The Chattanooga campaign, by Michael Hendrick Fitch

After the battle of Gettysburg in the East, and the siege of Vicksburg in the West, attention was riveted during the later summer and autumn of 1863 on the campaign around Chattanooga. Seated on the heights along the southern border of Tennessee, that city commanded highways running through the very heart of the Confederacy. The result at Gettysburg had demonstrated that no Southern army could invade the North; the Union victory at Vicksburg determined that the Mississippi should run unhindered to the sea. The battles of Chickamauga, Lookout Mountain, and Missionary Ridge not only decided that Kentucky and Tennessee should remain in the Union, but they opened the way for Sherman’s advance on Atlanta and his March to the Sea, which cut the Confederacy in two and made Lee’s surrender a necessity.

The War between the States saw no more stubborn fighting than raged on September 19th and [xii] 20th around the old Cherokee stronghold of Chickamauga. Two months later, occurred the three days’ battle around the hill city of Chattanooga. In all these events, the citizen soldiers of Wisconsin played a conspicuous part, which is herein described by a participant and student of these famous contests. In these battles the reputations of officers were made and unmade, and from them emerged the great generals who were to carry the Union arms to complete victory—Thomas, Sherman, Sheridan, and Grant.

Colonel Fitch, the author of this volume, began his service July 16, 1861, as Sergeant-Major of the Sixth Wisconsin; he was commissioned First-Lieutenant in October following, and in the succeeding April was appointed Adjutant of the Twenty-first; he became, in succession, Major and Lieutenant-Colonel of that regiment, and in March, 1865, was brevetted Colonel of Volunteers “for gallant and meritorious services during the war.” He served chiefly with the Army of Potomac, Army of Virginia, Army of Ohio, and Army of Cumberland. He commanded his regiment from July 1, 1864; and on the March to the Sea; and in the Carolinas headed a wing of the [xiii] brigade, consisting of the Twenty-first Wisconsin, the Forty-second Indiana, and the One Hundred-and-fourth Illinois. Later, he was assigned to the command of the Second Brigade of the Fourteenth Army Corps. He now lives at Pueblo, Colorado.

The maps illustrating the text are adaptations from John Fiske’s The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War (Boston, 1900), which we are permitted to use through the generosity of the publishers, Houghton Mifflin Company.

The Commission is also under obligations to the editorial staff of the Wisconsin Historical Society for having seen the volume through the press. The index was compiled by Dr. Louise Phelps Kellogg, a member of that staff; the proof-reading has been the work chiefly of Misses Annie A. Nunns and Daisy G. Beecroft.

The Union Army of the Cumberland, commanded by Major-General William S. Rosecrans, was, in June, 1863, encamped at Murfreesboro, Tennessee, thirty-two miles south of Nashville. It had been lying here since January 5, 1863, having marched from the adjacent field of Stone’s River. The Confederate Army of the Tennessee, was, at the same time, in camp near Tullahoma, forty miles south of Murfreesboro. The Confederates had been defeated at Stone’s River, and had fallen back to Tullahoma at the same time the Union forces had taken up their camp at Murfreesboro.

I will designate the campaign of the latter army, beginning on June 23, 1863, by marching from [2] Murfreesboro, as the “Chattanooga Campaign of 1863.” The various engagements in that campaign, beginning with Hoover’s [1] and Liberty gaps [2] on June 24, down to that of Missionary Ridge, at Chattanooga, on November 25, are incidents of that campaign, and necessary parts of it. A description of the campaign immediately preceding, which started when General Rosecrans assumed command of the army of the Cumberland at Bowling Green, Kentucky, in October, 1862, and ended with the victory of the Union forces in the battle of Stone’s River, and the occupation of Murfreesboro—would give a preliminary historical setting.

In fact, a full history of the Chattanooga campaign may well include the entire movements of the army under General Buell, from October 1, 1862, when it marched out of Louisville, Kentucky, in pursuit of Bragg’s army. The latter was then supposed to be in the vicinity of Frankfort, the capital of that State, engaged [3] in the inglorious occupation of coercing the legislature to pass an ordinance of secession. It was also trying to recruit its ranks from the young citizens of Kentucky, and was restocking its commissary from the rich farms of the blue-grass region. Buell found it, on October 8, at Perryville, seventy-five miles southeast of Louisville. He drove it out of Kentucky, and then marched to Bowling Green, on the railroad between Louisville and Nashville, where in the same month he was superseded, as commander, by Rosecrans.

The Atlanta campaign, immediately following that of Chattanooga—beginning on May 4, 1864, and ending in the capture of Atlanta on September 8 of that year—gives a subsequent historical setting: a connection in time as well as in space, to the operations of the Army of the Cumberland in 1863. By referring to these several important military campaigns of the war, the reader may obtain a synchronous perspective of the most important events in the Middle West, in the department occupied by that army.

A larger setting can be given to this campaign for the capture of Chattanooga, by framing it into [4] the two military fields of the Potomac on the east, and the Tennessee on the west. The Army of the Potomac was opposed to General Lee’s forces. It operated generally between Washington, D. C., and Richmond, Virginia, the latter being the objective. At the time the Army of the Cumberland marched out of Murfreesboro, Lee had taken advantage of the defeat of the army under Hooker from May 1 to 3, 1863, at Chancellorsville, Virginia, and invaded Maryland and Pennsylvania. He was decisively defeated in the battle of Gettysburg, on July 3 following, by Major-General George C. Meade, which closed his campaigning into the North. The old field north of Richmond was reoccupied by the Army of the Potomac, then in command of Meade, as successor to Hooker. It was the latter who, in October, brought the Eleventh and Twelfth corps from the Army of the Potomac to the Army of the Cumberland, at Chattanooga.

On the west of the Army of the Cumberland, was the field of the Army of the Tennessee. Its task was the opening of the Mississippi River. At this time, General U. S. Grant was in command, [5] and had his army at Vicksburg. That stronghold surrendered to him on July 4. Thus the great river was opened. This left the greater part of the Army of the Tennessee free to cooperate in the autumn with the Army of the Cumberland in the battles around Chattanooga; and from that date to assist in the Atlanta campaign, and the March to the Sea, the following year.

It will thus be seen that victory crowned all three of the great armies during the time of the Chattanooga campaign. The confidence and discipline of the Union forces, increased at this time; the discovery, by the governing powers at Washington, of those of the general officers who displayed the most ability; the placing of such officers in the command of the Union armies; and the gradual weakening of the secession armies, were the principal factors contributing to the final end of the war. The resulting campaigns of 1864 and the early part of 1865, sufficed to crush the most powerful rebellion in history.

During its long occupancy of Murfreesboro, the Army of the Cumberland had been somewhat recruited; its equipment was restored to its former [6] condition; and it had also been very much improved, as well as reorganized. During this time the formidable Fortress Rosecrans was built at Murfreesboro, so that a small force might continue to hold the place after the army moved on. This fort proved of great value during the Hood campaign against Franklin and Nashville, in November and December, 1864. Nashville had to be permanently occupied. In fact, the line of railway running from Louisville through Kentucky and Tennessee to Chattanooga, through Bowling Green, Nashville, Murfreesboro, Tullahoma, and Bridgeport, formed the line for carrying supplies, as well as the line of operations. This line, about three hundred and forty miles long, had to be defended and kept open, as the Union Army advanced. As part of it—if not the whole—lying in southern Kentucky and Tennessee, was in the enemy’s country, it was necessary to build and man as the army advanced, a line of forts and block houses, for the protection of this railroad from Nashville to Chattanooga.

By glancing at a good map, the reader can see the immense difficulty involved in the maintenance [7] and defense of this line of supplies consisting of but a single-track railroad. The task required the services of about a fourth of the entire army. The field of operations contained no navigable rivers parallel with the line of advance, upon which gunboats might assist the army in its conflicts with the enemy, and by which the railroad could be assisted in carrying supplies. Two somewhat important streams traversed the field, or rather ran at right angles to it—the Cumberland, on which Nashville is located; and the Tennessee, flowing past Chattanooga. These run westward from the Cumberland Mountains, and for very small craft plying for limited distances only, were navigable within the field of the Army of the Cumberland. But they were of practically no use to the Union Army, except at Chattanooga after its occupation—when for a time, supplies were thus transported from Bridgeport and Stevenson pending the repairing of the railway from those places. There were also two smaller streams in southern Tennessee, running at right angles to the line of operation, called the Duck and the Elk. It was necessary that the [8] Union commander consider these in his advance from Murfreesboro, for they were fordable only in places, and not even there when floods were rampant. They were bridged on the main wagon roads, but these bridges were easily destroyed by the enemy. In its campaigns from Louisville, Kentucky, to Chattanooga, the Army of the Cumberland did not have any assistance from the navy.

In this sketch, it is not necessary to give a tedious account of the most difficult natural obstacles, such as streams, mountains, and distances. These are apparent upon the study of any good map. But mention must be made, that the Union Army faced a chain of mountains lying between it and Chattanooga, at the northwestern edge of which then lay the Confederate Army. This is the plateau of the Cumberland Mountains, extending in a southwest direction from West Virginia to northern Alabama, and covering what is known as East Tennessee. This plateau is about 2,200 feet above tidewater.

Chattanooga is the commercial gateway through which run both the Tennessee River and [9] the railways from north, east, and south. It lies near the junction of the boundary line between Alabama and Georgia, with the south line of Tennessee, at the eastern edge of the Cumberland Mountains, where the Tennessee River, flowing westward, cuts through the range. It is in a direct southeast line from Nashville. The occupation of Chattanooga by the Union Army cut the Confederacy asunder. Hence, the struggle for this position became a fierce one. It cost both sides strenuous campaigns, an immense number of lives, and the destruction of an incalculable amount of property. Its possession by a Union Army was an inhibition of any serious Confederate invasion into Middle Tennessee or Kentucky. The object of the Chattanooga campaign was, therefore, the capture of that city; and ultimately, the destruction of the Confederate Army. Should the capture of the city be accomplished, but the army of the Confederate escape, Chattanooga could be made the sub-base of a new campaign, which would effectually dismember the Confederacy, and greatly hasten its downfall. Such was the Union theory, and this actually occurred.

[10] Followed by the “March to the Sea,” the Atlanta campaign dismembered the enemy’s domain and made possible the end of the war. Lee’s surrender would not have occurred at the time it did (April, 1865), if the homes of his soldiers in the Carolinas, Georgia, Tennessee, and Alabama had not been invaded by the Western armies of the Union; and his rear threatened by Sherman’s troops. These results were made possible only by the capture and continued possession of Chattanooga.

After Sherman had marched through Georgia and South Carolina, and penetrated North Carolina, with a large part of the old Army of the Cumberland and troops from other armies, thousands of Lee’s army deserted, and lined the roads leading back to their homes. When captured and paroled, as they were in immense numbers, by Sherman’s “bummers,” they invariably said that they left Lee when Richmond was abandoned; and would not longer fight for a Confederacy that could not defend their homes. Love of home is greater than love of country; unless the state or nation can protect the homes from invasion and [11] desecration, there is little incentive for its volunteers to fight for the abstract principles of patriotism.

A description of the contour of the field, from Murfreesboro to the Chickamauga, would be only an interminable and profitless account; it being a tangle of flat and rolling land, from Murfreesboro to the gaps in the first hills, where the enemy was met; and thenceforth steep mountains and deep valleys. But the grand strategy subsequently adopted by Rosecrans, depended so entirely upon this contour, that when each separate movement or battle shall hereafter be described, a somewhat minute account of the country contiguous to that particular military event will be given.

ORGANIZATION

After the battle of Stone’s River and while lying at Murfreesboro, the Army of the Cumberland was reorganized. As previously stated, Rosecrans joined it as the successor of Buell, at Bowling Green, in October, 1862. Stone’s River was the army’s first battle under Rosecrans. [12] In that, the army was called the Fourteenth Corps, Department of the Cumberland; and it was divided into three divisions—the centre, right, and left wings. General George H. Thomas commanded the centre, General Alexander McD. McCook the right, and General Thomas L. Crittenden the left. In the new organization, the command was called the Army of the Cumberland, and divided into three corps, the Fourteenth, the Twentieth, and the Twenty-first. Thomas was assigned to the command of the Fourteenth, General McCook to the Twentieth, and Crittenden to the Twenty-first.

Rosecrans came to the Army of the Cumberland with considerable prestige. He was then forty-three years old, having graduated from West Point in 1842. As brigadier-general he had gained the battle of Rich Mountain, Virginia, in July, 1861; won the battle of Carnifex Ferry, Virginia, in September of the same year; as commander of the Army of the Mississippi was victorious in the battles of Iuka in September, 1862, and of Corinth in October following. He came to the Army of the Cumberland with a record of unbroken [13] successes behind him. He was genial, and had untiring industry. His heart and head were devoted to the Union cause. His troops saw him frequently. He was a lover of approbation, and had the confidence of his generals, and the love of his rank and file. The men affectionately nicknamed him “Old Rosy,” and that was his usual cognomen with the whole army. He was a strategist of high order. A study of his Chattanooga campaign will show his eminent ability, in so maneuvering as to compel the enemy to fight in the open. When an engagement was thus brought on, and the actual combat occurred, he lacked (in those which he fought with the Army of the Cumberland) the proper supervision of his line of battle. He too implicitly relied upon his subordinates. During the whole of the Chattanooga campaign his strategy was of the first order; but at both Stone’s River and Chickamauga, the right of his line was too attenuated; in both engagements, disaster occurred to this part of his troops.

The chief of staff to Rosecrans was General James A. Garfield, who was then thirty-one years [14] old, brainy and very energetic. Although not a graduate of West Point, he was possessed of decided military instincts. Before the war he was an instructor in, and later president of, Hiram College, Ohio; and later was a member of the Ohio Senate. Entering the army as lieutenant-colonel of an Ohio regiment, he defeated Humphrey Marshall in the battle of Middle Creek, Eastern Kentucky, January 10, 1862, and was that year promoted to be a brigadier-general. Able and conscientious as an officer, he was perhaps rather too democratic and academic to become a typical soldier. He became very nervous at the delay in moving from Murfreesboro, and instituted an inquiry into the reasons, both for and against an earlier advance on Tullahoma. A majority of the subordinate generals in the Army of the Cumberland supported General Rosecrans in his delay. Later on, notice will be taken of Garfield’s service in the battle of Chickamauga, and his retirement to a seat in Congress.

Next to Rosecrans, the most important figure among the subordinate commanders was Thomas. He was then forty-seven years old, and a graduate [15] of West Point in 1840. Between that time and the Civil War, he served in the war with Mexico, and against the Indians in the West. At the beginning of the War between the States he was major of the Second Cavalry, of which Albert Sidney Johnston was colonel, Robert E. Lee lieutenant-colonel, and William J. Hardee senior major. Thomas was the only field officer of that regiment who remained loyal to the Union. He was commissioned colonel of the regiment, reorganized it, and during the first battle of Bull Run served in General Patterson’s detachment, in the Shenandoah Valley. He was commissioned brigadier-general in August, 1861, and was sent to Kentucky to serve in the then Army of the Ohio (afterwards the Army of the Cumberland), under General Robert Anderson of Fort Sumter fame. Thomas organized the first real little army of that department at camp Dick Robinson, Kentucky, between Danville and Lexington; and in January, 1862, with this force defeated the Confederate troops under Zollicoffer, at Mill Springs, Kentucky, on the Cumberland River. This force and this place were then the extreme [16] right of the Confederate line of defense, of which Forts Donelson and Henry, in Tennessee, and Paducah, Kentucky, constituted the left. This line was fortified, and extended through Bowling Green. A month after General Thomas had turned its right at Mill Springs, General Grant also turned its left, by capturing both Forts Donelson and Henry. This necessitated the establishment of a new Confederate line farther south, the evacuation of Kentucky, and the eventual loss to the Confederates of Middle Tennessee. Just before the battle of Perryville, Kentucky, the President offered General Thomas, on September 29, 1862, the command of the Army of the Cumberland at Louisville, but he declined it. Buell was in command of the army during the battle of Perryville; after which he was superseded by Rosecrans. Thomas was a soldier, pure and simple, having never resigned from the army after his graduation from the Military Academy. He had shown great ability in the recent battle of Stone’s River, as well as in every position in which he was placed, prior to that battle. It will be seen, further on, what important movements [17] he directed in the battle of Chickamauga, which saved the Army of the Cumberland from imminent disaster.

General McCook, who commanded the Twentieth Corps, belonged to the younger class of West Point graduates, of which General Sheridan was a type. He graduated in 1853, and was thirty-two years old in April, 1863. He was a handsome man, of striking presence, and commanded with some dramatic effect.

General Crittenden, commanding the Twenty-first Corps, was then a year older than Rosecrans—forty-four years. He was not a graduate of West Point, but had served as a volunteer in the Mexican War. He was a son of U. S. Senator John J. Crittenden, of Kentucky.

The Fourteenth Corps was made up of four divisions. These were commanded respectively by Major-General Lovell H. Rousseau, Major-General James S. Negley, Brigadier-General John M. Brannan, and Major-General Joseph J. Reynolds. Each of these divisions contained three brigades, and three light field batteries. [18] The brigades were generally composed of four regiments, but sometimes of five.

The Twentieth Corps contained three divisions, commanded respectively by Brigadier-General Jefferson C. Davis, Brigadier-General Richard W. Johnson, and Major-General Philip H. Sheridan. These were made up of brigades of four and five regiments of infantry and three batteries of artillery.

The Twenty-first Corps likewise was organized into three divisions, commanded by Brigadier-General Thomas J. Wood, Major-General John M. Palmer, and Brigadier-General Horatio P. Van Cleve, each with three brigades and several batteries. The artillery of each division of the army was commanded by a chief of artillery.

All of the cavalry were organized into a separate corps, commanded by Major-General David S. Stanley. This was divided into two divisions; the First was composed of two brigades, and commanded by Brigadier-General Robert B. Mitchell; the Second, also of two brigades, was commanded at first by Brigadier-General John B. Turchin. [19] Prior to the battle of Chickamauga, Turchin was assigned to an infantry brigade. These cavalry brigades were much larger than the infantry brigades, for they contained five or six regiments. Generally there was a battery attached to each brigade of cavalry.

On June 8, 1863, a reserve corps was organized, with Major-General Gordon Granger in command. It contained three divisions, commanded by Brigadier-General James D. Morgan, Brigadier-General Robert S. Granger, and Brigadier-General Absalom Baird, respectively. The last-named was afterwards transferred to the First Division, Fourteenth Corps, being succeeded by General James B. Steedman. It was the duty of this reserve corps to guard the communications in the rear of the army; but it was also subject, in emergency, to be ordered to the front, as will be seen further on—for example, when General Granger with three brigades, marched from Bridgeport, Alabama, to Rossville Gap, Georgia, and assisted very greatly in the battle of September 20, at Chickamauga. In this reserve corps should also be included certain miscellaneous [20] troops, scattered in forts along the line of the Louisville & Chattanooga railroad, such as Nashville, Clarksville, and Gallatin, Tennessee. At this time Colonel Benjamin J. Sweet of the Twenty-first Wisconsin Infantry was in command of the forces at Gallatin. He had been wounded severely in the battle of Perryville, Kentucky, on October 8, 1862, and was not able to endure active service at the front.

The First Brigade of the Third Division, reserve corps, was stationed at Fort Donelson, Tennessee, and commanded by Colonel William P. Lyon, of the Thirteenth Wisconsin Infantry, that regiment being a part of the garrison. The First Wisconsin Cavalry, commanded by Colonel Oscar H. LaGrange, was attached to the Second Brigade of the First Division of the cavalry corps. Captain Lucius H. Drury, of the Third Wisconsin Battery, was chief of artillery to the Third Division of the Twenty-first Corps.

This organization of the Army of the Cumberland remained substantially the same, until after the battle of Chickamauga. Sometime in the latter part of July, or first part of August, General [21] Rousseau received leave of absence, and General Absalom Baird was assigned on August 24 to command the First Division of the Fourteenth Corps in his stead. Baird remained in command of this division until after the battle of Chickamauga, when Major-General Lovell H. Rousseau again took the command. Rousseau was a loyal Kentuckian, who at the very beginning of hostilities had raised a regiment for the service of the Union. He was then forty-five years old and had served in the Mexican War. He was a spectacular officer of great bravery, who is entitled to much credit for his unflinching devotion to the Union, under circumstances which made other men desert our cause.

Major-General John M. Palmer of Illinois, a lawyer of eminence in his State, was an officer of more than usual ability. He was not a West Point graduate, and was forty-six years old.

General Granger was then forty-two years old, a graduate of West Point in the class of 1845, and had fought in the Mexican War. It will be noticed that many of the general officers of the Army of the Cumberland served in the Mexican [22] War. The experience they then acquired in the field, in actual campaigning, and by some of them in actual battle, undoubtedly served to give to the Army of the Cumberland much of its esprit de corps , and its general success in winning battles and in holding the territory over which it marched. General Granger was an unusually able and gallant officer. Later on, it will be told what important service he rendered General Thomas in the battle of Chickamauga.

Major-General Philip H. Sheridan was then thirty-two years old. He graduated at West Point, rather low in his class, in 1853. At the outbreak of the war he was promoted to a captaincy. In May, 1862, he was commissioned colonel of cavalry in the volunteer service, and brigadier-general of volunteers July 1, 1862, being made a major-general on December 31, 1862. He had commanded a division in the battle of Perryville, Kentucky, in October, 1862, and was at Stone’s River December 31, 1862, to January 3, 1863. He is entitled to this special notice more for what he became, than for what he had done prior to the Chattanooga campaign. He [23] had as yet shown no extraordinary ability as a commander. His age was the same as that of his corps commander, General McCook, and they graduated in the same class at West Point.

Generals Absalom Baird, John M. Brannan, Jefferson C. Davis, Thomas J. Wood, R. W. Johnson, and David S. Stanley were all officers of the old regular army, soldiers by profession, whose minds were not distracted from their duties in the field by politics or academic proclivities. They were brave and always at the front, working for success with military spirit. All of them served faithfully until the close of the war. Davis, Wood, and Stanley afterwards commanded corps—commanded them ably and with notably unassuming manners. There was no taint about these officers of “playing to the galleries.” They were not expecting applause, and did their work without brass bands or reporters to sound their achievements to the country. Such were the officers of this great central army.

What of the musket bearers? Who were they? Where did they come from? Were they soldiers by profession or merely citizens in [24] arms for a special purpose? I have already said that very many of the general officers of the Army of the Cumberland were of the regular army. The United States regular army was represented only, however, by one brigade of the regular troops, namely, the Third Brigade of the First Division of the Fourteenth Corps, commanded by Brigadier-General John H. King. Thus almost the entire rank and file of the army were volunteers. The regiments were filled and officered by the executives of the different states. The men were mustered into the service of the General Government as volunteers for three years or during the war. These volunteers were citizens of the states, and each company elected its officers among those who had originally enlisted as privates. The musket bearers were men from all callings in life—farmers, mechanics, merchants, teachers, students, and laborers. They were the voters who made up the political divisions of the townships, counties, and states, whose ultimate power lay in their voting franchise which they shared with the men, who—for various reasons—remained at their homes during the war. The volunteer-regiments [25] which composed the Army of the Cumberland were mostly from the states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Kentucky, Wisconsin, and Minnesota; Pennsylvania had three infantry and two cavalry regiments; Missouri had two regiments, and Kansas one; Tennessee was represented by several regiments. The great bulk of the troops came, however, from the states north of the Ohio River—the Northwest Territory. No drafted men in the army partook in the Chattanooga Campaign of 1863. These volunteers sought the service and understood what it involved. Very few of them knew what regimentation meant, and the great majority had never before handled a musket. But they were young and teachable. They readily learned the drill, and became good marksmen. These soldiers realized very soon that a clean musket, plenty of ammunition, and obedience to orders, composed the military moral code of efficiency. By the laws of their states, they were entitled to vote for officers and affairs at home, and to have their votes counted, just as if they had been cast at home. The soldiers received during the prolonged war as many [26] furloughs as were compatible with the exigencies at the front, and thus they were occasionally enabled to visit the folks at home during their strenuous service. The intelligence of the private soldier was often superior to that of his officer. Nevertheless he obeyed faithfully that officer’s commands, because he fully understood that discipline could be maintained only by implicit obedience and the object of his service, viz: the suppression of a rebellion be accomplished. Many of these volunteers enlisted directly from the public schools, which they were attending. They had been taught the history of their country; how its independence from the tyranny of a foreign power had been gained by the valor and patriotism of Washington and his volunteers, that by the discipline and perseverance of the revolutionary soldiers the sovereignty of a foreign king had been transferred to the citizens of their native land; that a new foe was now trying to dismember the nation, and that the corner stone of the Union was the principle, that all power is derived from the people. These volunteers were convinced that no power had the right to protect the maintenance and perpetuation [27] of slavery. They were soldiers therefore until the Union was re-established; and they tacitly resolved to fight until slavery was abolished. Such was the personnel of the Army of the Cumberland.

Wisconsin was well and ably represented in this army by the following organizations, viz: The First, Tenth, Fifteenth, Twenty-first, and Twenty-fourth volunteer infantry; the First Cavalry; and the Third, Fifth, and Eighth light batteries.

The First Wisconsin Infantry was a noted regiment in more than one way. It served as the only three-months regiment from Wisconsin, and was organized under President Lincoln’s first call for 75,000 men. It was mustered out after the ninety days’ service August 21, 1861, and reorganized under the second call for three years’ service. This second mustering was completed October 19, 1861. The regiment proceeded from Milwaukee to Louisville, Kentucky, and the volunteers served during the next three years in the Army of the Cumberland. It was active in various parts of Tennessee during the first year of its service, [28] marching as far as Bridgeport, Alabama, to which place it returned during the campaign of Tullahoma. John C. Starkweather was its first colonel. He was made commander of the brigade when it was reorganized at Murfreesboro, and Lieutenant-Colonel George B. Bingham commanded the regiment. This regiment had fought in both the battles of Perryville and Stone’s River. It was assigned to the Second Brigade of the First Division of the Fourteenth Corps.

The Tenth Wisconsin Infantry was mustered into the service October 14, 1861, at Milwaukee. Alfred R. Chapin was its first colonel. Proceeding to Louisville, Kentucky, it became part of the future Army of the Cumberland, and advanced with General O. M. Mitchell’s forces to Stevenson and Huntsville, Alabama, in the spring and summer of 1862. The regiment returned to Louisville in September with Buell’s army and engaged in the battles of Perryville and Stone’s River. When the reorganization at Murfreesboro took place this regiment became a part of Scribner’s Brigade of Rousseau’s Division of the Fourteenth Corps. Almost side by side with the [29] First and Twenty-first infantries, it took part in all engagements.

The Fifteenth Wisconsin Infantry was a Scandinavian regiment, and its first colonel was Hans C. Heg. It was mustered into the service on February 14, 1862, at Madison. It had taken part in the siege of Island Number Ten. It did not join the Army of the Cumberland until just before the battle of Perryville, in which it took active part, as in the battle of Stone’s River. In the reorganization at Murfreesboro, it became a part of the Third Brigade—and was commanded by its colonel, Hans C. Heg, of the First Division, Twentieth Corps.

The Twenty-first Wisconsin Infantry was organized at Oshkosh, in August, 1862, and on September 11, 1862, it joined the Army of the Cumberland at Louisville, Kentucky. Benjamin J. Sweet was its first colonel; he was so severely wounded in the battle of Perryville as to be disabled for further field service. This regiment was brigaded with the First Wisconsin Infantry at Louisville, and served also in the battles of Perryville and Stone’s River. At the time of [30] the reorganization at Murfreesboro it was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Harrison C. Hobart, and it was assigned to the Second Brigade of the First Division of the Fourteenth Corps.

The Twenty-fourth Wisconsin Infantry was mustered into the service at Milwaukee, August 21, 1862. It proceeded to Louisville, where it became a part of the Army of the Cumberland. This regiment engaged in the battles of Perryville and Stone’s River, and was assigned to the First Brigade, Third Division, Twentieth Corps in the reorganization at Murfreesboro; its commander was Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore S. West.

The First Wisconsin Cavalry was mustered into the service at Kenosha, on March 8, 1862, with Edward Daniels as its first colonel. It was sent to Benton Barracks, near St. Louis. There and in various parts of Missouri its first year of service was performed. On June 14, 1863, at Nashville, it was made a part of the Army of the Cumberland, with which it was from that time identified until the close of its service. This regiment’s activity in the Tullahoma campaign, the Chickamauga campaign, and in pursuit of Confederate [31] cavalry in the Sequatchie Valley on October 2, 1863, and along the line of communication during the battles around Chattanooga is mentioned in more appropriate places, relating to the general movements of the army. It was commanded by Colonel Oscar H. LaGrange, and assigned to the Second Brigade, First Division, Cavalry Corps, during the reorganization.

The Third Wisconsin Light Battery was mustered into the service at Racine, Wisconsin, October 10, 1861. Lucius H. Drury was its first captain. The regiment went first to Louisville, then to Nashville, whence it marched with Buell’s army in order to reinforce General Grant at Shiloh. It was engaged in the battles of Perryville and Stone’s River. The regiment was assigned to the Third Brigade, Third Division of the Twenty-first Corps, and was commanded by Lieutenant Courtland Livingston.

The Fifth Wisconsin Battery was mustered into the service at Racine, October 1, 1861. Oscar F. Pinney was its first captain. March 16, 1862, it arrived at St. Louis. Afterwards it proceeded to New Madrid, Missouri (on the Mississippi [32] River), and became a part of General John Pope’s army, in the reduction of Island Number Ten. It was also active at the siege of Corinth, and marched about two hundred miles from Iuka, Mississippi, to Nashville, Tennessee, where the regiment joined the forces of General Buell. On the northward march in September, 1862, these forces engaged in the battles of Perryville and Stone’s River; the service of the Fifth Wisconsin Battery was of the most active and valuable kind. It was commanded by Captain George Q. Gardner, and was assigned to the First Brigade, First Division, of the Twentieth Corps.

The Eighth Wisconsin Battery was mustered into the service on January 8, 1862, and moved to St. Louis on March 8, 1862. Its first captain was Stephen J. Carpenter. It formed a part of the force that moved to Forts Leavenworth and Riley, Kansas, in April and May, 1862, whence it moved to Columbus, Kentucky, and finally took part in the campaign at Corinth and Iuka, Mississippi. From there it marched to Nashville, and Louisville, engaging in the battles of Perryville and Stone’s River. It was commanded [33] by John D. McLean, lieutenant, and was assigned to the Third Brigade, First Division of the Twentieth Corps.

ORGANIZATION OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY

The Confederate Army which confronted the Army of the Cumberland on June 24, 1863, was officially called the Army of the Tennessee. It was divided into four corps—two of infantry and two of cavalry. General Leonidas Polk commanded one infantry corps, and General William J. Hardee the other. The cavalry corps were commanded by General Joseph Wheeler, and General N. B. Forrest. In addition to the artillery, attached to the regular corps, there was also a reserve artillery. In General Bragg’s return of the “aggregate present” of his army in the field on June 20, 1863, his figures are 55,070. His reserve troops were not included in this statement; they were scattered throughout the districts of Tennessee and northern Alabama.

At this same date the return of the Army of the Cumberland was 71,409 of all arms—exclusive [34] of the reserve corps—as “aggregate present.” It will be noticed later on, that the Confederates greatly increased their numbers prior to the battle of Chickamauga, but that the Union Army received no reinforcements; on the contrary, it lost heavily by sickness as the army advanced.

General Bragg was at that time forty-six years old. He had distinguished himself in the Mexican War. He commanded the Confederate Army in both the battles of Perryville and Stone’s River. He did not win either of these, having in both of them abandoned the field to the Union forces.

Perhaps the most distinguished officer in Bragg’s army was Major-General John C. Breckenridge. He was more distinguished, however, as a politician, than as a military leader. He was forty-two years old. Before the war he had been a member of Congress, vice-president of the United States, and in 1860 the presidential candidate of the Southern democrats. At the breaking out of the war, he was a United States Senator from Kentucky. He was a Confederate officer at Shiloh in April, 1862, and commanded the [35] right wing of the Southern forces at Stone’s River.

General Leonidas Polk was fifty-seven years old in 1863. He was a bishop of the Episcopal church. He graduated from West Point in 1827, but resigned his commission in the army in the same year. He entered the Confederate Army as a major-general, but was soon promoted to lieutenant-general.

General William J. Hardee was forty-seven years old at this time. He graduated from West Point in the class of 1838. He served with distinction in the Mexican War. He entered the Confederate service as colonel, commanded a corps at Shiloh in 1862; was appointed lieutenant-general in October, 1862; and commanded the left wing of the Southern Army at Perryville.

General Simon Bolivar Buckner, another officer in the Confederate Army, was forty years old, and a West Pointer. He surrendered Fort Donelson to General Grant in February, 1862.

Of the two Confederate cavalry commanders, General Nathan B. Forrest was by far the greater. He was a rough, uneducated man, but of great force as a partisan leader. When Lord [36] Wolseley was at the head of the British Army, he said of Forrest that he was the ablest cavalry leader that was produced by our War between the States. He was personally brave, possessed a fine physique, and had sufficient magnetism to inspire the soldiers of his command to great activity and endurance. During the war twenty-nine horses were shot under him, and he took active part in thirty-one encounters, it has been stated. He was wounded several times.

The rank and file of the Confederates were made up of the citizens of the Southern states, in much the same manner that the Union Army was composed of Northern citizens. They fought with a certain fanaticism, for what they deemed their rights. It is singular, that at the beginning of the war, so universal a desire to dissolve the Union seized the great majority of the white people of the South, although they might not be slave owners. They made most efficient soldiers and suffered many hardships, unknown to the soldiers of the Union Army. The martial temperament, inherited as well as acquired through personal habits, was more predominant in the South than in [37] the North. The Southerners lived largely a country-life before the war; they rode horseback, hunted with hounds, and had become more familiar with firearms than the Northerners. The practice of duelling continued longer with them than with the men of the North, who were not as fiery tempered as those of the South. These traits made them soldiers by nature; they liked to serve in the field, and were therefore difficult to conquer. They seemed more lithe and active, than the staid volunteers from the colder North. They have claimed, that they were largely outnumbered; that is true in the aggregate, but not so true on the firing line. The battles of Stone’s River and Chickamauga illustrate these facts. The numbers in both armies were quite evenly matched. During the last year of this war there was little difference in the fighting qualities of the veteran regiments on both sides. The rebellion was put down according to the rules of warfare, and whatever that result may have cost in numbers, it was worth the price. Not every revolt against authoritative power has been suppressed by superior numbers, not even that of the [38] thirteen colonies against England’s. At first, the power of England seemed so overwhelming, that scarcely any one expected that colonial independence could be gained. Foreign nations did not believe that this rebellion could be suppressed, notwithstanding the superiority in numbers of the Union Army.

The wonderful thing about it is, that Lincoln persevered to the end, against discouragements and disasters which seemed, at the time, to be insurmountable. Fortunately there was no compromise, the rebellion was simply crushed, no terms were made; and no promises given to embarrass the reconstruction. Of course, it required large armies and grim determination to reach the goal. The great fact is, not that the Union armies outnumbered the Confederate forces, but that the Union itself was restored. The war was merciless; all wars are. Mercy, pity, and the extension of the hand of helpfulness came after the war was over, not while it was going on. Each side did all it could to fight and win its battles. The North had the larger number of citizens from which to draw, and of course, availed itself of that advantage. The [39] South would have put larger armies into the field if it could have done so; it did use every available man, however, and fought its best. The South might have conquered the Union by overwhelming forces, could such have been secured, but available men were lacking. At all events, the rebellion was crushed by means of legitimate warfare, and the Union was restored.

THE ADVANCE OF THE UNION ARMY

The Confederate Army, commanded by General Braxton Bragg, lay in front of Tullahoma, [3] where Bragg had his headquarters. There was a large entrenched camp at the junction of the Nashville & Chattanooga railroad. This camp and the McMinnville branch was each a secondary depot for commissary stores, while the base of supplies was at Chattanooga. Its front was covered by the defiles of the Duck River, a deep narrow stream edged by a rough range of hills, which divides the “Barrens” from the lower level of Middle Tennessee. The Manchester Pike [40] passes through these hills at Hoover’s Gap, nineteen miles south of Murfreesboro, ascending through a long and difficult canon to the “Barrens”. The Wartrace road runs through Liberty Gap, thirteen miles south of Murfreesboro and five miles west of Hoover’s. There were other passes through these hills, but the enemy held all of them. Bragg’s main position was in front of Shelbyville, about twenty-eight miles southwest of Murfreesboro, and was strengthened by a redan line extending from Horse Mountain, located a little to the north of Shelbyville, to Duck River on the west, covered by a line of abatis. The road from Murfreesboro to Shelbyville was through Guy’s Gap, sixteen miles south of Murfreesboro. Polk’s corps was at Shelbyville, Hardee’s held Hoover’s, Liberty, and Bellbuckle gaps, all in the same range of hills. It was not wise to move directly against the entrenched line at Shelbyville, therefore Rosecrans’s plan was to turn the Confederate right and move on to the railroad bridge, across Elk River, nine miles southeast of Tullahoma. To accomplish this, it was necessary to make Bragg believe that the advance would be [41] by the Shelbyville route. The following dispositions were therefore made: General Granger’s command was at Triune on June 23, fifteen miles west of Murfreesboro; some infantry and cavalry advanced that same day toward Woodbury seventeen miles to the east of Murfreesboro; simultaneously Granger sent General Mitchell’s cavalry division on the Eaglesville and Shelbyville Pike, seventeen miles southwest of Murfreesboro, in order to make an attack on the enemy’s cavalry, and to drive the enemy’s infantry guards on their main line. General Granger, with his own infantry troops and Brannan’s division, moved—with ten days rations—to Salem. [4]

On June 24, Granger moved to Christiana, a small village a few miles southwest of Murfreesboro, south of Salem, towards Shelbyville. On the same day Palmer’s division, and a brigade of cavalry, were ordered to move to the vicinity of Bradyville, fourteen miles southeast of Murfreesboro; his advance columns were to seize the head of the defile leading up to the “Barrens” by an obscure [42] road to Manchester thirty-five miles southeast, and by way of Lumley’s Stand seven miles east of Hoover’s Gap. General Mitchell accomplished his work after a sharp and gallant fight. McCook’s corps advanced on the Shelbyville road, and turning to the left, six miles out, moved two divisions via Millersburg, a small village eleven miles south of Murfreesboro. By advancing on the road to Wartrace [5] he seized and held Liberty Gap.

Five companies of the Thirty-ninth Indiana mounted infantry opened the fight for Liberty Gap on June 24; they were followed by Willich’s brigade. General R. W. Johnson, in his report [6] says: “Here I placed at the disposal of General Willich a portion of the Second Brigade, Colonel Miller commanding, who sent the Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania and the Twenty-ninth Indiana to the right of the Fifteenth Ohio, then to change direction to the left, sweeping the hillside on which the Confederates were posted. This movement was handsomely executed. As [43] soon as the change to the left had been made, General Willich ordered his entire line forward. Under his own eye and management, the Confederates were driven at every point, their camps and camp equipages falling into our hands, and Liberty Gap was in our possession.” The next morning Carlin’s and Post’s brigades of Davis’s division came to Johnson’s support. The Confederates attacked quite fiercely, but were repulsed, and finally retired. The enemy here was Cleburne’s division; he reported a loss of 121.

General Thomas advanced on the Manchester Pike with the Fourteenth Corps in order to make an attempt to take possession of Hoover’s Gap. Major-General Crittenden was to leave Van Cleve’s division of the Twenty-first Corps at Murfreesboro, concentrate at Bradyville, fourteen miles southeast of Murfreesboro, and there await orders. All these movements were executed with success in the midst of a continuous rain, which so softened the surface of the roads, as to render them next to impassable. The advance of the Fourteenth Corps on Hoover’s Gap, June 24, was Wilder’s brigade of mounted infantry, of [44] Reynolds’s division; it was followed by the other two brigades of the same division. Wilder struck the enemy’s pickets within two miles of his camp at Murfreesboro and drove them through Hoover’s Gap to McBride’s Creek. The two rear brigades moved up and occupied the Gap. Soon afterwards Wilder’s brigade was attacked by a portion of Stewart’s division; this brought the rest of Reynolds’s division, and eventually the regular brigade of Rousseau’s division to his assistance.

On June 25 and 26, Rousseau’s, Reynolds’s, and Brannan’s divisions cooperated in an advance on the enemy; after a short resistance the enemy fled to Fairfield, five miles southwest of Hoover’s Gap, towards which place the Union pickets had advanced.

The First and the Twenty-first Wisconsin infantry were actively engaged at Hoover’s Gap, but suffered no casualties. The Seventy-ninth Pennsylvania, in the same brigade, lost twelve men, one wounded. General John T. Wilder’s brigade lost sixty-one men killed and wounded.

On June 27, Gordon Granger captured Guy’s Gap and the same evening took Shelbyville, [45] the main Confederate Army having retreated. The Union headquarters reached Manchester on June 27. Here the Fourteenth Corps concentrated during the night. Part of McCook’s arrived on the 25th; the rest of it did not reach Manchester before the night of the 29th. The troops and animals were very jaded. Crittenden’s Twenty-first Corps was considerably delayed. The troops encountered continuous rains and bad roads, and the last division did not arrive at Manchester before June 29, although an order to march there speedily was received on the 26th. On arrival it was badly worn out.

The forces were at last concentrated on the enemy’s right flank, about ten miles northeast of Tullahoma. During the incessant rain of June 30, an effort was made to form them into position in anticipation of an attack by the enemy. The wagons and horses could scarcely traverse the ground, which was quite swampy. Fortunately the enemy’s forces suffered likewise. What was trial and hardship to one of the armies—on account of the weather—was equally detrimental to the other side. That [46] army which could overcome quickly and victoriously the climatic conditions, had the best chances to win in the martial contest. In forming a line at Manchester to resist an attack, the Fourteenth Corps occupied the centre, with one division in reserve, the Twentieth Corps on the right and the Twenty-first on the left. The last two corps had each one division in reserve. The Union Army was on the right flank of the Confederate line of defense, and of course expected to be attacked. But it was not.

In the meantime Stanley’s cavalry, supported by General Gordon Granger’s infantry and all troops under Granger’s direction, had attacked the enemy at Guy’s Gap—sixteen miles south of Murfreesboro and five miles west of Liberty Gap—and had driven the Confederate troops back to their entrenchments. Then, finding that the enemy’s main army had fallen back, Stanley captured the gap by a direct and flank movement with only three pieces of artillery. The cavalry unexpectedly captured Shelbyville with a number of prisoners, a quantity of arms, and the commissary stores. The reports of this cavalry [47] battle show the retreat of the enemy to Tullahoma forty miles southeast of Murfreesboro, where it was supposed that he intended to make a stand. But on July 1, General Thomas ascertained that the enemy had retreated during the night from Tullahoma. Some Union divisions occupied Tullahoma about noon that same day, while Rousseau’s and Negley’s divisions pushed on by way of Spring Creek overtaking late in the afternoon the rear guard, with which these divisions had a sharp skirmish.

On July 2, the pursuit was made by the Fourteenth and Twentieth corps. The bridge over the Elk River had been burned by the enemy while retreating. The stream had risen and the cavalry could barely ford the river. On July 3, Sheridan’s and Davis’s divisions of the Twentieth Corps, having succeeded in crossing the Elk River, pursued the enemy to Cowan, on the Cumberland plateau, eighteen miles southeast of Tullahoma. Here it was learned that the enemy had crossed the mountains; and that only cavalry troops covered its retreat. Meanwhile the Union Army halted to await needed supplies, [48] which had to be hauled by wagon from Murfreesboro over miserable roads. These supplies had to be stored at the railway station, nearest to the probable battlefield; and before the army could advance over the Cumberland plateau—where a battle would probably soon ensue—the railway had to be repaired. General Rosecrans in his official report says: “Thus ended a nine days’ campaign, which drove the enemy from two fortified positions and gave us possession of Middle Tennessee, conducted in one of the most extraordinary rains ever known in Tennessee at that period of the year, over a soil that became almost a quicksand.” [7] He claims—perhaps justly—that it was this extraordinary rain and bad roads, which prevented his getting possession of the enemy’s communications, and debarred him from forcing the Confederate Army to fight a disastrous battle. He speaks very highly of James A. Garfield, his chief of staff, saying: “He possesses the instincts and energy of a great commander.”

The Union losses during the “Tullahoma [49] Campaign”—thus named in the official record—were as follows: 14 officers killed, and 26 wounded; 71 non-commissioned officers and privates killed, and 436 wounded; 13 missing. Total, 85 killed, 462 wounded, and 13 missing. 1,634 prisoners were taken, some artillery and small arms of very little value; 3,500 sacks of corn and cornmeal were secured.

On July 3, General Braxton Bragg sent the following dispatch from Bridgeport, Alabama—twenty-eight miles directly west from Chattanooga—to Richmond, Virginia: “Unable to obtain a general engagement without sacrificing my communications, I have, after a series of skirmishes, withdrawn the army to this river. It is now coming down the mountains. I hear of no formidable pursuit.” [8] The Confederate Army crossed the mountains to the Tennessee River and on July 7, 1863, encamped near Chattanooga. The Union Army went into camp along the northwestern base of the Cumberland plateau. The object of the Army of the Cumberland for the ensuing campaign was Chattanooga; [50] the Tullahoma campaign was only a small part of the greater one which had yet to take place.

In the Tullahoma campaign the Tenth Wisconsin Infantry lost 3 enlisted men, wounded, and the First Wisconsin Cavalry 2 enlisted men. All the Wisconsin troops bore their full share of the fatigues of the campaign, but only the losses mentioned were reported.

There was one feature of the Tullahoma campaign that was very peculiar. A part of the Union Army had the previous year passed over this same region, while marching to the relief of Grant at Shiloh. Now returning by the way of Chattanooga, where Buell had marched on his way back to Louisville, they again came to this section of the country where the inhabitants mostly sympathized with the South. They were surprised and shocked in 1862 when the hated Yankees invaded their towns and farms. The Confederate authorities told them, that another invasion would never occur, that they could plant their crops and pursue their business without fear. Therefore, when their country was again overrun by the Union Army in 1863, their confidence in the Confederate generals was quite shaken.

A distinguished Confederate general—speaking of the importance of the city of Chattanooga to the Confederacy—said: “As long as we held it, it was the closed doorway to the interior of our country. When it came into your [the Union’s] hands the door stood open, and however rough your progress in the interior might be, it still left you free to march inside. I tell you that when your Dutch general Rosecrans commenced his forward movement for the capture of Chattanooga we laughed him to scorn; we believed that the black brow of Lookout Mountain would frown him out of existence; that he would dash himself to pieces against the many and vast natural barriers that rise all around Chattanooga; and that then the northern people and the government at Washington would perceive how hopeless were their efforts when they came to attack the real [52] South.” With regard to the claim that Chickamauga was a failure for the Union arms, he said: “We would gladly have exchanged a dozen of our previous victories for that one failure.” It is correctly said, that even Richmond was but an outpost, until the success of the Union armies—in the centre of the Confederacy—left Lee’s legions nowhere to go, when they were expelled from Richmond. [9] This was accomplished or made possible only by the operations of the Army of the Cumberland in the Chattanooga Campaign of 1863.

After the retreat of the Confederate Army of the Tennessee from the region about Tullahoma, across the Cumberland Plateau to Chattanooga, Rosecrans established his headquarters at Winchester, Tennessee. [10] He began the repair of the railroad back to Murfreesboro and forward to Stevenson, Alabama, ten miles southeast of Bridgeport and eight miles north of the Tennessee River. The three corps were put into [53] camp in their normal order. The Twentieth Corps occupied the country adjacent to Winchester; the Fourteenth Corps the region near to Decherd; [11] the Twenty-first Corps occupied the country near McMinnville. [12] Detachments were thrown forward as far as Stevenson. The campaign had so far been mere child’s play, compared with what lay before the army in the next movement against Chattanooga and the Confederate Army. The straight line of the plateau is thirty miles across from Winchester to the Tennessee River; the distance is perhaps forty miles by the available roads. The railroad after reaching the summit of the plateau followed down Big Crow Creek to Stevenson, then turned sharply up the valley of the Tennessee, crossing the river at Bridgeport to the South side; then winding among numerous hills, which constitute the south end of the Sand Mountain, continued around the northern nose of Lookout Mountain, close to the river bank, into Chattanooga. [54] Bridgeport is on the Tennessee River twenty-eight miles in a straight line west of Chattanooga. Just opposite, towards the northern nose of Sand Mountain, on the north side of the river, is the southern end of Walden’s Ridge which extends northward from the river, and parallel with the plateau, from which it is separated by the Sequatchie River and Valley. In short the Cumberland Mountains are here a series of ridges and valleys which run from northeast to southwest in a uniform trend, parallel with each other. The Tennessee River rises in southwestern Virginia, and runs between the Cumberland Plateau and Sand Mountain; but between Chattanooga and Bridgeport it cuts a zigzag channel towards the west, between Sand Mountain and Walden’s Ridge, which is the name given to that portion of the ridge lying on the north of the river. What the Army of the Cumberland intended to do was to cross the ridge, called the Cumberland Plateau, then the river, and the Sand Mountain into Lookout Valley and then the Lookout Ridge, in order to reach the Chattanooga Valley south of Chattanooga. Such a movement would force Bragg to [55] march out of the city to defend his communications. These ridges are all linked together at different places. Sand and Lookout at Valley Head, Alabama; the Cumberland Plateau and Walden’s at the head of Sequatchie Valley and River. Pigeon Mountain is a spur of Lookout Ridge. Chattanooga is located on the south side of the river, between the northern nose of Lookout and Missionary Ridge. The latter is a separate and low ridge about three miles southeast of Chattanooga. Without a map it will be difficult for the reader to perceive the rugged and almost impassable field of operations, which General Rosecrans faced, while his army lay at the northwestern base of the Cumberland Plateau, waiting for suitable preparation for the intended campaign.

There was an alternative line of advance open to Rosecrans, namely to cross the plateau into the Sequatchie Valley, or to march around the head of the valley at Pikeville, then over Walden’s Ridge, and thus attack Chattanooga directly from the north; or, to cross the river above and to the east of Chattanooga, at the north end [56] of Missionary Ridge, that is, at the mouth of the Hiawassie River. This last route would have exposed his line of retreat or communications, and he therefore chose to operate at his right and enter into the valley south of Chattanooga.

Early in August the railroad was repaired to Stevenson and Bridgeport; also the branch to Tracy City on the plateau.

Sheridan’s division of the Twentieth Corps was pushed forward to Stevenson and Bridgeport. The commissary and quartermaster-stores were accumulated at Stevenson as rapidly as possible. By the 8th of August these supplies were sufficient in quantity to justify a distribution of them to the different commands, preparatory to an advance across the river and over the difficult ridges, that lay at almost right angles to the line of movement. The advance of the main army began August 16.

The Fourteenth Corps crossed along the railroad line, or near to it. Its advance was soon at Stevenson and some of it at Bridgeport. The Twenty-first Corps—which formed the left of the army at McMinnville—crossed by the way of [57] Pelham, a small village on the plateau, to Thurman’s in the Sequatchie Valley. Minty’s cavalry covered the left flank by way of Pikeville, a village at the head of Sequatchie Valley. The Twentieth Corps also came to Stevenson and its vicinity, but by another route—to the right—than that taken by the Fourteenth, namely, via Bellefont, ten miles southwest of Stevenson, and Caperton’s Ferry, which is the river point nearest to Stevenson.

All these crossings of the plateau were made without resistance by the enemy, although there were small Confederate cavalry outlooks here and there, which fell back when the Union troops appeared. It seemed as if Bragg desired to have the Union Army advance as far as possible from its base of supplies into the mountain gorges and over a long and difficult line of communications. That course would afford him a better chance, as his army being reinforced would be in better condition to successfully attack and destroy the Union Army.

In order to save the hauling of full forage for the animals, General Rosecrans had delayed his movement until the corn should be sufficiently ripe. [58] No detail seemed wanting in the preparations for the difficult campaign. Enough ammunition was provided for at least two battles, and twenty-five days rations for the troops were hauled in wagons.

The Tennessee River had to be crossed by the different corps; in order to conceal this movement and deceive the enemy at Chattanooga, Hagen’s brigade of Palmer’s division, and Wagner’s of Wood’s of the Twenty-first Corps, accompanied by Wilder’s mounted infantry of Reynolds’s division, crossed Walden’s Ridge from the Sequatchie Valley into the valley of the Tennessee. These troops made ostentatious demonstrations upon Chattanooga from the north side of the river. Wilder—with four guns of Lilly’s battery—appeared suddenly before Chattanooga, threw some shells into the city, sunk the steamer “Paint Rock,” lying at the city landing, then ascending the river, feigned to examine the crossings, making frequent inquiry as to their difficulty and the character of the country. On the other side of the river east of Chattanooga, General Cleburne was sent by Bragg to make preparations for defending the crossings against the supposed advance of Rosecrans’s [59] army. He fortified the ferry crossings. General Buckner—who commanded in East Tennessee against the forces of Burnside—expressed as his opinion on August 21, that General Rosecrans would cross above the mouth of Hiawassie River—a stream flowing northwards—and transfer his forces into Tennessee on its south bank, some thirty-five miles northeast of Chattanooga. Buckner’s army was at the point mentioned.

Rosecrans’s intention was, however, to cross at Caperton’s Ferry—near Bridgeport and not far from Stevenson—and at Shellmound; these places are from twenty to forty miles below and to the west of Chattanooga. On August 20 at daybreak, Heg’s brigade, of Davis’s division of the Twentieth Corps, in which served the Fifteenth Wisconsin Infantry, crossed in pontoon boats at Caperton’s Ferry, drove away the enemy’s cavalry and occupied the southern bank. Here a twelve hundred feet pontoon bridge was soon completed, and Davis’s division of the Twentieth Corps, crossed and advanced to the foot of Sand Mountain, preceded by cavalry. Johnson’s division of the same corps crossed the following day [60] on the same bridge. Sheridan’s division of the Twentieth Corps crossed at Bridgeport on a bridge constructed by them of pontoons and tressels; it was 2,700 feet long. Baird’s—formerly Rousseau’s—and Negley’s divisions of the Fourteenth Corps followed Sheridan’s division. The Twenty-first Corps marched down the Sequatchie Valley and crossed at Battle Creek, nine miles up the river from Bridgeport. Hazen’s, Wagner’s, and Wilder’s brigades were, as before mentioned, in the Tennessee Valley to the north of Chattanooga, and did not cross with their corps. The whole movement across the river began on August 29 and ended on September 4. The Third brigade of Van Cleve’s division of the Twenty-first Corps was left at McMinnville as a garrison. The railway was protected by the reserve corps; the Fourteenth Corps was ordered to concentrate in Lookout Valley and to send immediate detachments to seize Cooper’s and Stevens’s gaps of Lookout Mountain, the only passable routes to McLemore’s Cove, down which runs the west Chickamauga Creek in a northeasterly direction, towards Chattanooga. The Twentieth [61] Corps was to move to Valley Head at the head of Lookout Valley, and seize Winston’s Gap forty miles south of Chattanooga. The Twenty-first Corps with the exception of Hazen’s and Wagner’s infantry and Minty’s cavalry—which were still north and east of Chattanooga—were to march to Wauhatchie, at the lower end of Lookout Valley, near Lookout Mountain, and to communicate with the Fourteenth Corps at Trenton in the same valley, and threaten Chattanooga by way of the Tennessee River via the nose of Lookout Mountain. The cavalry crossed at Caperton’s and at a ford near Island Creek, in Lookout Valley, from which point they reconnoitered towards Rome, Georgia, fifty-five miles south of Chattanooga, via Alpine. This last mentioned hamlet is forty-two miles south of Chattanooga. In the absence of Major-General Stanley—the chief of cavalry—its movements were not prompt. If the reader will refer to a good topographical map of the region around Chattanooga, he will see how sagacious these movements were, and what grand strategy they displayed. The Army of the Cumberland was [62] stretched in line through the whole length of Lookout Valley, between Sand Mountain and Lookout Mountain, on the south side of the Tennessee River; it faced east towards the Chattanooga Valley, with only one range between them and the Confederate line of retreat and supplies; while on the northeast side of Chattanooga was a Union force of several brigades to prevent any counter movement by the Confederates upon the Union line of supplies.

After crossing the Tennessee River, Rosecrans continued his feints to make Bragg think that the real movement was the feigned one. He had sent Wagner’s infantry, and Wilder’s and Minty’s cavalry brigades to report to Hazen with a force amounting to about 7,000. Hazen caused the enemy to believe that the whole army was there, intending to cross the river above Chattanooga. This was done by extensive firings, marchings, countermarchings, and by bugle calls, at widely separated points; while Wilder moved his artillery continuously across openings in sight from the opposite bank.

The Confederates occupied in force the point [63] of Lookout Mountain at Chattanooga. To carry this by an attack of the Twenty-first Corps seemed too risky; therefore the original movement was continued, namely, against the line south of Chattanooga, over Lookout Ridge, south of the point where it was held in force. The cavalry was ordered to advance on the extreme right to Summerville, in Broomtown Valley, a village eighteen miles south of Lafayette, Georgia. McCook was to support this movement by a division thrown forward to the vicinity of Alpine forty-two miles southwest of Chattanooga. These movements were made on September 8 and 9.

General Thomas crossed his corps over Frick’s, Cooper’s, and Stevens’s gaps of Lookout Mountain, to McLemore’s Cove.

These movements forced Bragg to evacuate Chattanooga on September 8. Then Crittenden with the Twenty-first Corps and its trains marched the same day around the point of Lookout and camped that night at Rossville, at the gap through Missionary Ridge, five miles south of Chattanooga. Through this gap runs the wagon road from Lafayette to Chattanooga.

[64] General Rosecrans claimed to have evidence that Bragg was moving towards Rome, and had therefore ordered Crittenden to hold Chattanooga with one brigade, call all the troops of Hazen’s command across from the north side of the river, an follow the enemy’s retreat vigorously.

On September 11, Crittenden was ordered to advance as far as Ringgold, but not farther, and to make a reconnoisance as far as Lee and Gordon’s Mill. [13] Crittenden’s report as well as other evidence convinced General Rosecrans that Bragg had only gone as far as Lafayette—twenty-five miles south of Chattanooga—and then halted. General Crittenden’s whole corps was therefore sent to Lee and Gordon’s Mill, where he found Bragg’s rear guard. He was ordered to communicate with General Thomas, who by that time had reached the eastern foot of Lookout Mountain in McLemore’s Cove, at the eastern base of Stevens’s gap. Wilder’s mounted brigade followed and covered the Twenty-first Corps in its [65] movements to Lee and Gordon’s Mill, and had a severe fight with the enemy at Leet’s tan yard, five miles to the southeast. Although Bragg made his headquarters at Lafayette in his retreat from Chattanooga, his rear guard did not get beyond Lee and Gordon’s Mill.

On September 10 Negley’s division of the Fourteenth Corps marched—after having crossed the ridge—from the foot of Stevens’s Gap, across McLemore’s Cove, towards Dug Gap in the Pigeon Mountains and then directly towards Lafayette. Dug Gap is six miles west of Lafayette. Negley found this gap heavily obstructed, but Baird’s division came to his support on the morning of September 11. They became convinced by some sharp skirmishing, which occurred on the 11th, that the enemy’s forces were advancing; and therefore fell back from Davis’s cross roads to a good position near the foot of Stevens’s Gap. These two officers are entitled to great credit for their coolness and skill in withdrawing their divisions from a very perilous trap. The forces of the enemy would have been overwhelming in their immediate front, if the Confederates had been [66] more expeditious and made the attack on the afternoon of September 10 or on the morning of the 11th. Hindman, Buckner, and Cleburne, with several divisions were there, but failed to cooperate in an attack at the right time. The obstructions placed in the gap by the Confederates favored Negley and Baird.

On September 12 Reynolds’s and Brannan’s divisions following over the mountain closed up to Negley and Baird. Bragg’s army was at Lafayette, near Dug Gap, in force. Having official information that Longstreet was coming from Virginia with large reinforcements, and having already received troops from Mississippi and the eastern part of Tennessee, Bragg halted in his retreat. He was preparing to give battle to the Union forces at the first good opportunity.

Two divisions of Joseph E. Johnston’s troops from Mississippi and Buckner’s Corps from Tennessee—where Burnside’s forces were—had joined Bragg before he moved north from Lafayette to Chickamauga, where he was joined by three divisions of Longstreet’s Corps from Virginia on the 18th, if not earlier. At the same time Halleck, [67] chief of the army at Washington, D. C., telegraphed Rosecrans September 11, 1863, as follows: “It is reported here by deserters that a part of Bragg’s army is reinforcing Lee. It is important that the truth of this should be ascertained as early as possible.” [14]

The fact stands out in bold relief, that the Confederate Government at Richmond hastened reinforcements to General Bragg; while the Washington Government sent none to Rosecrans, although Burnside was in the eastern part of Tennessee with 16,000 troops, and was at that time at leisure. Because the force, lately in his front, had reinforced Bragg at Lafayette, Burnside did not obey Halleck’s order to join Rosecrans; on the contrary, he drove Buckner’s force, which united with Bragg; thus Burnside enabled Buckner’s men to take part against the Union Army in the battle of Chickamauga.

Bragg in his official report, says: “During the [68] 9th it was ascertained that a column, estimated at from 4,000 to 8,000 had crossed Lookout Mountain into the cove by way of Cooper’s and Stevens’s gaps. Thrown off his guard by our rapid movement, apparently in retreat, when in reality we had concentrated opposite his center, and deceived by the information, by deserters and others sent into his lines, the enemy pressed on his columns to intercept us, and thus exposed himself in detail.” [15] He says further that he ordered Hindman, Cleburne, and Buckner to join and attack the forces—Negley and Baird—at Davis’s cross roads, near Dug Gap; but because Dug Gap was obstructed by felled timber, which required twenty-four hours to remove, and because Buckner, when he joined Hindman, wanted to change the plans, Negley and Baird had been allowed to move back in a position not wise to follow. Bragg drew Buckner, Hindman, and Cleburne back to Lafayette and prepared to move in order to attack Crittenden at Lee and Gordon’s Mill. Polk’s and Walker’s corps were moved immediately in that direction.

[69] The only Wisconsin troops in the affair at Dug Gap on September 10 and 11 were the First, Tenth, and Twenty-first Infantry. Lieutenant Robert J. Nickles of the First Wisconsin Infantry, aide to General J. C. Starkweather, commanding the brigade, was killed when reconnoitering alone the enemy’s skirmishers. This was the only casualty to the Wisconsin troops.

On September 12, General Leonidas Polk was ordered to attack Crittenden the next day, at Lee and Gordon’s Mill. Polk would not attack however, without reinforcements. Bragg spent the next five days getting his army in position along the west Chickamauga Creek, and on its east side from the north end of Pigeon Mountains to Reed’s Bridge. Brigadier-General B. R. Johnson, who had been holding Ringgold on the east side of the Chickamauga with one brigade, moved on the 18th to Reed’s Bridge on the west Chickamauga; this caused his force to become the extreme right of Bragg’s line. While Forrest’s and Pegram’s cavalry covered the extreme right at Reed’s Bridge, Walker’s Corps formed on the left of B. R. Johnson’s, opposite Alexander’s Bridge; Buckner’s [70] was next to Thedford’s Ford; Polk’s opposite Lee and Gordon’s Mill, and Hill’s Corps was on the extreme left, near Glass’s Mill. Wheeler’s Cavalry protected the left flank, and was ordered to annoy the troops in McLemore’s Cove so much that Bragg’s movement would not be discovered. With B. R. Johnson’s movement from Ringgold came two brigades—just arrived from Mississippi—and three of Longstreet’s from Virginia. The other two brigades from Virginia came on the 19th in time to take active part, the Confederate Army being in position on the east side of west Chickamauga Creek; and Crittenden’s Corps near Lee and Gordon’s Mill on the west side. Bragg was finally ready for attack; and on the night of the 17th issued his order of battle, namely, that each body of troops should cross the creek at the nearest practicable bridge or ford, turn to the left, and sweep up the Chickamauga towards Lee and Gordon’s Mill. This would bring the troops upon the left flank of Crittenden’s forces. Leonidas Polk was to attack in front, across the stream, while Hill was ordered to prevent the Union forces in McLemore’s Cove from [71] reinforcing Crittenden. It will be seen how Bragg’s plan of attack failed completely. The Chickamauga Creek or River rises at the head of McLemore’s Cove, and runs northeast, emptying into the Tennessee River about five miles above Chattanooga. Therefore, to retreat to Chattanooga, or to cut off the Union Army from it, the Confederate Army had to cross on the west side of Chickamauga. The road from Lafayette to Chattanooga—on which the Confederates marched—runs on the east side of and parallel with Pigeon Mountains and the river, and crosses the river at Lee and Gordon’s Mill. The road on which the Union troops at Stevens’s gap marched, runs down the cove on the west side of the river and Pigeon Mountains, past Crawfish Springs, near which it branches to McFarland’s Gap and to Kelly’s farm on the Lafayette road, three miles north of Lee and Gordon’s; this distance is about sixteen miles. The Pigeon Mountains dwindle away into the level country some miles south of Lee and Gordon’s.

The order of battle issued by Bragg on September 17, was not immediately executed, on account [72] of some resistance made by Wilder’s mounted infantry and Minty’s cavalry at Reed’s and Alexander’s bridges.

The activity of Minty and Wilder, and the bold front shown by the troops of Crittenden at and about Lee and Gordon’s Mill, prevented a serious attack by General Leonidas Polk, who was in front of that position. These facts together with the affair at Dug Gap and the presence of McCook’s Corps at Alpine caused the Confederate Army to hesitate; thus General Rosecrans was given time to concentrate his whole army—not Crittenden’s Corps only—at Chickamauga, across the Lafayette road, between the Confederate Army and Chattanooga. Bragg’s plan was to attack Crittenden’s left and rear, throwing it back upon the centre—General Thomas’s—before Crittenden could be reinforced, and then to thrust his army between Rosecrans and Chattanooga. Rosecrans’s plan was to prevent such a disaster. Late in the afternoon of September 18, the first Confederate troops crossed the Chickamauga towards the west; this movement was still going on [73] on the morning of the 19th, when something unexpected happened to Bragg’s Army.

About two-thirds of the Confederate Army had crossed and was facing towards Lee and Gordon’s Mill, when at 9 o’clock a brisk engagement commenced with Forrest’s cavalry on the right of the Confederate line at Jay’s Mill, near Reed’s Bridge.

While these movements of the Confederate Army were being inaugurated from Lafayette down on the east side of Chickamauga, the Union Army, at the foot of Stevens’s Gap in the cove and McCook’s Twentieth Corps, twenty miles away near Alpine, had to get together and join Crittenden’s Twenty-first Corps at Lee and Gordon’s Mill.

While waiting to receive sufficient information to convince him that Bragg had halted at Lafayette, Rosecrans had on September 11 or 12 greatly widened the distance between his corps. It was a very dangerous maneuver to face Bragg, and had a more enterprising general been in command of the Confederate Army, the result would probably have been fatal for the Union forces. General D. [74] H. Hill says in a Century Magazine article, that Bragg was confused by the rapid movements of the Union Corps; the presence of McCook’s Corps, south of Lafayette, at Alpine, held Bragg for a while at that place. He was not well informed as to the movements of Rosecrans’s Army. [16]

Bragg, by failing to attack the detached Fourteenth Corps nearest him in McLemore’s Cove, and afterwards to march towards the more distant detached Twenty-first Corps at Lee and Gordon’s gave the Union commander an opportunity to concentrate, and place his united army across the road from Lafayette to Chattanooga, at Kelly’s farm between Rossville and Lee and Gordon’s Mill. How was this movement done?

While it took Bragg five days—from September 12 to 17—to concentrate his army from Lafayette and Ringgold near Lee and Gordon’s, it required the same length of time for McCook to march his corps from the vicinity of Alpine to connect it with Thomas at the foot of Stevens’s Gap [75] in the cove. There was a distance of forty miles from flank to flank of the Union Army, that is, from Alpine to Lee and Gordon’s. But McCook marched fifty-seven miles by the route he took in order to connect with Thomas. General Rosecrans in his official report says: “He [General McCook] had, with great prudence, already moved his trains back to the rear of Little River, on the mountain, but unfortunately, being ignorant of the mountain road, moved down the mountain at Winston’s Gap, down Lookout Valley to Cooper’s Gap, up the mountain, and down again, closing up with General Thomas on the 17th.” [17]

Looking back at this scattering of Rosecrans’s forces by the sending of McCook’s Corps to Alpine—twenty miles southwest of Lafayette—one can understand that such tactics were serious mistakes. General Rosecrans thought himself justified for the movement upon the supposed correctness of the information he had received, namely, that Bragg’s Army was in full retreat towards Rome, Georgia. It is apparent, however, that a reconnoisance of the cavalry to Alpine and Summerville would have [76] accomplished the same result as the corps of infantry which was sent. The alternative before Rosecrans, when he discovered the retreat of the Confederate Army, was to concentrate the Fourteenth and Twentieth corps at Chattanooga, occupy Rossville Gap with a strong outpost, well entrenched, and Lookout Mountain with another entrenched detachment; he could then have waited for further developments. It is hardly probable that Bragg would have attacked him after having received his reinforcements, but would perhaps have fallen back on his line of supplies at some point in the rear. Before that could have occurred, however, the reinforcements that Rosecrans afterwards received would have been able to protect his line of communications.

By the evening of the 17th the Union troops were substantially within supporting distance, but not yet in line to resist an attack by the enemy upon Crittenden at Lee and Gordon’s, but orders were immediately given to move the Fourteenth and Twentieth corps towards the northeast, down the west Chickamauga River, in order to cover the Lafayette road, somewhere near Crittenden’s [77] Corps. The position of the troops and narrowness of the roads retarded the march.

It must be kept in mind, that the movements which Rosecrans made after he discovered that Bragg had halted at Lafayette, were for the purpose of concentrating upon Chattanooga; and that the route Rosecrans took after the junction of the Fourteenth and Twentieth corps was perhaps the shortest route he could take to Chattanooga, while he could at the same time watch the enemy. He encountered Bragg’s force at Chickamauga and was forced to fight there. This was, therefore, the battle for Chattanooga. He gained his point—the military occupancy of Chattanooga—but it required two battles to win it; those of Chickamauga and the three days fight immediately around Chattanooga.

During the 18th Minty’s cavalry, in position east of Reed’s Bridge, was attacked by Bushrod Johnson’s troops coming from Ringgold, and Wilder’s mounted infantry at Alexander’s, by Walker’s Corps. Both were holding bridges, but were driven back into the Lafayette road. General Rosecrans’s plan, as given in orders, was that [78] General Thomas on his way down the cove road passing Crawfish Springs, near the battlefield, should post General Negley’s division there, relieving two divisions of Crittenden’s Corps. With the remainder of his corps, he was to march by way of Widow Glenn’s house to the Lafayette road, and take position at Kelly’s farm, across this road. General Crittenden was to move Palmer’s and Van Cleve’s divisions, relieved by Negley, to the left of his line, and with them prolong his left, from the left of Wood’s division, so as to cover that part of the Lafayette road, near Lee and Gordon’s. McCook’s Corps was to follow General Thomas and take temporary position at Crawfish Springs, protecting the right of the Union line, and to keep his corps mainly in reserve.

The cavalry was to close on McCook’s right, and to watch the crossings of the Chickamauga in that region.

The Union movements began on the morning of the 18th, but were so slow, that McCook’s Corps only reached Pond Spring at dark, and bivouaced there for the night. Crittenden’s two divisions [79] reached their positions on the Lafayette road near midnight. In view of the accumulated evidence, that the enemy was crossing his forces over the Chickamauga below Lee and Gordon’s on the 18th, General Thomas pushed forward his corps, uninterruptedly during the night. He halted his leading division—Negley’s—at the assigned position near Crawfish Springs, where his corps rested for two hours at midnight and made coffee. From there on Baird’s division was in the lead, and General Thomas and staff rode with General Baird at the head of the column. This was a weird night-march. The utmost secrecy was kept. If the enemy—who was just across the river not far away—had discovered the movement, he would perhaps also have marched in the night and occupied the place for which General Thomas was aiming. General Hill’s Corps and Wheeler’s Cavalry of the Confederate Army were on the east side of the Chickamauga, in order to prevent the Fourteenth and Twentieth corps from making this march. To deceive the enemy campfires were left burning in the camps in the early evening; in fact all along the road southwest of [80] Crawfish Springs, frequent fires were kindled. Soon after leaving Crawfish Springs the column deflected to the right into an obscure cross-country road, which led to Kelly’s farm. Along the windings of this road, some of the hardest fights of the 19th and 20th took place. A pond afterwards known as “bloody pond” was passed soon after leaving Crawfish Springs; to the left, and a short distance from this pond, General William H. Lytle was killed September 20. Still further on was the place where the fatal blunder of the 20th occurred—at about 11 a. m.—near Brotherton’s house; General T. J. Wood, obeying his interpretation of an order from General Rosecrans, having withdrawn from the line, let in Longstreet’s troops.

This road runs almost entirely through thick hardwood timber, but about half way between Crawfish Springs and Kelly’s farm, there was a little dwelling in the midst of a clearing, known as Widow Glenn’s. Here the next day, General Rosecrans lifted the name of the widow from the depths of utter obscurity to the heights of national fame, by making her home his headquarters. In [81] fact, the whole region from Missionary Ridge, on the left of the marching column as far as Rossville Gap (four miles to the northwest) to the Chickamauga on the east, was densely wooded and covered with heavy undergrowth. A few small farms scattered through this woodland were tilled by the obscurest of backwoodsmen, who lived in small log cabins or small frame buildings. Their names would never have been known, even in Chattanooga nine miles away, had it not been for the accidental fighting there of the greatest battle of the west. Widow Glenn’s, Kelly’s farm, Snodgrass Hill, McDonald’s, Poe’s, Brotherton’s, Dyer’s, Vittetoe’s, and Viniard’s were suddenly made historical by the battle of Chickamauga.

General George H. Thomas was a very sedate man. There was about him, at all times, the very atmosphere of solid merit and reserved strength. As he rode beside General Baird, attended by the two staff corps, there was no indication that he was conscious of his high position. His modesty was always conspicuous. No one in the long line of troops stretching for miles [82] behind could see in this unpretentious officer the true hero of the coming conflict, who would be known in the future as the “Rock of Chickamauga.” After Negley’s division was left in position near Crawfish, there remained in the marching column the three divisions of Baird, Brannan, and Reynolds. Baird’s and Brannan’s had three brigades each, but Reynolds’s had only two; Wilder’s was mounted and operated as cavalry, wherefore it was not always with its division.

Chickamauga, September 19, 1863
Adapted from Fiske’s The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War , p. 266

About daylight on September 19, Baird’s division filed across the Lafayette road near Kelly’s log house, stacked arms, and commenced to prepare breakfast. Forrest’s Confederate cavalry lay at that time in the neighborhood of Jay’s Mill, one mile to the east, near Reed’s Bridge; Hood’s and Walker’s corps were further up, or west towards Lee’s and Gordon’s and within a mile and a half of Crittenden’s left. The stream was in many places easily fordable. The whole Confederate Army was across the Chickamauga at sunrise with the exception of Hindman’s, Breckenridge’s, [83] and Cleburne’s divisions. Thomas made temporary headquarters under a large tree by the roadside; while waiting for the closing up of the rear division, he lay down on some blankets, and told his aide not to let him sleep more than an hour. General Gordon Granger, who commanded the reserve corps, had been ordered by Rosecrans on September 13 to bring three brigades of this corps—which happened then to be at Bridgeport, Alabama, guarding that point of the Union line of supplies—to the Rossville Gap. His duty was to guard the approaches from the south and east and to generally support the main army . He moved with his usual energy and arrived at the gap on September 14, although the distance is about thirty-five miles. He brought with him two brigades of Steedman’s division, viz.: Mitchell’s and Whittaker’s, and Daniel McCook’s brigades of James D. Morgan’s division. Granger’s presence in the front of Rossville Gap at McAffee’s Church with Whittaker’s brigade, and his sending Daniel McCook’s and Mitchell’s brigades towards Jay’s Mill and Reed’s Bridge, assisted greatly in postponing the crossing of the [84] Confederate forces until the 18th and thus preventing an attack on Crittenden’s left flank.

On the morning of the 19th McCook’s brigade was bivouacing somewhere near Reed’s Bridge. McCook rode over to where Thomas was, and said hurriedly he must speak to him. He told General Thomas that a Confederate brigade had crossed at Reed’s Bridge and that his (own) brigade had then burned this bridge, thus this detached brigade could be captured, if General Thomas would send forces enough to do it. At that moment the head of Brannan’s division was approaching in rear of the line of Baird’s division to take position on the latter’s left. Thomas ordered Brannan to reconnoitre in that direction with two brigades and to attack any force met. His advance brigade—Croxton’s—encountered very soon Forrest’s cavalry, about 7:30 or 8 a. m. (some reports say 9 a. m.) and drove it more than half a mile. “This vigorous movement disconcerted the plans of the enemy to move on our left and opened the battle of the 19th September,” says General Rosecrans in his official report. [18] Forrest [85] was in that place as a defense of Bragg’s right flank. The sudden musketry of Croxton’s attack on Forrest far to the right of the Confederate commanders startled them and gave them the first intimation, that Bragg’s order did not meet the situation.

General H. V. Boynton says that, at the time the isolated Confederate brigade was reported as on the west side of Chickamauga, early in the morning of September 19, two-thirds of the Confederate Army were on the west side.

It was 6:30 a. m. when Brannan left Kelly’s and moved north; he took the Reed’s Bridge road for the capturing of the isolated brigade. It was between 8 and 9 a. m., before the enemy was struck.

General Forrest called immediately for assistance. Ector’s and Wilson’s infantry brigades of Walker’s Corps returned down the stream and drove Croxton. This brought Brannan with his two remaining brigades forward; he in turn drove back the Confederate force. Brannan in his report [19] says, that his troops came upon a strong force [86] of the enemy, consisting of two divisions instead of the supposed brigade. Very soon Baird’s division was sent in on the right of Brannan; this at first drove the Confederate force that was attacking Brannan, but in turn it was attacked directly on its right flank and rear by Liddell’s division, which threw it into temporary confusion. In the meantime McCook’s Corps arrived on the field. R. W. Johnson’s division of that corps was sent in, at noon, on Baird’s right; it struck Cheatham’s division on its right flank, driving it back in confusion. Johnson’s was overlapped and in immediate danger, when General John M. Palmer’s division of Crittenden’s Corps, relieved the right of his division; Crittenden had very wisely dispatched Palmer’s division toward the sound of the firing and this burst upon the enemy. Palmer’s right was soon overlapped when Van Cleve from Crittenden’s Corps came to the rescue, but later in the day he also was beaten back. Then Reynolds’s division of Thomas’s corps advanced on the left of Palmer’s division, and two brigades of Van Cleve’s division came in on Palmer’s right. Davis’s division of McCook’s Corps attacked most opportunely and [87] drove the enemy, but was compelled somewhat to give way. In this attack Colonel Hans C. Heg of the Fifteenth Wisconsin Infantry was mortally wounded. In the meantime Crittenden’s remaining division under Wood attacked the Confederates and turned the tide. Lee and Gordon’s Mill was at that moment uncovered, all of Crittenden’s Corps having marched towards the left. About 3 o’clock p. m. McCook was ordered to send his remaining division (Sheridan’s) to support the line near Wood and Davis, and to place Lytle’s brigade at Lee and Gordon’s as the extreme right. This stayed the Confederate advance in that section.

Lytle’s brigade was considered sufficient at that time to hold a point against which Bragg was, at first, directing his whole force. This point—at Lee and Gordon’s—was the left of the Union Army on the 18th; at noon on the 19th it was the right.

Negley’s division, which had been posted near Crawfish Springs the night before, was then the only Union division which did not partake in the battle at first, but arrived in accordance with orders [88] on the field about 4:30 p. m. He was ordered to the place, from which Van Cleve had been driven, in order to attack; he drove the enemy steadily, while Thomas was driving him on the Confederate right; these movements continued until night.

It can readily be perceived that the battle of the 19th was more or less a haphazard fight, neither side being aware of the position of the other. The undergrowth of the woods was so dense in most places, that opposed sides could not perceive each other until they were within a few yards, except by the firing. It was unfortunate that Rosecrans was not present with Thomas, when the latter’s corps crossed the Lafayette road. Before an attack was made, the Twenty-first Corps, being the nearest one to the Fourteenth, should have been formed on the right of the Fourteenth, both in a compact line, and with a brigade for each division in reserve; and the Twentieth Corps—when it closed up on the right of the Twenty-first in the same compact order—should have advanced swiftly upon the Confederates, some of whom were still crossing the river, and some with their right flanks to the Union line of attack. It is possible [89] that such an attack would have driven the Confederates into the river in great confusion; but an attack by only one division (Brannan’s) on Forrest’s cavalry beyond the Confederate right flank, simply notified the Confederate commanders, and gave them ample time to wheel their divisions into the proper direction, and signalled them where to attack. General Rosecrans in his report does not mention a night fight that occurred on the extreme Union left. In fact, he says, there was no firing after dark. Just as it began to grow dark, however, Cleburne’s division of Hill’s Corps arrived from across the river. He boldly and characteristically marched through the defeated and prostrated divisions of Walker and Cheatham, was joined by two brigades of Cheatham’s division, Jackson’s, and Preston Smith’s, and then attacked with great fierceness the Union troops under R. W. Johnson and Baird; they covered Johnson’s front and lapped over on Baird. It was too dark to recognize friend from foe, and it was more or less a hand-to-hand contest. Finally the attack was repulsed, the Union troops holding the field. [90] The Confederate general, Preston Smith, and two of his staff officers were killed.

Some idea of the severity of the fighting on the 19th—the charging and falling back of both sides; the difficulty in keeping alignments; the impossibility of officers identifying friend or foe; the losing of artillery batteries and single pieces, their recapture; and the awful slaughter in both armies—can be obtained only by reading official reports in serial numbers 50 and 51 of Rebellion Records . Its intensity can be estimated from the following data. Breckenridge’s division was not in the fight of September 19, but fought on the 20th only; his loss in killed and wounded was 1,075. Cleburne was in the night fight of the 19th, and was as active as Breckenridge on the 20th; his loss was 1,743 in killed and wounded. The total difference of 668 does not give an accurate comparison of the two days’ fighting, but does give some idea of the awful slaughter. The battle of the 19th was fought without breastworks; it was a square stand-up fight; nearly every division engaged on both sides, first attacked, then drove its opponent, and after falling back in some disorder, [91] reformed, and again advanced, until the day and part of the night were gone.

The surgeon-general of the Union Army reported that about 4,500 wounded were treated after this battle of the 19th. The loss in killed and wounded must, therefore, have reached 6,000, but the Union reports do not separate the losses of the 19th from the total.

Late in the afternoon of the 19th, Brannan’s division was withdrawn from the left and placed in reserve, or rather in echelon at the right of Reynolds, near Brotherton’s house, at the right of Thomas’s line.

During the night of the 19th the lines of both armies were readjusted. That of the Union Army was drawn back. Palmer of Crittenden’s Corps and Johnson of McCook’s, who had reported to General Thomas the day before, were ordered to remain under his direction. He placed his troops in a compact line—facing east with the Lafayette road in his rear—around Kelly’s farm, but some distance in the woods. The divisions were in the following order from left to right: Baird, Johnson, Palmer, Reynolds, and Brannan; Brannan was [92] drawn back so far, however, that he could be available as a reserve and at the same time close enough to advance quickly to the front line. The right and left were both refused. Baird had no reserve; but Johnson and Palmer had each a brigade in reserve. Each division was formed in two lines, and both were protected by hastily thrown up log breastworks. The artillery was in battery between brigades; this line was not broken during the battle of the 20th. Reynolds’s line crossed the Lafayette road at Poe’s house, near Brotherton’s, and from there to Lee and Gordon’s neither of the armies was in possession of the road. Reynolds had Turchin’s brigade in line and King’s in reserve. Baird’s left did not reach to the Lafayette road. Kelly Field, which was a parallelogram about half a mile long and a quarter of a mile wide, was the storm centre of battle during September 20. Besides the immense fighting along the main line of log works, there were five different charges, in rear of the main line from the south to the north side by five different Union brigades. These charges were made against the Confederate troops, which had turned on the left of Baird’s line and [93] gained his rear. The brigades of Stanley, Van Derveer, Gross, Willich, and Turchin made these charges.

The right of the Union line on the 20th—from Brannan’s right—was neither compact nor protected. During the night of the 19th, or early morning of the 20th, the four divisions of Sheridan, Davis, Wood, and Van Cleve had been moved to the eastern slope of Missionary Ridge, a mile or more from the Lafayette road, in order to cover the road leading from Crawfish Springs to McFarland’s Gap, west of Rosecrans’s headquarters. General Rosecrans says he rode the line about daylight, and that he suggested certain changes to McCook, especially that he keep close to the left, which was not done, however, in time to prevent disaster. Negley of the Fourteenth Corps, who was in line on the right adjoining Brannan, was ordered to proceed to Thomas’s left, but only two brigades, John Beatty’s and Stanley’s, arrived, one at a time; both were driven away by the enemy. John Beatty’s brigade—which at 8:30 a. m. was placed on the left of Baird, so as to reach the Lafayette road—was not fortified; its thin line was [94] swept away at the first attack by the enemy. Negley was expected to fill this gap with his whole division, and Thomas sent request after request for Negley’s division. There was so much re-adjustment going on at the wrong time, and much of it not going on at any time in the troops under McCook and Crittenden on the 20th, that it is difficult now to try to place them up to 11 a. m. Wood, with his two brigades from the reserve, relieved Negley’s two remaining brigades in the front line, next to Brannan’s about 9:30 a. m., his brigade being a little withdrawn in echelon. This was done to enable Negley to take position on Baird’s left. About 11 a. m. Van Cleve marched to the rear of Wood and had his men lie down. All these troops on the right—from Reynolds’s right to Sheridan’s the extreme right of the Union Army—were very thinly drawn out, and did no good in the day’s fight, with the exception of one full brigade of Wood’s, namely, Harker’s, one regiment of Buell’s brigade, and a few regiments from other divisions, which will be mentioned further on. The troops had done excellent service the day before; but future events will show that they seemed [95] to be paralyzed, by not having been well fortified and compactly placed the night before. This mistake had been corrected to some extent, when the disaster came. On the 20th the troops faced Longstreet, a most sagacious general, who was exceedingly energetic in taking advantage of every defect of his opponent’s line and every blunder in his maneuvers.

McCook had Davis’s and Sheridan’s divisions still on his extreme right. Crittenden had Van Cleve’s and Wood’s, although the latter was in the early morning supposed to be in reserve. Wood came into the front line as stated, but Van Cleve seems not to have found a place there on the 20th.

THE CONFEDERATE LINE ON SEPTEMBER 20

The Confederate line was in admirable formation on the morning of the 20th, at a distance of 400 to 1,000 yards east of the Lafayette road. From its right to its left it may be described as follows: General Leonidas Polk commanded the right wing which was formed as follows: Forrest’s cavalry on the extreme right, 3,500 strong, a large [96] part of it dismounted; and next to him Breckenridge’s division. The cavalry and two infantry brigades of Breckenridge’s extended beyond Baird’s left; next in line came Cleburne’s division, in reserve behind Breckenridge was Walker’s two divisions of five brigades.

General Longstreet commanded the left wing of the Confederate Army. This began at Cleburne’s left with Stewart’s division opposite Palmer’s and Reynolds’s; then came B. R. Johnson’s opposite Brannan’s and Wood’s; next in line came Hindman’s, just opposite to Davis, and Sheridan’s, and in reserve behind Hindman’s was Preston’s. In reserve behind B. R. Johnson’s were Law’s or Hood’s—until Hood was wounded—and Kershaw’s five brigades in both. Cheatham’s five brigades were in reserve behind Stewart’s right, but fought only the Union left, both on the 19th and 20th. At 3:30 p. m. Cheatham went to the extreme right of the Confederate Army. The strength of the whole Confederate formation lay in its reserves; they were used with consummate ability. The only reserves on the right wing of the Union Army at the time of the Confederate assault [97] was Van Cleve’s division—which as an organized division did not fight on the 20th—and Wilder’s mounted brigade.

Longstreet had brought with him from Virginia two divisions of Hood’s Corps—McLaws’s and Law’s. Of McLaws’s division only Kershaw’s and Humphreys’s brigades arrived in time to take part in the battle of Chickamauga. Law had three brigades in his division. These were Robertson’s, Benning’s, and another, later commanded by Colonel James L. Sheffield.

Bushrod R. Johnson’s division belonged to Buckner’s Corps from East Tennessee. Buckner’s Corps included also Stewart’s and Preston’s divisions. These were not together during the battle, but were presumably under direct command of General Longstreet. The condition of Leonidas Polk’s old corps, was almost similar. Cheatham’s division of five brigades, and Hindman’s of three brigades—of Polk’s former corps—were separated, and operated in different parts of the field. Daniel H. Hill’s Corps consisted of Cleburne’s and Breckenridge’s divisions; these acted together, commanded by Hill in person. General W. H. [98] T. Walker’s Corps was composed of his old division, commanded by General State Rights Gist, and Liddell’s division consisting of two brigades—Govan’s and Walthall’s.

Chickamauga, morning of September 20, 1863
Adapted from Fiske’s The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War , p. 268

It will be understood that the Confederate forces were large, strongly organized, well officered, and extremely well placed on the field. Since falling back from Tullahoma the following reinforcements had joined Bragg: Walker’s five brigades from Mississippi, Buckner’s six brigades from East Tennessee, and Hood’s five brigades from Virginia, besides a large amount of artillery. The coming of General Longstreet from Virginia was a distinct assistance to the Confederate Army. He was a genuine soldier of great ability, and capable of commanding his soldiers, clearly shown when he handled the left Confederate wing on the 20th. The contrast between him and Leonidas Polk was very much in evidence on the 20th. Longstreet was exceedingly strong, while Polk was very weak. The Confederate right overlapped the Union left and had the Union right been as compactly drawn towards its left as it should have been, the Confederate left would also [99] have overlapped that flank. The Confederate Army facing the Union forces on the morning of the 20th was made up of eleven divisions of infantry, and two of cavalry. General Rosecrans had no cavalry on his left, and Wheeler’s Confederate cavalry was at first on the east side of the Chickamauga and afterwards on the west side, watching Mitchell’s Union horsemen near Crawfish Springs.

General Rosecrans had 141 regiments of infantry, 18 of cavalry, and 36 batteries. Bragg had 173 infantry regiments, 11 of cavalry—which were dismounted and fought as infantry—28 cavalry regiments, and 50 batteries.

The Union front of battle on the morning of the 20th, was about two and a half miles in length. Although Bragg had ordered the attack to be commenced on his right at daylight, and to be continued towards the left, yet it was 9:30 o’clock before Breckenridge advanced his three brigades, Adams’s, Stovall’s, and Helm’s against the left of Baird’s and John Beatty’s thin line beyond. Adams’s brigade on the right crossed the Lafayette road, and Stovall struck Beatty. The latter [100] had to give way, but inflicted terrible punishment on the enemy.

Part of Stovall’s brigade came against the regular brigade, but made no impression. Helm, the left of Breckenridge’s line, attacked the right of the regulars’, Scribner’s line. The Confederate line was shattered and went to pieces. Helm, in bravely trying to rally his men was killed; two of Helm’s colonels were also killed, and two others wounded.

Adams’s brigade was gaining the rear of King, when Stanley’s brigade of Negley’s long delayed division came into the Kelly field, and formed at right angles with the road and the Union line swept to the north, past King’s left, charged into the woods upon Adams’s brigade, and drove it away. Sometime during their attacks Adams was wounded and taken prisoner. Breckenridge’s attack was a failure, but the firing by the infantry and the artillery was terrific while it lasted. Cleburne’s division advanced while Breckenridge was still in the fight; his attack covered part of Baird’s and Johnson’s. Cleburne was a very capable officer; brave to the utmost; [101] still his attack completely failed. Polk’s brigade of that division assaulted Starkweather. With regard to this attack Polk states in his official report [20] “My line from right to left, soon became furiously engaged, the enemy pouring a most destructive fire of canister and musketry into my advancing line—so terrible indeed, that my line could not advance in face of it, but lying down, partially protected by the crest of the hill, we continued the fight for an hour and a half.”

Cleburne states in his report [21] “Polk’s brigade and the right of Wood’s encountered the heaviest artillery fire I have ever experienced. I was now within short canister range of a line of log breastworks, and a hurricane of shot and shell swept the woods from the unseen enemy in my front.” This charge was also a failure, but most destructive to the Confederates. Wood reported [22] a loss in his brigade of 96 killed and 680 wounded. The great disparity of the wounded, in comparison with the killed, showed that the Confederate lines did [102] not get very close to the Union boys. The Union forces were so pleased with having repulsed so forceful an attack, that they sent forward a strong skirmish line. General Hill—who was forming from the reserves a stronger second attack—paused, and concluded he would have to resist an attack from the Union line.

Walker’s reserve corps of two divisions of five brigades was therefore moved forward and distributed along the broken points of the first line. During the day successive charges were made from Palmer’s position to the Union left, by ten Confederate brigades along the Union line, which, however, they could not penetrate, nor could they get very close to the breastworks. Colquitt, commander of one of these brigades, fell as well as several of his officers, and General Deshler of Cleburne’s division was killed. Govan of Walker’s troops gained the rear of Baird’s division by marching around Baird’s left and driving away the thin unprotected Union line at that point. This second advance—which was actually another phase of the continuous attack from 9:30 to nearly noon—had extended its right much further beyond [103] the Union left, and by a wide left wheel it had straddled the Lafayette road. One brigade on the right of the road, another on the left, boldly threw out skirmishers and advanced towards General Reynolds’s rear, beyond the Kelly house. It was a very threatening and dangerous situation. The Confederate line in front—from Baird around to Brannan—opened a heavy fire upon the barricades. It looked for a while, as if the movement would succeed in destroying the heretofore invincible line of General Thomas’s troops; but Thomas saw every movement and knew the weakness of the left beyond Baird. Brannan had a reserve brigade—Fred Van Derveer’s—and this arrived just in time to form in front of the Confederate brigades in the Kelly field. It changed front under fire, charged the Confederate line, broke it, and finally drove it clear of the Union left. Then the reserve brigade returned to a point near the Kelly house. Van Derveer’s brigade had come, at this time, with an order from General Rosecrans to Brannan, to report his whole division to General Thomas. It was under the supposition that Brannan had done so, that Rosecrans soon after [104] issued the fatal order to Wood to close up on Reynolds. But the enemy had gained the line, where Beatty had before stood. Palmer sent his reserve brigade (Grose’s), in accordance with General Thomas’s order; his brigade formed double lines, and with cheers they charged into the woods and the enemy was driven away. Then Barnes, of Van Cleve’s division, was placed on or near the left; the Union left was henceforth safe.

THE CONFEDERATE ATTACK UPON THE UNION RIGHT

About 11 o’clock the successive attacks of the Confederate divisions from the left to the right had reached Longstreet’s wing; they were continued with a charge by Stewart upon Reynolds’s position; it involved Hazen or Palmer, who had been transferred to the right of Reynolds and to the left of Brannan. This was the beginning of the general assault on the Union right, which came so near being disastrous to General Rosecrans’s army. This attack of Stewart’s took place at the time when Adams and Stovall of Breckenridge’s [105] division were entering the open Kelly field upon the Confederate right. General Stewart acknowledges, in his report, that his charge was repulsed with great slaughter. The division next to Stewart took up the assault. It was Bushrod R. Johnson’s supported by Law and Kershaw. Just before this attack an aide of General Thomas had come to General Rosecrans to ask again for support on the left. In riding close to the line between General Reynolds’s and General Brannan’s divisions he observed that the latter—Brannan being in echelon with Reynolds—did not make a continuous line, but a broken one. The position of General Brannan was nevertheless just as effective, and perhaps more so, than if he had been in the main line. General Thomas J. Wood’s division, which had just replaced Negley’s division, was next to the right of Brannan but in the main line; it joined, however, its left to Brannan’s right; wherefore the aide reported to General Rosecrans that Reynolds’s right was unprotected. Brannan had been ordered to go to General Thomas’s left, but on account of being threatened with an attack on his front he remained with two of his brigades, and [106] sent Van Derveer’s, his reserve brigade. Rosecrans dictated at once an order to Wood, “to close upon Reynolds as fast as possible and support him.” Thereupon Wood withdrew from the line, and marched to the rear of Brannan, just as the Confederate charge, under B. R. Johnson, reached its old front. Rosecrans issued his order to Wood supposing that Brannan had gone with his whole division to the Kelly field. Brannan reported what action he had taken, and that Reynolds had approved it. Rosecrans gave his approval instantly; but the fatal order had been issued to Wood some minutes before, and consequently his division was moving out, just as the eight brigades made the attack. Longstreet had massed these brigades opposite the Union centre. They were formed in three lines, lapped over the right of Brannan and the left of Davis—whose division was on the right of Wood—and moved close to the gap; they widened the awful space left by Wood; the attack struck Wood’s rear brigade (Buell’s) and shattered it. Brannan who was a very able commander threw back his right, but lost a part of Connell’s brigade in this movement. With great skill [107] and considerable deliberation he re-established his line on the Horse Shoe Ridge, near the Snodgrass house, on a line nearly perpendicular to the one from which he had retreated. Although Wood’s division was subjected to a heavy attack, he—with the aid of General Thomas, who had just come from the left wing—succeeded in establishing his remaining troops in prolongation of Brannan’s new line, and in reaching towards, but not entirely, Reynolds’s right, which retired slightly. Hazen’s brigade of Palmer’s division filled up the gap between Reynolds and Wood, thus making the Union line a nearly continuous one from Snodgrass Hill to the left of Baird, where Barnes’s brigade had taken position. The shape of the line was that of a very flattened crescent, with the convex side towards the enemy; it was greatly shortened, however, by the losses of the 19th, and the cutting off on the right of two whole divisions, Davis’s and Sheridan’s, a part of Wood’s, and some of Van Cleve’s. These were now beyond the Confederate line and were attacked by heavy forces while on the march, driving them from the field. Negley with his remaining brigade was [108] caught in the gap from whence he drifted towards Brannan. General H. V. Boynton said about this affair on this part of the field: “Negley, gathering up much artillery, was ordered by General Thomas to post it on the crest overlooking the field in front of Baird’s left, but instead he took it to Brannan’s right. This was a good position for it and it could have been of great service there later, when the Confederate line made an advance to that point, but he retired with it in haste toward Rossville, ordering all the artillery to follow him, before he was attacked.”

Jefferson C. Davis was a fine and brave officer. He had only two brigades, Carlin’s and Heg’s; the latter was commanded by Martin, for Colonel Heg had been mortally wounded the day before. These brigades had done some wonderful fighting on the day before, when they were greatly reduced. After the break they could not stand against the Confederate charge, wherefore they drifted towards Rossville. Davis and Sheridan were both on the move by the left flank closing up toward the left, when the Confederate charge struck them. Van Cleve with his remaining [109] brigades in motion—Barnes had gone to the left—was thrown into disorder by the rapid dash of some artillery through the ranks, while a portion of them rallied with Wood. General Lytle of the Sheridan brigade was killed while trying to rally his troops. These divisions and brigades went back, together with Wilder’s mounted brigade, carrying with them Generals Rosecrans, McCook, and Crittenden, who at that time were to the right of the break. The line of their retreat was through McFarland’s Gap in Missionary Ridge, south of Rossville. These troops did not go further back than to Rossville, but Rosecrans, McCook, and Crittenden kept on to Chattanooga. Boynton says, that Sheridan’s division was in good order when it arrived at Rossville. Davis tried his best to reform his troops near to McFarland’s Gap; he did march them back to the field, but reached it too late in the evening. In the neighborhood of the two gaps, McFarland’s and Rossville, were some ten thousand fugitive troops; the way was open for them to have been led either to the right or to the left of the Union line. But who was there who had rank and [110] authority enough to lead them, while their army and corps commanders were still further to the rear? James A. Garfield, Gates P. Thruston, chief of McCook’s staff, Surgeons Gross and Perkins, medical directors of the Fourteenth and Twentieth corps, rode back and joined General Thomas. Sheridan was requested by Thruston, the adjutant-general and chief of staff to General McCook, at McFarland’s Gap—by a message from General Thomas—to march to the latter’s relief, but he insisted on marching back to Rossville and from there taking the Lafayette road to the left flank of the army. [23] This was a most out of the way road to the battlefield. Sheridan wanted to report quickly to General Thomas when the break occurred and was doing that by way of Rossville. It was dark before he arrived near to the left; the Union troops had then begun the backwood movement.

After the second attack on the left by Walker’s and Hill’s corps, Breckenridge again came in behind [111] Baird, but was repulsed by Van Derveer, Grose, and Willich. All was quiet on the left, while heavy firing continued on the right, when General Thomas rode over to the right to look at matters there. This occurred during the adjustment after the break, and he placed what remained of Wood’s on the left of Brannan, the latter having taken his position prior to that on Horse Shoe Ridge. General Thomas did not return to the left until about 5:30 p. m.

There had been no intimation to the four commanders on the left—Baird, Johnson, Palmer, and Reynolds—that everything had not gone well with the right. They could get no message from Thomas for two or three hours. At this juncture, fearing another assault by the Confederate lines, and supposing that Thomas had been cut off from them, Palmer, Johnson, and Reynolds consulted with Baird and proposed that General Palmer, as the senior and ranking officer, be placed in command of their four divisions and march them off the field. General Baird refusing to join them, prevented this calamity. Had this been done, the Confederate right wing, [112] confronting them, could have advanced unimpeded in the rear of the Union troops on Snodgrass Hill, about three-quarters of a mile directly in the rear of the Union left. In view of what happened later in the evening with regard to the successful falling back, it is not necessary to state what a probable disaster General Baird prevented.

The Fatal Order to Wood, at Chickamauga
Adapted from Fiske’s The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War , p. 270

Longstreet followed the drawing back of the Union right, by a right wheel of his divisions, while keeping Preston’s division in reserve, probably in order to be ready to repel quickly any attack upon his left and rear by Davis, Sheridan, Wilder, or R. B. Mitchell. There was no need to be alarmed, for no troops approached from that quarter. He largely outflanked and outnumbered the right wing of Rosecrans. General Garfield had brought an order to Thomas from Rosecrans to take command of the army, which was left on the field, and to fall back to Rossville, to form a new line, and to hold back the enemy from Chattanooga. Thomas made his headquarters near the Snodgrass house and directed all the movements of the Union forces for the rest of the day. He determined to hold the present line at [113] least until night, when the retreat could be made with less danger. To meet the six triumphant divisions of Longstreet, the available troops in line were Croxton’s and part only of Connell’s brigades of Brannan’s division; Wood, with only Harker’s brigade, and one regiment of Buell’s; his other regiments seemed to have faded away, or been cut off in the break. With Wood’s line were a part of John Beatty’s brigade, a part of Stanley’s, and the Twenty-first Ohio of Sirwell’s: these were of Negley’s division, but Negley was not with them. There were parts of the Ninth and Seventeenth Kentucky, Forty-fourth Indiana, and Thirteenth Ohio of Van Cleve’s division, but no division commander with them.

The Forty-fourth Indiana of Dick’s brigade, and the Seventeenth Kentucky of Beatty’s brigade, and both of Van Cleve’s—Barnes’s brigade being still on the left—were the only regiments which deflected from the fugitives, and fell in with Wood’s and Brannan’s line.

Chickamauga, evening of September 20, 1863
Adapted from Fiske’s The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War , p. 274

Longstreet’s troops attacked these fragments repeatedly with tremendous force, but were repulsed with great loss. Finally one of Hindman’s brigades [114] gained a position on Brannan’s right and rear, without opposition, for no troops were there to oppose them. Negley had held that point earlier with ample artillery and infantry supports, but he was then in Rossville. Just at this time, when disaster again seemed inevitable, General Gordon Granger reported to General Thomas; having marched his troops with the true instincts of a soldier from McAffee’s church, in front of Rossville Gap facing Ringgold, to the sound of the battle. Thomas ordered him to the right of Brannan. Two large brigades, Whittaker’s and John G. Mitchell’s, were commanded by the gallant General James B. Steedman; these formed in line, charged up the hill against that brigade which had gained the flank of Croxton, and drove it pell-mell back down the hill with great slaughter. At this time, Van Derveer’s brigade came from the Kelly field, where it had done such fine service. This brigade formed on Steedman’s left and joined in the attack. When this combined force struck the enemy the musketry firing was heavier than any before delivered. It lasted perhaps twenty minutes. It was immediately in [115] the rear of Baird’s division, on the left, about three-fourths of a mile away; could not be seen on account of the woods, but was heard, and it was terrific. Twice Hindman reformed at a safe distance, and tried to recapture the hill, but being overwhelmed, abandoned any future efforts; these brigades formed in prolongation of Brannan’s right and fought until dark. While Sheridan was marching on the west side of Missionary Ridge towards Rossville, Granger was marching on the east side of it towards the battle, without other orders than a general one, given days before to support the army. They both must have heard the firing, and should have marched to it; if these fugitive troops could have been brought on the field with a competent commander, what would the result have been? How could they keep away? Would not the Confederate Army—which was so nearly used up—have been glad to fall back to Rome?

Hindman, in his report [24] speaks in the following words of this desperate contest on the Union right lasting over four hours, viz.: “I have [116] never known Federal troops to fight so well.” General Daniel H. Hill, who commanded a Confederate corps on the army’s right, says in an article on the battle of Chickamauga, that he never saw the dead so thick anywhere as he did on the slopes of Snodgrass Hill after the attacks by Longstreet’s several divisions. [25]

General Garfield after returning from Rossville to the field, rode long the lines of his old brigade, now Harker’s of Wood’s division, cheered the men with muskets and gave by his presence the evidence that others who did not come back from the rear could have done so. Longstreet’s report states: “Hood’s column broke the enemy’s line near the Brotherton house, and made it wheel to the right. In making this movement Major-General Hood fell severely and it was feared mortally wounded by a minie ball breaking his thigh.” Law succeeded Hood in command. Longstreet continues as follows: “About three o’clock in the afternoon I asked the commanding general for some of the troops of the Right Wing, but was informed by him that they had been beaten [117] back so badly that they could be of no service to me.” [26] The figures of losses on the two wings given later on will show that Bragg was right.

The forces to resist the whole Confederate Army were but five divisions in line. The rank and file of these divisions did not know of the condition on the right, which was very fortunate; they stood and fought therefore defensively, and with great confidence and bravery.

The Union line, as now formed, consisted of Thomas’s original five divisions and such troops as Wood’s one brigade (Harker’s), a fraction of another (Buell’s) and fractions of regiments which had drifted in, together with Steedman’s two brigades. It stood off the Confederate Army until dark. An attack on General Thomas’s left—organized about three o’clock—must be mentioned, however. It is supposed that this was made in order to prevent any of the Union troops at that point from being sent to the right. The attack was a general one and was easily repulsed. The divisions of Breckenridge, Liddell, Armstrong’s dismounted cavalry, and Forrest’s artillery across [118] the Lafayette road, were active. Willich made the fourth charge along the length of Kelly’s field against these troops across the Lafayette road. At half after five o’clock all was quiet on the Union left, and confidence filled the hearts of the troops; but the attacks by Longstreet on the Union right lasted another hour.

Thomas had orders from Rosecrans to draw back to Rossville; Granger wanted him to ignore the orders and hold the field; but Thomas would not accede to such a request, and began the movement at half past five. His line was solid and confident, but had very little ammunition, and no rations. He was largely outnumbered and outflanked at both right and left; by falling back to Rossville he would gain the fugitive troops, whom he had been unable to induce to march back to this position; he would also gain a stronger defensive line, which would better cover the approaches to the city. He intended to start the movement so early in the evening that he could get the troops in the proper roads and directions before night, when darkness would protect them from danger of attack during the march. Boynton says: “It [119] was in no sense a military retreat,” it was done “because Chattanooga, and not the Chickamauga woods, was the objective of the campaign.” Still, it may also be said, that the Confederate Army was the objective, and that its destruction was of more importance than the occupation of the city. It is quite certain that General Thomas would gladly have remained on the field, if he had been confident that he could have destroyed Bragg’s army the next day. He did not know at that time that it was badly used up as later events proved and the movement backwards in the face of a very vigilant foe, who was constantly advancing in almost full force, would have been dangerous.

The dispositions made by General George H. Thomas—before and after he discovered the break in the Union right—were of the highest military character; his plan of withdrawal to Rossville was equally scientific. In his report he says, that after the arrival of Granger’s forces and their effective attack on the enemy’s troops on the right of Brannan, every assault of the enemy until nightfall was repulsed in the most gallant style by the whole line. This was the result of his skillful [120] placing of troops, his constant watchfulness with regard to the movements of the enemy, and the excellent counter movements by the Union forces. But the real cause of the preservation of the army was the masterful formation of the five divisions remaining under General Thomas’s command on the morning of the 20th; they were formed in compact, double lines, protected by log breastworks and had three or four brigades in reserve; these lines required no re-adjustment and were not penetrated. His watchfulness of the troops—of which many formed under his own direction on Snodgrass Hill after the break on the right—enabled him to point out instantly where they should go, when Granger and Steedman appeared. Let it be remembered that he was at that time unaware of the extent of the disaster on the right. In his report he states, “General Garfield, chief of staff of General Rosecrans, reached this position about 4 p. m., in company with Lieutenant-Colonel Thruston, of McCook’s staff, and Captains Gaw and Barker, of my staff, who had been sent to the rear to bring back the ammunition, if possible. General Garfield gave me the first reliable [121] information that the right and centre of our army had been driven, and of its condition at that time. I soon after received a dispatch from General Rosecrans, directing me to assume command of all the forces, and, with Crittenden and McCook, take a strong position, and assume a threatening attitude at Rossville, sending the unorganized forces to Chattanooga for reorganization, stating that he would examine the ground at Chattanooga, and then join me; also that he had sent out rations and ammunition to me at Rossville.” [27]

General Thomas, of course, knew before Garfield reached him that disaster of some kind had occurred on the right; but he did not know its extent, neither did he know of the departure of the many troops and high officers from the field. When he received this dispatch from General Rosecrans he determined to fall back and immediately formulated his plans. To enable the troops in line to hold the positions they occupied until the proper time to fall back, he sent two aides to distribute some ammunition—ten rounds to the man—which Granger had brought with him. As [122] soon as this was done he sent Captain Willard, an aide, to direct the division commanders to be prepared to withdraw their commands as soon as they received orders. At 5:30 p. m. Captain Barker carried the order to Reynolds to commence the movement. Thomas does not indicate in his report why he wanted Reynolds to commence the movement, but it has been shown that his division was the one best located for the work. A brigade of Confederate troops of Liddell’s division occupied at that time the woods on the west of the Lafayette road, between the Union right on Snodgrass Hill and the left around the Kelly field. It was in the rear of both Union wings. Reynolds’s position was at the head of these woods, and his troops could fire into the Confederate lines without danger to the backs of the Union soldiers. Under Thomas’s direction, Turchin’s brigade moved down the Lafayette road, and filed to the left; when his rear had cleared the road and faced to the right on the march, he threw his brigade upon the Confederate forces and drove them in utter defeat entirely beyond Baird’s left. This was the fifth charge made during the day in [123] the same direction along this road, in and adjacent to the Kelly field. General Thomas posted Reynolds’s two brigades, Turchin’s and Robinson’s—formerly King’s—together with Johnson’s reserve brigade and General Willich’s on the ridge road west of the Lafayette road, near the Mullis farm, in order to cover McFarland’s Gap. Thomas’s report describes best what followed: “These dispositions being made, I sent orders to Generals Wood, Brannan, and Granger to withdraw from their positions. Johnson’s and Baird’s division were attacked at the moment of retiring, but, by being prepared, retired without confusion or any serious losses. General Palmer was attacked while retiring. * * * I then proceeded to Rossville, accompanied by Generals Garfield and Gordon Granger, and immediately prepared to place the troops in position at that point.” [28]

During Baird’s withdrawal he was heavily attacked by the enemy, and lost a great many who were taken prisoners; some of these remained too long behind the breastworks, others took a wrong direction in falling back. The troops which [124] had retreated to Rossville Gap during the day were reorganized by their officers prior to the falling back of the main army. Negley’s division was placed directly across the gap, and the next morning Baird’s was placed behind it; the other divisions on the right and left (on the crest of the ridge) were stationed with Minty’s cavalry in front of the gap, about one mile and a half on the Ringgold road. General R. B. Mitchell’s cavalry was on the Union right covering McFarland’s Gap, and extending his right to the Chattanooga Creek. McCook’s Corps was in line about a mile behind him.

On September 21, General N. B. Forrest advanced at Rossville some Confederate cavalry close enough to throw a shell or two into a Union wagon train and Minty’s advance Union cavalry on the Ringgold road had a little skirmish. But the Confederate Army was not advancing; apparently it did not intend to attack the position at this point. In fact, General Bragg did not know of the retirement of the Union Army until the 21st, and he did not order an advance. The Confederate Army lay still on the field during the [125] 21st, and most of the 22nd. Therefore General Thomas advised General Rosecrans to concentrate the troops at Chattanooga, and this was done on the night of September 21, in a most admirable manner under Thomas’s direction. Brannan’s division—in order to cover and protect the movement—was posted half way between Rossville and Chattanooga. Nearly all the infantry and artillery were in or around the city by 7 a. m. of the 22nd. The different organizations were marched directly to positions previously assigned them.

Baird’s division (now Rousseau’s), with Minty’s cavalry still in rear of it, brought up the rear, and did not arrive in the entrenchments around the city until late in the evening of the 22nd. General Rousseau, who was absent from early in August, joined the army again at Rossville on September 21, and assumed command of his old division. General Baird was later assigned to another division at Chattanooga.

In the forenoon of the 22nd, Cheatham’s Confederate division marched to the neighborhood of Chickamauga station, and took a road leading [126] thence to the top of Missionary Ridge; it was followed by the rest of Polk’s Corps on the 23rd. On the same day, Hill’s and Longstreet’s corps followed on different roads and slowly formed their line on top of the ridge. Longstreet’s and Hill’s was thrown across the valley to the foot of Lookout; their left was on the top of Lookout Mountain and their right on the northeast nose of Missionary Ridge, abutting on the Tennessee River, but the main line did not reach to the river. Their camps were principally located in the Chickamauga Valley on the east side of the ridge, where they were protected from observation by the Union forces.

WISCONSIN TROOPS AT CHICKAMAUGA

There were five infantry regiments from Wisconsin in the battle of Chickamauga, viz.: the First, Tenth, Fifteenth, Twenty-first, and Twenty-fourth. The First and Twenty-first were parts of the Second Brigade, commanded by General John C. Starkweather—formerly Colonel of the First Wisconsin Infantry—of the First Division, commanded by General Absalom Baird, of [127] the Fourteenth Corps, commanded by General George H. Thomas. They were actively engaged near the extreme left on both days of the battle. When Baird’s division on the morning of the 19th advanced from Kelly’s house on the Lafayette road, Starkweather’s brigade was in reserve behind the other two brigades of the division. His brigade was formed in two lines, the first composed of the First Wisconsin on the right and the Seventy-ninth Pennsylvania on the left, with the Fourth Indiana Battery between the two wings. The Twenty-first Wisconsin Infantry and Twenty-fourth Illinois Infantry formed the rear line. Lieutenant-Colonel George B. Bingham commanded the First, and Lieutenant-Colonel Harrison C. Hobart the Twenty-first. Having advanced about a mile through the woods, driving the enemy’s skirmishers, Starkweather moved to Thomas’s left by the order of the General, in order to relieve Croxton’s brigade of Brannan’s division, reported to be out of ammunition. General Starkweather seems to have no sooner taken position here than the enemy attacked in such overwhelming numbers as to force him back. He [128] retreated to a ridge in the rear of his left; leaving his battery temporarily in the possession of the enemy. Very soon the enemy was struck on his flank and rear by General Johnson’s division of McCook’s Corps and forced back; the battery was then recovered.

In reforming the lines late in the afternoon, Starkweather’s brigade was placed on the left of Johnson’s division; it took part in the night attack by the Confederate General Cleburne, and was under fire during the whole of the battle of the 19th. On the morning of the 20th it formed the right of Baird’s position in the woods east of the Kelly field, and was in one of the most exposed positions; this brought it again on the left of Johnson’s division. The Fourth Indiana Battery had two guns in the centre of the brigade and two upon the left. General Starkweather in his official report says: “This position was held and retained during the whole day under repeated attacks from the enemy in heavy columns supported with batteries, repulsing and driving the enemy back from time to time; driving the enemy also back from the extreme left with the artillery. [129] * * * While holding this position the ammunition of my first line was expended, and most of the second line, together with all the ammunition of the battery, except three rounds of canister.” [29] He retired with the rest of Baird’s division in the evening of the 20th to Rossville, thence to Chattanooga on the 22nd. In the retirement, Lieutenant-Colonel Hobart, eight other commissioned officers, and 67 men of the Twenty-first Wisconsin were captured by the enemy. The loss of the First Wisconsin was 188 killed, wounded, and missing; the latter being 77. The officers killed were Captains Abner O. Heald, and William S. Mitchell; Lieutenants James S. Richardson, and Charles A. Searles. Of the Twenty-first the loss was 121, of these 76 were missing. The First seems to have gone into the battle with 391, and the Twenty-first with 369 men.

The Tenth Wisconsin Infantry—commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel John H. Ely—was in Scribner’s brigade of Baird’s division. The history of its fighting is almost identical with that of the First and Twenty-first. On the 20th the Tenth [130] Wisconsin Infantry was immediately on the left of Starkweather. Colonel Ely, Major McKercher and several other officers, together with a large number of men were captured in falling back (by orders), on the evening of the 20th. They, by mistake, took the wrong direction, going too far to the right, as they faced the rear, and thus ran into the enemy. Its loss was a total of 211, but 145 of these were missing. Captain J. W. Roby, who made the report says: “Monday morning September 21st we numbered three officers and 26 men.” Lieutenant-Colonel Ely’s name appears among those killed; the other officers killed were Captain George M. West and Lieutenant Robert Rennie.

The Fifteenth Wisconsin Infantry served in the Third brigade, Davis’s division of the Twentieth Corps. This brigade was commanded by Colonel Hans C. Heg until he was killed on the 19th; and afterwards by Colonel John A. Martin. This regiment fought most gallantly with Davis’s division on the 19th, when, according to their official report, the loss was 7 officers and 59 enlisted men killed, wounded, and missing. It will be remembered [131] that on the 20th General Davis’s division was cut off on the right by the break at Wood’s division, and that it, after some desultory fighting, retired to McFarland’s Gap. The total loss of the Fifteenth Wisconsin Infantry was 111, of which 55 men were captured or missing. The officers killed were Colonel Hans C. Heg, Captains Hans Hanson, Henry Hauff, John M. Johnson, and Lieutenant Oliver Thompson.

The Twenty-fourth Wisconsin Infantry was in General Lytle’s brigade of the First Division of the Twentieth Corps. This regiment, with the brigade to which it was attached, occupied the entrenchments at Lee and Gordon’s Mill on the afternoon of the 19th, where it relieved General Thomas J. Wood’s division; it remained here all afternoon under a little artillery fire from the enemy, which did no harm, however. At 3 a. m. on the 20th it went to a point near General Rosecrans’s headquarters, near the Widow Glenn’s house; at 10:30 a. m. it double quicked—under a terrific fire from the enemy—to the point where General Lytle was killed; it fought here for thirty minutes driving the enemy, but was soon outflanked [132] by Hindman’s troops coming toward its left flank from the celebrated break. The official report of its commander (Major Carl Von Baumbach), from which the foregoing facts are gleaned, says further: “We retreated in some disorder; but quickly reformed on a hill some 400 yards to the rear. Our brave and gallant commander, Lieutenant-Colonel T. S. West, being among the missing, I assumed command.” This regiment bivouaced for the night at Rossville; its loss was 3 officers and 69 men killed and wounded, and 20 missing; Captain Gustavus Goldsmith was killed. The Major in his report makes especial mention of Lieutenant Thomas E. Balding, acting adjutant, for his gallant conduct.

The First Wisconsin Cavalry—under command of Colonel Oscar H. LaGrange—was a part of the Second Brigade, of Colonel Edward M. McCook’s cavalry division. During the campaign, preceding the battle, this regiment performed the usual duties of cavalry in reconnoitering, picketing, leading in advance of the marching column of infantry, and generally acting with the rest of the cavalry, as the eyes of the army. On [133] the 19th it was stationed on the right of the army to watch the enemy’s cavalry, which kept on the east side of the Chickamauga in the movement back to Rossville, and thence into Chattanooga, it protected the trains and rear of the army. Its loss was 2 men wounded and 4 missing.

There were three Wisconsin light batteries with the Army of the Cumberland, in the battle of Chickamauga: the Third, Fifth, and Eighth. The Third Battery—commanded by Lieutenant Courtland Livingston—was attached to Van Cleve’s division of Crittenden’s Corps. Captain L. H. Drury of this battery, was chief of artillery of the division; he was severely wounded in a skirmish several days before the battle. This battery followed the fortunes of its division; but there seems to be no definite report by its commanding officer. Its losses were 2 killed, 12 wounded and 12 missing, out of an aggregate of 119.

The Fifth Wisconsin Battery, commanded by Captain George Q. Gardner was attached to the First Brigade, commanded by Colonel P. Sidney Post of General Jefferson C. Davis’s division of the Twentieth Corps. This brigade was [134] guarding the supply train, and was not engaged in the battle, and this battery had no losses. The brigade commander, in his official report, commends Captain Gardner for great zeal and ability in the management of the battery.

The Eighth Wisconsin Battery—commanded by Lieutenant John D. McLean—was attached to Colonel Heg’s brigade of Davis’s division of McCook’s Twentieth Corps. The chief of artillery of Davis’s division reports, that the movement of the artillery in the Chickamauga woods was not deemed practicable; therefore, this battery did not become engaged, and had no losses.

The Chickamauga campaign proper was now ended. It formed the second step in the campaign from Murfreesboro to Chattanooga; the Tullahoma campaign being the first. It is true, the city was now occupied by the Army of the Cumberland, but its possession was not secure as long as the Confederate Army lay within two or three miles, and held the city’s most available lines of supply by the river and the river road, between Bridgeport and Chattanooga. Therefore, another conflict was necessary, which would constitute [135] the third step in the great campaign. An account of that struggle will include the coming of reinforcements to the Union Army; the opening of what the men in the ranks called, “the cracker line;” the reorganization of the Army of the Cumberland; and an account of the four battles of Wauhatchie, Orchard Knob, Lookout Mountain, and Missionary Ridge. But before that is attempted, it will be necessary to make some observations on the late battle of Chickamauga.

The Army of the Cumberland—or rather that part of it which now occupied the city—was reduced by the Chickamauga battle to an estimated aggregate of 35,000. This estimate excluded perhaps the cavalry. Its total losses, killed, wounded, and prisoners, in the Chickamauga campaign reached 13,615. A large number of sick, besides the wounded, were in hospitals. But the Confederate losses were at least 5,374 more than those of the Union Army. General Longstreet, in his book, From Manassas to Appomatox , claims that the Confederate force at Chickamauga was somewhat less than 60,000 men. The Confederate records are so defective that it is largely [136] an estimate to give their numbers or losses. General H. V. Boynton estimates the number at very much more than 60,000. There is no doubt that Bragg actually outnumbered Rosecrans on the field by several thousand troops, perhaps in the proportion of 60,000 to 50,000.

The Union Army captured 2,003 prisoners, and lost 4,774. Of the latter 2,500 were wounded and left on the field when the army fell back to Rossville. The terrible fighting which took place is shown by the number of killed and wounded on each side. Longstreet says in his book, that Bragg’s killed and wounded amounted to 16,986, but the official returns make them about 1,100 less, or 15,881. The official returns of the army give the Union losses of killed and wounded 11,338. The Confederate loss was greater in killed and wounded than at Gettysburg; and the largest the enemy had in a single battle. Attention is called to the fact, that the numbers engaged at Gettysburg were about 80,000 on each side; and that the battle lasted three days.

The killed and wounded in some battles of the war are shown in the following table:

In every one of these battles the Union loss was greater than the Confederate, except at Chickamauga; yet Shiloh, Gettysburg, and Stone’s River are recorded as Union victories. The Confederate loss at Antietam was much smaller than that given above, which includes Harper’s Ferry, South Mountain, Crampton’s Gap, and Shepardstown. The prisoners captured are excluded from the above list, because only the killed and wounded indicate the intensity of the fighting.

The Confederate’s large losses at Chickamauga show plainly the active musketry of the Union troops, their good marksmanship, and the difference (in the number of casualties) between making and receiving attacks. On the second day the Union troops remained in line and received the attacks of the Confederates. At Gettysburg the [138] Union forces did the same thing during the last two days. Those on the left at Chickamauga were protected by breastworks, and suffered but little loss on the 20th; while they inflicted very heavy punishment on the Confederates; for instance, Hill’s Corps of the Confederate right lost 2,990 out of 8,894; Jackson’s brigade of Cheatham’s division lost 35 per cent. of his force, and the losses in Govan’s brigade exceeded 50 per cent. On the Union side Steedman, while attacking the Confederate troops—which had gained an enfilading position and were about to attack the right flank of Brannan—lost in this assault and in the subsequent position which his troops occupied, 1,787 out of 3,700 in about four hours. The loss is fearful, when assaults are made on protected lines, or on points held with difficult approaches. On the Confederate left Benning’s brigade of Hood’s division lost 56.6 per cent.; Gregg’s brigade of B. R. Johnson’s lost 44.4 per cent. Taking Longstreet’s estimate of 16,986 killed and wounded, and adding to it the number of prisoners captured, namely, 2,003, the total Confederate loss aggregates 18,989. It is officially established [139] that the Union loss was 11,338 in killed and wounded; its loss in prisoners was 4,774; but 2,500 of them were wounded and were left on the battlefield. It is reasonable to suppose that these wounded left on the field were reported as wounded by their company officers, and are included in the official returns of the 11,338.

The historian will point out sharply the immense benefit to the Union Army derived from the log works and the compact lines of the four divisions under General Thomas on the 20th. The conclusion is a fair one, that the whole line ought to have been similarly fortified; there was ample supply of timber along the line to provide for such protection. Of the five divisions under General Thomas’s command on the 19th and on the 20th, Brannan’s was the only one which fought both days without works; on the 19th none of them fought behind any entrenchments, yet they fought against six Confederate divisions, viz.: two of Walker’s corps, two of Cheatham’s, Cleburne’s, and Stewart’s. On the 20th Brannan was on the right and did not fight any of the Confederate troops, which Baird’s, Johnson’s, Palmer’s, Reynolds’s, and his [140] own divisions had fought on the 19th. Van Derveer’s brigade of Brannan’s division made one charge, however, along the Kelly field, against two brigades of Breckenridge’s; then returned to the right. But it must be noticed that Breckenridge was not in the fight of the 19th. On the 20th Baird, Johnson, Palmer, and Reynolds fought behind breastworks all day the same divisions they had fought the day before without breastworks, and also Breckenridge’s in addition. It is true they were assisted a little by two brigades of Negley’s and one of Van Cleve’s on the left of the breastworks. In addition to the Confederate infantry divisions mentioned, there was also Forrest’s cavalry of 3,500, which would more than offset any assistance these four Union divisions had received from other troops on the 20th. The following table will show the losses in killed and wounded of the divisions on both sides, with the exception of prisoners captured during the two days of battle in and around the Kelly field.

There were 14 Union brigades and 19 Confederate. It will be seen that Brannan, who was not protected by works on the 20th, lost about 800 more than the highest loss of any of the Union divisions, which were protected. That is a practical illustration of the value of the precautions thus taken by the protected troops. Estimating Brannan’s loss on the 20th at 900, his loss on the 19th would be 1,077. This would reduce the total loss in the Union column above to 5,083. Considering that the Confederate divisions mentioned above encountered no other Union troops during the battle, except those five divisions mentioned, it will be understood that the five Union divisions by incurring a loss of 5,083 killed and wounded, inflicted a loss on the enemy of 8,625. Forrest’s loss does not appear but should be added to the latter; let this item be offset, however, by the losses to [142] Beatty’s Stanley’s and Barnes’s brigades in their assistance on the left of Baird.

We will make a similar comparison of the losses on the right of the Union, and the left of the Confederate Army:

The estimated Confederate loss given above has been made up in the following manner. The official Confederate loss is given by Colonel W. F. Fox in his Regimental Losses in the Civil War as 15,881 killed and wounded at Chickamauga, the Confederate loss of the troops opposed to the above named Union divisions can be found by adding to 8,625—the Confederate losses in the [143] first table given above—the estimated loss of the Confederate cavalry, probably enough to bring the figures to 9,000, and deducting that from 15,881, the total Confederate loss is secured. The result makes 6, 881 killed and wounded—as given in the last table—by the seven Union divisions mentioned above, at a cost to the latter of 6,140 killed and wounded. Longstreet gives in his report his loss at 7,594 killed and wounded; deducting Stewart’s loss from this sum leaves 5,920 as the loss of the above mentioned Confederate forces. This makes the contrast between the two tables still greater.

These figures emphasize the deadly fighting in that great battle, and they are more eloquent of the valor of American soldiers than words of song or oratory. They emphasize also the value of defensive breastworks, in comparison with fighting unprotected.

The Union troops expended 2,650,000 musket cartridges in hitting the 15,881 Confederate killed and wounded; some of them were, however, wounded by artillery. It appears as if it took about 150 infantry cartridges to hit one man. The [144] expenditure was 650,000 more cartridges than at Stone’s River; but then 6,642 more of the Confederates were struck at Chickamauga, which shows that the firing was much more destructive.

General Rosecrans states: [30] “The fight on the left after 2 p. m., was that of the army. Never, in the history of this war at least have troops fought with greater energy and determination. Bayonet charges, often heard of but seldom seen, were repeatedly made by brigades and regiments in several of our divisions.”

At 2 p. m. on September 21, C. A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, sent a dispatch from Chattanooga to the Secretary of War. It contained the following statements: “Thomas, finding himself cut off from Rosecrans and the right, at once brought his seven divisions into position for independent fighting. Refusing both his right and left, his line assumed the form of a horse-shoe posted along the slope and crest of a partly wooded ridge. He was soon joined by Granger from Rossville, with the brigade of McCook and division of Steedman, and with these forces firmly [145] maintained the fight till after dark. Our troops were as immovable as the rocks they stood on. The enemy hurled against them repeatedly the dense columns which had routed Davis and Sheridan in the morning, but every onset was repulsed with dreadful slaughter. Falling first on one and then another point of our lines, for hours the rebels vainly sought to break them. Thomas seemed to have filled every soldier with his own unconquerable firmness, and Granger, his hat torn by bullets, raged like a lion wherever the contest was hottest with the electrical courage of a Ney. * * * When night fell this body of heroes stood on the same ground they had occupied in the morning their spirit unbroken, but their numbers greatly diminished. * * * The divisions of Wood, Johnson, Brannan, Palmer, Reynolds, and Baird, which never broke at all, have lost very severely.” [31] He should have added that they inflicted greater loss upon the enemy than any of the other divisions. The discouraged spirit of the Confederate Army at the close of the battle was sufficiently apparent when the forces under [146] Thomas’s command were able—after the arrival of General Gordon Granger’s troops—to stop the enemy’s further successes. It is evident that the fighting spirit was gone from Bragg’s army since, although they discovered the falling back, they did not approach Rossville Gap on the 21st with a considerable force, nor seriously interfere in the backward movement to Chattanooga, not even trying to capture a wagon, mule, or horse, although its great cavalry leader, Forrest and his troopers, were in force close to Rossville Gap. It was more paralyzed than the Union Army. General Daniel H. Hill, who commanded a Confederate corps on the right in the battle, states in the article referred to before: “There was no more splendid fighting in ’61, when the flower of the Southern youth was in the field, than was displayed in those bloody days of September, ’63. But it seems to me that the elan of the Southern soldier was never seen after Chickamauga—that brilliant dash which had distinguished him was gone forever. He was too intelligent not to know that the cutting in two of Georgia meant death to all his hopes. * * * He fought stoutly to the [147] last, but, after Chickamauga, with the sullenness of despair and without the enthusiasm of hope. That ‘barren’ victory sealed the fate of the Southern Confederacy.” [32]

If the Army of the Cumberland accomplished so much at Chickamauga in spite of certain mistakes, after having penetrated to the centre of the Confederate territory, what might not have been done, if the right of the Union line had been properly placed and protected during the night of the 19th, and if the disastrous order to Wood had not been issued? The withdrawal of Wood from the line—just before Bushrod Johnson advanced against the centre—cost the Union fighting line 10,000 men, and caused the withdrawal, some hours later, of the Union Army to Rossville. Whether Wood interpreted that order correctly, the fact is that the order should never have been issued. The movement of closing in towards the left and of throwing the right further back, should have been done hours before. One of Mitchell’s cavalry divisions should have been placed on the Union left during the night of the 19th.

[148] It must be conceded that Brannan’s division was the most active in the battle. It was well managed, but its loss in killed and wounded was greater than that of any other Union division. Brannan lost in killed and wounded 1,977, with 214 missing. His division fought bravely under his skillful management, yet he was unprotected on both days. Negley’s loss was 496 killed and wounded, the smallest loss of all. The following officers went through the battle with great credit, viz.: Generals Thomas, Granger, Steedman, Brannan, Baird, Johnson, Palmer, Reynolds; and Brigade-Commanders Hazen, Harker, Van Derveer, Croxton, Whittaker, John C. Mitchell, Willich, and Turchin.

If a real soldier, like Longstreet, had been in command of the Confederate right and had found upon advancing against the Union line, that two brigades lengths extended beyond the Union left, he would certainly have made more out of such a condition than did Breckenridge or Leonidas Polk.

General D. H. Hill, in his report [33] discusses the situation as follows: “The important results effected [149] by two brigades on the flank proved that, had our army been moved under cover of the woods a mile farther to the right, the whole Yankee position would have been turned and an almost bloodless victory gained. A simple reconnoisance before the battle would have shown the practicability of the movement and the advantage to be gained by it.” Hill was in command on that flank and should have acted in accordance with his understanding of the situation, or at least reported the facts to his superior. This was what Rosecrans was anxious about when he hastened troops from the right to the left. If Sheridan could have reached Thomas before Longstreet cut him off in the act of double-quicking toward the left flank, what would have happened?

General Thomas’s dispositions to protect his left showed military genius of the highest order, and General Baird greatly assisted him in this matter. This was only one instance, however, of General Thomas’s many equally meritorious tactics in this great battle. He rose to the highest point in the estimation of both officers and men.

Both days’ fighting illustrates the fact that when [150] troops are outflanked or attacked in the rear, however brave they may be in other positions relative to the enemy, they will as a rule go to pieces. It was repeatedly shown on both sides, especially on the 19th, during the battle, that the veteran troops as well as the new regiments, would become disheartened and confused in such a position; many of the regiments on the left during the second day, who did not flinch when attacked in flank and rear on the day before, then went to pieces.

The protected troops on the Union left fought through the entire day of the 20th, entirely unconscious that they were frequently surrounded not only in front and rear of their own line, but that the two flanks of the army were only about three-fourths of a mile apart, although in the morning they were two and a half miles apart. At noon the Union right was contracted, and thrown back against the left. The order to retreat late in evening of the 20th came as a surprise and shock to these troops, who had been repulsing the enemy all day with comparative ease. Thousands of musket bearers were so stiff and sore from the two days’ conflict and the marches over the mountains [151] during the preceding days, that when a regiment lying down on the evening of the 20th attempted to rise there was a distinct creaking of bones and an accompanying groan, slight, but perceptible. Many of them while moving back to Rossville at night, took the desperate chance of lying down for a nap in the woods by the roadside, intending to rest for an hour or two and then join their regiments again before daylight; but hundreds of these awoke to find it was already daylight and many were captured by the enemy’s cavalry.

The Confederate Army itself did not advance from the battlefield until the 23rd; only a small part leaving on the 22nd. The fact is that the Confederate Army was much more used up than the Union Army; General Bragg said to General Longstreet on the 20th that his troops upon his right were used up. [34] The same Confederate troops which had penetrated the line and driven Davis, Sheridan, and others from the field, were so roughly handled by Brannan and Granger on Snodgrass Hill that they could not be brought forward for another attack. The slowness with [152] which the Confederate Army moved to their positions around Chattanooga proves that they were practically defeated. At the time the orders were sent to the divisions behind the log works on the left to prepare for withdrawal, their commanders sent word back to General Thomas that there was no reason for them to retreat; they had been, and were at that moment repulsing easily every assault. They did not know of the disaster to the right, caused by Wood’s withdrawal, nor did General Baird and his brigade commanders know of the movements of either Union or Confederate forces until after the retreat. Many writers have expressed the opinion that the Union Army should not have retreated. But to a soldier who was present on the field and knew the facts—such as the absence of the commander of the army; his order sent from the far rear to fall back to Rossville; the absence of ammunition and rations; the utterly exhausted condition of the rank and file by the superhuman exertions of the two days’ fighting and the preceding hard marching; the fear that if the Union Army remained, the Confederate Army might yet wedge its way between it and Chattanooga, [153] the Union commander not being aware at that time of the exhausted and discouraged condition of the Confederate Army—it seems that the falling back in the way and at the time it did was the correct thing. At least it seems as if Thomas had really nothing else to do than to fall back when the order from General Rosecrans was received. Had General Thomas been the commander of the army, it might have been different.

The Union cavalry did not properly cooperate with the other arms of the Union forces. Forrest, with his large Confederate cavalry force, was close to the right of the Confederate Army, and did fine service; the force was equal to the infantry in number. Forrest should have been opposed by a division of the Union cavalry. Only one cavalry brigade was needed at Crawfish Springs; the other cavalry brigade together with Wilder’s mounted infantry which closed up on the right of McCook, should have given better service at a time when it was most needed. This was not the fault of the cavalry commander, for he only obeyed orders from his superiors. In a dispatch to General R. B. Mitchell, the commander of the cavalry, [154] at 7:15 p. m. September 20, General Rosecrans said, “Had you been on our right today you could have charged the enemy’s flank, and done much incalculable mischief.” Why was not his cavalry as close to the Union right flank as Forrest’s was to the Confederate right flank? Mitchell’s cavalry was too far away to be effective, when disaster overtook the wing: it was supposed to be protecting, but it was farther away from Snodgrass Hill on the right than were the forces of Gordon Granger, at McAffee’s church on the left.

When the Army of the Cumberland fell back from Chickamauga and Rossville to Chattanooga, the first and most important thing to do was to quickly fortify against attack. The troops marched directly to the places assigned them, and when all were in place, the lines half encircled the city, both flanks terminating at the river. McCook was on the right, Thomas next, and Crittenden on the left. The troops began at once the work of throwing up the ordinary entrenchments; these were from time to time strengthened until satisfactory. Two forts had been partially completed by the enemy; these were finished and occupied by both artillery and infantry. The army was drawn in close around the city; the point of Lookout Mountain and its slopes beyond Chattanooga Creek were left to the enemy. This gave the Confederate Army command of the river, the rail and wagon [156] roads (parallel with the river), between Chattanooga, Bridgeport, and Stevenson. The only other practicable road to the bases of supplies was over Walden’s Ridge on the north side of the river, a distance of 60 miles by wagon; thus it became very difficult to furnish more than half or three-quarters rations to the men, and only very little forage could be furnished to the animals. The road mentioned was so steep and bad that a team of four or six mules would consume almost the entire load of feed in bringing the load and in returning for another.

General Bragg deemed the occupancy of his main line along Missionary Ridge—across the valley to Lookout Mountain, thence on the south side of the river by small detachments at different points—to Bridgeport sufficient to starve out the army in Chattanooga. Meanwhile he sent Wheeler’s cavalry to the north side, in order to raid the line of supplies. Wheeler burned 300 wagons in the Sequatchie Valley and went on north doing what damage he could. Fearing that Bragg might follow Longstreet’s advice and cross the river east of Chattanooga with a large [157] part of his army, Rosecrans soon completed an inside works of circumvallation by which ten thousand men might be able to hold the city, while he might be obliged to protect his base of supplies by marching the rest of his army to meet such a situation. That Bragg did not undertake an enterprise of this character was further proof of the used-up condition of his army, the result of the late battle of Chickamauga. Bragg’s reasoning regarding his ability to starve the forces in the city was good only on the supposition that the Government at Washington would fail to send sufficient reinforcements to protect the rear, and to raise “The Siege of Chattanooga;” it was not more than a semi-siege, however, and has been so called by some authors. If Bragg’s army had occupied both sides of the river and practically surrounded the city, as the German troops surrounded Paris in the Franco-German War of 1871, then it could have been called a siege. Of course the situation of the Union Army was critical, not only here in the fortified city, but ever since it crossed the Tennessee River during the campaign preceding the battle of Chickamauga. As before mentioned, [158] General Rosecrans estimated on September 23, 1863, that he had about 35,000 troops in the entrenchments; the cavalry and Wilder’s brigade of mounted infantry were then on the north side of the river and guarded the crossings for a considerable distance, both above and below. Union reinforcements had been ordered both from the east and from the west; but Burnside, who commanded in East Tennessee, was asking at the same time for help at Knoxville, instead of being able to send any succor to Rosecrans. Before the battle of Chickamauga reinforcements had been ordered from the Army of the Tennessee—at that time on or near the Mississippi at Memphis—and from Burnside, but none had arrived. After the great battle and the falling back of Rosecrans, the commander did not need to urge the President and Secretary of War to be convinced, that unless they really desired to lose Tennessee and all that had so far been gained in the department of the Cumberland, other troops must be sent with the greatest celerity. Two corps from the Army of the Potomac were ordered to the battlefield; the Eleventh commanded [159] by General O. O. Howard, and the Twelfth under General H. W. Slocum; both under the command of General Joseph Hooker. General W. T. Sherman was also to reinforce the Union Army with the Fifteenth Corps, and one division of the Seventeenth from the Army of the Tennessee. In the meantime every exertion was made by the troops present to hold the city at all hazards. When Wheeler captured and burned the 300 wagons near Anderson’s cross roads, in the Sequatchie Valley, Colonel E. M. McCook with the First Wisconsin Cavalry, the Second and Fourth Indiana cavalry and a section of artillery started from Bridgeport up the Sequatchie Valley. Retarded by an incessant rain, he was in time to see the smoke only of the burning wagons; he made a charge and drove a detachment of the enemy’s troops past the fire upon their main body. He followed this Confederate division—which was commanded vigorously by Martin and Wheeler—out of the valley, captured a number of soldiers and 800 mules and saved some of the wagons. Wheeler reached McMinnville in time to capture the garrison and burn the supplies. He was off [160] toward Murfreesboro before the arrival of Crook and his command, who had taken up the pursuit. The Union cavalry corps, commanded by R. B. Mitchell, with McCook’s division, joined Crook at Murfreesboro and saved that place from capture. They followed Wheeler so persistently and fought him so successfully that they prevented the destruction of the railroad, but were unable to save the telegraph lines. Wheeler crossed back at Rogersville to the south of the Tennessee; Mitchell followed and captured at that point a large amount of Confederate cotton and destroyed it. Mitchell prevented the Confederate advance to Winchester and Decherd after having heard at Huntsville, Alabama, that Roddey’s Confederate cavalry was moving towards these cities, having been forced to recross the river. Bragg’s intention was to destroy Rosecrans’s communications and to force him to abandon Chattanooga. The maintenance of the railroad back to Nashville was of vital importance to the Union Army. Wheeler’s loss on this raid was according to the estimate of General Crook, 2,000 men and 6 pieces of artillery. These fatalities made the [161] Confederate commander more cautious. Crook’s loss was only 14 killed and 97 wounded. Wheeler’s raid and the Union pursuit, are specimens of the kind of warfare which cavalry are expected to make, showing the terrible destruction of men and horses, the untiring marches, and watchfulness necessary in a field so extensive and difficult as that of the department of Cumberland. It would have been much more economical and effective, if the War Department had previously protected the railway with sufficient infantry, as it now intended to do, than to protect it by an ordinary force of cavalry. The Department did adopt the plan of protecting the railway with infantry, when Hooker came with a division; this mode was most effectively used also in 1864.

Although the railroad from Nashville to Stevenson was being maintained and supplies were accumulated at the latter city, yet the necessity of hauling supplies by wagons over such an extended and precipitous road as the one over Walden’s Ridge, and the destruction of so many wagons by Wheeler, told heavily on the devoted troops in the entrenched city. The rains were heavy and continuous [162] during the early part of October, making the roads almost impassable in some places. The trips to Bridgeport seemed gradually to lengthen, the mules became thinner, and so the rations had to be reduced from time to time, until men, horses, and mules were in very sore straits. The artillery horses and all extra horses of mounted officers, that had not already died from starvation, were sent back to Bridgeport or Stevenson to be kept there until the strain could be relieved sometime in the indefinite future. Yet no thought of retreat or surrender entered the minds of the devoted soldiers. The fact that the army in the surrounding hills was in a worse condition—too weak to take any advantage of the situation by aggressive movements, except those abortive cavalry raids in the rear—undoubtedly saved the Union Army from destruction.

In the early part of October, General Hooker arrived at Nashville with the Eleventh and Twelfth corps. They were stationed along the railroad to Bridgeport. The corps had come to Nashville by railroad, but were without transportation, therefore did not supply all the relief [163] needed at Chattanooga. What was absolutely necessary was the restoration of rail transportation from Stevenson to Chattanooga, and not exclusively the protection of the railroad from the north to Bridgeport. Sufficient reinforcements were also needed in order to enable the Union Army to attack and destroy or drive back the enemy, who was in too close proximity for safety; and therefore the first thing to be considered, after the Union troops were properly fortified, was to plan means by which the cooperation of these eastern reinforcements could be made available. In preliminary preparation for this, a steamboat which had been captured at Chattanooga, had been repaired and another was being built at Bridgeport. Rosecrans ordered Hooker to bring to Bridgeport all his command, with the exception of what was needed to protect the railroad from Nashville to the Tennessee River. He started also the construction of pontoons for a bridge, at some point over the river below Chattanooga, where his troops might have to cross in order to meet Hooker’s forces coming from Bridgeport, and also in order to shorten the [164] road down the river. General W. F. Smith (“Baldy Smith”) had lately been appointed chief engineer of the Army of the Cumberland. General Rosecrans ordered him to reconnoiter the river near Williams’s Island, a few miles below the points of Lookout Mountain, expecting to make of that island a steamer landing and supply depot. This last order was issued October 19, and on that same day General Rosecrans was relieved from the command of the Army; and General George H. Thomas assumed command.

Prior to this date, on October 9, a complete reorganization of the Army of the Cumberland had been made. Many of the regiments and brigades had been so reduced in numbers by the late battle and by sickness, that consolidation of brigades became imperative. Besides, in order to maintain efficiency in the army and proper discipline, a weeding out among the general officers became a necessity. Ever since the close of fighting at Chickamauga, there had been an undercurrent of feeling among the majority of the officers, that certain ones, who had failed to meet the emergencies which arose during that battle, could not continue [165] in command, without decided detriment to the future operations of the army. In compliance with the President’s order of September 28, the Twentieth and Twenty-First corps were consolidated and called the Fourth Corps. This new corps was placed under the command of General Gordon Granger who had particularly distinguished himself at Chickamauga. The reserve corps was made a part of the Fourteenth Corps. Each corps was composed of three divisions and each division of three brigades. The following short dispatch sent to the Secretary of War by C. A. Dana, gives a very concise and interesting statement of what was done:

“Fourth Corps: First Division, Palmer; First Brigade, Cruft, nine regiments, 2,044 men; Second Brigade, Whittaker, eight regiments, 2,035 men; Third Brigade, Colonel Grose, eight regiments, 1,968 men. Second Division, Sheridan; First Brigade, F. T. Sherman, ten regiments, 2,385 men; Second Brigade, Wagner, eight regiments, 2,188 men; Third Brigade, Harker, 2,026 men. Third Division, Wood; First Brigade, Willich, nine regiments, 2,069 men; Second [166] Brigade, Hazen, nine regiments, 2,195 men; Third Brigade, Samuel Beatty, eight regiments, 2,222 men.

“Fourteenth Corps: First Division, Rousseau; First Brigade, Carlin, nine regiments, 2,072 men; Second Brigade, King, four regiments of regulars and four regiments of volunteers, 2,070 men; Third Brigade, Starkweather, eight regiments, 2,214 men. Second Division, J. C. Davis; First Brigade, J. D. Morgan, five regiments, 2,214 men [this brigade had been in the reserve and did not take part in the late battle]; Second Brigade, John Beatty, seven regiments, 2,460 men; Third Brigade, Daniel McCook, six regiments, 2,099 men [this brigade had few losses in the late battle]. Third Division, Baird; First Brigade, Turchin, seven regiments, 2,175 men; Second Brigade, Van Derveer, seven regiments, 2,116 men; Third Brigade, Croxton, seven regiments, 2,165 men.”

Those detachments of the reserve corps which still remained along the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad beyond Bridgeport, were not included. The garrison at Stevenson, [167] Bridgeport, and Battle Creek, under General J. D. Morgan, as above stated, were however included. The State of Tennessee was divided into two districts, the northern, commanded by General Robert S. Granger with headquarters at Nashville, and the southern under General R. W. Johnson with headquarters at Stevenson.

General L. H. Rousseau superseded General R. S. Granger at Nashville, in November, prior to the battles. General Starkweather relieved Johnson at Stevenson after the battle, the latter having been assigned in Rousseau’s place, as commander of the First Division of the Fourteenth Corps.

In the reorganization of the army the Wisconsin troops were distributed as follows: The First and Twenty-First Infantry remained in Starkweather’s Third Brigade of the First Division of the Fourteenth Corps; the Tenth Infantry in the First Brigade of the same division which was commanded by General W. P. Carlin. The Twenty-fourth Infantry was in the First Brigade of Sheridan’s Division, commanded by Colonel F. T. Sherman; the Fifteenth Infantry in Willich’s [168] Brigade of Wood’s Division, of the Fourth Corps. The Fifth Battery was attached to Davis’s Division of the Fourteenth Corps; the Third, Eighth and Tenth, and Company A of the First Wisconsin Heavy Artillery were assigned to the Second Division of the Artillery Reserve. The Eleventh and Twelfth corps were not reorganized prior to the battles; the Third and Twenty-sixth Wisconsin Infantry remained in the same organization in which they were in the Army of the Potomac—viz.: the Third in Ruger’s Third Brigade of the First Division (Williams’s) of the Twelfth Corps; the Twenty-sixth in the Second Brigade of the Third Division of the Eleventh Corps.

When General Thomas became commander of the Army of the Cumberland, General John M. Palmer was made commander in his place of the Fourteenth Corps, and General Charles Cruft was assigned to the command of the First Division of the Fourth Corps, in place of Palmer.

General James A. Garfield, chief of staff, had been elected member of Congress from his district in Ohio; he left in order to assume his duties and [169] General J. J. Reynolds had been appointed chief of staff in his place. General John M. Brannan was made chief of artillery. These, with General W. F. Smith as chief engineer, greatly added to the strength of the headquarters staff.

This order of the President—which affected these local changes in the Army of the Cumberland—was followed by a much greater consolidation on a very much broader scale. The Army of the Tennessee—then in western Tennessee and northern Mississippi—was placed under command of General W. T. Sherman, who was on his way with a portion of it to Chattanooga in order to reinforce the Army of the Cumberland. The Army of the Ohio, under General A. E. Burnside, was at Knoxville. These three armies had not before had a commander in common under whose orders they could be made to cooperate. A commander-in-chief at Washington had so far been unable to accomplish this very necessary cooperation. The Tennessee River ran through the fields of operations of all the three armies—less directly in the field of the Army of the Tennessee—and the preceding lack of unity [170] in movements jeopardized the ultimate object of all their campaigns, namely: the re-establishment of the former relation between the states in rebellion and the general government. On this account the President established the Military Division of the Mississippi, with Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant in command. This was a virtual consolidation of the three armies; their cooperation in that wide field was henceforth perfect. Subsequent events showed the wisdom of this order. The Confederates never won another battle in this department; and in fourteen months after the organization of one command there existed no organized Confederate force in this field, worthy of notice. There were only detachments here and there, like Forrest’s rangers in the early spring of 1865, until General James H. Wilson’s cavalry raid put an end to all resistance.

After its reorganization, the Army of the Cumberland was composed of the Fourth, Eleventh, Twelfth, and Fourteenth corps, and three divisions of cavalry. Had General Sheridan been placed in command of the combined cavalry, his subsequent career shows that its efficiency [171] would have been greatly improved; but all the changes, that might have been beneficial, could not be thought of at once. The pending events in this department developed some pre-eminent officers, who were indeed very much needed; they became masterful factors in the early downfall of the rebellion, both in the east and in the west; Sheridan was one of these; others were Grant, Thomas, and Sherman.

Grant reached his new command by way of Louisville, Kentucky, where he met the Secretary of War, Edwin M. Stanton, who brought with him the order of October 18, as well as General Grant’s commission. Grant sent from Louisville the following telegram to Thomas, “Hold Chattanooga at all hazards. I will be there as soon as possible. Please inform me how long your present supplies will last, and the prospect for keeping them up.” General Thomas answered: “Two hundred and four thousand four hundred and sixty-two rations in storehouses; ninety thousand to arrive tomorrow, and all the trains were loaded which had arrived at Bridgeport up to the [172] 16th—probably three hundred wagons. I will hold the town till we starve. ”

On October 19, Thomas ordered General Hooker to carry out the former orders of General Rosecrans, namely to concentrate his forces at Bridgeport, in order to move them to Chattanooga.

General Grant arrived at Chattanooga on the evening of October 23, one month after the Union troops had taken possession of the city. On the 24th he went to Brown’s Ferry in company with Thomas and W. F. Smith, the chief engineer; at once he recognized the necessity and possibility of the scheme, initiated by General Rosecrans, but conceived and planned by W. F. Smith, of placing a pontoon bridge there and of obtaining a hold on the south side of the river at that point, and he ordered its execution; much had already been done toward preparing for it. General Smith was given full power to complete the plan. The river at Chattanooga runs almost directly west opposite the city, but soon it curves to the north and then it turns to the south with quite a sharp bend at the foot of Lookout Mountain, from where the [173] river runs directly north, forming a narrow and perfect peninsula directly opposite or west of the city. This peninsula widens slightly at its southern end and forms a perfect shape of a human foot; hence it is called “Moccasin Point.” Brown’s Ferry is directly west of the city, on the western point of the neck of this peninsula, some miles below Lookout. It is only about a mile in direct line to Brown’s Ferry from the northern end of the bridge, at the foot of Cameron Hill in the western outskirts of the city. From Brown’s Ferry the river continues north, and passes Williams Island; five or more miles from the ferry, it makes another sharp turn to the south at the foot of Walden’s Ridge; in the course of six or seven miles from this northern bend it flows tortuously past Kelly’s Ferry. The peninsula thus formed, is the northern nose of Raccoon Mountain. From Brown’s to Kelly’s Ferry is about five miles in direct line somewhat to the southwest, and, as said before, it is one mile across to Chattanooga. It is about five miles from Cameron Hill bridge to Brown’s Ferry, but from where the boats for the Brown’s Ferry bridge subsequently started, it is [174] about nine miles, and to Kelly’s Ferry more than fifteen, perhaps twenty miles. These figures show the value to the transportation, of obtaining unobstructed access to Kelly’s Ferry as a landing for steamboats bringing supplies from Bridgeport across Brown’s Ferry, when it should come into possession of the Union Army by the advance of Hooker, until the railroad could be repaired or put into working order from Bridgeport to Chattanooga. The movement of troops which accomplished this, also, gave the army a lodgment on the south side of the river, to meet, and assist, Hooker’s forces coming from Bridgeport, thus breaking the Confederate hold upon the river road to Bridgeport. Under General Smith’s orders and supervision, the plans were successfully carried out. Two flatboats and fifty pontoons, with cars, were prepared. In these, 1,500 men under Hazen passed down the river nine miles, and close to the Confederate pickets. They were to land at different points in sections, the places having been pointed out previously to the officers in command. On account of the darkness fires were kept burning opposite these places, so that the different [175] sections could land at the proper points. The remainder of Turchin’s and Hazen’s brigades—from which the men in the boats were taken—and their batteries, were marched across the peninsula, and posted out of sight in the woods, near Brown’s Ferry on the north side of the river.

The infantry troops were to cross in the boats, as soon as the men under Hazen landed on the south side, and recross to the north side. The artillery was to move into position as soon as the boats landed, in order to cover a retreat in case of disaster. The equipment for the pontoon bridge was also in place and ready for use. The boats commenced to float at 3 a. m. October 27, and they were not discovered by the enemy until 5 a. m., when the first section had landed; a portion of the second section, which did not land in the proper place, was fired on by the enemy’s picket, calling forth an attack by the picket-reserve of the enemy. But the Union troops on the north side of the ferry crossed rapidly in the boats, pushed forward to the top of the ridge, and in two hours they protected themselves sufficiently with timber [176] and abatis to hold the tête de pont . On the 27th the bridge was completed at 4:30 p. m.; the work was done under some shelling from Lookout Point. Captain P. V. Fox of the First Michigan Engineers was the skillful superintendent of the bridge building. Twenty beeves, six pontoons, a barge and about 2,000 bushels of corn fell into the hands of the Union troops. The Union loss was 6 killed, 23 wounded, and 9 missing. Six prisoners were taken from the Confederates and 6 were killed; how many were wounded is not known. While the bridge was being laid, General Hooker crossed the river at Bridgeport on a pontoon bridge, and was marching up towards Chattanooga. At 3 p. m. on the 28th, his head of column reached Wauhatchie, in Lookout Valley, at the junction of the railroad from Bridgeport, with the branch from Trenton up the valley. The wagon road from here to Brown’s Ferry runs about four miles, along the western base of a ridge, which here and there has deep depressions; through one of these the railroad continued to Chattanooga, around the nose of Lookout, close to the river; through another the [177] wagon road runs. General Hooker had with him Howard’s Eleventh Corps, and Geary’s division of the Twelfth, with the exception of one regiment left at the bridge at Bridgeport, one at Whiteside’s and one at Shellmound; the latter two places being on the railroad between Bridgeport and Chattanooga.

The First Division of the Twelfth Corps, (Williams), had been left to guard the railroad from Murfreesboro to Bridgeport. In Ruger’s brigade of this division was the Third Wisconsin Infantry, commanded by Colonel William Hawley. This regiment had been mustered into the service on June 29, 1861, and had been serving with the Army of the Potomac since that date until now, when it became a part of the Army of the Cumberland. In the Second Brigade of the Third Division, (Schurz) of the Eleventh Corps was the Twenty-sixth Wisconsin Infantry, commanded by Captain Frederick C. Winkler, who was appointed Major November 17, 1863. It was exclusively a German regiment, and was mustered in at Milwaukee on August 17, 1862. On the following October 6, it left Wisconsin for [178] the Army of the Potomac, in which it served until it became a part of the Eleventh Corps under Howard and Hooker of the Army of the Cumberland.

Hooker’s advance troops, under General Howard, camped that night within a mile or so of Brown’s Ferry, where they opened communication with the troops there. Geary’s division was in the rear and camped near Wauhatchie, three miles from Howard’s troops; thus the road from Wauhatchie to Kelly’s Ferry—three miles to the northwest of Wauhatchie—was controlled. About 1 a. m. on the 29th, Geary was heavily attacked by a part of Longstreet’s troops, but not before he had his division in line for defense. Howard was ordered to double quick his nearest division, under command of General Carl Schurz, to Geary’s relief. Before proceeding far, it was fired upon from the near hills on the division’s left, but at long range. The firing produced no great injury to Schurz’s troops. Howard detached one brigade to deploy on these hills, and pushed on with the other; in the meantime Steinwehr’s division, also of Howard’s, came up. [179] Then it was discovered that another hill, in the rear of Schurz was also occupied by the enemy. Smith’s brigade charged it and carried it with the bayonet against three times its number.

Hooker says, “No troops ever rendered more brilliant service. The name of their valiant commander is Colonel Orlando Smith of the Seventy-third Ohio Infantry. * * * For almost three hours, without assistance Geary repelled the repeated attacks of vastly superior numbers, and in the end drove them ingloriously from the field.” Thus the Lookout Valley was secured, and new communications were opened. The loss to General Hooker’s command was 416. Longstreet practically conceded that the Union commander had succeeded in opening this new line of communication, but spoke lightly of it. Whittaker’s and John G. Mitchell’s brigades were subsequently moved over to this region. The steamboat at Chattanooga passed down on the night of the 28th; thereafter two steamboats (one had been built at Bridgeport), made regular trips with supplies from Bridgeport to Kelly’s Ferry. Good roads were made from Chattanooga via Brown’s [180] to Kelly’s Ferry and the railroad from Bridgeport towards the east was being repaired. There was no shortage of rations or forage after these rapid preparations were commenced to attack the enemy in his strong positions around the city. Hope and confidence had always inspired the Army of the Cumberland; the rank and file had never despaired; now, they took the lead in anticipating that the end was in sight; success in battle depends very much on the condition of the human body and the enthusiasm of the spirit.

The feeble and ineffectual efforts of Longstreet to prevent the opening of the river, and the advance of Hooker’s troops, opened the eyes of all the general officers of the Army of the Cumberland to the weakness of the Confederate Army, both in the ranks and among the officers. General Longstreet, in his official report of the battle of Wauhatchie, attributes his defeat to the jealousy of brigade officers. [35] The Confederate troops, making the attack on General Geary, were withdrawn from the east side of Lookout, but they returned immediately before daylight on the [181] night of the attack. General Longstreet gave reasons for this action; he showed that it was not good military tactics to keep a large force on that side of the mountain, where its only line of retreat was around the slope of Lookout; if it were defeated, it would be exposed to the fire of the Union troops at and opposite Chattanooga. These reasons were sound and foreshadowed the ease with which Hooker’s forces, on November 24, drove the enemy so easily and captured Lookout Mountain. It was after this defeat, that Bragg (for reasons unknown), sent Longstreet’s Corps toward Knoxville to assist in defeating Burnside. Bragg hoped that it could be returned in time to assist in the battle, that he knew must be fought at Chattanooga. Longstreet took with him the two divisions of McLaws and Hood, and Alexander’s cavalry. Wheeler’s cavalry passed him on the road; it was supposed to do certain things that it failed to do. Longstreet recommended that Bragg’s army should be drawn back in a strong position behind the Chickamauga, after the departure of Longstreet’s troops in November; his reason for this recommendation was, that in its [182] present position it could be reached in twenty minutes by the Union Army. Bragg seemed to be blind, however, to the events so rapidly transpiring in Chattanooga; he did not seem to realize that the troops Longstreet had fought at Wauhatchie, were reinforcements from the East to the Union Army.

In the meantime the Confederate batteries on Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge sent an occasional artillery shot into the Union lines. The pickets of the two armies held their lines close to each other in the valley and watched each other’s movements, firing whenever a soldier on his beat became visible. There being no good reason for this desultory and ineffectual warfare, an agreement was finally reached, that the pickets should fire only when advances of troops became apparent; henceforth, an officer could with impunity ride along the picket line in plain view of the opposite pickets.

As soon as Grant became aware of Longstreet’s departure for East Tennessee, he prepared for an attack on Bragg’s army in order to keep him from detaching more troops against Burnside and to [183] compel him to return those already sent. He ordered General Thomas to assault the north end of Missionary Ridge; the order was given November 7; but on account of the utter lack of animals—caused not only by the great loss in the recent battles, but also by the death of a large number from starvation since the occupation of the city—it was finally decided by Grant, Thomas, and Smith, that nothing but a defensive attitude would be feasible until General Sherman’s forces could arrive. The necessity for aggressive operations, on account of Bragg’s boldness in taking such a desperate chance as to send a large force commanded by his ablest general away from his weak little army, increased the activity of the Union Army in its preparation for battle, and thus was opened a way for the relief of Burnside; the hope was that he could hold out until help arrived.

It is to be presumed, that Bragg had implicit confidence that the Union Army would not dare to attack such a strong position as Bragg’s army then held. General Grant at once wrote the facts of the situation to Burnside and urged him [184] to maintain his attitude at Knoxville, until a battle could be fought at Chattanooga and a detachment sent to his assistance. Not waiting for Sherman, he formulated his plans; and thus knew before the latter’s arrival, just where he should place Sherman, what his part of the attack should be, and that he should march immediately on his approach directly to the north end of Missionary Ridge. Grant planned furthermore that Hooker should attack Lookout Mountain from his position in Lookout Valley; the one should attack the right of the Confederate Army and the other the left. Sherman arrived at Bridgeport, with his leading division, on November 15. Arriving at Chattanooga ahead of his troops, he with Grant, Thomas, and Smith, looked over the entire situation and learned how, and by what route, he could reach his point of attack. It had become apparent to the Union commanders, that Bragg’s line did not reach the immediate river hills, at the north end of Missionary Ridge, but was deflected to the east, along the third hill to the south of the river, with a deep depression between it and the next hill to the north. This made necessary a much stronger [185] position than the supposed location at Bragg’s right flank, and stronger forces and dispositions were needed. Grant announced his plan to his generals on the 18th and expected the attacks could be made on the 21st; a rain storm delayed, however, the arrival of Sherman’s troops. When they did arrive at Brown’s Ferry the high water had broken the bridge, which delayed the crossing. When the bridge was repaired, Sherman crossed it in plain view of the enemy’s signal station on the point of Lookout Mountain; he marched into the woods behind a series of hills on the north side of the river; these hills concealed his march all the way to the mouth of Chickamauga Creek, where Davis’s division of the Fourteenth Corps had been placed to cover his movement, and to protect the bridge there, after Sherman’s troops had again crossed to the south side. The crossing at the Chickamauga was also protected by artillery, placed on the heights north of the river. After crossing at the mouth of the Chickamauga, Sherman was to follow Missionary Ridge as far as the railroad tunnel. This seemed to be the principal point of attack; the plan further contemplated [186] that all the forces available should be converged toward General Sherman’s position. Therefore Howard’s Eleventh Corps was taken from Hooker’s position and replaced by Whittaker’s and Grose’s brigades of the Fourth Corps; the Eleventh Corps was placed on the left of the Army of the Cumberland south of the river, looking towards Sherman’s position perhaps four miles further east. Thomas was to cooperate by moving his troops to his left, so that he could join with Sherman’s right, when the latter should push the Confederate forces back to the tunnel. The combined forces should then advance against the enemy, with the object in view of sweeping the Confederate Army into the south Chickamauga Creek, which runs on the opposite side of Missionary Ridge. General Hooker was to hold Lookout Valley with Geary’s division and the two brigades of Whittaker and Grose, and Howard’s corps was to be in readiness to act with either Sherman or Thomas, as circumstances should dictate. The plan was a fine one, because, if that flank could be defeated, the Confederate line of retreat could be easily cut off.

[187] Colonel Long with his brigade of cavalry moved to Sherman’s left. When Sherman should sweep the ridge, he was ordered to cross the Chickamauga and raid the rear of the Confederate Army. This attack was to begin on the 22nd, but was postponed on account of the fact that two of Sherman’s divisions had not been able to cross Brown’s Ferry bridge, on account of a break. To avoid any further delay, Thomas suggested that Howard’s Corps be sent to General Sherman in place of the two delayed divisions, and that the latter be ordered to report to General Hooker, whose combined forces should immediately attack Lookout Mountain in order to divert the attention of the enemy from Sherman’s contemplated attack; this suggestion was in part approved by General Grant.

A singular thing happened on November 22. General Ewing’s division of Sherman’s troops had come into Lookout Valley at Trenton from Bridgeport; Bragg’s rear was thus threatened. The movement of some of Bragg’s troops to avert this calamity together with the former withdrawal of Longstreet’s Corps for Knoxville, produced [188] the impression in the Confederate Army, that the whole was going to fall back. Deserters who came into the Union line reported this impression. Bragg also notified the Union commander to remove all non-combatants from the city; this was on the 20th. General Grant ordered Thomas to make a reconnoisance in front of Chattanooga in order to test the truth of this report, and to find out whether Bragg was really falling back, and if so, Thomas should prevent him from doing it undisturbed. The Army of the Cumberland was nearest to the enemy and in readiness to do this with the most celerity. It seems that General Bragg had such confidence in the strength of his position on the top of Missionary Ridge, about 500 feet high, that he was willing not only to send away Longstreet, but actually started other forces to follow him. The latter he recalled, however, in time to take part in the battle. He supposed, and with good reason, that Missionary Ridge could not be taken by assault; and even if Lookout should become untenable on account of the capture of the valley of Chattanooga, he would [189] be safe in his entrenchments on Missionary Ridge. This must have been his conclusion, and he must have known that the Army of the Cumberland was receiving considerable reinforcements. Bragg’s lines were altogether too long. When the object of holding Lookout Mountain no longer existed, after the reopening of the river and railroad route to Bridgeport, he should have withdrawn from there and from Chattanooga Valley; he should either have concentrated on Missionary Ridge or taken Longstreet’s advice and fallen back to Dalton, behind the second ridge, southeast of Chattanooga, where he was finally driven.

Fortunately for the success of the Union movements, Bragg did not do the things that an abler general would have done. He stood stolidly in his original line along its whole length until the opening of the battle of Missionary Ridge. It has been stated, that Bragg expected Grant when he discovered the departure of Longstreet for East Tennessee, would send forces to support Burnside.

In pursuance of the order to make a reconnoisance, Thomas ordered Granger, who commanded the Fourth Corps, to advance a division of his [190] corps towards Orchard Knob November 23, about noon. This elevation of land is located about half way between the city and Missionary Ridge, at the left of Thomas’s line. Between the Union line and this knob was a growth of trees and bushes. These concealed the formation of the troops for a while only from the enemy. Wood’s division was deployed in front of Fort Wood. Sheridan’s division formed next on the right and rear of Wood. Howard’s Corps was massed in the rear of these two divisions. General Baird’s division fell, in echelon, at the right of Sheridan. General Johnson’s division (formerly Rousseau’s) of the Fourteenth Corps stood with arms in the entrenchments, ready to move in any direction. This really placed the latter in echelon with Baird. It is said the enemy looked upon these movements as a parade for display or to obtain wood for fires, when seeing them from the top of Missionary Ridge. The Confederates had a line of rifle-pits along the base of Orchard Knob, following Citico Creek for a mile or more.

With Willich’s and Hazen’s brigades in front and Beatty’s in reserve, General Wood moved [191] forward about 2 p. m. His troops pushed back easily whatever was in their front. Willich struck Orchard Knob squarely on his front, and soon captured it, clearing it of the enemy’s lines. Hazen met more resistance from the Confederates who were perhaps more numerous or better fighters, although the hill he attacked was not so high as Orchard Knob. He carried the hill, however, and captured the Twenty-eighth Alabama Regiment and its flag. This advanced line gave a good position for further advances, and was held; the rest of the troops on the right moving up to and extending the line far to the right. General Wood fortified his line over Orchard Knob, and General Howard formed his corps on its left. The summit of this Knob gave a splendid outlook over the field between it and Missionary Ridge, and gave a fine view of the ridge itself. It afforded an opportunity for Grant and Thomas to view later on the whole subsequent movements against the enemy. General Wood lost 125 men killed and wounded in this battle of Orchard Knob. The Fifteenth Wisconsin of Willich’s brigade took part in this engagement; its losses [192] were not reported until after the battle of the 25th, when its commander reported 6 men slightly wounded in both engagements. Wood occupied this position until 3:15 p. m. on the 25th, when he moved forward with the rest of the army to the assault on Missionary Ridge. Bridge’s Illinois Battery occupied an epaulment in Wood’s line on Orchard Knob.

The taking of Orchard Knob had a most important bearing on the attack that General Hooker made on Lookout Mountain the next day. It caused Bragg to withdraw Walker’s division from that point to strengthen his right, which Bragg thought to be menaced by this advance to Orchard Knob. These troops prolonged Bragg’s line towards Sherman’s front but did not reach it. The Confederate general, Stevenson, signalled from the top of Lookout to Bragg that night that if an attack was intended by Grant, it would be delivered on Lookout Mountain. This is what actually occurred. Another of Sherman’s divisions crossed Brown’s Ferry on the 23rd; the bridge was again broken, however, leaving Osterhaus’s division still on the left bank. This gave General Sherman [193] only three divisions besides General Davis’s of the Fourteenth Corps, with which to operate at the designated place on Missionary Ridge. General Thomas informed General Hooker of the proximity of Osterhaus’s troops and directed, that if they did not get over to Sherman, he should have them join him and “take the point of Lookout Mountain.” This division was at that time in command of General Charles R. Woods, one of its brigade commanders. How sagacious was General Thomas in seeing immediately the advantage that should be taken of a mere accident, like the breaking of a pontoon bridge! It looks as though Thomas had made this suggestion to Hooker, without having beforehand a distinct understanding with General Grant; for he told General Hooker later, that Grant still hoped Woods’s (Osterhaus’s) division could cross in time to participate in Sherman’s movement, but if it could not the mountain should be taken if practicable. Hooker, finding that there was little possibility of the bridge being quickly repaired, made preparations for the advance against the mountain. It will be observed further on, that this accident resulted [194] in modifying the original plans very materially, as the taking of Orchard Knob had already done. The left of Bragg’s line was turned, but not his right; this movement was a result of the accidents to the Brown’s Ferry pontoon bridge. General Grant showed his broad mind in this affair as well as in other changes he made in his original plan, at a later date.

Chattanooga and Vicinity, November, 1863
Adapted from Fiske’s The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War , p. 288

THE BATTLE OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN

At 4 p. m. on November 24, 1863, one of the most spectacular battles of the war commenced. General Hooker’s force consisted of the following: Osterhaus’s division of the Fifteenth Corps, Cruft’s (formerly Palmer’s) of the Fourth; Geary’s of the Twelfth—with the exception of such regiments from the last two divisions as were required to protect the communications with Bridgeport and Kelly’s Ferry; battery K of the First Ohio, and battery I of the First New York of the Eleventh Corps, having sufficient horses for but one battery; a part of the Second Kentucky Cavalry, and Company K of the Fifteenth Illinois Cavalry. The aggregate number [195] of this force was 9,681. The foregoing statement of the forces is taken from General Hooker’s official report [36] , which is remarkably well written, clear in statement and full of essential facts. “At this time the enemy’s pickets formed a continuous line along the right bank of Lookout Creek, with the reserves in the valley, while his main force was encamped in a hollow half way up the slope of the mountain. The summit itself was held by three brigades of Stevenson’s division, and those were comparatively safe, as the only means of access from the next [that is, from the valley in which Hooker’s troops were located] for a distance of 20 miles up the valley was by two or three trails, admitting to the passage of but 1 man at a time; and even these trails were held at the top by rebel pickets.”

The top of Lookout Mountain at this point consists of a perpendicular crest, or palisade of rocks which rises out of the main body of the mountain about a hundred feet. From the foot of this crest the mountain slopes by a gradual descent but with a very broken surface on all sides to the valleys on [196] the east, west, and to the river on the north. An army could operate on this slope only below the crest, from the west to the east, or on the side of Chattanooga, around the northern slope, under the crest. Hooker’s army did not cross the top of the crest; but by taking the slope, the Confederate troops occupying the top, were forced to retreat by the only wagon road reaching to the top on the Chattanooga side. The slope on that side is less precipitous than on the west side where Hooker was. At the foot of the slope on the Chattanooga side flows the Chattanooga Creek and on the west side Lookout Creek, both flowing north, practically parallel with the trend of the mountain, and emptying into the Tennessee River, which runs west at the foot of the northern slope. Hooker continues his report as follows: “On the northern slope midway between the summit and the Tennessee, a plateau or belt of arable land, encircles the crest. There, a continuous line of earth-works had been thrown up, while redoubts, redans, and pits appeared lower down the slope to repel an assault from the direction of the river.”

Geary commenced his movements as instructed, [197] crossed the creek at 8 o’clock a. m., “captured the entire picket of 42 men posted to defend it, marched directly up the mountain until his right rested on the palisades, and headed down the valley.” The Confederate Walthall was in command of the troops immediately opposed to Geary, and Moore’s brigade near the Craven house on the eastern, or northeastern slope. General Stevenson was there in command of all the Confederate troops on the mountain. He placed sharpshooters along the western edge of the crest, and wherever there was depression enough, the artillery by raising the trails of the gun carriages did some execution until Geary’s troops reached the foot of the palisades. The Confederate troops located on the western slope, moved into position, facing Lookout Creek, in order to prevent the Union troops crossing at the bridge; but this disposition subjected them to a flank enfilading fire from Geary’s troops. The other Union troops moved up the Creek, crossed behind Geary’s line, and joined on his left. The batteries had been placed on elevated points, so as to enfilade the route by which the enemy had to march down [198] the slope, and on other points, by which the Confederates had to retreat if they were driven back. The Union line advanced, the artillery opened. The rout of the enemy was complete, many prisoners were taken, and many were killed and wounded. At noon when Geary’s advance rounded the northern slope, his flags were plainly visible from Chattanooga. There had been a fog all morning, which greatly favored Hooker’s movements, preventing the Confederates on top of the crest from directing their shots satisfactorily. As the Union flags appeared on the sky line of the northern slope, and were visible at Chattanooga, this fog settled down upon the lower stretches of the slope and revealed the Confederate lines badly broken and in flight with the compact ranks of the Union soldiers triumphantly advancing with flags flying and muskets glistening in the sun. It was a glorious sight to the Union troops, then in line in front of the works at Chattanooga. The picture presented was a “battle above the clouds,” for the fog obscured all that part of the mountain which was below the conquering lines of Hooker. General Stevenson says [199] in his report, with regard to this affair: “Finding that the fog was becoming so dense that the troops on the northern part of the mountain [meaning Pettus’s brigade on the crest] could not see the enemy moving upon Walthall, I gave orders for Pettus with my only disposable force to move down and report to Brigadier-General Jackson. He started at 12:30 o’clock and reached the scene of action a little past 1 o’clock. * * * This position was held by Moore, Walthall, and Pettus until about 8 p. m.” [37]

Stevenson had six brigades in his command; four of these took part in the fight on the mountain, the other two were placed between Chattanooga Creek and the road up the slope, in order to guard the line of retreat on the east side of the mountain against any advance from Chattanooga. Stevenson reports, that he lost only 380 in his three brigades; he does not state the number of troops he had on the mountain. Hooker rested at 2 o’clock p. m. after passing the point. The settling down of the fog shut off his view of the Chattanooga Valley and prevented his seeing [200] sufficiently the topography to justify him in advancing down into the valley that same evening. He formed his lines on the eastern slope; his right was at the palisades, and his left was near the mouth of Chattanooga Creek. This line he fortified, and reported the fact to the department commander. In this position he enfiladed the enemy’s line in the Chattanooga Valley, and also had communication across the mouth of the creek with the Union forces in the city. At 5:15 p. m. General Carlin’s brigade of Johnson’s division of the Fourteenth Corps, reported to General Hooker after having crossed the mouth of the creek by ferry; he was placed on the right of the line relieving Geary’s troops, which were almost exhausted with fatigue. During the night the enemy withdrew entirely, leaving behind 20,000 rations, and the camp and garrison equipage of three brigades. General Thomas reported, that Hooker captured 500 or 600 prisoners. The Eighth Kentucky Infantry scaled the crest about daylight on the 25th and hoisted the United States flag amid wild and prolonged cheers from the whole army.

[201] At ten o’clock a. m. on the 25th, leaving two regiments to hold the mountain, Hooker started towards Rossville, across Chattanooga Creek and the valley, with Osterhaus’s division of the Fifteenth Corps in the lead. Thus the left of the Confederate Army was completely turned, while the right still held its own. Hooker was too far from the Confederate line of retreat to menace it. To have turned the right first would have been better. Hooker was delayed four hours by a destroyed bridge in crossing Chattanooga Creek. The Tenth Wisconsin Infantry of Carlin’s brigade of Johnson’s division of the Fourteenth Corps participated in this engagement; it was detached from the brigade, and held a fort south of the Crutchfield house on the east side of the mountain; its losses were not reported.

While these operations were occurring on Lookout Mountain under the command of Hooker, Sherman advanced across the Tennessee River at the mouth of the Chickamauga with three divisions of the Army of the Tennessee, and one division (Davis’s) of the Army of the Cumberland, on the morning of the 24th, against the [202] other or extreme right wing of the Confederate line on Missionary Ridge. He advanced and formed his lines on the north end of the ridge; a brigade of Howard’s Corps moved to the left at 9 a. m. on the same day and communicated with Sherman about noon. Later Howard joined Sherman with his two divisions and formed on his right. Carlin’s brigade rejoined his division on the 25th, which was then in the valley half way to Missionary Ridge and on the right of Thomas’s line. Palmer’s and Granger’s corps were held in readiness by Thomas to advance to the foot of the ridge, as soon as Hooker should get into position at Rossville. It was after 2 p. m. that General Hooker effected a crossing of Chattanooga Creek and advanced as above stated. At noon General Sherman was heavily engaged with the enemy in his position, and finding it to be very strong was not making any headway against it. General Baird was, therefore, ordered to march his division within supporting distance of Sherman, and to move promptly.

He reported to Sherman, but the latter told him he could not find room for him and could not [203] make use of his troops. General Baird marched back a distance of about two miles, and arrived at the left of General Thomas’s line at 2:30 p. m.; he was ordered to fall in on the left of Wood, the left division of Grangers Fourth Corps.

It will be well at this time to take a rapid view of the entire lines of the Union and the Confederate armies, as they stood facing each other, arms in hand, at 3 o’clock p. m. on November 25, 1863, just before they grappled in a struggle for life and death, and for the permanent possession of the stronghold of the Middle West. So many changes having occurred in the previous three or four days in the Union Army, and equally as many and more important changes occurring on the Confederate side, makes it necessary to pause, just before describing the great spectacular battle of Missionary Ridge, and try to get at least a bird’s-eye view of the position of the numerous divisions and corps.

General Osterhaus had again taken command of his own division, relieving General Charles R. Woods; General Cruft, and General Geary were near enough with their troops to the ridge at [204] Rossville to form the extreme right of the Union line. There was an interval between Geary’s left and Johnson’s right, where Carlin stood after coming from Lookout. Johnson had only two brigades, Carlin on the right, and Stoughton (John H. King’s successor) on the left; Starkweather had been left in the works around the city. Hooker’s and Thomas’s troops were without reserves. Sheridan’s three brigades, F. T. Sherman’s, Harkers’s and Wagner’s were next to the left of Johnson; then Wood’s three brigades, Hazen’s, Willich’s, and Beatty’s; the latter appeared in two lines, being the last in Thomas’s section, and forming the left flank of the line; and then Baird’s three brigades, Turchin’s, Van Derveer’s and Phelps’s.

A mile and a half to the left of General Thomas’s line lay Sherman’s right flank, with no troops in the interval. The latter’s line was composed from right to left of the following brigades, viz.: Buschbeck’s, Ewing’s Matthies’s, Corse’s and A. Smith’s; Raum, was behind Matthies, and two brigades of J. E. Smith’s were in reserve behind the centre. Behind this line, a half mile [205] in the fortified line lay from left to right the brigades of Loomis, Cockerill, Alexander, and Lightburn, and Schurz’s division. Sherman thus had six divisions. The Confederate line from its right, which faced Sherman, was as follows by divisions: Cleburne, Stevenson, Gist, Cheatham, Anderson, Bate, and Stewart. Stewart held the left of Bragg’s line, and his troops were the first to encounter those of Hooker on their way to Rossville from Lookout Mountain. General Hardee commanded the right wing, consisting of the following four divisions: Cheatham, Cleburne, Stevenson, and Walker; General Breckenridge was in charge of the left wing, which was composed of Bate, Stewart, and Anderson. Cheatham’s division faced Baird, Anderson’s Wood; Bate’s Sheridan, and Stewart’s Johnson. Cleburne’s division reached the front of Sherman’s line on the afternoon of the 24th while marching from the Confederates’ left. Before the fight of the 25th occurred, Cheatham’s, Stevenson’s, and Walker’s divisions had prolonged Bragg’s line to within three-quarters of a mile of the tunnel; Smith’s brigade of Cleburne’s [206] division held Tunnel Hill on the 25th against Sherman; the rest of the division was not heavily engaged, but it had the assistance of Brown’s and Cumming’s brigades of Stevenson’s division, and Maney’s of Walker’s. Tunnel Hill was not captured by Sherman’s troops until after the retreat of these Confederate forces on the evening of the 25th, the result of the successful assault in the centre by Thomas.

The whole Confederate line on the left across the Chattanooga Valley was abandoned; Stewart withdrew to the top of the ridge before Hooker reached Rossville. It must be noticed, that General Thomas’s line in the centre, contained only four divisions of the Army of the Cumberland, namely two of the Fourth Corps, and two of the Fourteenth; one division (Davis’s) of the Fourteenth Corps was with Sherman on the left, and one (Cruft’s) was with Hooker on the right. Hooker had three divisions and Sherman six.

Starkweather’s brigade of Johnson’s division was left to hold the original works around Chattanooga; and did so during the assault of the rest of the troops upon Missionary Ridge.

[207] At 1 p. m. on the 12th, C. A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, who was in Chattanooga, sent this dispatch to the Secretary of War at Washington, “In our front here [meaning Thomas’s front], Confederate rifle-pits are fully manned, preventing Thomas gaining ridge.” At 4:30 p. m. he sent another dispatch showing how misleading the former dispatch was: “Glory to God. The day is decisively ours. Missionary Ridge has just been carried by a magnificent charge of Thomas’s troops, and rebels routed.” The reader must not lay much stress on the time given, at which the various movements were made; this is a mere guess in most instances. Seldom did an officer think of looking at his watch, at the moment any orders were given to make an important movement. The original Army of the Cumberland, referred to by Dana, were the troops General Grant thought would not fight, because they had been so roughly handled at Chickamauga. [38] It was quite a natural conclusion. The entire Union Army was in line at about [208] 3:30 p. m., ready for any commands which might be given by Grant, Thomas, Sherman and Hooker. The array of soldiers in the Union ranks from the three armies, those of the Potomac, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee, was formidable, commanded by such heroes as Grant, Thomas, Sherman, Hooker, Sheridan, and Howard. Thomas’s four divisions had about 18,000 in rank and file, Hooker’s about 9,000, and Sherman’s about 24,000.

It is not likely that Bragg had more than 30,000; but his position was sufficiently strong to almost equal Grant’s advantage in numbers. The Confederate Army was concentrated on a 500 feet ridge, which had a very steep and rough surface, sloping towards the Union lines at an angle of about forty-five degrees. This ridge had a fortified line on the top, manned by veteran infantry and artillery, and a thinner line of infantry at its foot in a series of deep rifle-pits; in front of the latter was a swarm of skirmishers. The army was still in command of Braxton Bragg, a commander of great experience; and of two wing commanders, Hardee a veteran of the [209] old regular army, and Breckenridge a former vice-president of the United States. Its division commanders were, as a rule, soldiers of the old regular United States Army, and were very capable officers. That army had two months before (or thought it had) won the battle of Chickamauga, and it was now fighting—at least in the centre where Thomas’s troops faced them—the same troops they claimed to have defeated a short time ago. It had every advantage of position at this time, and it had success in the past to fire the hearts of its soldiers, and arouse in them confidence in their ability to hurl back their old foe, who had the audacity to assault so formidable a stronghold.

Standing on any of the Union forts at Chattanooga, especially on Fort Negley or Fort Wood, or better still on Orchard Knob, where Grant and Thomas remained during the 25th, one would have not only a rear view of the Union Army as it stood, but also a front view of most of the Confederate force. From the top of Missionary Ridge, where Bragg had his headquarters, the whole panorama was magnificent. The lines of [210] blue, and their array of glittering muskets, could be seen from there in front. The backs of the troops were turned on Chattanooga. “Their faces were to the foe.” Bragg had a view of them which Grant and Thomas missed, and if he could have had an hour undisturbed by the conflicting emotions aroused in him by the pending conflict, if he could have watched through his field-glass the valorous mien, the confident air, and the evident determination of these veteran soldiers, to “feed fat the ancient grudge” against the old foes they had met at Mill Springs, Perryville, Stone’s River, and Chickamauga, he would surely have read in these characteristics the doom of the defeat which an hour later overwhelmed him and his little army, and from which it never sufficiently recovered to win another battle. Had he been half as much of a philosopher, as he was a soldier, he would have foreseen, what afterwards was expressed by one of his ablest generals (D. H. Hill), that the holding of Chattanooga “sealed the fate of the confederacy.”

The living, moving lines of soldiers, presented [211] to the view of the two opposing commanders, stationed at vantage points above the valley in which the Union Army was then formed, although a most interesting picture, was more impressive because of its background of magnificent mountains, rivers, and hills. On the west rose great Lookout Mountain, 1,500 feet above the level of the valley; while across the valley, east of Lookout, Missionary Ridge stretched from the north to the South, rising 500 feet and crowned by the lines of grey soldiers, every movement of whom could be seen from Orchard Knob.

General Grant’s most excellent plan on the 24th was that Thomas’s troops should bear to the left, join with the right of Sherman after his forces had advanced to the tunnel, through which the railroad from Chattanooga to East Tennessee ran, and together they should make an assault with the whole union line. Thomas’s troops were in line until 3:30 p. m. on the 25th, waiting for Sherman to capture the hill over the tunnel. General Sherman had begun the fight early in the morning of the 25th by advancing Corse’s brigade; the latter moved down the southern slope of the [212] second hill which had been gained the day before, and under a galling fire advanced against Cleburne’s fortified position. This position was very strong, however, and Corse could not drive the enemy from the hill. Then other brigades were brought up, but they did not succeed in loosening Cleburne’s firm hold. General Grant observing this from Orchard Knob sent the rest of Howard’s Corps to Sherman’s aid at 10 a. m. Howard had two divisions, Steinwehr’s and Schurz’s. It was evident, that Bragg endeavored most vigorously to keep Sherman from turning his right. Had Sherman succeeded in his effort, he would have been in Bragg’s rear and able to menace his line of retreat at Chickamauga station, which was immediately in the rear of the right flank. There was no evidence, however, that Bragg was weakening his lines in front of Thomas; although he had already sent the forces, which Hooker had defeated the day before on Lookout, to his right wing; and these proved to be amply able to hold so strong a natural fortress without any further reinforcements. When General Sherman received Howard’s two [213] divisions, he renewed his efforts to take Tunnel Hill; he made a charge and received one in return, which broke some of John E. Smith’s brigades.

It appears that Grant did not contemplate any attack by Thomas on the centre, when he at noon ordered Baird to report to Sherman; for with Baird’s he had already detached nearly half of Thomas’s troops to Sherman and Hooker. With Baird gone, Thomas had only eight brigades to Sherman’s seven divisions; General Hooker had seven brigades as far from General Thomas’s right, as General Sherman’s were from the latter’s left.

General Grant and General Thomas were together when these orders were given on the 25th; they were in accordance with Grant’s original plan, that Bragg’s defeat should be accomplished by Sherman’s turning the enemy’s right. Grant must therefore have consulted with Thomas concerning this maneuver. Whether General Thomas expressed his opinion on the 25th with regard to making the attack in some other place than at Sherman’s line, is not known; [214] but it will be seen, that the success of the day pivoted around Thomas, because of the invincible position of the enemy at Tunnel Hill, and the valor of the old Army of the Cumberland. This is no disparagement to General Grant’s original idea; his plans were generally correct and successful, and this one was fine in conception, but it shows definitely, that the “best laid schemes, o’mice and men, gang aft a’gley.”

General Grant boldly made his third deviation from his original outline planned for the battle. Seeing the improbability of Sherman advancing his present line to join with Thomas’s left, as contemplated, he ordered an independent assault by Thomas’s troops alone; this order was given at 3 p. m. This section of the Union line was covered by two lines of skirmishers; and was confronted by something less than four divisions of the enemy, namely, a part of Stewart’s on the Confederate left, which was facing Hooker’s line under General Breckenridge’s personal direction. The signal for the advance was to be six shots from a battery (perhaps Bridge’s), on Orchard Knob. General Grant’s report will best tell what occurred, viz.: [215] “Thomas was accordingly directed to move forward his troops, constituting our center, * * * with a double line of skirmishers thrown out, followed in easy supporting distance by the whole force, and carry the rifle-pits at the foot of Missionary Ridge, and when carried to reform his lines, on the rifle-pits with a view to carry the top of the ridge. These troops moved forward, drove the enemy from the rifle-pits at the base of the ridge like bees from a hive—stopped but a moment until the whole were in line—and commenced the ascent of the mountain from right to left almost simultaneously, following closely the retreating enemy, without further orders. They encountered a fearful volley of grape and canister from near thirty pieces of artillery and musketry from still well-filled rifle-pits on the summit of the ridge. Not a waver, however, was seen in all that long line of brave men. Their progress was steadily onward until the summit was in their possession.” [39]

When the summit was reached by the Union troops, the scene of confusion and flight of the [216] Confederate forces, down the eastern slope of the ridge, was wonderful to behold.

General Thomas in his report, [40] says: “Our troops advancing steadily in a continuous line, the enemy, seized with panic, abandoned the works at the foot of the hill and retreated precipitately to the crest, where they were closely followed by our troops, who, apparently inspired by the impulse of victory, carried the hill simultaneously at six different points, and so closely upon the heels of the enemy, that many of them were taken prisoners in the trenches. We captured all their cannon and ammunition before they could be removed or destroyed.”

In the meantime Hooker was advancing toward Thomas’s right with his line stretched across the ridge, at right angles to it. Stewart’s troops, seeing their left threatened by Hooker, tried to escape down the eastern slope toward Ringgold, but encountering there Osterhaus’s troops, moved northward along the base; here they ran into Johnson’s division, and more than a thousand were captured. After General Baird’s division had gained [217] the summit, Stewart wheeled his division to the left, across the crest, and advanced toward the troops, resisting General Sherman. He had not advanced far before he met Cheatham’s forces in line across the crest; the contest here lasted until after dark. During the night all the Confederate forces retreated across the Chickamauga, burned the bridges, and continued their flight to Taylor’s Ridge, near Ringgold, the nearest heights across the Chickamauga Valley, sixteen miles in a straight line southeast. General Sheridan, after halting a few moments on top of the ridge to reform his troops, pushed on to Chickamauga Creek; he captured 300 prisoners, 13 cannon, and a train of 12 wagons.

Mr. C. A. Dana sent a dispatch to the Secretary of War at 10 a. m. November 26, which contained the following paragraph: “The storming of the ridge by our troops was one of the greatest miracles in military history. No man who climbs the ascent by any of the roads that wind along its front can believe that 18,000 men were moved up its broken and crumbling face unless it was his fortune to witness the deed. It seems as awful as a [218] visible interposition of God. Neither Grant, nor Thomas intended it. Their orders were to carry the rifle-pits along the base of the ridge, and capture their occupants; but when this was accomplished, the unaccountable spirit of the troops bore them bodily up those impracticable steeps, over the bristling rifle-pits on the crest, and the thirty cannon enfilading every gully.”

General Grant says in his report that he intended the lines should be readjusted and ascend the ridge if they were successful at the base. The reports of the corps and division commanders indicate that some of them misunderstood the orders. The men advanced without special orders, however, when they found the position at the foot of the ridge too much exposed to the plunging fire of the enemy. In some instances they were even called back to the foot after proceeding part way up the hill. The assault was made, however, and was so successful, that no one was court-martialed; no one was bold enough to repudiate the responsibility for its initiation. General Grant did not hesitate to modify his original plans from time to time, when inevitable circumstances showed him [219] that some other movement than the one laid down was essential to success. This characteristic is the quality of a great general.

The artillery also under command of General Brannan did fine service during the assault. The large guns in Forts Wood, Sherman, Cheatham, and battery Rousseau directed their fire first upon the Confederate line at the foot of the ridge, as did four light batteries in front of Chattanooga. When the Union line was ascending the ridge, this artillery turned their shots to the entrenched Confederate line on top. The enemy’s artillery and musketry seemed largely to have over-shot the Union lines; the records do not show that the Union troops suffered as heavy losses during the time they were under fire, as the enemy’s apparently advantageous position would warrant. It is also probable that the audacity of the blue coats in assaulting the top of the ridge surprised the Confederates and induced nervousness, wild shooting, terror, confusion, and flight.

The Union troops did not advance up the ridge as if on parade; but conformed more or less to the contour of the ground; the line appeared to an onlooker [220] as a zigzag one; but the standards were always where they ought to be, and there were no stragglers. They did not fire their muskets to any extent while advancing, although they received a constant wild fire from the enemy. It was an assault by the musket bearers, and it is not likely they received many orders from their officers. As soon as the Union troops gained the crest at one point, although it appeared as if the six different points were gained simultaneously, it greatly assisted the rest of the troops, who were so near the crest. The Confederates began to fall back as soon as the first Union troops gained the top. General Bragg tried to send his troops from a less threatened point to one more in danger, but his attempt failed, because his men saw better than he seemed to do that all was lost when one point was carried. This observation applies only of course to the isolated line on the right and left of Bragg’s headquarters, which was attacked by General Thomas’s troops. His troops further to the right, beyond an unoccupied space—such as Cheatham’s division—were not affected that way, because [221] they turned on left wheel, and attacked Baird’s division on the crest.

The Union troops, which were called back to the foot of the ridge by those officers who thought their orders carried them only thus far, caused Bragg to believe that they had been repulsed by the fire of his troops; he rode along his line congratulating them, when he was informed that his line was broken further to the right, and the Union forces had crowned the ridge. The victory was gained too late in the evening to ensure an effective pursuit. The enemy had all night, after crossing the Chickamauga, in which to move undisturbed his troops and wagon trains; he made the distance between himself and the pursuing force as great as possible before morning. General Grant was apparently justified in waiting for Hooker to arrive at Rossville before he ordered Thomas’s advance, but he was not justified in waiting so long as he did for Sherman’s expected capture of Tunnel Hill. Yet who could hope or believe that Thomas’s troops could successfully assault so formidable a position as they did? Hooker was delayed four hours in [222] crossing Chattanooga Creek. If Grant had sent Howard’s Corps at 10 a. m. on the 25th to Rossville in Hooker’s place, instead of sending it to Sherman, and as soon as it was in position, ordered Thomas, Howard, and Sherman to advance in unison, the same result would have occurred at one or two o’clock as was secured much later, and then the four and a half or five hours of daylight would have been sufficient to injure the Confederate Army very greatly before it could have crossed the Chickamauga. But it is very easy to look back and criticise. On the battlefield there may be reasons, apparent to a commander, why these supposable movements could not be made that are not so palpable to a historian, who may lose sight of all the complex situations, the inside knowledge of the commander, and his fearful responsibility to the country.

The pursuit was taken up on the morning of the 26th by General Hooker’s troops and Palmer’s Fourteenth Corps. Hooker attacked the enemy in a strong position at Ringgold Gap on Taylor’s Ridge; he lost heavily without inflicting corresponding injury on the enemy. The Fourth Corps [223] was marched back to the city on the morning of the 26th to make preparations for the relief of Burnside at Knoxville.

On the 27th, the pursuit was abandoned at Ringgold, twenty-three miles by rail south of Chattanooga. General Grant telegraphed from that place at 2 p. m. to General Halleck at Washington, D. C.: “I am not prepared to continue pursuit further.” The official reports neither give the strength of the Union Army nor of the Confederate Army. At the time of the attack on Missionary Ridge the Union Army outnumbered largely the Confederate Army. A large part of this disparity in numbers was offset by the extraordinarily strong position of the Confederate forces, and the fact that the Union Army was the aggressor. Could Bragg have commanded the resources that Grant did, he would have gladly availed himself of them in order to outnumber the Union Army; no false notions of chivalry prevented either army from availing itself of any great advantage in battle, which is habitually taken where war is waged. The Confederate boast at the beginning of the [224] war that one Confederate could out-fight five Yankees—as all northern troops were called by the Confederates—was rather incompatible with their complaint after the war, that they were crushed only by weight of numbers.

Military skill will sometimes win battles against numbers; this was not the case in the battles around Chattanooga, however. Bragg does not give his losses in his official report; but he lost to the Union Army in prisoners 6,142 men, 42 pieces of artillery, 69 gun carriages, and 7,000 stands of small arms. He destroyed much other material before and during his flight.

The Union less was 5,286 killed and wounded, and 330 missing. These losses seem small compared with other battles of less importance—Chickamauga for instance; but it must be remembered that the sacrifice for the continued possession of Chattanooga by the Union Army includes also all the losses of the conflicts of the Tullahoma campaign, of Chickamauga, Wauhatchie, Lookout Mountain, Orchard Knob, and Missionary Ridge. When it is considered how much these battles meant, in their causal effect on the [225] final suppression of the rebellion itself, their value becomes apparent.

WISCONSIN TROOPS IN THE BATTLE OF MISSIONARY RIDGE

Wisconsin’s part in the battle of Missionary Ridge was important and honorable. The First and Twenty-first Infantry were in Starkweather’s brigade of Johnson’s division. This brigade had lost heavily at Chickamauga; it was assigned to remain in Chattanooga in order to hold the works, while the army was assaulting the ridge. This duty was cheerfully and thoroughly done, although it deprived the brigade of the glory of charging up the ridge.

The Tenth Infantry remained on detached duty holding a fort south of the Crutchfield house, on the side of Lookout Mountain, and did not ascend the ridge.

The Fifteenth Infantry was attached to Willich’s brigade of Wood’s division of Granger’s fourth corps; it was commanded by Captain John A. Gordon. In the ascent of the ridge it was in the reserve line of the brigade, therefore its loss [226] was nominal; the entire loss during the battles was 6 men wounded. General Willich speaks of the regiment in high terms in his report. It consisted only of 130 men.

Before coming to the Army of the Cumberland the Fifteenth Infantry had distinguished itself. On October 19, 1862, Major Quincy McNeill of the Second Illinois Cavalry wrote to the Governor of Wisconsin, from Island Number Ten, that there was no braver man in the service than Captain John A. Gordon.

The Eighteenth Infantry came with Sherman’s troops of the Army of the Tennessee; it was commanded by Colonel Gabriel Bouck and attached to the First Brigade (Alexander’s), of the Second Division (General John E. Smith’s), of the Seventeenth Corps. This infantry regiment was engaged with Sherman’s troops on the extreme left; its losses are not reported. It was organized at Milwaukee in February, 1862, and was mustered in March. It proceeded to Pittsburg Landing, Tennessee, and became a part of the Army of the Tennessee on April 5, 1862. This regiment was heavily engaged in the battle at that place on [227] April 6; also in the battle of Corinth and other engagements prior to its coming to Chattanooga. The Eighteenth Infantry was noted for the size of its men; it was said that Company G of this regiment averaged by actual weight 160 pounds to the man. At the battle of Pittsburg Landing on April 6, 1862, this regiment was in the left brigade of General Prentiss’s division; it was then commanded by its first colonel, J. S. Alban. It formed for battle only thirty rods from its tents, and fifteen minutes later the Confederate line was upon it. The enemy outflanked and overpowered it; Alban was wounded, and carried from the field, dying soon afterwards; the Lieutenant-Colonel was also wounded and Major Crane was killed. All this occurred one week after the regiment left its camp of organization in Wisconsin. Captain Gabriel Bouck, Company E, Second Wisconsin Infantry was made Colonel of the Eighteenth on April 22, 1862.

The Twenty-fourth Infantry was attached to Francis T. Sherman’s Brigade of Sheridan’s division of the Fourth Corps, and was commanded by Major Carl Von Baumbach. His official report [228] is a vivid account of how the top of the ridge was gained, “My regiment advanced in admirable line of battle up to the first pits of the enemy. Upon reaching the first line, the men were pretty much exhausted, and unable to move for some time. In about five minutes, however, we moved over the first pits of the enemy, but after advancing beyond the first line, the line of battle was not regular. The men took advantage of all obstacles, in the way, for shelter, and thus advanced toward the top of the ridge. The fighting was fierce and severe, but owing to the formation of the ground my men were able to screen themselves partially, from the deadly volleys, that were being hurled at us, at every step of our advance. In the course of the ascent my men had to rest several times on account of exhaustion. But at length we succeeded in gaining the crest of the ridge, after two hours steady fighting * * * I would most respectfully mention Adjutant Arthur McArthur, Jr., for his bravery. When the color sergeant was exhausted he carried the flag in front of the regiment, cheering the men to follow him up the ridge.”

[229] The loss of the Twenty-fourth is given as 31 killed and wounded. Captain Howard Greene and Lieutenant Robert J. Chivas were killed. Captain Richard H. Austin and Lieutenant Thomas E. Balding were wounded. Major Von Baumbach commended especially the bravery of the latter two.

The Twenty-sixth Infantry, still in the second brigade of Schurz’s division of the Eleventh Corps, was commanded by Major F. C. Winkler; this regiment followed the movements of its brigade and on November 25, was with Sherman on the extreme left. Its losses are not reported.

The Third, Eighth, and Tenth light batteries were in the First Brigade of the Second Division of the artillery reserve. Company C of the first heavy artillery was in the Second Brigade of the same division.

The Eighth Battery did excellent service on the evening of the 24th, when Carlin’s brigade crossed Chattanooga Creek at its mouth and joined Hooker. Lieutenant O. German, commanding the battery, placed two sections near the mouth of the creek on its right bank, and shelled the Confederate [230] position and the road up the east of the mountain. On the 25th, after the infantry had taken Missionary Ridge it ascended to the crest. Losses, none.

The Fifth Battery was part of the artillery which was so placed as to cover the pontoon bridge at the mouth of the Chickamauga, where Sherman’s troops crossed on the 24th.

The Twelfth Battery was placed on a hill near the location of the Fifth Battery.

The Sixth and Twelfth batteries were attached officially to the Second Division of the Seventeenth Corps; therefore they were on the left with Sherman during the 25th. Their losses are not reported.

There is no report from the Tenth Battery, which was stationed at Harrison’s Landing, about twelve miles up the river, east of Chattanooga; a section of this battery reported to Colonel Eli Long (of the cavalry) at Calhoun, Tennessee.

Battery C of the First Regiment of Wisconsin Heavy Artillery was mustered in October 1, 1863; it was sent directly to Chattanooga and assigned to Fort Wood.

[231] The Sixth Wisconsin Battery was mustered into service at Racine, Wisconsin, October 2, 1861. It did not leave the State until March 15, 1862, when it went to St. Louis. It took part in the siege of Island Number Ten, the siege and battle of Corinth, and the siege of Vicksburg. This battery came to Chattanooga with the Fifteenth Corps under Sherman.

The Tenth Wisconsin Light Battery was mustered into the service at Milwaukee on February 10, 1862, with Captain Yates V. Beebe as commander. It left the State March 18 and went to St. Louis. From there it joined the Army of the Tennessee and took part in the battle of Corinth. On September 14, 1862, it arrived at Nashville, and took part in the battle of Stone’s River. It did active duty in various locations until the date of the battles around Chattanooga.

The Twelfth Wisconsin Battery was organized and equipped at Jefferson Barracks, Missouri. It did service in both Tennessee and Mississippi until coming to Chattanooga with General Sherman.

The Army of the Cumberland—as reorganized prior to the battles around Chattanooga—with [232] General Thomas in command, was now in permanent possession of Chattanooga. The Confederate Army took up its winter quarters at Dalton, Georgia, on the railway twenty-eight miles southeast of Chattanooga, across two mountain ranges. The assignment of General Grant as commander of the Division of the Mississippi—giving him command of all the forces, operating in the States of Kentucky, Tennessee, Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi—which so greatly contributed to the victories in the battles around Chattanooga, insured also the permanent holding of that city.

Whatever was accomplished by Rosecrans during the four months of the campaign, beginning on June 23 at Murfreesboro, and ending on October 19, 1863 at Chattanooga, was done by him and his Army of the Cumberland alone. He could not get any cooperation from the East or West. The President and General Halleck at Washington, seemed to be in earnest by the wording of their dispatches, as published in the Rebellion Record , in urging and commanding Burnside in east Tennessee and the Army of the Tennessee on the Mississippi to join with Rosecrans [233] prior to the battle of Chickamauga; for reasons not apparent to the reader of present history, no reinforcements came. It is pathetic to read the official record of those days, which gives an account of the struggles, the marches, the battles, the sacrifices, the patient endurance by the musket bearers of extreme fatigue, and the cheerfulness with which the soldiers endured all. They faced death without a thought of their real heroism. To one who went through the campaign and came out alive and unwounded it is incomprehensible, that all did not die.

It is true other armies, such as those of the Potomac, the Tennessee, and the one in Missouri had campaigns at the same time and were equally exposed to the hazards of war; but none of them marched over a territory so mountainous and so difficult; none of them fought battles in so perilous a region or with more deadly effect, than the soldiers in the battle of Chickamauga. Had the Union Army been really defeated and had it lost Chattanooga, the army could hardly have recovered from the disaster, without the quick aid of large reinforcements, [234] which were too far away at that time to be available in an emergency. Burnside was besieged at Knoxville, and the Army of the Tennessee so far away, that it took weeks to get it to Chattanooga. It will be of great interest to the future student of the military history of the War between the States to follow the subsequent campaigns of the Western armies after Grant became commander-in-chief, and Sherman was assigned to the command in the West, with headquarters at Chattanooga. He will apprehend how all the armies worked together, and how soon the rebellion itself was crushed, although its soldiers fought to the bitter end.

Adams, Gen. Daniel W., at Chickamauga, 99 , 100 , 104 .

Alabama, 8 - 10 ;
troops in, 33 , 232 ;
28th Infantry, 191 .

Alexander, Col. E. Porter, at Knoxville, 181 .

Alexander, Col. Jesse I., at Missionary Ridge, 205 , 226 .

Alexander’s Bridge, near Chickamauga, 69 , 72 , 77 .

Alpine (Ga.), 61 , 63 , 72 - 75 .

Anderson, Gen. Patton, at Missionary Ridge, 205 .

Anderson, Gen. Robert, in Kentucky, 15 .

Anderson’s Cross Roads (Tenn.), 159 .

Armies —
Cumberland, 1 , 3 , 5 , 8 , 13 , 15 , 164 , 177 , 178 , 201 , 206 - 208 , 226 , 232 ;
organization, 12 , 19 , 20 , 24 , 25 , 28 ;
commander, 16 ;
reorganized, 164 , 169 , 170 , 231 ;
reinforced, 135 , 189 ;
retreats, 155 ;
at Murfreesboro, 4 , 5 , 11 ;
in Chickamauga campaign, 52 - 154 ;
at Chattanooga, 186 ;
courage of, 22 , 180 , 214 ;
personnel, 25 - 27 , 33 .
Mississippi, 12 .
Ohio, 15 , 169 .
Potomac, 4 , 158 , 177 , 178 , 208 , 233 .
Tennessee (Confederate), 1 , 33 ;
organized, 33 - 39 ;
in Chickamauga campaign, 52 - 154 ;
on Missionary Ridge, 202 - 222 .
Tennessee (Union), 4 , 5 , 158 , 159 , 169 , 201 , 208 , 226 , 231 - 233 .

Armstrong, Gen. Frank C., at Chickamauga, 117 .

Atlanta (Ga.), capture, 3 , 5 , 10 .

Austin, Capt. Richard H., wounded, 229 .

Baird, Gen. Absalom, of regular army, 23 ; [236]
commands division, 19 , 21 , 166 ;
in Chickamauga campaign, 60 , 65 , 66 , 68 ;
at battle of Chickamauga, 79 , 81 - 103 , 107 , 108 , 111 , 112 , 115 , 122 , 126 - 129 , 139 - 142 , 145 , 152 ;
withdraws, 123 , 125 , 129 ;
at Rossville, 124 ;
Orchard Knob, 190 ;
Missionary Ridge, 202 - 205 , 213 , 216 , 221 ;
commended, 148 , 149 .

Balding, Lieut. Thomas E., 132 ;
wounded, 229 .

Barker, Capt. John D., aide to Thomas, 120 , 122 .

Barnes, Gen. Sidney M., at Chickamauga, 104 , 107 , 109 , 113 , 142 .

Bate, Gen. William B., at Missionary Ridge, 205 .

Battle Creek (Tenn.), 60 , 167 .

Battles —
Antietam, 137 .
Bull Run, 15 , 137 .
Carnifex Ferry, 12 .
Chancellorsville, 4 , 137 .
Chickamauga, mentioned, 14 , 17 , 19 - 21 , 30 , 34 , 37 , 81 , 126 , 157 , 207 , 224 , 233 ;
not a failure, 52 ;
described, 67 - 124 ;
criticized, 13 , 135 - 150 .
Corinth, 12 , 32 , 227 , 231 .
Crampton’s Gap, 137 .
Dug Gap, 65 - 69 .
Fredericksburg, 137 .
Gettysburg, 4 , 136 - 138 .
Guy’s Gap, 44 , 46 .
Harper’s Ferry, 137 .
Hoover’s Gap, 2 , 43 , 44 .
Island Number Ten, 29 , 32 .
Iuka, 12 .
Leet’s Tanyard, 65 .
Liberty Gap, 2 , 42 , 43 .
Lookout Mountain, mentioned, 135 , 181 , 212 , 224 ;
described, 192 - 201 .
Middle Creek, 14 .
Mill Springs, 15 , 16 , 210 .
Missionary Ridge, mentioned, 2 , 135 , 189 , 192 , 193 ;
described, 201 - 222 .
Orchard Knob, mentioned, 135 , 224 ;
described, 189 - 194 .
Perryville, 3 , 16 , 20 , 22 , 28 - 35 , 210 .
Pittsburg Landing, 226 , 227 . [237]
Rich Mountain, 12 .
Ringgold Gap, 222 , 223 .
Shepardstown, 137 .
Shiloh, 31 , 34 , 35 , 50 , 137 .
South Mountain, 137 .
Stone’s River, 1 , 2 , 11 , 13 , 16 , 22 , 28 - 37 , 137 , 144 , 210 , 231 .
Vicksburg, 5 .
Tunnel Hill, 185 , 186 , 206 , 211 - 214 , 221 .
Wauhatchie, mentioned, 135 , 224 ;
described, 176 - 182 .

Baumbach. See Von Baumbach.

Beatty, Gen. John, at Chickamauga, 93 , 99 , 104 , 113 , 142 ;
at Chattanooga, 166 .

Beatty, Gen. Samuel, at Chattanooga, 166 ;
at Orchard Knob, 190 ;
at Missionary Ridge, 204 .

Beebe, Capt. Yates V., commands battery, 231 .

Bellefont (Ala.), 57 .

Benning, Gen. Henry L., at Chickamauga, 97 , 138 .

Benton Barracks (Mo.), 30 .

Bingham, Col. George B., in Tullahoma campaign, 28 ;
at Chickamauga, 127 .

Bloody Pond, at Chickamauga, 80 .

Bouck, Col. Gabriel, commands regiment, 226 , 227 .

Bowling Green (Ky.), 2 , 3 , 6 , 11 , 16 .

Boynton, Gen. H. V., cited, 85 , 108 , 109 , 118 , 136 .

Bradyville (Tenn.), 41 , 43 .

Bragg, Gen. Braxton, Confederate commander, 2 , 33 , 34 ;
at Tullahoma, 39 , 40 ;
at Chattanooga, 54 , 55 ;
plans, 57 , 183 , 189 ;
evacuates Chattanooga, 63 , 64 , 67 ;
at Lafayette, 65 , 66 , 68 ;
reinforced, 66 , 67 , 76 , 98 ;
at Chickamauga, 58 , 62 , 69 - 80 , 85 , 87 , 99 , 116 , 117 , 119 ;
size of army, 136 ;
after Chickamauga, 124 , 146 , 151 , 156 - 161 ;
line near Chattanooga, 181 - 194 ;
at Missionary Ridge, 205 - 213 , 220 - 224 ;
reports, 49 , 67 .

Brannan, Gen. John M., of regular army, 23 ;
commands division, 17 , 24 , 66 ;
in Tullahoma campaign, 41 ;
at Chickamauga, 82 - 96 , 103 - 115 , 119 , 127 , 138 - 142 , 151 ;
withdraws, 123 , 125 ;
chief of artillery, 169 ;
at Missionary Ridge, 219 ;
commended, 148 ;
reports, 85 , 86 .

Breckenridge, Gen. John C., at Chickamauga, 82 , 90 , 96 - 100 , 104 , 110 , 117 , 140 , 141 , 148 ; [238]
Missionary Ridge, 205 , 209 , 214 ;
characterized, 34 , 35 .

Bridge, Lyman, commands Illinois battery, 192 , 214 .

Bridgeport (Ala.), railway junction, 6 , 7 , 28 , 52 - 54 , 56 , 59 , 60 , 159 , 162 , 163 , 166 , 171 - 174 , 176 , 177 , 180 , 184 , 187 , 189 , 194 ;
supply station, 134 ;
road to, 156 ;
steamboat at, 179 ;
Bragg at, 19 , 49 ;
Gordon, 83 ;
garrisoned, 167 ;
troops cross at, 176 .

Broomtown Valley (Ala.), 63 .

Brotherton, ——, house near Chickamauga, 80 , 81 , 91 , 92 , 116 .

Brown, Gen. John C., at Missionary Ridge, 206 .

Brown’s Ferry (Tenn.), fortified, 172 - 176 ;
captured, 178 ;
bridge at, 179 , 185 , 187 , 192 , 194 .

Buckner, Gen. Simon B., in East Tennessee, 59 ;
reinforces Bragg, 60 , 67 , 70 ;
in Chickamauga campaign, 66 , 68 ;
at Chickamauga, 97 , 98 , 142 ;
characterized, 35 .

Buel, C. C., and Johnson, Robert U., Battles and Leaders of Civil War , 74 , 116 , 147 .

Buell, Gen. D. C., Confederate officer, 2 , 3 , 11 , 16 , 28 , 31 , 32 ;
at Chattanooga, 50 .

Buell, Gen. George P., at Chickamauga, 106 , 113 , 117 .

Burnside, Gen. Ambrose E., in East Tennessee, 59 , 66 , 67 , 158 , 232 , 234 ;
at Knoxville, 169 , 181 - 184 , 189 , 223 .

Buschbeck, Col. Adolphus, at Missionary Ridge, 204 .

Calhoun (Tenn.), 230 .

Cameron Hill, at Chattanooga, 173 .

Camp Dick Robinson (Ky.), 15 .

Caperton’s Ferry (Ala.), location, 57 , 59 ;
crossed, 60 , 61 .

Carlin, Gen. William P., commands brigade, 43 , 201 ;
at Chickamauga, 108 ;
Chattanooga, 166 , 167 ;
Lookout Mountain, 200 ;
Missionary Ridge, 202 , 204 .

Carpenter, Capt. Stephen J., commands battery, 32 .

Century Magazine , cited, 74 .

Chapin, Col. Alfred R., commands regiment, 28 .

Chattanooga (Tenn.), location, 55 ;
importance of, 3 , 7 - 9 , 39 , 51 , 71 , 119 , 134 ;
railway terminus, 6 , 177 ;
in 1862, 50 ;
held by Confederates, 49 , 52 - 54 , 58 , 63 ;
evacuated, 63 ;
Union army enters, 64 ; [239]
Union troops at, 72 , 76 , 77 , 109 , 112 , 135 , 181 , 188 , 200 , 210 , 219 , 225 , 227 , 230 , 231 , 234 ;
troops withdraw to, 125 , 129 , 133 , 146 , 152 ;
siege of, 156 - 163 ;
steamboat built, 179 ;
Union forts at, 209 ;
battles near, 2 , 5 , 31 , 155 - 234 ;
permanently occupied, 232 ;
Rosecrans retires to, 121 ;
reports from, 144 , 210 .

Chattanooga Valley, 54 , 188 , 189 , 199 - 201 , 206 .

Cheatham, Gen. Benjamin F., at Chickamauga, 86 , 89 , 96 , 97 , 138 , 139 , 141 ;
advances, 125 ;
at Missionary Ridge, 205 , 217 , 220 .

Chickamauga campaign, 51 - 154 . See also Battles: Chickamauga.

Chickamauga Station, 125 , 212 .

Chickamauga Valley, topography, 11 , 126 , 217 . See also Creeks: Chickamauga.

Chivas, Lieut. Robert J., killed, 229 .

Christiana (Tenn.), 41 .

Cincinnati Gazette , cited, 52 .

Clarksville (Tenn.), 20 .

Cleburne, Gen. Patrick R., commands division, 43 ;
in Chickamauga campaign, 58 , 66 , 68 ;
at battle of Chickamauga, 82 , 89 , 90 , 96 , 97 , 100 - 102 , 128 , 139 , 141 ;
at Missionary Ridge, 205 , 212 ;
report, 101 ;
characterized, 100 .

Cockerill, Col. Joseph R., at Missionary Ridge, 205 .

Columbus (Ky.), 32 .

Connell, Col. John M., at Chickamauga, 106 , 113 .

Colquitt, Gen. Peyton H., killed, 102 .

Corps —
4th, formation, 165 , 170 ;
officers, 168 ;
at Missionary Ridge, 186 , 203 , 206 ;
Orchard Knob, 189 , 190 ;
Lookout Mountain, 194 ;
Chattanooga, 222 ;
Wisconsin troops in, 168 , 225 , 227 .
11th, comes to Chattanooga, 159 , 170 ;
at Nashville, 162 ;
Wauhatchie, 177 , 178 ;
Orchard Knob, 190 , 191 ;
Missionary Ridge, 186 , 187 ;
Wisconsin troops in, 168 , 177 , 178 , 229 .
12th, reinforces Chattanooga, 159 , 170 ;
at Nashville, 162 ;
Wauhatchie, 177 , 178 ;
Lookout Mountain, 194 ;
Wisconsin troops in, 168 , 177 .
14th, formation, 12 , 17 , 19 ;
commanders, 12 , 168 ;
officers of, 21 , 24 ;
medical director, 110 ;
in Tullahoma campaign, 43 - 47 ;
at Decherd, 53 ; [240]
advances, 56 , 57 , 60 , 65 , 76 ;
at Chickamauga, 76 - 79 , 86 , 88 ;
reorganized, 165 , 166 , 170 ;
at Orchard Knob, 190 , 191 ;
Lookout Mountain, 200 ;
Missionary Ridge, 185 , 193 , 206 ;
pursues enemy, 222 ;
Wisconsin troops in, 28 , 30 , 127 , 167 , 168 , 201 .
15th, reinforces Chattanooga, 159 ;
at Lookout Mountain, 194 , 201 ;
Wisconsin troops in, 231 .
17th, portion sent to Chattanooga, 159 ;
Wisconsin troops in, 226 , 230 .
20th, formation, 12 , 18 ;
commander, 17 , 23 ;
medical director, 110 ;
in Tullahoma campaign, 46 , 47 ;
at Winchester, 53 ;
Alpine, 74 , 75 ;
advances, 56 - 61 , 76 ;
at Chickamauga, 73 , 76 - 79 , 86 - 88 ;
Wisconsin troops in, 29 , 30 , 32 , 33 , 59 , 130 , 131 , 133 , 134 ;
merged in 4th Corps, 165 .
21st, formation, 12 , 18 ;
commander, 17 ;
in Tullahoma campaign, 43 , 45 , 46 ;
at McMinnville, 53 ;
advances, 56 - 64 ;
at Chickamauga, 70 , 73 , 74 , 78 , 86 - 88 ;
Wisconsin troops in, 31 , 133 ;
merged in 4th Corps, 165 .
Cavalry, 18 , 31 .
Reserve, 19 , 83 , 165 .
For Confederate Corps, see names of commanders.

Corse, Col. John M., at Missionary Ridge, 204 , 211 , 212 .

Cowan (Tenn.), 47 .

Crane, Maj. Josiah W., killed, 227 .

Craven, ——, house on Lookout Mountain, 197 .

Crawfish Springs (Ga.), 71 , 78 - 80 , 82 , 87 , 93 , 99 , 153 .

Creeks —
Big Crow, 53 .
Chattanooga, 124 , 155 , 196 , 199 - 202 , 222 , 229 .
Chickamauga, 60 , 64 , 66 , 69 , 70 , 73 , 76 , 81 , 82 , 119 , 133 , 181 , 185 , 201 ;
described, 71 ;
crossed, 72 , 78 , 79 , 85 , 99 , 187 , 230 ;
retreat across, 217 , 221 , 222 .
Citico, 190 .
Island, 61 .
Lookout, 195 - 197 .
McBride’s, 44 .
South Chickamauga, 186 .

Crittenden, Senator John, son of, 17 . [241]

Crittenden, Gen. Thomas L., commands division, 12 ;
at Hoover’s Gap, 43 ;
in Tullahoma campaign, 45 ;
Chickamauga campaign, 63 , 64 , 68 , 69 ;
at battle of Chickamauga, 70 , 72 , 73 , 76 , 78 , 82 , 84 , 86 , 87 , 91 , 94 , 95 , 109 , 121 , 133 ;
at Chattanooga, 155 ;
characterized, 17 .

Crook, Gen. George, cavalry raid, 160 , 161 .

Croxton, Gen. John T., at Chickamauga, 84 , 85 , 113 , 114 , 127 ;
at Chattanooga, 166 ;
commended, 148 .

Cruft, Gen. Charles, at Chattanooga, 165 , 168 ;
Lookout Mountain, 194 ;
Missionary Ridge, 201 , 203 , 206 .

Crutchfield, ——, house on Lookout Mountain, 201 , 225 .

Cumming, Gen. Alfred, at Missionary Ridge, 206 .

Dalton (Ga.), Confederates at, 189 , 232 .

Dana, C. A., assistant secretary of war, reports, 144 , 145 , 165 , 207 , 217 .

Daniels, Col. Edward, cavalry officer, 30 .

Danville (Ky.), 15 .

Davis, Gen. Jefferson C., of regular army, 23 ;
commands division, 18 ;
in Tullahoma campaign, 43 , 47 ;
Chickamauga campaign, 59 ;
battle of Chickamauga, 86 , 87 , 93 , 95 , 96 , 106 , 107 , 109 , 111 , 130 - 134 , 142 , 145 , 151 ;
at Chattanooga, 166 , 168 ;
Missionary Ridge, 185 , 193 , 201 , 206 ;
characterized, 108 .

Davis’s Cross Roads (Ga.), 65 , 68 .

Decherd (Tenn.), 52 , 53 , 160 .

Deshler, Gen. James, killed, 102 .

Dick, Gen. George F., at Chickamauga, 113 .

Drury, Capt. Lucius H., chief of artillery, 20 , 31 ;
wounded, 133 .

Dyer, ——, house near Chickamauga, 81 .

Eaglesville (Tenn.), 41 .

Ector, Gen. Matthew D., at Chickamauga, 85 .

Ely, Col. John H., at Chickamauga, 129 ;
captured, 130 .

Ewing, Gen. Hugh, at Trenton, 187 ;
Missionary Ridge, 204 .

Fairfield (Tenn.), 44 . [242]

Forrest, Gen. Nathan B., cavalry commander, 33 ;
raiding, 69 , 146 , 170 ;
in Chickamauga campaign, 69 ;
at battle of Chickamauga, 73 , 82 - 85 , 89 , 95 , 117 , 140 , 141 , 153 , 154 ;
Rossville, 124 ;
characterized, 35 , 36 .

Forts :
Cheatham, 219 ;
Donelson, 16 , 20 , 35 ;
Henry, 16 ;
Leavenworth, 32 ;
Negley, 209 ;
Riley, 32 ;
Rosecrans, 6 ;
Sherman, 219 ;
Sumter, 15 ;
Wood, 190 , 209 , 219 , 230 .

Fox, Capt. P. V., builds bridge, 176 .

Fox, Col. W. F., Regimental Losses in Civil War , 142 .

Frankfort (Ky.), 2 .

Franklin (Tenn.), 6 .

Furay, W. S., war correspondent, 51 , 52 .

Gallatin (Tenn.), 20 .

Gaps :
Bellbuckle, 40 .
Cooper’s, 60 , 63 , 68 , 75 .
Crampton’s, 137 .
Dug, 65 , 66 , 68 , 72 . See also Battles: Dug Gap.
Frick’s, 63 .
Guy’s, 40 , 44 , 46 .
Hoover’s, 2 , 40 , 42 , 43 .
Liberty, 2 , 40 , 42 , 46 .
McFarland’s, 71 , 93 , 109 , 110 , 123 , 124 , 131 .
Rossville, 19 , 76 , 81 , 83 , 109 , 114 , 124 , 146 .
Ringgold, 222 .
Stevens’s, 60 , 63 - 65 , 68 , 71 - 74 .
Winston’s, 61 , 75 .

Gardner, Capt. George Q., commands Wisconsin battery, 32 , 133 , 134 .

Garfield, Gen. James A., at Chickamauga, 110 , 112 , 115 , 120 , 123 ;
leaves army, 168 , 169 ;
commended, 48 ;
characterized, 13 , 14 .

Gaw, Capt. W. B., at Chickamauga, 120 .

Geary, Gen. John W., at Wauhatchie, 177 , 178 , 180 ;
Lookout Mountain, 186 , 194 , 196 - 198 , 200 ;
Missionary Ridge, 201 - 204 .

Georgia, boundary, 9 ; [243]
soldiers from, 10 ;
Union troops in, 146 , 232 .

German, Lieut. Obadiah, at Missionary Ridge, 229 .

Gist, Gen. State Rights, at Chickamauga, 98 ;
Missionary Ridge, 205 .

Glass’s Mill (Ga.), 70 .

Glenn, Widow ——, house near Chickamauga, 78 - 81 , 131 .

Goldsmith, Capt. Gustavus, killed, 132 .

Gordon. See Lee and Gordon’s Mill.

Gordon, Capt. John A., 225 , 226 .

Govan, Gen. Daniel C, at Chickamauga, 98 , 102 , 138 .

Granger, Gen. Gordon, commands reserve, 19 ;
in Tullahoma campaign, 41 , 44 , 46 ;
at Chickamauga, 83 , 114 , 115 , 118 , 119 , 121 , 144 , 151 , 154 ;
withdraws, 123 ;
commended, 145 , 148 ;
commands corps, 165 ;
at Orchard Knob, 189 , 190 ;
Missionary Ridge, 202 , 203 , 225 ;
characterized, 21 , 22 .

Granger, Gen. Robert S., commands brigade, 19 ;
at Nashville, 167 .

Grant, Gen. Ulysses S., at Vicksburg, 4 , 5 ;
Shiloh, 31 , 50 ;
captures Fort Donelson, 16 , 35 ;
takes command at Chattanooga, 170 - 172 , 207 , 232 ;
plans, 182 , 183 , 185 - 189 , 193 , 194 , 211 - 214 , 218 , 221 , 222 ;
watches battle, 191 ;
at Missionary Ridge, 208 - 212 ;
reports, 215 , 223 ;
commander-in-chief, 234 ;
genius of, 219 .

Greene, Capt. Howard, killed, 229 .

Gregg, Gen. David M., at Chickamauga, 138 .

Grose, Col. William, at Chickamauga, 93 , 104 , 111 ;
Chattanooga, 165 ;
Lookout Mountain, 186 .

Gross, Surgeon Ferdinand H., at Chickamauga, 110 .

Halleck, Gen. H. W., commander-in-chief, 66 , 67 , 223 , 232 .

Hanson, Capt. Hans, killed, 131 .

Hardee, Gen. William J., before the war, 15 ;
commands corps, 34 , 40 ;
at Missionary Ridge, 205 , 208 ;
characterized, 35 .

Harker, Gen. Charles G., at Chickamauga, 94 , 113 , 116 , 117 ;
Chattanooga, 165 ;
Missionary Ridge, 204 ;
commended, 148 .

Harrison’s Landing (Tenn.), 230 .

Hauff, Capt. Henry, killed, 131 .

Hawley, Col. William, of Third Wisconsin, 177 .

Hazen, Gen. William B., in Chickamauga campaign, 58 , 60 , 61 , 62 , 64 ; [244]
at battle of Chickamauga, 104 , 107 ;
at Chattanooga, 166 ;
Brown’s Ferry, 174 , 175 ;
Orchard Knob, 190 , 191 ;
Missionary Ridge, 204 ;
commended, 148 .

Heald, Capt. Abner O., killed, 129 .

Heg, Col. Hans C., brigade commander, 29 ;
at Chickamauga, 59 , 134 ;
killed, 87 , 108 , 130 , 131 .

Helm, Gen. Ben Hardin, at Chickamauga, 99 ;
killed, 100 .

Hill, Gen. Daniel H., at Chickamauga, 70 , 79 , 89 , 97 , 102 , 110 , 116 , 126 , 138 ;
cited, 73 , 74 , 146 - 149 , 210 .

Hindman, Gen. Thomas C., in Chickamauga campaign, 66 , 68 ;
at Chickamauga battle, 82 , 96 , 97 , 113 , 115 , 132 , 142 ;
report, 115 , 116 .

Hiram College (Ohio), instructor, 14 .

Hobart, Col. Harrison C., commands regiment, 30 ;
at Chickamauga, 127 ;
captured, 129 .

Hood, Gen. John B., Confederate officer, 6 ;
at Chickamauga, 82 , 96 - 98 , 116 , 138 , 142 ;
wounded, 116 ;
at Knoxville, 181 .

Hooker, Gen. Joseph, at Chancellorsville, 4 ;
reinforces Chattanooga, 159 , 161 - 163 ;
brings troops, 172 , 174 , 176 ;
at Wauhatchie, 177 - 180 ;
Lookout Mountain, 181 , 184 , 186 , 187 , 192 - 200 , 212 ;
pursues Confederates, 201 - 208 , 222 ;
at Missionary Ridge, 213 , 214 ;
report, 186 , 187 .

Howard, Gen. O. O., reinforces Chattanooga, 159 ;
at Wauhatchie, 177 , 178 ;
Orchard Knob, 190 , 191 ;
Missionary Ridge, 186 , 187 , 202 , 208 , 212 , 222 .

Humphreys, Gen. Benjamin, at Chickamauga, 97 .

Huntsville (Ala.), 28 , 160 .

Illinois, troops from, 25 ;
24th Infantry, 127 ;
2nd Cavalry, 226 ;
15th Cavalry, 194 .

Indiana, troops from, 25 ;
29th Infantry, 42 ;
39th Infantry, 42 ;
44th Infantry, 114 ;
2nd Cavalry, 159 ;
4th Cavalry, 159 ;
4th Battery, 127 , 128 .

Islands :
Number Ten, 29 , 32 , 226 , 231 ;
Williams, 164 , 173 .

Iuka (Miss.), 32 .

Jackson, Gen. John K., at Chickamauga, 89 , 138 ; [245]
Lookout Mountain, 199 .

Jay’s Mill (Ga.), 73 , 82 , 83 .

Jefferson Barracks (Mo.), 231 .

Johnson, Gen. Bushrod R., Confederate officer, 69 , 70 ;
at Chickamauga, 96 , 97 , 105 , 106 , 138 , 147 .

Johnson, Capt. John M., killed, 131 .

Johnson, Gen. Richard W., commands division, 18 , 43 , 59 , 201 , 206 , 225 ;
of regular army, 23 ;
at Chickamauga, 86 , 89 , 91 , 92 , 100 , 111 , 128 , 139 - 141 , 145 ;
withdraws, 123 ;
at Stevenson, 167 ;
Orchard Knob, 190 ;
Lookout Mountain, 200 ;
Missionary Ridge, 204 , 205 ;
commended, 148 ;
report, 42 .

Johnson, Robert U. See Buel and Johnson.

Johnston, Gen. Albert S., Confederate officer, 15 .

Johnston, Gen. Joseph E., reinforces Bragg, 66 .

Kansas, forts in, 32 ;
troops from, 25 .

Kelly’s farm, at Chickamauga, 71 , 74 , 78 , 80 - 82 , 85 , 91 , 92 , 100 , 103 , 105 , 106 , 114 , 118 , 122 , 127 , 128 , 140 ;
charges at, 93 , 122 , 123 .

Kelly’s Ferry (Tenn.), 173 , 174 , 178 - 180 , 194 .

Kenosha, troops from, 30 .

Kentucky, troops in, 15 , 232 ;
troops from, 3 , 25 ;
8th Infantry, 200 ;
9th Infantry, 113 ;
17th Infantry, 113 ;
2nd cavalry, 194 ;
senator, 34 ;
railroad through, 6 ;
Confederates evacuate, 16 .

Kershaw, Gen. Joseph B., at Chickamauga, 96 , 97 , 105 .

King, Gen. John H., brigade commander, 24 ;
at Chickamauga, 92 , 100 , 123 ;
Chattanooga, 166 ;
successor, 204 .

Knoxville (Tenn.), operations at, 158 , 169 , 184 , 187 , 189 , 234 ;
Burnside at, 223 .

Lafayette (Ga.), 63 ;
Bragg retreats to, 64 - 67 , 71 - 74 , 77 ;
road from, 72 , 76 , 78 , 79 , 82 , 88 , 91 - 95 , 99 , 103 , 110 , 118 , 122 , 123 , 127 .

LaGrange, Col. Oscar H., commands cavalry, 20 , 31 ;
at Chickamauga, 132 .

Law, Gen. Evander M., at Chickamauga, 96 , 97 , 105 , 116 .

Lee, Gen. Robert E., 4 ; [246]
before the war, 15 ;
in Virginia, 67 ;
surrenders, 10 , 52 .

Lee and Gordon’s Mill, at Chickamauga, 64 , 65 , 68 - 79 , 82 , 87 , 92 , 131 .

Leet’s Tanyard (Tenn.), skirmish at, 65 .

Lexington (Ky.), 15 .

Liddell, Gen. St. John R., at Chickamauga, 86 , 98 , 117 , 122 .

Lightburn, Gen. Joseph A. J., at Missionary Ridge, 205 .

Lilly, Capt. Eli, artillery officer, 58 .

Lincoln, President Abraham, call for troops, 27 ;
orders, 165 , 169 , 170 , 232 ;
persistence, 38 .

Livingston, Lieut. Courtland, commands battery, 31 ;
at Chickamauga, 133 .

Long, Col. Eli, cavalry officer, 187 , 230 .

Longstreet, Gen. James, reinforces Bragg, 66 , 70 , 80 ;
advances, 126 ;
at Chickamauga, 95 - 98 , 104 , 106 , 112 , 113 , 116 , 118 , 143 , 148 , 149 ;
Wauhatchie, 178 - 182 ;
advises Bragg, 156 , 189 ;
goes to Knoxville, 181 , 182 , 187 , 189 ;
estimates losses, 138 ;
reports, 116 , 151 , 180 , 181 ;
From Manassas to Appomatox , 135 , 136 .

Lookout Valley, Union army in, 54 , 60 - 62 , 75 , 176 ;
opened, 179 , 184 , 186 , 187 ;
Confederates in, 195 .

Loomis, Col. John M., at Missionary Ridge, 205 .

Losses :
in Tullahoma campaign, 48 , 49 ;
at Chickamauga, 135 - 137 , 141 - 144 , 148 ;
at Missionary Ridge, 224 .

Louisville (Ky.), Union troops at, 2 , 3 , 6 , 8 , 16 , 27 - 29 , 31 , 50 ;
Grant at, 171 .

Louisville and Chattanooga Railroad, 20 .

Lumley’s Stand (Tenn.), 42 .

Lyon, Col. William P., commands regiment, 20 .

Lytle, Gen. William H., at Chickamauga, 87 ;
killed, 80 , 109 , 131 .

McAffee’s Church, at Chickamauga, 83 , 114 , 154 .

McArthur, Adj. Arthur Jr., commended, 228 .

McCook, Gen. Alexander D., commands division, 12 , 45 , 63 , 72 , 74 ;
in Tullahoma campaign, 42 ;
at Chickamauga, 73 - 75 , 78 , 86 , 87 , 91 - 95 , 109 , 110 , 121 , 128 , 153 ;
Rossville, 124 ;
Chattanooga, 155 ;
staff-officer of, 120 ;
characterized, 17 , 23 .

McCook, Gen. Daniel, at Chickamauga, 83 , 84 , 144 ; [247]
Chattanooga, 144 .

McCook, Col. Edward M., at Chickamauga, 132 ;
cavalry raid, 159 , 160 .

McDonald, ——, house near Chickamauga, 81 .

McKercher, Maj. Duncan, captured, 130 .

McLaws, Gen. Lafayette, at Chickamauga, 97 ;
Knoxville, 181 .

McLean, Lieut. John D., artillery officer, 33 ;
at Chickamauga, 134 .

McLemore’s Cove, near Chickamauga, 60 , 63 - 65 , 68 , 70 - 75 , 78 .

McMinnville (Tenn.), railroad junction, 39 , 53 , 56 , 60 ;
captured, 159 .

McNeill, Maj. Quincy, at Island Number Ten, 226 .

Manchester (Tenn.), pikeroad to, 39 ;
operations near, 42 - 46 .

Maney, Gen. George, at Missionary Ridge, 206 .

Marshall, Gen. Humphrey, Confederate officer, 14 .

Martin, Gen. John A., replaces Heg, 108 , 130 .

Martin, Gen. William T., cavalry officer, 159 .

Maryland, Confederates invade, 4 .

Matthies, Gen. Charles L., at Missionary Ridge, 204 .

Meade, Gen. George C., at Gettysburg, 4 .

Memphis (Tenn.), troops from, 158 .

Michigan, troops from, 25 ;
1st Engineers, 176 .

Mill Springs (Ky.), 15 , 16 .

Miller, Col. J. McClelland, at Liberty Gap, 42 .

Millersburg (Tenn.), 42 .

Milwaukee, troops muster at, 27 , 28 , 30 , 177 , 226 , 231 .

Minnesota, troops from, 25 .

Minty, Gen. Robert H. G., in Chickamauga campaign, 57 , 61 , 62 ;
at battle of Chickamauga, 72 , 77 ;
withdraws, 125 ;
at Rossville, 124 .

Mississippi, troops from, 66 , 70 , 98 ;
troops in, 169 , 231 ;
Union troops, 232 .

Missouri, troops from, 25 ;
Wisconsin troops in, 30 ;
Union army, 233 .

Mitchell, Gen. John G., at Chickamauga, 114 ;
Wauhatchie, 179 ;
commended, 148 .

Mitchell, Gen. O. M., in Alabama, 28 .

Mitchell, Gen. Robert B., cavalry officer, 18 , 41 , 42 ; [248]
at Chickamauga, 83 , 99 , 112 , 147 , 153 , 154 ;
Rossville, 124 ;
raiding, 160 .

Mitchell, Capt. William S., killed, 129 .

Moccasin Point, fortified, 173 .

Moore, Gen. John C., at Lookout Mountain, 197 , 199 .

Morgan, Gen. James D., commands division, 19 ;
at Chickamauga, 83 ;
Chattanooga, 166 , 167 .

Mountains —
Cumberland, 7 - 9 , 47 - 49 , 52 - 55 .
Horse, 40 .
Horseshoe Ridge, 107 , 111 .
Lookout, 51 - 55 , 60 , 62 , 76 , 155 , 156 , 172 , 173 , 176 , 204 , 205 , 211 , 225 ;
crossed, 63 , 64 , 68 ;
Confederates on, 63 , 126 , 180 - 185 , 187 - 189 , 192 - 194 ;
described, 195 , 196 .
See also Battles: Lookout Mountain.
Missionary Ridge, 55 , 56 , 63 , 81 , 93 , 109 , 115 , 126 , 156 , 182 - 186 , 190 , 209 , 211 , 230 ;
Confederates on, 188 - 191 .
See also Battles: Missionary Ridge.
Pigeon, 55 , 65 , 69 , 71 .
Raccoon, 173 .
Sand, 53 - 55 , 59 , 62 .
Taylor’s Ridge, 217 , 222 .
Walden’s Ridge, 54 , 55 , 58 , 156 , 161 , 173 .

Mullis, ——, farm near Chickamauga, 123 .

Murfreesboro (Tenn.), Union troops at, 1 , 2 , 4 - 8 , 11 , 14 , 28 - 30 , 39 , 44 , 232 ;
advance from, 46 - 48 , 134 ;
railroad centre, 6 , 52 , 160 .

Nashville (Tenn.), troops at, 20 , 30 - 32 , 231 ;
railroad terminus, 3 , 6 , 9 , 160 - 163 .

Nashville and Chattanooga railroad, 3 , 9 , 166 .

Negley, Gen. James S., takes command, 17 ;
in Tullahoma campaign, 47 ;
Chickamauga, 60 , 65 , 66 , 68 ;
at battle of Chickamauga, 78 , 79 , 82 , 87 , 93 , 94 , 100 , 105 , 107 , 108 , 113 , 114 , 140 , 142 , 148 ;
Rossville, 124 ;
report, 110 .

New Madrid (Mo.), 31 .

New York, 1st Infantry, 194 .

Nickles, Lieut. Robert J., killed, 69 . [249]

North Carolina, invaded, 10 .

Northwest Territory, troops from, 25 .

Ohio, troops from, 14 , 25 ;
1st Infantry, 194 ;
13th Infantry, 113 ;
15th Infantry, 42 ;
21st Infantry, 113 ;
73d Infantry, 179 ;
representative in Congress, 168 .

Orchard Knob, captured, 190 , 192 , 194 ;
vantage point, 209 , 211 , 212 ;
battery on, 214 .
See also Battles: Orchard Knob.

Oshkosh, troops from, 29 .

Osterhaus, Gen. Peter J., crosses the Tennessee, 192 , 193 ;
at Lookout Mountain, 194 ;
Missionary Ridge, 203 , 216 ;
pursues enemy, 201 .

Paducah (Ky.), 16 .

“Paint Rock,” steamboat, 58 .

Palmer, Gen. John M., commands division, 18 , 58 , 194 ;
in Tullahoma campaign, 41 ;
at Chickamauga, 78 , 86 , 91 , 92 , 96 , 102 , 104 , 107 , 111 , 139 - 141 , 145 ;
withdraws, 123 ;
commended, 148 ;
promoted, 168 ;
at Chattanooga, 165 ;
Missionary Ridge, 202 ;
pursues enemy, 222 ;
characterized, 21 .

Patterson, Gen. Robert, 15 .

Pegram, Gen. John, in Chickamauga campaign, 69 .

Pelham (Tenn.), 57 .

Pennsylvania, Confederates invade, 4 ;
troops from, 25 ;
77th Infantry, 42 ;
79th Infantry, 44 , 127 .

Perkins, Surgeon Jabez, at Chickamauga, 110 .

Pettus, Gen. Edmund W., at Lookout Mountain, 199 .

Phelps, Col. Edward H., at Missionary Ridge, 204 .

Pikeville (Tenn.), 55 .

Pinney, Capt. Oscar F., 31 .

Pittsburg Landing, 226 .

Poe, ——, house near Chickamauga, 81 , 92 .

Polk, Gen. Leonidas, commands corps, 33 , 40 , 68 , 69 ;
at Chickamauga, 70 , 72 , 95 , 97 - 100 , 148 ;
advances, 126 ;
characterized, 35 .

Pond Spring (Ga.), 78 .

Pope, Gen. John, at Island Number Ten, 32 . [250]

Post, Col. Philip Sidney, in Tullahoma campaign, 43 ;
at Chickamauga, 133 .

Prentiss, Gen. B. M., 227 .

Preston, Gen. William, at Chickamauga, 96 , 97 , 112 , 142 .

Racine, troops from, 31 , 231 .

Raum, Col. Green B., at Missionary Ridge, 204 .

Rebellion Records , cited, 42 , 48 , 49 , 67 , 75 , 84 , 85 , 90 , 101 , 115 , 117 , 121 , 123 , 129 , 144 , 145 , 148 , 151 , 180 , 195 , 215 , 216 , 232 .

Reed’s Bridge, near Chickamauga, 69 , 72 , 73 , 76 , 82 - 85 .

Rennie, Lieut. Robert, killed, 130 .

Reynolds, Gen. Joseph J., commands division, 17 , 44 ;
in Tullahoma campaign, 44 ;
Chickamauga campaign, 58 , 66 ;
at battle of Chickamauga, 82 , 86 , 91 - 96 , 103 - 107 , 111 , 139 - 141 , 145 ;
withdraws, 122 , 123 ;
made chief of staff, 166 ;
commended, 148 .

Richardson, Lieut. James S., killed, 129 .

Richmond (Va.), 4 , 10 , 49 , 52 , 67 .

Ringgold (Ga.), 64 , 69 , 70 , 74 , 77 , 114 , 216 , 217 , 223 ;
road from, 124 .

Rivers —
Cumberland, 7 , 15 .
Duck, 7 , 39 , 40 .
Elk, 7 , 40 , 47 .
Hiawassie, 56 , 59 .
Little, 75 .
Mississippi, 4 , 31 , 158 , 232 .
Ohio, 25 .
Sequatchie, 54 , 55 .
Tennessee, 7 - 9 , 52 - 54 , 71 , 126 , 196 ;
described, 54 ;
valley of, 58 ;
bends, 172 ;
bridged, 163 ;
crossed, 19 , 59 - 62 , 157 , 160 , 176 , 201 ;
Confederates command, 155 , 156 ;
armies on, 169 .

Robertson, Gen. Jerome B., at Chickamauga, 97 .

Robinson, Col. Milton S., at Chickamauga, 123 .

Roby, Capt. J. W., at Chickamauga, 130 .

Roddey, Gen. Philip D., cavalry leader, 160 .

Rogersville (Ala.), 160 . [251]

Rome (Ga.), 61 , 64 , 75 , 115 .

Rosecrans, Gen. William S., commands army, 1 - 3 , 14 , 16 ;
characterized, 12 , 13 ;
plans, 11 , 13 , 40 , 51 , 57 ;
at Winchester, 52 ;
in Chickamauga campaign, 55 , 58 , 59 , 62 , 64 , 67 ;
orders, 83 , 103 , 104 , 106 , 118 , 152 , 153 , 172 ;
at battle of Chickamauga, 72 - 80 , 88 , 93 , 99 , 104 , 109 , 112 , 120 , 121 , 131 , 136 , 144 , 149 , 154 ;
retreats to Chattanooga, 125 ;
defends Chattanooga, 157 , 158 , 160 ;
reinforced, 158 , 159 ;
relieved, 164 ;
results, 232 ;
reports, 48 , 84 , 89 , 144 .

Rossville (Ga.), Union troops at, 19 , 63 , 76 ;
during battle of Chickamauga, 108 , 109 , 112 , 114 - 116 , 118 ;
withdrawal to, 119 , 121 , 123 , 129 , 132 , 133 , 136 , 147 , 151 , 152 , 155 ;
abandoned, 125 ;
advance from, 144 ;
in Chattanooga campaign, 201 - 206 ;
Hooker at, 221 , 222 .
See also Gaps: Rossville.

Rousseau, Gen. Lovell H., commands division, 17 , 28 , 44 , 47 , 190 ;
on furlough, 21 ;
rejoins army, 125 ;
at Chattanooga, 166 ;
Nashville, 167 .

Rousseau Battery, 219 .

Ruger, Gen. Thomas H., at Chattanooga, 168 ;
guarding railway, 177 .

St. Louis, Wisconsin troops at, 31 , 32 , 231 .

Salem (Tenn.), 41 .

Scandinavians, as Wisconsin soldiers, 29 .

Schurz, Gen. Carl, at Wauhatchie, 177 , 178 ;
Missionary Ridge, 205 , 212 , 229 .

Scribner, Gen. Benjamin F., commands brigade, 28 ;
at Chickamauga, 100 , 129 .

Searles, Lieut. Charles A., killed, 129 .

Sequatchie Valley, described, 31 ;
troops in, 54 , 55 , 57 , 58 , 60 ;
raided, 156 , 159 .

Sheffield, Col. James L., at Chickamauga, 97 .

Shelbyville (Tenn.), 40 , 42 ;
captured, 44 , 46 .

Shellmound (Tenn.), 59 , 177 .

Shenandoah Valley, war in, 15 .

Sheridan, Gen. Philip H., West Point graduate, 17 ; [252]
commands division, 47 , 56 , 60 ;
at Chickamauga, 87 , 93 - 96 , 107 - 111 , 115 , 142 , 145 , 149 , 151 ;
Chattanooga, 165 , 167 ;
Orchard Knob, 190 , 217 ;
Missionary Ridge, 204 , 205 , 208 , 227 ;
commended, 170 , 171 ;
characterized, 22 .

Sherman, Col. Francis T., at Chattanooga, 165 , 167 ;
Missionary Ridge, 204 , 227 .

Sherman, Gen. William T., reinforces Chattanooga, 159 , 183 - 185 , 187 ;
commands Western army, 169 , 234 ;
at Chattanooga, 231 ;
Tunnel Hill, 206 , 211 , 213 , 221 ;
Missionary Ridge, 186 , 187 , 192 , 193 , 201 - 205 , 208 , 212 - 214 , 217 , 222 , 226 , 229 , 230 ;
March to the Sea, 5 , 10 ;
commended, 171 ;
Memoirs , 207 .

Sirwell, Col. William, at Chickamauga, 113 .

Slocum, Gen. H. W., reinforces Rosecrans, 159 .

Smith, Gen. A., at Missionary Ridge, 204 .

Smith, Gen. James A., at Missionary Ridge, 205 .

Smith, Gen. John E., at Missionary Ridge, 204 , 213 , 226 .

Smith, Col. Orlando, at Wauhatchie, 179 .

Smith, Gen. Preston, at Chickamauga, 89 ;
killed, 90 .

Smith, Gen. W. F., chief engineer, 164 , 169 , 172 , 174 , 183 , 184 .

Snodgrass, ——, house near Chickamauga, 107 , 112 , 116 .

Snodgrass Hill, battle at, 81 , 120 , 122 , 151 , 154 .

South Carolina, invaded, 10 .

Stanley, Gen. David S., commands cavalry, 18 , 46 ;
of regular army, 23 ;
on furlough, 61 ;
at Chickamauga, 93 , 100 , 113 .

Stanley, Col. Timothy R., at Chickamauga, 142 .

Stanton, Edwin M., secretary of war, 171 , 217 .

Starkweather, Col. John C., brigade commander, 28 , 69 ;
at Chickamauga, 101 , 126 - 130 ;
at Chattanooga, 166 , 204 , 206 , 225 ;
Stevenson, 167 ;
report, 128 , 129 .

Steedman, Gen. James B., commands division, 19 ;
at Chickamauga, 83 , 114 , 117 , 120 , 138 , 142 , 144 ;
commended, 148 .

Steinwehr, Gen. Adolph von, at Wauhatchie, 188 ;
Missionary Ridge, 212 .

Stevenson, Gen. Carter L., on Lookout Mountain, 192 , 195 , 197 , 199 ;
at Missionary Ridge, 205 , 206 ;
report, 198 , 199 .

Stevenson (Ala.), railroad junction, 28 , 52 , 53 , 56 , 59 ;
supplies at, 7 , 161 - 163 ;
garrison, 57 , 166 ;
road to, 156 ;
headquarters, 167 .

Stewart, Gen. A. P., Confederate officer, 44 ; [253]
at Chickamauga, 96 , 97 , 104 , 105 , 139 , 141 , 143 ;
Missionary Ridge, 205 , 206 , 214 , 216 , 217 .

Stoughton, Gen. William L., at Missionary Ridge, 204 .

Stovall, Gen. Marcellus A., at Chickamauga, 99 , 100 , 104 .

Summerville (Ga.), 63 , 75 .

Sweet, Col. Benjamin J., 20 ;
wounded, 29 .

Tennessee, actions in, 27 ;
in two districts, 167 ;
barrens of, 39 - 41 ;
railway in, 6 ;
forts, 16 ;
Union troops, 169 , 231 , 232 ;
troops from, 10 , 25 , 66 .

Thedford’s Ford (Ga.), 70 .

Thomas, Gen. George H., commands corps, 12 , 63 , 64 ;
in Tullahoma campaign, 43 , 47 ;
at Chickamauga, 22 , 72 , 74 , 75 , 78 , 79 , 82 - 84 , 88 , 91 - 94 , 103 - 117 , 120 , 121 , 127 ;
denominated “Rock of Chickamauga”, 82 ;
protects his corps, 139 ;
withstands attacks, 144 - 146 ;
withdraws, 112 , 118 - 126 , 152 , 153 ;
at Chattanooga, 155 , 232 ;
commands army, 164 , 168 ;
besieged, 171 , 172 ;
plans for advance, 183 , 184 , 186 , 187 , 193 , 218 ;
reconnoisance, 188 , 189 ;
at Orchard Knob, 190 , 191 ;
Missionary Ridge, 202 - 215 , 220 - 222 ;
reports, 119 - 121 , 123 , 200 , 216 ;
commended, 148 , 149 , 171 ;
characterized, 14 , 15 , 81 .

Thompson, Lieut. Oliver, killed, 121 .

Thruston, Gen. Gates P., at Chickamauga, 110 , 122 .

Thurman’s (Tenn.), 57 .

Tracy City (Tenn.), 56 .

Trenton (Ga.), troops at, 61 , 176 , 187 .

Triune (Tenn.), 41 .

Tullahoma (Tenn.), 1 , 6 ;
advance toward, 14 ;
fighting near, 45 , 47 ;
Bragg at, 52 , 53 , 98 ;
campaign for, 28 , 30 , 39 - 50 , 134 , 224 .

Turchin, Gen. John B., commands cavalry, 18 , 19 ;
at Chickamauga, 92 , 93 ;
withdraws, 122 , 123 ;
at Chattanooga, 166 ;
Brown’s Ferry, 175 ;
Missionary Ridge, 204 ;
commended, 148 .

Valley Head (Ala.), 55 , 61 .

Van Cleve, Gen. Horatio P., commands division, 18 , 60 ;
in Tullahoma campaign, 43 ;
at Chickamauga, 78 , 86 , 88 , 93 - 95 , 97 , 104 , 107 - 109 , 113 , 133 , 140 , 142 .

Van Derveer, Col. Ferdinand, at Chickamauga, 93 , 103 , 106 , 111 , 114 , 140 ; [254]
Chattanooga, 166 ;
Missionary Ridge, 204 ;
commended, 148 .

Van Horne, Thomas B., Army of the Cumberland , 110 .

Vicksburg (Miss.), siege of, 231 .

Viniard, ——, house near Chickamauga, 81 .

Virginia, troops from, 54 , 66 , 70 , 78 .

Vittetoe, ——, house near Chickamauga, 81 .

Von Baumbach, Maj. Carl, at Chickamauga, 132 ;
Missionary Ridge, 227 - 229 .

Wagner, Gen. George D., in Chickamauga campaign, 58 , 60 - 62 ;
at Chattanooga, 165 ;
Missionary Ridge, 204 .

Walker, Gen. W. H. T., Confederate officer, 68 , 69 ;
at Chickamauga, 77 , 82 , 85 , 89 , 96 - 98 , 102 , 110 , 139 , 141 ;
Lookout Mountain, 192 ;
Missionary Ridge, 205 , 206 .

Walthall, Gen. Edward C., at Chickamauga, 98 ;
Lookout Mountain, 197 , 199 .

Wars :
Mexican, 15 , 17 , 21 , 34 , 35 ;
Indian, 15 .

Wartrace (Tenn.), 40 , 42 .

Washington (D. C.), orders from, 4 , 67 .

Wauhatchie (Tenn.), 61 ;
action at, 176 - 180 .

West, Captain George M., killed, 130 .

West, Col. Theodore S., commands regiment, 30 ;
at Chickamauga, 132 .

West Point (N. Y.) Military Academy, graduates, 12 , 15 - 17 , 21 - 23 , 35 .

West Virginia, troops in, 8 .

Wheeler, Gen. Joseph, cavalry commander, 33 , 181 ;
at Chickamauga, 70 , 79 , 99 ;
raiding, 156 , 159 - 161 .

Whiteside (Tenn.), 177 .

Whittaker, Gen. Walter C., at Chickamauga, 83 , 114 ;
Chattanooga, 165 ;
Wauhatchie, 179 ;
Lookout Mountain, 186 ;
commended, 148 .

Wilder, Gen. John T., brigade commander, 44 ;
in Tullahoma campaign, 43 , 44 ;
Chickamauga campaign, 58 , 60 , 62 , 64 ;
at battle of Chickamauga, 72 , 77 , 82 , 97 , 109 , 111 , 153 ;
at Chattanooga, 158 .

Willard, Capt. J. P., aide to Thomas, 122 . [255]

Williams, Gen. Alpheus S., at Chattanooga, 168 ;
guarding railway, 177 .

Willich, Gen. August, in Tullahoma campaign, 42 , 43 ;
at Chickamauga, 93 , 111 , 118 ;
withdraws, 123 ;
at Chattanooga, 164 , 165 ;
Orchard Knob, 190 , 191 ;
Missionary Ridge, 204 , 225 , 226 ;
commended, 148 .

Wilson, Col. Claudius C., at Chickamauga, 85 .

Wilson, Gen. James H., cavalry raid, 170 .

Winchester (Tenn.), 52 , 53 , 160 .

Winkler, Maj. Frederick C., commands regiment, 177 ;
at Missionary Ridge, 229 .

Wisconsin, troops from, 25 ;
in army of Cumberland, 27 - 33 ;
in Tullahoma campaign, 44 , 50 ;
at Dug Gap, 69 ;
Chickamauga, 126 - 134 ;
reinforce Chattanooga, 177 , 178 ;
at Missionary Ridge, 225 - 232 ;
1st Infantry, 27 - 29 , 44 , 69 , 126 - 129 , 167 , 225 ;
2nd infantry, 227 ;
3rd Infantry, 168 , 177 ;
10th Infantry, 27 - 29 , 50 , 69 , 126 , 129 , 130 , 167 , 201 , 225 ;
13th Infantry, 20 ;
15th Infantry, 27 , 29 , 59 , 87 , 126 , 130 , 131 , 167 , 191 , 192 , 225 , 226 ;
18th Infantry, 226 , 227 ;
21st Infantry, 20 , 27 , 29 , 30 , 44 , 69 , 126 - 129 , 167 , 225 ;
24th Infantry, 27 , 30 , 126 , 131 , 132 , 167 , 227 - 229 ;
26th Infantry, 168 , 177 , 178 , 229 ;
1st Cavalry, 20 , 27 , 30 , 50 , 132 , 133 , 159 ;
1st Heavy Artillery, 168 , 230 ;
3rd Battery, 20 , 27 , 31 , 133 , 168 , 229 ;
5th Battery, 27 , 31 , 32 , 133 , 168 , 230 ;
6th Battery, 230 , 231 ;
8th Battery, 32 , 33 , 133 , 134 , 168 , 229 , 230 ;
10th Battery, 168 , 229 - 231 ;
12th Battery, 230 , 231 .

Wolseley, Field-Marshal Sir G. J., Viscount, commends American officer, 36 .

Wood, Gen. S. A. M., at Chickamauga, 101 .

Wood, Gen. Thomas J., of regular army, 23 ;
commands divisions, 18 , 58 ;
at Chickamauga, 80 , 87 , 93 - 96 , 104 - 107 , 109 , 111 , 113 , 116 , 117 , 131 , 142 , 145 , 147 , 152 ;
withdraws, 123 ;
at Chattanooga, 165 , 168 ;
Orchard Knob, 190 - 192 ;
Missionary Ridge, 203 - 205 , 225 .

Woodbury (Tenn.), 41 .

Woods, Gen. Charles R., at Lookout Mountain, 193 ;
relieved, 203 .

Zollicoffer, Gen. Felix K., 15 .

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PAGE
Wisconsin History Commission	ix
Introduction	xi
The Chattanooga Campaign :
Chapter I. The Preliminary Campaign	1
Organization	11
Organization of the Confederate Army	33
The advance of the Union Army	39
Chapter II. The Chickamauga Campaign and Battle	51
The Confederate line on September 20	95
The Confederate attack upon the Union right	104
Wisconsin troops at Chickamauga	126
Chapter III. The occupation and battles of Chattanooga	155
The Battle of Lookout Mountain	194
Wisconsin troops in the Battle of Missionary Ridge	225
Index	235

	Union	Confederate
Shiloh, Tenn.	10,162	9,735
Second Bull Run	10,199	9,108
Fredericksburg, Va.	10,884	4,664
Chancellorsville, Va.	11,368	10,746
Gettysburg, Pa.	17,567	15,298
Chickamauga, Ga.	11,409	15,881
Stone’s River	9,532	9,239
Antietam, Md.	11,657	11,234

Union		Confederate
Brannan—Three Brigades	1,977	Walker—Five Brigades	2,290
Baird—Three Brigades	975	Cheatham—Five Brigades	1,843
Johnson—Three Brigades	1,088	Cleburne—Three Brigades	1,743
Palmer—Three Brigades	1,165	Stewart—Three Brigades	1,674
Reynolds—Two Brigades	778	Breckenridge—Three Brigades	1,075
———		———
Total	5,983	Total	8,625

The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Chattanooga Campaign: With especial reference to Wisconsin's participation therein

THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN

Contents

Maps

Wisconsin History Commission

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I
The Preliminary Campaign

ORGANIZATION

ORGANIZATION OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY

THE ADVANCE OF THE UNION ARMY

CHAPTER II
The Chickamauga Campaign and Battle

THE CONFEDERATE LINE ON SEPTEMBER 20

THE CONFEDERATE ATTACK UPON THE UNION RIGHT

WISCONSIN TROOPS AT CHICKAMAUGA

CHAPTER III
The Occupation and Battles of Chattanooga

THE BATTLE OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN

WISCONSIN TROOPS IN THE BATTLE OF MISSIONARY RIDGE

INDEX

THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE

PAGE
The Chattanooga Campaign	Frontispiece
Chickamauga, September 19, 1863	82
Chickamauga, morning of September 20, 1863	98
The fatal order to Wood, at Chickamauga	112
Chickamauga, evening of September 20, 1863	114
Chattanooga and Vicinity, November, 1863	194

Union
Steedman	1,174	—Two Brigades
Sheridan	1,090
Davis	944	—Two Brigades
Wood	876	—Two Brigades
Van Cleve	660
Negley	496
Brannan (estimate)	900
———
Total	6,140

Confederate
Hood		Six Divisions, 6,881 (estimated)
Hindman
Buckner
Preston

The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Chattanooga Campaign: With especial reference to Wisconsin's participation therein

THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN

Contents

Maps

Wisconsin History Commission

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I The Preliminary Campaign

ORGANIZATION

ORGANIZATION OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY

THE ADVANCE OF THE UNION ARMY

CHAPTER II The Chickamauga Campaign and Battle

THE CONFEDERATE LINE ON SEPTEMBER 20

THE CONFEDERATE ATTACK UPON THE UNION RIGHT

WISCONSIN TROOPS AT CHICKAMAUGA

CHAPTER III The Occupation and Battles of Chattanooga

THE BATTLE OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN

WISCONSIN TROOPS IN THE BATTLE OF MISSIONARY RIDGE

INDEX

THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE

CHAPTER I
The Preliminary Campaign

CHAPTER II
The Chickamauga Campaign and Battle

CHAPTER III
The Occupation and Battles of Chattanooga