily é for e, and e for é. Incorrect grammar and spelling has been left unchanged. Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings in the text, and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained. Table of Contents: Pg v: ‘Captain Hollowell’ replaced by ‘Captain Hallowell’. Pg x: ‘maratime operations’ replaced by ‘maritime operations’. Pg xii: ‘retreats to Lerena’ replaced by ‘retreats to Llerena’. Main text: Pg 3: ‘Pyrennean vallies’ replaced by ‘Pyrennean valleys’. Pg 3: ‘into the vallies’ replaced by ‘into the valleys’. Pg 5: ‘Nuesta Senora’ replaced by ‘Nuestra Senora’. Pg 11: ‘the commucations of’ replaced by ‘the communications of’. Pg 13: ‘being unqual to’ replaced by ‘being unequal to’. Pg 14: ‘very essense of’ replaced by ‘very essence of’. Pg 18: ‘on the ocsion’ replaced by ‘on the occasion’. Pg 21: ‘occupied by Coupigny’ replaced by ‘occupied by Conpigny’. Pg 33: ‘calamity befal’ replaced by ‘calamity befall’. Pg 47: ‘was betowed with’ replaced by ‘was bestowed with’. Pg 54: ‘and carelesssly’ replaced by ‘and carelessly’. Pg 61 (Sidenote): ‘Wellesly’ replaced by ‘Wellesley’. Pg 63: ‘the Portugese’ replaced by ‘the Portuguese’. Pg 64 (Sidenote): ‘Wellesly’ replaced by ‘Wellesley’. Pg 73: ‘subborn resistance’ replaced by ‘stubborn resistance’. Pg 86: ‘from Aranjues to’ replaced by ‘from Aranjuez to’. Pg 92: ‘whose procedings’ replaced by ‘whose proceedings’. Pg 96: ‘at Yevenes and’ replaced by ‘at Yebenes and’. Pg 125: ‘war of invavasion’ replaced by ‘war of invasion’. Pg 138: ‘evacuted the town’ replaced by ‘evacuated the town’. Pg 139: ‘to recal them’ replaced by ‘to recall them’. Pg 143 (Sidenote): ‘des Française’ replaced by ‘des Français’. Pg 174: ‘Toccadero creek’ replaced by ‘Troccadero creek’. Pg 179: ‘soldiers, and and a’ replaced by ‘soldiers, and a’. Pg 197: ‘from about Lerena’ replaced by ‘from about Llerena’. Pg 237: ‘required extrordinary’ replaced by ‘required extraordinary’. Pg 237: ‘merely a a conqueror’ replaced by ‘merely a conqueror’. Pg 242: ‘dictinct lines’ replaced by ‘distinct lines’. Pg 243: ‘Gallicia and Asturia’ replaced by ‘Gallicia and Asturias’. Pg 247: ‘in misrepresentions’ replaced by ‘in misrepresentations’. Pg 261: ‘having Silviera and’ replaced by ‘having Silveira and’. Pg 280: ‘secorrer esta plaza’ replaced by ‘socorrer esta plaza’. Pg 304 (Sidenote): ‘Cox’s Narative’ replaced by ‘Cox’s Narrative’. Pg 307: ‘lost a quadron’ replaced by ‘lost a squadron’. Pg 331: ‘Portuguese caçadore’ replaced by ‘Portuguese caçadores’. Pg 356: ‘3º. From Bucellas’ replaced by ‘4º. From Bucellas’. Pg 359: ‘Massena, suprised’ replaced by ‘Massena, surprised’. Pg 366: ‘own governmennt’ replaced by ‘own government’. Pg 380: ‘Frenchmen run to’ replaced by ‘Frenchmen ran to’. Pg 380: ‘with the assistace’ replaced by ‘with the assistance’. Pg 396: ‘when Bacellar brought’ replaced by ‘when Baccellar brought’. Pg 414: ‘Moguer and Heulva’ replaced by ‘Moguer and Huelva’. Pg 454: ‘the posisition of’ replaced by ‘the position of’. Pg 464: ‘the abler tactitian’ replaced by ‘the abler tactician’. Pg 473: ‘from distruction’ replaced by ‘from destruction’. Pg 485: ‘immediately run out’ replaced by ‘immediately ran out’. Pg 514: ‘seventh divison’ replaced by ‘seventh division’. Pg 583: ‘de St. Fernado’ replaced by ‘de St. Fernando’. Pg 588: ‘wish to emove’ replaced by ‘wish to remove’. Appendix: Pg 608 Note VII: missing heading ‘SECTION 2.’ inserted before ‘Extrait du Journal du C. de B. Pelet’. Pg 615 Note VII: ‘SECTION IX’ replaced by ‘SECTION 9’. Pg 621 Note VII: ‘SECTION XVIII’ replaced by ‘SECTION 18’. Pg 621 Note VII: ‘SECTION XIX’ replaced by ‘SECTION 19’. Pg 622 Note VII: ‘SECTION XX’ replaced by ‘SECTION 20’. Pg 628 Note IX: ‘SECTION II’ replaced by ‘SECTION 2’. Pg 628 Note IX: ‘Brigadier-gen. Dilkes’ replaced by ‘Brigadier-gen. Dilke’. Pg 629 Note IX: ‘SECTION III’ replaced by ‘SECTION 3’. Pg 635 Note IX: ‘SECTION 7’ replaced by ‘SECTION 8’. *** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE PENINSULA AND IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR 1814, VOL. 3 *** Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will be renamed. Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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