ANTI-SEMITISM IN THE UNITED STATES
ITS HISTORY AND CAUSES

BY

RABBI LEE J. LEVINGER, Ph.D.

Author of “ A Jewish Chaplain In France ”

NEW YORK
BLOCH PUBLISHING CO., Inc.
“ THE JEWISH BOOK CONCERN ”

1925

This study, which was submitted as one of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania, has meant the assembling of personal and theoretical interests of various types. It has two chapters of pure theory on which the practical application is based. To the student of social philosophy or sociology, then, chapters 1 and 2 will contain the essentials of the study. The general reader, not interested in the technical basis but in the conclusions, may prefer to omit these chapters from the reading, and to proceed from the introduction directly to the applications of this theory in American history and specifically to the problem of the Jew in America, as developed in chapters 3 to 9.

Grateful acknowledgments are due to Professor Edgar A. Singer, Jr., of the University of Pennsylvania, Professor Julius Drachsler of the College of the City of New York, and Mr. Leon L. Lewis, Secretary of the Anti-Defamation League, for their very stimulating aid, both prior to and during the writing of this study, and to my wife for her assistance in the preparation of the manuscript.

Lee J. Levinger

Wilmington, Delaware, May, 1925.

The existence of an anti-Semitic movement in the United States of America since the World War is a paradox that attracts attention at once. The most ancient and most pervasive form of intolerance is now at home in a nation founded by revolution and dedicated to the principles of freedom and tolerance. How can such a movement exist in such a nation? The apparent contradiction leads us at once into the many contradictions of the psychology of large groups of human beings, which both parallels and contradicts the simpler psychology of their constituent individuals. This is a leading question, to answer which we must go as deeply as we can into the mind of the group, into the relation of groups to the smaller groups of which they are composed and of those smaller groups to each other, into the genesis and implications of tolerance and intolerance.

This theoretical study completed, we shall then have to verify the principles there worked out by application to the difficult and crucial problem of the present study. If a theory of group and sub-group can explain the existence and the development of anti-Semitism in America, it will have solved a problem of exceptional complexity and significance, one central to the whole field. This will involve a study of the mind of the American people, in brief outline, with its various movements of intolerance in their bearing on the present one. It will also necessitate a slight study of the various anti-Semitic examples, historic and contemporary, from which the American movement derives in part. It will conclude with a consideration of the future of the American people as a united group, taking into view the tendencies of the sub-groups within the bounds of their common nation, or over-group.

Anti-Semitism is the modern form of the ancient prejudice against the Jew; it began in Germany in 1871, directly after the Franco-Prussian War, and bases its opposition to the Jews on [10] the race theory. Anti-Judaism is, of course, much older, as old as the people against whom it was directed. In most ancient times, as represented by the Egyptian taskmasters and the Haman of the Book of Esther, it was like any other national hatred or prejudice. Later it took on a distinctly religious coloring, so that we find a Philo going to Rome to appeal for the Jewish colony in Alexandria or a Josephus writing a defense of his people against Apion. With the growth of Christianity into a persecuting body, anti-Judaism became strictly a religious matter, based on the New Testament story that the Jews were responsible for the death of Jesus. Medieval laws on the Jews were, then, often based on the principle of expiation, such as the yellow badge which distinguished the wearer when he left the compulsory shelter of the Ghetto. A different form of religious motivation was shown in the frequent accusations of desecrating the Host or of using the blood of a Christian child in preparing the unleavened bread of Passover, which appears in the Canterbury Tales and was revived as recently as 1911 in the notorious Beilis case at Kiev, Russia. Along with this went occasional mob outbreaks such as occur against the negroes in our Southern states, and still more rarely decrees of expulsion, which drove the entire Jewish population from England in 1294, from Spain in 1492, and from other countries at other times, for a longer or shorter period.

The actual applications of this religious anti-Judaism were far too many to enumerate here, ranging from the prohibition of tilling the soil to compulsory attendance at a Christian sermon, as in Browning’s “Holy Cross Day.” Counteracting it were the frequent intercourse and occasional intermarriage through the Middle Ages, the paid protection of the Holy Roman Emperor for his Kammerknechte , the toleration of the Moors and later of Holland, finally the emancipation of the French Revolution on abstract grounds of the Rights of Man. Religious discrimination was forbidden in the American Constitution, so that anti-Judaism of the religious type had no footing in the new nation, strong as it had previously been in several of the colonies. In addition, the number of Jews in America was very small, so that discrimination against them might exist in principle [11] but could have little exercise in practise. And those few were often wealthy and cultured descendants of the old Spanish Jewry. During the most of the nineteenth century the Jews entering the country met the same difficulties as other immigrants, with very little variation.

But then the problem changed; the number of Jews increased from 3,000 in 1800 to 250,000 in 1880. Some of these achieved wealth and began to associate with non-Jewish social circles. The opposition to them now became largely social. They were excluded from many hotels and summer resorts, from clubs, college fraternities and the like. This phase of the problem was often acute but never important, and is here mentioned merely in passing, though it will have its bearing on the theory to be developed. In addition, the religious prejudice continued, similar to that between Christian denominations but stronger, owing to the frequent teaching of Jewish responsibility for the crucifixion. These two aspects of anti-Judaism persisted as the only ones in America until after the World War, and these were sporadic, and often opposed by the tendency of our political democracy and by various groups of religious liberals.

Meanwhile, modern racialism had been born and with it modern anti-Semitism, the attack on the Jew as a member of a different race, inferior or at least unassimilable by the Aryan. Writers against the Jew no longer turned for their weapons to Eisenmenger’s “Endecktes Judentum” of 1701, with its religious criticism and personal strictures. The new classics are Werner Sombart’s “Die Juden und das Wirtschaftsleben” and Drumont’s “La France Juive.” An elaborate scientific basis has been constructed, on which a movement of opposition was erected, apparently much the same as that of the Inquisition or of Apion. One of the conclusions of the present study will be that it is in fact the same, and that the racial theory can be almost overlooked in estimating the actual causes and processes of anti-Semitism. It would be an interesting, though not essential task, to examine this racial theory in detail and determine how much scientific authenticity it may possess. In Russia the conditions of autocracy threatened by liberalism and war led to official anti-Semitism, with pogroms or massacres of the Jews [12] actually led by army officers. In Germany the officialism and social stratification led to discrimination against Jews in the appointment of judges, university professors and army officers. In France anti-Semitism became a part of royalism and clericalism, and from the military and royalist group came the Dreyfus case. In England anti-Semitism was chiefly literary; Hillaire Belloc proves the Jews to be aliens who should all be sent to Palestine, while Gilbert K. Chesterton visits Palestine and reports that the Jews there are terrible creatures and ought to be excluded from the Holy Land!

But all this time there was no anti-Semitism, as a literary, political or economic movement in the United States. That was a product of the period after the World War. There was merely religious prejudice of the orthodox and social ostracism of the elite among gentile society. The Jew had not even attracted the special attention of the various anti-alien movements in American history, owing to his small numbers and frequent rapid Americanization. It seemed as though anti-Semitism was a movement foreign to American life and institutions. Now, however, the movement exists and may be considered briefly in four phases.

1. The first to be considered is the attempt to limit the percentage of Jews in American universities. The “numerus clausus,” typical of Russia under the Czars, has been one of the favorite projects of the anti-Semitic parties in various European countries, working either through their representatives in the parliaments or through their sympathizers in the universities themselves. Whether the motive was to brand the Jew as inferior mentally, or to make him so through lack of education, is hard to say—probably it is merely another manifestation of the process which this paper aims to trace.

In American institutions of higher learning there has been a growing problem of the increase of entering classes, as well as a growing perplexity at the number of Jewish immigrants who seek an advanced education. These young people often lack American manners and background, standing out from the great mass of the student body, whether for good or bad is immaterial. What more natural than that some would attempt to solve the [13] two problems at once by excluding a certain percentage of these objectionable persons, at the same time cutting down enrollment? I do not speak of rumors that this purpose has been achieved in certain institutions by personal interviews, psychological tests, and the like, even though statistics seem to bear out this interpretation. I consider only the Harvard incident, which is public and official.

In June 1922 President Lowell of Harvard, in his address at the graduation exercises drew attention to the double phase of the problem, the increase of registration and the danger to the social and personal standard of the university, and recommended its full investigation by committees of the faculty and board of trustees of the university. The sensation caused by this bringing into the open of a subject long covertly agitated, especially in view of the large Jewish population of Boston, and fairly large registration at Harvard, was extreme. The matter came to an end April 9, 1923, when the committee recommendation was accepted by the Board of Overseers for the University. The report recommended:

The report even avoids recommending any test of personal fitness which might be interpreted as a cover for racial or religious discrimination.

2. A further expression of anti-Semitism appeared in the form of books and magazine articles. “The Cause of World Unrest,” an English book, was reprinted in 1920 by G. P. Putnam’s Sons of New York; “The Protocols of the Meetings of the Zionist Men of Wisdom” by Small, Maynard and Co. of Boston in the same year; “The Jews in America” by Burton J. Hendrick, appeared as a series of articles in the World’s Work, and was issued later as a book by Doubleday Page and Co. [14] of New York in 1923. Periodicals such as “The Searchlight” of Atlanta, the “Fellowship Forum” of Washington, D. C., and “The American Standard” of New York City (to mention only a few of a large number) conducted an active campaign against Jews and Catholics, which still continues.

Most conspicuous of all was the long series of articles on the Jewish problem carried by the Dearborn Independent of Dearborn, Mich., the personal organ of Mr. Henry Ford. This series began in May, 1920; the four booklets containing their reprinted form are dated, the first on November, 1920; the fourth, May 1922. They take ostensibly the position that international finance, under the leadership of certain Jews, is endeavoring to rule the world. Actually, however, they use any anti-Semitic theme that comes to hand, from the race theory to articles on the “Jewish liquor trust” and “the Jewish aids of Benedict Arnold.” Their chief arsenal of material is the Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion, referred to above, a purported record of secret meetings held by leaders of world Jewry with the object of overthrowing the gentile nations and ruling the world themselves. This work first saw the light in Russia in 1901 and was utilized in 1905 as part of the propaganda against the abortive revolution of that year; it was the work of one Serge Nilus. Later study has shown it to be a forgery, largely copied from a French political pamphlet directed against Napoleon III and published in Brussels in 1865 by Maurice Joly under the title, “Dialogues in Hell between Machiavelli and Montesquieu”! The Russian editions of this work, and those in German, as well, included virulent attacks on Britain and America as representatives of liberalism, and therefore of Judaism; naturally, these have been omitted from the English versions.

3. This agitation could not remain theoretical—in fact, probably the theory was itself a late product of a broader tendency. The Johnson immigration act, setting the quota of immigrants to be admitted to the United States on the basis of their proportion in this country in 1890, was avowedly planned on a racial basis to encourage immigrants from northern and western Europe, and exclude those from eastern and southern Europe and from other continents. Secretly there seems to have been both anti-Jewish [15] and anti-Catholic sentiment involved, as certain partisan publications boast quite openly.

By far the most significant expression of anti-Semitism in the United States is the Ku Klux Klan, which will later be considered in some detail. At this point it is sufficient to point out that the Klan was organized in 1915 by William J. Simmons of Atlanta, Ga., and became a national movement in 1920. Its name and much of its ritual are taken from the Ku Klux Klan of 1867–71, but its motives are quite different, for the old Klan was a local movement intended to protect the defeated Confederacy, to overawe the negroes and to oppose the North; while the modern Klan is not sectional, but in every section opposes the negro, the Jew, the Catholic and the foreign-born. Its membership is exclusively “white, gentile, Protestant American” and it therefore claims to be the only “one hundred per cent. Americans”. The Klan defends its purpose and attacks the proscribed groups by business boycott, political opposition, sometimes even by threats or by physical violence. The Klan is the most important symptom at hand of the nature of anti-Semitism in the United States, beside being a most significant type of social grouping and of social motive.

4. A final type of anti-Semitism in America was a direct importation from Europe through a group of Russian emigrés, some of them living in this country as private citizens, others as employees of the section on Russia of the Department of State. These men were bitterly anti-Soviet, anti-radical, and (whether for propaganda purposes, or through the convictions of the Russian aristocracy as a whole) bitterly anti-Semitic. Anti-Semitism is an article in the creed of every reactionary movement in Europe, with the single exception of the Italian Fascisti, and is strongest of all among the Russians. It seems to have been these people who persuaded Mr. Henry Ford of the authenticity of the Protocols, and introduced these to America as a whole. They seem also to have been active in the anti-radical agitation of the post-war period, which tried to identify foreigner, radical and Jew in the mind of the American people, [16] and to attribute the Russian revolution, the Bolshevist government and the radical groups in America, alike to insidious Jewish influence.

As this tendency was not as public as the others, I give some proof of its existence. It was discussed in Hearst’s International Magazine in 1923 in a series of articles by the editor, Norman Hapgood; and in the Bnai Brith Magazine of October and November, 1924, in two articles by Jacob Spolansky, a former agent of the United States Department of Justice, who was employed to hunt down radicals and if possible to find Jews among them. As the most official statement, I quote Mr. Louis Marshall, president of the American Jewish Committee, in his annual report to that body, delivered November 13, 1921. 1

In the report of the same body, October 19, 1919, 2 reference is made to the hearing before the sub-committee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate in February 1919, when—

There is, then, an anti-Semitic movement in America, and has been since 1919 or 1920. Its philosophy of racialism, exclusiveness and “hundred per cent.” Americanism, is derived [17] largely from the Voelkische parties of Germany and other nations of Europe, which lay great stress on Aryan race and especially on its Nordic or Teutonic branch. The extreme of this position is found in the apparently well reasoned position of Burton J. Hendricks, who attempts to prove that the Spanish and German Jews were desirable because white, but that the Russian Jews are undesirable immigrants because they are descended from the Chazars, a Tartar tribe which embraced Judaism in the ninth century. The premises of this writer seem untenable, and the conclusions do not necessarily follow on them. Much of this anti-Semitic literature and public action seems to be based on similar rationalizations of intolerance, of group prejudice.

In studying this anti-Semitic movement in America as a crucial example of the relations of group and sub-group, I stand in the contrary danger, that of rationalizing the inferiority complex of a persecuted group. My only justification for facing this danger is that nobody can approach this type of problem without one danger or the other, and the subject is too vital to be entirely neglected. I can only hope that my analysis of the underlying problem of the nature of human groups and of their interrelations may be made in such a scientific spirit that the application of my theory to the special problem of anti-Semitism in the United States may be of some value in the clearing up of this great field of human action.

The causes of intolerance rest, not in what men say but in what they do. The reasons alleged for dislike or suspicion of the Jew are valuable merely for showing a state of mind in the anti-Semite himself, not for revealing the actual reasons for his attitude. For that reason I shall disregard these reasons very largely in searching for the causes of anti-Semitism in America. Instead, I shall turn to the field of social study to find out how groups of men act toward one another, and why and under what circumstances intolerance is one of their by-products. I shall apply to the phenomena of group life the method of behaviorism, now being adopted by sociology from its original field of psychology, in such definitions as that of E. C. Lindeman: 3 “Sociology is the science of collective behavior.”

1.

The prevailing view of students of society seems now to be that society is a natural phenomenon on the mental plane. Human society is not now regarded, as by Buckle, as a reflection of environment, even though the importance of physical background and racial constitution must be recognized. As Charles A. Ellwood says, 4 “Society is a group of psychically interacting individuals.” “The essential element in the social process is the psychical element.” 5 That is to say, mental material—instincts, emotions, feeling, and ideas—are the plane on which groups of individuals combine into social structures, operate in social functions, develop to social progress. Relations between individuals (except for the limited biological function) are [19] mental relations, carried on through physical media such as postures, speech and writing.

These mental interactions of human beings are not an artificial construct from primitive egoism by the social contract or any other method. William MacDougall is almost alone in holding that the social sentiments are derived from the self-regarding ones through the operation of the tender emotion and the parental instinct. Hobhouse says: 6 “The conception of a primitive egoism on which sociality is somehow overlaid is without foundation in either biology or psychology.” John Dewey puts this view most forcibly:

And Ellwood adds—expressing here the general opinion of both sociologists and modern social philosophers—“All human consciousness is socially conditioned.... This is as true of the racially inherited aspects of consciousness—the feeling-instincts—as it is of the acquired traits.” Man is a social animal and his sociality is one of the few unescapable things about him. He is born in some kind of a social group; he gets the most of his ideas from his association with others; his whole development is a give-and-take in which the take is from the first, and often remains, the greater element.

But the recognition of this fact does not bind us to any one explanation of it. We do not need to accept the “consciousness of kind” of Giddings, the “herd instinct” of Trotter, or the “imitation” of Tarde,—in fact, we may very well consider that there is no one principle to explain so universal and complex a [20] phenomenon; that these terms and others like them are in no sense explanations, but merely different words for the same fact, that man is a naturally gregarious or social being. We may rather turn to the more generalized modes of expressing this conception, the group mind or general will, as developed by Durkheim, Wundt and in our day by Baldwin, MacDougall, and others.

2.

Before attacking this problem directly, I must clear away several misconceptions of the “group mind,” which I cannot accept as a part of this theory. First, this thesis need not exclude the operation of physical and biological forces on social groups, any more than it excludes their operation on any individual, who is also a psychological unit. Society may well be a unit, just as the individual is, in a world of varying forces—climate, birth rates, and the like. Second, a theory of group mind may be empirical, and need not necessarily rest on an idealistic conception of the Volksgeist . By adopting the historical method, rather than the statistical, relying on values to indicate our problem rather than trying to express it in terms of natural science, we shall find ourselves treating the theory of the group in a realistic and empirical way, eschewing the dogmatism of applying a priori principles to human material, and the equal fallacy of considering minds in the same terms as chemical elements. 8

Third, a modern social psychology need not be a literal transcription of Durkheim or Wundt, relying on an antiquated psychology for its analogies and its basic conceptions. A theory of group mind today must recognize that personality is not always a unity, that it is never a complete unity; the vast field of the unconscious in mental life has just been opened to view. Both of these conceptions apply to the mental life of men in great masses as truly as when alone. Neither the individual nor the group is something hard, fixed and static; neither can be summed up as a group of faculties or a system of ideas. Both individual [21] and group must be conceived in process, to take the words of Lindemann, 9 as “the total equipment with which man responds to his environment, all that enters into behavior from the side of human nature.”

Some views of group mind are vitiated for our present purpose by the narrow limits they impose, or by the one-sided way in which they arrive at their definitions. This applies especially to those who use the mob as the typical group and consider “crowd-mindedness” (to use Everett Dean Martin’s term) as a synonym of sociality. The crowd, the herd, the mob are various terms for an exceptional type of group of human beings, bound together by physical presence, transformed by a powerful emotion, launched finally into unified and often violent action. But as Baldwin says: 10 “The mind of the crowd is essentially a temporary, unorganized, ineffective thing.... The mob is a by-product of society, it is the exaggeration of the normal.” Finally, the group mind need not be expressed entirely in terms of instinctive adaptation, any more than the mind of the individual; either may have many types, may be instinctive or impulsive or rational, may have a growing sense of rationality and a growing power of independent, deliberate action. In opposition to MacDougall, with his elaborate system of instincts and sentiments, we may place the vast majority of students of the problem, Cooley, Platt, Ellwood, Baldwin, and so on. Even when the members of a group all use reason to a very high degree, they still constitute a group if they have organization and some method of reaching a general decision, as in a congress, a national association of scientists, or a business corporation.

Obviously, human beings form many kinds of groups, and there would then, on an empirical basis, be many varieties of group minds. Individuals fall into many classes, as we all know, primitive and cultured, ignorant and educated, the infant, the child and the adult, the moron and the genius. So with the group. There are large and small groups, from families to nations; temporary and permanent ones, from the theatre [22] audience to the church; simple and complex, from town meeting to a Federal union, comprising states, counties, cities and townships; unorganized and organized; groups founded on physical presence, like a baseball team, and international bodies of scientists or philosophers who may form “a school of thought” but may never hold a meeting. The study of these various types is not only interesting in itself; it may help us in formulating the principle of the mind of the group as a whole. To begin with the definition of the primitive group by Franz Boaz:

“He who is not with me is against me,” 12 said Jesus for the religious group. How far we have proceeded from the horde in our civilized nations, and how near we are to it still in the essential character of the mind of the group!

3.

Does the group mind exist? Not as a super-consciousness, external to the individuals composing it—that view has been discarded long ago. But as a category which is needed to explain many phenomena, and which we can then proceed to study and explain in greater detail, a term with pragmatic value, such as “life” or “mind.” “Life” is no longer used as a principle of explanation, as a vital principle which is infused into dead matter, but life exists, for all that, and we can see its effects and study them. “Mind” is not something separate and distinct from the body in which it dwells or from the world in which it acts, but we know that mind is a useful and necessary category [23] in which to include a whole phase of living being, especially of human life. “Group Mind” is the same sort of category as these. Just as mind inheres in the neurones and is coincident with the chemical changes in them, and yet cannot be summed up by chemical changes; so group mind inheres in the brains, of individuals and is coincident with individual ideas and acts, yet cannot be summed up as so many individual responses but as the unified response of a group of persons at once.

Morris Ginsberg, in his Psychology of Society, opposes any type of group theory, as he sees only individuals in a social environment; he holds that the group may have unity of content but not of process, of ideas and ideals but not of mind. Floyd H. Allport speaks of “The group fallacy,” 13 “the error of substituting the group as a whole as a principle of explanation in place of the individuals in the group,” to which Emory S. Bogardus replies in his discussion that 14 “if there is a group fallacy, there is also an individual fallacy.”

On the other hand, so radical a behaviorist as E. C. Lindeman remarks, 15 “The group is a plurality of individuals, but what the group does is not plural but singular.” 16 “From the purely descriptive point of view, the group becomes a new quality.” Dr. M. M. Davis puts it this way: 17 “Millions of brain cells are co-ordinated to think as one brain. Psychology tries to tell how. Millions of brains co-ordinate themselves and function in many ways as one brain. The how of that marvel is for sociology.” Giddings calls the group mind “the concert of thought, emotion and will” of individual minds. Cooley says: 18 “The unity of the social mind consists not in agreement but in organization.” Ellwood phrases it somewhat differently:

[24] Dr. Baldwin sums up his view in the last sentences of the Social and Ethical Interpretations:

And so, if this were primarily a historical study, I might go over many similar and differing theories, which consider the group as a unity on the mental plane, that is, in one sense or another, as a group mind.

The material is still being collected for this study, the essential points of view still being defined, and such important factors as instinct and intelligence are still being redefined with the rapid progress of science today. As several of the terms cited above suggest, the difference between the individual as a mind and the group of individuals as a mind is always given and must always be given in terms of structure. In the words of Lindeman:

Not to cite more opinions on a point on which there seems general agreement, we may take it for granted that the chief, perhaps the only difference historically pointed out between the mind of one man and of a group of men is that the man has a brain and a nervous system, while the group has neither, but operates apparently through the brains and nervous systems of its members. But in their functioning, in their activities, the mind of the man and of the nation or other group are so similar as to be almost indistinguishable.

Of course, this distinction depends, finally, on the definition of mind which we are prepared to accept. Dennes gives an adequate summary and criticism of Durkheim, for instance, who considered collective mind to consist of the collective ideas [25] or representations of a society; and of Wundt, who considered mind an integration of processes, not of ideas, and therefore sought for the group mind in the collective results of group mental process, in speech, religion and custom. But Dennes himself seems confused by the need of defining mind without regard to bodily structure. He says: 22 “Individual minds or persons have or produce bodies as well as objective mental products. But social groups are not minds and have no bodies. They are associations of minds.” MacDougall defines mind as 23 “An organized system of mental or purposive forces,” and continues, “In the sense so defined, every highly organized human society may be properly said to possess a group mind.” While MacDougall’s definition seems circular in nature, it still recognizes that a functional definition of mind can make no distinction of structure, whether any particular mind is associated with one or many bodies. Lindeman calls mind 24 “the total equipment with which man responds to his environment”, which seems more than one can accept, for “total equipment” would include hands and feet, as well as mind. A more precise statement of the same general tenor appears in Dr. Singer’s Mind as Behavior:

Thus, any functional definition of mind that has no reference to brain or nervous system, must apply and does apply in the group of persons in exactly the same sense as to the single individual. If there is “unified behavior,” if there is “organized system of purposes,” if there is “response to environment,” then we have mind, whether the behavior, response, or purpose dwell in one or two or many bodies.

One question remains, and a most perplexing one. How can [26] one distinguish between a group mind and a group purpose, or the accidental coincidence of many minds and many purposes? A flock of migrating birds has no group mind—each bird would travel south at the same time and the same rate of speed, were there no flock at all. Or still lower forms, such as unicellular organisms, may move simultaneously to warmer waters. On the other extreme, the hordes of Huns led by Attila had a group purpose in their migration; the leader gave the word, and the followers leaped together to their horses’ backs to ride from Asia into Europe. But when a half million negroes migrate from the southern to the northern states in a few years, coming family by family, as the opportunity affords, yet with a steady tendency of drift, is that a group mind or the accidental agreement of many individuals? Is it mind or minds? And the same problem is present in a declaration of war, or the victory of a foot-ball team, or the adoption of a new fashion of clothes. When does the group act and when the individual members? When do we have the mind of all, when the mind of each?

To this crucial problem I must present one qualification and one answer. The qualification is: the group never acts except through its constituent individuals, any more than the mind acts without its brain cells and bodily organs. The difference between the act of all and the act of each is not a complete disjunction but a difference of emphasis, of interpretation, of purpose. When the army marches, every soldier goes ahead; when the nation elects its president, the millions of voters cast their ballots; when the church adopts a creed or reforms its ritual, the many believers experience a change in their faith and their hope. Not that group opinion need be unanimous; it is rather a mode of general consent by which unified action can arise out of conflicting opinions, by which many individuals are absorbed into a group mind. Thus in many, perhaps in most cases we cannot say definitely: this is group mind, not personal preference, or this is individual action, and the group has nothing to do with it. The problem is much like that which faced Kant in defining moral action, when the demands of the universal law may often coincide with personal preference, perhaps even with the greatest and most appealing happiness.

[27] And our answer may be similar to his. Kant turned to the test case. We know we have morality, said he, when duty and pleasure are opposed, and the man obeys the voice of duty. Similarly, we can say: we know that we have group mind and purpose when the pleasure of the individual is opposed to the will of the group, and the individual gives up his purpose for that of the army, the nation, the church. When the soldier or the martyr gives up his urge for self-preservation and offers his body to the bullets of the enemy or the stake of the persecutor, then we know that he has abdicated his individuality and is acting only as a member of the greater whole. Lindeman, whose study is based on observation of farmers’ co-operative societies, presents a contrary view:

If this were true, these associations would constitute merely a set of books, not a group of persons. But we see further on in the same book that the co-operative associations demanded loyalty even at the cost of whim or momentary interest; they enforced their contracts with the farmer by which he agreed to sell only through the association. If he got tired of waiting for his money, or if a dealer placed a financial premium on disloyalty, still he was expected to be loyal to the group. Finally, the group had to take cognizance of other aspects of the human life of its members besides the sale of their cotton or tobacco; it built up personal and social groupings for the entire family; it became a truly unified group mind, through the slow process of integration of individuals and of local groups, resting on a basis of personal friendship. Thus, even in an interest group, [28] a true group mind is developed through participation and sacrifice.

4.

We are now ready to define group mind in the sense in which it will be understood in this essay. A group mind is the common purpose of two or more persons, which they accept as their own purpose. The mode of this acceptance or identification is in behavior, which includes the reasons given by the individuals—their rationalizations—as well as their overt acts. The test of this in any particular case is the test of sacrifice, whether the man acts as a self-preserving being, an individual pacifist, or as a citizen and soldier, a member of a group at war; whether the church member acts as an individual thinker, or subordinates his judgment to the interpretation and the practice of the church; whether the son acts as a loyal son, a member of the family, to his own hurt, or goes off to marry against his parents’ will, leaving them perhaps to suffer want. I have purposely taken examples where opinion may be divided, as it is not my purpose to attach moral right or wrong to either group loyalty or individual freedom; either may be right under given circumstances, or judged by certain standards.

The group mind may be conscious, as a deliberative assembly; or instinctive and unconscious, as the racial group or the partly hypnotized mob. The ancient Israelite identified himself with his people; he did not even expect personal immortality, but desired sons to carry on his name so that his family and his people might be immortal. Parents are willing sacrifices for their children, but sacrifices nevertheless. The patriot volunteers for dangerous duty consciously, or leaps over the parapet in the blind enthusiasm of a charge; whether conscious or unconscious of the meaning of his act, he acts as a soldier, not a self-seeking person. The varieties of the group mind are almost innumerable. The group mind may be as instinctive and unorganized as a religious revival, as natural as a nation with its bonds of language, land, custom and government, as artificial as a military company without even a name, with only a number, and yet with a definite morale, a tradition, a personality [29] of its own. The theater audience has a group mind, while the restaurant crowd has not; for it is an axiom in the theater that each audience has a character of its own, that only a full house really abandons itself at a comedy, while even a smaller crowd may be carried away by a tragedy, and so on; the individual abandons his own judgment and his inhibitions at least in part, to react to the performance as a member of the group.

According to this definition, the individual also may have a group mind, as his diverse purposes are summed up in one supreme purpose, or as he has inner conflicts, the far-sighted against the narrow view, the better ideal against the worse. The reasons or motives which animate the various members of a group mind need not always be the same; they may range from deliberate choice to compulsion by public opinion or the blind following of herd instinct, the desire to “run with the crowd,” to “be on the band wagon.” There is always a margin of unassimilated purpose in either the individual or the group; neither mind ever quite attains perfect unity. Durkheim makes the pregnant suggestion, (not without its critics, it is true,) that the most unified mind was that of the primitive horde, where unity was achieved by identity; while developed societies achieve unity through organization and division of function, thus including the most diverse elements in a genuine unity of co-operation and purpose.

The group mind, then, is an empirical fact, which can be perceived in many practical ways. The intellectual content, the emotional coloring, group habits which we call custom, group ideas which we call tradition, group organization by which a consensus of opinion is ascertained for the purpose of unified action—all are characteristics of the group mind, just as the parallel factors of ideas, emotion, and will are the phases into which we analyze the mind of the individual. There is a difference in every one of these factors between the group mind of America and of China, between that of ancient Greece and of medieval Italy. And the difference lies not only in factors such as language, religion and history, which are constitutive to the group, but external to the individual. It lies also in subtler matters of opinion, of emotions, which seem to be within the [30] individual and yet must be absorbed from the environment, because they differ so strikingly from group to group. I shall go carefully into the reasons further on which impel me to consider that the Jewish people possess a group mind, even though they have no common government, language or land, and have even many divisions on questions of faith and religious practice. Here it is sufficient to note that the Jewish people act as one under attack; that a pogrom in Russia arouses the very different Jews of France, England and America to a feeling of unity and acts of relief and of defense. Labor and capital are becoming “class conscious” in opposition to each other; that is, group minds are in process of formation. The group mind appears in the behavior of the group through its constituent individuals, whether the group be a static one, dominated by the fixed habits of custom, or a dynamic one, with a great wave of progress; for behavior includes both custom and progress.

One more point comes properly under the definition of the group mind—the wide-spread conception of a general will, or more precisely a common will. According to the viewpoint of this study, the general will is no mystical entity, overpowering the wills of the individuals; nor is it an arithmetical average, in which personal opinions cancel each other out. Neither of these theories covers a willing mind. The group will is a resultant, not an average; one element in it is tradition, another is leadership, a third is the interaction of the various sub-groups. In the final result, the negative element is often actually erased, the wavering members accept the winning opinion as a whole, and the consequent group action is a unity, almost a unanimity of response. After war is declared the peace party practically disappears. In less clear-cut issues, we see the workings of compromise, which again appears in the behavior of the group as a whole.

Group consciousness exists when the individuals identify themselves with the group, not merely accepting its purpose but losing their own purposes in it. Consciousness implies also intelligence, as it does in the individual; it may co-exist with a high emotional tone but must have a rational element as well. [31] MacDougall utters a view in consonance with that held here when he says:

But when he holds 28 that groups are self-conscious according to the degree that the idea of them is present in the minds of the individuals composing them, then we must agree with Dennes that:

It will then be necessary to posit group consciousness as we posit individual consciousness, not distributively but collectively. We have group mind and group will when the group acts as one or behaves as one; but we have group consciousness when the group thinks as one. Not that this action can possibly take place outside of the individual minds; MacDougall is undoubtedly right in his citation of E. Barker: 30 “There is no group mind existing apart from the minds of the members of the group; the group mind exists only in the minds of its members. But nevertheless it exists.” Yet the group mind must include the individual minds in a unified purpose, to which they relinquish their own wills, willingly or with a struggle, whose ideas are their ideas, whose consciousness is, to a certain extent at least, their consciousness. If it is possible, in ordinary speech, to recognize that a man acts now personally, again as a churchman, a citizen, or a committee member, it should be possible to accept this fact as a part of our theory and to embody it as one phase of the theory itself. The individual and the group are not mutually exclusive; neither exists without the other; the group is a part of the individual mind as much as the individual is a part of the group mind.

1.

Theoretically, the individual might be independent of other individuals and of groups as well. He might be his own alter, so that through the active and reflective standpoints working on each other the individual himself might constitute a group mind, and might produce many, if not all, the characteristic products of the group. 31 But practically in society, the exact opposite is invariably the case. According to Baldwin’s dialectic of the individual development: 32 “The sense of self always involves a sense of the other.” 33 “The real self is always the bipolar self, the social self.” Empirically, not only are civilization, history and government the products of social heredity; the individual himself as we have him owes his mental content, many of his feeling and motor responses, and his ultimate ideals, to the group in which he was born and has developed. On this basis the ancient conflict between the isolated individual and the group domination becomes unimportant, if not meaningless from the empirical point of view. As Joseph K. Hart remarks:

Why, then, the eternal conflict between the individual and the group? Why does a Schiller or an Ibsen proclaim, “The strongest man is he who stands most alone”? Why do we have the group portrayed so often as the oppressor, the individual as the hero, genius, and martyr to the conventional ideas of the mass? Because the group has more fixed habits than the individual, or at least than the exceptional individual; because in most individuals the group factor is the dominant one by preference, [33] and the struggle against it is both rare and mild; because, finally, the group mind does involve a sacrifice of the individual purpose on many occasions, and these are the test cases of the strength of the group itself. There are really two types of individuals who stand out from the group—the genius, or social discoverer; the criminal, or social rebel. Platt suggests that 35 “Man has never become entirely socialized”; his biological heredity always lags behind the social heredity of the group and leaves a residuum of conflict. Baldwin gives a broader theory, which may include this: 36 “The individual is the particularizing social force; society is the generalizing social force.” That is, the individual produces variations, which are then stamped out by social disapproval, or generalized by social acceptance. The genius thinks for the race; the mass of individuals have their thinking done for them by the prepared reactions of the group. Without the social group the individual would be as unformed mentally, as helpless ethically, as is the single bee without the hive. In Baldwin’s words: 37 “A man is a social outcome rather than a social unit.”

All this by the way; if I were to take up the problem of the individual and group, it would occupy this entire study. I merely want to show its bearing on the central thesis here brought forward, which concerns the relation between group and group, rather than that between individual and group.

2.

The problem of group and sub-group can be approached either descriptively or genetically. If we take the former angle, we see every large group divided indefinitely into small, conflicting, overlapping, and infinitely various sub-groups. Much of the complexity of our society consists in this overlapping, by which the individual belongs to many groups at once, so that his mind cannot attain complete unity, and none of his groups can possess him wholly. A man belongs to a family, a city, a profession, a church, a school alumni body, a nation [34] and an international peace society. In addition, he may join a labor union, a chamber of commerce, or a half dozen fraternal orders. His mind is a perfect maze of group attitudes; he shifts from one group to another as interests or contiguity impel him. In the same way, a large group such as a political party includes members from different sections of the country, different economic strata, different churches, and so on. The group mind, as a category in this situation, is purely a functional unity, which works in and through its individual members and through its smaller groups of individuals in exactly the same way. I quote Dr. Singer: 38 “My world is highly organized—groups within groups, and groups within these,” for that is the scientific, realistic view of the social world.

Various classifications of groups have been devised by students of the problem, useful for their different purposes. Cooley speaks of primary and secondary groups, those in which men and women are born and grow, and the larger integrations into which the smaller, more natural groups enter. Miller prefers 39 “Vertical and horizontal groups,” the former being the natural divisions which include all classes, such as the nation; the latter a caste or class grouping. Hayes calls them personal and impersonal groups, apparently meaning much the same as Professor Cooley by the terms primary and secondary. Probably the most useful mode of classification is the genetic, beginning with the family, and then expanding according to the particular situation in view—in the primitive group to the clan, tribe and confederacy; in the civilized to the school, the interest group, the religious affiliation, the political nation, the international ideals and bonds of union.

Whatever be the more or less arbitrary mode of classification, we see that, except for the supposititious primitive horde, groups are never single nor simple. They resemble rather the physical organism or the mind of the individual, either of which is necessarily complex. Group minds exist and grow by progressive integration of the lesser into the greater, from the individual up to the greatest possible bodies of human beings.

[35] The group mind comes into being only through contact with other groups. We may go so far as to conclude that there must be two groups in order that there may be one group. If an isolated island possessed a few people so unorganized that they felt no difference of groupings among themselves, then there would be no sense of a total group, either. Under those circumstances that would be attained only in case of an invasion by people from without the land, or a rebellion within, when group unity of the islanders would at once appear. If my previous identification of mind in the individual and the group is exact, not merely an analogy, then this follows from Baldwin’s genetic study of the individual. The mind of the individual grows by constant reference to the alter—for in the thought of the child the ego and alter are one—and even in the highest reaches of moral judgment there remains an element of social approval, of what would be the judgment of the ideal group or the ideal comrade. 40 “We do right by habitually imitating a larger self whose injunctions run counter to the tendencies of our particular selves.”

To quote a few applications of this viewpoint to particular problems: Sumner applies it to the primitive horde:

In Ellwoods’s words:

[36] Dr. George E. Vincent wrote:

“Races, Nations and Classes,” a recent work by Dr. Herbert A. Miller, presents a series of studies of social relations in terms of group conflicts, group oppression and group revolt, as these exist in various crucial situations today.

Most of the treatments of the subject calmly assume that the other group with which contact is established must necessarily be parallel and competing with the first group. But in empirical situations that is not always, perhaps not often the case. We may become conscious of our American unity in war with an external foe, but we may become equally conscious of it in inter-state relations; because an inter-state conflict may bring us to the superior federal power; or in the division of powers between state and nation, or in the strong hand of the federal government reaching out to detect groups of law-breakers within the constituent states. That is, the two groups need not be parallel and exclusive; they may overlap, or one may enclose the other entirely. I can become conscious of my international Jewish loyalty in contrast to the Christian church, which also is international; or I may become conscious of it through the overlapping with my American citizenship; or even through contrast with a family loyalty, which might conceivably be enhanced by disregarding the membership in the Jewish people, with its frequent disabilities. The first is a case of two separate groups; the second, two overlapping ones; the third, where one is a sub-group of the other. In this sense it is conceivable, though not usual, for the individual with his own “group mind” to serve as a contrast to the group in which he is included. For in every one of these instances there has been actual or potential relinquishment of purpose into the larger group which includes the smaller, or into the one which overlaps and [37] conflicts with the other; and in the case of two parallel groups there is a conflict and contrast of purposes, hence of group mind itself.

3.

The mode of group contacts has practically always been viewed in terms of conflict and competition. In contrast to this, I present the view that there are two modes of group contact—competition and imitation. Competition strengthens and unites each competing group. Imitation brings the different groups together into an overgroup. The two together constitute the social process (if we allow for the element of individual initiative and leadership, which hardly comes within the special topic of this study).

The classic presentation of group struggle is by Gumplowitz, in his “Rassenkampf,” where he took Gobineau’s rather crude theory of races and applied it to history and sociology, including also groups smaller and of different origin than the races themselves. To present Gumplowitz’s view in his own words:

This is his “social law of nature,” which he compares to the law of gravitation in its certainty. War is therefore necessary for civilized as for primitive societies, and any talk of ideals or of peace is but self-deception, if it be not deliberate masking of warlike intentions. The race theory of Gobineau has gone on until it is one of the important factors in American group oppositions today. And surprisingly enough, the conflict theory of Gumplowitz comes back also from time to time. In “Survival or Extinction,” a new work by Elisha M. Friedman, I find this sentence: 47 “The absorption of a scattered minority people is the inexorable law of History. Can the Jews hope to [38] escape it?” This on the basis of Gumplowitz, whose treatment of the Jewish problem is very different; he criticized the Jews bitterly for being the one exception to his “inexorable law,” and said they should have obeyed it and been absorbed among the nations, as were the Phoenicians two thousand years ago.

Certainly there is group struggle; it is a natural tendency when two different groups come into contact; and it is a gross and obvious phenomenon which nobody can help noticing. But at the same time there goes on also a subtler but equally significant movement of group imitation. The white settlers fought the Indians in a way that everybody knew; many have missed the adoption by the whites of maize and tobacco, names of rivers and sites of cities; by the Indians of the horse, the rifle and the religion of the conquerors. Rome conquered Greece in war, and Rome imitated Greece in art and literature. Israel conquered Canaan and imposed the one God, destroying the high places where the earlier inhabitants had worshipped the powers of fertility in nature; but Israel incorporated the harvest festivals of the Canaanites into its own shepherd and nomad ritual. Group imitation takes its place beside group competition in the spread of culture elements about the earth, in the study of foreign languages and literature, in missionary effort, in the adoption of new inventions for warfare or for industry. These are as important and as omnipresent as business competitions or territorial rivalry, far more common than war.

The function of group conflict is to strengthen the separate groups and bring them to recognizable group mind. Loyalty is never so strong as when our group is under fire. War brings millions to an acute sense of national loyalty who have hardly felt they had a nation. The ancient loyalty of the Jew is largely due to the persecutors who constantly reminded him that he had no right to desert his people. There is definite survival value in this, which can easily be connected with the historic and prehistoric process which brought our present groups into being. As Dr. Miller says: 48 “Loyalty and patriotism are merely the emotional side of the group impulse. They measure the identity [39] of the individual with his group.” Royce’s “Philosophy of Loyalty” is one long praise of these virtues of the loyal son of his group. His somewhat exaggerated discussion of the value of the “lost cause” for character development illustrates the overemphasis on group struggle which is typical of all those who long for group solidarity. For group struggle does bring solidarity and loyalty except in the limiting case, where the group is destroyed in the struggle and there is nothing left to which we can be loyal. And that is precisely the case envisaged by Gumplowitz, the case of the stronger group crushing and then absorbing the weaker one.

Dr. Miller has worked out a type of group pathology which attacks both victor and victim of a group struggle. He calls it the “Oppression Psychosis.” Its effects on the victor are found in such rationalizations as the “myth of superiority” and other defense complexes, leading to “cultocracy” or class rule, and finally if unchecked to the stagnation of caste. To quote:

The inferiority complex of the oppressed people has very different and still more disastrous consequences. Dr. Miller points out that what are usually considered Jewish traits may be found also among the Irish, the Poles, and the Negroes, all very different groups but all subject to oppression and therefore presenting a psychological reaction to oppression.

[40] And he goes on to show the use of symbols as compensatory mechanism of the oppressed group, and thus to account for the ardent clinging of such groups to their language or religion as the real outlet of their self expression and of their will for resistance.

So far with conflict. Imitation of individuals has attracted much attention, especially through its exhaustive treatment by Gabriel Tarde, but group imitation has passed by with much less notice. However, we may fairly say that group imitation is as universal a by-product of group contact as are rivalry and conflict. The immigrant comes to America, and the result of that transference of a group into a new environment can be expressed in terms of either imitation or conflict, but can be summed up fully only by recognizing both processes at work at once. The children attend public schools, where they learn the English language, the salute to the flag, and some American group customs. The father learns English at his work; the mother copies American fashions in dress and household; both become naturalized citizens—that is what we call Americanization. But at the same time they speak their native tongue in the home, they read a foreign language newspaper, they keep up their correspondence with the relatives back in the Old Country, they belong to a patriotic or revolutionary society with its roots in the homeland. Often they even organize a school that their children may learn the language, religion and other essentials of their earlier group life. So the children often attend two schools, an American one to assimilate them to the group mind of America, a Polish or Russian or Jewish one to keep them in touch with the group mind of their parents’ allegiance. The hatreds of the central European peoples are transferred to America. The political issues between Czarist and Bolshevist, or between Fascismo and Socialism are perpetuated here. Sometimes the contrast between American and alien is emphasized, and takes the place of the old-world conflicts in the center of consciousness.

Conflict strengthens the fighting groups; imitation welds them together into an overgroup. The American process is one of forming a united people, an integrated, self-conscious group [41] mind, out of the many diverse elements which enter this continent. And this goes on by conscious teaching and unconscious imitation, through social, political and economic motives, everywhere except when interrupted by the counter process of oppression and resistance. We speak nowadays of a Greco-Roman civilization, a direct recognition of the part that imitation played in the Roman empire with all its warlike power. We speak of modern European culture, recognizing that European culture is one, with local variations indeed, and that art, science, philosophy and religion are international, for every group imitates every other. The trend of such a tendency can only lead toward an eventual amalgamation, not by abolishing present languages and parliaments, but by the growth of every sort of international and supernational consciousness, beginning with schools of literature or art, and culminating in a World Court or a League of Nations.

4.

This suggests the ideal of society which is implicit in our minds as we study its development by means of conflicting, imitating and overlapping group minds. The desirable qualities which this process evokes are heterogeneity and progress. We thus steer midway between the equal dangers of uniformity and standardization, on the one hand, and the isolation of castes, on the other. The caste system of India provides plenty of heterogeneity, but because the groups are isolated from each other physically and mentally, because of the influence of “untouchability,” the mind of the group has never unified, never presented the possibility of change. The modern movement in India under Ghandi is precisely of this type, to unify India and introduce the concept of progress by a double process, by abolishing “untouchability” within and bringing the caste groups to imitate and emulate each other; by strengthening loyalty through united opposition to the common oppressor. It is a most significant example of the development of the group mind through union of sub-groups and by contrast to another hostile group. On the other hand, the beginning of modernity in Europe meant a radical opposition [42] to the levelling influence of the Church universal, the rise of vernacular tongues, of national governments, of national churches—that is, the dissociation of the medieval mind, which was European, into the sub-groups, which are primarily national. That the reverse movement is now taking place is significant, for this reverse movement is a natural one by imitation and common interests, not forced by the union of the Inquisition and the secular arm. As Bernard Shaw remarks in the preface to “Saint Joan”:

We must then, conceive modern society, not as a simple unity but as an integration of group minds, from that of the individual, the family, the clique, up to that of the nation, with a dawning international mind now in process. These group minds struggle for domination and for existence; they learn from each other at the same time. The double process constantly in evidence is group conflict, resulting in the mind of the sub-group, and group imitation, resulting in the integration of the sub-groups into a larger and more inclusive mental entity. In addition, the various groups are not all parallel, but very largely crossing each other; one individual or sub-group may belong to several of them. Economic classes cross national boundaries, for both capital and labor are international. Most conspicuous of all, religious groupings are international and interracial, so that a man belongs to a church as well as a nation. In peace times the national will to dominate and the church ideal of peace are kept carefully as far apart in his mind as possible; the one coming into the center of consciousness on Sundays, the other on election day or similar occasions. In time of war, the two actively [43] conflict within the group mind, and thus within the individual minds which belong to the group.

The accumulation of knowledge and the advancement of reason are accompanied by a progressive widening of the circle of the group mind, to include an ever larger number and variety of sub-groups. Dr. Baldwin suggests this process: 53 “Group selection gives rise to what may be called the law of the widening unit, that as the circle of co-operation widens the unit of survival, the group, taken as a whole, becomes larger.” The other side of the same process is the increasing complexity of the mind of the individual and the sub-group because of the richer world in which they exist—in Dr. Vincent’s words, 54 “The person has as many selves as there are groups to which he belongs. He is simple or complex as his groups are few and harmonious or many and conflicting.” The actual growth of an international mind today is evident, through scientific, religious, artistic and economic influences; through the great alliances of the World War; through the ease of communication and the spread of news and propaganda. A world-wide group mind, if such is possible, cannot and should not eliminate its sub-groups, but include them in a wider synthesis; even enriching the complexity of the sub-groups by its further ramifications and their further imitations.

But the easy and natural way for such an international group mind is by conflict with a still different outside group. The white races would easily attain unity if there were a real race conflict against the colored races of the world; differences between French and German, between Russian and American, would be swallowed up in a day. Unity of the entire human race would come instantly if we were invaded from Mars. The slogans of our earth-wide unity would be the defense of our beloved planet and the common descent of all human beings. In default of such a threat from without, is the international mind an impossible hypothesis?

I suggest that actual contrasts exist which may make it possible for a world-wide group mind to grow through the normal [44] mode of group conflict and group imitation and co-operation. Perhaps we can attain race unity by envisaging the forces of nature as the rival group, conceiving the inroads of the insect world as the threat against human domination which must make us spring to arms in a sense of our common unity and our common nature. Perhaps we can conceive the national group as the contrasting element, and the international group mind as, not its enemy, but its synthesis. Finally, one all-inclusive mind actually does exist in the faith of most of the race—the ideal self of the group to which we give the name of God. The God-idea of the group is not the group itself, but is its outgrowth, its ideal self. Perhaps the future unity of mankind may come at last through a summation of its highest ideals and the rational toleration of diverse interpretations, different personalities, and widely contrasting group customs and manners. At present, however, an outstanding phenomenon of the group mind is intolerance, and through a study of intolerance we can perceive much of group nature and of the actual life of human societies.

1.

Tolerance is the characteristic virtue of the modern era, just as intolerance has been typical of every age and almost every people in days gone by. Tolerance, we feel is the golden key which alone can open the door to the golden age. Tolerance is the one thing that can possibly wipe out the evils of hatred, warfare, and confusion, the age-old enemies of the progress of the race. When men and women learn tolerance for each other’s race, nationality, religion, and general attitudes, then they will be able to understand one another, and eventually to work with one another, even to love one another. Without that tolerance, we can never understand people of different race or religion or nationality, because we never even stop to look at them fairly and honestly. Certainly, without tolerance, co-operation, human sympathy, the brotherhood of man are empty words without possibility of realization.

But that only pushes the problem back a step. What is this tolerance, and how can it be attained? It is easy for us to be tolerant on matters we do not care about, but hard on matters that are deep in our hearts. Religious tolerance is growing because religious intensity of the old type is weakening. Religious wars, as practised in Europe three hundred years ago, will never be repeated because Christians are no longer certain that their fellow-Christians of different sects are going to burn in everlasting flames. Thomas Jefferson was tolerant on religion because he was fairly indifferent to the whole subject; his intolerance was reserved for political opponents, and for the aristocratic party in other lands as well. The rarest object in the whole museum of history is the man who has profound convictions of his own, and yet is tolerant of those who differ from him—a Roger Williams, for example, who was a pious clergyman but allowed liberty of conscience in his settlement of Rhode [46] Island even to Catholics and Jews. Such a man is a symbol of what the whole world may become in the messianic age, a type of our strictly modern ideal.

2.

The study of intolerance takes us at once out of the field of individual psychology into the newer and less cultivated field of social psychology, the mind of the group. For intolerance is characteristically an attribute of groups. Intolerance is the white against the black; the Christian against the Jew, the Frenchman against the German—always one group lined up against another. Intolerance nestles in the individual mind simply because every individual of us is a member of a nation, a religion, a race, and has the typical prejudices of his own people. I may think myself better than you, but that is merely egotism. If I think my family better than your family and refuse to associate with you, that becomes intolerance. And if I join an organization of people with similar opinions to my own, and we decide to keep you and all your kind from doing business or holding public office or otherwise prospering and succeeding in a country which we both inhabit, then intolerance has attained its growth and come to flower. Always one body of people against another, animated by prejudice, and the reasons do not matter. For prejudice, literally, means prejudgment, opinion before the facts come in, and the facts are then selected to give us reasons for our attitude.

First of all, we must realize that intolerance is the typical and natural human attitude. From the beginning of history it was so deeply intrenched in every race and tribe that it seems to have begun with the life of the race, and has its roots perhaps in the pre-human life, among those wolves or bees that drive a stranger out of the pack or hive and leave him to die alone. For that happened times without number in the early human packs of human hives. Every group of people knows that it is the one proper, human group, and that all others are imitations and second-rate. The foreign language always is gibberish to us, not because it is inferior, but simply because we do not understand it. The uneducated man always looks on a foreigner [47] as somehow an imbecile, because he cannot understand a simple, natural tongue like English! The ancient Greeks spoke of such old, magnificent civilizations as those of Egypt and Persia as barbarians, even though Greece was their pupil in every art from war to letters. The Mohammedan calls others unbelievers, even though they may be fire-worshippers, or Buddhists, or Christians; these people are not unbelievers, but merely different-believers. And the Christian calls the Mohammedan, in turn, infidel, which means the same thing. In the Merchant of Venice, the Jew is referred to as a pagan, which is exactly the thing which the Jew is not historically, for Christianity represents a combination of Jewish and pagan elements. No matter—everyone thinks that his people are right and other peoples wrong. “My country, right or wrong,” represents a concession to modernism, blatant as it is. The universal feeling has always been, up to the threshold of our own age, “My own country, or tribe, or people, is always right.”

Intolerance, then, is not based on reasons, whether good or bad. It grows out of the nature of groups of people. It means merely that the other fellow is different, not at all that he is wrong. Everett Dean Martin points out in his studies of the crowd that the crowd is always dogmatic and egocentric. Every nation has some crowd characteristics, is interested in its own welfare, not in that of its colonies, or its competitors, or the human race. Patriotism is as dogmatic as is religion. Every state, every city has its local loyalty, which magnifies its advantages and conceals its disadvantages, and especially cries down its rival state or city. Even the scientist, the student of social conditions, is apt to speak of higher and lower cultures, or higher and lower races—meaning always that his culture is higher and the Chinese lower, or the Anglo-Saxon is higher and the Italian lower. At that point the scientist seems to be animated by a very unscientific intolerance. When a student of society points out ways in which the Chinese culture is worthy of our imitation, then I will feel that he is truly scientific and not at all prejudiced. For who says that our occidental culture is superior to the Chinese? We say so. Who says the Chinese is superior? The Chinese do, of course. But they are prejudiced? [48] Certainly, and so are we! The most that can be said with certainty is that the two cultures are different, and these differences can then be studied in detail.

Prejudice is often racial because people of different appearances stand out clearly as very different from us indeed. But they need not be inferior. The current prejudice against the Negro says that he is lazy, unintelligent, immoral—but the same intolerance operates against the many members of the colored race who are more diligent, more intelligent, and quite as moral as the average white. In all these characteristics the races overlap; the most that can be said statistically is that the whites have the larger percentage of the higher intellectual persons. Unfortunately, much of that may be due to training rather than to heredity, for in the army tests the northern negroes actually averaged higher than the southern whites. But even if this intolerance toward the black race were justified by facts after we whites entertained it on natural instinctive grounds, why then should we give directly opposite reasons for our dislike of the Japanese? For the Japanese is called by his very enemies shrewd, industrious and saving. If the lazy negro is our inferior, then the hustling Japanese should be our superior. The fact is that neither race is inferior in a way that can be proved—but both are different, and every group is naturally intolerant of the group that is different from itself.

But weighty reasons of racial character are quite unnecessary in establishing prejudice. Probably no two peoples in Europe are more closely related in race than the Germans and the English. A hundred years ago or more they were closest allies against Napoleon; during the World War, when political and economic conditions ranged them on opposite sides, each tried to show that it was a superior race, with no connection at all with the other, so far beneath it. Religious prejudice may be based on genuine differences, as between Jew and Christian, or on comparatively trivial matters as between Methodists and Baptists. The shifting nature of these prejudices and their purely personal application appears distinctly in the latest slogan of intolerance—“White, Protestant, Gentile, American.” All others, not conforming to this criterion, cannot be one hundred [49] per centers. This excludes the Negro, as well as the Indian, who is certainly American but is not white. It eliminates the Jew, who is not a gentile; and the Catholic who is not a Protestant. And it excludes a white Protestant gentile of English or German birth, who may be everything else but is not American-born. Obviously, there is no logic in this, for classes are excluded for exactly opposite reasons. There is nothing in it except the one fact which always animates every kind of intolerance—the fact of difference.

Walter Lippman in his “Public Opinion” presents a point which no discussion of prejudice can ignore— 55 “that the way we see things is a combination of what is there and of what we expected to find.” He works out the process of the “mental stereotype,” by which we have a preconception of the labor agitator, the alien, the Harvard man, and see the individual always in the light of the group to which we may attribute him. 56 “One factor, the insertion between man and his environment of a pseudo-environment. To that pseudo-environment his behavior is a response.” 57 “The pictures inside people’s heads do not automatically correspond with the world outside.”

Thus acquaintance of one group with another is not enough in itself to break down prejudice, for the white man may see the Negro, or the Christian the Jew, not as the other really is but as he thinks the other group ought to be. Only escape from group thinking, the use of the individual intelligence about an [50] individual, can possibly make any difference in our pre-conceived notions of other peoples.

Moreover it is true, as Professor Shailer of Harvard pointed out long ago in his book, “The Neighbor,” that this fact of difference operates most strongly when the two different groups come into contact with each other. Prejudice is always strongest on the frontier. The Nebraskan does not have the active prejudice against Mexico that animates the Texan, nor against Japan that we find in California, nor against the Negro as in the solid south. Not that Nebraska is a land favored peculiarly by justice, but that it has no direct contact with large numbers of these different races. Naturally, this contact often opens the way to real acquaintance, before which intolerance grows faint and may even vanish. American soldiers in the occupied districts of Germany brought enough German brides to show how quickly prejudice breaks down on personal acquaintance. Christian scholars of the time of Humanism learned Hebrew from Jews whom their medieval predecessors would have avoided as the plague, and a new respect for Judaism began to spread. But as long as the contact of the two peoples is a frontier contact only, a group contact, of class with class, directed by their different status in the world, such contact merely ministers to the intolerance which individual knowledge and friendship would break down.

A striking instance of this group nature of intolerance occurred within my own observation on the Western front during the World War. In an attack one of our prisoners was a German lad of eighteen, a harmless peasant boy who had deserted his machine gun and come in willingly as a prisoner; we made him useful about the first aid post, and he carried water, swept out the place, and even wrapped up German helmets to send to America as souvenirs. But Hans had been a machine gunner; if our soldiers had found him at his post they might have shot him on sight. If they had found him with other troops, they would have disarmed him, driven him back to the prison camp. In the first case, he would have belonged to the group of machine gunners, the greatest danger to the American advance. In the second, he would have belonged to the group [51] of German soldiers, and been fair prey for enmity and capture. As it was, he was regarded merely as Hans—and the hated German machine gunner acted as servant to the friendly American bosses.

If these general principles of intolerance are true, we can apply them at once to the peculiar situation of the Jew—everywhere at home, yet everywhere the creature of prejudice; not so very different from the other white nations among whom he lives, yet always distinct from them and always the target of intolerance. Every movement of bigotry, aristocracy, militarism, junkerism in every land makes anti-semitism one of its cardinal shouting-cries, from the emigrés of Russia to the royalist anti-Dreyfusards of France. The Jew is hated everywhere simply because he lives everywhere, and is everywhere a little different from other people. The Jew has a distinct religion, a peculiar tradition and appearance which can sometimes be distinguished—he is different from other people. And the extreme bitterness of this anti-Semitism, more than of any other anti-party the world over, is simply because everywhere the Jew lives on a frontier, in direct group contact with the intolerant of other peoples. Every Jew lives on a Franco-German frontier, or a Mexican-American one. Even in the United States of America, with its proud tradition of tolerance written into the Federal Constitution, there is now a movement of anti-Semitism. The most obvious condition of its rise is the increase of the Jewish community of America, that is, the extension of the frontier line, the contact of more Americans with this “alien,” which means different, people. Add to that the hatred of certain foreign groups aroused during the war, the suspicion of certain radical groups directly after it, the general unsettled condition of world opinion, and the vast increase of European anti-Semitism as the parties of reaction were thrown on the defensive—and the exact form of American anti-Semitism begins to show itself.

But all these local details do not obscure the real nature of this prejudice which we face in America today. It is just another form of the intolerance of everything different which the wandering exiles have had to face during their two thousand [52] years of homeless persecution. Of course, all this has had its effect on the Jew. It has driven the Jew into intolerance in his turn. His intolerance has never expressed itself in terms of persecution or violence, very seldom in terms of hatred. The intolerance of the Jew became, in self-defense, a pride in the Chosen People of God, in his ancient lineage, in his family loyalty, in his glorious tradition. He then emphasized the fact of difference from other peoples, just as they did, and the Jew looked down on the rude, ignorant heathens just as the Christian despised the uncouth alien Jew. Intolerance has one virtue—it makes for loyalty to your own. It has many vices, beginning with false and ignorant pride, culminating in bitter, malignant hatred.

4.

If intolerance is this natural, universal force, what then is tolerance? How can tolerance ever hope to succeed in a world divided into so many hostile and suspicious groups? Tolerance means the exercise of the individual intelligence. It means that a man has dared to look at the facts and to say: “My people is wrong. This foreigner is just as good as I am.” Or this Jew, or Catholic, or negro, as the case may be. It means that a man has the courage to defy the public opinion of his own group, and to use his own brains instead of going along with the crowd. It means that general principles of right and wrong, applicable universally, have begun to replace the old tribal morality, of sticking by your own through thick and thin. It represents the growth of free inquiry, of science, of the unbiased use of the human intellect, the broadening of the human sympathies. It represents also the breaking down of group control, that instant and unthinking emotional response of the crowd to that which is congenial or against that which is different. Tolerance is the typical virtue of the modern world because the modern world is becoming increasingly self-conscious, intelligent and individualistic, and especially because the modern world is beginning to afford opportunities for real acquaintance between members of different peoples, not merely the superficial frontier contacts which make for prejudice. Above all, tolerance marks the [53] growth of the larger, more inclusive group which includes the smaller ones, and outlaws intolerance between them. In the American army during the World War intolerance was at its lowest, simply because all the various elements in our people were acutely conscious of their common country. Old-time prejudices, left over from the Civil War, were forgotten. Religious and racial intolerance were minimized because there was a common purpose, and a common intolerance of a common enemy.

The coming of tolerance between any two groups, then, means that these two have been included, in the minds of their own members, as parts of a larger, more inclusive body to which they both owe loyalty. Such a tolerance between the nations of the world, now so ready to make war at the slightest provocation, would imply an international or a supernational loyalty, a genuine brotherhood of man, and a real fatherhood of God. Tolerance means that intelligence has made inroads into the old habit of following the group custom blindly through thick and thin. It means that sympathy has succeeded hatred, that suspicion has given way to brotherhood and love. Tolerance is the supreme challenge to the authority of the group to master the thinking man. Treachery to one’s own nation or faith is no such challenge, for that simply means that the traitor preferred another rule and another standard to the one in which he was born. But tolerance is the challenge; it serves notice that no absolute authority, no ancient usage of hatred or bigotry, no instinct to fear the stranger, can forever dominate.

There is a fine summary of this whole question in “The Group Mind” by Professor William MacDougall of Harvard. Dr. MacDougall says of the modern world: 59

And he concludes the examination of the subject by saying:

5.

One more question arises naturally in our minds before we can accept this analysis and use it as part of our daily thinking and acting; what is the effect of such toleration on our own loyalty to our own people? Does the philanthropist neglect his family, or the man without strong religious hatreds prove careless of his religion, or the lover of mankind prove a poor patriot? This is the usual opinion, and therefore a very effective argument against the position which I have here tried to establish. But this opinion is directly contrary to the facts of the case. Does family affection make for or against love of country? Naturally, the former, for loyal children are also loyal citizens. Should the man who would love his country on that account hate his city or his state? Of course not; love of his native land begins with the smaller unit, which he knows best, and then grows to the entire nation, which includes it. And in the same way loyalty to the cause of humanity need not mean, cannot mean disloyalty to the cause of the nation, which is so great and important a part of the human race. But, on the other hand, the patriotic American does not hate Illinois because he has moved to Indiana. Love of one’s own state persists without the hatred and intolerance of the other state, just because the two are members of the American nation, and the inclusive loyalty makes the other loyalties less bitter and less contentious against each other. Why, in the Balkans, states much smaller than Indiana and Illinois have their armies always ready for a cause of complaint against the other. That is because they have as yet no common loyalty. It is because the free intelligence has not yet broken through the inborn suspicion and intolerance of the human pack. Probably we can never expect all human beings actually and actively to love one another. [55] That seems illusory in light of the history of human nature. But there is every prospect that tolerance will spread as world intelligence becomes more enlightened, and as more people in each generation share in that world intelligence. And this spread of tolerance will make always for larger and more ideal loyalties, including the warring nations and hating sects of today, even as nowadays the city includes the family or the nation includes the state. Hatred toward the Jew takes its place today in the hierarchy of hatreds as one of the strongest and most widespread of all. Therefore it will probably be one of the last to go as tolerance overcomes intolerance the world over. But every step toward the discovery of new truths or toward the dissemination of the truths already known is another step toward the destruction of all prejudice and toward the real liberation of the Jew. Naturally, the Jew himself will overcome his prejudices at the same time, as he has shown himself pathetically eager to do at several times of false security in the past.

The great hopeful fact of it all is this: tolerance begets tolerance. That hatred causes hatred is well known, for it is the normal course of every personal conflict or national war. Each unfriendly act of one side is followed by one of the other, until nations enter warfare all ready to hate one another, and leave it hating more than ever. But friendship, fairness, tolerance, have the same way of spreading by their own inner force. If America discriminates against Japanese immigrants, the Japanese think of ways to show their dislike of America. But if America gives back the Boxer indemnity to China, the Chinese send their students to America, then these return to their native land with an attitude of friendliness, and the process of tolerance and peace, once begun, grows by its own power. Lines of tolerance radiate from every true center of justice, of inquiry, of religion. Human growth is slow, but we can mark its methods and take part in its tremendous process.

All history may reasonably be regarded as a process of group minds in conflict and association, struggle and integration. Probably this method of study will bring out more genuine facts and a more fundamental order of causation than political or military or economic history alone; at the least, it presents one significant and important mode of studying human association in both the past and present. From this point of view, Greece was a congeries of competitive city states, which united only against an outside foe; Israel was the union of twelve different tribes, together with the Canaanites whom they subdued; Rome was a product of the various organizations, the patricians and plebeians; England the growth into each other of the successive waves of conquest—Celts, Romans, Saxons, Normans—and the more recent peaceful immigrants. From this point of view, the United States is conspicuous among all nations for the number and variety of its groups and for their union (on the whole) by a federal principle of agreement, rather than a forcible levelling and unification from without. And this process of group synthesis is not a modern one only, as it is sometimes erroneously considered; it is characteristic of the piece-meal, haphazard colonization from the very outset; it pervaded the Revolutionary army, and was the outstanding fact that confronted the framers of the Federal Constitution in 1787.

1.

E. B. Greene sums up the reasons for adopting the Constitution in this way:

Thus the causes of the Federal union were the need of external defense and the need of reconciling the many diverse groups in the population of the new nation. These groups are summarized by Carl R. Fish:

He then goes on to enumerate the groups: New England, with its Puritan English ancestry and its agriculture and fishing; the South, with its English Episcopalians, its aristocratic ideals, its plantation life; the piedmont country, with its independent small farmers and self-governing townships; and in between the commercial valleys of the Hudson, the Delaware and the Susquehanna. These again had their local differences of character:

Beyond all these was the frontier, with its own natural conditions, type of inhabitants, and economic problems, a democratic community separate from all the rest.

The Constitutional convention of 1787 in Philadelphia was typical of this situation. Every problem found divergent interests and opinions; every solution was effected by compromise. 63 There was state jealousy of all central authority; the opposition [58] between large and small states; that between the industries of the north and the agriculture of the south; the slave trade, with its complex of moral and economic problems; the sectionalism of the settled east and the frontier west; the protection of the property-holding class and the satisfaction of the radicals with their demand for liberty and equality. Every one of these conflicts had to be settled if possible, or at least (as with slavery) brought to a temporary status to avoid sharp struggle. There were, of course, certain unifying factors. The majority of the settlers were English, and most of these Protestants. The non-English speaking elements were very largely of Teutonic blood and Protestant religion also. There was a common political experience, and a democratic urge typical of the frontier. Most important of all, there was an eight-year war fought together against a common enemy and under the same Commander-in-Chief. The American government, then, with its new Constitution, was not a simple unity from the outset. It was rather a highly complex unity, containing within itself many minor groups, many different viewpoints, and many integrations of the sub-group for the benefit of the nation as a whole.

2.

An interesting illustration of this, and for our purpose a crucial one, is in the religious life of the thirteen original states. Before the Revolution, the states might be divided into four groups as regards their religious organization: there were congregational establishments in Massachusetts and Plymouth, New Haven, Connecticut, and New Hampshire; Church of England establishments in Virginia and the two Carolinas; four states formerly under various regimes had had the Church of England forced on them—Maryland, at first under Catholic rule, but with freedom of residence for all Christians; New York and New Jersey, which had been dominated by the Dutch Reformed Church; and Georgia, founded with almost complete religious liberty. Only three states had no established church—Rhode Island, Pennsylvania and its offshoot, Delaware. Of these last, Rhode Island was founded by Roger Williams in 1636, under the radical, not to say revolutionary principle of [59] complete separation of church and state, with right of residence and citizenship for all persons, even including Jews and atheists. Pennsylvania, chartered in 1681, was founded by William Penn, the Quaker, with liberty of residence for all “believers in Almighty God”; but the English government insisted on the condition that all voters and office holders “shall be such as profess faith in Jesus Christ” and the Protestant religion. What the new nation had, then, was not religious liberty, but rather a clash of many different points of view.

What, then, should be the upshot of this confusion of religious groups, with their ancient hatreds and prejudices, ingrown with history and overlaid with former strife and martyrdom? It was obviously impossible to make the United States Calvinist or Episcopal; it was necessary to have some sacrifice of each for the good of all. But it might have been possible to make the nation Protestant Christian, as was actually the case with the state of New Hampshire until 1877. Various minor causes here entered in. Warfare with England meant some opposition, at least, to the Church of England. The distance from the actual seat of old-world struggles, the character of the colonists and their longing for every type of freedom, helped much. The new theories of the French Encyclopedists, as adopted by Jefferson, certainly had great influence. But most important of all was the existence of the many minor sects, with the few important ones, of which all longed to rule but none wished to be dominated by any other.

The upshot was religious freedom, the separation of church and state, according to Article VI, Section 3, of the Federal Constitution: “No religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United [60] States.” This clause was opposed on both sides—by Massachusetts as being too liberal, by Virginia and Rhode Island as not liberal enough. Virginia had two years before this overthrown her state church and given complete freedom of conscience—not toleration—to all her people. The opposition even to toleration was becoming crystallized in the words of Thomas Paine: “Toleration is not the opposite of intolerance, but the counterfeit of it. Both are despotisms: the one assumes to itself the right of withholding liberty of conscience, the other of granting it.” So the first amendment to the Constitution, adopted immediately afterward by motion of the first Congress, and by the required two-thirds of the states, was: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”

This was tremendously significant of the growing and newly conscious group mind of the United States of America. It was equally important for the future of the nation and its unity in days to come. Religious liberty was not a matter of doctrine in its inception; it was the product of the birth and development of the group mind of the nation. It meant the relinquishment of the racial habits, of the state laws, of the old urge to persecute (common to almost every group, even those who were themselves refugees from persecution), and the adoption of a national standard to which every state, every church and every sect should bring its sacrifice. And if this sacrifice was not of their own right to live, but only of the right to make others miserable, it was nevertheless the sacrifice of something so important that the demand had convulsed France, Germany and England not many years before. Religious liberty, indeed, however firmly based on law and political ideals, never became the habit of thought and action which intolerance had been. A recurrent phenomenon of American life has been the breaking up into religious, racial and sectional groups, with a further synthesis of Americanization, through some common interest to unite them. The conflict among the many groups prior to the adoption of the Constitution, and its solution in that document with its Bill of Rights, has been paralleled at least four times from that period to the present day.

[61] 3.

These four reactions against the immigrant correspond with the four peaks of the curve of immigration into the United States, with two great alterations in the process, corresponding to the Civil War and the World War.

Up till 1830, immigration into the United States was small in amount and fairly regular. The first wave stretched from 1831 to 1861, reaching its peak in 1855; its total amounted to four millions of foreigners, of whom the largest group and the first to come were the Irish, the second in number and date of arrival the Germans. The growth of intolerance against these newcomers was shown in the movement known as Know-Nothingism or the American Party. The second wave, of similar nationalities, was from 1862 to 1877; the reply to this appeared in the anti-alien planks in the political platforms of 1876. The third wave, from 1878 to 1897, was larger than these earlier ones; it included many Scandinavians and, after 1882, growing numbers of Italians, Russians, and Austro-Hungarians, the two last being composed in part of persecuted Jews, in part of impoverished peasants. The Nativist reaction against this immigrant trend appears rather in the form of religious opposition, for the American Protective Association of those days was predominantly anti-Catholic. The fourth wave began in 1898 and extended until 1914, when the outbreak of the World War in Europe caused a sudden drop to almost nothing; in its highest years, 1907 and 1913, more than 1,200,000 entered our ports annually; and the greatest number of these new arrivals came from Italy, Austria-Hungary and Russia. The reaction against these new immigrants was under way, but the war interrupted its progress, and the Ku Klux Klan arrived at its full power only after the war, when new conditions swayed the group mind of America.

In each of these cases, the height of the movement against the immigrant came just after the peak of the wave of immigration, at the time when it had had time to impress itself on the native-born. The philosophies of these four movements varied according to the nationality of the immigrants against whom the [62] natives were protesting, and according to the general philosophy of life in vogue at the time. The first such movement, the Know-Nothing or American Party, originated in New York State in 1852 “as a secret organization with passwords, oath, grip and ritual.” 65 Its creed was summed up in two words: Americanism and Protestantism. Its special target was the two million Irish who had come into the country; they were poor laborers, with a low standard of living, ignorant, hereditary enemies of England, and Catholics into the bargain. No wonder there were anti-Irish riots in New York, Philadelphia and Boston; that it was rumored the Pope would soon be dictator of America; or that the secret anti-alien society was begun. But the course of the movement was spectacular and brief. It entered national politics, thus both making bitter enemies for itself and taking off the secrecy which was its chief source of power. Then came the abolitionist movement, and the American party was split into northern and southern branches. Most important of all, the peak of immigration was passed, the Irish adopted the American standard of living, became a part of communal life, without any danger of Catholic overthrow of our cherished institutions—Othello’s occupation was gone, and the Know-Nothing party disappeared.

The next wave of immigration and the next reaction against it were minor ones. The immigrants met groups of their own origin already absorbed into the common life of America, and fitted in with little difficulty. The attempt in 1876 to prevent the use of public funds for sectarian schools was itself comparatively slight.

But in between came the tremendous crisis of the Civil War. Here the opposition was not between native and immigrant, but between north and south, an industrial society of free laborers against an agricultural society of castes,—planters, poor whites, and negro slaves. I shall not go further into this conflict, because it is too familiar and has comparatively little to do with the particular application of my viewpoint. But, from our point of view, it is important to see the place of the first [63] Ku Klux Klan of 1865–71. This was again a secret organization, adding the feature of disguise, for the terrifying effect on the negroes whom it was the object of the Klan to overawe. The Klan was a partisan and sectional organization, of Southern white men of Confederate sympathies, to maintain their group supremacy over the newly freed negroes and the “carpet baggers” from the North. The victors had, as usual, indulged in oppression over the losers, and the grievance was a very real one. The Klan was partially successful in its object, but at once fell into numerous abuses, was used by partisans to vent personal grudges, fell into the hands of a lawless element, and was formally disbanded in 1871 by General Nathan B. Forrest, its national commander or Grand Wizard. Its slogan of “white supremacy” shows its animus against the negroes and the North, not against the alien. Some of its partisans claim that the Klan did not disband when it was formally ordered so to do, but persisted in its underground activity until as late as 1877. 66 However that may be, its character and purpose are very clear; it was sectional, timely, and for the one aim of white supremacy. It appealed to its members and frightened its enemies by its methods of disguise and secrecy, no less than by the beatings, burnings and other outrages which were carried on either under its auspices or by the false use of its insignia and methods. Its defiance of the law imposed by force, and its use of force in reply, are the vestiges of war psychology; It was the legitimate, if unlovely, offspring of the Reconstruction. It had no function left when the white South regained control of the states, but its memory still lingers as part of the idealization of the “lost cause” of the Confederacy.

The third reaction against immigration was primarily anti-Catholic in trend. This was the A. P. A., or American Protective Association, another secret society, organized in 1887, which reached its greatest popularity in 1894 and 1895. At this same period there were several other societies with the same purpose, notably the National League for the Protection of American Institutions, which had a number of extremely prominent men [64] among its members. At this time the so-called “new immigration” was growing strong, with its large numbers of Italian and Austrian Catholics, added to those of German and Irish origin already on the ground. The old fear of political domination by the Papacy, expressed at the time of the adoption of the first amendment to the Constitution, and then refuted, was again revived. There was an orgy of purported “confessions” of nuns and priests; there was circulated a forged oath of the Knights of Columbus, in which the members agreed to place the papal authority above their national allegiance; and a false encyclical of Pope Leo XIII. Thousands of patriotic Americans believed all this obvious nonsense, stirred up by the fear of a dominant Church; the A. P. A. had as many as two million members and threatened to drive out of public life the twelve million Catholics then in the country, without regard to their race, nation, service to America, or the number of generations they had lived in the United States. The mob spirit, once aroused, crystalized in the breaking of the Northern group mind of Civil War days into various sub-groups, Catholic, anti-Catholic and indifferent. But the financial panic of the 1890’s resulted in a sudden drop in immigration; the older settlers learned English and were absorbed into the American cultural group; the A. P. A. had no reason for existence, and again substantial unity was achieved by the mind of the American people.

In this connection we must give a passing glance to what is still our single greatest problem of groups, the existence of a ten per cent. negro minority in the United States. These people were brought here by force as slaves; as a subject class they were refused education, though at the same time their own language, religion and customs were thrown into disrepute and have been largely forgotten. Though freed from economic slavery, they are still politically a subject class in our southern states, while in northern and border states they are gaining a political balance of power. Finally, they rest everywhere under social disabilities, from the “Jim Crow” cars of the South to the subtler distaste and ostracisms of the North. The result is that they are forming complete, self-contained Negro communities [65] within the larger cities of the North and South alike; that they are growing increasingly self-conscious as a group; and that the large number of mulattoes, who in the British and French West Indies would rank as a third group, between the racial divisions, are here forced to make common cause with negroes. The negroes are thus a self-conscious group, though their culture is imitative. The grouping of the negroes apart is easy, on the whole, because of the gross external signs, such as skin color and texture of hair, so that the mass of the whites of the United States regard them definitely as a different and a lower race. That anthropologists are not so certain of all this makes little difference, because the group mind is based rather on old habits of thought than on the understanding of new and difficult facts. Here seems a problem of a different order, then, than the racial and religious groupings of the sub-varieties of the white race, which are constantly being overcome and regrouped in a larger union of social life. In this study it will be impossible to do more than point out the existence of this distinct problem, with its similar mental background to the rest but its immeasurably more terrible implications.

The fourth wave of immigration was by far the greatest in number of newcomers, and by far the most variegated in racial and national composition. It brought a million a year or more for six years during this period. And its members had 75% of persons from southern and eastern Europe, while the immigration prior to 1890 had included only 20% of these races, and had been chiefly the English, Irish, Germans and Scandinavians. It is no wonder that the race theory began to be popular in America, under the spectacular leadership of Lothrop Stoddard and Grant Madison, and that many began to agitate for a greater or less limitation of the flood of immigration. Even so sober a student of society as Professor Edward A. Ross of Wisconsin held that it was wise to assimilate people of different group mind more slowly than we were doing at the time. He said:

And he proceeded to point out their inexperience with democratic institutions, their lack of respect for law and for women, their disbelief in progress. In addition, we need only note that many of these people were Catholics and Jews; the total number of the former in the United States in 1923 being estimated at 18,000,000 and of the latter at 3,600,000. And the Jews were far more conspicuous than their numbers, on account of their massing in the great cities and their concentration in certain lines of industry. Thus the ground was fully prepared for a new anti-alien movement, expressing itself this time in the form of efforts to restrict immigration. This movement was under way in 1914, and would probably have followed in the course of its precursors. But world-shaking events ensued which altered the course of groups in America as well. The outbreak of the World War in 1914, the entrance of the United States into the war in 1917, altered all groups, profoundly affected the American group mind, and made the relation between the sub-groups and the mind of America very different from what it had been. The results of this process are still evident, and it is among them that we can look for anti-Semitism, together with many other types of intolerance and group opposition.

1.

With the outbreak of the World War in August 1914, the mind of America suddenly became strikingly distinct from that of Europe. They were fighting; we were watching. President Wilson appealed to the United States to be “neutral in fact as in name ... impartial in thought as well as in action.” The older American stock sympathized, on the whole, with England, except for the Irish and Germans; the newer immigrants had different racial and national affinities and memories, some holding allegiance to their former governments, some, like the oppressed Russian Jews, being especially bitter against their former rulers. In this situation, American neutrality was the result, not of indifference, but of lack of understanding on the part of many groups in our population and of a stalemate between the rest.

One definite result certainly was that all these diverse groups of new and old immigrants began to feel themselves a unity, an American people. They felt their distinction from the warring nations overseas, their own interest, their own reaction to the complex problems at issue. Meanwhile, however, both parties were trying every means to bring the United States into the war on their own sides. Germany tried to bring about an embargo on munitions sold to the Allies and in default of that, to obstruct their shipment by both peaceful and warlike means. Great Britain, more especially, tried to influence American public opinion in favor of the Allies and against Germany. Within, there were pacifists and advocates of preparedness, both trying to mold opinion. This formation of an American mind, and the difficulty of determining its future direction, came to a head in the election of 1916, when the German-Americans opposed President Wilson, and when Hughes was supported by Roosevelt, the arch-interventionist. During this period we experienced the [68] first development of what we have since grown to know intimately as “propaganda,” a deliberate, elaborate technique for influencing the mind of the group.

The declaration of war by the United States in April, 1917, unified the American mind in a manner and to a degree that were almost inconceivable. Every immigrant group began to pass resolutions favoring the government; the foreign language newspapers commenced an intensive propaganda for the prosecution of the war. Volunteers came from every section of the country and every type of origin, as many from the children of Germans as from any other group. The draft law was passed with apparent general approval; and its enforcement met with surprisingly little difficulty. Huge loans were made to the Allied governments. Tremendous bond issues were raised by the American government, with general approval and the coercion of any minority objectors. The National Council of Defense, founded in August, 1916, was able in many cases to overcome the dominant profit-motive of our society in gaining self-sacrificing patriotism of manufacturers and merchants.

Along with this voluntary and spontaneous unification of the group mind, came repression and coercion directed to forcing into agreement any unabsorbed minority groups. The Committee on Public Information was founded in September, 1917, to exert propaganda through the sources of public information, to send out favorable news and opinion, and even through censorship to suppress material considered dangerous to the general cause. The censorship exercised by the military forces on war bulletins, war correspondents and the personal letters of soldiers, was applied less strictly to the general population. The secret service, greatly expanded to cope with German spies, began hunting out strikers, radicals or any others who—in the minds of the detectives or of any other government officials—might possibly obstruct the war efforts. Emergency acts gave the President unusual power in these and other directions.

This use of force was characteristic, not only of the government, but of local groups as well. In one place a German sympathizer (real or supposed) might be made to kiss the flag; in another a strike leader might be lynched. In Milwaukee, [69] where public opinion was sensitive on account of the large number of German-Americans, a quota of Liberty Bonds was assigned arbitrarily to every person, and he was practically forced to purchase them, irrespective of his ability to do so, by threats of ostracism, by influence of his creditors, by every sort of social pressure,—in order that Milwaukee might rank as a real American community and go “over the top” in every “drive.” The military language applied to these campaigns was matched by a growing technique of organization. Professional propagandists perfected a method of meetings, songs, card-catalogs, and quotas, by which any cause might be assured of huge sums of money. The greater propaganda of our government and foreign governments was matched by the little propaganda of every subgroup, as long as this was not in conflict with the general purpose.

A striking illustration of this is in the successful drives of the various war-work agencies, the Red Cross, American Library Association, Young Men’s Christian Association, Jewish Welfare Board, Knights of Columbus, and the rest; and especially in their enormous joint campaign just after the signing of the armistice. Every American felt that this joint campaign, first, would help the soldiers and the common cause; and second, indicated by its inclusiveness the complete unification of America. Along with this general unification came the similar process in many of the immigrant groups themselves. Professor Miller 68 tells how this was reflected in the Czecho-Slovak group in America, so that bitter atheists united with Catholic priests on joint committees for national freedom in their old home in Europe.

2.

This internal unification was accomplished by a high emotional tension, a national and personal uncertainty, and a common hate. The prejudice against the various immigrant groups, arising as a result of the great wave of immigration, was abated for the moment; all the little prejudices were summed up in one great hatred of the common enemy, Germany. This was reflected in [70] avoidance of everything German in this country as well; German instruction was withdrawn from many high schools, German music from the opera houses, German fried potatoes from the restaurants. The term, “German-American,” formerly in good repute, now became a byword, and with it every form of “hyphen.” The demand now was for “hundred per cent.” Americanism.

In the prevailing ignorance of foreign languages and peoples, or even if this ignorance had not existed in its full measure, the hatred against the Germans was transferred in part to other groups as well, even those with most reason to be anti-German or anti-Austrian. Foreign language newspapers fell under popular suspicion and official censorship much heavier than that of the English language periodicals. Some states passed laws, later declared unconstitutional, forbidding teaching, preaching or public meetings in languages other than English. Foreign sounding names attracted suspicion, and were changed in large numbers. Altogether, America begun to repeat the oppression of subject groups which had caused permanent resentment and sown the seeds of rebellion in almost every land in Europe, to create her own Ireland, Alsace-Lorraine or Poland. Americanization became a synonym for compulsory adoption of American standards and group habits.

Americanization had had a long, if somewhat unsatisfactory, trial before the war. It was the attempt, at that time, to bring American culture to the supposedly uncultured immigrant through settlements, night schools, and other cultural agencies. The attempt was satisfactory in a comparatively small proportion of the total immigrant population; and the earnest workers blamed this fact on the poorness of their textbooks, the unsuitability of their buildings, or the weariness of the people after a day of arduous labor. Now, all of these were undoubtedly true, but a more fundamental cause of the weakness of Americanization methods lay in the fact that they were all one-sided; they consisted in attempts to change the immigrant into an American, rather than attempts to join many groups together into a composite unity. Even the conference on Americanization called by the Secretary of the Interior in 1918 passed [71] friendly and practical resolutions, but still one-sided and consequently superficial.

The few individuals who persisted in their individuality, who refused to be absorbed in the group purpose, formed no clearly marked group of themselves. They were the “conscientious objectors,” who refused any type of activity that might help the military machine; the “slackers,” who evaded the draft for selfish reasons; various religious groups, such as the Quakers; a few economic dissenters, such as the Industrial Workers of the World. They received, as they must have expected, the violent disapproval of the group, expressed in terms of mob attack, legal imprisonment, or at least, extreme social disapproval. They were the unassimilated residuum of personality in the general unification of the American group under the pressure of an external foe.

3.

Then came the armistice in November, 1918. As Dr. Drachsler remarks:

The artificial unity of war-time had no longer a purpose, and began instantly to dissolve into its component elements. But the high emotional tone of the war-time remained. Men still hated violently, but they could no longer release this hatred in battle or in sending others to battle. The repressive agencies remained in existence and in excellent running order; groups had learned how to use propaganda as an instrument; the habit of group pressure on subgroups and on different and opposing groups had been strengthened. Most of all, great masses of Americans had a new group consciousness of America as a group, with the uniformity of habit, opinion and conduct characteristic of their own subgroup taken as normal for the whole.

The first result, then, was that the original subgroups fell apart and that their opposition was stronger and more open [72] than before the war. This was due certainly to the heightened emotional tone, not only of the American mind, but every group mind the world over. During the war men and nations lived habitually under conditions of excitement, uncertainty and tension. After the war the same emotional tone remained to color whatever group ideas might become associated with its action. So the whites who had drafted negroes to fight for them resented these same negroes coming home with the new pride of soldiers, remembering new equality of treatment they had received from the French. The daughters of the rich no longer danced with the poor, ignorant farm boys as they had in every cantonment. Prejudice against the uniform returned, and girls of certain classes would no longer care to be seen with soldiers or sailors; as they had when those men were expressing the group purpose by their very garments. And the hatred of the various immigrant groups for each other—the hatred of the older American groups against the immigrant, the Catholic and the Jew, returned with redoubled force. As the present writer found occasion to note directly after the close of the war:

This disappointment was common to many of us who had allowed our hopes to run beyond our knowledge.

Another cause of this unusual strength of group hatreds was the very repression of the war period. Individuals and sub-groups had sacrificed their prejudices for the common purpose, but they had done so without pleasure and as a sacrifice. Now they resumed their group intolerance with redoubled zest due to long repression, whether that had been voluntary or forced. The “white, gentile, Protestant American” may have resented fighting on an equality with the negro, or under the orders of a foreigner—now that resentment had its vent. Never has group [73] feeling run higher in America than in this reaction from the sudden, violent and partially artificial unity during our participation in the World War.

One notable result of this sudden relaxation of unity, this sudden predominance of the subgroups, appeared in the phenomena of displacement. Displacement is a common matter among paranoiacs, where one object is substituted for another with the same meaning and the same feeling-tone of resentment or of pleasure. It is also a common characteristic of mobs, which may be called for this and other reasons, a sort of social paranoiacs; the lynching mob will turn from its intended victim to hang instead a public official or a bystander who objects even mildly to its program. 71 In this way the hatreds of war-time were displaced. The hatred for the German was displaced to the alien as a whole. The hatred and suspicion of Russia, aroused when that nation drew out of the war, and intensified when it adopted the radical economic program of the Bolsheviki and the novel political rule of the Soviets, was displaced and applied to all economic radicals, whether Russian or American. Finally, the Jew was identified as a foreigner (even though he might be American-born and a veteran of the war); and as a radical (even though he might be an ultra-conservative capitalist). The ancient, lingering anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism of ages past appeared again; the Jew was not only a Christ-killer or a boor or a Semite,—for no accusation was ever entirely dropped—he was also an alien and a radical, an international banker and an enemy of gentile civilization.

The outstanding phenomenon of the post-war period was the Ku Klux Klan. Other events which accompanied it were the new laws for the limitation of immigration and the general suppression of civil liberties of many kinds. The Klan had something to do with both of these as cause and as effect. Moreover, all three—Klan, anti-alien movement, anti-radical movement—were largely anti-Semitic in sentiment; in addition to which there was a separate movement of anti-Semitism based on the imported anti-Semitism from Europe. Therefore in any study of anti-Semitism as a group reaction we must also study these three group reactions of the post-war period, all of them partially anti-Semitic, and all of them associated with the same group-ideas and the same group-will as anti-Semitism itself.

1.

The Ku Klux Klan of the present is not the one of the Reconstruction period in any sense. It has taken over the name, the garb and much of the high-sounding ritual. But it has a new motive and a new psychology. The old Klan was sectional; the new is national. The old was anti-Northern and anti-negro; the new is anti-alien, anti-negro, anti-Catholic and anti-Jewish. The old met a certain emergency and was then disbanded by compulsion of the Federal government and the action of its own leaders; the new has expanded from the character of a fraternal society to that of a nation-wide propaganda movement, has entered politics, and become one of the leading political issues of the campaign of 1924. In other words, its real ancestors are: not the Ku Klux Klan of the south in 1866–71, but the Know-Nothing Party of the 50’s and the A. P. A. of the 90’s.

The Ku Klux Klan was organized in 1915 in Atlanta, Ga., by William J. Simmons, a former Protestant minister of strong convictions, intense if narrow intellect, and great interest in [75] the organization and spreading of fraternal orders. For five years it grew slowly and inconspicuously, during the period of the war and for two years thereafter; in June 1920 it had about five thousand members and was in financial straits. At this juncture it was taken up by Mr. Edward Young Clarke and Mrs. Elizabeth Tyler, who had had experience in the new technique of propaganda. Under their skilled hands the Klan at once grew with astounding rapidity; paid organizers entered state after state, organized “Klaverns,” and reaped great profits for themselves and for the heads of the organization. But the commercial motive, while probably strong in a few persons, was in no sense important in the actual membership of the Klan and their acts. “Its official documents indicate that the Klan originally was a purely fraternal and patriotic organization, one of the hundreds of similar secret societies throughout the country.” 72 The New York World investigated the Klan in 1921, and a Congressional investigation followed in October of that year, but both served rather to advertise than to harm the organization. It spread rapidly throughout the Union, claiming at one time as many as four million members, elected senators and governors in a few instances, and in several became the outstanding issue of state elections, sponsored or was accused of innumerable acts of mob violence, ranging from warnings to certain persons to discontinue their bootlegging or immorality, up to beatings, tar-and-feather parties, and the notorious Mer Rouge murders of 1922 in Louisiana.

We have already discussed the expansion of propaganda, so that its enormous utilization by the Klan is quite comprehensible. But even the constant reiteration of laudable motives and grandiloquent phrases about Americanism cannot account for this sudden rise to power; two other elements must be included—group prejudice and secrecy. The Klan capitalized every prejudice of its group, which was predominantly a small-town one, of American birth, Protestant religion, and Anglo-Saxon either in race or in their opinion of their race. And the Klan met in utter secrecy, did not divulge the names of its members, [76] paraded the streets in the disguise of robes and masks, and carried out its deeds of violence in the same awe-inspiring anonymity.

Clearly, the Klan is typical of the tendencies we have found in the American mind after the war. It represents a subgroup revolting against its voluntary sacrifices for the nation during the war. It represents the anti-alien, anti-Catholic and now also anti-Jewish sentiment, the reaction against the enormous wave of immigration just at an end. It includes also the fear and hatred of the negro, strongest in the old South but spreading to the North with the northern migration of many negroes during and after the war. On the Pacific coast the fear of the Japanese immigration enters into the complex of hatreds. In other words, the Klan is the third wave of Nativism. It is the great reaction of the subgroup to the intense sacrifice for the nation during the war.

2.

Various other motives are implicated in this general complex. The South furnished the original soil of the Klan; its second center was the middle west, the old home of the A. P. A. It was weakest on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts (except Oregon) where the various immigrant groups actually live. It was weak in the heterogeneous masses of the cities with their aliens, Catholics and Jews; strongest in the small town, where men may talk of the Papal menace without actually knowing many Catholics, of the Elders of Zion without seeing personally more than one or two Jews a year. The attitude of Nativism, the reaction to the immigration of huge masses of foreigners, is still strongest where these foreigners themselves are not in evidence.

This suggests that other motives must enter in, that something else in the small-town American must have made the Klan congenial. That something else is monotony, standardization (the “Main Street” attitude), and the appeal of the Klan to these people lay largely in its glamor of mystery, secrecy and hidden power. The rise of fraternal orders is one of the note-worthy movements in American life; there are now over six hundred of these societies in the United States, of which four hundred [77] ninety were organized between 1880 and 1895. Over seven per cent. of our population is affiliated with these orders, and their greatest strength is precisely in the small town, where they are a bright spot in the dull social life, and give a factitious importance to their “nobles” and “exalted rulers,” as well as to the many who are permitted to enter into their secrets and to parade in their regalia. Professor Mecklin 73 classifies secret societies in three groups: the beneficial societies, with whom secrecy is merely protective; the social organizations, devised to give “variety and interest to our poverty-stricken American life”; and finally, militant societies with a general program which affects the entire nation, like the old Ku Klux Klan, the Mafia, and the Fenians. He concludes that the present Klan, while undoubtedly furnishing for many of its members the release from monotony, the sense of power, the revolt against repression, that is characteristic of the second class of organizations, has also the characteristics of the third type and is therefore a public problem. As he points out elsewhere in his book, the disguise of the mask is a further danger, as it may be adopted by members to persecute non-members in nameless ways, and even presents an opportunity for non-Klansmen to indulge in violence practically without fear of detection.

Professor Mecklin’s analysis of Klan psychology in Chapter IV of his book presents several suggestive points. He says:

The Klan insists on like-mindedness, in the sense of adopting the Anglo-Saxon ideals as the norm for America. Finally,

Father John A. Ryan contributes an additional motive,

Frank Tannenbaum covers similar points in the first chapter of “Darker Phases of the South,” where he deals with the Klan. He holds, first, that

To his keen psychoanalytic study I must add a few words from an article by Frank Bohn in the American Journal of Sociology. 81 Mr. Bohn points out that the Klan, once organized, had to find something to do, that its violence was a natural outcome of disguise, organization and aimlessness. He attributes its origin chiefly to the disillusionment of the American people over the break-down of their simple, democratic ideals when applied to a huge nation of complex population; and to the changing character of the racial and social composition of the people, with the revolt of the older stocks. He concludes:

3.

A word may be needed especially on our narrower topic, the relation of the Ku Klux Klan to the Jew. Its preliminary questions to the candidate for “naturalization” include two that exclude the Catholic, two the Jew, one the alien and one the negro. [79] The most inclusive is number 2: “Are you a native born, white, Gentile American citizen?” Number 4 is: “Do you believe in the tenets of the Christian religion?” Imperial Wizard H. W. Evans gave out an interview in Indianapolis early in 1924 when he made the following statement, repeated several time later in other connections:

Here are the same themes of racial superiority, like-mindedness of America, identification of Americanism and Protestantism. But elsewhere we meet with direct attacks on the Jew, as on the Catholic, negro and foreigner—not merely the assertion of their inferiority. Speaking at Dallas, Texas, December 7, 1922, Mr. Evans said:

This sounds like an economic motive, but it may be merely repetition of stock charges of traditional anti-Semitism. Mr. Bohn hints at such an economic purpose when he remarks:

These facts seem to me erroneous; there have always been Jewish merchants and peddlers throughout the country, and they have always had Christian competitors; probably they have merely [80] been a point of vantage for the aroused prejudices of the group. Dr. Mecklin says:

4.

The Klan has now passed the zenith of its aggressiveness and its influence. The campaign of exposure, while it made thousands of members, also made thousands of enemies and robbed the Klan of the secrecy which was so essential an element of its strength. Many of its members lost interest, others were positively estranged by certain methods and ideals of the organization. The trials for murder at Mer Rouge, La., brought the Klan into bad odor generally. Most important of all, the Klan went into politics, and in this followed exactly the cycle of the Know-Nothings and A. P. A.’s—secrecy, growth, propaganda, politics, enemies, decline. In 1924 the Klan was an element in the national conventions of the two major parties. The Republicans considered planks opposing and favoring the organization and finally took no action. The Democrats had to take up the issue because of the movement to nominate as their presidential candidate Alfred E. Smith, governor of New York, and a professing Catholic. While Mr. Smith had political supporters in his own state of every religious denomination, still the entire strength of the Klan was thrown against him. At the same time, the many Irish Catholics belonging to the Democratic party resented the attempt of the Klan to dictate the nomination and [81] introduced a resolution attacking the Klan by name. The conflict of that convention is now historic, and resulted in thoroughly disorganizing the Democratic party for the ensuing campaign.

Finally, the passage of the immigration bills of 1921 and 1924 robbed the Klan of its chief reason for existence, its most potent argument. Immigration was abruptly cut down. Not only that, but its national origin was totally altered so as to favor the peoples of northern and western Europe, and to keep out the Italian Catholics and Russian Jews. It is no longer possible to stimulate fear or hatred on such a large scale again, now that immigration is no longer a large factor in American life, and the group integration is once more proceeding at its accustomed rate.

5.

The anti-immigration movement must not be regarded as a result of the Klan but as a parallel phenomenon, with the same motives and philosophy. The original political theory and economic situation, by which all immigrants were welcomed into the United States to help build up the country and to become full Americans has been slowly altering. The first law of limitation, passed in 1882, and followed up by later amendments, merely excluded convicts, persons affected with contagious diseases, persons likely to become public charges, and similar individuals for individual reasons. Other legislation of economic trend excluded Chinese and later Japanese laborers, and contract labor. In 1917 the demand to limit the numbers of common labor, voiced by the American Federation of Labor, met the desire to limit numbers and to select racial groups, and the literacy test was embodied in the law, excluding all who could not read or write in any language. But this was satisfactory to neither the friends nor foes of immigration; it was merely a temporary device.

In May 1921 a temporary law was passed limiting the number of each nation to enter the United States annually to 3% of natives of that nation residing here in 1910. This limited the total immigration at once from the 1,285,349 of 1907, the peak [82] year, to a total of 357,803. This total is in addition to immigrants from Canada, Mexico, Newfoundland, Cuba and Central and South America; it does not deduct the emigrants who often amount to as many or more than those entering the country. It is simply a means of cutting down numbers and altering proportions. It is directly a result of Klan preachments, of Nordic theories, of the reaction of the native, gentile, Protestant American to the growing complexity and heterogeneity of the nation, and to the need of revising his mental stereotypes of the United States. He must grow to think of his nation as a nation of many elements, many beliefs, many backgrounds, most of them different from his own—to him America is a Protestant country, a white man’s country, a gentile country, and he intends that it shall remain so.

Therefore the permanent immigration bill enacted in May, 1924, changed the percentage from three to two, and the date on which the quota is to be estimated from 1910 to 1890. The result of this double change is to alter radically the racial and national composition of the immigration stream and hence the total character of the United States. As Chairman Albert Johnson of the House Committee on Immigration, after whom the bill was named, phrased its double purpose:

The total immigration, therefore, was reduced from 357,000 to 164,667 and the emigrants have to be deducted from this to ascertain the actual annual increase. The Italian quota was reduced from 42,000 to 3,845; the Russian from 24,000 to 2,200; the Polish from 30,000 to 6,000. On the other hand, the German quota was reduced only from 67,000 to 51,000; the Norwegian [83] from 12,000 to 6,400; the British and Irish from 77,000 to 62,500. The bill carried out radically the intentions of its sponsors, to cut down the flood of immigration and to discriminate against the racial and religious groups which they consider inferior because they appear externally to be different. It is a group reaction of the same order and motivation as the Ku Klux Klan.

6.

A concurrent phenomenon, arising from the same group mind but essentially different in manifestation, is the suppression of civil liberties which began during the war and continued afterward, an expression of the same impulse toward compulsory like-mindedness, but taking its criterion from the economic rather than the cultural, religious or racial aspects of the differing groups. As Father Ryan put it:

86 Dr. Harry F. Ward of Union Theological Seminary, in the same Proceedings of the American Sociological Society, has a fine summary of the “Repression of Civil Liberties in the United States (1918–23).” He enumerates the new Supreme Court interpretation of the free-speech clause of the first amendment to the Constitution, by which a “clear and present danger” justifies its violation; the state laws on syndicalism or sedition or anarchy; the attacks on the right of labor to strike; the use of the Department of Justice of the United States to repress radical economic movements; the mob violence increasingly widespread [84] and regular; and the national organizations engaged in repression, such as the National Civic Federation, the National Security League, and the Better American Federation.

The material is too wide in range and too full of important instances to be even cursorily examined here. The trend, however, was definitely a part of the post-war attitude of the American mind, the breaking up into violently opposing groups, each claiming to assert the true American spirit. The same attitude of repression appears in the churches in the form of heresy trials and an aggressive Fundamentalism. It appears in the form of legislative acts to prohibit the teaching of evolution in the state universities of several Southern states (most of which failed of passage). Dr. Ward feels that the

Attempts were made during the height of the anti-Russian and anti-radical movement to connect Jews with Bolshevism in Russia and with radicalism in the United States, so that this movement also has its anti-Semitic phase. Thus anti-Semitism is bound up with the Ku Klux Klan, with the immigration bills, with the economic repression,—it is an integral part of the group reaction from national unity, and appears in every phase of the post-war group reactions.

In “Loyalties” by John Galsworthy, there occur two statements of anti-Semitism so powerful and so keen that they may serve as a key to the whole situation. The young Jew has accused a Christian aristocrat of stealing his purse. The gentile girl, naturally a liberal, has to choose her loyalty. She says: “Oh! I know lots of splendid Jews, and I rather like little Ferdie; but when it comes to the point—they all stick together; why shouldn’t we! It’s in the blood.... Prejudices—or are they loyalties—I don’t know—criss-cross—we all cut each other’s throats from the best of motives.” And later on an English grocer of the lower middle class confesses: “To tell you the truth, I don’t like—well, not to put too fine a point on it—‘ebrews. They work harder; they’re more sober; they’re honest; and they’re everywhere. I’ve nothing against them, but the fact is—they get on so.”

1.

Anti-Semitism is, then, a typical because a violent group attitude. In America in its newest manifestation it is a part of the complex of group revolts after the World War; it is intimately associated with the Ku Klux Klan, anti-immigration movement, and repression generally, at the same time that it has distinctive phases of its own. As Lewis S. Gannett wrote:

88 Because anti-Semitism is world-wide it is easy to assume that it has the same causes everywhere; but conditions in America are very different from conditions in countries where religion is taught in the schools, where the Jews are virtually all middlemen, where the Ghetto is an abiding place for generations of the same family.... American anti-Semitism can largely be explained without reference to the religious beliefs of Christians or Jews.

This last statement applies only to the immediate situation, not the background.

[86] The two elements in American anti-Semitism, then, are the imported prejudice from Europe and the American soil which received it. The form of the prejudice was the importation; its material backing and impulse was the native American reaction against the apparently new or apparently different group. The intensity of the movement at this particular moment in history is a part of the post-war mental state of the American people. In addition to the movements described in the last chapter there are other manifestations mentioned in the introduction: such as the attempt to limit the proportion of Jews in the colleges; the anti-Semitic books and periodicals; and the activity of the Russian emigrés constituting the immediate connecting link with anti-Semitism in Europe and the world over. The agencies which hunted down the radicals, whether as Russian sympathizers or from economic motives or merely as a different group, tried assiduously to find Jews among their leaders and were bitterly disappointed when economic radicalism turned out to be an American movement in which Jews had merely a minority share.

As we have seen, in 1919 the soil of the United States was abundantly prepared for the imported seeds of anti-Semitism. Group was arrayed against group, native and alien, Nordic and South European, Catholic and Protestant, Christian and Jew. In addition to the local and timely fact, we must also presuppose an old inheritance of specific prejudice against the Jew of a strictly religious nature. This is by no means the immediate occasion of the present movement, as it may have been of pogroms in Russia; but it is certainly an element in the national subconsciousness and in the conscious thinking of certain more orthodox Christian churches. Granted that Horace M. Kallen exaggerates the importance of this factor, still he has done well in pointing it out. He says:

Certainly the teachings of infancy and childhood have left this, residue of anti-Judaism in the minds of millions of persons, who would be the first to deny the possession of religious bigotry; certainly the Christian church, as a group mind, contains a tradition of anti-Judaism as one of its ideas. But this means merely that religion to the Jew takes the place of skin color to the Negro or language to the Czech. We have ancient warrant that so trivial a matter as the mispronunciation of the word Shibboleth was sufficient identification for one sub-group of Hebrews to kill members of another group of their own people. All that intolerance needs is some mark of identification, however irrelevant or petty, to set off the rival group.

2.

The European importation at this period was the race theory. Originated in France by Gobineau, taken up in Germany by scientific thinkers and made the rallying cry of political parties, the theory was adapted to American conditions. In Germany and France the “great race” was the Teuton, below whom were ranged in order the Alpine, the Mediterranean, and the Semite. The safety of the Teuton and therefore of civilization as a whole depend on the purity of blood of the Teuton and his guarding from contamination by alien blood. The Semite, in particular, is a menace by reason of his lower moral and social standards and his inability ever to be assimilated by the higher races; he must be driven out of power and if possible out of the “sacred German land” itself. In the United States this theory was taken over bodily by such writers as Lothrop Stoddard and Grant Madison, with the trifling change that the word “Teuton” was altered to “Nordic.” This was done in order to include the many sub-varieties of the older immigration, most of whom [88] came at some time from northern and western Europe. The Klan and the writers in the Dearborn Independent echoed them. The Russians in the United States attacking the Soviet government, many sub-groups of new Americans who imported their anti-Semitism with them, and the constant flood of letters, periodicals and books regarding the growth of mob violence, political discrimination and social obloquy in Europe, furnished the connecting link. The race theory became acclimatized.

Peculiarly enough, one of the most radical statements of the race theory was by a Jew, Maurice Samuel in “You Gentiles,” where he showed quite unintentionally how the theory is reversible to form opposite conclusions on the same premises. To Samuel, Jew and gentile are two radically different sorts of people, as the anti-Semite agrees; the difference he finds, however, is one of temperament, of viewpoint.

To this we may contrast the remark of Irwin Edman:

The reprints from the Dearborn Independent can match this sort of hasty generalization a hundred times over in the language of anti-Semitism.

3.

I shall devote very few words to showing that this race theory, whether from the Nordic or any other angle, is composed of hasty and unscientific generalizations, merely the rationalization of the group prejudice whose actual background we are tracing. In the first place, anthropologists are not at all agreed either on the definition or the history of races. There seems, however, to be fairly general agreement that there is no such thing as a pure race—certainly not the English and probably not the Jews either. All sub-varieties of the white race are greatly mixed in blood. For the Jewish side of this problem, an interesting study is that of M. Fishberg, “The Jews, a Study of Race and Environment,” where the author has demonstrated the many physical types which appear in the Jewish people the world over, whether these are due to local and climatic influences, or as Dr. Fishberg holds, to interbreeding with other racial stocks. In the second place, even such racial groupings as can be roughly established vary indefinitely and overlap indefinitely in every physical and mental characteristic. There is no considerable body of people who conform to the Nordic type—blond, tall, long-headed, and so on. No test has ever been devised which can adequately compare the intelligence of different races, for every intelligence test yet invented presupposes a certain cultural and language background, and is therefore favorable to the group which has this background, and certain [90] to give a low intelligence quotient to any different cultural group, whatever be its race or its potential intellectual power.

As Jean Finot sums up the entire theory in his book, “Race Prejudice”:

The eminence of certain European nations today is historical and cultural, not racial. Otherwise, how explain the past eminence of Egypt, Babylon, Greece and Rome? True, some try to detect an admixture of Nordic, or at least of Aryan blood in these nations as a cause of their once high civilization. But to claim this is so to dilute the meaning of the word that almost any blood may be considered “Aryan.” The fact is that the Jew now in the United States did not kill Jesus but is still accused of it; and is not a Semite but is still accused of that. The one accusation like the other is merely a rationalization of the social trait of intolerance, now sprung to growth in the United States.

4.

Minor accusations against the Jews need only summary consideration. Needless to say, many of them are true but probably none of them are actual causes for hatred of the Jews. [91] The theory of Burton J. Hendrick that the Russian Jews are inferior racially to the west European ones is merely another variety of the race theory and is worth no more than any variety. The Jews are called materialists and money-grabbers, which many of them are, as well as many non-Jews; they are accused of having wealth and of being subverters of wealth, and some Jews are in each of these categories. Some Jews are bootleggers, as they are called. Possibly some Jews have been traitors, though the writer in the Dearborn Independent seems to have taken a great deal of trouble to prove that Benedict Arnold may or may not have had some Jewish accomplices. Certainly the complaint of the colleges that many of their Jewish students are not socially acceptable is entirely correct. The Jew is the only immigrant group whose poor boys attend institutions of higher learning in any large numbers. Other groups usually wait at least a generation until they have acquired both prosperity and some American culture before their children attend college. Besides, there are a number of Catholic universities which are attended by many Irish and Italian youths, while there is no such school to divert the Jewish youth. Hence there is no doubt that many young Jews attend college who are externally uncouth, who speak English with an accent, who wear shabby clothes, and who have no interest in athletics, dancing or undergraduate activities. It is certain, however, that these young people learn to conform very rapidly indeed; and that, before they learn, they may be able to contribute a little variety and interest to the monotony of American youth.

A charge of great importance during the height of prejudice against the Russian Soviet government was that the Jews were responsible for that government, its success and its excesses. The inevitable conclusion was, then, that the Jews were trying to introduce the ideals of the Soviets into the United States. Even when this conclusion was not drawn, the connection was so emphasized as to minister to anti-Semitic sentiment. John Spargo 100 made a special effort to minimize this rather indirect, but at the time very dangerous piece of propaganda. He showed [92] that the number of Jews in high position in Russia was very small, while the larger number of government clerks and similar functionaries was due to the larger percentage of educated men among Jews than among the mass of Russians; that the great commercial class of Jews were financially ruined by the socialistic policy of the government; that the Jews of Russia were divided among the several political parties for and against the Communists; and finally that the Bolsheviki had suppressed Jewish religious schools, like Christian ones, and estranged the orthodox of both religions. But the anti-Semitic writers used the Russian Revolution to show the growing menace of Jewish power the world over.

Finally, the charge of the Dearborn Independent that there is a Jewish world conspiracy to overthrow the governments of the world in favor of an all-Judaic power. To the person who knows Jewish life, broken into so many conflicting theories and different cultural and economic groups, the whole viewpoint is too ridiculous to require disproof. It is merely another sign that the modern conception of social and economic process is very new indeed and has made little headway into the group mind. Every world process from the World War to the fall of the German mark, from immodest clothing to vapid popular songs, must be blamed on a person or race. In this case the person disliked is the Jew, and everything is blamed on him. But a different group prejudice could just as well ascribe these same factors to the German (as during the war), to the Russian, to the international bankers, or to the Republican party. Again, we are confronted by the rationalization of a group prejudice, and in this case the rationalization is merely unusually fantastic.

As Ludwig Lewisohn sums up anti-Jewish prejudice:

To this we may compare the interesting if somewhat hasty generalization of Friedman:

And Shailer speaks of 103 “This most striking and universal of ethnic judgments,” that the Jews are an unpleasant people. The Semite to him is “the ablest type of man the world has known, but a type that is somewhat archaic” because religious rather than scientific in mental trend. He feels that Jew and Aryan are different in their mode of meeting the stranger, the Jew is more impulsive due to swifter mental processes, which invariably causes bad first impressions to be later overcome. And so on. These reasons seem hardly better than those of the anti-Semites themselves—for the Jew today is not a Semite; Dr. Shailer compared him with the rather repressed New Englander at Harvard, not with the Aryan of Germany or Italy or Russia; since he wrote seven Jews have received the Nobel prize for scientific distinction; and finally, the challenge to the superior race (of Dr. Friedman) is simply the fact of difference. No characterization of the Jew accounts for anti-Semitism, whether it be formulated by friend or foe; the only genuine causes are those that can be found in the group mind itself.

5.

In addition to the background of American group mind, already studied, and the imported theory of anti-Semitism, there are certain facts which affect the situation in its special manifestations. The most important of these is the great increase of [94] Jewish population in the United States. At the time of the Know-Nothings there were not over 50,000 Jews in this country, and many of them had lived here since before the Revolution, possessing fine patriotic records; there was thus no motive to single them out for the anti-alien agitation of that period. At the time of the A. P. A., there were about 500,000 Jews, but these were still not a large enough group to attract special attention; they were widely scattered through the south and west; and the agitation against the larger numbers of Catholic immigrants passed them by. In 1925, however, the number of Jews in the United States is estimated at 3,600,000, of whom 1,735,000 have immigrated into America in the last 25 years, and 900,000 of these in the last 15. Here, then, is a tremendous body of Jews who are also foreigners, who speak the Yiddish language, adhere to traditional Jewish religious practices, and who are massed in great bodies in certain cities and in certain industries. The foreign Jew is thus more conspicuous today than any other immigrant group, even than those much larger in number. New York City alone has 1,500,000 Jews, such a huge number of whom are of obviously foreign origin that they are a conspicuous attraction for the intolerance of other groups in America. As Mecklin says:

A special feature of this present Jewish immigration is that much of it comes from a belated civilization. The Jew of Poland or Ukrainia or Rumania steps from an agricultural society into an industrial one; from an aristocratic class society into a democratic one; from an isolated Jewish Ghetto life into a maelstrom of races and cultural groups, among whom he must grope his way. No wonder that his adjustment is not always a correct [95] one, still less often the same adjustment as that of the standardized , typical American. Many of them become radicals in economics, religion and politics as a reaction against their former experience of oppression; some of them were pro-German during the World War to oppose their former Russian tyrants; for all of them the problem is doubly difficult because it involves not only a personal adjustment to new economic and social conditions, but also the group adjustment into the life of the United States. Many of them in their new-found freedom become super-patriots, take America to their hearts, and are thus doubly disappointed when America also repulses them.

But Jewish immigration also has been largely stopped and the foreign aspect of American Jewry is rapidly disappearing. In 1914, the Jewish admissions to the United States numbered 138,000 or 11.3%; when departures are taken into account, the Jews became 14.3% of the total. During the war the Jewish immigration was negligible; but in 1921 it again amounted to 119,000 or 14.7% of the total, or deducting departures, 21.2%. The passage of the quota law of 1921 resulted in reducing the total Jewish admissions to 53,000 and 49,000 in the next two years; or 17.3% and 9.5% of the total admissions. As 1922 was a year of many departures among Greeks, Italians and several other groups, the net Jewish immigration of that year actually amounted to 47.5% of the total net immigration. The effect of the 1924 immigration act has already been noted by social workers and others in touch with immigration, but it is still too early to show by statistics what has occurred, namely the practical cessation of this great Jewish immigration into the United States. It is obvious that this fact will alter the animus and the nature of anti-Semitism, just as all anti-alien sentiments, even though it will not eradicate the other causes and therefore will not stop anti-Semitism completely.

There are two kinds of answers possible to a movement like anti-Semitism, the explicit refutation of its doctrines and teachings, whether by Jews or non-Jews; and the response by adjustment and by psychological traits. It is a commonplace that Jewish loyalty is always strengthened by anti-Semitism; it is equally true that the Jewish inferiority complex is conditioned, if not caused, by anti-Semitism. In fact, we may well conclude that Jewish characteristics are greatly influenced and molded by the adverse forces of the environment. Both these types of response, the explicit and the implied, exist in this particular case, whether as counterpart or as results of anti-Semitism itself, and both can be traced in the United States in connection with the present movement.

1.

Defense of Jews by non-Jews is a notable phenomenon of modern times, associated with the general growth of tolerance. Beginning with the Renaissance there have been a few hardy spirits in every generation who were willing to espouse the cause of these pariahs of Christendom, chiefly the liberals who were challenging group standards in many directions. Such advocates as Mirabeau, Lessing, Jefferson and Macaulay endeavored to remove Jewish disabilities and to defend the Jews against the attacks of the intolerant groups. Here in America we have seen the same result; the use of the individual intelligence has drawn many non-Jews out of the unified group mind of the persecutors; many entire groups, in fact, of Catholics, liberals, and others had never entered into it. Even before the World War the Reverend Madison Peters of Brooklyn was widely known for his book, “Justice to the Jew,” and several similar volumes. More recently, as a definite reply to the anti-Semitic writers there have appeared “The Jew and American Ideals,” by John Spargo; “The Jew and Civilization” by Ada Sterling; [97] “The Truth about the Jews, by a Gentile,” by Walter Hurt; and “Patriotism of the American Jew” by Samuel W. McCall. These works and others like them, of varying merit, were definitely apologetic in nature. A number of periodicals published articles either avowedly in defense of the Jew, or purporting to examine the Jewish problem fairly and without intolerance. Such were the brilliant series by able thinkers, which I have quoted so frequently, in the Nation; by Norman Hapgood in Hearst’s International; by William Hard in the Metropolitan Magazine; by Arthur Brisbane in his syndicated newspaper column, and many others. Former President William Howard Taft, now Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, during the interval between these high offices, wrote a speech on “Anti-Semitism in the United States,” which he delivered in many parts of the country and which was printed by the Anti-Defamation League.

Several actions of larger bodies of non-Jews lent even more dignity to this counter-movement. On December 5, 1920, the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, the great Protestant federation, passed the following resolution in its national convention in Boston:

It is a peculiar commentary upon the nature of groups and group leadership that the very churches thus addressed by their great national leaders should have furnished so much material for the recruiting officers of the Ku Klux Klan.

On January 16, 1921, a protest against anti-Semitism was issued under the initiative of John Spargo, signed by one hundred [98] nineteen distinguished American Christians from every walk of life, headed by the names of President Woodrow Wilson, former President William Howard Taft, and William Cardinal O’Connell. I quote a few sentences from this interesting document:

The most practical work of this kind was undertaken in December, 1924, when a joint committee of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America and of the Central Conference of American Rabbis met in Washington, D. C., to consider the problem of good will between Christians and Jews. Their statement follows in full:

2.

While some non-Jews were trying to break up the group ideas which were expressed in anti-Semitism, whether through drawing away individuals by argument, or through diverting groups by the prestige of great names, the Jews themselves were far from idle. There was a flood of books, articles, speeches, designed to show that the Jews have had a proud share in American history in the past, are now patriotic citizens, are being wronged by calumny, and so on. Most of these were quite worthless for their purpose, for anti-Semitism was not caused by the arguments against the Jews at all; moreover, they were plainly apologetic and would not have impressed a prejudiced person in the least. But the work of several great Jewish organizations was of a different order.

Among a number of these organizations I select three which have, from their inception, made this one of their prime purposes of existence. The oldest of these is the American Jewish Committee, of which Mr. Louis Marshall of New York City is president. This organization was founded in 1906 with the purpose of defending Jewish rights at home and abroad; its immediate occasion was the Kishineff massacre in Russia, with the consequent strengthening of Jewish group loyalty in the United States as well. The annual reports of this body, published in the various volumes of the American Jewish Yearbook, reveal, besides other activities, a variety of defense methods—a personal protest to the head of a publishing firm which was producing the “Protocols”; efforts on behalf of newly arrived immigrants; the completion and publication in summary form of the record of American Jews in the army, navy and marine corps during the World War; attempts to befriend persecuted Jews in foreign lands. On December 1, 1920, this committee published an “Address to their Fellow Citizens on the Protocols, Bolshevism and the Jews,” which was signed also by representatives [100] of nine other Jewish organizations—rabbinical conferences, unions of congregations and the like. This statement rehearsed the proofs against the current charges of anti-Semitism and appealed to the American public, with the evident hope of breaking up the group mind that was then filled with the image of anti-Semitism. It ends in this fashion:

The Anti-Defamation League, with its headquarters at Chicago, was founded in 1913 under the auspices of the Independent Order B’nai B’rith to carry on a somewhat different work. Its executive secretary for almost this entire period was Mr. Leon L. Lewis, now Grand Secretary of the Order. Its first activity, which it has continued throughout, was to issue individual protests to such magazines, newspapers, motion picture producers, vaudeville managers, etc., as allowed anti-Semitic tendencies to creep into their productions. In many cases a friendly protest was enough to stop the propaganda; in some extreme instances, no result whatever could be achieved, as the work in question was a direct expression of intolerance. Since the actual anti-Semitic movement began in the United States, the Anti-Defamation League has broadened its activities, has published some material refuting charges against the Jew, has circulated this through the country, has investigated various anti-Jewish organizations and so on. It has rendered great service in diverting from the anti-Semitic sub-group such individuals as drifted into it more or less by accident but who were not definitely aligned with it.

Finally, the American Jewish Congress, organized in Philadelphia on December 15, 1919, has passed certain resolutions of interest to the general public. Its chief work, however, was the appointment of delegates to represent the American Jews at Paris during the Peace Conference. Largely through the [101] efforts of this delegation and similar ones from the Jews of other countries, the rights of Jewish and other minorities in the newly constituted countries of eastern Europe were protected by treaty, and Palestine was made a British mandatory, with special rights of settlement for the Jews. This work, which has proved so important with regard to anti-Semitism abroad, has comparatively little direct influence on its American phase.

3.

This direct propaganda may have some influence, but only as propaganda, not as argument to refute arguments from the other side. The fact of difference is the primary fact on which anti-Semitism, like all other intolerance, is based. This can be transcended only by an inclusive loyalty and an inclusive purpose in which both sub-groups lose their own purposes and consequently their opposition. The most direct reaction to anti-Semitism appears in the intensification of Jewish loyalty. Conflict makes the group mind vigorous and self-conscious, especially in the defeated group. The power of the “lost cause” over the minds of men has been beautifully developed by Royce in his “Philosophy of Loyalty”; and the cause of Jewry has been for two thousand years such a “lost cause” among the oppressors of the world.

Thus oppression of anti-Semitism in any part of the world cements Jews everywhere into one body, forces the group mind of the Jew into unity and direction. As Dr. Drachsler points out:

The group loyalty of world Jewry has shown itself in the United States in the form of certain agencies that have been particularly active during and since the World War. The poverty, persecution and devastation of the great Jewish communities of eastern Europe occasioned the formation of the Joint Distribution Committee in America, in which—for the first time—reform, orthodox, and radical Jews sat together and labored in a common cause; the sixty-five million dollars they collected in America and disbursed abroad are less important to us than the group mind they developed in this common purpose. The Zionist movement, both as an attempt to provide a home in Palestine for the oppressed Jews of eastern Europe, and as a hope for the revival of Jewish nationality and culture in the Holy Land, has furnished a mode of resistance and a source of Jewish pride to many who felt themselves persecuted, either in their own persons or by proxy, in America. Such a distinguished American Jew as Justice Louis D. Brandeis of the United States Supreme Court felt his first call to Jewish allegiance or action in middle age, when he became an active Zionist and the president of the Zionist Organization of America. This influence operated on great numbers of Jews in the United States during the time of anti-Semitism abroad, and on still more during the period of anti-Semitism here. Anti-Semitism is a great incentive to Jewish loyalty, even as it disrupts the mind of the American people into conflicting groups.

4.

The most important reaction to anti-Semitism is the unconscious mode of response which we call the inferiority complex. Certainly the Jew has such a complex. He alternates boldness and timidity, because he is self-conscious in the presence of the non-Jew and therefore uncertain of himself. Jews change their names from land to land, assuming the Russian “witz” or the Polish “sky” for the previous German “sohn” as a patronymic—for all Jewish names were originally in the Hebrew form of [103] Isaac ben (son of) Abraham; but when they come to the United States the “witz” and “sky” are foreign and many of them are dropped in turn. The Hebrew Moses becomes the German Morris, and then the English Montague. This is partly due to the adoption of the standard of taste of the new environment, partly to the desire not to be too aggressively Jewish in externals. As Friedman shows:

In the present state of ignorance, I cannot state how much of the Jewish character is hereditary and how much environmental, or how much of the latter is due to the inferiority complex and hence to anti-Semitism. Certainly there must be many traits of this origin. Thomas Babington Macaulay made this discovery in 1833, when he argued in the House of Commons in favor of removing civil disabilities from the Jews of England.

Ludwig Lewisohn finds exactly such an artificial case in the German-Americans during the World War:

[104] To which the Jew retorts:

Professor Miller generalizes this into a theory of “oppression psychosis,” mentioned above:

Besides the pathology of the case, Miller here indicates two modes of adjustment, the success motive and the religious motive. The former can be seen clearly in the Jewish students, who are largely excluded from social and athletic leadership in the colleges, and whose response is to excel wherever possible in scholarship. It appears in the medieval Jew who was placed outside the feudal system and consequently had no feudal loyalties, but established the first international financial connections; or in the Jew of some of the modern hyper-nationalistic countries of Europe, who is excluded from public life and finds his outlet in Zionism. Finally, and most important of all historically, the Jew has found his compensation in his religion. He was the Chosen People, he had the sacred Torah, he kept the festivals, obeyed the commandments of God; in the home and the synagog he was priest and king, whatever might be his [105] beatings or his cringings without. Conversely, the growing indifference to Judaism today is both an adaptation to the new modes of thought the world over, and a relaxing of intensity of Jewish loyalty in the countries where the penalties for that loyalty are themselves relaxed.

The religious interpretation of this status is very ancient. The Bible speaks of the Jews as a “peculiar people”; “a kingdom of priests and a holy nation.” And the Talmud says:

The famous fifty-second chapter of Isaiah with its marvelous conception of the Suffering Servant of the Lord, is again a picture of the Jewish people, persecuted and oppressed, but finding its purpose and its compensation in its religious message, which in the Messianic age was to convince and to overawe the world.

Perhaps I can best summarize this view in the words of Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, whose “Israel among the Nations” some thirty years ago marked a new treatment of the Jewish question by a Christian writer. This book contains a chapter on the Psychology of the Jew, in which he develops the idea of the influence of the milieu on the Jewish character:

[106] 5.

The various theories and groupings of Jewry today may be regarded from the viewpoint of responses to the total environment, of which anti-Semitism is one of the important factors. On this basis neither Zionism nor reform Judaism can be regarded directly as a reply to anti-Semitism, but both are this among other things, for both are modes of response to the environment, with its Jewish and its non-Jewish factors. Two such responses are religious—the orthodox and the reform; two are racial and national—the assimilationist and the Zionist. From another standpoint, two are modes of adjustment to the environment—assimilation and reform; two are modes of resistance to the environment—Zionism and orthodoxy. Or, more precisely, assimilation is a racial adjustment to the non-Jewish environment; reform Judaism a religious adjustment; Zionism is a racial and national resistance to the environment; and orthodoxy a religious resistance. Obviously, the four are not unrelated, but many individuals adopt more than one of them as guides in various fields of thought and behavior.

Assimilation of the Jew to his environment, which involves abandonment of the group life, is an individual, not a group response. It attracts individuals in considerable numbers from the extreme right and left wings of American Jewry, from the very wealthy who may adopt Christianity for social distinction, and from the proletarians who adopt an international economic and political theory. It cannot be a group response because if great masses of Jews were to join any other church, or any other national or social grouping, they would do it as Jews still—we would then have churches of Hebrew Christians, or a Jewish wing for the Socialist party (as in Russia), but not the absorption in the environment which the assimilationist considers the solution of the Jewish problem. One point is true in the assimilationist theory—if there were no Jewish group, there would be no anti-Semitism. It is equally true that if there were no groups of human beings, there would be no intolerance. But such a condition is impossible. Man is a social being, and the tradition, [107] the ideals, and the life of his own group hold him too firmly to be escaped except by the smallest minority.

116 Assimilation may be social or biological in character, and the radical adoption of it would involve both phases. Intermarriage, the biological side of assimilation, is actually going on now, but to a much smaller extent among the Jews than among any other immigrant group in America. Drachsler worked out the proportion of intermarriages among 100,000 marriages in New York City of all races, and found that approximately 14 per cent. of these were intermarriages. Among all white groups, however, the Jews presented the smallest proportion of intermarriages, 1.17 per cent., ranging from less than half of 1 per cent. among Rumanian Jews, to 5 per cent. among German Jews, and 6.5 per cent. among French Jews. The age-old tradition against marriage outside of the group, together with the anti-Semitic spirit without, have conspired to prevent this type of assimilation even now. And while the second generation of Jews in America shows far more intermarriages than the first, the proportion is still extremely low—.64 per cent. for the first generation, and 4.5 per cent. for the second. And for a more assimilated section of Jewry, such as the German Jews, the difference between first and second generations is much less marked.

The directly opposite theory to assimilation is Zionism, the attempt to revive Jewish group life in the ancient homeland of the Jew, to restore the Hebrew tongue, erect a Jewish educational system, Jewish culture, and Jewish agriculture and industry as well. The connection of this movement with anti-Semitism is evident from its origin in the mind of Theodore Herzl, a Viennese correspondent in Paris, directly after he had observed the Dreyfus case, and his whole Weltanshauung was thereby transformed. Zionism is the same answer to the problems of internationalism and civilization that we see in all the new nationalities of Europe, in Ireland, Czecho-Slovakia and Poland. It has achieved a measure of success that is really astonishing in view of the slight resources and organization behind [108] it. At the same time, it makes no pretension toward furnishing an eventual home for all the Jewish people, especially not for those of the United States and other lands of freedom. Zionism aims to save the persecuted Jews by finding for many of them a shelter; it aims, moreover, to solve the double problem of anti-Semitism and the inferiority complex by giving the Jewry of the world a source of pride in the form of a national home. To many thinkers this seems the only answer under present conditions.

Friedman’s whole thesis is that Zionism is the logical and final solution.

Orthodoxy in Judaism is the attempt to maintain the Jewish group by means of the religious and customary behavior which has operated successfully for that end since the destruction of the Jewish commonwealth in 70 A. D. It is conservative; it finds its chief values, not in the national, but in the religious life; and it endeavors to hold its group intact by a traditional ritual which possesses a profound emotional appeal and establishes certain habits of life. It is the appeal to loyalty and to group stability, and parallels similar conservative movements in many Christian denominations, though with the stronger urge of a longer and more bitter history of persecution.

[109] Finally, there is a theory of group adaptation, best developed institutionally by the reform and conservative synagogs, but also in many non-religious organizations—social clubs, Young Men’s Hebrew Associations (the very name an imitation), labor unions, and the like. Not that these various parties are identical; as a matter of fact, they have practically nothing in common except the incorporation in their philosophies of the two elements—Jewish tradition and modern adaptation; but the conservative and reform statements—of adaptation, of tradition, and of the relation between the two—present profound differences both in theory and in practical details of application. This adjustment is not as yet entirely successful, but has developed a number of useful responses, by which Jews are managing to preserve their group identity and at the same time to enter as constituent members into the American group mind. It is still in a transition period, but the synthesis is being worked out clearly enough for our purposes. In the synagog it involves the reading of part of the prayers in English, as well as Hebrew, the beautification of the service by modern music, both vocal and instrumental, the incorporation of a sermon in English, a modern system of religious education, and a development of the social life of the young people by clubs, classes and recreational means. Without the synagog, it involves a type of “Modernism,” intellectual and moral. Even in the group which endeavors to be most orthodox, it is finding its way in the form of social surveys, modern methods in Hebrew education, and some sort of working compromise with the community custom of Sunday observance, the English language and the eating of non-kosher food. The nature of this adjustment is clear from the fact that every separate item has a different solution. The great majority of Jews work on the traditional Sabbath, due to the combined social and economic pressure; they universally are adopting English as their daily speech, but the majority of them have not yet admitted English into the ritual of the synagog; all those who really care to do so maintain the Jewish dietary laws in their own homes, though very few (comparatively) go so far as to refuse to enter a restaurant where the dishes are washed with soap, or to refuse to drink wine made by gentiles [110] of which a libation might have been made to idols. At the same time, the Hebrew education, so long an integral part of Jewish life, has been completely revolutionized from the unsystematic private or charity instruction of Russia to the large, well organized schools for daily Hebrew instruction at the close of the public school day, whose method is largely copied from that of the American public school. 121

We are witnessing before our eyes a group adjustment on a large scale to modern thought, to American customs, to the non-Jewish group. Some of this adjustment is systematic, based on a theory of Jewish life as a distinct religion among Americans of other religions. Some of it is economic and social, either without theory or directly against the orthodox theory of the adjusters themselves. At the same time, we are witnessing orthodoxy fighting for group solidarity; Zionism establishing a Jewish group in a distant land; the assimilationists who escape as individuals from the burden and the odium of being Jews. Each theory is today being tried out in practice, and the results of each will in time be demonstrated. At the same time, each theory of Jewish life implies a corresponding conception of America and of human groups as a whole.

1.

The ideal of most social thinkers has been that of uniformity, absence of parties and swallowing of groups in a common loyalty.

Uniformity and unity within, hostility and spoils from without—this is the old ideal of the happy society, founded on the patriotism of the little Greek cities in their petty isolation.

But now this point of view of the state, appropriate in its origin, is applied uncritically to a great modern nation, with a hundred cities larger than any one of ancient Greece, with its inhabitants drawn from the ends of the earth—such a nation shall also present a uniformity of blood, speech and loyalty. What is the method by which such an end can be achieved? What is the theory by which such an end can be justified?

Dr. I. Berkson in his “Theories of Americanization” has developed in detail four types of theory for the relation of the sub-groups, especially the immigrant sub-groups, to the American nation. Of these the first two imply uniformity, “Americanization” by imposing the social and cultural standards of the Anglo-Saxon group on the newer arrivals; the “Melting-Pot” by which uniformity is to be achieved through a general admixture and intermingling, racial or social. The viewpoint of Americanization has been mentioned previously in this study—the view that the United States ought to be a homogeneous [112] people, and that the proper standard of homogeneity is that of the white, Protestant, gentile group, of Anglo-Saxon origin. The newer arrivals are expected to forget their native languages and habits, to throw off their former loyalties, to copy the standards of life which they see already established in this country. The new loyalty is conceived as antagonistic to the old; the demands of democracy that the new citizen also shall express himself are quite disregarded. The rapidity of the process of intermarriage among many immigrant groups, and the still greater speed of social adaptation and assimilation are evidences that this theory has something in its favor. The awakening group loyalties which its repressive methods arouse show definitely that it has not the final word. As Lewis S. Gannet put it:

A variation of this, which posits uniformity, but not the uniformity of one group imposed on all the rest, is the Melting-Pot theory. The term was fathered by Israel Zangwill, who made the young Jewish immigrant exclaim:

Something of the same view seems to be voiced by John J. Smertenko:

The Melting Pot theory marks an advance over the Americanization theory in its treatment of the immigrant, not in its conception of the United States. Uniformity, physical or social or both, is taken as the sine qua non of group unity, like-mindedness as its minimum. But many ethnic groups, religious groups and others, wish to maintain their identity in their new home. Democracy would allow them to do so. The group theory of American life—which I have already elaborated historically and in the present, would not merely allow this, but take it as the only normal way in which an over-group of a hundred million people can ever hope to attain the unity of a group mind.

2.

The first form of such a theory is called by Dr. Berkson the “Federation of Nationalities.” It is modelled after the Federal government, which is a union of self-governing states. In the same way, as geographical units grow steadily less important and functional units more important in our national life, the same conception of federation was applied to these. The Soviet government has taken national control as a function of a federation of economic interests; the federation of nationalities view takes it as a federation of ethnic and religious groups. Our greater cities are now beginning to establish this sort of an appearance. They have Italian quarters, Jewish quarters, Negro quarters, even an American quarter, restricted to families whose acceptability can be approved and vouched for. The advocate of this theory holds that races are unchangeable—“a man cannot change his grandfather,” they say—the best that they can do is to live in amity within the same general national boundaries. Now, it is true that groupings based on heredity and on interest are growing increasingly important, as compared with the geographical groupings which once meant so much. Only in the old families, whose associations with a particular state have persisted for generations, is much state sentiment left among us. On the other hand, the Catholic, the Bohemian, the [114] German, the Jew—every national and religious group has enduring loyalties. And the new economic groupings, labor, capital, the commercial class, the trade association, are developing their own group minds more rapidly than we can easily note.

The danger of this theory, however, is as obvious as its partial justification. It would make for the stability of what is actually fluid. All groups take more than they give when they enter a great mass of other groups, such as the United States. Immigrant communities in the United States are changing constantly, due to imitation—the Federation theory would establish them in the fixity of conflict and opposition. It would result, on the one hand, in permanent immigrant groups, with little participation in the general American group mind; on the other, in permanent groups of protest, such as the Ku Klux Klan. Carried to its logical extreme, it would give us the situation of the Levant, where a half dozen different races and religions, represented in the same village, preserve their isolation and their enmity for a thousand years.

3.

Both the old Americans, who insist on American unity, and the newer immigrants, who see and love their own group identity, have taken hold of real elements in the total situation, but neither has envisaged the social process as a whole. It is true that ethnic and religious groups are distinct in America, both racially and socially; on the whole, the Jew refuses to intermarry with the gentile, the white with the Negro, a prohibition that in the Southern states is reinforced by law. Similarly, the Irishman preserves his loyalty and his interest in the struggle for Irish liberty; the Italian and Greek reservists return to their native lands when called for military duty; the Jew raises huge sums for the relief of his fellow-Jews across the seas. But at the same time, all these groups were ready to unite in a common purpose when the United States was at war. Every immigrant group, as every native group, daily sacrifices its own purpose in a crucial problem for the greater welfare of the United States. The double process, which we have traced in [115] the formulation of the Constitution of the United States and in subsequent history, is constantly going on—the entrance of new groups into the United States, and their incorporation into the American group. This is what Dr. Berkson calls the “community” theory, Professor Miller, “proportional loyalty,” and many other thinkers by other terms, a point of view toward which social theory and political thought is constantly tending; one which we may call, in the terms employed in this study, the integration of sub-groups into the American group mind by the sacrifice of their own purpose for that of the United States as a whole.

This theory recognizes the necessary and proper existence of the sub-groups, whether family, religious, racial or ethnic units. Human beings live naturally in comparatively small units, which can be easily recognized and whose loyalty is habitual (some would even claim, instinctive). These groups then join with others into larger units of synthesis, by accepting the common purpose of the whole in place of the conflicting purposes of each. Just as the individual becomes a loyal member of a family, the family of a Protestant church or a Jewish people, so that church or ethnic unit becomes, in turn, a unit in the larger whole of the American people. Group intolerance is thus sacrificed to America in increasing proportion and scope; while group individuality preserves the democratic ideal by which a man is an end in himself. The personal satisfactions and welfare of the immigrants themselves cannot be advanced by compelling them to give up everything they hold dear—instead, the attempt will prove subversive of the hoped-for unity by the usual result of group resistance. But all these values can be retained in a higher synthesis, a gradation of loyalties, an integration of minds in a true group mind.

The traditional Hebrew phrases for the Jewish people are Am Israel , the People of Israel, and Keneseth Israel , the Congregation of Israel—grasping thus both the racial and spiritual elements in one conception. To quote Berkson:

Professor Dewey put the matter similarly:

Dr. Drachsler represents the same point of view:

But, many will say, does this theory erect conflicting loyalties? Can they be reconciled? The answer to this is in terms of proportional loyalties. I quote Professor Miller’s summary:

Among these international values he finds the religious, economic and cultural ones, all of which transcend the nation, either by being wider or narrower, belonging to a sub-group or to humanity.

4.

This integration of groups need not stop at the nation as at present constituted, as is hinted in the last citation. The nation is itself an integration of groups, and can enter into other integrations, which include it or which cross it with different lines of interest and of grouping. In the words of U. G. Weatherly:

To return to Miller for another phrase:

There is no beginning and no end to the growth and the organization of the mind. Beginning with the individual and the family, we may analyze the elements which enter into these elementary mental units, or we may observe the mounting synthesis to the city, state and nation; or, following other lines of interest and of affiliation, to the movements of world culture, religion and economic organization, in their world-wide bearing. The nation is formed by a synthesis of its sub-groups; and the nation, in turn, enters into a wider synthesis to form the nascent but still growing conception of mankind. The mind of the many groups of Americans yield up their purposes, when called upon, for the greater unity—greater not only in size, but in richness, variety and tradition—that constitutes the mind of America. The future will mark the growing unity in diversity of the American group mind; the mounting beauty of its many-colored canvas, the increasing harmony of its many-throated symphony. At the same time, America will become more and more a part of a still greater synthesis, the group mind that will transcend the selfish purpose of the nation in such common purposes as the struggle against the adverse forces of nature; the organization of men for welfare and for culture; the prevention of that ancient group intolerance, which means the destruction of many small groups and the standardization and impoverishment of many great ones. The fulfillment of the prophet’s vision will be at hand when groups of men will not strive to destroy each other but to fulfill each other, when the sub-group will not undermine but serve the greater unity, when the ultimate vision of every struggling group of men, be it small or great, will be to serve the purpose of the whole, to enter into the mind of humanity, the ideal of God.

• Franz Boaz , The Mind of Primitive Man.
• Paul Barth , Die Philosphie der Geschichte als Soziologie.
• I. Berkson , Theories of Americanization.
• James Mark Baldwin , Social and Ethical Interpretations.
• Sir Martin Conway , The Crowd in Peace and War.
• Sanford H. Cobb , The Rise of Religious Liberty in America.
• Susan L. Davis , Authentic History of the Ku Klux Klan.
• William Durant , Philosophy and the Social Problem.
• Julius Drachsler , Democracy and Assimilation.
• John Dewey , Reconstruction in Philosophy.
• William Ray Dennes , Method and Presuppositions of Group Psychology.
• Charles A. Ellwood , Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects.
• M. Fishberg , The Jews, a Study in Race and Environment.
• C. R. Fish , Development of American Nationality.
• Elisha M. Friedman , Survival or Extinction.
• Jean Finot , Race Prejudice.
• Morris Ginsberg , The Psychology of Society.
• Gumplowitz , Der Rassenkampf.
• E. B. Greene , Foundations of American Nationality.
• Paul Goodman , The Synagog and the Church.
• Burton J. Hendrick , The Jews in America.
• The International Jew , 4 vol.
• Joseph Jacobs , Contributions of the Jew to Civilization.
• Aurel Kolnai , Psychoanalysis and Sociology.
• B. Lazare , Anti-Semitism.
• Walter Lippman , Public Opinion.
• Le Bon , Le Foule.
• E. C. Lindeman , Social Discovery.
• John M. Mecklin , The Ku Klux Klan.
• Everett D. Martin , The Behavior of Crowds.
• Herbert A. Miller , Races, Nations and Classes.
• William MacDougall , Introduction to Social Psychology.
• William MacDougall , The Group Mind.
• Charles Platt , Psychology of Social Life.
• The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion.
• Max Raisin , History of the Jews in Modern Times.
• Melvin G. Rigg , 2d, Theories of the Obligation of Citizen to State.
• J. H. Robinson , The Mind in the Making.
• Edward A. Ross , Social Control.
• Josiah Royce , Philosophy of Loyalty.
• The Reference Shelf: Ku Klux Klan.
• The Reference Shelf: Restriction of Immigration.
• John Spargo , The Jew and American Ideals.
• [120] Nathaniel S. Shailer , The Neighbor.
• Maurice Samuel , You Gentiles.
• Oscar Straus , The American Spirit.
• Philip Schaff , Church and State in the United States.
• Edgar A. Singer , Jr., Mind as Behavior.
• Edgar A. Singer , Jr., Modern Thinkers and Present Problems.
• Gabriel Tarde , Les lois de l’imitation.
• W. Trotter , Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War.
• Frank Tannenbaum , Darker Phases of the South.
• J. M. Williams , Principles of Social Psychology.
• Peter Wiernick , History of the Jews in America.
• Lucien Wolf , The Myth of the Jewish Menace in World Affairs.
• Israel Zangwill , The Voice of Jerusalem.
• American Journal of Sociology, May 1924.
• Allport: Group Fallacy in Relation to Social Science.
• Kantor: Institutional Foundation of a Scientific Social Psychology.
• American Journal of Sociology, Jan. 1925.
• Bohn: The Ku Klux Klan Interpreted.
• American Journal of Sociology, Jan. 1911.
• George E. Vincent: The Rivalry of Groups.
• B’nai B’rith Magazine, Oct., Nov. 1924.
• J. Speransky: My Adventures with Radicals.
• B’nai B’rith Magazine, 1922 and ’23.
• A series on the Ku Klux Klan, with statements by its Grand Wizard.
• Hearst’s International Magazine, 1922 and ’23.
• A series on anti-Semitism; another on the Ku Klux Klan.
• Jewish Social Service Quarterly, Nov. 1924.
• Drachsler: Jewish Communal Life in the United States.
• The Menorah Journal, Nov. 1924.
• Erwin Edman: Race and Culture. Frequent articles on similar topics.
• The Nation, 1923 and ’24.
• A series of 10 articles on anti-Semitism.
• Publications of the American Sociological Society, Vol XVIII.
• U. G. Weatherly: Racial Pessimism.
• Harry F. Ward: Repression of Civil Liberties.
• John A. Ryan: Intolerance: Causes and Lessons.